PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
operatives then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and
HON. LAGUIO, JR. and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN
Petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside
the resolutionRegional Trial Court of Manila granting private
respondent Lawrence C. Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and
acquitting him of the three (3) criminal charges filed against
him.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On the night of May 16, 1996, the police operatives of
the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC)
arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain
Arellano, for unlawful possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
The investigation of the three arrested persons revealed
that their sources of Shabu were, Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio. An entrapment operation was then set for the arrest of
Teck and Junio. The two were arrested while they were about
to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and
company.
Questioned, Teck and Junio informed the police
operatives that they were working for Lawrence Wang. They
also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu
early the following morning and that their employer (Wang)
could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate,
Manila.
The police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed
light on the illegal drug activities of Teck and Junio. The police
placed the same under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Coronel testified
that at about 2:10 a.m. of 17 May 1996, Wang, who was
described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment
and walked towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he,
together with three other police officers approached Wang,
introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name
and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately
frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of
the BMW car. The search resulted to the discovery of an
unlicensed pistol, several plastic bags of shabu. Then and there,
the police operatives arrested Wang but the latter resisted the
warrantless arrest and search.
Wang was then charged with violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, Illegal Possession of Firearms and
COMELEC Gun Ban.
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter
a plea to all the Informations and instead interposed a
continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence
obtained by the police operatives. Thus, the trial court ordered
that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him. Thereafter, joint
trial of the three (3) consolidated cases followed.
Trial pursued and the prosecution rested its case and
Wang filed Demurrer to Evidence which Hon. Laguio, Jr.
granted and acquitted him of all charges for lack of evidence.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari by the People of
the Philippines.
Held:
The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the
prosecution may appeal the trial court’s resolution granting
Wang’s demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the
charges against him without violating the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy; and (b) whether there
was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in
this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a
search warrant.
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case,
namely, the warrantless arrest and the warrantless search.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a
peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant: (a) when
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)
when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it, and (c) when the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
None of these circumstances were present when the
accused was arrested. The accused was merely walking from
the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked
BMW car when the police officers arrested and frisked him and
searched his car. The accused was not committing any visible
offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an indication
that he was about to commit a crime or that he had just
committed an offense.
Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in
flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled
that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within
the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph
(b) of Section 5. What is clearly established from the
testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested
mainly on the information that he was the employer of Teck
and Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal
transport of shabu. And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does
not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial
court, is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the
warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise
unlawful.
The People’s contention that Wang waived his right
against unreasonable search and seizure has no factual basis.
While we agree in principle that consent will validate an
otherwise illegal search, however, based on the evidence on
record, Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his person
and belongings. The implied acquiescence to the search, if
there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee. Moreover, the continuing
objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of
record during the arraignment bolsters Wang’s claim that he
resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
We cannot close this ponencia without a word of
caution: those who are supposed to enforce the law are not
justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name
of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As
Justice Holmes once said, "I think it is less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the government should play
an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to
violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated
is the Constitution itself.
VALDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure
without valid warrant is not only ancient. It is also zealously
safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence
obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still
it must be exercised and the law implemented without
contravening the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.
Facts:
Bautista testified that during the night of March 17,
2003, he was conducting the routine patrol along the National
Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union
together with Aratas and Ordoño when they noticed petitioner,
lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus.
The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared
suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something. They
thus approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run
away. They chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter
brought him to the house of Barangay Captain Orencio
Mercado (Mercado) where he, as averred by Bautista, was
ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioner’s bag allegedly
contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant
and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and
cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the police
station for further investigation.
The petitioner, on the other hand, denied the charges
against him. According to him, as he was walking, prosecution
witness Ordoño approached him and asked where he was
going. Petitioner replied that he was going to his brother’s
house. Ordoño then purportedly requested to see the contents
of his bag and appellant acceded. It was at this point that
Bautista and Aratas joined them. After inspecting all the
contents of his bag, petitioner testified that he was restrained
by the tanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It was Aratas
who carried the bag until they reached their destination.
Petitioner maintained that at Mercado’s house, his bag was
opened by the tanod and Mercado himself. They took out an
item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to be
marijuana leaves.
Petitioner was then charged with violation of R.A. No.
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.

The RTC convicted the accused. Aggrieved, he
appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals but
the appellate court affirmed the challenged decision. Thus, this
appeal.
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and
asserts that the warrantless arrest effected against him by the
barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of
his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law.
Held:
To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in
evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the
search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The
search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is justified only
if it were incidental to a lawful arrest.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides the only occasions on which a person may be arrested
without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the
arresting barangay tanod, not one of these circumstances was
obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own
admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the time
he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then
committing an offense. The tanod did not have probable cause
either to justify petitioner’s warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate,
this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.
Here, petitioner’s act of looking around after getting off
the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his
destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the
tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be
construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal
knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually
engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity.
 It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking
the street at night, after being closely observed and then later
tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their
approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must
not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt.
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that
they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite
suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his
warrantless arrest.
Accordingly, petitioner’s waiver of his right to question
his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken
during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him
as they were seized during a warrantless search which was not
lawful. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also
mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during
an illegal warrantless arrest.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which
may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to
validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the
consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear
and convincing evidence. The question whether consent to a
search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
Even granting that petitioner admitted to opening his
bag when Ordoño asked to see its contents, his implied
acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and hence, is considered no consent at all within
the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee. As a result,
petitioner’s lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a
voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
NG YIK BUN, ET AL.
Facts:
On the night of August 24, 2000, Capt. Ibon of Task
Force Aduana received information from an operative that
there was an ongoing shipment of contraband in Barangay
Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon Province. Consequently, Capt. Ibon
formed a team and then proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in
Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya.
The members of the team were able to observe the
goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters.
They spotted six Chinese-looking men loading bags containing
a white substance into a white van. Having been noticed, Capt.
Ibon identified his team and asked accused-appellant Hwan
what they were loading on the van. Hwan replied that it was
shabu and pointed, when probed further, to accused-appellant
Raymond Tan as the leader. A total of 172 bags of suspected
shabu were then confiscated. Bundles of noodles (bihon) were
also found on the premises.
Accused-appellants were then charged with violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Accused-appellants all
maintained their innocence but the RTC convicted all the
accused-appellants of the crime charged.
Accused-appellants questioned the RTC Decision before the
CA but the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the lower
court. Hence, this appeal.
Essentially, accused-appellants claim that no valid in
flagrante delicto arrest was made prior to the seizure and that
the police officers placed accused-appellants under arrest even
when there was no evidence that an offense was being
committed. Since there was no warrant of arrest, they argue
that the search sans a search warrant subsequently made on
them was illegal. They contend that a seizure of any evidence
as a result of an illegal search is inadmissible in any proceeding
for any purpose.
Held:
On the issue of warrantless arrest, it is apropos to
mention what the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution
provides in part:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the
aforequoted provision is that of an arrest made during the
commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant. Such
warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. The aforementioned exception is referred to as
arrest in flagrante delicto.
In the instant case, contrary to accused-appellants’
contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in
flagrante delicto. Consider the circumstances immediately
prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants:
(1) the police officers received information from an
operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband;
(2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to
Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon;
(3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a
distance of around 50 meters; and
(4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading
transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-
300 van.
Evidently, the arresting police officers had probable
cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and
transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being
accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and
pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accused-
appellants––who were caught in flagrante delicto of
possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van,
shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as amended--––is
valid.
As aptly noted by the appellate court, the crime was
committed in the presence of the police officers with the
contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view
and duly observed by the arresting officers.
And to write finis to the issue of any irregularity in their
warrantless arrest, the Court notes, as it has consistently held,
that accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their
objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before
entering their plea.
Moreover, present in the instant case are all the
elements of illegal possession of drugs: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said
drug.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENDAYA y LAIG
On November 11, 2002, police operatives of
Mataasnakahoy Police Station, acting on a report from a
barangay official that appellant is involved in illegal drug
activities, conducted surveillance operations on appellant. A
week of surveillance confirmed the veracity of the report.
Hence, a team of police officers was formed to perform
a buy-bust operation against appellant. A civilian asset, armed
with five (5) pieces of P100.00 bills as marked money, acted as
poseur-buyer.
On board a car, the police operatives and the civilian
asset proceeded to the place of operation: the Golden Luck
Beer Garden. The civilian asset then alighted from the vehicle
and proceeded on foot to the establishment where appellant
was a regular customer. In the meantime, the buy-bust team
positioned themselves at a place outside the restaurant not far
from where the civilian asset was.
Appellant subsequently arrived and approached the
civilian asset, who was standing in front of the beer house. The
two talked for a while, after which, the police operatives saw
the civilian asset hand the marked money to appellant who, in
turn, handed something to the former which later turned out to
be a plastic sachet containing shabu.
After receiving the plastic sachet from appellant, the
civilian asset made the pre-arranged signal of touching his head
to signify that the transaction had been completed. The police
officers then immediately approached appellant, introduced
themselves as police officers and informed him that he is under
arrest for selling shabu. Further search of the appellant’s body
yielded another eight (8) plastic sachets of shabu.
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against
him. He claimed that while drinking beer inside the
establishment, two police officers approached him and invited
him to go out with them to the police car. Appellant obliged,
but as he was about to get into the car, a police officer punched
him in the stomach and pushed him inside the car. It was then,
according to appellant, when the police officers started their
threats to kill him unless he reveals to them the name of the
drug pusher in the area. In reply to their threats, appellant told
them that he did not know anyone selling drugs.
Appellant alleged that they drove around the
municipality of Mataasnakahoy, circling it three times before
the police officers brought him to the police station. At the
police station, he was immediately put in jail but he was unable
to ask the reason for his imprisonment because one of the
police officers punched him again. When he was subsequently
taken out of his cell, the police officers led him to a table where
they showed him plastic sachets containing shabu allegedly
found in his wallet.
The RTC convicted the accused for the violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. On appeal, the appellate
court sustained the findings of the lower court. Hence, this
appeal.
Held:
Appellant’s guilt for illegal sale and illegal possession
of shabu was proven beyond reasonable.
The sachets of shabu not fruits of poisonous tree; hence,
admissible in evidence against appellant.
Appellant continued to crave for acquittal claiming that,
assuming without conceding that he had in fact sold and
possessed the plastic sachets of shabu, they cannot be admitted
in evidence for being fruits of a poisonous tree, having been
obtained after an unlawful arrest and search.
Appellant’s insistence on the illegality of his
warrantless arrest lacks merit. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court allows a warrantless arrest under any of the following
circumstances:
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful – A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In this case, the arrest of appellant was effected under
paragraph (a) or what is termed "in flagrante delicto.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in
flagrante delictounder paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Rule,
two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.
Here, the police officers personally witnessed the
exchange between appellant and the poseur-buyer of the
marked money and the plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance which subsequently tested positive for
shabu. At the time he was arrested, therefore, appellant was
clearly committing a crime in full view of the buy-bust team.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ADRIANO y SALES
Police Officer Morales testified that acting on a report
received from a barangay official and an informant that
Adriano was selling drugs in North Daang Hari, Taguig City.
Police Chief Inspector Calagan then formed a team to conduct
a buy-bust operation to entrap Adriano, designating PO1
Morales as the poseur-buyer, and marking the buy-bust money
consisting of ten P100.00 bills with the initials "PC".
After briefing, PO1 Morales, together with the
informant and his team, proceeded to North Daang Hari where
PO1 Morales bought P200.00 worth of shabu from Adriano.
Upon giving Adriano the marked money and after receiving a
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, PO1
Morales signaled his team to arrest Adriano. PO2 Fabroa
immediately arrested Adriano. The marked money confiscated
from Adriano was brought to the police station for
investigation, while the plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance was brought to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory.
On the other hand, the defense presented Adriano, who
testified that on 22 October 2008, at around 10:00 p.m., he was
at home, putting his nephews and nieces to sleep when
suddenly two (2) armed men barged into the house and dragged
him outside and forcibly took him to the police station in
Taguig City. It was only when they arrived at the police station
when he learned that he was arrested for illegal sale of shabu.
Adriano was then charged with illegal sale of shabu
under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. The RTC
found Adriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Hence, this appeal.
Held:
The appeal before us maintained that the lower courts
gravely erred in not finding the warrantless arrest on the person
of Adriano as illegal and in convicting Adriano.
With regard to the warrantless arrest, the defense’s
contention that the buy-bust team should have procured a
search warrant for the validity of the buy-bust operation is
misplaced.
Warrantless arrests are allowed in three (3) instances as
provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful – A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Based on the above provision, Adriano was arrested
pursuant to Section 5(a), which provides that a person may be
arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." In the case
at bar, Adriano was caught in the act of committing an offense,
in flagrante delicto, when Adriano was caught selling illegal
shabu through a buy-bust operation, within the plain view of
the arresting officers.
A buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment, in
which the violator is caught in flagrante delicti and the police
officers conducting the operation are not only authorized but
duty-boundto apprehend the violator and to search him for
anything that may have been part of or used in the commission
of the crime."
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in
recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of
apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to
commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody
inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If carried out
with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-
bust operation deserves judicial sanction.
Finally, the arresting officers enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their official duties. The
presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence. However, in the case at bar, the defense failed to
present any proof to substantiate its imputation of ill-motive on
the part of the arresting officers. Contrarily, the prosecution
duly proved the existence of the two elements ofthe crime of
illegal sale of shabu and established the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items. The presumption of
regularity in favor of the arresting officers prevails.
PESTILOS, ET AL. vs. GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
On February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning,
an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty.
Generoso at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon
City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.
Atty. Generoso called the Batasan Hills Police Stationto
report the incident. Acting on this report, Desk Officer
Monsalve dispatched SP02 Javier to go to the scene of the
crime and to render assistance. SP02 Javier, together with
augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Sayson and
Airman Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one
hour after the alleged altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso
badly beaten.
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those
who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite"
the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.
The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan
Hills Police Station. At the inquest proceeding, the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed
Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso
fortunately survived the attack.
The petitioners were then indicted for attempted
murder.
The petitioners then filed an Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not been
lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest
took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge
that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed
that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the
inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for
preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant
to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC denied the petitioners' Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation. The petitioners challenged
the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari but to no avail, hence, the present petition.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not
lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued; they went
to the police station only as a response to the arresting officers'
invitation.
Held:
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the
RTC Order. The criminal proceedings against the petitioners
should now proceed.
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure was further amended with the incorporation of the
word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's
determination on whether the person to be arrested has
committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
“When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it.”
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the
previously subjective determination of the arresting officer as
to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person
sought to be arrested committed the crime.
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first,
an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting
officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these
elements separately below, starting with the element of
probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has
just been committed, and the arresting officer's personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed the crime.
First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the
"objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting officer
shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his
personal knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the
person to be arrested has committed the crime.
In determining the existence of probable cause, the
arresting officer should make a thorough investigation and
exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the
factual basis supporting a probable cause assessment are not
less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case
where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable
cause determination of a warrantless arrest is based on
information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of
the arrest and not on the information acquired later.
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not
certainty is the determinant of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to
the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon which
reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question
to be determined in each case in light of the particular
circumstances and the particular offense involved.
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may
rely on all the information in his possession, his fair inferences
therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not
meet the requirements of showing probable cause to arrest
without warrant especially if it is a mere general suspicion.
Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information
as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may
rely on information supplied by a witness or a victim of a
crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need
not verify such information.
Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113: The
crime has just been committed/personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the
validity of the warrantless arrest of the present petitioners, the
question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid
warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1)
has the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2)
did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3)
based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer
possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a
reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the
attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the
petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.
There was a valid warrantless arrest.
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because
it has misapprehended the facts in its decision.
From a review of the records, we conclude that the
police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances upon which they had properly determined
probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against the
petitioners.
.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene
of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his
alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of
the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the
alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso
and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified
the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and,
notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the
same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners
were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny
their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although
they narrated a different version of what transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police
officers gathered and which they have personally observed less
than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene
of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we
deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the
petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well
within the police officers' observation, perception and
evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances
qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are
within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the
warrantless arrests.
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just
committed under the terms of the above-cited provision, does
not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was
being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the
police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be
arrested has recently committed the crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing,
particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion, the
personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-
the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and
warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper.
Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor
conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
RAYRAY Y AREOLA
Facts:
In the morning of September 12, 1986, P/Lt. Ancheta
was at the Friendly Shop located at Ortega St., San Fernando,
La Union, when accused-appellant Jose Rayray y Areola
approached him offering to sell marijuana. Making the latter
believe that he was interested in buying, Lt. Ancheta asked
where the merchandise was and accused-appellant responded
by taking marijuana wrapped in komiks from his pocket.
Catching sight of the marijuana fruiting tops and
marijuana cigarette being offered him, Lt. Ancheta
immediately identified himself as a police officer, arrested
accused-appellant and brought him to the San Fernando Police
Station where he was turned-over to the desk officer, Sgt.
Carmelito Leyga, who entered the details of the arrest in the
police blotter.
Accused-appellant denied making the offer to sell and
instead testified that he was at Dodies' Fishing Supply at
Ortega Street with his friend Bonifacio Chan to buy fish hooks
when he was suddenly tapped on the shoulder by somebody
who whispered, "Don't try to involve somebody." After being
ordered to undress, he was made to face the stranger who was
holding something wrapped in paper and which he tried to pass
off as that of accused-appellant by saying, "You are selling
marijuana." Afterwards, accused-appellant was forced into a
tricycle, brought to the municipal jail and there incarcerated for
no reason.
The RTC convicted accused-appellant for violation of
RA 6425. Hence, this appeal.
Accused-appellant argues that his arrest was illegal
because P/Lt. Ancheta had no authority to arrest persons in San
Fernando, La Union, being then assigned at the Regional INP
Command in Baguio City.
Held:
 We cannot yield to appellant's view that just because
Lt. Ancheta was assigned in Baguio City he could not arrest
persons caught in the act of committing a crime in some other
place, especially so where he was the intended victim.
A policeman cannot callously set aside his essential
duty of apprehending criminal offenders and of keeping peace
and order on the shallow excuse that he is not in his place of
assignment. His responsibility to protect the public by
apprehending violators of the law, especially one caught in
flagrante delicto is not limited by territorial constraints. It
follows him wherever he goes.
Moreover, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure authorities a warrantless arrest,
otherwise called a citizen's arrest, "when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense."
ELIZA ABUAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
The Case for the Prosecution
On the morning May 5, 1998, SPO2 Gamboa and
SPO2 de Vera of the Calasiao Police Station received
information from a confidential informant that Abuan was
conducting illegal drug activities in her house at Barangay
Lasip, Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Acting on the said information, Gamboa and de Vera
conducted surveillance-monitoring operations on her residence,
three times for more than an hour. They saw more or less 20
people who were coming in and out of Abuan’s house.
According to the informant, these people were drug addicts and
Abuan was a known drug pusher.
On the same day, the officers, through SPO3 Cesar
Ramos, applied for a warrant to search the house of Abuan for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and the seizure
of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), weighing scale,
aluminum foil, and burner. To establish probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant, Ramos presented their informant,
Marissa Gorospe, who was subjected to searching questions by
the Executive Judge.
Gorospe testified that she was a resident of Barangay
Sapang, Manaoag, Pangasinan. She knew Abuan because they
were employed as dealers of Avon Cosmetics. Abuan was a
prominent personality in Barangay Lasip. She visited Abuan in
her house at least three to four times a week. That during her
visits, she observed that Abuan placed shabu inside plastic
bags. She also saw weighing scales and paraphernalias used in
sniffing shabu. Gorospe identified and affirmed the truth of the
contents of her deposition.
The Executive Judge found probable cause and issued Search.
On May 6, 1998, police operatives composed went to
Barangay Lasip to enforce the search warrant. However, before
proceeding to Abuan’s residence, the policemen invited
Barangay Captain Mangaliag and Kagawad Garcia of
Barangay Lasip to witness the search.
 Upon arriving at the premises, Barangay Captain
Mangaliag introduced the police officers to Abuan who
presented Search Warrant No. 98-62 to her. Abuan read the
warrant and permitted the officers to conduct the search. The
search resulted to the discovery of 57 sachets of suspected
shabu, one roll of aluminum foil and assorted luminous plastic
sachets in the drawer just beside Abuan’s bed.
The Case for the Accused
Abuan testified that she was jobless in 1998. She did
not know any person by the name of Marissa Gorospe. She did
not work for Avon Cosmetics nor used any of its products.
At around 8:30 a.m. on May 6, 1998, she was with her
two daughters when four armed men suddenly barged into their
house and declared a raid. The men searched her house for
about 10 to 15 minutes and turned up with nothing. Some of
the men went out of the house and boarded a jeepney. The men
again went into the bedroom and came out with powder placed
in a plastic.
Abuan insisted that the applicant failed to show
probable cause for the issuance of search warrant. According to
him, Marissa Gorospe is a fictitious person whose alleged
testimony is fabricated. That there is no such person who is a
resident Barangay Sapang, Manaoag, Pangasinan nor a person
employed as a dealer of Avon Cosmetics. She presented
witnesses to support this claim. Consequently, the search
warrant, according to him, is void and the substances and
paraphernalia confiscated by the policemen are inadmissible in
evidence.
On March 28, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision finding
accused guilty of the charge. On appeal, the CA sustained the
findings of the trial court. Hence, this present petition.
Held:
The Court is tasked to resolve the following threshold
issues: (a) whether petitioner waived her right to question
Search Warrant No. 98-62 and the admissibility of the
substances and paraphernalia and other articles confiscated
from her house based on said warrant; and (b) whether the
prosecution adduced evidence to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Petitioner Did not Waive Her Right to File a Motion To Quash
Search Warrant and for the Suppression of the Evidence Seized
by the Police Officers
The record shows that petitioner was ready to adduce
evidence in support of her motion, but the court declared that
this should be done during the trial. She likewise objected to
the admission of the search warrant and the evidence
confiscated by the police officers after the search was
conducted. It bears stressing that the trial court admitted the
same and she objected thereto. It cannot, therefore, be said that
petitioner waived her right to assail the search warrant and
object to the admissibility of the regulated drugs found in her
house.
Is Valid; the Articles, Paraphernalia and Regulated Drugs
Found in Petitioner’s Bedroom and Confiscated by the Police
Officers are Admissible in Evidence
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are:
(1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must
examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally
known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Probable cause is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.
The Judge in determining probable cause is to consider
the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by
a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality
of the circumstances standard.
The evidence presented by petitioner that Gorospe was
not a resident or transient of Barangay Sapang, even if true and
credible, is not at all material or necessary to the determination
of probable cause. Whether petitioner and Gorospe were
dealers of Avon Cosmetics as of May 5, 1998 may be relevant
to the issue of whether there was factual basis for the finding of
probable cause by the Executive Judge against petitioner;
however, petitioner’s evidence to prove his claim is tenuous
and does not warrant the quashal of Search Warrant No. 98-62
and the suppression of the evidence seized after the
enforcement of the search warrant.
DE LOS SANTOS-DIO vs. CA, ET AL.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DESMOND
Facts:
In 2001, petitioner De Los Santos-Dio, the majority
stockholder of H.S. Equities and authorized representative of
Westdale Assets was introduced to Desmond, the Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Subic Bay Marine
Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI), and the authorized
representative of Active Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc.
(JV China), the majority shareholder of SBMEI.
After some discussion on possible business ventures,
Dio, on behalf of HS Equities, decided to invest a total of
US$1,150,000.00 in a theme park to be constructed at the
Subic Bay Freeport Zone. Dio was then elected as a member of
SBMEI’s Board of Directors and further appointed as its
Treasurer. After sometime, Dio discovered that, without her
knowledge and consent, Desmond made certain disbursements
from Westdale’s special account and the same for the operating
expenses of Ocean Adventure.
Dio filed two criminal complaints for estafa, both
against Desmond. After the preliminary investigation, the
Prosecutor found probable cause against Desmond for the
abovementioned crimes. After the informations were filed in
the trial court , Desmond filed a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause.
The RTC ruled in favor of Desmond and declared that
no probable cause exists for the crimes charged against him
since the elements of estafa were not all present. Consequently,
the RTC denied the issuance of a warrant of arrest and hold
departure order against Desmond and ordered the dismissal of
the cases against him.
On appeal, the CA upheld the RTC’s authority to
dismiss a criminal case if in the process of determining
probable cause for issuing a warrant of arrest, it also finds the
evidence on record insufficient to establish probable cause
Hence, the instant petitions.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the RTC when it dismissed the
subject informations for lack of probable cause.
Held:
The petitions are meritorious.
Determination of probable cause may be either
executive or judicial. The first is made by the public
prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is
given broad discretion to determine whether probable cause
exists for the purpose of filing a criminal information in court.
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by
the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.
The second is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy himself that, on
the basis of the evidence submitted, there is a necessity for
placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause,
the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
In other words, once the information is filed with the
court and the judge proceeds with his primordial task of
evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a
warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately
dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit
additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable
cause.
Verily, a judge's discretion to dismiss a case
immediately after the filing of the information in court is
appropriate only when the failure to establish probable cause
can be clearly inferred from the evidence presented and not
when its existence is simply doubtful.
After all, it cannot be expected that upon the filing of
the information in court the prosecutor would have already
presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of
the accused, the objective of a previously-conducted
preliminary investigation being merely to determine whether
there is sufficient ground, to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
In this light, given that the lack of probable cause had
not been clearly established in this case, the CA erred, and the
RTC gravely abused its discretion, by ruling to dismiss
Criminal Case Nos. 515-2004 and 516-2004.
Indeed, these cases must stand the muster of a full-
blown trial where the parties could be given, as they should be
given, the opportunity to ventilate their respective claims and
defenses, on the basis of which the court a quo can properly
resolve the factual disputes therein.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO
VELASCO
Facts:
On December 27, 2001, at around 11:00 o’clock in the
morning, Lisa was at the sala watching television.
Momentarily, appellant approached her and thereafter,
removed his shorts and underwear as well as that of Lisa’s. He
then mounted Lisa and inserted his penis into her vagina. He
warned her not to report the incident to anybody, otherwise, he
will kill her and her mother. After satisfying his lust, appellant
left without saying a word. The same incident happened for the
next two days.
For his defense, Velasco averred that during date of the
alleged rape incidents happened he was working as a mason in
Barangay Caingin, Malolos, Bulacan. He leaves their house at
7:00 o’clock in the morning to go to work and arrives at 5:30 in
the afternoon.
Velasco was then charged with three counts of rape and
one count of acts of lasciviousness. The trial court found him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Velasco faulted the
CA for not finding that his warrantless arrest as illegal.
Held:
The petition is without merit.
With regard to purported irregularities that attended
appellant’s warrantless arrest, we are of the same persuasion as
the Court of Appeals which ruled that such a plea comes too
late in the day to be worthy of consideration.
Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from
assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this
issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him
on this ground before arraignment, thus, any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the
court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived.
Nevertheless, even if appellant’s warrantless arrest
were proven to be indeed invalid, such a scenario would still
not provide salvation to appellant’s cause because
jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal arrest of an
accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free
from error.
VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE
 PHILIPPINES
Facts:
PROSECUTION’S VERSION
A complaint was filed by Brian Resco against Danilo
Villanueva for allegedly shooting the former along C-3 Road,
Navotas City. After recording the incident in the police blotter,
several police officers proceeded to the house of Villanueva.
They informed Villanueva about the Complaint lodged against
him. They invited him to the police station. There, he was
subjected to a body search and, in the process, a plastic sachet
of shabu was recovered from the left pocket of his pants.
DEFENSE’S VERSION
The accused testified that at the time of the incident, he
was at home watching TV when PO3 Coralde, along with three
others, invited him to go with them to the police station.
Informed that he had been identified as responsible for
shooting Resco, the accused was then frisked and detained at
the police station.
The RTC convicted petitioner of the offense charged. On
appeal to the CA, petitioner faulted the trial court for not
finding as illegal the accused-appellant’s warrantless arrest and
search. Nonetheless, CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioner’s
conviction despite the illegality of the arrest and the lapses on
the part of the police officers in the handling of the confiscated
drug.
Held:
Petitioner claims that his arrest does not fall within the
purview of valid warrantless arrests, since it took place on the
day of the alleged shooting incident. Hence, to "invite" him to
the precinct without any warrant of arrest was illegal. The
evidence obtained is, consequently, inadmissible. The Office of
the Solicitor General filed its Comment stating that he cannot
raise the issue regarding the apprehending officers’ non-
compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 for the
first time on appeal.
We find the instant appeal meritorious.
Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning the
legality of his arrest.
Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless
arrests either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful – A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

The circumstances that transpired between accused-
appellant and the arresting officer show none of the above that
would make the warrantless arrest lawful.
Nevertheless, records reveal that accused-appellant
never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He
actively participated in the trial of the case. Thus, he is
considered as one who had properly and voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right
to question the validity of his arrest.
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver
of an illegal search. Records have established that both the
arrest and the search were made without a warrant. While the
accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of
his arrest, he is not deemed to have equally waived his right to
contest the legality of the search.
The search made was not among the instances of valid
warrantless search.
Consent must also be voluntary inorder to validate an
otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated
by any duress or coercion.
In this case, petitioner was merely "ordered" to take out
the contents of his pocket. The evidence obtained is not
admissible.
Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the
seized item is thus inadmissible in evidence against accused-
appellant. Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit
of the poisonous tree. Hence, the confiscated item is
inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section
3(2) of the 1987 Constitution: "Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. Without the seized item,
therefore, the conviction of accused appellant cannot be
sustained.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARAZA y SAGUN
Facts:
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION
The prosecution presented Police Officer 1 Edmund
Talacca (PO1 Talacca) who testified as follows:
At around 8:00 p.m. of August 28, 2002, PO1 Talacca
accompanied the Barangay Chairman, Barangay Tanods and
several members of the barangay council confiscated a video
karera machine inside the house of a certain Alejandro Sacdo
(Sacdo).
While confiscating said machine, PO1 Talacca saw nine
persons, including Araza, sniffing shabu or engaging in a pot
session inside the house of Sacdo. He arrested and frisked
them. Recovered from the pocket of Araza was a small heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance which PO1 Talacca suspected to be shabu. PO1
Talacca immediately seized said sachet and brought Araza and
his companions to the police station. He turned over the said
sachet to the chief investigator, Larry Cabrera (Cabrera), who
marked the same with the initials "RSA" in his presence.
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE
The defense presented a completely different version of
the incident. Araza testified that he was sleeping inside a room
in the house of Sacdo when PO1 Talacca suddenly woke him
up and frisked him. PO1 Talacca confiscated his wallet that
contained coins then took him to the police station and charged
him with illegal possession of prohibited drugs.
The RTC convicted Araza. On appeal, the appellate
court affirmed in toto the findings of the lower court. Hence,
this appeal where Araza seeks for his acquittal.
Held:
The appeal is unmeritorious.
The arresting officer, PO1 Talacca, positively identified
Araza as the person caught in possession of the shabu
presented in court. He stated that the shabu was validly
confiscated after Araza was arrested in flagrante delicto
sniffing shabuin the company of other people.
We find the statement of PO1 Talacca tobe credible.
The narration of the incident by a police officer, "buttressed by
the presumption that they have regularly performed their duties
in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary, must be
given weight.
An accused cannot assail any irregularity in the manner
of his arrest after arraignment.
Araza calls attention to the admission of PO1 Talacca that the
shabu was confiscated from his pocket and was not in plain
view. He therefore posits that he was not apprehended in
flagrante delicto and the ensuing warrantless arrest was invalid.
Moreover, the sachet allegedly seized from him is not
admissible in evidence against him being the fruit of a
poisonous tree.
Such an argument is unworthy of credence since
objections to a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the
court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must
be manifested prior to entering his plea. Otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived.
Moreover, jurisprudence dictates that "the illegal arrest
of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free
from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction
of the accused.
Here, Araza did not object to the alleged irregularity of
his arrest before or during his arraignment. He even actively
participated in the proceedings before the RTC. He is,
therefore, deemed to have waived any defect he believes to
have existed during his arrest and effectively submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the RTC. In other words, Araza is already
estopped from assailing any irregularity in his arrest after he
failed to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
Information on this ground before his arraignment.
 As to the admissibility of the shabu seized from Araza,
it is crucial to ascertain whether the search that yielded the
alleged contraband was lawful. The Constitution states that
failure to secure a judicial warrant prior to the actual search
and consequent seizure would render it unreasonable and any
evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. This constitutional prohibition,
however, admits exceptions.
In this case, there is sufficient evidence to prove that
the warrantless search of Araza was effected as an incident to a
lawful arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
provides in part:
Araza and his companions were arrested in the act of
sniffing substance that seemed to be shabu inside the premises
where a video karera machine was being confiscated by the
barangay officials for whom he provided security. He thus
entered the room, effected their arrest and conducted a body
search on them.
Considering the foregoing, Arazawas clearly
apprehended inflagrante delicti as he was then committing a
crime in the presence of PO1 Talacca. Hence, his warrantless
arrest is valid pursuant to Section 5(a) of the above-quoted
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. And having been lawfully
arrested, the warrantless search that followed was undoubtedly
incidental to a lawful arrest, which as mentioned, is an
exception to the constitutional prohibition on warrantless
search and seizure. Conversely, the shabu seized from Araza is
admissible in evidence toprove his guilt of the offense charged.
RONTOS y DELA TORRE vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Facts:
On the afternoon of October 19, 2003, several police
officers of the Anti-Illegal Drugs Task Force to conduct
surveillance in Sampaloc St., Camarin, Caloocan City because
of reports of illegal drug activity in the said area.
When they got there around 5:00 p.m., the police
officers noticed petitioner standing about five meters away
from them, apparently preoccupied with scrutinizing two
plastic sachets in his hand.
Upon coming closer, they saw that the plastic sachets
appeared to contain a white crystalline substance similar to
shabu. They approached petitioner and confiscated the plastic
sachets. Thereafter, he introduced himself as a police officer
and informed petitioner of the offense the latter had committed.
The two police officers informed petitioner of his constitutional
rights, while he just remained silent. They then brought
petitioner to the station.
On the other hand, petitioner narrated a different
version of the incident. According to him, on the date and time
mentioned, he was at home with his parents, sister, nephews
and a visitor named Cassandra Francisco (Cassandra) when
some police officers suddenly barged in. The police officers
searched the house, claiming that they were looking for
something. When the search proved fruitless, they arrested
petitioner and Cassandra and detained them at the Drug
Enforcement Unit in Camarin, Caloocan City. Cassandra was
later released when her uncle allegedly gave money to the
police officers.
The RTC convicted the accused for illegal possession
of dangerous drugs. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of
the lower court.
Held:
We acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt.
We cannot uphold the contention of petitioner that his
warrantless arrest was illegal. The CA correctly ruled that his
failure to question the legality of his arrest before entering his
plea during arraignment operated as a waiver of that defense.
It has been ruled time and again that an accused is
estopped from assailing any irregularity with regard to his
arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of
the information against him on this ground before his
arraignment. In his arraignment before the trial court, petitioner
never raised any issue and instead "freely and voluntarily
pleaded Not Guilty to the offense charged. Thus, he was
estopped from raising the issue of the legality of his arrest
before the trial court, more so on appeal before the CA or this
Court.
However, on the basis of the nonobservance of the rules
of procedure for handling illegal drug items, we resolve to
acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. In illegal
drugs cases, the identity and integrity of the drugs seized must
be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that
required to arrive at a finding of guilt.
The case against the accused hinges on the ability of the
prosecution to prove that the illegal drug presented in court is
the same one that was recovered from the accused upon his
arrest.
The procedure set forth in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 is
intended precisely to ensure the identity and integrity of
dangerous drugs seized. This provision requires that upon
seizure of illegal drug items, the apprehending team having
initial custody of the drugs shall:
(a) conduct a physical inventory of the drugs; (b) take
photographs thereof (c) in the presence of the person from
whom these items were seized or confiscated, (d) a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
and any elected public official (e) who shall all be required to
sign the inventory and be given copies thereof.
This Court has emphasized the import of Section 21 as
a matter of substantive law that mandates strict compliance
Here, the procedure was not observed at all.
We cannot, in good conscience, affirm the conviction of
petitioner for possession of illegal drugs if the police officer
charged with the preservation of the evidence cannot even be
certain in the identification of the envelope that was presented
in court. The possibility of substitution is fatal for the
prosecution for there is then a failure to prove the identity of
the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CUNANAN Y
DAVID ALIAS “PAENG PUTOL
Version of the Prosecution
At about 6:00 p.m. on October 13, 2006, a confidential
informant (CI) went to the EPD-District Intelligence
Investigation Division (EPD-DIID) Headquarters of Pasig City
and informed PSI Abalos that a certain “Paeng Putol,” later
identified as the appellant, was engaged in selling illegal drugs
in Barangay Pineda, Pasig City.
Acting on the information, PSI Abalos organized a buy-
bust team composed of himself and several other officers to
entrap appellant. One of the police officers was designated as
the poseur-buyer and was thus given two 100-peso bills which
he marked with his initials “DG,” while the rest of the team
would act as back-ups.
Thereafter, the team proceeded to and arrived at the
target area. The poseur-buyer and the CI then walked towards
a store along an alley while the others strategically positioned
themselves some five to seven meters away. The CI saw a man
wearing gloves standing beside the store and informed the
poseur-buyer that the man was the appellant.
Together, they approached appellant who is familiar to
the CI. They told the appellant as a drug user who wanted to
buy shabu worth P200.00. After receiving the marked money,
appellant entered a narrow alley and came back with a small
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which he
handed to the poseur-buyer. Thereupon, the police officers
arrested the appellant.
Appellant, for his defense, denied the charge and
interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up/extortion. He
alleged that at the time of the alleged arrest, he was watching a
bingo game when three men arrived and held him by both
hands. They introduced themselves as policemen and told him
that they have a warrant for his arrest. The men brought him to
a police station where police officers threatened to file a case
against him unless he gives the police P50,000.00 as
settlement. He failed to give the said amount.
The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused of
illegal sale of prohibited drugs. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
order of conviction. Hence, this appeal
Appellant points out that there was no in flagrante
delicto arrest as he was not committing any crime at the time
he was apprehended but was merely watching a bingo game.
Held:
The appeal is without merit.
Appellant assails the legality of his arrest contending
that he was not caught in flagrante delicto. Appellant’s
contention fails to convince. The testimony of the police
officer who acted as the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation
clearly recounts how the sale transaction between him and
appellant transpired.
In any event, jurisprudence is settled that any
irregularity attending the arrest of an accused should be timely
raised in a motion to quash the Information at any time before
arraignment, failing in which, he is deemed to have waived his
right to question the regularity of his arrest.

As the records show, except during the inquest

proceedings before the prosecutor’s office, appellant never
objected to the regularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
In fact, he even actively participated in the trial of the case.
With these lapses, he is estopped from raising any question
regarding the same.