Socially Cooperative Choices: An Approach to
Achieving Resource Sustainability in the Coastal Zone
COLIN CRANCE
Department of Geography
Wilfrid Laurier University
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5
DIANNE DRAPER*
Department of Geography
The University of Calgary
Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4
ABSTRACT / Achieving resource sustainability, particularly
in the coastal zone, is complicated by a variety of
interdependencies and trade-offs between economic, social,
and ecological variables. Although trade-offs between each
of these variables are important, this paper emphasizes the
social components of resource management. In this regard
a distinction is made between individual and cooperative
choices. Individual choices frequently are made from a short-
term, self-interested perspective, whereas cooperative
Resource and environmental policy makers are faced
increasingly with difficulties in integrating economic,
social, and environmental considerations in develop-
mental planning. Incorporating sustainability criteria
into management plans has gained importance as a
societal objective in both developed and developing
nations. Such a goal can be reached in part through
effective environmental and human ecological manage-
ment (Gale 1991, Nelson 1992). Achieving sustainable
environments involves broad, general prescriptions for
attaining ecologically sustainable resource use and re-
quires involvement of governments, academic and pri-
vate sectors, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
and local communities. Because of the abundance of
interdependencies operative in many resource use situa-
tions, management efforts must be redefined to suit
unique circumstances. Such a redefinition must ac-
knowledge the role and importance of individual deci-
sion making (even though individuals do not necessarily
have equal input into decisions).
KEY WORDS: Behavioralsolutions; Cooperation; Integration;Mistrust;
Self-interest; Social dilemmas
*_Authorto whom correspondenceshould be addressed.
Environmental Management Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 175-184
choices are made from a long-term, community and
resource-sustainability perspective. Typically, when presented
with a spectrum of resource management decisions,
individuals have a tendency to act in a self-interested
manner. Thus, cooperative benefits, such as reduced conflict
and improved resource certainty, are not realized. An
overview of selected aspects of social dilemma theory
suggests that socially cooperative choice outcomes are
attainable in coastal zone management by integrating
structural and behavioral solutions in resource use decision
making. Three barriers to successful integration of structural
and behavioral solutions are identified as self-interest,
mistrust, and variable perceptions of resource amenities.
Examples from coastal zone management indicate that these
barriers may be overcome using approaches such as scope-
reduction, co-management, community education, and local
participation. The paper also provides comment on the
potential benefits of integrating structural and behavioral
solutions in international coastal zone management efforts.
In public interest resource issues, and particularly in
common property situations, diverse individual actions
for access to and use of resources lead to competition.
When the actions of individual decision makers are left
unchecked and uncoordinated, long-term environmen-
tal sustainability is compromised and Hardin's (1968)
tragedy of the commons frequently occurs. Hardin con-
cluded that eventual destruction of common property
resources was inevitable because individuals acted
strictly in short-term economic self-interest. The validity
of rational economic man in resource use situations is
contested by those who recognize the existence of social
dilemmas (Edney 1980, Berkes and others 1989, Berkes
and Feeny 1990, Draper and Driscoll 1991, ILartez 1991,
Wiener and Doescher 1991). In social dilemmas involv-
ing environmental resources there is often conflict be-
tween individual and collective rationality and between
short- and long-term resource sustainability. These di-
lemmas are reflected in the behavior of all parties associ-
ated with a resource. Managers who are able to under-
stand social dilemmas may be better equipped to align
individual behavior and management practices.
This paper is written from the premise that social
dilemma theory is relevant to resource managers in
their attempts to attain environmental sustainability for
public benefit. An examination of selected aspects of
© 1996 Springer-VerlagNew York Inc.
176 c, Crance and D. Draper
social dilemma theory reveals various dimensions of in-
dividual choice processes. These individual choices in-
fluence economic, social, and ecological trade-offs in
resource management. To highlight the importance of
achieving socially cooperative individual choices, in
both the short- and long-term, selected types of and
major obstacles and solutions to social dilemmas are
discussed. The understanding gained through use of
social dilemma theory is applied to examples from
coastal zone management. These examples illustrate
how, in general, resource managers may benefit from
more detailed consideration of the social constructs of
sustainability. If, in addition to knowledge of economic
and ecological systems, resource managers possess a
clearer understanding of social systems, they may more
readily fulfill societal expectations of integrating envi-
ronment and economy.
Social Dilemmas and Resource Management
Issues
In a social dilemma, a person who contributes to the
good of the community receives fewer personal benefits
than a person who does not contribute, and all group
members receive more personal benefits if they all con-
tribute than if none, or only some, of the group mem-
bers contribute (Wiener and Doescher 1991). An indi-
vidual's incentive not to cooperate is greater than his
or her incentive to cooperate, however, because the
cooperation necessary to resolve a social dilemma may
result in a lower level of personal benefit. Generally, in
social dilemma situations, each individual follows his or
her own self-interest, electing competitive strategies to
achieve personal gains, without realizing that all group
members would be better off if each cooperated. In
both private and common property resource ownership
situations, individuals do not cooperate to achieve
group gain either because they care only to perpetuate
their own profit or because they do not appreciate the
group or collective benefits that could accrue in the
long-term. The tendency to satisfy individual gain rather
than to seek cooperative benefit translates into a so-
cial dilemma.
The existence of social dilemmas in resource man-
agement issues has not always been recognized by those
charged with the responsibility for decision making.
Social dilemmas involve multiple, interactive dimen-
sions including the individual or joint behavior of indi-
viduals toward other users (who may be their competi-
tors), the resources, and their management regime. It
is important that decision makers become aware of the
ways individuals act when faced with varying levels of
resource conflict and uncertainty. Without such knowl-
edge, the conflict between individual and collective ra-
tionality may not be recognized. This may result in a
reduction of the likelihood of attaining long-term soci-
etal goals and a reduced ability to obtain public support
for management initiatives.
The conflict between individual and collective ratio-
nality can be reduced and even eliminated by altering
the payoffstructure that dictates individual choice. Solu-
tions that appeal to an individual's self-interest are inef-
fective in achieving collective gain because the social
payoff from cooperating will always be negative (Wiener
and Doescher 1991), but solutions focused on reducing
the negative aspects of cooperation should enhance
the desirability of individual cooperative choices, thus
affecting the payoff structure in a positive manner. Re-
ducing the negative aspects of cooperative choices is
paramount in resolving social dilemmas and is the focus
of the following section.
Resolving Social Dilemmas
Messick and Brewer (1983) have classified structural
and behavioral approaches as two ways to resolve social
dilemmas. Structural solutions involve coordinating
group action to alter payoffs, subsequently eliminating
the social dilemma. Structural solutions imply that some
sort of restriction or coercion is directed at the individ-
ual in order to change the payoff structure. Examples
of structural solutions widely used to restrict excessive
coastal resource usage include permit systems, shore-
land restrictions, zoning, critical area plans, and some
acquisition and restoration programs. Programs such
as these derive their potential effectiveness principally
from legislative authority.
Behavioral solutions influence cooperative outcomes
by promoting independent changes in individual behav-
ior. A behavioral solution works by inducing individuals
to cooperate for the sake of cooperation (Wiener and
Doescher 1991). The absence of coercion in behavioral
solutions means that individuals who alter their behavior
are willing to do so independently; consequently the
benefits created by cooperation are expected to remain
over the long-term.
Behavioral solutions offer promise for resolving so-
cial dilemmas through instigating fundamental changes
in individual thinking, attitudes, and actions. These so-
lutions are characterized by internal decision-making
processes that promote values such as egalitarianism
and trust. In a resource use situation, for example, trust
may positively influence an individual's perspective on
attaining sustainable use of a resource. In comparison,
structural solutions usually are comprised of established
organizational frameworks and mostly top-down deci-