MACALINTAL v.
PET (2011) or Vice President, and may promulgate its
G.R. No. 191618
Facts:
1. This is a Motion for Reconsideration
filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal
regarding the previous Court
Decision dismissing his petition and
declaring the establishment of
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)
as constitutional.
2. Atty. Macalintal maintains that
among others, Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution does not provide
for the creation of PET which was
opposed by the OSG.
Issue: Does the Supreme Court have the
authority to create the PET?
Ruling: Yes, the Supreme Court has the
authority to create the PET.
The judicial power granted to the Supreme
Court by the same Constitution is plenary.
Under the doctrine of necessary implication,
the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the
last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution to decide presidential and vice
presidential elections contests include the
means necessary to carry it into effect.
The explicit reference by the framers of our
Constitution to constitutionalizing what was
merely statutory before is not diluted by the
absence of a phrase, line, or word,
mandating the Supreme Court to create a
PET.
Although the method by which the Supreme
Court exercises this authority is not
specified in the provision, the grant of power
does not contain any limitation on the
Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The
conferment of full authority to the Supreme
Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full
authority conferred upon the electoral
tribunals of the Senate and the HoR.
Other notes:
Article VII, Section 4: xxx The Supreme
Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President
rules for that purpose.
COA v. Province of Cebu (2001)
G.R. No. 141386
Facts:
1. The provincial governor of the
Province of Cebu, as chairman of
the local school board, under
Section 98 of the Local Government
Code, appointed classroom teachers
who had no items in the DECS
plantilla to handle extension classes
that would accommodate students in
public schools.
2. In the audit of the accounts
conducted by COA of the Province
of Cebu, it appeared that the
salaries and personnel-related
benefits of the teachers appointed
for the extension classes were
charged against the Special
Education Fund (SEF). The college
scholarship grants were also
charged in the SEF.
3. COA then issued Notices of
Suspension to the Province of Cebu
saying that the salaries and
scholarship grants are not
chargeable against the SEF.
4. The Province of Cebu then filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the
trial court.
5. The trial court then authorized the
expenditures of the SEF. Hence, the
instant petition by the COA.
Issue: Are the salaries and personnel
benefits of the teachers appointed for the
extension classes and the college
scholarship grants chargeable against the
SEF?
Ruling: The salaries and personnel benefits
of the teachers appointed are chargeable
against the SEF but not the college
scholarship grants.
Salaries
Under the doctrine of necessary implication,
the allocation of the SEF for the
establishment and maintenance of
extension classes logically implies hiring of
teachers who should, as a matter of course
be compensated for their services.
Every statute is understood by implication to
contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and
purpose, or to make effective rights,
powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it
grants, including all such collateral and
subsidiary consequences as may be fairly
and logically inferred from its terms.
Verily, the services and the corresponding
compensation of these teachers are
necessary and indispensable to the
establishment and maintenance of
extension classes.
The SEF may expended only for the
salaries and personnel-related benefits of
teachers appointed by the local school
boards in connection with the establishment
and maintenance of extension classes.
Scholarship grants
However noble the intention of the province
in extending said scholarship to deserving
students, the Court refused to apply the
doctrine of necessary implication as the
grant us neither necessary or indispensable
to the operation and maintenance of public
schools. Instead, such scholarship grants
may be charged to the General Funds of the
province.
Other notes:
 The SEF was created by virtue of
R.A. No. 5447 which is an Act
creating a special education fund to
be constituted from the proceeds of
an additional real property tax and a
certain portion of the taxes on
Virginia – type cigarettes and duties
on imported leaf tobacco, defining
the activities to be financed, creating
school boards for the purpose, and
appropriating funds therefrom.
The SEF may be expended
exclusively for the organization and
operation of such number of
extension classes, the creation of
positions of classroom teachers,
head teachers and principals for
such extension classes, the payment
and adjustment of salaries of public
school teachers, and the granting of
government scholarships to poor but
deserving students.
R.A. 5447 was repealed by the Local
Government Code providing that the
SEF is now limited for the operation
and maintenance of public schools
and establishment and maintenance
of extension classes where
necessary.
 Extension classes: additional
classes needed to accommodate all
children of school age desiring to
enter in public schools to acquire
basic education
SHIOJI v. HARVEY (1922)
G.R. No. L-18940
Facts:
1. The CFI of Manila wherein S. Shioji
was the plaintiff and Toyo Kisen
Kaisha and the Pacific Mail
Steamship Co. were defendants. A
judgement was rendered by Judge
Concepcion in favor of the plaintiff.
The defendants then appealed
before the SC.
2. In accordance with Rule 21 of the
Supreme Court, the appellants had
30 days from the receipt of the
printed bill of exceptions within
which to serve and file copies of the
brief. The appellants missed the
deadline and their subsequent
motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.
3. The case was then transferred to
CFI of Manila. An execution was
then issued but before the levy could
be done, the appellants filed for a
petition to enjoin Judge Concepcion
from proceeding with the levy and
raised the allegation that the
judgement of the SC is
unconscionable and was rendered
without due process of law and that
Rule 24 (a) under which the
judgement was rendered is
 unconstitutional and being in conflict
with the law, is null and void.
4. The case was then transferred to
Judge Harvey who then issued the
subsequent injunction.
Issue: Is Rule 24 (a) of the Rules on Civil
Procedure null and void?
Ruling: No, Rule 24 (a) of the Rules on Civil
Procedure is valid.
Authority of the SC to promulgate rules
The SC is expressly authorized by statute to
make rules for the regulation of its practice
and conduct of its business. Section 28 of
the Judiciary Act (No. 136), grants to the
members of the Supreme Court the power
to “make all necessary rules for orderly
procedure in the Supreme Court … in
accordance with the provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure which rules shall be …
binding upon the several courts.”
The enactment of rules having to do with
the preparation and filing of briefs is within
the Court’s authority.
Did not violate any law of the United States
or of the Philippines
The enforcement of the time prescriptions
for the filing of briefs is in accordance to
Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
promoting its object and assist the parties in
obtaining speedy justice.
Since it is not in conflict with any law of the
United States or of the Philippines, it is still
a necessary rule for orderly procedure and
for regulating the conduct of business in the
Supreme Court.
Independent of any statutory provision, the
Court asserts that every court has inherent
power to do all things necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of
its jurisdiction.
LUCIANO v. PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR
(1969)
G.R. No. L-30306
Facts:
1. In the general elections of November
14, 1967, Mayor Estrella, Vice
Mayor Gealogo, and eight (8)
councilors including Luciano were
declared municipal officials of
Makati.
2. On January 1969, the First Assistant
Provincial Fiscal instituted a criminal
case against Mayor Estrella, Vice
Mayor Gealogo, and other elective
municipal officials for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
for entering into a contract with JEF
Enterprises for the delivery and
installation of 59 traffic deflectors in
which only 34 were delivered and
installed making it manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the
municipal government of Makati and
to its prejudice.
3. During the pendency of this case,
the Provincial Governor sought legal
advice from the Provincial Fiscal and
later to the Secretary of Justice if he
should suspend Mayor Estrella and
the other municipal officials charged.
The Secretary of Justice declared
that it was mandatory for the
Provincial Governor to suspend
them.
4. On February 26, to prevent the
Provincial Governor from
suspending them, the elective
officials registered and injunction suit
and a restraining order was likewise
issued on the claim that it should be
the Provincial Board that should
suspend the elective officials.
5. The elective officials were then
convicted.
6. However, on May 1969, a TRO was
issued to bar Luciano from assuming
the post of Mayor claiming that the
criminal case has yet to be final
since they have appealed before the
CA on the same day. The TRO for
Luciano was dismissed.
7. Luciano then filed a motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction to
order the Provincial Governor and/or
Provincial Board to immediately
suspend the elective municipal
officials of Makati and to either install
 him or recognize his right as Acting
Mayor.
Issues:
1. Can the elective officials still be
prosecuted for their violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act?
2. Is the suspension automatic?
3. Who should exercise the mandatory
act of suspension?
4. Can Luciano assume the position of
Mayor?
Ruling:
1. Yes, the elective officials cannot
claim that they could only be
prosecuted during their term. Such
argument is only aloud for
administrative charges but not in
criminal prosecutions in which case,
the law makes no distinction.
2. No, it is not. The law provides that
any public officer charged under a
valid information shall be suspended
from office. It does not say “is
suspended” or “is deemed
suspended.” This only means that
there must be someone who shall
exercise the act of suspension.
While it is mandatory, it is not
automatic.
3. The court should exercise the
mandatory act of suspension. Under
the law, the court is empowered to
perpetually disqualify erring public
officials from public office. Since
removal from office is within the
power of the court, there is no
reason to believe that the court does
not have the power to suspend given
that it is a less powerful power.
Secondly, since there is a need for a
“valid information” it is just that the
power to suspend is lodge to the
courts. Further, the court would
serve as an unbiased platform free
from any political agendas or parties
that could be detrimental to the
defendants.
4. Luciano can now sit as an acting
Mayor since the phrase “any
temporary incapacity” catches the
present situation. Incapacity is the
lack of physical or intellectual power
or of natural or legal qualification. In
this case, there is a legal inability on
the part of Mayor Estrella and Vice
Mayor Gealogo to perform their
functions by reason of their
suspension by the CFI.
AMERICAN TOBACCO v. DIRECTOR OF
PATENTS (1975)
G.R. No. L-26803
Facts:
1. American Tobacco et al. challenged
the validity of Rule 168 of the
Revised Rules of Practice before the
Philippine Patent Office in
Trademark Cases which authorizes
the Director of Patents to designate
any ranking official of said officer to
hear “inter partes” proceedings.
2. The said Rule likewise provides that
“all judgements determining the
merits of the case shall be
personally and directly prepared by
the Director and signed by him.”
3. These proceedings refer to the
hearing of opposition to the
registration of a mark or trade name,
interference proceeding instituted for
the purpose of determining the
question of priority of adoption and
use of a trade-mark, trade name or
service mark, and cancellation of
registration of a trade-mark or trade
name or service mark, and
cancellation of registration of a
trade-mark or trade name pending at
the Patent Office.
Issue: Is the said amendment void?
Ruling: No, the amendment which allows
the Director of Patents to designate any
ranking official to hear is valid.
Under the pertinent laws on intellectual
property rights, the Director of Patents is
empowered to obtain assistance from other
qualified officers when deemed necessary
in the consideration of any matter submitted
to the Office. He can likewise promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all
business in the Patent Office. This shall
apply to the administration and enforcement
of the Trade-mark Law.
Administrative agencies are entrusted to
issue such regulations and orders as may
be deemed necessary or proper in order to
carry out its purpose and provisions may be
an adequate source of authority to delegate
a particular function, unless by express
provisions of the Act or by implication it has
been withheld.
There is no provision either in R.A. 165 or
166 (An Act Creating the Patent Office and
Act Providing for the registration of
trademarks) negativing the existence of
such authority, so far as the designation of
hearing examiners by concerned. Nor can
the absence of such authority be fairly
inferred from contemporaneous and
consistent Executive interpretation of the
Act.
This subdelegation of power has been
justified by sound principles of organization
which demand that “those at the top be able
to concentrate their attention upon the
larger and more important issues and their
time be freed, so far as possible, from the
consideration of the smaller and far less
important matters of detail.
The Director due to the magnitude of his
responsibility cannot be required hear
personally each and every case pending in
his Office.
Lastly, this delegation is valid the ultimate
decision on the merits of all the issues and
questions involved is left to the Director of
Patents. The examiners were there to
gather all the facts and relay the same to
the Director together with their initial basis
for granting/dismissing the case subject to
the review of the Director and his final
signature.
PEOPLE v. CONCEPCION (1922)
G.R. No. 19190
Facts:
1. By telegrams and a letter of
confirmation to the manager of the
Aparri branch of PNB, Venancio
Concepcion, President of the PNB,
authorized an extension of credit in
favor of “Puno y Concepcion, S. en
C.” in the amount of P300,000.00.
2. Puno y Concepcion, S. en C is a
copartnership wherein President
Concepcion’s wife owns one-half of
the capital.
3. This special authorization was in
accordance to the memorandum
order of President Concepcion
limiting the discretional power of the
local manager of Aparri, Cagayan to
grant loans and discount negotiable
instruments.
4. The loan was paid on July 17, 1919.
5. President Concepcion was then
charged with and was found guilty of
the violation of Section 35 of Act No.
2747 which provides that “the
National Bank shall not, directly or
indirectly grant loans to any of the
members of the board of directors of
the bank nor to agents of the branch
banks.”
Issue: Was the granting of a credit if
P300,000.00 to the copartnership by PNB
President Venancio Concepcion, an indirect
loan within the meaning of Section 35 of Act
No. 2747?
Ruling: Yes, it is within the meaning of
Section 35 of Act No. 2747.
The intent of the legislature was to plainly
erect a wall of safety against temptation for
a director of the bank because of the
familiar maxim that no man may serve two
masters. In this case, the personal interest
clashes with fidelity to duty and the latter
almost always suffers.
President Concepcion being the husband is
financially interested in the success and
failure of his wife’s business venture. A loan
to a partnership of which the wife of the
director is a member, falls within the
prohibition.
Also, since their property relations are
covered by the Civil Code provision on
conjugal partnership, the loan granted is an
indirect loan to such director.