Kabilang vs.

NHA

FACTS:

On May 21, 1986, petitioners filed an Amended Petition, accompanied by a motion to admit said amended petition. In
the Amended Petition, the petitioners (only four of whom are original petitioners, the rest being newly impleaded)
invoke as an additional ground the alleged non-publication of P.D. No. 1808. On May 29,1981, the Court admitted the
Amended Petition and required respondents to comment thereon. The Court further required the Republic of the
Philippines to move in the premises within ten (10) days from notice, considering the supervening events that had
transpired since the filing of the respective memoranda of the petitioners and the respondent Republic of the
Philippines. Respondent NHA submitted its comment on June 11, 1986, stating that contrary to petitioners' allegation in
the Amended Petition, P.D. No. 1808 was published in the Official Gazette of October 4, 1982 (Volume 78, No. 40, pp.
5481-4 to 5486-8) and reiterating its arguments discussed in its comment dated September 4, 1981 on the original
petition and its later comment/opposition dated March 19, 1982. On July 2, 1986, the NHA filed a manifestation by way
of report on the current status of the subject property, stating inter alia 1) that all available workable areas in the
subject property, totalling approximately 3.1 hectares and consisting of 378 lots averaging 50 square meters each, have
been substantially developed, except for some minor repair work still to be undertaken; 2) that the NHA has already
invested P3 million representing the cost of implementing the development plans in the workable areas of the project
site; 3) that in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 1808, the N HA has already deposited with the Philippine
National Bank the amount equivalent to the cost of all subdivision lots in the project site; 4) that 76 landowners have
already withdrawn the corresponding compensation for their respective lots, totalling Pl,919,402.44, while 72
landowners including the petitioners Robidante L. Kabiling, et al. have not yet claimed the compensation for their
respective lots totalling Pl,581,676.52; and 5) that all titles to the homelots, except the lost title of Cresencio Deboma,
which is undergoing reconstitution, have already been transferred to respondent NHA pursuant to the provision of P.D.
No. 1808.

ISSUE: The petitioners' challenge to the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1808.

HELD:

 The stated objective of the decree, namely, to resolve the land tenure problem in the Agno-Leveriza area to allow
the implementation of the comprehensive development plans for this depressed community, provides the
justification for the exercise of the police power of the State. The police power of the State has been described as
"the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers.1 It is a power inherent in the State, plenary, "suitably vague
and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or
group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measure to ensure communal peace,
safety, good order and welfare.

 The objection raised by petitioners that P.D. No. 1808 impairs the obligations of contract is without merit. The
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of the
police power of the State in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. For the same reason,
petitioners can not complain that they are being deprived of their property without due process of law.
 Nor can petitioners claim that their properties are being expropriated without just compensation, since Sec. 3 of
P.D. No. 1808 provides for just compensation to lot owners who have fully paid their obligations to the City of
Manila under their respective contracts before the issuance of the decree. However, in accordance with our decision
in Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Hon. Ceferino Dulay, etc., et al., G.R. No. 59603, April 29, 1987, which
declared P.D. No. 1533 unconstitutional, those lot owners who have not yet received compensation under the
decree are entitled to a judicial determination of the just compensation for their lots.

Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz

Facts: On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M.
Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of
Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly
Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for
search warrant which was attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo
Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Vera’s
letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio
subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet
subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by Judge. At that time the Judge was hearing a
certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio.
After the session had adjourned, the Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer,
upon request of the Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, the Judge asked Logronio to take the oath and
warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. The Judge
signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. Search Warrant 2-M-70 was then signed by Judge
and accordingly issued. 3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR agents served the search warrant to the corporation and Seggerman
at the offices of the corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. The corporation’s lawyers protested the search on the
ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded
with their search which yielded 6 boxes of documents. On 3 March 1970, the corporation and Seggerman filed a petition with
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that Vera,
Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be ordered to pay the corporation and Seggerman, jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s
fees. After hearing and on 29 July 1970, the court issued an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant.
In the meantime, or on 16 April 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on the corporation in the total
sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized. The corporation and Seggerman filed an
action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

Issue: Whether the corporation has the right to contest the legality of the seizure of documents from its office.

Held: The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs.
Diokno, et al. (GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the Supreme Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to
object against unreasonable searches and seizures; holding that the corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of the corporate officers, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each
of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be; and that the corporate officers therefore may
not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. The distinction between the Stonehill case and the present case is that: in the former case,
only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers and effects were searched and seized were
the petitioners; while in the latter, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby
been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score, the corporation herein stands on a different footing from the corporations
in Stonehill. Moreover, herein, the search warrant was void inasmuch as First, there was no personal examination conducted
by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio). The Judge did not ask either of the two any question
the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against Bache & Co.
and Seggerman. The participation of the Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was
thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of
perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination.
Second, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant was issued for at least 4
distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of Section 46(a), Section 72 and Section 73 (the filing of income
tax returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation of Section 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The
third is the violation of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Section 209
(failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon).
Even in their classification the 6 provisions are embraced in 2 different titles: Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II
(Income Tax); while Sections 208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation). Lastly, the search
warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 tends to defeat the major objective
of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all
conceivable records of the corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant
2-M-70 is null and void.