Winner Team Memorial Appellant Auro National Criminal Law Nallurigowthami Dsnluacin 20200201 104352

SCC Online Web Edition, Copyright © 2020
Page 1 Saturday, February 01, 2020

Printed For: Nalluri Gowthami, Damodaram Sanjivayya National Law University
SCC Online Web Edition: http://www.scconline.com
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5th AURO National Criminal Law Moot, 2019

Winner Team Memorial - Appellant
Before The Hon'ble District and Sessions Court

In the matter of
State of Gujraj . . Appellant;
Versus
Baba Neem Hakim Param Sachha . . Defendant.
On behalf of the Appellants
CONTENTS
S. NO. SUBJECT PAGE NO.
1. TABLE OF CONTENTS 2
2. LIST OF ABBREVIATION 4
3. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 5
4. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 9
5. STATEMENT OF FACTS 10
6. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 11
7. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 12
8. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 13
9. ISSUE-1: WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE FOR RAPE 13
UNDER SECTION 376 OF THE INDIE LAND PENAL CODE?
1.1 THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE FOR RAPE.
1.1.1 DELAY IN LODGING THE FIR IN RAPE CASES IS
IRRELEVANT
1.1.2 CONSENT OBTAINED THROUGH THREAT AND BY
VIRTUE OF AUTHORITY
1.1.3 MEDICAL EVIDENCE IS NOT RELEVANT
1.2 THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER 376(2)(f) OF IPC
1.3 THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER 376(2)(k) OF IPC
1.4 THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER 376(2)(n) OF
IPC
10. ISSUE-2: WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE FOR 20
OUTRAGING MODESTY OF A WOMAN AND SEXUAL
HARRASSMENT UNDER SECTIONS 354 AND 354A OF THE
INDIE LAND PENAL CODE?
2.1 THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY FOR OUTRAGING A
MODESTY OF A WOMAN UNDER S. 354
2.2 THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY FOR SEXUAL
HARRASSMENT UNDER S. 354A
11. ISSUE-3: WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER 24
SECTION 326, 428 AND 377 OF THE INDIE LAND PENAL
CODE?
3.1 THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE TO BE CONVICTED FOR
CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION UNDER SECTION 506
MISCHIEF BY KILLING OR MAIMING ANIMAL UNDER
SECTION 428
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BESTIALITY UNDER SECTION 377
12. PRAYER 30
LIST OF ABBREVIATION
AIR All India Reporter
App Appeal
Art. Article
Ibid Ibidium
Const. Constitutional
Cl. Clause
Ed. Edition
Hon'ble Honourable
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SC Supreme Court
HC High Court
Sec. Section
u/s Under Section
i.e. That is
X Tenth
No. Number
Ors Others
Anr Another
V Versus
& And
¶ Paragraph
FIR First Information Report
J. Justice
I NDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
S. NO. CASES CITATIONS
1. State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384 : AIR
1996 SC 1393
2. State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa (2004) 4 SCC 75
3. Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of (2013) 5 SCC 546
Maharashtra
4. Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675 : AIR
2013 SC 2071
5. State of Punjab v. Ramdev Singh (2004) 1 SCC 421 : AIR
2004 SC 1290
6. Jugendra Singh v. State of U.P. (2012) 6 SCC 297
7. Gurucharan Singh v. State of Haryana (1972) 2 SCC 749 : AIR
1972 SC 2661
8. Shri Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Miss Subhra (1996) 1 SCC 490 : AIR
Chakraborty 1996 SC 922
9. State of Maharashtra v. Priya Sharan (1997) 4 SCC 393
Maharaj
10. Kamalanantha v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005) 5 SCC 194
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11. Shri Bodhi Sattwa Gautam v. Subhra (1996) 1 SCC 490 : AIR
Chaudhary 1996 SC 922
12. Ganga Singh v. State of M.P (2013) 7 SCC 278
13. Satendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha v. 2003 Cri. L.J. 392 (Pat.)
State of Bihar
14. State of H.P. v. State of Haryana (2004) 8 SCC 153
15. State of Chhatisgarh v. Derha (2004) 9 SCC 699
16. Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana (2004) 4 SCC 379
17. Balaji Laxman Itkar v. State of 2008 Cri. L.J. 3224 (Bom.).
Maharashtra
18. Rajoo v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 15 SCC 133 : AIR
2009 SC 858
19. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sanjay (2017) 2 SCC 51 : 2016 (4)
Kumar Crimes 424 SC
20. Vijay alias Chinee v. State of Madhya (2010) 8 SCC 191
Pradesh
21. State of Maharashtra v. Chandra-prakash (1990) 1 SCC 550
Kewalchand Jain
22. Suresh v. State of Rajasthan (2013) 2 RLW 1039 (Raj)
23. Ayub Hussain Mandal v. State of Assam (2007) 15 SCC 549
24. Prem Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2005 Cri. L.J. 1145 (MP).
25. Rajinder @ Raju v. State of Himachal (2009) 16 SCC 69 : JT 2009
Pradesh (9) SC 9
26. State of H.P v. Gian Chand. (2001) 6 SCC 71
27. R v. Linekar (1995) 3 All ER 69 (CA).
28. Rao Harmarain AIR 1958 Punj 123
29. Sitaram v. State of M.P 1996 CrLJ 4 (MP)
30. Narendrasingh v. State of M.P 1996 CrLJ 198 (MP)
31. Bandu v. State of Maharashtra 1996 CrLJ 285 (Bom)
32. Rabinarayandas v. State of Orissa 1992 CrLJ 269 (Ori.)
33. Gajanand Maganlal Mehta v. State of 1987 CrLJ 374 (Guj.)
Gujarat
34. Sohan Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1998 CrLJ 2618 (Raj)
35. Shiv Nath v. State of M.P 1998 CrLJ 2691 (MP).
36. Mukhera Belakota Reddi v. State of A.P. 1992 CrLJ 2236 (AP).
37. Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46
38. Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar (2005) 1 SCC 88
39. Yedla Srinivasan Rao v. State of A.P (2006) 11 SCC 615
40. Ram Kala 47 CrLJ 611 (All.)
41. Panibhusan Behra v. State of Orissa (1995) 2 CrLJ 1561 (Ori)
42. Mahesh Kumar Bherulal v. State of M.P. (1995) 2 CrLJ 2021 (MP)
43. T. Manikadan v. The State (Govt. of NCT 2017 SCC Del 6440.
of Delhi)
44. Girdhar Gopal v. State AIR 1958 MB 147 (148).
45. Tarkeshwar Sahu v. State of Bihar (2006) 8 SCC 560
46. Ashraf Khan v. State of MP 2013 CrLJ 1286 (MP)
47. Premiya v. State of Rajhasthan (2008) 10 SCC 81 : AIR
2009 SC 351
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48. Ram Asrey v. State of U.P 1990 Cr LJ 405

49. Ramkripal v. State of M.P (2007) 11 SCC 265
50. Jasvinder Saini v. State (Govt. of NCT of (2013) 7 SCC 256 : AIR
Delhi) 2014 SC 841.
51. Salman Khan v. State of Maharashtra (2004) 1 SCC 525 : AIR
2004 SC 1189
52. Gurbachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 623
53. Willie (William) v. State of M.P. AIR 1956 SC 116
54. Prasad Mahato v. State of Bihar 1994 SCC (Cri) 55
55. Sattan Sahani v. State of Bihar (2002) 7 SCC 604
56. State of UP v. Indrajeet alias Sukatha (2000) 7 SCC 249
57. Emperor v. Juman Sajan, AIR 1947 Sindh 66 : 48
Cri.L.J. 700
58. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1
59. Noble Mohandas v. State of T.N. 1989 CrLJ 669 (Mad)
60. Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabaghana 1995 CrLJ 3559 (Ori)
Behera
61. Siyasaran v. State of M.P. 1995 CrLJ 2126 (SC)
Statutes
S. NO. NAME
1. THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
2. THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872
3. THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
Journals
S. NO NAME
1. All India Reporter
2. Supreme Court Cases
3. Manupatra
4. Supreme Court Reporter
Books
S. NO NAME
1. Batuk Lal, “Commentary on the Indian Penal Code, 1860”, Ed. R. P.
Kataria and S. K. A. Naqvi, Vol-I, (Section 1 to 300), (Orient
Publishing Company, 1st Edn. New Delhi) (2006-07).
2. Dr. Hari Singh Gour, “The Penal Law of India”, Vol-I, (Section 1 to
120), (Law Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd., 11th Edn.) (2006).
3. Field's “Commentary on Law of Evidence”, Ed Gopal S. Chaturvedi,
Vol-I & II, (Delhi Law House, 12th Edn.) (2006).
4. Halsbury's Laws of India, Vol-32, “Criminal Procedure - I & II”,
(Lexis Nexis Butterworths, New Delhi) (2007).
5. Nelson R. A. Indian Penal Code, 10th Ed. (2008)
6. Kathuria, R.P. Supreme Court on Criminal Law, 1950-2002, (6th
Ed. 2002)
7. Princep's Commentary on the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(18th ed. 2005)
8. Mitra, B.B., Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (20th ed. 2006)
9. K. D. Gaur, “Commentary on Indian Penal Code”, (Universal Law
Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi) (2006).
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10. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, “Commentary on the Code of Criminal

Procedure”, Vol I & II, (Wadhwa and Company, 18th Edn., Nagpur)
(2006).
11. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, “Law of Crimes”, Vol-I & II, Ed. Justice C. K.
Thakkar, (Bharat Law House, 25th Edn., New Delhi) (Reprint 2006).
Legal Dictionaries
S. NO NAME
1. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, (WEST PUBLISHING GROUP 7TH EDN.)
(1999)
2. P. RAMANATHA AIYAR'S, “ADVANCED LAW LEXICON”, VOL-I TO IV,
(WADHWA AND COMPANY, 3RD EDN., NAGPUR) (2005)
3. STROUD'S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY OF WORDS AND PHRASES, VOL-I
TO III, EDITOR DANIEL GREENBERG, (SWEET AND MAXWELL LTD.,
7TH EDN., 2006, REPRINT 2008) LONDON.
4. WHARTON'S LAW LEXICON, BY A. S. OPPE, (SWEET AND MAXWELL
UNIVERSAL LAW PUBLISHING CO. PVT. LTD., 14TH EDN., 1997).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE PROSECUTION HAS APPROACHED THIS HON'BLE SESSIONS COURT UNDER
SECTION 26 R/W SECTION 28 R/W SECTION 177 R/W SCHEDULE I OF THE CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973, WHICH READS AS HEREUNDER:
S. 26. Courts by which offences are triable:
Subject to the other provisions of this Code,—
(a) Any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be tried by—
i. …
ii. The Court of Session
iii. …
S. 28. Sentences which High Courts and Sessions Judges may pass:
(1) …
(2) A Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge may pass any sentence
authorised by law; but any sentence of death passed by any such Judge shall
be subject to confirmation by the High court
(3) …
S. 177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial
Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose
localjurisdiction it was committed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I: BACKGROUND: Indie Land is home to several Gods, beliefs and Godmen. The
Indie Land Penal Code governing the laws related to substantive criminal activities
which has been criticised for being too gender biased. Recently, the country has
witnessed a mass upsurge in terms of women rights and several oppressed women
have come out in open to discuss their experiences of harassmentand molestation.
II: BABA NEEM HAKEEM PARAM SACHHA (GURUJI): Guruji is the biggest
motivational Godmen in the state. He teaches his disciples the art of living which
includes performance of several activities for cleansing of their soul and is famous for
his motivational lectures nationwide
III: 24TH APRIL, 2016: A FIR was filed by Kusum Krantiveer Paramsachhe
against Guruji at the Palan Police Station, Khoobsurat, 3 kms southwest to the
Ashram. Chargesheet no. 012/2017 charged Guruji with Section 326, 354, 354A, 376,
377 under the Indie Land Penal Code. Guruji was arrested the very next day
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(Annexure B) and placed under judicial custody.
IV: ALLEGED OFFENCES: In 2010, after being sent to the Ashram by her family
she was repetitively raped by Guruji. She also stated that one night, when she was
feeding Indu, her favourite stray dog in the ashram, Guruji asked Kusum togo to her
cottage. On her resistance, Guruji forced her and Indu started barking at Guruji. In afit
of anger, Guruji took a wooden stick lying in vicinity and rammed it in the vagina of
Indupulling out her intestines causing instant death. Guruji threatened Kusum that if
sheattempted to complain or disclose the reality, he would do the same with her and
her ordealsat the hands of Guruji continued.
On 26th March 2013, Kusum's marriage had been solemnized with Krantiveer, on
21st April 2016, Kusumand her daughter visited Guruji's Ashram to celebrate his
birthday, there, Guruji again tried to molest her but left the room soon as other
followerswere hovering around her room. When she returned home, she told
everything toher husband, after listening to her they decided to file an FIR against
Guruji.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE FOR RAPE UNDER SECTION 376 OF THE INDIE
LAND PENAL CODE?
2. WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT UNDER SECTIONS 354
AND 354A OF THE INDIE LAND PENAL CODE?
3. WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 326, 428 AND 377 OF THE
INDIE LAND PENAL CODE?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE FOR RAPE UNDER SECTION 376 OF THE
INDIE LAND PENAL CODE
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the accused is liable for
committing rape u/s. 376. The accused had committed sexual intercourse with the
prosecutrix against her will. It is a case where she had surrendered herself
involuntarily. From the evidences traced from the given statements of the witnesses it
is clearly seen that Guruji was seen leaving the girl's rooms or calling them to his own
at odd hours which can be construed as circumstantial evidence that rape has been
committed not only with the prosecutrix but possibly with several other young girls
who reside in the ashram.
II. THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE FOR OUTRAGING THE MODESTY OF A
WOMAN AND SEXUAL HARRASSMENT UNDER SECTIONS 354 AND 354A OF THE
It is humbly submitted that the accused outraged the modesty of the prosecutrix or
molested her as well as sexually harassed her on various occasions and hence must be
held liable for the heinous acts under both the sections, Section 354 as well as section
354A.
III. THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 506, 428 AND 377 OF THE
It is humbly submitted that the accused is liable for criminally intimidating the
Prosecutrix by threating to kill her if she doesn't abide by his wishes by killing her pet
under section 506, and not under Section 326. In this context alteration of charges
can come into picture.
It is humbly submitted that the accused is liable for killing and maiming a dog. A
dog comes within the definition of animals for section 428 of the IPC.
dog comes within the definition of animals for section 428 of the IPC.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
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ISSUE-1:
WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE TO BE CONVICTED FOR RAPE UNDER
SECTION 376 OF IPC.
1.1 THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE FOR RAPE.
It is humbly submitted that the accused is guilty of rape. Under S. 375 a man is
said to commit “rape” who, except in the case hereinafter accepted, has sexual
intercourse with a woman-Against her will or with her consent, when her consent has
been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death
or of hurt.1
In the present case, the bare reading of the complaint makes it clear that the acts
as examined in the statement satisfies the above conditions. Here, the accused had
committed sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix against her will. It is a case where
she had surrendered herself involuntarily.
Rape is the most morally and physically reprehensible crime in a society as it is an
assault on the body, mind and privacy of the victim. A rapist degrades and defiles the
soul of a helpless female.2 Rape reduces a woman to an animal as it shakes the very
core if her life. By no means, a rape victim can be called an accomplice. Rape leaves a
permanent scar on the life of the victim, it's a crime against the society and violates
the human right of the victim. Being the most hated crime, rape tantamount to a
serious blow to the supreme honour of a woman and offends both her esteem and
dignity. It causes psychological and physical harm to the victim leaving upon her
indelible marks3 Rape is not only an offence against the person of a woman rather a
crime against the entire society, it is a crime which violates the most cherished
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.4 When a family
suffers in such a manner, the society as a whole is compelled to suffer as it creates an
incurable dent in the fabric of the social milieu.5
During her examination, PW 1 stated:
“…he repeatedly raped me in a pretext of cleansing my bad karma”
Through her statement, the witness has expressly stated that she had been raped.
Conviction for rape could be founded on the testimony of prosecutrix alone unless
there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration.6 The evidence of prosecutrixs
more reliable. Even minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the
statement of prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out otherwise reliable
prosecution case.
It is not unusual to come across cases where so-called spiritual heads exploit young
girls and women who become their disciples and come under their spell.7 Even in
cases where injuries are absent, rape charges cannot be considered fabricated because
the rape trial is such a harrowing experience that no woman would invite it.8
Prosecutrix is victim of crime, not accomplice and her evidence need no corroboration.
Her evidence has to be given same weight as was given to injured witness.9 It is also
well settled that a victim of sexual assault is not accomplice, she should be treated as
an injured and Court can convict the accused even on sole testimony of the victim girl.
Since it is most unlikely that a girl would invite such disgrace in society of herself and
her family.10 The court should deal with the cases of sexual offences against woman
sternly and severely.11 Therefore her testimony can be acted upon without
corroboration in material particulars.12 Once it is found that the version of the
prosecutrix is worth relying then it goes without saying that the offence of rape is duly
proved.13 The court has always held so far as the prosecutrix is concerned, mere
statements of the prosecutrix herself is enough to record a conviction when her
evidence is read in its totality and found to be worth reliance.14 To insist on
corroboration except in the rarest of rare cases is to equate one who is the victim of
the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime and thereby insult womanhood.15
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She is undoubtedly a competent witness under S. 118 of the Evidence Act and her
evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of
physical violence.16
Further evidence by the witnesses on examination:
PW 10, Exhibit 42—
“I have seen Guruji entering different rooms at different occasions…. have also
seen many girls returning late at night from Guruji's quarters…”
“I suddenly heard some loud voices coming from the other side of the wall and
went to stand closer to the same. I realized that it was Guruji talking loudly to some
of his sevak about girls that come to his ashram. He said he has not found any good
girl in the ashram from many days, he also told him to get girls below 16 as he
enjoys spending time with young girls. I was shocked seeing this. I have also seen
him going to girls' cottage during odd hours and cries of girls are very frequent at
nights.”
“Girls are often seen spending months at the ashram, doing guruji's seva. I have
never interacted with any of the followers of Guruji but I feel that the place is a hub
of many criminal activities.”
Thus, from the above evidences it is clearly seen that Guruji was seen leaving the
girl's rooms or calling them to his own at odd hours which can be construed as
circumstantial evidence that rape has been committed not only with the prosecutrix
but possibly with several other young girls who reside in the ashram.
1.1.1 DELAY IN LODGING THE FIR IN RAPE CASES IS IRRELEVANT
Rape is a crime that adversely affects the honour of the family and the prestige of
the victim.17 As per the prosecutrix statement examined as PW 1, her family has been
blindly following the accused from past many years. She was even sent to his asharam
on her 18th birthday so that she could learn values imparted by “Guruji”. Filing a report
against a person who has been a spiritual Gods man for the whole family is a huge
thing for a woman in country which lacks equality for woman. There are several factors
which weigh in the mind of prosecutrix before coming to the police station to lodge a
complaint18 . In tradition bound society, prevalent in India, (parimateria to Indie land)
more particularly rape cases. Normally no girl or her relatives would come forward to
make humiliating statement against the honour of the girl, therefore, evidence of the
prosecutrix and her family cannot be discarded lightly. The testimony of victim in case
of sexual offences is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitates
looking for corroboration of her statement, the court should find no difficulty to act on
the testimony of the victim of sexual assault. Corroborative evidence is no an
imperative component of judicial credence in every rape case.19 The courts must while
evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting
women would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against
her honour, such as is involved in the commission of rape on her.20
As expressed by PW-1 in the cross examination given below:
“Every girl in our family has to go to Guruji's Ashram before their marriage, so I
was also sent there. …my in-laws are also devotees of Guruji…The FIR is delayed
because we were having discussion in my family. Initially my family was hesitant
but later they agreed.”
In the above statement, as stated by PW 1 in the cross examination on 2-3-2017,
she clearly stated the reason for the delay in FIR that her family was hesitant to file a
complaint against the renowned cult-leader of the state. Her in-laws were also the
devotees of the accused which made the prosecutrix more reluctant to come forward
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against him. In a patriarchal society of Indie land, women also fear that this could
affect their present or future married life which, in turn, makes them more reluctant
and hence prosecutrix had being a self-respected woman of the society and hence the
societal pressures and the need to protect her self-respect makes the delay in lodging
the FIR a valid and comprehendible reason.
Delay in lodging FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting the
prosecution case and discarding it.21 The accused in present case also threatened
prosecutrix when he rammed a wooden stick in the vagina of Indu, and threatening
the prosecutrix, the accused threatened her that if she attempted to complain or
disclose the reality, he would do the same with her and her ordeals at the hands of
Guruji continued. This also petrified her in going against the accusation and hence was
one of the reasons of the delay. She had been living under a constant threat and could
not muster courage to inform any person. This provides a satisfactory explanation for
the delay. The delay has been satisfactorily explained in this case and therefore it does
not cause any dent in the prosecution case.
1.1.2 CONSENT OBTAINED THROUGH THREAT AND BY VIRTUE OF AUTHORITY
“Guruji took a wooden stick…rammed that stick inside Indu's Vagina and pulled
her intestines out… I shouted and started crying when I saw Indu lying in pool of
her blood with her intestines out. After this Guruji barked…if I ever complained he
will proceed to do the same with me…”
The PW 1, during her examination stated the above which shows that she was
intimidated and threatened into the sexual relation. Fear of the same fate as that of
Indu prevented her from protesting against the forced sexual assault and further
complaining about her ordeals. An essential ingredient of the offence is the proof that
the woman did not consent to the actual act of sexual intercourse with the particular
man who penetrated her.22 Consent as a defence to an allegation of rape requires
voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the
knowledge of the act but after having freely exercised the choice between resistance
and assent,23 so a helpless resignation in the face of inevitable compulsion or passive
giving in is no consent.24 When a girl says that she did not give consent, the court
shall presume that she did not consent25 (vide s. 114 A Evidence Act). S. 90 of IPC
states that “Consent given under the fear of injury is no consent at all.” When the
evidence shows that the victim of rape was overpowered by the accused and was
unable to resist the inference of consent cannot be drawn.26 An act of helplessness in
the face of inevitable compulsions is not consent in law.27
The accused used his dominance as a teacher or guardian over the hapless victim
knowing that she will not be able to refuse anything meted out to her in the name of
teaching or helping them better their lifestyles as she was sent there by her parents to
learn these life lessons and be guided by the accused. The accused further used his
position of dominance or authority over the 18-yr. old victim making her believe that
he was raping her for her own good calling it a mantra to cleanse her aura.
1.1.3 MEDICAL EVIDENCE IS NOT RELEVANT
The presence of smegma on the corona glandis of the accused soon after the
incident is proof against complete penetration since it rubbed off during the
intercourse28 but to be of any value examination of smegma must be done within 24
hrs.29 Since in this case the medical tests were done after about 6 years, the medical
tests are of no relevance. The fact inmedical examination report of the accused -
Exhibit 51, Smegma deposits on corona: Present hence becomes irrelevant.
1.2 THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER 376(2)(f) OF IPC
The Indian Penal Code (parimateria to Indie Land Penal Code) under 376(2)(f),
states that “whoever being a relative, guardian, or teacher of, or a person in a position
of trust or authority towards the woman, commits rape shall be punished with rigorous
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imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 10 yrs., but which may extend to
imprisonment for life.”
Since, he was also her guardian and teacher in a position of trust which he violated
in the grossest of such violations. He is liable to be convicted under Section 376(2)(f).
1.3 THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER 376(2)(k) OF IPC
The Indian Penal Code (parimateria to Indie Land Penal Code) under 376(2)(k)
states that Whoever, “Being in a position of control or dominance over a woman,
commits rape on such woman shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than 10 yrs., but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”
Hence, the counsel humbly submits that by virtue of the above facts, the accused
used his power of control and dominance and must be convicted under Section 376(2)
(k).
1.4 THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER 376(2)(n) OF IPC
The accused did not stop raping the prosecutrix till she was in the ashram which
can be inferred from the statement she made in the FIR “Guruji also raped me a day
before our wedding but I was unable to protect myself.” This shows that he repeatedly
raped the helpless victim.
376(2)(n) states that Whoever, “Commits rape repeatedly on the same woman
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
10 years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”
Therefore, the counsel humbly submits that the accused is also liable under Section
376(2)(n) as he repeatedly raped her.
Hence, the counsel humbly submits before the hon'ble court that accused is liable
for rape under Section 376, 376(2)(f), 376(2)(k) & 376(2)(n).
ISSUE-2: WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE TO BE CONVICTED FOR
OUTRAGING THE MODESTY OF A WOMAN AND SEXUAL HARRASSMENT UNDER
SECTION 354 AND 354A OF IPC?
2.1 THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE TO BE CONVICTED FOR OUTRAGING THE
MODESTY OF A WOMAN UNDER SECTION 354 AS WELL AS SEXUAL
HARASSMENT UNDER SECTION 354A.
It is humbly submitted that the accused outraged the modesty of the prosecutrix or
molested her as well as sexually harassed her on various occasions and hence must be
held liable for the heinous acts under both the sections, Section 354 as well as section
354A. Generally, when the modesty of a woman is outraged or it is likely to be
outraged coupled with an assault or criminal force, Section 354 IPC would be
attracted. Ingredients of Section 354 IPC would show that the same mandate an actus
reas of assault or criminal force with an intention to outrage or likely to outrage the
modesty whereas a mere physical contact with advances as noted above would attract
Section 354A IPC. Though in this case there is an overlap of both Sections 354 and
354A IPC however. Once an offence falls under Section 354 IPC even if ingredients of
Section 354A IPC are satisfied, the accused will be punished for Section 354 IPC the
same being more serious in nature as it prescribes the minimum sentence of one year
and term for imprisonment which may extend to five years.30 In the present case the
allegations proved against the petitioner are that he fondled the breast of the
prosecutrix with ill intention and also molested her on a different occasion.
2.2 THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE TO BE CONVICTED FOR OUTRAGING THE
MODESTY OF A WOMAN UNDER SECTION 354
Section 354, IPC, has been enacted with a view to protect a woman against
indecent assault. The object of the provisions as contained in ss. 354, IPC is to protect
a woman against indecent behaviour of others which is offensive to morality. These
offences are not only offences against individual but against public morals and society
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as well.31
Intention to outrage the modesty of a woman or the knowledge that the accused
would result outraging her modesty is the gravamen of the offence.32
In the present case, the PW 1 when examined, has stated;
“…he kissed me on my forehead and fondled my breasts and said I would know
that very soon. I did get uncomfortable by his touch but because…,”33 “…the very
next night, he repeatedly raped me in pretext of cleansing my bad karma. In the
beginning he came to my room every night but after four months he started coming
to me once a week and later on he would come to my room once every month…,”34
“…on 21st., Guruji came to my room at night and tried to molest me again but
because few of his followers were hovering around my room, he left my room…”35 .
From the above statements, the fact that the PW 1 was “uncomfortable by his
touch” as stated by her it is apparent that the touch wasn't welcome and was forced
upon her. Fondling the prosecutrix's breast against her will and without her consent
will constitute the use of criminal force against her36 . Where the prosecutrix doesn't
state specifically about the act, but has loosely described as “fondling”, the modesty of
the women is believed to have been outraged.37 The intent of the accused is clear from
the very point at which he calls the prosecutrix alone to his room and concocts the
story of cleansing her aura and thereby touches her inappropriately. He subjecting her
to his perverse acts, touching her inappropriately, that is kissing and fondling her
breasts38 without consent under the pretext of cleansing of her aura. The fact that
there was no request of sexual intercourse but that the prosecutrix was forced into
submission of it further proves outraging of her modesty. Claim of lack of protest
cannot be an alibi, and the culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter.
The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. The
accused in this case had committed the offence of outraging the modesty of the
prosecutrix the moment he touched her with the immoral intention of outraging her
modesty by molesting or raping her. This stands true even for the later event of
molestation39 on the 21st of April 2016, the offence of molestation of a woman which
leads to outraging the modesty of the lady is a bailable offence, and in the eyes of law,
not that big an offence as compared with rape or murder, but in the eyes of society
this remains a heinous act.
In a case of sexual molestation, the court held accused liable for rape by declaring,
“the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex”. The court further explained that, “the
act of pulling a woman, removing her saree, coupled with a request for sexual
intercourse…would be an outrage to the modesty of a woman; and knowledge, that
modesty is likely to be outraged, is sufficient to constitute the offence.”40
A person who is guilty of attempting rape cannot be allowed to escape with a lesser
penalty than that of this section. Outraging a woman's modesty as mentioned in s.
354 will apply to crimes against women that fall short of penetration, in which event it
becomes rape. In this case for rape to take place outraging of modesty of the woman
must have always taken place, as the moment you disrobe her or even touch the
women with intention to carry out a sexually perverse act with the women, the
modesty of the women has been outraged, just like in the case of the prosecutrix.
Therefore, the counsel humbly submits that the accused is liable for the offence of
assault or use of criminal force to woman with the intent to outrage her modesty under
section 354.
2.3 THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF THE WOMEN
UNDER SECTION 354A IPC
Sexual harassment under section 354A is defined as, a man making any physical
contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures ordemanding
or requesting for sexual favours.41
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In the present case the accused sexually harassed the prosecutrix which can be
traced from the circumstances and the given statements.
The physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual
overtures made by the accused are manifest in the statements of PW 1 when she
states “…I did get uncomfortable by his touch…”42 wherein touch refers to the accused
touching her inappropriately in her private parts, i.e. fondling her breasts and kissing
her without her consent, as well as the statements of PW 9 her very act of hitting the
accused with the plate for preventing the attempt of assault shows that the physical
contact by the accused was unwelcome.
The accused molested the prosecutrix on the 21st of April and that would also
amount to unwelcome physical contact and advances as she cried after the incident
and it was this incident that prompted her to file a case against the accused. The
accused's various concocted stories to free the women from their unclean aura or to
help them attain more peace and the acts required to do so, knowing that they were
girls of 18 sent to the ashram to learn these life lessons and be guided by the Guru,
couldn't deny anything asked by him in the matter of learning or improving
themselves or their lifestyles, can be interpreted as a demand for sexual favours,
under clause(2) of the section.
From the above stated arguments it is apparent that sexual harassment of both PW
1 and PW 9 has taken place, by the very virtue of the fact that PW 6 was also raped by
the accused against her will and without her consent it is reasonable to assume she
was also subjected to sexual harassment in one of the four mentioned forms as stated
under the section 354A, IPC.
Therefore, the counsel humbly submits the accused is liable for sexual harassment
under section 354A.
ISSUE-3: WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 326, 428 AND
377 OF THE INDIE LAND PENAL CODE?
3.1 THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE TO BE CONVICTED FOR CRIMINAL
INTIMIDATION UNDER SECTION 506
In the instant case, the accused has been tried by the session court for the charges
framed under section 326 of IPC. As grievous hurt as described cannot be applied to
animals, the section is applicable only to human beings. It is humbly submitted that
the accused is liable for criminally intimidating the Prosecutrix by threating to kill her
if she doesn't abide by his wishes by killing her pet under section 506, and not under
Section 326. In this context alteration of charges can come into picture.
The Section 21643 of CrPC talks about alteration or addition of the charge but it
should bedone before the judgment pronounced.44 The charge can be altered at the
stage of the trial depending upon the evidences adduced in the case. Framing of
charges depends upon the trial judges after considering the relevant materials on
record. Trial court is the appropriate court to frame the charges and moreover trial
court can find the truthfulness, sufficiency and acceptability of the material
produced.45
As per Section 46446 of CrPC which deals with the effect of omission to frame, or
absence of, or error in, charges. The mere omission to frame a charge or mere defect
in the charge is no ground forsettingaside a conviction. Procedural laws are made with
the aim to facilitate the justice. Technicalities should not come in the way of
administration of justice. The aimof the charge is to convey the accused that what he
has been charged with. If thenecessary information is conveyed to accused and there
is no prejudice caused to himdue to the charges, then the accused cannot take the
defence that the framed chargeswere defective.47
In judging a question of prejudice related with the guilt of accused. Court must act
with abroad vision and look to the substance and not to technicalities, and their main
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-
concernshould be to see whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what
he wasbeing tried for, whether the main facts sought to be establishment against him
wereexplained to him fairly and clearly and whether he was given a full and fair chance
todefend himself.48
Section 326 describes the voluntary causing of grievous hurt49 as defined above,
using a dangerous weapon or means and the punishment for it50 . A dangerous object
may include any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument
which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or means of fire or any
heated substance, or means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or means of any
explosive substance, or means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human
body to inhale, to swallow, or to re-ceive into the blood, or any animal51 (that will
cause hurt). There is no such thing as a regular or earmarked weapon for committing
murder or for that matter a hurt. Whether a particular article can per se cause any
serious wound or grievous hurt or injury has to be determined factually.52 This section
fulfils all the criteria of grievous hurt but cannot be applied to animals, Hence the
counsel would like to alter the charges from grievous hurt under Sec 326 to criminal
intimidation under Sec 506 IPC.53
U/s. 506 of the IPC, if threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc. or to cause an
offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
seven years, or with fine, or with both.
The PW 1 during her examination states that:
“…When Indu (my pet stray dog) tried to protect me one night, Guruji took a
wooden stick rammed it into her (Indu's) vagina pulling her intestine out. I saw the
dog lying in the pool of blood with her intestines poured out After this Guruji barked
at me saying that if I ever protest against his Mantra again and if I ever complained
he will proceed to do the same with me.”54
This statement by the PW 1 clearly shows the Guruji tried to intimidate her by
killing her pet and threatening to do the same to her if she complains about the abuse
she was facing. Criminal intimidation means threatening another with any injury to his
person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that
person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person
to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that
person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat,
commits criminal intimidation.55 The threat must be real in the sense that the accused
means what he says and the victim of the threat should actually feel threatened.56
Property includes pets, hence by hurting and killing her pet, he was intimidating her,
as it not only alarmed her, but his later threat forced her to keep quiet about the
sexual abuse and to accept it without any complains. The intention of the accused
must be to cause alarm to the victim and whether he is alarmed or not is of no
consequence. However, mere expression of any words without any intention to cause
alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of the section 50657 . Here the
intention was clear.
Therefore, the counsel humbly submits the accused is liable for criminal
intimidation under Section 506.
3.2 THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE TO BE CONVICTED FOR MISCHIEF BY
KILLING OR MAIMING ANIMAL UNDER SECTION 428
dog comes within the definition of animals for section 428 of the IPC. By maiming and
killing the dog, the accused has committed mischief as described under the
aforementioned section and must be convicted for it. Abuse of animals must be
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-
treated as a crime against society because right to dignity and fair treatment is not
only confined to human beings alone, but to animals too. It flies in the face of our
Constitutional duty under Article 51A(g), which enjoins us to have compassion for all
living beings and not just humans.
The word ‘animal’ in S. 42858 denotes ‘any living creature, other than a human
being. The word ‘maiming’ means some kind of a permanent injury which causes
privation of the use of a limb or a member of the body59 . The animal affected must be
property, it must belong to somebody, it must be a pet, which it is in the present
case60 . Similarly, the expression ‘rendering useless’ implies that the animal is no more
of use at all for the work in which it was being used.
During her examination the PW 1 stated that “… the dog lying in the pool of blood
with her intestines poured out…”61 which indicates that the dog was either maimed in
a grievous manner as has already been proved or she was dead as her intestines were
pulled out and she was lying in a pool of blood it is reasonable to assume that she
might be dead. The fact that the PW 1 in her statements during cross examination
says that, “…I don't know what happened to Indu after that, I have never seen her
body…”62 indicates that there is no certainty of the dog's death. In any case the extent
of harm done to the dog has rendered it useless for the application of the section.
Hence the accused has committed the crime of maiming or killing the dog.
Therefore, the counsel humbly submits the accused is liable for committing mischief
by killing or maiming an animal of the value of 10 rupees under Section 428.
3.3 THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE TO BE CONVICTED FOR BESTIALITY UNDER
SECTION 377
It is humbly submitted that the accused rammed a stick into the vagina of a dog,
the act committed is an unnatural act of bestial nature and must be punished under
section 377 of the Indian Penal Code.
Bestiality is a part of the ‘unnatural offences’ described under section 377 of the
Indian Penal Code (parimateria to Indie Penal Code).
In all of the sexual offences mere penetration is sufficient to constitute carnal
intercourse. This offence consists a carnal intercourse committed against the order of
nature by man with man, or in the same unnatural manner with woman, or by man or
woman in any manner with beast.63 Where in beasts means animals and include dogs.
The term carnal may be interpreted to mean lustful in this context. The provision was
meant to cover the whole range of sexual acts against the order of nature, the variety
of which the drafters recognised and did not wish to limit by words of description.64
Bestiality65 is a species of buggery, and it is committed when a human being, male
or female, has sex with an animal per anus or per vagina.66 “It usually takes place
through the vagina but it may also take place through the vagina, anus, or any other
part of the body fit to receive the male organ.”67
With the coming into force of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 201368 and the
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (the Pocso Act)69 , the scope of
sexual assault has been widened to include non peno-vaginal sexual assault and also
criminalise non-consensual sexual acts between children thereby plugging important
gaps in the law governing sexual violence in India.70
The words used in the Penal Code were very simple and wide enough to include all
acts against the order of nature which includes non-penile penetration of the vagina of
an animal. The words of Section 377 are simple and wide enough to include any carnal
intercourse against the order of nature within its ambit71 .
In this case the PW 1 when examined states the following;
“There were few stray dogs near the Ashram and I used to feed and play a bit
with one of the dogs whom I had named fondly as Indu. Indu would regularly wait
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-
for me near my cottage room so that I could feed her rotis”72
“…when I was living in Ashram I was repeatedly raped by Guruji in the pretext of
cleansing my aura. When Indu (my pet stray dog) tried to protect me one night,
Guruji took a wooden stick rammed it into her (Indu's) vagina pulling her intestine
out. I saw the dog lying in the pool of blood with her intestines poured out…”73
The prosecutrix's statements (insertion of some sec from evidence act, giving it
validity) suggest that there were a few stray dogs in her Ashram, out of which one of
them was indicated by her to be her pet who would wait on her every day near her
cottage room. On one of the nights when the accused went to the prosecutrix's
cottage, the said dog also happened to be present. The dog tried to stop the accused,
who got violent and “took a wooden stick rammed it into her (Indu's) vagina pulling
her intestine out”.
This act of ramming an object into the private parts of an animal amounts to
bestiality under section 377. The section leaves a lot of scope for interpretation of the
term penetration, but when interpreted as it is interpreted for the purposes of rape,
penetration includes non-penile penetration as well as penile penetration.74 There is no
doubt that there has been penetration to the extent of pulling out the dog's intestines.
The penetration was done through a stick, into the vagina of the dog. This act is
heinous and completely against the order of nature, no act so abominable maybe
considered justified so as to be excluded from the interpretation of the term ‘against
the order of nature’. Hence the act fulfils all the conditions for the unnatural offence of
bestiality and comes under Section 377.
A case with similar facts wherein a stick has been rammed into the vagina of a dog
is pending before the Supreme Court at the moment, the case filed is for changing the
charges from section 428 to bestiality under Section 377 as it constitutes bestiality as
the act is against the order of nature.
Therefore, the counsel humbly submits the accused is liable for the act of bestiality
under section 377.
PRAYER
Wherefore in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it
is humbly and respectfully submitted that this Honourable Court may be pleased to:
I. CONVICT THE ACCUSED FOR RAPE UNDER SECTION 376 OF IPC.
II. CONVICT THE ACCUSED FOR OUTRAGING THE MODESTY AND SEXUAL
HARRASSMENT OF A WOMAN UNDER SECTION 354 AND 354A OF IPC
RESPECTIVELY.
III. CONVICT THE ACCUSED FORCRIMINAL INTIMIDATION, MISCHIEF BY KILLING
OR MAIMING OF ANIMALSAND BESTIALITY UNDER SECTIONS 506, 428 AND 377
OF IPC RESPECTIVELY.
And pass any other order that this Honourable Court may deem fit in the interests
of justice, equity and good conscience.
1
Section 375, IPC.
2 State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : AIR 1996 SC 1393; State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa,
(2004) 4 SCC 75.
3
Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546; Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013)
7 SCC 675 : AIR 2013 SC 2071.
4 State of Punjab v. Ramdev Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 421 : AIR 2004 SC 1290.
5 Jugendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2012) 6 SCC 297.
6Gurucharan Singh v. State of Haryana, (1972) 2 SCC 749 : AIR 1972 SC 2661; Shri Bodhisattwa Gautam v.
Miss Subhra Chakraborty, (1996) 1 SCC 490 : AIR 1996 SC 922.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
7State of Maharashtra v. Priya Sharan Maharaj, (1997) 4 SCC 393; Kamalanantha v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005)
5 SCC 194.
8 In Shri Bodhi Sattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chaudhary (1996) 1 SCC 490 : AIR 1996 SC 922, it was observed by
the court that the raped woman undergoes traumatic experiences at the time of trial. She relives the experience
of rape, in glare of publicity in a totally alien atmosphere. The tribulations which begin with the treatment of rape
victims by police, continue through a male dominated criminal justice system.
9 Ganga Singh v. State of M.P., (2013) 7 SCC 278.
10 Satendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha v. State of Bihar, 2003 Cri. L.J. 392 at 394 (Pat.).
11 State of H.P. v. State of Haryana, (2004) 8 SCC 153; State of Chhatisgarh v. Derha, (2004) 9 SCC 699.
12Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2004) 4 SCC 379 : AIR 2004 SC 1497 : 2004 CrLJ 1399, the court added
that if it is not able to accept the version of the prosecutrix, it may seek evidence to lend assurance to her
testimony, a kind of assurance which is short of corroboration would suffice as is the practice in dealing with
accomplice evidence.
13 Balaji Laxman Itkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cri. L.J. 3224 (Bom.).
14 Rajoo v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 15 SCC 133 : AIR 2009 SC 858.
15
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sanjay Kumar, (2017) 2 SCC 51 : 2016 (4) Crimes 424 SC : 2016 (12) SCALE
831.
16
Vijay alias Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 8 SCC 191; State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash
Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550.
17
Suresh v. State of Rajasthan (2013) 2 RLW 1039 (Raj).
18 Ayub Hussain Mandal v. State of Assam, (2007) 15 SCC 549.
19
Prem Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2005 Cri. L.J. 1145 (MP).
20
Rajinder @ Raju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2009) 16 SCC 69 : JT 2009 (9) SC 9.
21 State of H.P. v. Gian Chand (2001) 6 SCC 71.
22 R v. Linekar, (1995) 3 All ER 69 (CA).
23Rao Harmarain, AIR 1958 Punj 123; Sitaram v. State of M.P., 1996 CrLJ 4 (MP); Narendrasingh v. State of
M.P. 1996 CrLJ 198 (MP); Bandu v. State of Maharashtra, 1996 CrLJ 285 (Bom).
24Rabinarayandas v. State of Orissa, 1992 CrLJ 269 (Ori); Gajanand Maganlal Mehta v. State of Gujarat, 1987
CrLJ 374 (Guj.).
25Fletcher, (1859) 8 Cox 131. Sohan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1998 CrLJ 2618 (Raj); Shiv Nath v. State of
M.P.,1998 CrLJ 2691 (MP).
26
Mukhera Belakota Reddi v. State of A.P., 1992 CrLJ 2236 (AP).
27 Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46; Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar (2005) 1 SCC 88; Yedla
Srinivasan Rao v. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 615; State of H.P. v. Mange Ram, (2000) 7 SCC 224.
28 Ram Kala, 47 CrLJ 611 (All).
29S.P. Kohli, 1978 CrLJ 1804; Panibhusan Behra v. State of Orissa, (1995) 2 CrLJ 1561 (Ori); Mahesh Kumar
Bherulal v. State of M.P., (1995) 2 CrLJ 2021 (MP).; Y. Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P., (1995) 2 CrLJ 1597 (AP).
30 T. Manikadan v. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2017 SCC Del 6440.
31 Girdhar Gopal v. State, AIR 1958 MB 147 (148).
32 Tarkeshwar Sahu v. State of Bihar (2006) 8 SCC 560.
33 Moot Problem, Page no. 14.

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
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-
36 Ashraf Khan v. State of MP, 2013 CrLJ 1286 (MP).
37 Premiya v. State of Rajhasthan, (2008) 10 SCC 81 : AIR 2009 SC 351.
38
S.I. Pramodh Singh v. State of J &K.
39 Rameshwar, (1984) Cr. LJ 786 (P&H). Ram Asrey v. State of U.P, 1990 Cr LJ 405.
40 Ramkripal v. State of M.P (2007) 11 SCC 265.
41 Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013.
42
Moot Problem, Page no. 14.
43 The Code of Criminal Procedure, Bare Act, Professional Publisher.
44 Jasvinder Saini v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2013) 7 SCC 256 : AIR 2014 SC 841.
45
Salman Khan v. State of Maharashtra (2004) 1 SCC 525 : AIR 2004 SC 1189.
46 Supra Note 43.
47 Gurbachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 623.
48
Willie (William) v. State of M.P., AIR 1956 SC 116.
49 Prasad Mahato v. State of Bihar, 1994 SCC (Cri) 55.
50 Sattan Sahani v. State of Bihar, (2002) 7 SCC 604.
51
Section 326, Indian Penal Code.
52 State of UP v. Indrajeet alias Sukatha, (2000) 7 SCC 249.
53 Supra note 43.
54
55 Supra note 43.
56
Noble Mohandas v. State of T.N., 1989 CrLJ 669 (Mad); Siyasaran v. State of M.P., 1995 CrLJ 2126 (SC).
57
Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabaghana Behera, 1995 CrLJ 3559 (Ori).
58
59 Emperor v. Juman Sajan, AIR 1947 Sindh 66 : 48 Cri.L.J. 700.
60
61 Moot Problem, Page no. 14.
62 Ibid.
63
Ratanlal&Dhirajlal, Law of Crimes Vol II (241h Ed, 1998) at 1822.
64
(2001) 13 Sac LJ 406.
65The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines bestiality as ‘sexual relations between a human being
and an animal’. In England, bestiality is prohibited under Section 12 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956.
66
Gandhi, Indian Penal Code at 439.
67 Raghavan, supra n 11 at 923; Ejaz Ahmad, supra n 11 at 320.
68 Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013.
69
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.
70 Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1.
71 Ibid.
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72
73 Ibid.
74 Supra note 43.
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Page 1 Saturday, February 01, 2020

5th AURO National Criminal Law Moot, 2019

Before The Hon'ble District and Sessions Court

3.3 THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE TO BE CONVICTED FOR

48. Ram Asrey v. State of U.P 1990 Cr LJ 405

10. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, “Commentary on the Code of Criminal

33 Moot Problem, Page no. 14.

© EBC Publishing Pvt.Ltd., Lucknow.

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