To Renew a Rational Debate

Reviewed Work(s): A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger by Michael Friedman
Review by: Joseph Agassi
Source:
Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly /
‫ רבעון פילוסופי‬:‫עיון‬
54 (July 2005), pp. 317-323
Published by: S. H. Bergman Center for Philosophical Studies
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 Joseph Agassi

To Renew a Rational Debate

Michael Friedman's book has a clear and laudable aim: he hopes to see a
dialogue between the two leading schools of contemporary philosophy, the
analytic and the Continental.* To that end he discusses the 1929 meeting in
Davos, Switzerland, that was the last significant inter-school dialogue. He is
not the first; previous efforts in this direction, especially that of Sir Michael
Dummett's, have not seen success. Dummett's focus is on the origins of both
schools in the late nineteenth century, on the philosophy of Franz Brentano,
as he addresses their concern with logic and language; Friedman's focus is
on the early twentieth-century Neo-Kantians, as he addresses their concern
with the theory of knowledge, with claims for certainty. Kant had said that
the absence of a consensus about the basis of the consensus is a scandal.

Friedman follows suit and discusses dissent about proof.

Friedman's point of departure is Rudolf Carnap's critique of Martin
Heidegger's slogans as grammatical blunders and notes that it "may now
strike us as more than slightly absurd" (p. x). He finds the diversity of
interest of the two schools more important: one involves science, the other
involves the arts, the humanities (p. ix). Caring for both, he wishes to revive
the dialogue between them. Diversity of interests is no incentive for debate,
especially if one party is ignorant of the other's subject of interest. But
Friedman sees the escape into interest in the humanities as due to despair
about the theory of knowledge.
To his surprise, Friedman tells us, he has learned that once Carnap took
Heidegger seriously: he was present at the 1929 Davos meeting, where
Heidegger and Cassirer were engaged in a public debate, and he argued in
private with each of them. Friedman takes this as his point of departure, as
the last dialogue between the two parties (although Cassirer belonged to

* Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger

(Chicago and LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 2000).

317

© lyyun The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 54 (July 2005): 317-323

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318 Joseph Agassi

neither). Friedman ignores later encounters, such as the trip of Gilbert Ryle
and others to Paris in the late 1940s for a debate with Merleau-Ponty and
others. He values the discussion in Davos, as it centered on the interpretation
of Kant's first Critique. It was an attempt not to understand but to impose
new ideas on an old text. So its value is not as Kant scholarship but as an
exposition of the responses of different twentieth-century thinkers to Kant's
epistemology. The question they debated is important, as it concerned both
rationalism and liberal politics. Friedman says, one should not make too
much of the politics, since the rivals in Davos were cordial. Cordiality is
rather irrelevant, but politics no longer signifies for philosophy in any case,
observes Friedman, since some followers of Heidegger are on the left.
Heidegger conceded that his assertions might fail to appeal to the analytic
taste (p. 12). Carnap took this as an admission of defeat (p. 12). Heidegger
ridiculed this (p. 13). This exchange widened the gulf. It is clear why: some
philosophers do not abide by the rules of rational debate (Karl Popper, The
Open Society and Its Enemies, chapter 24). Yet Friedman hopes that
Heidegger's followers are open to rational debate; he supposes that at least
it is worth a try.
It is particularly worth a try since "Heidegger and Carnap are actually in a
remarkable agreement" (p. 13). Popper used this fact as evidence for the
futility of analysis (op. cit., 2: 297, 316). In part, Friedman tacitly agrees:
Carnap did not oppose "endeavors towards a synthesis and generalization of
the results of the various sciences" (p. 13). These endeavors comprise
scientific metaphysics. Hence, the difference between good and bad
metaphysics is not grammatical. This nullifies the central analytic thesis.
Friedman concedes this: "Carnap is primarily concerned with 'overcoming' a
very peculiar kind of 'metaphysics'" (p. 14). This leads him to wish "to
understand Carnap's anti-metaphysical attitude in its philosophical, cultural,
and political context" (p. 15). Carnap would have objected: he said
emphatically that grammatical analysis does not depend on context. Against
this, Friedman uses other claims of Carnap and thus proves him inconsistent.
Alternatively, he takes seriously some remarks of his that are better ignored.
This, however, is hard to do: "Carnap disagrees with Neurath over whether
social and political arguments can be used in support of philosophical—that
is logical—conclusions, but he just as strongly agrees with his more activist
friend and colleague that philosophy can and should serve social and political
aims in its particular historical context" (p. 16). Here Friedman touches upon

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 To Renew a Rational Debate 319

the inconsistency of Carnap's view of philosophy: at times but only at times

he considered logic a sufficient tool for unifying science. Friedman also notes
Carnap's appreciation of the anti-metaphysical stance as useful for liberal
causes (pp. 17 and 19). He also notes that Carnap and his peers disagreed
about politics (pp. 17n and 18n). They could not resolve disagreements by
analysis. Carnap tried to do this by analyzing Heidegger's words (p. 21).
Heidegger responded to this in a draft, published only posthumously (p. 22).
Friedman, we remember, finds Carnap's critique "more than slightly absurd."
Yet he finds hope in the need of both parties for improvement.
The need of the other school to improve was never contested. Edmund
Husserl, the initiator of the Continental school, developed phenomenology
as a solution to some neo-Kantian problems concerning certitude, and
Heidegger rebelled against him. So now neither party is concerned with
certitude. Friedman discusses Heidegger's critique of Husserl that today, he
suggests, is generally conceded: the subject of Husserl's discussion is an
a-historical and context-free individual; Heidegger preferred the individual
historical and context-dependent.
"There is no doubt," says Friedman, that Husserl's idea of the human
individual is abstract and that Heidegger's idea of the real human (Dasein)
is concrete (p. 49). Heidegger says, we all suffer from fear and boredom.
How concrete is this? Or, as Friedman asks this question, "How do we
construct an a priori analysis of the real concrete subject?" (p. 49). Friedman
cites Heidegger's reply in full (for "Dasein" read "a real human"):

How do we construct an a priori analysis of the real concrete subject? We start with
a feature of Dasein that is even more fundamental than the three features noted above,
namely, its finitude. Dasein is no a-temporal eternal being but rather a being that is
finite—temporally finite—at its very core. The question, then, is how to represent this
essentially temporal finitude of Dasein, and how then to put this representation to use
in grounding and articulating an a priori analysis of Dasein. Such a representation of
finitude does not appear to be within the framework of Husserlian "pure
consciousness." Pure phenomenological consciousness, for Husserl, is characterized
as a flow of phenomena or immanent experiences to a punctual or momentary "now,"
from the perspective of which this flow is intentionally grasped (as past, present, and
future, earlier and later, and so on), and it is necessarily experienced as temporally
unlimited at both ends. Husserl's phenomenological time is thus essentially infinite,
not finite.63 And it is clear, moreover, that simply adding temporal finitude to
Husserl's characterization (adding the stipulation that the intentional flow of
phenomena is limited at both ends) takes us no further. (Pp. 49-50)

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320 Joseph Agassi

(Footnote 63 provides reference to Husserl's text.) Some readers find this kind
of writing profound and in great need of elaboration, others find it trite. It does
confuse the concept of finitude with finitude, incidentally, and in a manner
that Carnap spotted and declared characteristic of Heidegger's philosophical
output. This is what Friedman finds "more than slightly absurd." And this
example shows that he has a point: the grammatical error is there, but it hardly
troubles anyone. Rather, what is troubling some readers is the understanding
of this long quote to say no more than this: Heidegger viewed real humans as
mortal and he said that Husserl had denied this by implication.
Friedman reads Carnap's first major work—concerning space—as
neo-Kantian. He admits that this reading differs from the standard one, of
Camap and of Quine (p. 7 In). Carnap soon followed Wittgenstein, and he
then read the old work to fit the new setting, as he was already in tune with
Wittgenstein's philosophy: he had found no disagreement about space: "there
is actually nothing to dispute about after all" (p. 64). This is an appraisal, let
me interject, not a factual assertion: debates about space were animated then,
as they still are. How mistaken Popper was in trying to persuade Carnap to
agree with him that they had some disagreement. It is a wonder that Carnap
agreed to differ from Neurath (over politics and over protocol sentences). He
also agreed with the "positivistic" critique of Kantianism, Friedman notes,
but, not seriously: he said, Kantianism was "not.. .completely discredited" (p.
69). As Friedman aims to revive a dispute, he disagrees with Carnap—and
with Wittgenstein too—about disagreements. Yet here it is possible to
smoothen out disagreements in line with Carnap's refusal to completely
discredit competing opinions and not in line with his complete discrediting of
a view as a grammatical blunder. We may explicate matters thus: there are two
sets, the "completely discredited" and the rest, and disagreements with the
"completely discredited" differ from disagreements among the credited.
Hence, let me suggest, when Carnap said that there is no disagreement about
space between the realists and the neo-Kantians, or that he had no
disagreements with Popper, he meant nothing more than that none of the
competing parties is "completely discredited." This makes it crystal clear what
Friedman is after: he seeks a disagreement in which neither party is
"completely discredited." This is very much to my liking, as I am advocating
for decades the idea that the problem of rationality is that of the demarcation of
rational disagreements, namely, of those in which no party is "completely
discredited."

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 To Renew a Rational Debate 321

Cassirer was one of the two discussants in the Davos meting that this
book portrays. As his history is neo-Kantian, it "may... appear as both
'Whiggish' and 'triumphalist,' but... [it] is nevertheless extraordinary" (p.
89). Its defect is in its inclusion of the classical view of rationality as perfect
knowledge, as proof. Einstein had presented science without proof. Hilbert
began then to develop proof theory. Cassirer remained behind. Friedman
presents his view as a "relativization of the 'critical' [neo-Kantian] theory of
knowledge" (p. 96). This makes him Hegelian, not Kantian (pp. 101, 129,
and 135n). Cassirer and Heidegger shared Hegelian ideas.
Young Moritz Schlick criticized Cassirer's unrealistic reading of Einstein's
theories (p. 115), which won him Einstein's gratitude and support. Friedman
recognizes the superiority of Schlick's realistic reading, yet he defends
Cassirer's view (as not "completely discredited"): Schlick had no right to
demand of him to produce an example of an a priori valid synthetic statement
(p. 115). For, Cassirer held that "we can venture the very well-supported
conjecture that one or another special-geometrical structure is present" (p.
116). Schlick was in error, Friedman says, in that he did not notice that in
Cassirer's view the a priori is merely a regulative idea (p. 116-17). Cassirer
responded to Schlick, noting that Schlick himself used a principle of causality,
which is a priori valid. If so, then, after all, Cassirer did have an example of
an a priori valid synthetic statement: the principle of causality. Cassirer
forgot, however, that in his own view a principle need not be a priori valid, as
it can be a "very well-supported conjecture." Nevertheless, Cassirer had a
point. As Friedman notes, he found a tension concerning principles in Schlick:
he viewed every principle alternatively as a priori valid and as valid by mere
convention, never as a "very well-supported conjecture" (p. 118); they all
ignore this third option that Schlick endorsed at the time, before he came to
know Wittgenstein, the option that the principle of causality is uncertain yet a
"very well-supported conjecture."
Cassirer also attacked Carnap's physicalism, according to which we
should limit our assertions about cultures to concepts from physics alone
(pp. 123-24). This, however, is no longer under dispute: as a variant of
Wittgenstein's view of science as a language, physicalism (in the original
strict sense) has no defenders any more.
Heidegger liked Cassirer's anthropology (p. 131). He gave it "ontological
grounding": the overwhelming experience of alienation, of being thrown into
an unknown world (pp. 131-32). This has obvious merit: although it is not

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322 Joseph Agassi

ontological, it is at least true. Also, Cassirer already said so (pp. 133 and 137).
He threw a challenge (p. 139): did Heidegger give up all objectivity (i.e.,
proof)? Yes, responded Heidegger: nothing is stable, not even meanings; we
can only gaze at our inner selves and see there the void that we constitute.
This grounds all groundings. Understanding this void, Heidegger wrapped
things up, is the grand self-liberation (p. 140). This, Cassirer commented,
rests on viewing the "transcendental imagination" as foundation (p. 140).
Kant, by contrast, preferred as foundation the idea of humanity or of morality
(p. 142). Here then is Cassirer's "real and essential objection" to Heidegger:
if all is in flux, if all is finite, then there is no substance, and then, as Kant
would say, nothing is intelligible (pp. 141^4-2). This objection is neo
Kantian: it did not impress non-Kantians, Heidegger least of all.
In Davos, Cassirer used mathematics against Heidegger's finitude. Later
he used humanity instead (p. 142). Friedman approves, since "Kant's entire
architectonic ... rests, in the end, on his original sharp distinction between
sensible and intellectual faculties" (p. 143). Moreover, "Kant himself
grounds the unity of practical and theoretical reason on the idea that it is the
same reason at work in both cases." This is insightful but, as Friedman notes,
it is not Cassirer, since he had no architectonic (pp. 143-44).
Friedman's conclusion about the rift between the two schools is thus

intriguing. "The extraordinarily ambitious post-Kantian program inevitably

provoked severe philosophical reaction" (p. 146). This increased the interest
in the theory of knowledge. This explains how "Frege implemented the idea
of pure logic in a basically technical direction" so successfully (p. 147). This
is problematic, since chronologically Frege came first. This objection may
be small, however, since his ideas took only at the time that Friedman
centers on. The question is, then, when did the "basically technical direction"
take? For this we should know more about it. The following may offer a
clue.

Friedman locates the rift in the difference of the responses to the failure of
the "extraordinarily ambitious post-Kantian program." One response was
formal and science-oriented, one existential and humanities-oriented. By now
the description of the rift is less abstract and more historical: who won the day
and when and why? Here Friedman is in error when he ignores Wittgenstein,
as he had a tremendous influence, perhaps the most central as a contributor to
the rift. Also Carnap's impact is largely due to his adherence to a variant of
Wittgenstein's anti-philosophy. He established his reputation with the

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 To Renew a Rational Debate 323

publication of his Syntax of 1934, where he accepted Russell's preface to

Wittgenstein's first book that was highly critical of it and modified
Wittgenstein's philosophy. (Endorsing Russell's idea of the meta-language,
he declared metaphysics confusions between the object-language and the
meta-language, and used it to dismiss Heidegger as confused this way.)
Friedman explains the allure of analytic philosophy for Carnap: it is his
constant penchant for dissolving all disagreement (pp. 148^9). In accord
with Wittgenstein, he viewed all (prolonged) disagreement as confusions. He
always discussed this: he constantly debated the grounds for the alleged
impossibility of all debate.
The basic fact remains, and is the pivot of this book: both schools claimed
certitude (p. 149) and this blocks debate. Recent developments could remove
this obstacle but it is lingering. The rationalists looked for proof surrogates.
The rest gave up rationalism. This dichotomy rests on the view of rationality
as certitude. (Cassirer stressed this, let me repeat.) Popper has changed all
that, but Friedman ignores him. More's the pity.
Friedman shows high regard for Heidegger's work. Its "result is a
breathtakingly original exploration of the spiritual and philosophical
predicament of the early twentieth century." He "exhibits a sensitive
awareness of the great revolutions in the foundations of mathematics and
mathematical physics that were so important in this period" (p. 151). Yet
Friedman qualifies this praise. He admits: "Heidegger comes increasingly to
adopt a severely dismissive attitude towards these developments" and
deprives them of all "philosophical significance" (p. 151).
Friedman shows high regard for Cassirer's work too, and it is likewise
qualified (p. 152). In lieu of proof, Cassirer sought comprehensiveness. He
failed (p. 154). Analysts like Carnap declared mathematics plus science to
constitute a comprehensive system. They failed too (p. 156). Recognizing
this should suffice for the removal of the obstacle to debate. Instead, the Nazi
"seizure of power" deepened the rift (p. 156). This, we remember, Friedman
deems past history that we better deem relevant no longer.
The quest for a debate is laudable, as is the search for a respectable
disagreement. Friedman's book is hardly likely to reopen the debate, but it
may bring the parties closer to his target. This may be all to the good. At least
it will enhance the great and unconditional value of rational debate.

Tel-Aviv University and York University, Toronto

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