Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No.

L-45081, July 15, 1936

DECISION
(En Banc)

LAUREL, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of
the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the
National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not
been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest
against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The
following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution
providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or
before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner
sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied
his motion.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua
against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the
National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time
as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to
be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore,
the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have
been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP
VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY,
Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY,
ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin
was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front
walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
“IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act
No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team
Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No.
10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against
it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for
by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names
ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of
the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political
question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its
divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation.
Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of
prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court
through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1
of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the
act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right.
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the
manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the
fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an
issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free
speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does
not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies
is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that
the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case,
organ of government before a court may come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s
letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is
enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as
COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their
position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that
all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not
candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences
enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the
RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure
of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is
election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for
consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included,
while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On
the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more
than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of
the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the
subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation
includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner
of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The
tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this
court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only
when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will
it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression.
There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to
post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect
anyone else’s constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public,
the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their
property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of
private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property
rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process
and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals
and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private
property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as
regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on
the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not
to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups
to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into
account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental
regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be
infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary
religious exercise may flourish.”
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
Exercise

Affiliate program commission

Criminal Law

Games
It has a secular legislative purpose;
It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
INTERVENTION

FIRESTONE CERAMICS V. CA
2 Sept. 1999

Facts: The government filed a case to annul the certificate of title of D covering
forestland. X wanted to intervene believing that if D’s title would be annulled and after
declassification of the forestland to alienable land, then his title over a portion of the
property would become valid. Y also wanted to intervene because the cancellation of D’s
title would allegedly pave the way for his free patent application.
Issue: Whether X and Y should be allowed to intervene.

Held: No. Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts when
the applicant shows that he is qualified to intervene as provided under Sec. 1 of Rule
19. The legal interest of the intervenor must be of direct and immediate character and
not merely contingent or expectant so that he will either gain or lose by the direct
operation of the judgment. X and Y merely have a collateral interest in the subject matter
of the litigation, thus, allowing intervention would not be justified.
TERESITA G. FABIAN v. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, GR No. 129742, 1998-09-16
Facts:
Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business.
Private respondents
Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he
allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office
in the office of the Ombudsman.
private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled
petitioner into an amorous relationship.
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989)[1] pertinently provides that -
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari
within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or... decision
or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. (Emphasis supplied)
However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07
(Rules of Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman),[2] when a respondent is absolved
of the charges in an administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and...
unappealable.
"necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because
of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant
provisions:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. - x x x No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy
against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure
question on law.
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial
evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final and
unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari
within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision
or denial... of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the
interest of justice may require.
Issues:
She accordingly submits that the office of the ombudsman has no authority under the
law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed
by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court.
Ruling:
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It...
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
Furthermore in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent,
private respondent's position paper correctly yields the legislative background of
Republic Act No. 6770... t also reveals that Senator
Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted that
the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee on
Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter,... As a
consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be
struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
appeals from... decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise
of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which
shall now be... vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to
procedure only... it cannot be said that transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of
the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a
procedural and not a... substantive power.
rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural
and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the
time the statute went into effect
Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the
transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together
with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the
aforesaid Act and... insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary
cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared
INVALID and of no further force and effect.
Principles:
First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, el al. [23] was intended to give
this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of... legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court
Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008

Facts: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were
suspected of being members of the New People’s Army, were forcibly taken from their
home, detained in various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units. After
several days in captivity, the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their
abductors as members of the armed forces led by General Jovito Palparan. They also
learned that they were being held in place for their brother, Bestre, a suspected leader
of the communist insurgents. While in captivity, they met
other desaperacidos (including the still-missing University of the Philippines students
Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also suspected of being communist
insurgents and members of the NPA. After eighteen months of restrained liberty, torture
and other dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to escape and file a petition for the
writ of amparo.

Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by existing
laws.

Held: Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution. At its core is the immunity of one’s person against
government intrusion. The right to security of person is “freedom from fear,” a guarantee
of bodily and psychological integrity and security.
To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if the Orwellian
sword of the State, wielded recklessly by the military or under the guise of police power,
is directed against them? The law thus gives the remedy of the writ of amparo, in
addition to the rights and liberties already protected by the Bill of Rights. Amparo,
literally meaning “to protect,” is borne out of the long history of Latin American and
Philippine human rights abuses—often perpetrated by the armed forces against farmers
thought to be communist insurgents, anarchists or brigands. The writ serves to both
prevent and cure extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, and threats thereof,
giving the powerless a powerful remedy to ensure their rights, liberties, and
dignity. Amparo, a triumph of natural law that has been embodied in positive law, gives
voice to the preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.

OMBUDSMAN Carpio-Morales v. CA and Jejomar Binay G.R. Nos. 217126-27,

November 10, 2015 Doctrine of Condonation Abandoned
APRIL 1, 2019
FACTS:

A complaint/affidavit was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.
and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr.,
et al), accusing them of Plunder and violation of RA 3019, otherwise known as “The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,” in connection with the five phases of the
procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building.

Before Binay, Jr., et al.’s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman issued the
order placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six
months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.

The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public
officer are present, and that their continued stay in office may prejudice the
investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.

Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the
preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin
its implementation.

Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any
anomalous activity attending any of the five phases of the Makati Parking Building
project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati
in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election
as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative
liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and
academic.

Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, the Ombudsman filed the
present petition before this Court, assailing the CA’s Resolution, which granted Binay,
Jr.’s prayer for TRO.

The Ombudsman claims that the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.’s prayer for
a TRO.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of condonation should apply in Binay’s case.

RULING:

The petition is partly meritorious.

This Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this
jurisdiction. It was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959
and thus, out of touch from – and now rendered obsolete by – the current legal regime.
In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that
originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as
Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon
by the CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of the condonation

doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines.

The condonation doctrine was first enunciated in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija, There is no truth in Pascual’s postulation that the courts would be
depriving the electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be
sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular
constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office.

In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically
implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and
republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective
official’s administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the
same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it
be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law,
whether in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists.

Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate’s
will has been abdicated.
DUNCANO VS SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. NO. 191894 JULY 15, 2015)
Duncano vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015

Facts: Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional
Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758. On March 24, 2009, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for
violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILO
DUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking public officer, being the Regional Director of
Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is
under an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his assets,
liabilities and net worth and financial and business interests, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and
Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business
interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which
he and his family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor
vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part
of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner.
Held: No. The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of
the 1973 Constitution. By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486. The decree was later amended by P.D. No.
1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860, and P.D. No. 1861.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for
in Section 4, Article XI thereof. Aside from Executive Order Nos. 14 and 14-a, and R.A.
7080, which expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further
modified by R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 8249, and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.
For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which
states: SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
“A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
“(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
“(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
“(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
“(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
“(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
“(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
“(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
“(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations.
“(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
“(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
“(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
“(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
“B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
“C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by
the law. In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The specific inclusion constitutes an exception
to the general qualification relating to “officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher,
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.”38 As ruled in Inding:
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the
accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has
jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the
principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those
specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated
otherwise, except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to
(g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of
the proper trial courts “where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to SG 27 or higher.” By this construction, the entire Section 4 is
given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a
harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to
every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that
construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute – its every
word.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees
occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade “27” or higher,
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758)
in relation to their office.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the
position of Director II with Salary Grade “26” under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in
serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs
prayed for.

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 132601,

January 19, 1999
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent
Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC
not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power
of the executive to grant reprieve.

Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and
executory, still has jurisdiction over the case

Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers
or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction
to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final, the
SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.

The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essential aspect of its
jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution
vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is
the process of execution of decisions where supervening events
may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and
adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these
unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent
and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them comform
to law and justice.

The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting the TRO,
the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec.
19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final
judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the
appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final
conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such
a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation
of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary
suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be
denied that Congress can at any timeamend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the
penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that
ofcommutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power
to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the President to
commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative
and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for
the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that
only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction
is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the
government.

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v Court of Appeals

Case Digest
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v CA

FACTS:

This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of
Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT
COMPANY, INCORPORATED. The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the
Government of India while the private respondent is a private corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines.

The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from the failure of the
respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner even it had already
received payment and despite petitioner’s several demands. The petitioner then informed the
private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their
contract which stipulates that he venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favour of the petitioner
setting forth the arbitral award. To enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a
Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the
arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by the respondent but foreign
court refused to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to pay the required filing
fees. Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands
by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount
adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City
for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent
moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action.
The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of
the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the
arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court
could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed this petition for review on
certiorari,

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the
private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract.

RULING:

The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not
preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact
and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the
fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs
from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. If the procedure in the
foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to
pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of
the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's
complaint before Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED,
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De Castro v. JBC
Facts:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen
from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010
or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman
Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC,
requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be
commenced immediately.

In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that
they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief
Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief
Justice.
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or
recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star.

In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of
announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their
sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010.

Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice
Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the
President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being
unresolved.

The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for
either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass
the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight
appointment.

A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30,
1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of
Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred
to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII
prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions
during the period therein fixed.

ISSUES

W/N the petitioners have legal standing?

W/N there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination?

W/N the incumbent President appoint the next Chief Justice?

W/N mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of
nominees by the JBC?

RULING

Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by
the Court.

Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits
are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law
or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually
sue in the public interest.” But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners “are not covered
by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious
constitutional questions raised.”

There is a justiciable issue

We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the
selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President
for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief
Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process
of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether
to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next
President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps
are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates,
and the “interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.”

The resolution of the controversy will surely settle – with finality – the nagging questions
that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or
that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.

PROHIBITION UNDER SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII DOES NOT APPLY TO

APPOINTMENTS TO FILL A VACANCY IN THE SUPREME COURT OR TO OTHER
APPOINTMENST TO THE JUDICIARY.

Two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict:

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:

Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.

Justification of the Supreme Court:

First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the
framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution.
Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions
of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but
purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the
Constitution should contain.

The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the
awesome powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative
(Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The
arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that
underlies the political structure

As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others,
it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of
appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial
appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall – an imperative,
operating to impose a duty that may be enforced – should not be disregarded. Thereby,
Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of
a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The
failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.

The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy
in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite
mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere
judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed
because it was “couched in stronger negative language.”

Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the
Judiciary.

There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as
part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an
outgoing Chief Executive. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in
Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined
the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did
not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of
candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the
JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by
doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments.

Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments
in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC
itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors
about the “constitutionality of xxx appointments” to the Court of Appeals in light of the
forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that “on the basis of the (Constitutional)
Commission’s records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court
of Appeals.” This confirmation was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the
President for consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of
Appeals.

Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section
16) concern the appointing powers of the President.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they
affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16
refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that
Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent
with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.

Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments
to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the
independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative
Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the
fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential
election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current
incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure
judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the
appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not
run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term
will end by June 30, 2010.
Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the
incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief
Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will
still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining.

The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring
from Chief Justice Puno’s retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply
Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court.

Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday
of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the
regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115
days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days.
Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions
(i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the
90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be
in no position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme
Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended
such an absurdity.

Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether
a JBC list is necessary at all for the President – any President – to appoint a Chief Justice
if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court.

Sec. 9, Article VIII says:

xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from
a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

xxx

The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the
outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of
candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting
justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC.

WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE JBC

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is
directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not
available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.

For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff
has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to
perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects
the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial,
not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
 G.R. No. 213181 JARDELEZA v. SERENO 733 SCRA 279
JARDELEZA v. SERENO

G.R. No. 213181

August 19, 2014

733 SCRA 279

FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said
vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic
was included in the list of candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.

However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno,
will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity
is in question.

During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which

characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would
defend himself provided that due process would be observed. His request was denied
and he was not included in the shortlist.

Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the
JBC to include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with
grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number
of votes to qualify for the position.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC
proceedings in cases where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.

RULING: Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not
automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC
proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to
explain one’s self is availing.

In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of

due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This
holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually,
its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its
discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is
afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the
situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious
assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply
the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the
same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness
because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included
in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice
Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure
and the basic tenets of due process.

True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from
the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.