JOSE VS JAVELLANA

Facts:
Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration of ₱160,000.00 to respondent
by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land. They agreed that Javellana would pay ₱80,000.00
upon the execution of the deed and the balance of ₱80,000.00 upon the registration of the
parcels of land under the Torrens System (the registration being undertaken by Margarita within
a reasonable period of time); After Margarita died the vendor’s undertaking fell on the shoulders
of Priscilla, being Margarita’s sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the
undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead,
began to improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of
converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision. Faced with Priscilla’s
refusal to comply, Javellana commenced an action for specific performance, injunction, and
damages against her in the RTC.
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription;
and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.
The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss. However, upon her motion for
reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and granted the motion to dismiss.
Javellana moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for
lack of any reason to disturb the order. Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal and the
records were elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA promulgated its decision in reversing and setting aside the dismissal of Civil Case and
remanding the records to the RTC “for further proceedings in accordance with law.” CA explained
that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action; The CA denied the motion for
reconsideration, stating that it decided to give due course to the appeal even if filed out of time
because Javellana had no intention to delay the proceedings, as in fact he did not even seek an
extension of time to file his appellant’s brief; that current jurisprudence afforded litigants the
amplest opportunity to present their cases free from the constraints of technicalities, such that
even if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate court was given the discretion to
nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable reasons.

Issue:
Whether the Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was a final order
and appealable?

Held:
Yes, The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined,
but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided
upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to
be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment
is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial
court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
otherwise, it is final. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated
in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that “appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable;” but the remedy from an interlocutory one is
not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari.

ALVERO VS DE LA ROSA
FACTS:

Margarita Villarica sold to Jose R. Victoriano 480 square meters area of land on October 1, 1940,
for the sum of P6,000. Their agreement includes that Victoriano should make a down payment
of P1,700, and a monthly payment of P76.86 in 120 equal monthly installments. Immediately
after the sale, Victoriano took possession of the land and made improvements to the amount of
P800. On December, 1941, because of the war-time conditions then existing, Villarica and
Victoriano agreed verbally to suspend such payments until the restoration of peace. Victoriano
continued occupying said property not until December, 1944 because he went to go to
evacuation places, but returned thereto in February, 1945. The agreement also includes that,
upon failure of the purchaser to make payments of three (3) successive monthly installments,
the vendor would be free to sell the property again, forfeiting the payments made, except in the
case of force majeure.

Meanwhile, on December 31, 1944, , Villarica, having claimed to forgot to have sold said land to
to Victoriano, sold the same toFredesvindo S. Alvero for P100,000 in Japanese military notes.
After liberation, she offered to repurchase said property from Alvero for of PHP8,000 but the
latter refused to accept the offer. On the other hand, on January 3, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero
presented the deed of sale, executed in his favor, to the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila,
and took possession of said property in December, 1944. Then, Alvero found out that Victoriano
is in the premises in February, 1945. Both Victoriano and Alvero, although had presented the
deed of sale they separately executed with Villarica, to the ROD, had failed to secure the transfer
of title.
On June 25, 1945, Victoriano filed a complaint, in the RTC of the City of Manila, against Alvero
and Villarica, (1) to declare in force the contract of sale of the subject land, made on October 1,
1940, between Victoriano and Villarica, and (2) to declare subsequent sale of said land to Alvero,
null and void. In his answer, Alvero denied the allegations, and claimed exclusive ownership of
the land, and at the same time set up a counterclaim and crossclaim, demanding from Victoriano
a P200-monthly rent on said property, beginning from February, 1945, plus P2,000 as damages.
Villarica filed an answer, expressly admitting having sold said land to Alvero , in December, 1944,
in order to raise funds to support for herself and family, and that forgot of the previous sale, but
had offered repurchase of said property to Alvero, the latter refused.

The RTC judge rendered his decision in favor of Victoriano, taking into consideration Victoriano's
document was older than that of Alvero, and that the former had taken possession of said
property, since October 1, 1940. Adjudging to Victoriano the title over the property in question,
including all the improvements existing thereon, and dismissed the counterclaim.

On November 28, 1945, Alvero was notified of said decision; and on December 27, 1945, he filed
a petition for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied on January 3, 1946; and of said
order he was notified on January 7, 1946.

On January 8, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed his notice of appeal and record on appeal
simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the P60-appeal bond.

On January 14, 1946, Jose R. Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the appeal, and at the same
time, asked for the execution of the judgment.

On January 15, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss, alleging
that on the very same day, January 15, 1946, said appeal bond for P60 had been actually filed,
and allege as an excuse, for not filing the said appeal bond, in due time, the illness of his lawyer's
wife, who died on January 10, 1946, and buried the following day.

On January 17, 1946, the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, ordered the dismissal of
the appeal, declaring that, although the notice of appeal and record on appeal had been filed in
due time, the P60-appeal bond was filed too late.
On January 23, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed a petition for the reconsideration of the said
order dated January 17, 1946, dismissing his appeal; and said petition for reconsideration was
denied on January 29, 1946.

Alvero filed petition for certiorari, on grounds of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge and of the CA in not relaxing the rules.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge
and of the CA in not relaxing the rules.

HELD:
No, the petition is untenable. 1) Said petition is defective in form as well as in substance; (2) There
has been no excusable negligence, on the part of the petitioner, or grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the respondent judge, in the instant case.

Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law; and rules of
court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken,
are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly
and speedy discharge of judicial business. Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held
mandatory and imperative, so that failure to failure to perfect and file his appeal, within the
period fixed for that purpose, will cause the dismissal of the appeal.

As already stated, the decision rendered by the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa,
was dated November 16, 1945, of which counsel for Fredesvindo S. Alvero was notified on
November 28, 1945; that his motion for reconsideration and new trial was filed on December 27,
1945, and denied on January 3, 1946, and that said counsel for Alvero was notified of said order
on January 7, 1946; and that he filed his notice of appeal and record on appeal the following day,
to wit, January 8, 1946, and that the P60-appeal bond was filed only on January 15, 1946. Counsel
for the petitioner Fredesvindo Alvero alleges as an excuse, for his failure to perfect and file his
appeal, in due time, the illness of his wife, which ended in her death on January 10, 1946, and by
which he was greatly affected. The attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero could have asked
for an extension of time, within which to file and perfect his appeal, in the court below; but he
had failed to do so, and he must bear the consequences of his act. A strict observance of the rules
of court, which have been considered indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to
the orderly and speedy dispatch of judicial business, is an imperative necessity.
It may not be amiss to state in this connection that no irreparable damage has been caused to
the petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, as Margarita Villarica, the vendor to the two, of the land in
question, has shown readiness to repair the damage done.

According to the computation erroneously made by the court, the last day for filing and
perfecting the appeal, in this case, was January 8, 1946, or which date, Fredesvindo S. Alvero
should have filed his (1) notice of appeal, (2) record on appeal, and (3) appeal bond. But the P60-
appeal bond was filed only on January 15, 1946.

Failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules of court, will cause the
judgment to become final, and the certification of the record on appeal thereafter, cannot
restore the jurisdiction which has been lost. The period within which the record on appeal and
appeal bond should be perfected and filed may, however, be extended by order of the court,
upon application made, prior to the expiration of the original period.

No showing having been made that there had been merely excusable negligence, on the part of
the attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, and that there had been gave abuse of sound
judicial discretion, on the part of the respondent judge, the petition for certiorari filed in this
case, is, therefore, dismissed.