SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR.

y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017

TOPIC: Section 23 of RA 9165, rule-making power of Supreme Court, equal protection clause

PONENTE: Peralta

FACTS:

Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in
view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his
possession.

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of said law
violates:

The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution;
and
The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.
ISSUES:

Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being violative of the Constitutional right
to equal protection of the law.
HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now
Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.
The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in
the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:

Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative
disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules
instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. – The Cooperative Code
provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market
Vendors MultiPurpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of
the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon.
Mangotara, et al. – Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt
from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770,
which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as
it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive
branches of government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice,
and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.