c



Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is no of the stated aims of the United States

government. The threat of rogue states developing and using nuclear
technologies is a perennial danger. In the last twenty years the possibility of
terrorist groups using nuclear weapons has arising. The United States needs to
take direct action against this threat. Terrorist could in the future steal highly
enriched nuclear material, they may steal a nuclear weapon or they may be
supported by rogue State. The threat of stealing a weapon is very real. The
nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union is guard with differing levels of
effectiveness. There may be tactical nuclear weapons that are unaccounted for
that could fall into the black market. The United States needs to keep an
intelligence presence on the black market. Market manipulation, confidence
tricks and disinformation must be used in order to discourage potential nuclear
terrorists from gaining nuclear weapons. The ability of terrorists to steal nuclear
material is illustrated in this white paper. It will be shown that terrorists have
the potential to build a simple nuclear weapon themselves. Rogue States
represent the greatest chance for terrorists to gain access to nuclear weapons.
We must endeavor to understand the motivations of terrorists and rogue states.

 

  



 

Nuclear technology and know-how are widespread in todayǯs world. Nuclear
reactors create bodies of skill personnel in the nuclear field 1 Experimental
reactors in trouble spots such as Iran and North Korea creates a problem. Fuel
rods in these reactors are of local design. They do not have to return spent fuel to
others. This makes the fuel rods available for reprocessing and plutonium
extraction. Because in they are trouble spots they are susceptible to theft. It is up
to policy maker to explore ways in which nuclear control regimes may be
updated to respond to present challenges.

   

 

The security of nuclear arsenals in Russia and Asia is most problematic. These
are in regions of conflict with large amounts terrorist groups active. The arsenals
left over from the Soviet Union represent a singular risk because of the amount
of weapons that there and dysfunctional manner in which they are guarded.2
Alarms are turned off because of annoying false alarms. Guards carry unloaded
guns to limit risk of injury. The bureaucracy has convinced itself that the risk of
theft is minimal. The borders of the Former Soviet Union are por ous. Border
police would be unable to detect nuclear cargo if it were smuggled out.


  
 
  

1 Michael V. Hynes, John E Peters and Joel Kvitky, DzDenying Armageddon:

Preventing terrorist use of nuclear weapons,dz þ
 þ

þ




 
  607 p 154
2 Grasping the reality
The possibility of stealing nuclear material from facilities is more possible than
Russian bureaucrats imagine. There is always wastage in nuclear processes. With
even the most stringent quantifying regime some material still disappears. We
are unable to account for this discrepancy in the process. This provides personal
with the chance to smuggle out nuclear material. This would have entail taking
many trips to smuggle out necessary amounts. But theorically it is possible to do.
Uranium can be safely handled and is difficult to detect. Plutonium does not exist
in nature. It is manmade. It is more radioactive. It could be handled in makeshift
glove boxes. The United States should therefore insure that it alerts other
nuclear powers to this risk and offers every assistance in strengthening security.
The intelligence services of the United States must employ methods to
manipulate the black market fro nuclear weapons and materials. By pushing up
the price of items on the black market. The aspiring nuclear actor could well be
discouraged from such a course of action. Black market for non-state actors is
not very information rich. There are difficulties identifying buyers and sellers.
Participants have difficulties evaluating the quality of the goods for sale. The
information vacuum provides an opportunity for police to enter the market. The
buyers in non-state organization are not very competent. Police can spread and
elaborate myths that are already in circulation. These myths may then serve to
make buyers give up on the hope of nuclear weapons. They should come to
believe they would be better off with conventional weapons. Police present on
the market can use method such as bait and switch etc would further disillusion
would be terrorists. 3

i


    
  

What has been proposed thus far are soft power means of encouraging
nonproliferation by deception and intelligent gathering. But if an actor is
determined to acquire nuclear devices these measures alone will not stop it.
A terrorist would group have two options steal a nuclear device or make one.
Both option are well within the bounds of possibility for an even non-state
actors.
Making a bomb would be an impressive feat and it very possible. There is no
reason to not believe that with the aid of a PhD in the relevant areas and
competent technician that a simple bomb couldnǯt be made. A gun type bomb
works by firing highly enriched plutonium or uranium into a larger circle of
nuclear material. Such a bomb could easily be transported in a Van into the c
US. The bomb would have to be constructed in such a way that material can be
kept together long enough so as to generate an explosion of sufficient magnitude.
Terrorists could make a bomb themselves but they could not undertake the
enrichment process needed to make nuclear materials ready for nuclear bomb.
Nuclear enrichment is task that we can safely say is beyond the capacity of the
non-state actors.

i
  
  
 

3Simon Saradzhyan, DzRussia: Grasping the Reality of Nuclear terrorism,dz þ


 þ

   


   607 (2006): 64
A terrorist group could decide to steal a nuclear weapon. American weapon
would seem to safe enough because they are geographically remote from Eurasia
where we can expect terrorist groups to have their strongholds. American
weapon have Dzpermissive action linksdz that mean they need codes in order to be
activated. Nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union do not always have
safety systems. They may no locks at all. Tactical weapons would represent the
greatest attraction to terrorist. They easy to transport and they lack permissive
action links. We can expect that many of these weapons have been destroyed.
But some may exist still and are not necessarily being guarded thoroughly.
In Pakistan and India nuclear weapons do not use PAL and are believed to be
stored partly disassembled. Terrorists having stolen a weapon may well chose to
extract the nuclear material from the weapon and build their own weapon.

` 


  

I have discussed means of curtailing access to nuclear materials thus far. States
and terrorist groups that desire nuclear weapons want them for a reason.
Understanding these motivations is task the United States Government must
undertake. Just barring them from access to nuclear material would be
imprudent as it possible they may one day access such weapons.

Non-state actors represent a grave risk to the US. They essentially have a
hierarchical structure of command that use violence for political ends. They may
have control over a geographical area. This excludes criminal gangs because they
have private ends and paramilitaries that are state sponsored. The greatest risk
the US Al Qaeda is newer form again because it is transnational. But the it is less
than clear how rigorous the their chain of command is. The advancing nature of
terrorist tactics suggests that their ambitions could include nuclear attacks.
Nuclear weapons would provide them with massive and violent destruction4
Terrorists are not against shy about broadcasting their intentions and
grievances. But States may not be willing or able to act on these demands
because they are impossible to meet.





 

Many terrorist groups are religiously motivated. A study from 1995 found that
twenty-six out of fifty six terrorist groups were religiously motivated. 5Their
aims and motivations, because of their religious nature, are more difficult to
address than the demands of secular groups such as neo Nazis. Religious
organizations like Al Qaeda are more likely use nuclear weapons. 6
Terrorist organisations are now very decentralised. Al Qaeda could be likened to
franchise rather than army with strict hierarchy. This makes it harder to
understand their motives. Communications technology and easy travel allow

4 Bonnie Jenkins, DzCombating Nuclear terrorism: Addressing Nonstate Actor

motivations,dz i þ

   


  607
(2006);p.36
5 Bonnie Jenkins, Motivations p36
loosely connected groups to operate. Because their decentralised nature it
becomes possible for the leadership to change course while a splinter group
continues with the original mission. Where possible diplomatic and economic
incentives should be used in order discourage terrorist groups and states that
may support them. But we should not shy away for threatening force if these
measures donǯt work.

¢ 


Nuclear weapons at present are the most prestigious form of weapons. A limited
number of states have them. For terrorist to get their hands on such weapon
would be a major publicity coup. We must move to reduce the glamour of
nuclear arms. States should reduce their stockpiles of weapons in united manner.
Development of new forms of weapons should be stopped. But states still seem
devoted to keeping their weapons. The French have said in the past that they will
use nuclear weapons against terrorist. The United Kingdom fears that the future
may not be as safe as today. We in the United States are developing new forms of
weapon for attacking underground targets the so called bunker buster. Nuclear
states should abide by nonproliferation treaties to order to reduce the attraction
of nuclear weapons to terrorist organization. We need too recognize that we can
hardy encourage nonproliferation when we show no signs of disarming
ourselves.

` 
`c 
 
  

The United States would be a lot safer if we adopted a posture of understanding

towards those who may be our enemies. It is foolish to suppose that the US
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have not created grievances. We must
examine the unintended effects of our operations. Stories of torture and harsh
treatment will fuel passions increasing the attraction of terrorism in population
that feel they are powerless against a cruel foreign force. There exists on these
issues a diverse range of view in the United States. These voices should be heard
in troubled areas. Local population will see that the US is not monolithic and that
their voices can be heard. This would go along way towards reducing tensions in
local populations. The US needed to explain persuasively its vision. We cannot
assume that local populations understand this vision. Linguistic differences
make it very easy for terrorist groups and their ideologues to present US
operation as imperialism.

¢
 c 


 

Rogue states provide the greatest opportunity fro terrorists to gain access to
nuclear materials. In turn terrorism is an easy way for rogue states to make war
on United States. The United States must adopt a carrot and stick approach to
Rogue states. Rogue states must be brought before the spotlight international
scrutiny. Sanctions can be called for but the implementation may be incomplete.
Nevertheless the attention of the international community may cause the rogue
state to change its posture towards our demands. We must be prepared to
directly engage the state. Authoritative channels of communication should be
used so as to assure the state that it will be listened to. Congressǯs role in United
States foreign policy must not be forgotten. It has the power to constrain the
President. The executive branch must cultivate good relations with the
legislature for US relations with rogue states. We must not be afraid that the
change is happening slowly. Leaders on both sides need time to change their
positions gradually. Th e American people will need time persuaded that change
has taken place. Rogue states may have murdered Americans and reconciliation
may be politically contentious. But we must remember that retaliation would
only prove to endanger Americans more.

*
  


The United States must respond to the diffusion of nuclear weapons in the world
by monitoring and manipulating the black market. We must rethink our
approach to nuclear security. We must develop close relation with nuclear power
so as to improve security. We must try to understand the motivations of
terrorists groups. Following from this we must try to reduce the attractions of
nuclear weapons. By adopting a friendly posture towards the rest of the world
we can greatly reduce our risk of nuclear atrocities.

Bibliography

Bonnie Jenkins, DzCombating Nuclear Terrorism: Addressing Nonstate Actor

Motivations,dzþ

þ

 


   607 (2006): 33

Jonathan B. Schwartz, DzDealing with DzRogue Statedz: The Libya Precedent,dz i 

þ


  


 101 (2007): 553

Simon Saradzhyan, DzRussia: Grasping the Reality of Nuclear Terror,dz þ
 

þ

þ



 
   607 (2006): 64

Matthew Bunn and Anthony Weir, DzTerrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How
Difficult?dzþ
 þ

þ



 
   607
(2006): 133