Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Rem Rev1 Compiled Digests Sept 26
Rem Rev1 Compiled Digests Sept 26
14
Trial
Order of trial
Reverse trial when complaint is admitted
Consolidation
Test is common questions of fact or of law
Demurrer to Evidence
Concept of demurrer
Effect of denial or grant of demurrer to evidence
(12)
RADIOWEALTH V. DEL ROSARIO, G.R. 138739 (2000)
DOCTRINE: Defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff's
evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if the trial
court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but
on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and
reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to
present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition,
resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as
a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations.
FACTS: Spouses Del Rosario jointly and severally executed, signed
and delivered in favor of Radiowealth a promissory note for
P138,948. Unfortunately, respondents defaulted on the monthly
installments. Despite repeated demands, they failed to pay their
obligations under their promissory note. Radiowealth, then, filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money. After the petitioner
offered its evidence and rested its case, Del Rosario filed a
demurrer to evidence for alleged lack of cause of action. The trial
court dismissed the complaint for failure of petitioner to
substantiate its claims, the evidence it had presented being merely
hearsay. On appeal, CA reversed the trial court decision and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Aggrieved,
Radiowealth filed a petition for review on certiorari questioning the
decision rendered by the appellate court. Radiowealth contends
that if a demurrer to evidence is reversed on appeal, the defendant
should be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence,
and the appellate court should render judgment on the basis of the
evidence submitted by the plaintiff. A remand to the trial court "for
further proceedings" would be an outright defiance of Rule 33,
Section 1 ROC. On the other hand, spouses Del Rosario argue that
the petitioner was not necessarily entitled to its claim, simply on
the ground that they lost their right to present evidence in support
of their defense when the Demurrer to Evidence was reversed on
appeal. They stress that the CA merely found them indebted to
petitioner, but was silent on when their obligation became due and
demandable.
ISSUE: WON Del Rosario can still present evidence after the CA’s
reversal of the dismissal on demurrer of evidence
HELD: No. Rule 33, Sec 1 ROC provides: After the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may
move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he
shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted
but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
The defendant is permitted, without waiving his right to offer
evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a
dismissal (i.e., demur to the plaintiff's evidence) on the ground that
upon the facts as thus established and the applicable law, the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the
dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient for
an award of judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the
case still remains before the trial court which should then proceed
to hear and receive the defendant's evidence so that all the facts
and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed
3.17
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
3.18
Summary Judgments
Distinguished from Judgment on the pleadings
(19)
VERGARA V. SUELTO, 156 SCRA 753
DOCTRINE: Summary judgment must not be confused with
judgment on the pleadings. The essential question in determining
whether a summary judgment is proper is not whether the answer
does controvert the material allegations of the complaint but
whether that controversion is bona fides and not whether the
answer does tender valid issues as by setting forth specific denials
and/or affirmative defenses but whether the issues thus tendered
are genuine, or fictitious, sham, characterized by bad faith.
FACTS: Vergara alleged that he is the owner of a commercial
building and that private respondents were the lessees thereof.
Having defaulted in their payments, Vergara filed an action for
unlawful detainer. Private respondents denied having paid rents to
Vergara and raised as an affirmative defense, ownership over the
land. Subsequently, Vergara filed a motion for summary judgment.
The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the
respondents’ answer specifically denied material allegations in the
complaint and even set up an affirmative defense. Thus, such
answer did not merely consist of a general denial but definitely
tendered a genuine issue which cannot be resolved by resort to a
summary judgment.
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
3.19
(26)
VELARDE V. SJS, G.R. 159357 (2004)
DOCTRINE: The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in
writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is
intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason
or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can
point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings
on points of law with which he disagrees.
FACTS: SJS filed a petition for declaratory relief before RTC Manila
against Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erano Manalo, Br. Eddie
Villanueva, and Br. Eliseo Soriano. Respondent SJS sought the
interpretation of several constitutional provisions, among them the
separation of Church and State, and the declaratory judgment on
the constitutionality of the acts of said religious leaders in
endorsing a candidate for an elective office. Petitioner Velarde filed
a motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action and that there was no justiciable controversy. The
trial court denied Velarde’s motion. In its order, the RTC judge did
not provide a statement of facts and dispositive portion. As such,
Velarde and Soriano filed separate motions for reconsideration
before the trial court were denied.
3.20
(31)
ISSUE: WON the RTC decision conform to the form and substance
required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court
HELD: No. The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in
writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is
intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason
or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can
point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings
on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching
judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal
reasoning.
Indeed, elementary due process demands that the parties to a
litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as
well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to
the conclusions of the court.
(27)
MIRANDA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 71 SCRA 295
(28)
REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO, 457 SCRA 400
(29)
BRIONES-VASQUEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. 144882
(2005)
(30)
NAVARRO V. METROBANK, G.R. 165697 (2009)
(32)
from
(33)
SPOUSES QUE V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. 1507397
(2005)
DOCTRINE: Under Rule 38, Sec 1, the court may grant relief from
judgment only “when a judgment or final order is entered, or any
other proceeding is taken against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. As used in that
provision, "mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which
relates to the case. "Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or
collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the aggrieved party
from having a trial or presenting his case to the court.
FACTS: Costales filed an action against Urian (Lorenzo’s
grandniece) and spouses Que for ownership and possession of the
subject property on the ground that she inherited the property
from Lorenzo. When she filed her complaint, spouses Que had
taken possession of the property and declared the land in their
name for tax purposes. It appears that petitioners obtained the
services of one Atty. Ranot to represent them. However, Atty. Ranot
failed to file petitioners’ answer. as such, Costales moved to
declare them in default. During the hearing, Urian manifested that
Atty. Ranot was still preparing the answer. The trial court found
Urian’s manifestation unmeritorious and granted respondent’s
motion to present her evidence ex parte. After the trial, the court
held in favor of respondent Costales. Petitioners, through their new
counsel, sought reconsideration or new trial, which the trial court
denied.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to relief from judgment
HELD: No. Under Rule 38, Sec 1, the court may grant relief from
judgment only “when a judgment or final order is entered, or any
other proceeding is taken against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence…" In their
petition for relief from judgment in the trial court, petitioners
contended that judgment was entered against them through
"mistake or fraud" because they were allegedly under the
impression that Atty. Ranot had prepared and filed "the necessary
pleading." This is not the fraud or mistake contemplated under
Section 1. As used in that provision, "mistake" refers to mistake of
fact, not of law, which relates to the case. "Fraud," on the other
hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which
prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his
case to the court. Clearly, petitioners' mistaken assumption that
Atty. Ranot had attended to his professional duties is neither
mistake nor fraud.
Under Section 1, the "negligence" must be excusable and generally
imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it
is binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and allow a party
to disown his counsel's conduct would render proceedings
indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere
subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should
do is seek administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and
not ask for the reversal of the court's ruling.
(34)
(35)
DARE ADVENTURE FARM CORP V. COURT OF APPEALS, 681
SCRA 580
(36)
SPOUSES ARENAS V. QUEZON CITY DEVT BANK, G.R.
166819 (2010)
3.21
(37)
(38)
Execution of Judgments
Only a final judgment that disposes of the action is
subject to execution
Final judgment versus final and executory judgment
(39)
CITY OF MANILA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 72 SCRA 98
(40)
VALENCIA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 184 SCRA 561
DOCTRINE: The existence of good reasons is principally what
confers such discretionary power in granting a motion for
execution pending appeal. Absent any such good reason, the
special order of execution must be struck down for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS: Petitioner Valencia filed a civil case before RTC Malolos for
the recisssion of a lease contract (over a fishpond) against private
respondents Bagtas. During the pendency of the case, the lease
contract expired and the property was returned to Valencia. The
trial court held that the issue of rescission had become moot and
academic, and the only remaining issue was the matter of
damages. Subsequently, Bagtas filed a motion for execution
pending appeal, which the court granted after Bagtas filed a bond
in the amount of P330,000.
(41)
4.2
4.3
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in granting the motion for
execution pending appeal
HELD: No. Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that in
order that there may be a discretionary issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal the following requisites must be
satisfied: (a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with
notice to the adverse party; (b) There must be a good reason for
issuing the writ of execution; and (c) The good reason must be
stated in a special order.
CAB: The ground relied upon by the trial court in allowing the
immediate execution, as stated in its order of March 20, 1989, is
the filing of a bond by private respondents. The rule is now settled
that the mere filing of a bond by the successful party is not a good
reason for ordering execution pending appeal.
(42)
4.4
(43)
4.
APPEALS
4.1 Nature of Appeal as Remedy
Guard against judgments of unskilled and unfair judges
(44)
Interrupted
by
Motion
for
new
trial
or
reconsideration
If New trial or reconsideration denied, fresh period
to appeal
Payment of docket fees must accompany notice of
appeal
Petition for review (by filing petition with CA under Rule
42)
Second level of review
Review of judgment in exercise of appellate
jurisdiction
RTC (appellate jurisdiction) to CA
Not a matter of right; discretionary on part of CA
(45)
(46)
CHEESMAN V. IAC, 193 SCRA 93
(47)
SUMBINGCO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 155 SCRA 24
DOCTRINE: It is axiomatic that appeals from the Court of Appeals
are not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion on the part
of this Court, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor.
FACTS: Demerin et al, filed a complaint against Sumbingco seeking
reinstatement as tenant’s on the latter’s 2 haciendas and
damages. They alleged that prior to Sumbingco’s purchase of the
property, they were already tenants in the haciendas. The Court of
Agriarian Relations dismissed the complaint; it rejected the
evidence offered by private respondents to substantiate their
claims as tenants, declaring the evidence as implausible and
tainted by material inconsistencies. On appeal, CA reversed the
judgement of CAR and ruled in favor of private respondents.
ISSUE: WON the appeal to the SC was proper
HELD: No. It is axiomatic that appeals from the Court of Appeals
are not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion on the part
of this Court, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. In other words, appeals from the Court
of Appeals are not entertained as a matter of routine; they may be
rejected out of hand in the exercise of this Court's sound judicial
discretion. The prescribed mode of appeal is by certiorari, limited
only to issues or questions of law which must be distinctly set forth
in the petition for review on certiorari. The findings of fact of the
Appellate Court are conclusive even on this Court, subject only to a
few well defined exceptions (none of which is present in the instant
case). It is incumbent on the appellant to make out a sufficiently
strong demonstration of serious error on the part of the Court of
(50)
MACAWILI GOLD MINING V. COURT OF APPEALS, 297 SCRA
602
(51)
LAND BANK V. RAMOS, 685 SCRA 540
4.5
4.6
Improper Appeals
To CA from RTC on questions of law
To SC via notice of appeal
To CA on notice of appeal from RTC decision rendered
in appellate jurisdiction