PEOPLE vs.

VERA
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937
FACTS:
This case involves the constitutionality of the old probation law. Respondent
Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for
reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal
to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for
probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221. Judge Tuason of the Manila
CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the
application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed
the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that
Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in
violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221, which grants provincial boards the power to
provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is
stated that it is applicable to a cities like Manila as it is only indicated therein
that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law, it
is unconstitutional because it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
constitution. It also avers that the said law provides absolute discretion to
provincial boards, thus it constitutes undue delegation of power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Act 4221 or the old probation law is an undue delegation of
legislative power on the ground that there is no standard set by congress for
its implementation.
HELD:
Yes. There is undue delegation of power because there is no standard
provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a
system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which
is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of
power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The
challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided
for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice
and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a
probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This
would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is
instituted may not avail of their right to probation.
ARANETA VS. DINGLASAN (THE FIRST EMERGENCY POWER CASE)
G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
FACTS:
This case involves Commonwealth Act 671, otherwise known as AN ACT
DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR
INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO
PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or
simply the Emergency Powers Act. Antonio Araneta is being charged for
violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential
buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta
appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with
the case. He avers that EO 62, issued by virtue of CA No. 671, is null and void
as the effect of CA No. 671 granting emergency power to the president has
already ceased. Three other cases were consolidated with the case of Araneta.
These are: 1.) L-3055, an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter,
against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; 2.) L-3054 filed by
Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds pursuant to
EO 225; AND 3.)L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo attacking EO 226 that appropriates funds to
hold the national elections. All the petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect
hence all E0s passed pursuant to it had likewise ceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA 671 has already ceased when Congress has met in session?
HELD:
Yes. CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May
25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of
law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which
preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention
of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or
only such subjects as he (President) may designate." Such acts were to be good only up to the
corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner
amended or repealed by the National Assembly." Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation
must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening
or upon early repeal. Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof
should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded;
prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." It is to be
presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The
opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle
that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The
assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the
Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the
period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative
and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent
law."
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., ETC., ET AL. vs. VICENTE GELLA, ETC., ET AL. (THE
SECOND EMERGENCY POWER CASE)
G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953

FACTS:
Eulogio Rodriguez, et. al. seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the
first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second
setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons,
floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. These EOs were issued
pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs. Dinglasan, Congress passed
House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the
Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the EOs issued have no force and effect on the ground that they are violative of
the principle of separation of power.

HELD:
Yes, the EOs are invalid. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to
CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or
calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such
invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be
attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the
intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For
“while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall
them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its
powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law.” Act No.
671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is
necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that
the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither
can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.
 Pelaez vs Auditor General
undue delegation of legislative power

Caption: PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. L-23825 15 SCRA 569 December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

Facts:

The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code,
issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities
enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the
Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: “Barrios shall not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of
Congress.”
Issues:

Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power.

Discussions:

Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such
discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the
national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the
Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits
him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof
perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority.

Rulings:

Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of the President to create
municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of
control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate. Instead of giving
the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments,
bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power
over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10202 March 29, 1916

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS Ex Rel. THE MUNICIPALITY OF CARDONA,

plaintiff,
vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN, ET AL., defendants.

Modesto Reyes and Eliseo Ymzon for plaintiff.

Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus and Roberto Moreno for defendants.

MORELAND, J.:

This is an action by the municipality of Cardona to prohibit perpetually the municipality of

Binangonan from exercising municipal authority over the barrios of Tatala, Balatik, Nambug, Tutulo,
Mahabang Parang, Nagsulo, and Bonot.

The complaint alleges that the municipality of Binangonan is now exercising governmental authority
over the barrios named, to the exclusion of the municipality of Cardona; that such authority is
exercised by the municipality of Binangonan by reason of Executive Order No. 66, series of 1914,
issued by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands on the 1st day of July, 1914, which reads
as follows:

Pursuant to the provisions of section one of Act Numbered seventeen hundred and
forty-eight, the boundary line between the municipalities of Binangonan and
Cardona, in the Province of Rizal, is hereby defined and fixed as follows, viz:

On the mainland, beginning on the north at the intersection of the Morong

River and the existing Binangonan boundary, thence in a southerly and
westerly direction to Mapulanglupa (otherwise called Santol), where a
partially destroyed monument now exists; thence in a direct southeasterly
line to the summit of Mountain Tutulo; and thence to the Laguna de Bay; thus
embracing within the limits of the municipality of Binangonan the barrios or
sitios of Tatala, Balatik, Nambug, Tutulo, Mahabang Parang, Nagsulo,
Sampad, and Bonot.

On the Island of Talim, that portion of the island embraced within points
known as Kaymaralina and Virgen-Bato, on the eastern coast and extending
to the summits of the range of hills geographically dividing the land, is hereby
confirmed as being embraced within the jurisdiction of the municipality of
Cardona; and the remainder of the island, including the small off-lying islands
of Bunga, Olahipan, and Malake, as being embrace within the jurisdiction of
the municipality of Binangonan.
 Action will at once be taken to survey the boundary line herein fixed and to
establish monuments demarcating same.

The plaintiff further alleges that the executive order referred to and above quoted and the Act under
which it was issued are "unconstitutional" in that said Act confers on the Governor-General
legislative authority; and that the Governor-General in promulgating said order usurped legislative
functions. Plaintiff also claims that the order is void because it does not contain a statement that the
change in the division line between the said municipalities was required by the public good; and that
it does not appear in said order itself that there was a present urgency requiring the promulgation of
such an order.

The defendant municipality demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The question before us is that presented by the demurrer.

We do not think that plaintiff's objections are well founded. No reason has been given why the Act is
unconstitutional and no argument or citation of authorities has been presented on that subject. Every
Act of the legislature is presumed to be constituted until the contrary is clearly shown; and no
showing of unconstitutionality having been made in this case, the objection to the order of the
Governor-General based on that ground must be overruled. The other two objections are frivolous.
Although it be admitted, for the sake of argument, that the Governor-General ought not to make such
an order unless the public good requires it, that fact need not be stated in the order. The same may
be said with regard to its urgency. The Governor-General having full authority to promulgate such an
order this court will assume, if it should act on the matter at all, that there was public necessity
therefor and that the matter was of such urgency as properly to evoke action by the Chief Executive.

The demurrer to the complaint is sustained and unless an amendment thereof is made within five
days from the service of a copy of this order eliminating the objections stated in this decision, the
action will be dismissed on the merits. So ordered.

Torres, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., concurs in the result.
Jimenez vs Cabangbang Digest
Jimenez vs Cabangbang

G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966

Facts:

Defendant Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense. He wrote an open letter to the President and caused its publication in several
newspapers of general circulation exposing the allegedly operational plans by some ambitious AFP
officers regarding a massive political build-up of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, to
prepare him to become a candidate for President in 1961.

Issue:

Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.

Held:

The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the publication falls within the purview of the
phrase “speech or debate in Congress” as used in Art. VI, Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11). Said expression refers to
utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as
bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of
their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. It was an open letter to the
President, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be
published in several newspapers of general circulation. In causing the communication to be so published,
he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of the Congress or as officer of any committee
thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
Adaza vs Panaca Digest
Adaza vs Panaca

G.R. No. L-68159 March 18, 1985

Facts:

Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He
took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Pacana
was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their respective terms
of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for
the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections,
petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as
Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On
July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos,
and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the
governor’s office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was
elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his
term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary
system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to
which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.

Issue:

Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province
simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original
position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.

Held:

Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:

“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office
or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or
member of the cabinet . . .”

The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices
abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more
than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a
private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the
governorship left vacant by petitioner’s election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP.
697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which
specifically provides that “governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials
shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.”
Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as
provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code.
Case Digest: Osmeña, Jr. vs. Pendatun, et. al.
G.R. No. L-17144 28 October 1960

Ponente: Bengzon, J.

FACTS:

Congressman Osmeña took the floor on the one-hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled ‘A Message to
Garcia’ wherein said speech contained serious imputations of bribery against the President. Being unable
to produce evidence thereof, Osmeña was then found to be guilty of serious disorderly behaviour by the
House of Representatives. Osmeña argues that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary
immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned.

ISSUE:

Whether said disciplinary action by the House is in violation of Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution.

RULING:

Said disciplinary action is not in violation of the Constitution. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that “for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of
Representative shall not be questioned in any other place.” Although exempt from prosecution or civil
actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in
Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other place” in Congress

Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924)

F:The petitioner in this original petition for mandamus andinjunction is Jose Alejandrino, a
Senator appointed by theGovernor General. to represent the 12th Senatorial District. Thecasus
belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senatecomposed of the respondent Senators, On
February 5,1924,depriving Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, andemoluments of his
office for the period of 1 yr from 1/24 havingbeen declared guilty of disorderly conduct and
flagrant violationof the privileges of the Senate for having treacherouslyassaulted Sen. de Vera
on the occasion of certain phrases beinguttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding
thecredentials of Mr. Alejandrino. The burden of petitioner'scomplaint is that the resolution is
unconstitutional and entirelyof no effect.
Issue: WON the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunctionmay annul the suspension of
Senator Alejandrino and compelthe Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position?

Held. The general rule is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the gov't to a coordinate
branch, for the very obvious reasonthat neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not
lieagainst the legislative body, its members, or its officers, tocompel the performance of duties
purely legislative in theircharacter w/c therefore pertains to their legislative functionsand over
w/c they have exclusive control.The courts cannotdictate action in this respect without a gross
usurpation of power.Precedents have held that where a member has been expelledby the
legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespectiveof whether the expulsion was right or
wrong, to issue amandate to compel his reinstatement

HERMINIO A. ASTORGA vs. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, ET AL.

Facts;

House bill No. 9266, defining the powers, rights and duties of the Vice Mayor of Manila became
a law under RA 4065 after both houses and the President signed it. However, it was later on
found out that the said law was not the same as the version approved by the Senate as it was
going thru its revision. With this finding, the Senate President and the President himself sent out
a statement saying they are withdrawing their signatures from the House Bill No. 9266,
therefore, it should not be considered as a law.

Issue;
WON the petition for mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction be granted and compel the respondents to comply with the provisions of
RA 4065.

Ruling;
The Supreme Court recognized the withdrawal of the President and the Senate Presidents'
signatures from RA 4065 or House Bill 9266, therefore it did not become a law. The temporary
restraining order was also made permanent.The intent of the law making body based on its
journals prevailed over technicality of the legal process of enacting a bill.

Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded

Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively
originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the
Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in
the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was
referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known
as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by
striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a
House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. Tolentino and
co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill.

ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.

HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version
originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that
the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where
Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other
such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted.
The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would
make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

MACIAS VS COMELEC, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

GR. L-18684 (Sept. 14, 1961) (Constitutional Law – Apportionment, Proportional

Representation)

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of a law (Republic Act 3040) that apportions
representative districts in this country on the ground that it is unconstitutional and void because it
apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces.
Respondents aver they were merely complying with their duties under the statute, which they
presume and allege to be constitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not an apportionment law that is disproportion in representation is

unconstitutional.

HELD: Yes, a law giving provinces with less number of inhabitants more representative districts
than those with bigger population is invalid because it violates the principle of proportional
representation prescribed by the Constitution. Such law is “arbitrary and capricious and against
the vital principle of equality.”