G.R. No.
150656 April 29, 2003 squabbles and irreconcilable conflicts transpired between the
MARGARITA ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS, petitioner, vs.
ABELARDO B. LICAROS, respondent
Doctrine:
As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any case against
him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his
person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the
case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in
Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances,
Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction
over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.
Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident
and is not found in the country may be served with summons by
extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action
relates to, or the subject of which is property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded
consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the
property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines.
Facts: Abelardo Licaros and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros
were lawfully married. Out of this marital union were born Maria
Concepcion and Abelardo, Jr. Ironically, marital differences,
spouses, such that sometime in 1979, they agreed to separate
from bed and board.
In 1982, Margarita left for the United States and there, to settle
down with her two (2) children. In the United States, Margarita
applied for divorce. On August 6, 1990, Margarita was granted
the decree of divorce together with a distribution of properties
between her and Abelardo.
Not long after, Abelardo and Margarita executed an "Agreement
of Separation of Properties. This was followed-up by a petition
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses and for the
approval of the agreement of separation of their properties.
For his part, Abelardo commenced Civil Case for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage with Margarita, based on psychological
incapacity under the New Family Code. As required by law, the
case was referred to Trial Prosecutor Bruselas, Jr. to find out
any possible collusion between the parties in the case.
Thereafter, with the negative report of collusion, Abelardo was
allowed to present his evidence ex-parte. A decision was
handed down declaring the marriage between Abelardo and
Margarita null and void.
Almost nine (9) years later, the petition at bench was
commenced when Margarita received a letter from a certain
Atty. Angelo Q. Valencia informing her that she no longer has
the right to use the family name "Licaros" inasmuch as her
marriage to Abelardo had already been judicially dissolved by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Asseverating to have
immediately made some verifications and finding the
information given to be true, petitioner commenced the instant
petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
trial court to hear and decide the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals rejected Margarita’s claim that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage for improper service of
summons on her. The case involves the marital status of the
parties, which is an action in rem or quasi in rem. The Court of
Appeals ruled that in such an action the purpose of service of
summons is not to vest the trial court with jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, but "only" to comply with due process.
The Court of Appeals concluded that any irregularity in the
service of summons involves due process which does not
destroy the trial court’s jurisdiction over the res which is the
parties’ marital status. Neither does such irregularity invalidate
the judgment rendered in the case. Thus, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment
Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the
petition because petitioner was never validly served with
summons?
Held: Yes. Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a
non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with
summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when
the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within
the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded
consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the
property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines.
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be
effected under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out
of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending
a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail
to the defendant’s last known address, also with leave of court;
or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient.
The Process Server’s Return shows that the summons
addressed to Margarita together with the complaint and its
annexes were sent by mail to the Department of Foreign Affairs
with acknowledgment of receipt. The Process Server’s
certificate of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the
facts as set out in the certificate. Before proceeding to declare
the marriage between Margarita and Abelardo null and void, the
trial court stated in its Decision dated 8 November 1991 that
"compliance with the jurisdictional requirements have been duly
established."
We hold that delivery to the Department of Foreign Affairs was
sufficient compliance with the rule. After all, this is exactly what
the trial court required and considered as sufficient to effect
service of summons under the third mode of extraterritorial
service pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 14.
G.R. No. 186366 July 3, 2013
HEIRS OF JOSE FERNANDO, PETITIONERS, vs.
REYNALDO DE BELEN, RESPONDENT.
Doctrine: What determines the nature of the action as well as
which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court may be
questioned at any stage of the proceedings. Lack of jurisdiction
is one of those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss
a claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings
or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even
if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss.
So that, whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This
defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even
after final judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of
jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let
alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set
aside.
Facts: This case emanated from a complaint for Recovery of
Possession filed by the petitioners against Reynaldo De Belen,
herein respondent, before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,
involving a parcel of registered in the name of the late Jose,
married to Lucila Tinio and Apolonia Fernando, which is situated
in Baliuag, Bulacan.
In the said complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the
children of the late Jose and they are in the process of
partitioning their inheritance. However, they could not properly
accomplish the partition due to the presence of the respondent
who intruded into a portion of their property and conducted
quarrying operations in its immediate vicinity for so many years,
without their knowledge and permission.
Petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan
to assert and defend their right over the subject property and for
the respondent to vacate the premises and pay rental
arrearages.
Instead of filing an Answer, respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss, setting forth the following grounds: (1) lack of
jurisdiction; (2) lack of cause of action; (3) ambiguity as to the
portion of the lot De Belen occupies; and, (4) incomplete
statement of material facts, the complaint having failed to state
the identity, location and area of the lot sought to be recovered.
Trial on the merits ensued which eventually resulted in the
decision of the RTC which is favorable to the petitioners.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals raising
the issues on jurisdiction for failure of the petitioners to state the
assessed value of the subject property, absence of evidence
proving the lawful ownership of the petitioners and the grant of
affirmative reliefs which were not alleged or prayed for.
The Court of Appeals issued the assailed decision setting aside
the decision of the RTC for want of jurisdiction and declaring
further that the Amended Complaint must be dismissed.
Issue: WON RTC did not acquire jurisdiction for failure to allege
in the complaint the assessed value of the subject property?
Held: YES. Instant complaint for Recovery of Possession failed
to specify the assessed value of the property subject matter of
the action. "What determines the nature of the action as well as
which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. The allegations
in the complaint and the relief sought by the party determine the
nature of the action if the title or designation is not clear. The
complaint, in the case at bar, is bereft of any allegation which
discloses the assessed value of the property subject matter
thereof. The court a quo therefore, did not acquire jurisdiction
over instant action. The Amended Complaint does not state a
valid cause of action.
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO
SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU
BRANCH) bonding company and defendant-appellant.
Doctrine: It has been held that a party can not invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean,
136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of
explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether
the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the
action or of the parties was not important in such cases because
the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment
or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication,
but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated —
obviously for reasons of public policy.
Facts: Barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No.
296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 — the spouses Serafin
Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum
of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the
filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus
costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was
issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same
was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by
defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same
month.
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their
answer in which, after making some admissions and denials of
the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a
counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had
become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court
issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ
having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond against
which the Surety filed a written opposition.
Upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs
filed a second motion for execution against the counterbond. On
the date set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of
the Surety's counsel, granted the latter a period of five days
within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such Held: YES. The facts of this case show that from the time the
answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have
corresponding writ was issued. raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground
reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the
that the same was issued without the required summary hearing
law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As
inferior courts. It failed to do so.
the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court
of Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo
its motion for reconsideration. Not one of the assignment of as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of
errors — it is obvious — raises the question of lack of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for
jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly. a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally
Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO
woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to
DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees action was filed
sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the
declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case
recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that
since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the
date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary
judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The
Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which
inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts
all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the
amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of
interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had
no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon these premises
the Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its
decision and to dismiss the case.

Issue: WON the trial court has jurisdiction over the action at bar
despite the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about
a month prior to the date when the action was commenced
which deprived it the jurisdiction by reason of the money
involved?