Tanada vs. Tuvera, G.R. No.

L-63915, April 24, 1985

Facts: Petitioners herein, seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials
to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders. The respondents, through the Solicitor
General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no
legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. They further contend that
publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as
to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable
for their effectivity. The contention was anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is mandatory for the effectivity
of a law.

Ruling: Yes, publication in the Official Gazette is mandatory for the effectivity of a law.
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the Official
Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the

effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they
have been circularized to all concerned.

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or
"of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.
Floresca vs. Philex Mining, L-30642, June 30, 1985

Facts: Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation
(Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba,
Benguet, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. The
complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations,
negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of
the lives of its men working underground. A motion to dismiss was filed by Philex
alleging that the causes of action of petitioners based on an industrial accident are
covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended
by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners filed an opposition claiming that the causes of action are not based on the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code
allowing the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages. Respondent Judge
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance with the
established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive
original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for work-connected deaths or
injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the employer was
negligent, adding that if the employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or
injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, pay additional compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the Petitioners may claim for damages provided under the
CivilCode
2. Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right
of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right under
the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code
for higher damages.
Ruling: 1. Yes, Petitioners may claim for damages provided under the Civil Code. It
should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the
Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and
moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos.
Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle
them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared in the complaint that
the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of their employments.
The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on
the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in
occurred resulting in the death of the employees working underground. Settled is the
rule that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's
compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code,
the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar
Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).

2. In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32
SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the
employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an
ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both
courses of action simultaneously. WE hold that although the other petitioners had
received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude
them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant
of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased
miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of
said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which
awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based
on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent
choice.
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN
FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM
PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED.
NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, G.R no. L-68470, October 8, 1985
Facts: Petitioner, a citizen of the Philippines and private respondent, a citizen of the
United States were married in Hongkong in 1972, however the parties were divorced in
Nevada, United States, in 1982. Later, the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Private respondent filed a suit against petitioner claiming that the latter’s
business in Ermita, Manila, is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that he be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and be declared to have a right to
manage that property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property". Private respondent however, avers that the Divorce Decree
issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines
and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot,
especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction
to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss, on
the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce
Decree has no bearing in the case. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the claim of private respondent is correct.

Ruling: No, private respondent’s claim is not correct. It is true that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by
the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to

dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

SO ORDERED.
Medina vs. Koiki, G.R No. 215723, Jul 27, 2016

Facts: Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent
Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in
Quezon City, Philippines. On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, were divorced
pursuant to the laws of Japan. Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code before the RTC. Doreen presented
several foreign documents, and in addition to that, photocopies of the Civil Code of
Japan and their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books entitled
"The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009" were likewise
submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce. The RTC in denying the
petition, ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully
proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the
national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce. Doreen’s
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in denying the petition.

Ruling: At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code -
which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The provision reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, the Court had the occasion to rule that:

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the

acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country."
However, considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and
Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are
essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the
RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond
the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review. Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is
not a trier of facts. In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final
orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of
fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA)
in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the
case is hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action
including the reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent
factual issues in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.