BOOK III

Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership

Preliminary Provision

ARTICLE 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation and by

intellectual creation.
Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and
transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession,
and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition.
They may also be acquired by means of prescription. (609a)

Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally classified into
two (2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e, through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law
or intellectual creation) and the derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or
tradition as a result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum)
--- Heirs of Rosendo Sevilla Florencio vs. Heirs of Teresa Sevilla De Leon, G.R. No. 149570, March
12, 2004

TITLE I
Occupation

ARTICLE 713. Things appropriable by nature which are without an

owner, such as animals that are the object of hunting and fishing,
hidden treasure and abandoned movables, are acquired by occupation.
(610)

ARTICLE 714. The ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired

by occupation. (n)

ARTICLE 715. The right to hunt and to fish is regulated by special

laws. (611)

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ARTICLE 716. The owner of a swarm of bees shall have a right to
pursue them to another's land, indemnifying the possessor of the latter
for the damage. If the owner has not pursued the swarm, or ceases to
do so within two consecutive days, the possessor of the land may
occupy or retain the same. The owner of domesticated animals may
also claim them within twenty days to be counted from their
occupation by another person. This period having expired, they shall
pertain to him who has caught and kept them. (612a)

The duty to make a closer inquiry into the certificate of registration of the female carabao
which was the subject of the barter, defendant Mauro Eluna should have performed but
did not. Thus, his being in bad faith, in acquiring the carabao from his vendor, Aurelio
Enopia. Thus, as has been stressed by this Court: "A purchaser cannot close his eyes to
facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in
good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. His mere
refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of the eyes to the possibility
of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title will not make him an innocent purchaser
for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective and it appears that
he had such notice of the defect would have led to its discovery had he acted with the
measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like
situation." (Leung Lee v. Strong, 37 Phil. 644). It is clear from the foregoing that possession
in good faith for four (4) years is not applicable, neither can possession in bad faith of
eight (8) years benefit respondents, for when the owner of a movable has lost or has
been illegally deprived of his property he can recover the same without need to
reimburse the possessor, as provided in Art. 559 of the Civil Code. Neither can Art. 716
of the Civil Code apply, for this article evidently refers to a possessor in good faith. ----
Arthur Pajunar vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77266, July 19, 1989

ARTICLE 717. Pigeons and fish which from their respective breeding
places pass to another pertaining to a different owner shall belong to
the latter, provided they have not been enticed by some article or
fraud. (613a)

ARTICLE 718. He who by chance discovers hidden treasure in

another's property shall have the right granted him in article 438 of this
Code. (614)

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ARTICLE 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must
return it to its previous possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder
shall immediately deposit it with the mayor of the city or municipality
where the finding has taken place.
The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two
consecutive weeks in the way he deems best.
If the movable cannot be kept without deterioration, or without
expenses which considerably diminish its value, it shall be sold at public
auction eight days after the publication.
Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner
having appeared, the thing found, or its value, shall be awarded to the
finder. The finder and the owner shall be obliged, as the case may be,
to reimburse the expenses. (615a)

When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner takes the
thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not become vested with
legal possession. In assuming such custody, the finder is charged with the obligation of
restoring the thing to its owner. It is thus respondent's duty to report to his superior or
his officemates that he found something. The Civil Code, in Article 719, explicitly requires
the finder of a lost property to report it to the proper authorities, thus:
Article 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must return it to its
previous possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit
it with the mayor of the city or municipality where the finding has taken place.
The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two consecutive weeks
in the way he deems best.
If the movables cannot be kept without deterioration, or without the expenses
which considerably diminish its value, it shall be sold at public auction eight days
after the publication.
Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner having
appeared, the thing found, or its value, shall be awarded to the finder. The finder
and the owner shall be obliged, as the case may be, to reimburse the expenses.
Contrary to respondent's claim, this Court is convinced that respondent had the
intention to appropriate the jewelry to himself had these not been discovered by his
wife. His claim that the ring and bracelet were worthless "fancy" jewelry is immaterial
because the basis for his liability is his act of taking something which does not belong
to him.
By admittedly finding complainant's ring and bracelet without returning them to the
rightful owner, respondent blatantly degraded the judiciary and diminished the respect
and regard of the people for the court and its personnel. Every employee of the judiciary
should be an example of integrity, morality and honesty. Like any other public servant,

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respondent must exhibit the highest sense of trustworthiness and rectitude not only in
the performance of his official duties but also in his personal and private dealings with
other people, to preserve the court's good name and standing as a true temple of justice.
It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct,
official and otherwise, of the personnel who work there, from the judge to the lowest
employee. --- Edna Palero-Tan vs. Ciriaco I. Urdaneta, Jr., A.M. No. P-07-2399, June 18, 2008

ARTICLE 720. If the owner should appear in time, he shall be obliged

to pay, as a reward to the finder, one-tenth of the sum or of the price
of the thing found. (616a)

TITLE III
Donation
CHAPTER 1
Nature of Donations

ARTICLE 725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person

disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts
it. (618a)

Under Article 725 of the Civil Code, in order to be valid, such a donation must be made in a public
document and the acceptance must be made in the same or in a separate instrument. In the
latter case, the donor shall be notified of the acceptance in an authentic form and such step must
be noted in both instruments. ---- Rosita Peña vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91478, February 7,
1991
It is explicit in Article 725 of the Civil Code that acceptance is necessary in a donation. This applies
to all kinds of donation because the law does not make any distinction. The rationale behind the
requirement of acceptance is that nobody is obliged to receive a benefit against his will (Arturo
M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume II,
1972 Edition, p. 521). --- Nazario Vita vs. Soledad Montanano, G.R. No. 50553, February 19,
1991

An agreement of the parties is essential in a donation.

A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor
of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential.
Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an

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exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be
spontaneous. The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like
any contract, renders the donation voidable. --- Corazon Catalan, et al. vs. Jose Basa, et al., G.R.
No. 159567, July 31, 2007

a. There are two types of donation as to effectivity:

1. Donation inter vivos – it takes effect during the lifetime of the donor upon concurrence
of the requirements of donation;
2. Donation mortis causa – it takes effect after the death of the donor, thus, in reality a will
and therefore must comply with the formalities of wills.

ARTICLE 726. When a person gives to another a thing or right on

account of the latter's merits or of the services rendered by him to the
donor, provided they do not constitute a demandable debt, or when
the gift imposes upon the donee a burden which is less than the value
of the thing given, there is also a donation. (619)

Remuneratory Donation – Those given on account of donee’s merits or of the services rendered
to the donor that do not constitute a demandable debt.
E.g. The done helped the donor while the latter was sick.
Modal Donation – This is a conditional donation because donor imposes upon the done a burden
which is less than the value of the thing given. E.g. (1) The donee is given the burden of paying
for the expenses during the wake of the donor in the amount which is much less than the
donation; or (2) The donation was made to a public school with the condition that it will be used
as a garden.

In De Luna v. Judge Abrigo, we recognized the distinct, albeit old, characterization of onerous
donations when we declared: "Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with
an onerous cause are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contracts, as
held in the cases of Carlos v. Ramil, L-6736, September 5, 1911, 20 Phil. 183, Manalo vs. de Mesa,
L-9449, February 12, 1915, 29 Phil. 495." In the same case, we emphasized the retention of the
treatment of onerous types of donation, thus: "The same rules apply under the New Civil Code as
provided in Article 733 thereof which provides:
Article 733.Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as
regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed."
We agree with the CA that since the donation imposed on the donee the burden of redeeming
the property for P15,000.00, the donation was onerous. As an endowment for a valuable
consideration, it partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract; hence, the rules of contract will
govern and Article 765 of the New Civil Code finds no application with respect to the onerous
portion of the donation.

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Insofar as the value of the land exceeds the redemption price paid for by the donee, a donation
exists, and the legal provisions on donation apply. Nevertheless, despite the applicability of the
provisions on donation to the gratuitous portion, the petitioner may not dissolve the donation.
She has no factual and legal basis for its revocation, as aptly established by the RTC. First, the
ungrateful acts were committed not by the donee; it was her husband who committed
them. Second, the ungrateful acts were perpetrated not against the donor; it was the
petitioner's sister who received the alleged ill treatments. These twin considerations place the
case out of the purview of Article 765 of the New Civil Code. ---- Calanasan v. Spouses Dolorito,
G.R. No. 171937, [November 25, 2013]

ARTICLE 727. Illegal or impossible conditions in simple and

remuneratory donations shall be considered as not imposed. (n)

Impossible or illegal conditions in simple or remuneratory donations shall be considered as NOT

IMPOSED. In other words, the donation is valid and is considered unconditional (unless there are
other conditions). However, in contracts, the illegal and impossible conditions annuls the
obligations (Article 1183)
Onerouss donation is void if illegal and impossible conditions are imposed. Donations that are
partly onerous and partly gratuitous, is void with respect to the part that is onerous and valid
with respect to the part that is gratuitous if illegal and impossible conditions are imposed.

ARTICLE 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of
the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall
be governed by the rules established in the Title on Succession. (620)

As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will
under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with, failing which the donation is
void and produces no effect. ---- Ursulina Ganuelas vs. Robert T. Cawed, G.R. No. 123968, April
24, 2003

"[I]rrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa,
where "revocability" is precisely the essence of the act. --- Jarabini G. Del Rosario vs. Asuncion
G. Ferrer, et al., G.R. No. 187056, September 20, 2010, citing Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,
426 Phil. 263 (2002)

A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked)
and control of the property while alive

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2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor
to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. ----
Jarabini G. Del Rosario vs. Asuncion G. Ferrer, et al., G.R. No. 187056, September 20, 2010
That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is not
controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not
altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. . . .
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the donation is the
"distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos." Here, the donors
plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be
respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even
clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation.
Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and administration
of the property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has
consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation
simply means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial
ownership of the donated property while they lived.
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed
required. This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos,
since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being
in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donor's lifetime. ---- Jarabini
G. Del Rosario vs. Asuncion G. Ferrer, et al., G.R. No. 187056, September 20, 2010

ARTICLE 729. When the donor intends that the donation shall take
effect during the lifetime of the donor, though the property shall not
be delivered till after the donor's death, this shall be a donation inter
vivos. The fruits of the property from the time of the acceptance of the
donation, shall pertain to the donee, unless the donor provides
otherwise. (n)

Delivery. There can be a donation inter vivos even if the property will not be delivered until the
death of the donor; the done shall become the owner and the fruits shall pertain to him unless
otherwise provided – Article 729

BAR QUESTIONS FOR ARTICLE 728 & 729:

Josefa executed a deed of donation covering a one-hectare rice land in favor of her daughter, Jennifer. The
deed specifically provides that:

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 "For and in consideration of her love and service Jennifer has shown and given to me, I hereby
freely, voluntarily and irrevocably donate to her my one-hectare rice land covered by TCT No.
11550, located in San Fernando, Pampanga. This donation shall take effect upon my death."

The deed also contained Jennifer's signed acceptance, and an attached notarized declaration by
Josefa and Jennifer that the land will remain in Josefa's possession and cannot be alienated, encumbered,
sold or disposed of while Josefa is still alive.

Advise Jennifer on whether the deed is a donation inter vivos or mortis causa and explain the
reasons supporting your advice. (8%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The donation is a donation inter vivos.

When the donor intends that the donation shall take effect during the lifetime of the donor, though
the property shall not be delivered till after the donor’s death, this shall be a donation inter vivos (Art. 729,
Civil Code).

The Civil Code prefers inter vivos transmissions. Moreover, mortis causa donations should follow the
formalities of a will (Art. 728, Civil Code). Here there is no showing that such formalities were followed. Thus,
it is favorable to Jennifer that the deed is a donation inter vivos.

Furthermore, what is most significant in determining the type of donation is the absence of
stipulation that the donor could revoke the donation; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to
be “irrevocable,” a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where
revocability is the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator cannot lawfully waive or restrict his right
of revocation. The provisions of the deed of donation which state that the same will only take effect upon
the death of the donor and that there is a prohibition to alienate, encumber, dispose, or sell the same should
be harmonized with its express irrevocability (Austria-Magat v. CA, G.R. No. 106755, February 1, 2002).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The donation is donation mortis causa.

The deed clearly states that the donation shall take effect upon the death of the donor, Josefa. The
donor, moreover, retained ownership of the subject property as it was declared that the property cannot be
alienated, encumbered, sold or disposed of while the donor is still alive.

As the donation is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will should have
been complied with under Art. 728 of the Civil Code, otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no
effect (The National Treasure of the Philippines v. Vda. De Meimban, G.R. No. L-61023, August 22, 1984).

ARTICLE 730. The fixing of an event or the imposition of a suspensive

condition, which may take place beyond the natural expectation of life
of the donor, does not destroy the nature of the act as a donation inter
vivos, unless a contrary intention appears. (n)
ARTICLE 731. When a person donates something, subject to the
resolutory condition of the donor's survival, there is a donation inter
vivos. (n)
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ARTICLE 732. Donations which are to take effect inter vivos shall be
governed by the general provisions on contracts and obligations in all
that is not determined in this Title. (621)

The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the
property donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration
revoking the same is not necessary. As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals: "By the very express
provision in the deed of donation itself that the violation of the condition thereof would
render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation, WE are of the opinion that there would be
no legal necessity anymore to have the donation judicially declared null and void for the reason
that the very deed of donation itself declares it so. For where (sic) it otherwise and that the
donors and the donee contemplated a court action during the execution of the deed of donation
to have the donation judicially rescinded or declared null and void should the condition be
violated, then the phrase reading 'would render ipso facto null and void' would not appear in the
deed of donation." In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule that a
judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may
be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. It called attention to
the holding that there is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into an
agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation even
without court intervention, and that it is not always necessary for the injured party to resort
to court for rescission of the contract. It reiterated the doctrine that a judicial action is proper
only when there is absence of a special provision granting the power of cancellation. ---- Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77425 & 50, June 19, 1991

An acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement
only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be
accepted by the donee during the donor's lifetime. --- Jarabini G. Del Rosario vs. Asuncion G.
Ferrer, et al., G.R. No. 187056, September 20, 2010

In case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis
causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final.
The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor
learned of the donee's acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the
absolute owner of the property donated. --- Jarabini G. Del Rosario vs. Asuncion G. Ferrer, et al.,
G.R. No. 187056, September 20, 2010, citing Angeles Ubalde Puig, et al. vs. Estela Magbanua
Peñaflorida, et al., G.R. No. L-15939, November 29, 1965

ARTICLE 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by

the rules on contracts and remuneratory donations by the provisions

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of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of
the burden imposed. (622)

Onerous Donation in essence, is not a real donation because it is not an act of liberality; the law
on contract govern.

Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple;
(2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A pure or
simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity. This is donation in its
truest form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made
for the purpose of rewarding the donee for past services, which services do not amount to
a demandable debt. A conditional or modal donation is one where the donation is made
in consideration of future services or where the donor imposes certain conditions,
limitations or charges upon the donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the
donation given. Finally, an onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a
reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable
consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the thing donated.
Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous type are the most distinct.
This is because, unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and the rights and
obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation is completely governed not
by the law on donations but by the law on contracts. In this regard, Article 733 of the
New Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules
on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title
as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed. AIDTHC

The donation involved in the present controversy is one which is onerous since there is a
burden imposed upon the donee to build a school on the donated property.
The Court of Appeals held that there was no valid acceptance of the donation because:
xxx xxx xxx
Under the law the donation is void if there is no acceptance. The acceptance
may either be in the same document as the deed of donation or in a separate
public instrument. If the acceptance is in a separate instrument, "the donor shall
be notified thereof in an authentic form, and his step shall be noted in both
instruments.
"Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee
by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in
a public instrument and the donor duly noticed thereof. (Abellera
vs. Balanag, 37 Phils. 85;Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245). If the
acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in
another. Solemn words are not necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the
intention to accept, But in this case, it is necessary that formal notice
thereof be given to the donor and the fact that due notice has been given
it must be noted in both instruments (that containing the offer to donate
and that showing acceptance). Then and only then is the donation

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 perfected. (11 Manresa 155-11, cited in Vol. II, Civil Code of the
Philippines by Tolentino.)."
This Court perused carefully the Deed of Donation marked as exhibit "A" and "1"
to determine whether there was acceptance of the donation. This Court found
none. We further examined the record if there is another document which
embodies the acceptance, we found one. Although the Court found that in the
offer of exhibits of the defendants, a supposed affidavit of acceptance and/or
confirmation of the donation, marked as exhibit "8" appears to have been
offered.
However, there is nothing in the record that the exhibits offered by the
defendants have been admitted nor such exhibits appear on record.
Assuming that there was such an exhibit, the said supposed acceptance was not
noted in the Deed of Donation as required under Art. 749 of the Civil Code. And
according to Manresa, supra, a noted civilist, the notation is one of the
requirements of perfecting a donation. In other words, without such a notation,
the contract is not perfected contract. Since the donation is not perfected, the
contract is therefore not valid.
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that there was a valid acceptance of the donation. Republic v. Silim, G.R. No.
140487, [April 2, 2001], 408 PHIL 69-82

Even conceding that petitioner's full payment of the purchase price of the lot might have been a
burden to him, such payment was not however imposed by the donor as a condition for the
donation. It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as
the donee, The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. We agree with
Respondent Court that the payments made by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts. This
much can be gathered from his testimony in court, in which he never even claimed that a burden
or charge had been imposed by his grandmother. ---- Tito R. Lagazo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 112796, March 5, 1998

Under the old Civil Code, it is settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not
by the law on donations but by the rules on contracts, as held in the cases of Carlos v. Ramil, L-
6736, September 5, 1911, 20 Phil. 183, Manalo vs. de Mesa, L-9449, February 12, 1915, 29 Phil.
495. On the matter of prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous donation, it was
held that the general rules on prescription applies. (Parks v. Province of Tarlac, supra.) The same
rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which provides: "Article
733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which
exceeds the value of the burden imposed.” ---- Evelyn De Luna vs. Sofronio F. Abrigo, G.R. No.
57455, January 18, 1990

ARTICLE 734. The donation is perfected from the moment the donor
knows of the acceptance by the donee. (623)
CHAPTER 2
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 Persons Who May Give or Receive a Donation

ARTICLE 735. All persons who may contract and dispose of their
property may make a donation. (624)

ARTICLE 736. Guardians and trustees cannot donate the property

entrusted to them. (n)

It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus, succession to her estate is
governed by the present Civil Code. Under Article 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are
her legitimate children, petitioners and private respondent herein, and her spouse, Rafael
Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. decided to adjudicate the entire property
by executing an "Affidavit of Adjudication" claiming that he is the sole surviving heir of his
deceased wife Felicidad F. Marquez. As such, when Rafael Marquez, Sr., for one reason
or another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of his
wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of
certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was
established. Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust
enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse
of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity
and good conscience, to hold.
Cognizant of the fact that the disputed land was conjugal property of the spouses Rafael,
Sr. and Felicidad, ownership of the same is to be equally divided between both of them.
Prescinding therefrom, can Rafael Marquez, Sr., as trustee of his wife's share, validly
donate this portion to the respondents? Obviously, he cannot, as expressly provided in
Art. 736 of the Civil Code, thus: "Art. 736. Guardian and trustees cannot donate the
property entrusted to them." Moreover, nobody can dispose of that which does not
belong to him. ---- Ricardo F. Marquez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125715, December 29,
|||

1998

ARTICLE 737. The donor's capacity shall be determined as of the

time of the making of the donation. (n)

In the case at bar, at the time Felisa executed the deed of extra-judicial partition dividing
the share of her deceased sister Honarata between her and the heirs of Filomena Almirol
de Sevilla; she was no longer the owner of the 1/2 undivided portion of Lot No. 653,
having previously donated the same to respondent Leopoldo Sevilla who accepted the
donation in the same deed. A donation inter vivos, as in the instant case, is immediately

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operative and final. As a mode of acquiring ownership, it results in an effective transfer
of title over the property from the donor to the donee and the donation is perfected
from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. And once a
donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. - |||

--- Heirs of William Sevilla vs. Leopoldo Sevilla, G.R. No. 150179, April 30, 2003

ARTICLE 738. All those who are not specially disqualified by law
therefor may accept donations. (625)

ARTICLE 739. The following donations shall be void:

(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal
offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and
ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may
be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the
donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the
same action. (n)

EFFECT ON SALE MADE BETWEEN PARTIES GUILTY OF ADULTERY OR CONCUBINAGE; RULE; CASE
AT BAR AN EXCEPTION. — there is no basis for holding that the property in question was property
of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because there was no such partnership
in the first place. The Court of Appeals held that the sale of the property to Nenita is void on the
principle embodied in art. 739(1) of the Civil Code which declares donations made between
persons who are guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation to be void. In the
first place, an action for declaration of the nullity of such donations can only be brought by the
innocent spouse, perhaps in this case by the first wife, but certainly not by Luisita whose
marriage to Aurelio is itself void. The last paragraph of art. 739 clearly provides: In the case
referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the
donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of
evidence in the same action. In the second place, until otherwise shown in an appropriate
action, the sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner's ownership is evidenced by a deed
of absolute sale executed with all the solemnity of a public document and by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her name. Petitioner is in possession of the property.
It was error for the Court of appeals to annul petitioner's title at the instance of one whose
marriage to the seller is void. Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a
long period of cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-1988). While

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petitioner knew respondent Chito to be Aurelio's son way back in 1976, there is nothing to show
that she knew Aurelio to be married to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to
be single. As far as petitioner was concerned, Chito could have been Aurelio's child by a woman
not his wife. There was, therefore, no basis for the Court of Appeals' ruling that Nenita was not
a buyer in good faith of the property because she ought to have known that Aurelio was married
to Luisita.||| ---- Nenita Bienvenido vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111717, October 24, 1994

ARTICLE 740. Incapacity to succeed by will shall be applicable to

donations inter vivos. (n) - Article 1027 and 1032

1. The priest who heard the confession of the testator during his last illness, or the minister
of the gospel who extended spiritual aid to him during the same period;
2. The relative of such priest or minister of the gospel within the fourth degree, the church,
order, chapter, community, organization, or institution to which such priest or minister
may belong;
3. A guardian with respect to testamentary dispositions given by a ward in his favor before
the final accounts of the guardianship have been approved, even if the testator should
die after the approval thereof; nevertheless, any provision made by the ward in favor of
the guardian when the latter is his ascendant, descendant, brother, sister, or spouse, shall
be valid;
4. Any attesting witness to the execution of a will, the spouse, parents, or children, or any
one claiming under such witness, spouse, parents or children;
5. Any physician, surgeon, nurse, health officer or druggist who took care of the testator
during his last illness;
6. Individuals, associations and corporations not permitted by law to inherit, and this
prohibition applies to both intestate and testate succession.
7. Parents who have abandoned their children or induced their daughters to lead a corrupt
or immoral life, or attempted against their virtue;
8. Any person who has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or
her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
9. Any person who has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes
imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;
10. Any heir of full age who, having knowledge of the violent death of the testator, should fail
to report it to an officer of the law within a month, unless the authorities have already
taken action; this prohibition shall not apply to cases wherein, according to law, there is
no obligation to make an accusation;
11. Any person convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
12. Any person who by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence should cause the
testator to make a will or to change one already made;
13. Any person who by the same means prevents another from making a will, or from
revoking one already made, or who supplants, conceals, or alters the latter's will;
14. Any person who falsifies or forges a supposed will of the decedent.
In cases falling under Nos. 8, 9, or 11, it shall be necessary to wait until final judgment is
rendered, and in the case falling under No. 10, the expiration of the month allowed for the report.

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The causes of unworthiness shall be without effect if the testator had knowledge thereof at the
time he made the will, or if, having known of them subsequently, he should condone them in
writing.

ARTICLE 741. Minors and others who cannot enter into a contract
may become donees but acceptance shall be done through their
parents or legal representatives. (626a)

ARTICLE 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children

may be accepted by those persons who would legally represent them if
they were already born. (627)

ARTICLE 743. Donations made to incapacitated persons shall be

void, though simulated under the guise of another contract or through
a person who is interposed. (628)

ARTICLE 744. Donations of the same thing to two or more different

donees shall be governed by the provisions concerning the sale of the
same thing to two or more different persons. (n)

Justa Kausapin executed on September 27, 1960 a "Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Property
by Reversion" whereby she transferred an unregistered parcel of land to her stepdaughter
Maxima Hemedes, pursuant to the resolutory condition in the deed of donation executed in her
favor by her late husband Jose Hemedes, except the usufruct thereof which shall remain in her
during her lifetime or remarriage, upon which the same shall automatically revert to Maxima.
Thereafter, Maxima initiated registration proceedings and new title was issued in her name, with
the annotation of usufruct in favor of Justa Kausapin. On June 2, 1964, Maxima and her spouse
mortgaged said property R & B Insurance as security for a loan, which they obtained. When
Maxima failed to pay the loan, R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. A public
auction sale was held in which R & B Insurance was the highest bidder. For failure of Maxima to
redeem the property, ownership was consolidated in the name of R & B Insurance and a new title
was thereafter issued in its name. The annotation of usufruct in favor of Justa Kausapin was
maintained in the new title. Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of
Maxima, Justa executed a "Kasunduan" on May 27, 1971 whereby she transferred the same land
to her stepson, Enrique D. Hemedes. Justa affirmed the conveyance of the subject property in
favor of Enrique and denied the conveyance made to Maxima. On February 28, 1979, Enrique
sold the property to Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation. On May 14, 1981,
Dominium leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery, Inc. who immediately
constructed two warehouses upon said property. Thereafter R & B Insurance and Maxima both

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claimed ownership of the subject property and the right to appropriate the constructions.
Maxima denied the execution of any real estate mortgage in favor of R & B Insurance. Dominium
and Enrique then filed a complaint for the annulment of the title issued in favor of R & B Insurance
and/or reconveyance to Dominium of the subject property.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I share the opinion expressed by my esteemed colleague, Mme. Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-
Reyes, in her ponencia.
I just would like to add that a donation would not be legally feasible if the donor has neither
ownership nor real right that he can transmit to the donee. Unlike an ordinary contract, a
donation, under Article 712, in relation to Article 725 of the Civil Code is also a mode of
acquiring and transmitting ownership and other real rights by an act of liberality whereby a
person disposes gratuitously that ownership or real right in favor of another who accepts it. It
would be an inefficacious process if the donor would have nothing to convey at the time it is
made.
Article 744 of the Civil Code states that the "donation of the same thing to two or more different
donees shall be governed by the provisions concerning the sale of the same thing to two or more
persons," i.e., by Article 1544 of the same Code, as if so saying that there can be a case of "double
donations" to different donees with opposing interest. Article 744 is a new provision, having no
counterpart in the old Civil Code, that must have been added unguardedly. Being a mode of
acquiring and transmitting ownership or other real rights, a donation once perfected would
deny the valid execution of a subsequent inconsistent donation (unless perhaps if the prior
donation has provided a suspensive condition which still pends when the later donation is
made).
In sales, Article 1544, providing for the rules to resolve the conflicting rights of two or more
buyers, is appropriate since the law does not prohibit but, in fact, sanctions the perfection of a
sale by a non-owner, such as the sale of future things or a short sale, for it is only at
the consummation stage of the sale, i.e., delivery of the thing sold, that ownership would be
deemed transmitted to the buyer. In the meanwhile, a subsequent sale to another of the same
thing by the same seller can still be a legal possibility. This rule on double sales finds no relevance
in an ordinary donation where the law requires the donor to have ownership of the thing or the
real right he donates at the time of its perfection (see Article 750, Civil Code) since a donation
constitutes a mode, not just a title, in an acquisition and transmission of ownership. ---- Maxima
Hemedes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107132 & 108472, October 8, 1999

ARTICLE 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or

through an authorized person with a special power for the purpose, or
with a general and sufficient power; otherwise, the donation shall be
void. (630)
Acceptance may be express or tacit:
1. An express acceptance must be made in a public or private document;
2. A tacit acceptance is one resulting from acts by which the intention to accept is necessarily
implied, or which one would have no right to do except in the capacity of an heir.
3. Acts of mere preservation or provisional administration DO NOT imply an acceptance of
the inheritance if, through such acts, the title or capacity of an heir has not been assumed.

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ARTICLE 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the
donor and of the donee. (n)

ARTICLE 747. Persons who accept donations in representation of

others who may not do so by themselves, shall be obliged to make the
notification and notation of which article 749 speaks. (631)

ARTICLE 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in

writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of
the document representing the right donated.
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand
pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing.
Otherwise, the donation shall be void. (632a)

ARTICLE 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be

valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must
satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done
during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be
notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in
both instruments. (633)

Ricky Q. Quilala vs. Gliceria Alcantara, G.R. No. 132681, December 3, 2001
Ignacio Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110335, June 18, 2001
Republic of the Phils. vs. David Rey Guzman, G.R. No. 132964, February 18, 2000
Heirs of Salud Dizon Salamat vs. Natividad Dizon Tamayo, G.R. No. 110644, October 30, 1998

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 CHAPTER 3
Effect of Donations and Limitations Thereon

ARTICLE 750. The donation may comprehend all the present

property of the donor, or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full
ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself,
and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation,
are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such
reservation, the donation shall be reduced in petition of any person
affected. (634a)

The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents, nephews and
nieces of Doña Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she had already
disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death. For those properties did not form part of
her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the
time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession." The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death,
and do not vest in his heirs until such time. Property which Doña Catalina had transferred or
conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time
of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that
remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those
transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances
to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not
inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs.
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doña Catalina, in transferring the
properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to
circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to her succession. Said
respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence
there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property
during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted
her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art.
750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:
"Art 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor,
or part thereof, provided he reserves, in, full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient
means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the
acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor.
Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on petition of any
person affected. (634a).
Mariano B. Locsin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89783, February 19, 1992

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ARTICLE 751. Donations cannot comprehend future property.
By future property is understood anything which the donor cannot
dispose of at the time of the donation. (635)

ARTICLE 752. The provisions of article 750 notwithstanding, no

person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may give
or receive by will.
The donation shall be inofficious in all that it may exceed this
limitation. (636)

A person's prerogative to make donations is a subject to certain limitations, one of which is that
he cannot give by donation more than he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). If he does, so
much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the
donation is reducible to the extent of such excess, though without prejudice to its taking effect
in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing donated (Art. 771, Civil
Code). Donation made in violation of Art, 752 of the Civil Code is collationable, that is, its value
is imputable into the heredity estate of the donor at the time of his death for the purpose of
determining the lifetime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of
the estate. --- Lucerna Vda. De Tupaz vs. RTC of Negros, G.R. No. L-65800, October 3, 1986

ARTICLE 753. When a donation is made to several persons jointly, it

is understood to be in equal shares, and there shall be no right of
accretion among them, unless the donor has otherwise provided.
The preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to donations made to
the husband and wife jointly, between whom there shall be a right of
accretion, if the contrary has not been provided by the donor. (637)

ARTICLE 754. The donee is subrogated to all the rights and actions
which in case of eviction would pertain to the donor. The latter, on the
other hand, is not obliged to warrant the things donated, save when
the donation is onerous, in which case the donor shall be liable for
eviction to the concurrence of the burden.

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The donor shall also be liable for eviction or hidden defects in case of
bad faith on his part. (638a)

ARTICLE 755. The right to dispose of some of the things donated, or

of some amount which shall be a charge thereon, may be reserved by
the donor; but if he should die without having made use of this right,
the property or amount reserved shall belong to the donee. (639)
ARTICLE 756. The ownership of property may also be donated to one
person and the usufruct to another or others, provided all the donees
are living at the time of the donation. (640a)

ARTICLE 757. Reversion may be validly established in favor of only

the donor for any case and circumstances, but not in favor of other
persons unless they are all living at the time of the donation.
Any reversion stipulated by the donor in favor of a third person in
violation of what is provided in the preceding paragraph shall be void,
but shall not nullify the donation. (641a)

ARTICLE 758. When the donation imposes upon the donee the
obligation to pay the debts of the donor, if the clause does not contain
any declaration to the contrary, the former is understood to be liable
to pay only the debts which appear to have been previously contracted.
In no case shall the donee be responsible for the debts exceeding the
value of the property donated, unless a contrary intention clearly
appears. (642a)

ARTICLE 759. There being no stipulation regarding the payment of

debts, the donee shall be responsible therefor only when the donation
has been made in fraud of creditors.
The donation is always presumed to be in fraud of creditors, when at
the time thereof the donor did not reserve sufficient property to pay
his debts prior to the donation. (643)

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 CHAPTER 4
Revocation and Reduction of Donations

ARTICLE 760. Every donation inter vivos, made by a person having

no children or descendants, legitimate or legitimated by subsequent
marriage, or illegitimate, may be revoked or reduced as provided in the
next article, by the happening of any of these events:
(1) If the donor, after the donation, should have legitimate or
legitimated or illegitimate children, even though they be posthumous;
(2) If the child of the donor, whom the latter believed to be dead
when he made the donation, should turn out to be living;
(3) If the donor should subsequently adopt a minor child. (644a)

ARTICLE 761. In the cases referred to in the preceding article, the

donation shall be revoked or reduced insofar as it exceeds the portion
that may be freely disposed of by will, taking into account the whole
estate of the donor at the time of the birth, appearance or adoption of
a child. (n)

ARTICLE 762. Upon the revocation or reduction of the donation by

the birth, appearance or adoption of a child, the property affected shall
be returned or its value if the donee has sold the same.
If the property is mortgaged, the donor may redeem the mortgage, by
paying the amount guaranteed, with a right to recover the same from
the donee.
When the property cannot be returned, it shall be estimated at what it
was worth at the time of the donation. (645a)

ARTICLE 763. The action for revocation or reduction on the grounds

set forth in article 760 shall prescribe after four years from the birth of

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the first child, or from his legitimation, recognition or adoption, or from
the judicial declaration of filiation, or from the time information was
received regarding the existence of the child believed dead.
This action cannot be renounced, and is transmitted, upon the death of
the donor, to his legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants.
(646a)

ARTICLE 764. The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the

donor, when the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions which
the former imposed upon the latter.
In this case, the property donated shall be returned to the donor, the
alienations made by the donee and the mortgages imposed thereon by
him being void, with the limitations established, with regard to third
persons, by the Mortgage Law and the Land Registration laws.
This action shall prescribe after four years from the noncompliance
with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and
may be exercised against the donee's heirs. (647a)

Apolinaria Austria-Magat vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106755, February 1, 2002
Central Philippine University vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112127, July 17, 1995
Alberto Garrido vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101262, September 14, 1994
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77425 & 50, June 19, 1991
Evelyn De Luna vs. Sofronio F. Abrigo, G.R. No. 57455, January 18, 1990

ARTICLE 765. The donation may also be revoked at the instance of

the donor, by reason of ingratitude in the following cases:
(1) If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the
honor or the property of the donor, or of his wife or children under his
parental authority;
(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act
involving moral turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless the
crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself, his
wife or children under his authority;
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(3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or
morally bound to give support to the donor. (648a)

Romulo and Sally Eduarte vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105944, February 9, 1996

ARTICLE 766. Although the donation is revoked on account of

ingratitude, nevertheless, the alienations and mortgages effected
before the notation of the complaint for revocation in the Registry of
Property shall subsist.
Later ones shall be void. (649)

ARTICLE 767. In the case referred to in the first paragraph of the

preceding article, the donor shall have a right to demand from the
donee the value of property alienated which he cannot recover from
third persons, or the sum for which the same has been mortgaged.
The value of said property shall be fixed as of the time of the donation.
(650)

ARTICLE 768. When the donation is revoked for any of the causes
stated in article 760, or by reason of ingratitude, or when it is reduced
because it is inofficious, the donee shall not return the fruits except
from the filing of the complaint.
If the revocation is based upon noncompliance with any of the
conditions imposed in the donation, the donee shall return not only the
property but also the fruits thereof which he may have received after
having failed to fulfill the condition. (651)

ARTICLE 769. The action granted to the donor by reason of

ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This action prescribes
within one year, to be counted from the time the donor had knowledge
of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action. (652)

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ARTICLE 770. This action shall not be transmitted to the heirs of the
donor, if the latter did not institute the same, although he could have
done so, and even if he should die before the expiration of one year.
Neither can this action be brought against the heir of the donee, unless
upon the latter's death the complaint has been filed. (653)

ARTICLE 771. Donations which in accordance with the provisions of

article 752, are inofficious, bearing in mind the estimated net value of
the donor's property at the time of his death, shall be reduced with
regard to the excess; but this reduction shall not prevent the donations
from taking effect during the life of the donor, nor shall it bar the donee
from appropriating the fruits.
For the reduction of donations the provisions of this Chapter and of
articles 911 and 912 of this Code shall govern. (654)

Eloy Imperial vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999
Lucerna Vda. De Tupaz vs. RTC of Negros, G.R. No. L-65800, October 3, 1986

ARTICLE 772. Only those who at the time of the donor's death have
a right to the legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may ask
for the reduction or inofficious donations.
Those referred to in the preceding paragraph cannot renounce their
right during the lifetime of the donor, either by express declaration, or
by consenting to the donation.
The donees, devisees and legatees, who are not entitled to the legitime
and the creditors of the deceased can neither ask for the reduction nor
avail themselves thereof. (655a)

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ARTICLE 773. If, there being two or more donations, the disposable
portion is not sufficient to cover all of them, those of the more recent
date shall be suppressed or reduced with regard to the excess. (656)

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