RUBI VS PROV. BOARD OF MINDORO 39 Phil.

660 – Political Law – Delegation of Powers – Liberty and due process

FACTS

Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to

remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of

Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a

reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who

were considered to be of “very low culture”.

One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan,

solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other

Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they

had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found
is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.

was challenged.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are

being deprived of their liberty.

HELD:

I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Under

the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but the provincial

governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to

the provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has

committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.

II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was

intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to

geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes

were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle

them down where they can adapt to the changing times.

The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and

stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization

of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say

that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws,

there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it

applies alike to all of a class.”

Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849
(1967)
J. Fernando

Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc.
petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of
Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to
the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the
challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due
process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and
P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a
form specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for
being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum
facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and
laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24
hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that
violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?

Held: No. Judgment reversed.

Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court
deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must
prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in
the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose
other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal
protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be
unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet the
due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the
right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the
license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases
than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances
must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to
interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s police power.
In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here
the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power
measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was
not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for
the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of
People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but
where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of establishments,
and the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal
laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as
saying what they obviously mean."

Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659

J. Cruz

Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer confiscated by the
station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits transportation of a
carabao or carabeef from one province to another. Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin
upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the
court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright
confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial court as guaranteed
by due process. He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by the former
president under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency
powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law.

Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?

Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.

Ratio:
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, “courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the
constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more
deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.”
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law due to the grant of
legislative authority over the president under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controvery. In the due
process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This was due to
the avoidance of an “iron rule “laying down a stiff command for all circumstances. There was
flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with varying degrees at protection for the changing
conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest they be confined to its
interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary evidence as
long as such presumption is based on human experience or rational connection between facts
proved and fact presumed. An examplesis a passport of a person with a criminal offense cancelled
without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which both restrains
and is restrained by dure process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in addition to 626 which
prohibits slaughter of carabos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original executive order, it can’t be said that it
complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the purpose sought
has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due process is not juridical
only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of
justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the method toconfiscate
carabos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or his defense and
punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separataion of

National Development Com pan y and New Ag rix vs. Philippine VeteransBank (192 SCRA 257)
Facts:A g r i x M a r k e t i n g e x e c u t e d i n f a v o r o f r e s p o n d e n t a r e a l e s t a t e m o r t g a g e o v e r three parcels of
land. Agri x later on we nt ba nkrupt. In ord er to rehabilitate
thec o m p a n y , t h e n P r e s i d e n t M a r c o s i s s u e d P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c r e e 1 7 1 7 w h i c
h m a n d a t e d , a m o n g o t h e r s , t h e e x t i n g u i s h i n g o f a l l t h e m o r t g a g e s a n d l i e n s attachin
g to the pro pert y of Agri x, a nd creatin g a Claim s Comm ittee to
process c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e c o m p a n y t o b e a d m i n i s t e r e d m a i n l y b y N D C . R e s p o n d e n t t h e r e o n f i l e
d a c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e c o m p a n y b e f o r e t h e C o m m i t t e e . P e t i t i o n e r s however filed a petition with the RTC of
Calamba, Laguna invoking the provision of the law which cancels all mortgage liens against it. Respondent took measures
toe xtraju diciall y foreclose which the petitioners opposed by filing another case int h e s a m e c o u r t . T h e s e
c a s e s w e r e c o n s o l i d a t e d . T h e R T C h e l d i n f a v o r o f t h e respondent on the ground of unconstitutionality of the
decree; mainly violation of the separati on of po wers, im pairment of obligation of contracts, and viol ation of the
equal protection clause. Hence this petition.

Issue:
•
Is the respondent estopped from questioning the constitutionality of the lawsince they first abided by it by filing a claim with the
Committee?
•
Is PD 1717 unconstitutional?

Ruling:

O n t h e i s s u e o f e s t o p p e l , t h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t i t c o u l d n o t a p p l y i n t h e present case since

when the respondent filed his claim, President Marcos was thesupreme ruler of the country and they could not question his acts
even before thecourts because of his absolute power over all governm ent institutions when he was the President. T h e
c r e a t i o n o f N e w A g r i x a s m a n d a t e d b y t h e d e c r e e w a s a l s o r u l e d a s unconstitutional
since it violated the p ro hibiti on that
the Batasang Pam bansa( C o n g r e s s ) s h a l l n o t p r o v i d e f o r t h e f o r m a t i o n , o r g a n i z a t i o n , o r r e g u l a t i o
n o f p r i v a t e c o r p o r a t i o n s u n l e s s s u c h c o r p o r a t i o n s a r e o w n e d o r c o n t r o l l e d b y t h e government.
PD 1717 was held as unco n stitutional on the other grounds that it was aninvalid exercise of police power, It had no
lawful subject and no lawful method. Itviolated due process by extinguishing all mortgages and liens and interests whichare property
rights unjustly taken. It also violated the equal protection clause
byl u m p i n g t o g e t h e r a l l s e c u r e d a n d u n s e c u r e d c r e d i t o r s . I t a l s o i m p a i r e d t h e obligatio
n of contracts, even though it only involved purely private interests

AGUSTIN V EDU. 88 SCRA 195

Facts:
Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter of Instruction 229
and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo Edu. His car already
had warning lights and did not want to use this.
The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device installed on a vehicle to
reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars.
The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the acquisition cost.
The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or highway for 30 minutes.
It was mandatory.
Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal protection, and due
process/
2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers millionaires at the expense f
car owners at 56-72 pesos per set.
Hence the petition.
The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the unconstitutionality
and undue delegation of police power to such acts.
The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs as a
regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police power.

Issue:
Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?

Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing more or less
than the power of government inherent in every sovereignty.
The case also says that police power is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare.
Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order, and general welfare of the people.
J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also intend to enable a
citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures calculated to insure communal peace.
There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.
Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of factual
record in over throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation in overthrowing
the statute.
Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that the statute was
oppressive was fantastic because the reflectors were not expensive.
SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of the driver is concerned.
Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because it’s installed when parked for 30
minutes and placed from 400 meters from the car allowing drivers to see clearly.
There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesn’t violate any constitutional
provision.
LOI 229 doesn’t force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only
prescribes rge requirement from any source.
The objective is public safety.
The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended enforcement for installation of
ewd’s. Bother possess relevance in applying rules with the decvlaration of principles in the
Constitution.
On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no settled legal doctrines.

MARANAW HOTEL V NLRC 238 SCRA 190

FACTS

On 16 June 1990, private respondent Gina G. Castro was hired on a probationary basis for six
months as a guest relations officer of the Century Park Sheraton Hotel, a five-star hotel located at
Malate, Manila, owned by the petitioner. 1 On 10 November 1990, she was dismissed on the ground of
failure to meet the standards set forth in her probationary employment contract. 2 She then filed on 13
November 1990 with the Arbitration Branch of the National Capital Region of the NLRC a complaint for
illegal dismissal with reinstatement, back wages, and damages against the hotel and its former general
manager, Peter Grieder. 3 The case was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-11-06059-90.

On 23 December 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision 4 in favor of the private respondent

On 7 February 1992, within the 10-day reglementary period, petitioner filed an appeal 6 to the NLRC
alleging therein that the Labor Arbiter committed abuse of discretion and serious error in his findings of
fact and conclusions of law

On 17 February 1992, the private respondent filed a motion for the execution of the decision 8 on the
ground that the petitioner did not file the memorandum of appeal and appeal bond and that the order of
reinstatement was immediately executory. This motion was likewise not resolved.

On 14 July 1992, the petitioner filed a surety bond in the amount of P100,562.00 9 to answer for the
10
monetary award based on the erroneous computation by the Labor Arbiter.

In its resolution of 25 March 1993, 11 the NLRC (Second Division) reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Issue: whether or not NLRC resolution be declared null and void because the
petitioner's appeal to the NLRC was not perfected on time due to the petitioner's failure
to put up the required surety bond within the 10-day reglementary period.

Held: The Petition is granted.

It must be stressed that the private respondent did not challenge the resolution of the NLRC
reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissing her complaint for illegal dismissal and it is
only in this action that she questioned the timeliness of the petitioner's appeal to the NLRC. We have
ruled that the issue of the timeliness of an appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC
may not be raised for the first time before this Court.19 The proper step that the private respondent
should have taken was to file with the NLRC a motion to dismiss the appeal and to remand the records on
the ground that the decision had become final and executory. 20

The sole issue thus presented for our determination is whether or not the NLRC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in holding that the private respondent should be considered as reinstated in the
payroll from the filing of the motion for execution on 13 March 1992 until the promulgation of its
resolution and, as a necessary consequence, ordering the petitioner to pay the private respondent
her salaries corresponding to the period from 13 March 1992 up to 25 March 1993 when its
resolution was promulgated.

We agree with the petitioner that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion. The petition should
thus be granted.

The resolution of the issue is found in the third paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code which
reads:

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be
executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work
under the terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at
the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by
the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
(emphasis supplied).

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,

vs.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.
G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994
Cruz, J.
Facts:
PAGCOR decide d to e xp and its operations to Cagayan d e Oro Cit y. To this end, itleased a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovated
ande q u i p p e d t h e s a m e , a n d p r e p a r e d t o i n a u g u r a t e i t s c a s i n o t h e r e d u r i n g t h e C h r i s t m a s season.C
ivic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed theobjection and so did the wom en's
grou ps and the youth. Dem onstrations we re led b y themayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest,
describing the casino as anaffront to the welfare of the city. The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang
Panlungsodof Cagayan de Oro City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operationof a casino and Ordinance
No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to
helpcentralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within theterritorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid

Held:
No. Cag ayan de O ro Cit y, like other local political subdi visions, is em powered toenact ordinances for the purposes
indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expresslyv e s t e d w i t h t h e p o l i c e p o w e r u n d e r w h a t i s k n o w n a s
t h e G e n e r a l W e l f a r e C l a u s e n o w embodied in Section 16 as follows:Sec. 16.
General Welfare
. — Every local government unit shall exercise thepowers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well
aspowers necessary, app rop riate, or incid ental for its efficient and effectivegovernance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the
generalwelfa re. W ithin their respective territori al jurisdicti ons, local governm entunits shall ensure and support,
am ong other thin gs, the pre servatio n an denrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of thepeople
to a balance d ecolog y, enco urag e an d support the devel opm ent of appropriate and self-reliant scientific
and technological capabilities, improvepublic morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote fullemployment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preservethe comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants. T h e r e i s a r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e o r d i n a n c e s s h o u l d n o t c o n t r a v e n e a s t a t u t e . Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exerciseonly delegated legislative powers conferred on
them by Congress as the national lawmakingbody. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
thoseof the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mereordinance the mandate of the statute.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,