RAMON P. BINAMIRA, vs. PETER D.

GARRUCHO, JR

Facts:

Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in violation
of his security of tenure.

The petitioner bases his claim on the following communication addressed to him by the
Minister of Tourism on April 7, 1986. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner assumed office on the
same date.

On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino of the
composition of the Board of Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-Chairman
in his capacity as General Manager. This approval was given by the President on the same
date. 1

Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA General
Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors and had been acknowledged as such by
various government offices, including the Office of the President.

He complains, though, that on January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent
Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism. Binamira's demurrer led to an unpleasant
exchange that led to his filing of a complaint against the Secretary with the Commission on
Human Rights. But that is another matter that does not concern us here.

On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho the following

memorandum, 2 copy furnished Binamira:

It appearing from the records you have submitted to this Office that the present
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority was designated not by the
President, as required by P.D. No. 564, as amended, but only by the Secretary of
Tourism, such designation is invalid. Accordingly, you are hereby designated
concurrently as General Manager, effective immediately, until I can appoint a
person to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity.

Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the PTA in accordance with this
memorandum, the petitioner filed this action against him to question his title. Subsequently,
while his original petition was pending, Binamira filed a supplemental petition alleging that on
April 6, 1990, the President of the Philippines appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. Capistrano was impleaded as additional
respondent.

Issue: WON the power of appointment by the president can be delegated

Held:

It is not disputed that the petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but
only designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between appointment
and designation that the petitioner has failed to consider.
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand,
connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where,
in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices
of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the
Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive
while designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the
naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of
the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is
that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary
appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the petitioner cannot
sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly
provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority
shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment
involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally
speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as
an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a
merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if
he happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.

Indeed, even on the assumption that the power conferred on the President could be validly
exercised by the Secretary, we still cannot accept that the act of the latter, as an extension or
"projection" of the personality of the President, made irreversible the petitioner's title to the
position in question. The petitioner's conclusion that Minister Gonzales's act was in effect the
act of President Aquino is based only on half the doctrine he vigorously invokes.

The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the
Philippines when "performed and promulgated in the regular course of business," which was
true of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds
that such acts shall be considered valid only if not 'disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive," as also happened in the case at bar.

The argument that the designation made by Minister Gonzales was approved by President
Aquino through her approval of the composition of the Board of Directors of the PTA is not
persuasive. It must be remembered that Binamira was included therein as Vice- Chairman only
because of his designation as PTA General Manager by Minister Gonzales. Such designation
being merely provisional, it could be recalled at will, as in fact it was recalled by the President
herself, through the memorandum she addressed to Secretary Garrucho on January 4, 1990.

With these rulings, the petitioner's claim of security of tenure must perforce fall to the ground.
His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did not
acquire valid title thereunder to the position in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be
and was authorized, the designation signified merely a temporary or acting appointment that
could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different reason).i•t•c-
aüsl In either case, the petitioner's claim of security of tenure must be rejected.
The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who apparently believed in good faith that he was
being extended a permanent appointment by the Minister of Tourism. After all, Minister
Gonzales had the ostensible authority to do so at the time the designation was made. This
belief seemed strengthened when President Aquino later approved the composition of the PTA
Board of Directors where the petitioner was designated Vice-Chairman because of his position
as General Manager of the PTA. However, such circumstances fall short of the categorical
appointment required to be made by the President herself, and not the Minister of Tourism,
under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564. We must rule therefore that the petitioner never acquired valid
title to the disputed position and so has no right to be reinstated as General Manager of the
Philippine Tourism Authority.

TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES vs. THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS,

AND OFFICES (C.A.), COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

Facts:

On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the
President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the
Constitution. Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. transmitted by letter, also dated April
6, 1988 the appointment of the said sectoral representatives to Speaker Ramon Mitra, Jr.

On April 18, 1988, the above-mentioned sectoral representatives were scheduled to take their
oaths before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. at the Session Hall of Congress after the Order of
Business. However, petitioner and the three other sectoral representatives- appointees were not
able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of Congress due to the
opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted
that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before
they could take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives.
This opposition compelled Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. to suspend the oath-taking of the four
sectoral representatives.

In view of this development, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. transmitted on April
25,1988, a letter dated April 11, 1988 of the President addressed to the Commission on
Appointments submitting for confirmation the appointments of the four sectoral
representatives.

Meanwhile, petitioner in a letter dated April 22, 1988 addressed to Speaker Ramon V. Mitra,
Jr. appealed to the House of Representatives alleging, among others, that since 41 no attempt
was made to subject the sectoral representatives* already sitting to the confirmation process,
there is no necessity for such confirmation and subjection thereto of the present batch would
certainly be discriminatory."

In reply, Speaker Mitra informed petitioner that since "President Corazon C. Aquino has
submitted your appointment to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation in a letter
dated April 11, 1988, . . . the Commission on Appointments now has sole jurisdiction over the
matter."

On May 10, 1988, petitioner Deles received an invitation dated May 6, 1988 to attend a
Commission on Appointments Committee Meeting scheduled for May 12, 1988 for the
deliberation of her appointment as sectoral representative for women. Petitioner sent a reply
dated May 11, 1988 explaining her position and questioning the jurisdiction of the Commission
on Appointments over the appointment of sectoral representatives.
In the May 12,1988 meeting of the Committee of the Constitutional Commissions and Offices of
the Commission on Appointments, chaired by Sen. Edgardo J. Angara, the Committee ruled
against the position of petitioner Deles.

Hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus praying that respondent Commission on
Appointments be enjoined from subjecting to confirmation process the petitioner's appointment
as sectoral representative for the women's sector and as member of Congress.

Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles contends that her appointment as Sectoral Representative for
Women by the President pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, does not
require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments to qualify her to take her seat in the
House of Representatives.

The opposite view is taken by the Solicitor General in his Statement of Position, dated July
15,1988 in this wise: "In view of the President's submission d the four sectoral representatives,
the petitioner included, to the Commission on Appointments by letter dated April 11, 1988,
then confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required."

On August 15, 1988, respondent Commission on Appointments, in addition to adopting the

Statement of Position submitted by the Solicitor General, likewise submitted its own Statement
of Position and further manifested that (1) the appointment of petitioner Deles was not acted
upon by the Commission on Appointments when Congress went into recess as required by the
Constitution; (2) the case of petitioner Deles for appointment as sectoral representative to the
House of Representatives has become moot and academic not having been finally acted upon at
the close of the session of Congress pursuant to See. 23 of the Rules of the Commission

Issue: WON the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House
of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments

Held:

Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution enumerates among others, the officers who may be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, as follows:

SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.

In Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al. (156 SCRA 549 [19871), we construed Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution to mean that only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of
the said Section 16, Article VII require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be
filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the
Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are
among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,"
referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).

Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in the Constitution which, by
express mandate of the Constitution, require no confirmation such as appointments of
members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the
Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption from confirmation had been
extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in the Constitution. Petitioner was
appointed on April 6, 1988 pursuant to Art. XVIII, Section 7 and Art. VII, Section 16,
paragraph 2 of the Constitution,

The invocation of Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution as authority for the appointment of
petitioner places said appointment within the ambit of the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII;
hence, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under the Mison doctrine.
Petitioner's appointment was furthermore made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2
which provides:

SEC. 16. ...

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.

The reference to paragraph 2, Section 16 of Article VII as additional authority for the
appointment of petitioner is of vital significance to the case at bar. The records show that
petitioner's appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March
26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII
in the appointment extended to her.

Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointment
of petitioner is, the recognition by the President as appointing authority that petitioner's
appointment requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Under paragraph 2,
Section 16, Art. VII, appointments made by the President pursuant thereto "shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Congress." If indeed appointments of sectoral representatives need no confirmation, the
President need not make any reference to the constitutional provisions above-quoted in
appointing the petitioner, As a matter of fact, the President in a letter dated April 11, 1989 had
expressly submitted petitioner's appointment for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Considering that Congress had adjourned without respondent Commission on
Appointments having acted on petitioner's appointment, said appointment/nomination had
become moot and academic pursuant to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent Commission
and "unless resubmitted shall not again be considered by the Commission."

Petitioners further contend that nowhere in the Constitution nor in Executive Order No. 198 is
mention made of the need for petitioner's appointment to be submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. Executive Order No. 198 promulgated on June 18, 1687 before
the convening of Congress, is denominated: "Providing for the Manner of Nomination and
Appointment of Sectoral Representatives to the House of Representatives." We agree with the
submission of respondent Commission that the provisions of Executive Order No. 198 do not
deal with the manner of appointment of sectoral representatives. Executive Order No. 1 98
confines itself to specifying the sectors to be represented, their number, and the nomination of
such sectoral representatives.

The power of the President to appoint sectoral representatives remains directly derived from
Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution which is quoted in the second "Whereas' clause of
Executive Order No. 198. Thus, appointments by the President of sectoral representatives
require the consent of the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the first sentence
of Section 16, Art. VII of the Constitution. More to the point, petitioner Deles' appointment was
issued not by virtue of Executive Order No. 198 but pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph
2 and Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution which require submission to the confirmation
process.