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COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS CONSIDERATIONS IN DESIGNING CLOSE SUPPORT FIGHTERS PERSPECTIVE OF ALL AIR MISSIONS, CLOSE SUPPORT IS: o THE MOST CRITICAL, PARTICULARLY FOR SHORT WARS. THE MOST WEGLECTED--TACTICALLY, TECHNICALLY AND FINANCIALLY. THE BOST IW NEED OF IMPROVED EFFECTIVENESS 40 YEARS OF CLOSE SUPPORT: NOTABLE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES SUCCESSES L FAILURES STUKA SUPPORT OF 0 STUKA SUPPORT OF WINTER GERMAN BLITZ INTO STATIC WAR (1942,1943) - FRANCE AND RUSSIA IN THE EAST STUKA/HENSCHEL ANTITANK o LUFTWAFFE SUPPORT OF THE SUPPORT IN MOBILE DEFENSE WESTERN FRONT IN RUSSIA P-47 SUPPORT OF PATTON'S o USAAF SUPPORT OF STATIC DRIVE ACROSS FRANCE BEACHEADS AND LINES IN ITALY USMC IN NEW GUINEA o USMC IN GUADALCANAL, TARAWA, OKINAWA USMC _CORSAIR SUPPORT o KOREA: USAF SUPPORT OF RETREAT FROM OF STATIC TRENCH LINES CHOSUN RESERVOIR A-1 SUPPORT OF SPECIAL o F-4/F-100 SUPPORT OF FORCES IN SVN (PARTICULARLY US ARMY IN SVN NIGHT-TIME) TAF SUPPORT OF MOBILE o IAF ATTACKS AGAINST ARAB COLUMNS (1956) ARMOR (1967) TAF SUPPORT OF ATTACK o IAF ATTACKS ON SYRIAN ON SUEZ CITY (1973) AND EGYPTIAN LINES (1973) © EASTER SFFEasve APR ATZ vVienUAM (CRITICAL FiRsT Twe WEeaKs —) SLX EB 1000" 2-3 WL spormdie Fade WHAT IS THE NATURE OF SUCCESSFUL CLOSE SUPPORT? USE OF AERIAL DIRECT FIREPOWER AGAINST AN ENEMY ENGAGING FRIENDLY GROUND FORCES WHEN: © AERTAL FIREPOWER IS INTEGRAL PART OF THE GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER. o PILOTS ARE IN DIRECT RADIO CONTACT WITH SUPPORTED GROUND UNITS (GROUND FACS). o PILOTS CAN DISTINGUISH FRIEND FROM FOE. o AERIAL FIREPOWER IS ACCURATE ENOUGH TO HIT FOES BUT NOT FRIENDS. o AIR RESPONSE TIME IS FAST ENOUGH TO MEET GROUND NEEDS. TACTICAL NOTE: CLOSE SUPPORT HAS NOT BEEN USED AS A COMBINED ARM. WHEN THIS HAPPENS, TACAIR EFFECTIVENESS WILL INCREASE DRAMATICALLY. WHAT ARE TYPICAL AND IMPORTANT CLOSE SUPPORT TARGETS? DAS CCAS/Bal) TANK COLUMNS/FORMATIONS BAL MACHINEGUN NESTS (SANDBAGS, LOGS, BASEMENTS) CRUCIAL TARGETS LANDING CRAFT IN WAVES TRUCK COLUMNS INFANTRY IN FOXHOLES OR COVER COMMAND POSTS (BASEMENTS, OTHER BUNKERS, APCs) IMPORTANT TARGETS ARTILLERY BAL APCs WHAT ARE TODAY'S TYPICAL AND IMPORTANT CLOSE SUPPORT THREATS? CRUCTAL THREATS ANY eNGDY FIOM TERS MIG-21s WITH SIDEWINDERS oF GUUS 14 wm 7-62mm AND 12-7mm MACHINEGUNS 20MM TO 4OMM AAA (OPTICAL FCS) SECONDARY THREATS SA-7/REDEYE SA-8/RAPIER, ETC- SA-6 (ONLY STATIC WARFARE) 57mm AAA FINDING ARMOR ON THE NO-FEBA BATTLEFIELD @ ONLY AVAILABLE SENSOR THAT DISTINGUISHES RED FROM BLUE ARMOR: — EYEBALL (PLUS RADIO) @ NEED SPEED/MANEUVER COMMENSURATE WITH: — SEEING TANKS AT LESS THAN 1000 YARDS — 500’ CEILING @ REQUIRES CRUISE CAPABILITY DOWN TO 150 KTS WITH AT LEAST 2.59 INSTANTANEOUS @NEED VIZ MUCH BETTER THAN F-86/F-16 81-3648 180340 5Z A “KILLING’ARMOR WHAT WEAPONS WORK? © ONLY LETHAL WEAPON (P, ABOVE 60%) — 30mm OR LARGER GUN © BOMBS, “SMART MISSILES (P_ LESS THAN 107%) — INEFFECTIVE ANO CAUSE HIGH LOSSES — NO USABLE ANTITANK SENSOR YET PROPOSED © OPPORTUNITIES FOR INCREASED GUN LETHALITY — MORE SHOTS IN FIRST 14 To 2 SECOND — FAR FASTER A/C RESPONSE/PRECISION * — SELECTABLE FEED FOR HE OR AP AMMO — HIGHER ROUND VELOCITY OR CALIBER % ACCURACY = NUMBER OF HITS/BURST OBTAINABLE WITH LESS THAN 12 SECONDS TRACKING TIME 188240 81-3649 SZ A “KILLING” ARMOR HOW MUCH MANEUVERING PERFORMANCE ? @ RATE OF KILL IS CRITICAL - ATTACKED UNITS DISPERSE RAPIDLY @ NEED “BUTTONHOOK" TURN (DECEL) TO CONVERT FROM FAST CRUISE TO CLOSE-IN ATTACK @ ABOVE ALL, NEED MINIMUM REATTACK TIME (<< 35 SEcs)| © INCLUDING BOMBS/MISSILES IN DESIGN PAYLOAD PRODUCES BIG, SLUGGISH A/C © NEED T/W OF .70 TO 1.0 AND BETTER MAX TURN THAN 4-10; SUSTAINED TURN IS NOT CRITICAL 81-3650 Sz 188240 A RAPID REPONSE AND BLITZFIGHTER FORCE MOBILITY @ EMERGENCY REINFORCEMENT REQUIRES 5 MINUTE RESPONSE - ONLY ACHIEVABLE BY AIR LOITER (NEED 2+HOURS WITH EXTERNAL FUEL) @ REAL INTEGRATION OF AIR ATTACK WITH GROUND TACTICS DEPENDS ON — RAPID RESPONSE FROM STRIP ALERT (<10 MINUTES) — ABILITY TO BASE WITHIN 40 MILES (ROADS, GRASS FIELDS, LIGHT PLANE sTRips) = ABILITY TO SHIFT A WING-SIZE BASE OVERNIGHT 81-3651 188240 sz A CRUCIAL THREATS SECONDARY THREATS WHAT ARE TODAY'S TYPICAL AND IMPORTANT CLOSE SUPPORT THREATS? o AIG-21s WITH SIDEWINDERS 7-62mm AWD 12-7mm MACHIWEGUNS 200M TO SOMA AAA (OPTICAL FCS) SA-7/REDEYE SA-8/RAPIER, ETC- SA-6 (ONLY STATIC WARFARE) S7mm AAA WHAT IS THE ACTUAL AIR DEFENSE THREAT OVER A SOVIET DIVISION (NO FEBA) ? @ DIVISION-LEVEL AA IS PERHAPS THE MOST MISESTIMATED. OF ALL Al THREATS © ONLY GUNS AND SMALL I MISSILES CAN KEEP UP WITH FAST-MOVING ARMORED OR MOTORIZED DIVISIONS © AAGUN EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST MANEUVERING ATTACKERS HAS NOT INCREASED SINCE WW II *, GUN VARIETY AND DENSITY HAS DECREASED © HIGH SURVIVAL (PERHAPS BETTER THAN WW ID oo ea DIVISIONS ON THE MOVE IS CLEARLY RADAR GUNSIGHTS ONLY WORK AGAINST STRAIGHT AND LEVEL TARGETS (eg.,CRUISE MISSILES OR MAVERICK- LAUNCHING A/C) 81-3652 82 SZ \g8240 ACHIEVING EXCELLENT SURVIVAL AGAINST DIVISION-LEVEL AIR DEFENSES PES © RULES OUT A/G MISSILES, REQUIRES MAJOR INCREASE IN PITCH/ROLL ACCEL AT HIGH G Ye SMALL SIZE AND SKY CAMOUFLAGE GIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN F-5 SIZE) @ COMPLETELY MIXED FLOW ENGINE (ATF-3_ W/400° EXHAUST OR IR SHIELDING 4 FLARES) © GOOD APHE ROUND (OR ARE MIX) TO DESTROY SANDBAGGED AAA AND TRACKED AAA © JP-4, ZERO FUEL NEAR ENGINE, AUTO EXTINGUISHING, 100% CONTROL REDUNDANCY (INCLUDING SURFACES), AMMO, DAMAGE- — _ __|_ CAPABLE STRUCTURE : © DEFEAT RADAR LOCKON/RANGING | @ MIGHT CONSIDER CHAFF OR POD (PROBABLY UNIMPORTANT) 81-36538 18115 Sz tanso @ LESS THAN 2 SEC WEAPON TRACKING TIME - CONSTANT JINK- ING ATTACK AND CLIMBOUT ___ e@ INVISIBILITY _ © ELIMINATE SA-7/ATOLL LOCKON © HIGH ANTI-AAA LETHALITY _ @ LOW VULNERABILITY TO FIRE AND CONTROL FAILURE ISA SMALL BLITZFIGHTER FEASIBLE P SAMPLE BLITZ DESIGN [7,000 A:37A 81-3654 SZ HOW GOOD A BLITZFIGHTER COULD WE BUILD? © Size: — 5000 TO 7,000 LBS ~ 2/3 OF F-5E SIZE (Feet?) cost: $2.0 MILLION TO 2.5 MILLION FLYAWAY (FY 82) 2000 BLITZFIGHTER PROGRAM=125 STRIKE EAGLES (0R=75% OF JTIOS PROGRAM DOLLARS) = _ — _ @ LETHALITY: — 50% BETTER *K/PASS THAN A-10; AMMO FOR 15 PASSES (0.75 SECOND BURSTS) @ PERFORMANCE: — USEFUL SPEED RANGE (150 TO 450 KTS) — ACCELERATION/CLIMB (75% BETTER THAN A-10) — TRANSIENTS (AT LEAST 200% BETTER IN ROLL/PITCH ACCELERATION —_TAKEOFF/LANDING (OPERATE FROM 4000 FEET ASPHALT ROAD OR GRASS) _ FEATURES: — TIW~.85 WITH COMMERCIAL ENGINE; WS ~ 30 PSF (50° DELTA) — CONVENTIONAL LANDING GEAR FOR GRASS FIELD CAPABILITY — HOT REFUEL/REARM — NO NEED FOR EXTERNAL TANKS (USE EXTRA INTERNAL VOLUME UNDER EXTERNAL RULES) 81-3659, ed SL A

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