1 Batch 3 Crim

CAPILI V PEOPLE
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
1 2
reversal of the Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and
without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending
civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed
by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would
exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the
declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant
criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the
filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient
invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a
subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from
the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second
marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.
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In an Order dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s Manifestation and
Motion to Dismiss, to wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated
December 1, 2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: “Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P.
Capili and Shirley G. Tismo,” a case for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second
marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that
the issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-
captioned case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court
is of the humble opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it
appears that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had
already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has
declared “the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity” of the said second marriage. As
such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
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Thus, in a Decision dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision.
The falloreads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6 nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied
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in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD

EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT
(REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST
PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE
FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND
THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH
STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE
TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS
HEREBY NULL AND VOID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND
SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH
72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS
BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS OR
FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY
CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO
APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN
EXCEPTION TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE
SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR
ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE
GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF
ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY
RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME “CAPILI” IS ILLEGAL
INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO
CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD
LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID
DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF
ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second
marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as
follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
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essential requisites for validity.
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the
Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted
on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and
Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City
itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous
in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime
of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long
as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
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In Jarillo v. People, the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that the
crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering
that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in
the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.11 nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that
what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
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declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as
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provided by law. It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from
the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the
judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a
criminal charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1,
2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
n September 1999, James Capili married Karla Medina. But then, just
three months later in December 1999, he married another woman named
Shirley Tismo.
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration of nullity of the
second marriage between Capili and Tismo. In June 2004, Tismo filed a
bigamy case against Capili.
Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case, the action filed by Karla
Medina was granted and Capili’s marriage with Tismo was declared void
by reason of the subsisting marriage between Medina and Capili.
Thereafter, Capili filed a motion to dismiss in the bigamy case. He alleged
that since the second marriage was already declared void ab initio that
marriage never took place and that therefore, there is no bigamy to speak
of.
The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed the bigamy case. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the case
to the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a declaration of nullity of the second marriage
avoids a prosecution for bigamy.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.
When Capili married Tismo, all the above elements are present. The crime
of bigamy was already consummated. It is already immaterial if the
second (or first marriage, see Mercado vs Tan) was subsequently declared
void. The outcome of the civil case filed by Karla Medina had no bearing
to the determination of Capili’s guilt or innocence in the bigamy
case because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that
the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
The Supreme Court also notes that even if a party has reason to believe
that his first marriage is void, he cannot simply contract a second marriage
without having such first marriage be judicially declared as void. The
parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption
is that the marriage exists.
BUSUEGO V OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Private respondent Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa) filed a complaint for: (1)
Concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) violation of Republic
Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children); and (3) Grave
Threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Office of the
Ombudsman against her husband, Alfredo. Alfredo is the Chief of Hospital, Davao
Regional Hospital. They have 2 children. However, their marriage turned sour. She
saw photographs of, and love letters addressed to Alfredo from, other women. She
confronted her husband but he claimed ignorance of the existence of such letters.
An opportunity to work as nurse in N.Y. USA. Alfredo opposed. Nonetheless,

Rosa completed the requirements. However, before leaving, furious with Rosa’s
pressing, Alfredo took his gun and pointed it at Rosa’s temple. Alfredo was only
staved off because Rosa’s mother arrived at the couple’s house.
Rosa went to the US and was eventually joined by her 2 children, Alfred and
Robert. Robert eventually returned to Davao City to study medicine. Sometime in
1997, Rosa learned that a certain Emy Sia (Sia) was living at their conjugal home.
When Rosa asked Alfredo, he said that Sia, nurse at the Regional Hospital, was just
in a sorry plight and was allegedly raped by Rosa’s brother-in-law so he allowed her
to sleep at the maids’ quarters.
In October 2005, Rosa finally learned of Alfredo’s extra-marital relationships.

Robert and the housekeepers executed a joint affidavit to support Rosa’s allegations.
Rosa and the other son Alfred flew to Davao without informing Alfredo. She
gathererd and consolidated information of her husband’s sexual affairs. She also
averred that during the course of the marriage, Alfredo physically and verbally
abused her and her family. Alfredo denied all accusations. In their subsequent
exchange of responsive pleadings, Rosa maintained Alfredo’s culpability, and
naturally, Alfredo claimed innocence.
In the course thereof, the procedural issue of Rosa’s failure to implead Sia and
de Leon as respondents cropped up. Alfredo insisted that Rosa’s complaint ought to
be dismissed for failure to implead his alleged concubines as respondents.
Specifically to dispose of that issue, the Ombudsman scheduled a clarificatory

hearing where both Rosa and Alfredo were represented by their respective counsels.
The office of the Ombudsman explained that the position of Alfredo would just
prolong the conduct of the preliminary investigation since Rosa can just re-file her
complaint. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply in the preliminary
investigation stage. Hence, the counsel for Rosa was directed to submit to this Office
the addresses of the alleged mistresses so that they could be served with the Order
directing them to file their counter-affidavits. Rosa submitted an Ex-Parte
Manifestation on the last known addresses of Julie de Leon and Emy Sia (alleged
mistresses.)
Ombudsman issued a Joint Order4 impleading Sia and de Leon as party-

respondents in the complaint for Concubinage and directing them to submit their
respective counter-affidavits within a period of time. Sia and de Leon did not submit
their respective counter-affidavits.
Alfredo opposed the Ombudsman’s ruling to simply amend the complaint and
implead the alleged mistresses. He filed his Comment to the Provincial Prosecutor
praying for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to implead the two mistresses.
Ombudsman issued herein assailed Resolution, disposing of the procedural

issues, which states that the short cut procedure would delay the proceedings is
misplaced, since Rosa could still amend her complaint and re-file the case for the
doctrine of res judicata will not apply. Alfredo filed a Motion for Reconsideration
excepting to the Ombudsman’s ruling on the automatic inclusion of Sia as
respondent in the complaint and their indictment for the crime of Concubinage.
Nonetheless, the Ombudsman stood pat on its ruling, declared that the Partial
Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time. Alfredo now comes to us on
petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s finding
of probable cause to indict him and Sia for Concubinage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in the
determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation.
RULING:
Yes. Therefore the Court sustain the Ombudsman’s decision.
The Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in the determination of

probable cause during a preliminary investigation. This is the reason why judicial
review of the resolution of the Ombudsman in the exercise of its power and duty to
investigate and prosecute felonies and/or offenses of public officers is limited to a
determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment
for that of the Ombudsman.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise

of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility. In this regard, petitioner failed to demonstrate the Ombudsman's abuse,
much less grave abuse, of discretion.
The Ombudsman merely followed the provisions of its Rules of Procedure.

No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written
authority or approval of the ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbyan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.
Notably, Rosa’s complaint contained not just the Concubinage charge, but
other charges: violation of Republic Act No. 9262 and Grave Threats. Upon the
Ombudsman’s perusal, the complaint was supported by affidavits corroborating
Rosa’s accusations. Thus, at that stage, the Ombudsman properly referred the
complaint to Alfredo for comment. Nonetheless, while the Ombudsman found no
reason for outright dismissal, it deemed it fit to hold a clarificatory hearing to discuss
the applicability of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the issue having been
insisted upon by Alfredo.
Surely the procedural sequence of referral of the complaint to respondent for

comment and thereafter the holding of a clarificatory hearing is provided for in
paragraph b, Section 2 and paragraphs d and f, Section 4 of Rule II, which the Court
have at the outset underscored. The Ombudsman merely facilitated the amendment
of the complaint to cure the defect pointed out by Alfredo. The Ombudsman’s
primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct preliminary
investigation of crimes involving public officers, without regard to its commission
in relation to office, had long been settled in Sen. Honasan II v. The Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ.
The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of

the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or employees. The
authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as
provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over,
at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of
such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any
investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws but
if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the respondent
Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.
Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ
have concurrent jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation, the respective
heads of said offices came up with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 for the
proper guidelines of their respective prosecutors in the conduct of their
investigations.
WHEREFORE the petition is DISMISSED.
TANENGGEE VS PEOPLE
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the December 12, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 23653 affirming with modification the June 25, 1999 Decision 3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-
163806-10 finding Carlos L." Tanenggee (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of five counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
Likewise questioned is the CA's September 6, 2007 Resolution4 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration5 and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.6
Factual Antecedents
On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations7 for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents were filed against petitioner. The said Informations portray
the same mode of commission of the crime as in Criminal Case No. 98-163806 but
differ with respect to the numbers of the checks and promissory notes involved and
the dates and amounts thereof, viz:
That on or about July 24, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then a private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud, thru falsification of commercial document, the
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by its
Legal officer, Atty. Ferdinand R. Aguirre, in the following manner: herein accused,
being then the Manager of the COMMERCIO BRANCH OF METROBANK
located at the New Divisoria Market Bldg., Divisoria, Manila, and taking
advantage of his position as such, prepared and filled up or caused to be prepared
and filled up METROBANK Promissory Note Form No. 366857 with letters and
figures reading "BD#083/97" after the letters reading "PN", with figures reading
"07.24.97" after the word "DATE", with the amount of ₱16,000,000.00 in words
and in figures, and with other words and figures now appearing thereon, typing or
causing to be typed at the right bottom thereof the name reading "ROMEO TAN",
feigning and forging or causing to be feigned and forged on top of said name the
signature of Romeo Tan, affixing his own signature at the left bottom thereof
purportedly to show that he witnessed the alleged signing of the said note by
Romeo Tan, thereafter preparing and filling up or causing to be prepared and filled
up METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK NO. CC 0000001531, a commercial
document, with date reading "July 24, 1997", with the name reading "Romeo Tan"
as payee, and with the sum of ₱15,362,666.67 in words and in figures, which
purports to be the proceeds of the loan being obtained, thereafter affixing his own
signature thereon, and directing the unsuspecting bank cashier to also affix his
signature on the said check, as authorized signatories, and finally affixing, feigning
and forging or causing to be affixed, feigned and forged four (4) times at the back
thereof the signature of said Romeo Tan, thereby making it appear, as it did appear
that Romeo Tan had participated in the preparation, execution and signing of the
said Promissory Note and the signing and endorsement of the said METROBANK
CASHIER’S CHECK and that he obtained a loan of ₱16,000,000.00 from
METROBANK, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew, such was
not the case in that said Romeo Tan did not obtain such loan from METROBANK,
neither did he participate in the preparation, execution and signing of the said
promissory note and signing and endorsement of said METROBANK CASHIER’S
CHECK, much less authorize herein accused to prepare, execute and affix his
signature in the said documents; that once the said documents were forged and
falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused released, obtained and
received from the METROBANK the sum of ₱15,363,666.67 purportedly
representing the proceeds of the said loan, which amount, once in his possession,
with intent to defraud, he misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said METROBANK
in the same sum of ₱15,363,666.67, Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
On May 27, 1998, the RTC entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioner after he
refused to enter a plea.9 The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried.
The proceedings before the RTC as aptly summarized by the CA are as follows:
During the pre-trial, except for the identity of the accused, the jurisdiction of the
court, and that accused was the branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch
from July 1997 to December 1997, no other stipulations were entered into.
Prosecution marked its exhibits "A" to "L" and sub-markings.
xxxx
The prosecution alleged that on different occasions, appellant caused to be

prepared promissory notes and cashier’s checks in the name of Romeo Tan, a
valued client of the bank since he has substantial deposits in his account, in
connection with the purported loans obtained by the latter from the bank. Appellant
approved and signed the cashier’s check as branch manager of Metrobank
Commercio Branch. Appellant affixed, forged or caused to be signed the signature
of Tan as endorser and payee of the proceeds of the checks at the back of the same
to show that the latter had indeed endorsed the same for payment. He handed the
checks to the Loans clerk, Maria Dolores Miranda, for encashment. Once said
documents were forged and falsified, appellant released and obtained from
Metrobank the proceeds of the alleged loan and misappropriated the same to his
use and benefit. After the discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was
conducted and an administrative investigation was held in the Head Office of
Metrobank, during which appellant signed a written statement (marked as Exhibit
"N") in the form of questions and answers.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses:
Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs Department of Metrobank,

testified that he conducted and interviewed the appellant in January 1998; that in
said interview, appellant admitted having committed the allegations in the
Informations, specifically forging the promissory notes; that the proceeds of the
loan were secured or personally received by the appellant although it should be the
client of the bank who should receive the same; and that all the answers of the
appellant were contained in a typewritten document voluntarily executed,
thumbmarked, and signed by him (Exhibit "N").
Rosemarie Tan Apostol, assistant branch manager, testified that the signatures
appearing on the promissory notes were not the signatures of Romeo Tan; that the
promissory notes did not bear her signature although it is required, due to the fact
that Romeo Tan is a valued client and her manager accommodated valued clients;
that she signed the corresponding checks upon instruction of appellant; and that
after signing the checks, appellant took the same which remained in his custody.
Eliodoro M. Constantino, NBI Supervisor and a handwriting expert, testified that

the signatures appearing on the promissory notes and specimen signatures on the
signature card of Romeo Tan were not written by one and the same person.
Maria Dolores Miranda, a Loans Clerk at Metrobank Commercio Branch, testified

that several cashier’s checks were issued in favor of Romeo Tan; that appellant
instructed her to encash the same; and that it was appellant who received the
proceeds of the loan.
For his defense, appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee testified that he is a holder of a

Masters degree from the Asian Institute of Management, and was the Branch
Manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch from 1994 until he was charged in
1998 [with] the above-named offense. He was with Metrobank for nine (9) years
starting as assistant manager of Metrobank Dasmariñas Branch, Binondo, Manila.
As manager, he oversaw the day to day operations of the branch, solicited accounts
and processed loans, among others.
Appellant claimed that he was able to solicit Romeo Tan as a client-depositor when
he was the branch manager of Metrobank Commercio. As a valued client, Romeo
Tan was granted a credit line for forty million pesos (₱40,000,000.00) by
Metrobank. Tan was also allowed to open a fictitious account for his personal use
and was assisted personally by appellant in his dealings with the bank. In the
middle of 1997, Tan allegedly opened a fictitious account and used the name Jose
Tan. Such practice for valued clients was allowed by and known to the bank to
hide their finances due to rampantkidnappings or from the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) or from their spouses.
According to appellant, Tan availed of his standing credit line (through promissory
notes) for five (5) times on the following dates: 1) 24 July 1997 for sixteen million
pesos (₱16,000,000.00), 2) 27 October 1997 for six million pesos (₱6,000,000.00),
3) 12 November 1997 for three million pesos (₱3,000,000.00), 4) 21 November
1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000,00), 5) 22 December 1997 for two
million pesos (₱2,000,000.00). On all these occasions except the loan on 24 July
1997 when Tan personally went to the bank, Tan allegedly gave his instructions
regarding the loan through the telephone. Upon receiving the instructions,
appellant would order the Loans clerk to prepare the promissory note and send the
same through the bank’s messenger to Tan’s office, which was located across the
street. The latter would then return to the bank, through his own messenger, the
promissory notes already signed by him. Upon receipt of the promissory note,
appellant would order the preparation of the corresponding cashier’s check
representing the proceeds of the particular loan, send the same through the bank’s
messenger to the office of Tan, and the latter would return the same through his
own messenger already endorsed together with a deposit slip under Current
Account No. 258-250133-7 of Jose Tan. Only Cashier’s Check dated 21 November
1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000.00) was not endorsed and deposited
for, allegedly, it was used to pay the loan obtained on 24 July 1997. Appellant
claimed that all the signatures of Tan appearing on the promissory notes and the
cashier’s checks were the genuine signatures of Tan although he never saw the
latter affix them thereon.
In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors conducted an audit of
the Commercio Branch for more than a week. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998,
appellant was asked by Elvira Ong-Chan, senior vice president of Metrobank, to
report to the Head Office on the following day. When appellant arrived at the said
office, he was surprised that there were seven (7) other people present: two (2)
senior branch officers, two (2) bank lawyers, two (2) policemen (one in uniform
and the other in plain clothes), and a representative of the Internal Affairs unit of
the bank, Valentino Elevado.
Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper (Exhibit "N") in
connection with the audit investigation; that he inquired what he was made to sign
but was not offered any explanation; that he was intimidated to sign and was
threatened by the police that he will be brought to the precinct if he will not sign;
that he was not able to consult a lawyer since he was not apprised of the purpose of
the meeting; and that "just to get it over with" he signed the paper which turned out
to be a confession. After the said meeting, appellant went to see Tan at his office
but was unable to find the latter. He also tried to phone him but to no avail. 10
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After the joint trial, the RTC rendered a consolidated Decision11 dated June 25,
1999 finding petitioner guilty of the crimes charged, the decretal portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Carlos Lo Tanenggee, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents charged in each of the five (5) Informations filed and hereby sentences
him to suffer the following penalties:
1. In Criminal Case No. 98-163806, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of

imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory
penalties provided by law.

penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱16
Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 27 November 1997
until fully paid.

Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 27 October 1997 until
fully paid.

Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 22 December 1997
until fully paid.

Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 12 November 1997
until fully paid.
Accused shall serve the said penalties imposed successively.

As mandated in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum duration of
the sentence imposed shall not be more than threefold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him and such
maximum period shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.
SO ORDERED.12
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the CA where the case was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23653. On December 12, 2006, the CA promulgated
its Decision13 affirming with modification the RTC Decision and disposing of the
appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated 25
June 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30 convicting the
accused-appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee on five counts of estafa through
falsification of commercial documents is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-163806, he is further ordered to
indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱16 Million with interest at 18% per annum
counted from 24 July 1997 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.14
On December 29, 2006,15 petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA

denied per its September 6, 2007 Resolution.16
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising the basic issues of: (1) whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s
admission in evidence of the petitioner’s written statement based on its finding that
he was not in police custody or under custodial interrogation when the same was
taken; and, (2) whether the essential elements of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents were established by the prosecution.17
The Parties’ Arguments
While he admits signing a written statement,18 petitioner refutes the truth of the
contents thereof and alleges that he was only forced to sign the same without
reading its contents. He asserts that said written statement was taken in violation of
his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly of his right
to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights.
Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), maintains that petitioner’s written statement is admissible
in evidence since the constitutional proscription invoked by petitioner does not
apply to inquiries made in the context of private employment but is applicable only
in cases of custodial interrogation. The OSG thus prays for the affirmance of the
appealed CA Decision.
Our Ruling
We find the Petition wanting in merit.
Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence.
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession

of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as
correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial
interrogation.
Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement

authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial
investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement
thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights
above.19 In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an
uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he
managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law
enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and,
(2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant
manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under
custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative
during the taking of his written statement.
Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,20 we declared that the right

to counsel "applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to
those made in an administrative investigation." Amplifying further on the matter,
the Court made clear in the recent case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission: 21
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the
Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the
exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only
to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.22
Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry

conducted by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly
committed in the course of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to
the courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration to
petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its
admissibility.
Petitioner’s written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an

already prepared typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis
and his supposition is just an afterthought for there is nothing in the records that
would support his claim of duress and intimidation.
Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until

the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the
contrary."23 Petitioner failed to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his
written statement was found to have been executed freely and consciously. The
pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality that
only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. The details contained therein attest to
its voluntariness. As correctly pointed out by the CA:
As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of appellant is replete
with details which could only be supplied by appellant. The statement reflects
spontaneity and coherence which cannot be associated with a mind to which
intimidation has been applied. Appellant’s answers to questions 14 and 24 were
even initialed by him to indicate his conformity to the corrections made therein.
The response to every question was fully informative, even beyond the required
answers, which only indicates the mind to be free from extraneous restraints. 24
In People v. Muit,25 it was held that "one of the indicia of voluntariness in the
execution of petitioner’s extrajudicial statement is that it contains many details and
facts which the investigating officers could not have known and could not have
supplied without the knowledge and information given by him."
Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any
charges, criminal or administrative, against the investigator and the two policemen
present who allegedly intimidated him and forced him to sign negate his bare
assertions of compulsion and intimidation. It is a settled rule that where the
defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any
criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no
physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be
considered as having been voluntarily executed.26
Neither will petitioner’s assertion that he did not read the contents of his statement
before affixing his signature thereon "just to get it over with" prop up the instant
Petition. To recall, petitioner has a masteral degree from a reputable educational
institution and had been a bank manager for quite a number of years. He is thus
expected to fully understand and comprehend the significance of signing an
instrument. It is just unfortunate that he did not exercise due diligence in the
conduct of his own affairs. He can therefore expect no consideration for it.
Forgery duly established.
"Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by the signing of another’s

name with intent to defraud."27 It can be established by comparing the alleged false
signature with the authentic or genuine one. A finding of forgery does not depend
entirely on the testimonies of government handwriting experts whose opinions do
not mandatorily bind the courts. A trial judge is not precluded but is even
authorized by law28 to conduct an independent examination of the questioned
signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
In this case, the finding of forgery on the signature of Romeo Tan (Tan) appearing
in the promissory notes and cashier’s checks was not anchored solely on the result
of the examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Document Examiner. The trial court also made an independent examination of the
questioned signatures and after analyzing the same, reached the conclusion that the
signatures of Tan appearing in the promissory notes are different from his genuine
signatures appearing in his Deposit Account Information and Specimen Signature
Cards on file with the bank. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the above findings
of the RTC which was affirmed by the CA. A rule of long standing in this
jurisdiction is that findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are accorded
great weight and respect. Absent any reason to deviate from the said findings, as in
this case, the same should be deemed conclusive and binding to this Court.
No suppression of evidence on the part of the prosecution.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution should have presented Tan in court to shed
light on the matter. His non-presentation created the presumption that his
testimony if given would be adverse to the case of the prosecution. Petitioner thus
contends that the prosecution suppressed its own evidence.
Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has the prerogative to

choose the evidence or the witnesses it wishes to present. It has the discretion as to
how it should present its case.29 Moreover, the presumption that suppressed
evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at the disposal of
both the defense and the prosecution.30 In the present case, if petitioner believes
that Tan is the principal witness who could exculpate him from liability by
establishing that it was Tan and not him who signed the subject documents, the
most prudent thing to do is to utilize him as his witness. Anyway, petitioner has the
right to have compulsory process to secure Tan’s attendance during the trial
pursuant to Article III, Section 14(2)31 of the Constitution. The records show,
however, that petitioner did not invoke such right. In view of these, no suppression
of evidence can be attributed to the prosecution.
Petitioner’s denial is unavailing.
The Court is also not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of
petitioner that the loans covered by the promissory notes and the cashier’s checks
were personally transacted by Tan against his approved letter of credit, although he
admittedly never saw Tan affix his signature thereto. Again, this allegation, as the
RTC aptly observed, is not supported by established evidence. "It is settled that
denials which are unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative
and self-serving evidence. They merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on
affirmative matters."32 The chain of events in this case, from the preparation of the
promissory notes to the encashment of the cashier’s checks, as narrated by the
prosecution witnesses and based on petitioner’s own admission, established
beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the unlawful acts alleged in the
Informations.
Elements of falsification of commercial documents established.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171

of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) refers to falsification by a private individual or a
public officer or employee, who did not take advantage of his official position, of
public, private or commercial document. The elements of falsification of
documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender is a
private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of
his official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC;33 and, (3) that the falsification was
committed in a public, official or commercial document.
All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case. First, petitioner is
a private individual. Second, the acts of falsification consisted in petitioner’s (1)
counterfeiting or imitating the handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to
appear that the same is true and genuine in all respects; and (2) causing it to appear
that Tan has participated in an act or proceeding when he did not in fact so
participate. Third, the falsification was committed in promissory notes and checks
which are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, in general,
documents or instruments which are "used by merchants or businessmen to
promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions."34Promissory notes facilitate credit
transactions while a check is a means of payment used in business in lieu of money
for convenience in business transactions. A cashier’s check necessarily facilitates
bank transactions for it allows the person whose name and signature appear
thereon to encash the check and withdraw the amount indicated therein. 35
Falsification as a necessary means to commit estafa.
When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of

the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 as a necessary means to commit
another crime like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex
crime. Under Article 48 of the RPC, there are two classes of a complex crime. A
complex crime may refer to a single act which constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies or to an offense as a necessary means for committing another.
In Domingo v. People,36 we held:
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of

committing estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to
defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage
or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of
public, official or commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification
has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial
document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the
commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the
falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary
means to commit estafa.
"Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence, or by means of deceit, and (b) the offended party or a third party
suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation."37Deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been
disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon
it to his legal injury."38
The elements of estafa obtain in this case. By falsely representing that Tan
requested him to process purported loans on the latter’s behalf, petitioner
counterfeited or imitated the signature of Tan in the cashier’s checks. Through
1âwphi1
these, petitioner succeeded in withdrawing money from the bank. Once in

possession of the amount, petitioner thereafter invested the same in Eurocan Future
Commodities. Clearly, petitioner employed deceit in order to take hold of the
money, misappropriated and converted it to his own personal use and benefit, and
these resulted to the damage and prejudice of the bank in the amount of about ₱43
million.
Taken in its entirety, the proven facts show that petitioner could not have
withdrawn the money without falsifying the questioned documents. The
falsification was, therefore, a necessary means to commit estafa, and falsification
was already consummated even before the falsified documents were used to
defraud the bank. The conviction of petitioner for the complex crime of Estafa
through Falsification of Commercial Document by the lower courts was thus
proper.
The Proper Imposable Penalty
The penalty for falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 of the
RPC is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not
more than ₱5,000.00.
The penalty in estafa cases, on the other hand, as provided under paragraph 1,
Article 315 of the RPC is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period39 if the amount defrauded is over ₱12,000.00 but does
not exceed ₱22,000.00. If the amount involved exceeds the latter sum, the same
paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period with an
incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for every ₱10,000.00 but in no case
shall the total penalty exceed 20 years of imprisonment.
Petitioner in this case is found liable for the commission of the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of commercial document. The crime of falsification
was established to be a necessary means to commit estafa. Pursuant to Article 48 of
the Code, the penalty to be imposed in such case should be that corresponding to
the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period. The
applicable penalty therefore is for the crime of estafa, being the more serious
offense than falsification.
The amounts involved in this case range from ₱2 million to ₱16 million. Said
amounts being in excess of ₱22,000.00, the penalty imposable should be within the
maximum term of six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight
(8) years of prision mayor, adding one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00.
Considering the amounts involved, the additional penalty of one (1) year for each
additional ₱10,000.00 would surely exceed the maximum limitation provided
under Article 315, which is twenty (20) years. Thus, the RTC correctly imposed
the maximum term of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
There is need, however, to modify the penalties imposed by the trial court as
affirmed by the CA in each case respecting the minimum term of imprisonment.
The trial court imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8)
years of prision mayor as minimum which is beyond the lawful range. Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the penalty should be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law for the offense. Since
the penalty prescribed for the estafa charge against petitioner is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would
then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods which has a
duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
Thus, the Court sets the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty at four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional. Petitioner is therefore sentenced
in each case to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 dated December 12, 2006 and September 6,
2007, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be imposed upon the petitioner
should be four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional.
SO ORDERED.
ONG VS PEOPLE 659 SCRA 588 FENCING

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 18 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), which affirmed the Decision2 dated 06 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 37, Manila. The RTC had convicted accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of
violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.
Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said accused, with
intent of gain for himself or for another. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
receive and acquire from unknown person involving thirteen (13) truck tires worth P65, 975.00,
belonging to FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y LEE, and thereafter selling One (1) truck tire knowing
the same to have been derived from the crime of robbery.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued, and the RTC
found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. The dispositive portion of
its Decision reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has established the
guilt of the accused JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1612 also known as Anti-Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day to 16 years with accessory penalty of temporary
disqualification.
SO ORDERED.4chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the records, the RTC's
finding of guilt was affirmed by the appellate court in a Decision dated 18 August 2009.
Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.
The Facts
The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as T494
1100 by 20 by 14. He acquired the same for the total amount of P223,401.81 from Philtread Tire
and Rubber Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of
Firestone tires. Private complainant's acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated
November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically
described by their serial numbers. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk
before storing them inside the warehouse in 720 San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay
San Antonio Valley 1, Sucat, Parañaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal,
Guano's caretaker of the warehouse, was in charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires
sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight
(38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Private
complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District
at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business
establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24, 1995, private complainant
chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by
appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by
14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire
fitting the description, which private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his
warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon. Private complainant asked
appellant if he had any more of such tires in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative.
Private complainant then left the store and reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano
Fegarido of the Southern Police District.
On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation on appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of six (6) members, led
by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero and supervised by Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's
companion Tito Atienza was appointed as the poseur-buyer.
On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with the Western
Police District, proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team arrived thereat at around
3:00 in the afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team
posted themselves across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by
14 Firestone truck tires available. The latter immediately produced one tire from his display,
which Atienza bought for P5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any more in stock.
Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse,
which was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires were brought in, private
complainant entered the store, inspected them and found that they were the same tires which
were stolen from him, based on their serial numbers. Private complainant then gave the
prearranged signal to the buy-bust team confirming that the tires in appellant's shop were the
same tires stolen from the warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went inside
appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the confiscation of the stolen
truck tires be witnessed by representatives from the barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it
was already past 10:00 in the evening when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the
police station for investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able to confiscate
thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires
were confirmed by private complainant as stolen from his warehouse.5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the
business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any
knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred that on 18
February 1995, a certain Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires
allegedly from Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City, for P3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires
for P45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the
letterhead Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold Link).6chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his bodega.
The poseur-buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and came back to ask for more tires. Ten
minutes later, policemen went inside the store, confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him
that those items were stolen tires.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found
in the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to
overcome the presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of P.D. 1612.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings with modification by reducing the minimum
penalty from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional.9chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
OUR RULING
The Petition has no merit.
Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain
for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of,
or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which
he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has
been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of
the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one
accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of
evidence in proving that all the elements of fencing are present in this case.
First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was
corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were
stolen testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was
able to prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 456511 dated 10 November 1994
and an Inventory List.12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that robbery was
reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay13 taken at the Southern Police District at
Fort Bonifacio.14 The report led to the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco,
Manila on 27 February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never
denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not
establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen
(13) out of thirty-eight (38) missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the
serial numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong's possession.15 Ong likewise
admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of ?45,500 where
he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980.16chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should
know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the
fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that
such fact exists.17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four
(24) years,18 ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an
unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he
did not even ask for proof of ownership of the tires.19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to
buy until the delivery of tires happened in just one day.20 His experience from the business
should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was
his first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the
thirteen (13) tires in the streets.
In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the
object of the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such
circumstances include the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with the
usual practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the
seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality
of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found in
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that "mere possession of any goods, . . ., object or anything of value
which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing" a
presumption that is, according to the Court, "reasonable for no other natural or logical inference
can arise from the established fact of . . . possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft." xxx.22chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D.
1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good,
article, item, object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier
thereof to secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated
National Police in the town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before
offering the item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining
clearances from the police station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular
transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should have exercised
prudence.
In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go. Logically, and for
all practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate
transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is
disputable.23 In this case, the validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the
prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address were fictitious.24 Ong failed to
overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the
transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D.
1612.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust
operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value
of the 25 property.
The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on P5,075 for each tire
recovered, or in the total amount of P65,975. Records show that Azajar had purchased forty-four
(44) tires from Philtread in the total amount of P223,40 1.81.26 Section 3 (p) of Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides a disputable presumption that private transactions have been
fair and regular. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the ordinary course of business is not
overturned in the absence of the evidence challenging the regularity of the transaction between
Azajar ,and Phil tread.
In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the parties, we do not
find sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the CA affirming the trial court's conviction of Ong
for violation of P.D. 1612 and modifying the minimum penalty imposed by reducing it to six ( 6)
years of prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30213 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ABELLA VS PEOPLE
It all started with an altercation during a basketball
game. Three days later, or on 10 March 1992, the bodies of
MARLON[1] Ronquillo; JOSEPH Ronquillo; ERWIN Lojero;
ANDRES Lojero, Jr.; and FELIX Tamayo were fished out of the
murky waters of the Pasig River, filthy, bloated, putrid, and
decomposing. Postmortem examinations on the cadavers showed
signs of foul play.
MARLONs hands were tied at the back with a black electric
cord. He had lacerated wounds, contusions, ligature marks and
hematoma. He died from a gunshot wound on the head.[2]
ANDRES hands were bound at the back with a plastic flat rope
with four loops. His genitals were cut off; and he had ligature
marks, contusions, and hematoma. The cause of his death was
asphyxia by strangulation; hemorrhage, intracranial, traumatic.[3]
JOSEPHs hands were hog-tied at the back using a basketball
T-shirt. He also had ligature marks, contusions, lacerated wounds
and fracture. He died of asphyxia by strangulation; hemorrhage,
intracranial, traumatic with skull fracture.[4]
ERWINs body showed abrasions and burns. There were cord
impressions on his wrists and depressed fracture on his head and
at the base of his skull. He died of asphyxia by drowning with
blunt head injury.[5]
FELIX had abrasions on the left cheek and tie impressions on
the wrists. The cause of his death was asphyxia by drowning.[6]
On 18 March 1992, five informations for murder were filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (hereafter the trial
court) against Juanito ABELLA, Diosdado GRANADA,
Benjamin DE GUZMAN, Edgardo VALENCIA, Renato Dante,
and Virgilio de Guzman. The cases were raffled to Branch 52
presided over by the late Judge David Nitafan. Docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 92-104529 to -33, the
informations[7] identically read as follows:
That on or about March 8, 1992, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together with others whose true names, real identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Marlon
Ronquillo y Alepda [(Criminal Case No. 92-104529), one Felix
Tamayo y Pascual (Criminal Case No. 92-104530), one Andres
Lojero, Jr. y Pascual (Criminal Case No. 92-104531), one
Joseph Ronquillo y Alepda [(Criminal Case No. 92-104532),
one Erwin Lojero y Pascual (Criminal Case No. 92-104533)] by
then and there hitting his head with guns, kicking him, tying his
hands, [neck and private organ (additional allegation in Criminal
Case No. 92-104531)] and thereafter throwing his body into the
river thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to law. [Enclosures supplied].
On 25 March 1992, the informations were amended to include
three other accused, namely, Joselito Crespo, Bienvenido Dugay
and Danilo Abarete.[8] Upon arraignment all the accused pleaded
not guilty to the charges against them. On 26 August 1992,
Joselito Crespo, Renato Dante, Bienvenido Dugay, Danilo
Abarete and Virgilio de Guzman were dropped from the
information.[9]
The prosecutions version of the events is as follows: In the
morning of 7 March 1992, MARLON, JOSEPH, and an
unidentified companion played three rounds of basketball against
the team of JOEY de los Santos at the vicinity of Dalisay and
Lakas Streets, Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The Ronquillos won
the first two rounds; but the third round ended in a brawl, which
the neighbors quickly pacified. JOEY later went back to Dalisay
Street carrying two pillboxes. A certain Donald Ancheta saw him,
took the pillboxes and turned them over to a policeman.[10]
On 8 March 1992, between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., JOEY and his
brother GENER threw stones at the Ronquillos house, attracting
the attention of neighbors, who forthwith ran after the
brothers. JOEY and GENER were overtaken and mauled before
they were released.[11]
Between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. of the same day, WILFREDO
Lojero, a certain Daniel, and the victims were in front of the
Ronquillos house in Lakas Street, trading stories while awaiting
a certain Aling Flor.[12] JOSEPHINE del Rosario was then at the
corner of Lakas Street on her way to a friends house when the
victims called her and asked her about her mother, who was a
barangay kagawad at Bacood. They told her that they were
waiting for Aling Flor to report to her that JOEY and GENER
threw stones at the Ronquillos house.[13] Later, EVELYN de la
Cruz joined the group in the conversation.[14] The area was then
illuminated by a streetlight at the corner of Damayan and Dalisay
Streets about ten arms-length away.
Suddenly, a dirty white Ford Fiera without a plate number
stopped in front of the group. There were about ten to thirteen
people on board. Among them were JOEY and GENER, who
looked out of the van and pointed at the victims. All the
passengers except for JOEY and GENER alighted. Their faces
were covered with black handkerchiefs, and they were armed.
Someone shouted, Pulis ito! Another exclaimed, Walang
tatakbo! FELIX ran but stopped when shots were fired; he was hit
with a gun then dragged into the van. WILFREDO Lojero,
however, managed to sneak into the Ronquillos house and was
able to see everything. The other victims were boxed, kicked, and
also hit with a gun and dragged into the van. Before the van sped
away, one of the abductors warned JOSEPHINE, Ikaw huwag
kang maingay, wala kang nakita, wala kang narinig.[15]
Meanwhile, at about 6:00 p.m. inside the Iglesia ni Cristo
(INC), Sta. Ana compound in Bacood, ELENA Bernardo was
waiting for Pastor Cesar Almedina to seek his advice regarding
her son-in-laws problem. Pastor Almedina asked her to wait, and
she did so. She waited until 10:00 p.m. Suddenly the guard
switched off the lights inside the compound. With only the
MERALCO light illuminating the compound from outside, she
saw a dirty white Ford Fiera loaded with passengers enter and
park in front of the pastoral house near the path leading to the
basement. JOEY, GENER, all the accused and the victims were
inside the van. Four of the victims were made to alight from the
van, while the fifth one lay on the floor of the vehicle as though
dead. The victims were brought to the basement, which was at the
back of the chapel and beneath the choir office. ELENA
followed. Inside the basement the victims were continually
mauled, whipped with a gun, and beaten with steel tubes, lead
pipes and other blunt instruments. One of the victims was tied
with wire. Filemon Garcia arrived with a blowtorch and also
entered the basement. ELENA heard the victims beg for
mercy. Unable to endure the sight she sat in front of the chapel
and stayed for 30 minutes. Pastor Almedina arrived and told her
that they would talk about her problem at another
time. Afterwards the victims were herded back to the Fiera. They
seemed almost dead.[16]
On 10 March 1992, at 8:45 a.m., the lifeless body of FELIX
was found floating on the Pasig River near Beata-Tawiran in
Pandacan. At 12:25 p.m., ERWINs body was retrieved from the
same river at the back of the Sta. Ana market. At about the same
time, the decomposing bodies of ANDRES, MARLON and
JOSEPH were also fished out of the Pasig River near Lambingan
Bridge.[17]
SPO3 Myrna Ricasa prepared the crime report and was part of
the group that conducted the police line-up on 13 March
1992. Witnesses to the abduction identified the accused from
among five line-ups. JOSEPHINE identified ABELLA as among
the passengers of the Ford Fiera. EVELYN pointed to
GRANADA; Roy Ronquillo and Noel Estorel, who were not
presented as witnesses, identified DE GUZMAN and
VALENCIA, respectively.[18]
Appellants advanced alibi as their defense. They all claim to
have attended the panata at the Punta Sta. Ana chapel on 8 March
1992 from 8:00 to 10:00 p.m., save for ABELLA whose
attendance was excused. The panata isa religious practice of the
INC held for seven consecutive days as preparation for the santa
cena or holy supper. In 1992, the panata was held from 8 to 14
March 1992 and the santa cena, on 15 March
1992.[19] VALENCIA testified that after the panata on 8 March
1992, he went home to San Juan, Metro Manila; it was then about
11:00 p.m.[20] For his part, GRANADA claimed that after
attending the panata, he left the Iglesia compound with Filemon
and Marilou Garcia. The three arrived at the Garcia residence in
Bacood, Sta. Mesa, at 11:00 p.m. Filemon and GRANADA had
snacks and watched two movies on the video player. It was
already past midnight when GRANADA went
home.[21] GRANADAs testimony was corroborated by both
Filemon and Marilou.[22]
ABELLA was a member of the PNP highway patrol group
assigned to Mobile Unit No. 13 in March of 1992. His tour of duty
was from 2:00 to 10:00 p.m. He was previously granted
exemption from attending the panata.Together with PO3
Ferdinand Parolina, he patrolled Roxas Boulevard from the
corner of T.M. Kalaw St. to the corner of Vito Cruz St. on 8
March 1992. ABELLA and Parolina parted ways at 10:15
p.m.[23] PO3 Parolina, who drove the mobile car, corroborated
ABELLAs testimony.[24]
According to former accused Bienvenido Tugay, on 11 March
1992 at 11:00 p.m., Major Joe Pring arrived at the Iglesia
compound in Punta, Sta. Ana, with police officers, demanding
entrance inside the premises. Since there was no order from his
superior allowing outsiders to enter the compound, Tugay
refused. Enraged, Pring asked for the names of Tugays
companions. Tugay enumerated the names of appellants.[25]
The following day, appellants read their names in newspapers
as among the perpetrators of the crime. Alarmed, they consulted
the INC Central Office on what steps to take. Accompanied by
Atty. Restituto Lazaro of the Iglesias legal department, appellants
proceeded to see Gen. Diokno at the Western Police District
Headquarters on 13 March 1992 to clear their names. Major Pring
brought them to his office and hurriedly organized a police line-
up. During the line-up Major Pring allegedly tapped all the
accused on the shoulder as a signal to the prosecution witnesses
for identifying them. Accordingly, appellants were identified.[26]
On 7 February 1995, after several instances where defense
counsel questioned his orders and doubted his partiality, Judge
Nitafan inhibited himself from further hearing the cases. The
cases were re-raffled to Branch 35 presided over by Judge Ramon
P. Makasiar, who penned the decision on 15 November 1996
convicting the accused.[27] The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing the four
accused in these cases: JUANITO ABELLA y GARCIA,
DIOSDADO GRANADA y SALCEDO, BENJAMIN DE
GUZMAN y LABASAN, and EDGARDO VALENCIA y
VILLANUEVA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER
on five (5) counts, and sentencing each of them to the penalties
of five (5) reclusion perpetua, and to pay the costs in
proportionate shares.
The said four accused are further ordered, jointly and severally,
to pay:
A. To Erlinda Ronquillo and Betty Ronquillo
1. P91,607.70 for actual damages,
2. P500,000.00 to each of them for moral damages,
3. P500,000.00 to each of them for exemplary damages;
B. To Domingo Tamayo
2. P500,000 for moral damages,
3. P500,000 for exemplary damages;
C. To Andres Lojero, Sr.

2. P1,000,000.00 for moral damages,
3. P1,000,000.00 for exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[28]
This decision was amended to include an award of P50,000 as
indemnity for the death of each of the victims.[29]
Appellants are now before us contending that the trial court
erred:
I
IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE AND

CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED IN THE
ALLEGED ABDUCTION OF THE VICTIMS;
II
IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF

ALLEGED EYEWITNESS ELENA BERNARDO;
III
IN HOLDING THAT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN CONVICTION;
IV
IN FINDING ACCUSEDS DEFENSE OF ALIBI WEAK;
V
IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY WAS PRESENT TO

QUALIFY THE CRIME TO MURDER; and
VI
IN RULING THAT THE VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OF

THE ACCUSED DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.[30]
V
We agree with the trial court that the killing was characterized
by treachery. It is true that treachery should normally attend at the
inception of the aggression. However, when the victim was first
seized and bound and then slain, treachery is present.[61] In this
case, it is enough to point out that the victims hands were tied at
the back when their bodies were found floating in Pasig
River. This fact clearly shows that the victims were rendered
defenseless and helpless, thereby allowing the appellants to
commit the crime without risk at all to their persons.
The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed
in treachery and cannot be considered as an independent
aggravating circumstance. It need not be alleged in the
information, as treachery was adequate to elevate the killing to
murder.
VI
We cannot equate appellants move to clear their names as

voluntary surrender. For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be
spontaneous and should show the intent of the accused to submit
himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because (1) he
acknowledges his guilt or (2) he wishes to save the government
the trouble and expense necessarily included for his search and
capture.[62] In an analogous case, we have held that when the
accused goes to a police station merely to clear his name and not
to give himself up, voluntary surrender may not be appreciated.[63]
Lastly, we affirm the awards made by the trial court except as
to the awards of moral and exemplary damages, which are,
however, reduced from P500,000 to P50,000 each.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 35 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-
104529 to -33 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that
the awards of moral and exemplary damages are hereby reduced
from P500,000 to P50,000 each.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC VS REYES-BAKUNAWA
Assets or properties, to be considered as ill-gotten wealth, must be shown to have
originated from the Government itself, and should have been taken by former
President Marcos, the members of his immediate family, relatives, close
subordinates and close associates by illegal means. That one served as a
government official or employee during the Marcos administration did not
immediately make her a close subordinate or close associate of former President
1
Marcos. cralaw virtualaw library
The Case
2
The Republic appeals the adverse decision rendered on April 10, 2002, and the
3
resolution issued on November 8, 2007, whereby the Sandiganbayan respectively
dismissed the complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages filed against respondents in Civil Case No. 0023, and denied the
Republic’s motion for reconsideration.
Antecedents
Civil Case No. 0023 is an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,

restitution and damages brought by the Republic against respondents Luz Reyes-
Bakunawa, Manuel Bakunawa, Jr., Manuel Bakunawa III, President Marcos and
First Lady Imelda R. Marcos for having allegedly acquired and accumulated ill-
gotten wealth consisting of funds and other property “in unlawful concert with one
another” and “in flagrant breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public
officers, with grave abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the
Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines, thus resulting in their
4
unjust enrichment.” cralaw virtualaw library
The complaint alleged that respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa (Luz Bakunawa) had
served as Imelda Marcos’ Social Secretary during the Marcos administration; that
it was during that period of her incumbency in that position that Luz Bakunawa
and her husband Manuel Bakunawa had acquired assets, funds and other property
grossly and manifestly disproportionate to her salaries and their other lawful
5
income; and that Luz Bakunawa, “by herself and/or in unlawful concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage
of her position, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, for
their benefit and unjust enrichment and in order to prevent disclosure and recovery
of assets illegally obtained, engaged in devices, schemes and
6
stratagems,” particularly:
1) acted as dummies, nominees, and/or agents of the Marcos spouses and, with the
active collaboration, knowledge and willing participation of the other defendants,
established several corporations engaged in a wide range of economic activities,
such as construction and cattle ranching;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
2) secured favorable contracts with the Department of Public Works and

Communications for the construction of government projects through grossly
undercapitalized corporations and without complying with such usual requirements
as public bidding, notice and publication of contractors;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
3) unlawfully acquired heads of cattle from the government dispersal program and
raised them on ranch lands encroaching on forest zones; chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
4) unlawfully encroached upon a mangrove-forested section in Masbate, Masbate

and converted it into a fishpond;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
5) unlawfully amassed funds by obtaining huge credit lines from government

financial institutions, and incorporating into their contracts a cost-escalation
adjustment provision to justify collection of grossly arbitrary and unconscionable
amounts unsupported by evidence of increase in prices; chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
6) unlawfully imported hundreds of brand-new units of heavy equipment without

paying customs duties and other allied taxes amounting to millions of pesos, by
falsely representing said heavy equipment to be for official government use and
selling them at very low prices to avoid paying the required taxes.7cralaw virtualaw library
The Republic prayed for: (a) the reconveyance to itself of all funds and other
property impressed with constructive trust, as well as funds and other property
acquired by respondents’ abuse of right and power and through unjust enrichment,
plus interests; (b) accounting of all beneficial interests in funds, properties and
assets in excess of their unlawful earnings; and (c) payment of actual damages to
be proved during the trial, moral damages of P50,000,000,000.00, temperate,
nominal and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and treble
8
judicial costs. cralaw virtualaw library
In their amended answer, the Bakunawas alleged that Luz Bakunawa was never the
Social Secretary of Imelda Marcos, but only an employee in the office of the Social
Secretary; that the properties acquired while Luz Bakunawa was employed in the
Government were purchased with honestly earned money and their acquisition was
well within their legitimate income; that their family owned and controlled five
closed family corporations, namely: (1) Hi-Tri Development Corporation; (2) 7-R
Development Corporation; (3) 7-R Heavy Equipment, Inc.; (4) 7-R Sales
Company, Inc.; and (5) 7-R Ranch, Inc.; that their public works contracts were
awarded to them in accordance with law; that their acquisition of the heads of
9
cattle were legal; and that they did not commit any breach of trust while in public
office, and did not possess illegally acquired funds that rendered them liable under
10
constructive trust in favor of the Republic. cralaw virtualaw library
During the pre-trial on August 26, 1999, the Bakunawas admitted that: (a) the
11
properties enumerated in Annex A of the complaint belonged to or were
connected to them, except three corporations, namely:7-R International Trading, 7-
R Enterprise, Inc., and 7-R Group of Companies; and (b) two parcels of land that
12
belonged to one of their children. cralaw virtualaw library
Also during the pre-trial, the parties agreed on the following statement of the
issues, to wit:
[t]he fundamental issue in this case is whether or not defendant Luz Bakunawa,
considering her position in Malacañang during the incumbency of President
Ferdinand E. Marcos from 1970 up to 1986, occupied a confidential position in
Malacañang, and was able to obtain contracts, run businesses and acquire real
properties as enumerated in the Complaint, using her office and the influence of
either or both of the [s]pouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. The parties agreed that
it is the use of the influence of the Spouses Marcos that constitutes the essence of
the case, and not the failure to report the Statement of Assets and Liabilities or any
other impropriety in the acquisition of the properties herein, this case having been
filed under the authority given to the Presidential Commission on Good Government
under Executive Orders No. 1,2, 14 and 14-a.13cralaw virtualaw library
After the Republic rested its case, respondents filed their motion to
14
dismiss, insisting that the Republic “has failed to establish even prima facie, its
15
case and/or charges against them.” cralaw virtualaw library
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On April 10, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in favor of

16
respondents, to wit: cralaw virtualaw library
x x x x
As the evidence stands, neither the presence of the link with the Marcoses, nor the
irrefutability of the evidence against the Bakunawas for their misuse of that
connection exists to justify the instant action by the PCGG.
In view of all the above, this Court is constrained to grant the Motion to Dismiss, as
it hereby dismisses, the Complaint of the plaintiff for its failure to prove the essential
allegations thereof.
The writs of sequestration issued and in force against the properties of the
Bakunawas as enumerated in Annex A of the Complaint (page 24 and p. 34, Vol. I,
Record) are lifted, set aside and declared of no further force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
The Sandiganbayan justified its decision in the following manner:
x x x x
Many of the plaintiff’s allegations in its specific averments (Article V) in the complaint are
alluded to in the evidence in a general fashion: engaging in cattle ranching and construction [para.
12 (a)], entering into public works contracts [para.12 (b)], acquisition of mangrove areas [para. 12
(c)]. Nothing exists in the record, however, with respect to undercapitalization of the corporation,
non-compliance with bidding requirements, encroachment of ranches into forest zones, huge credit
lines, unjustified claims of cost escalation adjustment, and importation of heavy equipment.
Properties have been shown in the name of the spouses Bakunawa or either of them; testimonies
have been rendered about eviction, official documents presented with respect to public works
contracts, and finally, a Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1985. Indeed, to hear some
of the witnesses, acts of oppression appear to have been committed if not by the wife then by the
husband Manuel Bakunawa. There is no indication however, that the acts of oppression involved
the improper use of influence on the part of the defendant Luz Bakunawa by reason of her having
been employed in the office of the Social Secretary of Imelda Marcos when the latter was the First
Lady.
x x x x
An examination of the testimonial evidence for the Plaintiff, as summarized in the first part of this
decision, shows its concentration in the alleged dispossession of some landowners of their
occupied land in the province of Masbate by the defendants Bakunawa and the allegedly (sic)
inaction by the Bureau of Forestry and the police agencies thereon. Thus, the almost uniform
allegation of witnesses is that they were dispossessed of pasture lands which they believed they
were entitled to possess. There were documents presented to prove that, indeed, the witnesses had
claims to these pieces of property or had occupied them and had introduced improvements thereon.
The tenor of the testimony of the said witnesses is that while there was no force directly applied
in the dispossession of their properties, their lands, however, were fenced in, and occupied by,
other people, allegedly the Bakunawas and secured by armed and uniformed men.
There is likewise the contention of the plaintiff’s witnesses that they did not know who these men
were, although it has been said that one or two of the men who helped in fencing off these
properties were employees of the Bakunawas.
What is clear is that with the evidence thus far, the Bakunawas, or more specifically, Manuel
Bakunawa, ignored the Bureau of Forestry summons, and caused the unceremonious exclusion of
people who had apparently occupied rather large tracts of land under permits for the Bureau or
those with pending applications.
There also seems to be evidence that defendant Luz Bakunawa did quite a bit of work in her
capacity as a member of the staff of the Social Secretary of Imelda Marcos. While the influence of
Luz Bakunawa may be assumed or conjectured, there has been no evidence which would
categorically show that the position of defendant Luz Bakunawa in Malacañang “in concert with
the spouses Marcos” or either of them was the explanation for the absence of the law enforcement
officers or the inaction of the administrative officers of the government.
x x x x
The influence may be assumed and in common parlance, it might be reasonably made. But to
conclude that there was abuse of office by Luz Bakunawa or her utilization of the influence of her
office or of the spouses Marcos cannot be assumed or stated in any certainty.
And since, as aforesaid, the action herein is confiscatory in character, assumptions will not do to
obtain judgment against the defendants Bakunawa.17cralaw virtualaw library
The Sandiganbayan ruled that in civil suits initiated by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) for the recovery of illegally acquired property pursuant to Republic Act
18
No. 1379, the Republic must show not only that defendant was a subordinate of the Marcos
spouses or of either of them, but also that the relationship was similar to that of an immediate
19
member of the Marcos family or a dummy of the Marcoses. It concluded that no proof
established the link between the alleged acts of the Bakunawas and those of the Marcoses, or
even the proximity of Luz Bakunawa as a Marcos relative or Marcos dummy.
The Republic sought the reconsideration of the decision, arguing that the Sandiganbayan erred in
holding that it did not show the Bakunawas’ link with the Marcoses, and in ruling that it did not
prove that the Bakunawas had abused their connections or close association with the
20
Marcoses. cralaw virtualaw library
On November 8, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s motion for
21
reconsideration, reiterating its ruling that the Republic did not discharge its burden of proving
the close links between the Bakunawas and the Marcoses, and of proving how the Bakunawas
had abused said links, assuming that the links existed.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The Republic ascribes the following errors, to wit:
I.
THE QUANTUM OF PROOF REQUIRED TO PROVE PETITIONER’S CASE AGAINST THE

BAKUNAWAS IS MERE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
II.
THE LINK BETWEEN AND/OR AMONG THE BAKUNAWAS AND THE MARCOSES WAS
SATISFACTORILY ESTABLISHED BY PETITIONER.
III.
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE BAKUNAWAS AMASSED ASSETS,

FUNDS AND PROPERTIES GROSSLY AND MANIFESTLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO
THEIR SALARIES AND OTHER LAWFUL INCOME BECAUSE OF THEIR POSITION IN
THE GOVERNMENT AND/OR CLOSE ASSOCIATION AND CONNECTION WITH THE
MARCOSES TO THE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER AND THE FILIPINO PEOPLE.22cralaw virtualaw
library
23
In their comment, respondents mainly submit that the Republic failed to present a justiciable
issue to warrant the reversal of the Sandiganbayan’s decision; and that the April 10, 2002
decision already become final and could no longer be reviewed and modified because of the
belated filing of the petition for review.
24
On her part, First Lady Marcos opted not to file her comment. cralaw virtualaw library
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.

1.
Appeal of the Republic was timely
The Bakunawas contend that the April 10, 2002 decision already became final because of the
Republic’s failure to file the petition for review on time.
We cannot sustain the contention.
The Republic had until November 24, 2007 within which to file the petition for review. It filed a
motion seeking an extension of 30 days of its period to file, or until December 24, 2007.
Although it did not file the petition within the requested extension period, the Court directed it
on June 30, 2008 to file the petition for review within 15 days from notice. Considering that it
25
received the resolution of June 30, 2008 on August 11, 2008, its filing of the petition for
review on August 26, 2008 was timely.
2.
Preponderance of evidence is required in actions brought to recover ill-gotten wealth
In its decision of April 10, 2002, the Sandiganbayan stated as follows:
Considering the confiscatory character of proceedings described in E.O. No. 14 in actions for
recovery of alleged unlawfully acquired property such as the instant case, evidence must be
substantial, if not beyond reasonable doubt, akin to the actions for forfeiture under Republic Act.
No. 1379; this, notwithstanding the statements in Sec. 3 of the Executive Order which states the
adequacy of mere preponderance of evidence.26cralaw virtualaw library
The Republic argues that the Sandiganbayan thereby erred in seemingly requiring a degree of
27
proof greater than that required by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 14-A. This was also its
submission in the motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the decision of April 10, 2002.
In denying the Republic’s motion for reconsideration through the November 8, 2007 resolution,
the Sandiganbayan agreed with the Republic’s submission to the effect that preponderance of
evidence was all that was required for this case. However, the Sandiganbayan pointed out that
even on that basis the Republic still did not satisfy its quantum of proof because the facts it
28
established were not sufficient to prove its case against respondents. cralaw virtualaw library
We uphold the Sandiganbayan.
We first clarify that the Republic correctly submits that only a preponderance of evidence was
needed to prove its demand for reconveyance or recovery of ill-gotten wealth. That is quite clear
from Section 1 of E.O. No. 14-A, which provides:
Section 1. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to read as
follows:cralawlibrary
Sec. 3. The civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379 or for
restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential and other damages or any
other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws filed with the Sandiganbayan against
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, members of their immediate family, close relatives,
subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees, may proceed
independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
By preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to that of the other side. Essentially, preponderance of evidence refers to the
comparative weight of the evidence presented by the opposing parties. As such, it has been
defined as “the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side,” and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of
the credible evidence. It is proof that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
29
which is offered in opposition thereto. cralaw virtualaw library
Here, the Bakunawas filed a motion to dismiss, by which they specifically demurred to the
evidence adduced against them. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in
an action to the effect that the evidence that his adversary produced, whether true or not, is
insufficient in point of law to make out a case or to sustain the issue. The demurring party
thereby challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a judgment. The court, in
passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence, is required merely to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or claim, or to support a verdict of
30
guilt or liability. cralaw virtualaw library
Under the rule on preponderance of evidence, the court is instructed to find for and to dismiss the
case against the defendant should the scales hang in equipoise and there is nothing in the
evidence that tilts the scales to one or the other side. The plaintiff who had the burden of proof
has failed to establish its case, and the parties are no better off than before they proceeded upon
31
their litigation. In that situation, the court should leave the parties as they are. cralaw virtualaw library
Moreover, although the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there
is no preponderance of evidence on the plaintiff’s side if its evidence alone is insufficient to
32
establish its cause of action. Similarly, when only one side is able to present its evidence, and
the other side demurs to the evidence, a preponderance of evidence can result only if the
plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to establish the cause of action. For this purpose, the sheer
volume of the evidence presented by one party cannot tip the scales in its favor. Quality, not
quantity, is the primordial consideration in evaluating evidence.
3.
The evidence of the Republic did not preponderantly establish the ill-gotten nature of the
Bakunawas’ wealth
The decisive query is whether the Republic preponderantly showed that the Bakunawas had
acquired ill-gotten wealth during Luz Bakunawa’s employment during the Marcos
administration.
33
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), decided on April 12, 2011, the Court settled
not only the meaning of ill-gotten wealth but also who were the persons liable to illegally acquire
or amass such wealth, viz:
xxxx
II
The Concept and Genesis of Ill-Gotten Wealth in the Philippine Setting
A brief review of the Philippine law and jurisprudence pertinent to ill-gotten wealth should furnish
an illuminating backdrop for further discussion.
In the immediate aftermath of the peaceful 1986 EDSA Revolution, the administration of President
Corazon C. Aquino saw to it, among others, that rules defining the authority of the government
and its instrumentalities were promptly put in place. It is significant to point out, however, that the
administration likewise defined the limitations of the authority.
The first official issuance of President Aquino, which was made on February 28, 1986, or just two
days after the EDSA Revolution, was Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1, which created the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Ostensibly, E.O. No. 1 was the first issuance in light
of the EDSA Revolution having come about mainly to address the pillage of the nation’s wealth
by President Marcos, his family, and cronies.
E.O. No. 1 contained only two WHEREAS Clauses, to wit:

WHEREAS, vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and
abroad;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth;

Paragraph (4) of E.O. No. 234 further required that the wealth, to be ill-gotten, must be “acquired
by them through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the conversion of funds belonging
to the Government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks
or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of their official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the grave
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.”
Although E.O. No. 1 and the other issuances dealing with ill-gotten wealth (i.e., E.O. No. 2, E.O.
No. 14, and E.O. No. 14-A) only identified the subject matter of ill-gotten wealth and the persons
who could amass ill-gotten wealth and did not include an explicit definition of ill-gotten wealth,
we can still discern the meaning and concept of ill-gotten wealth from the WHEREAS Clauses
themselves of E.O. No. 1, in that ill-gotten wealth consisted of the “vast resources of the
government” amassed by “former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives
and close associates both here and abroad.” It is clear, therefore, that ill-gotten wealth would not
include all the properties of President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates
but only the part that originated from the “vast resources of the government.”
In time and unavoidably, the Supreme Court elaborated on the meaning and concept of ill-gotten
wealth. In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, or BASECO, for the sake of brevity, the Court held that:
x x x until it can be determined, through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the property
was in truth “ill-gotten,” i.e., acquired through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the
conversion of funds belonging to the Government or any of its branches, instrumentalities,
enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection or influence, resulting in unjust enrichment of the ostensible
owner and grave damage and prejudice to the State. And this, too, is the sense in which the term
is commonly understood in other jurisdictions.
The BASECO definition of ill-gotten wealth was reiterated in Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Lucio C. Tan, where the Court said:
On this point, we find it relevant to define “ill-gotten wealth.” In Bataan Shipyard and Engineering
Co., Inc., this Court described “ill-gotten wealth” as follows:cralawlibrary
“Ill-gotten wealth is that acquired through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the
conversion of funds belonging to the Government or any of its branches, instrumentalities,
enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection or influence, resulting in unjust enrichment of the ostensible
owner and grave damage and prejudice to the State. And this, too, is the sense in which the term
is commonly understood in other jurisdiction.”
Concerning respondents’ shares of stock here, there is no evidence presented by petitioner that
they belong to the Government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities,
enterprises, banks or financial institutions. Nor is there evidence that respondents, taking undue
advantage of their connections or relationship with former President Marcos or his family, relatives
and close associates, were able to acquire those shares of stock.
Incidentally, in its 1998 ruling in Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, the
Court rendered an identical definition of ill-gotten wealth, viz:cralawlibrary
x x x. We may also add that ‘ill-gotten wealth’, by its very nature, assumes a public character.
Based on the aforementioned Executive Orders, ‘ill-gotten wealth’ refers to assets and properties
purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of
government funds or properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their public
office; or their use of powers, influence or relationships, “resulting in their unjust enrichment
and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.” Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the
government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such,
upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the satisfaction
of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. Another declared
overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for
national economic recovery.
All these judicial pronouncements demand two concurring elements to be present before assets or
properties were considered as ill-gotten wealth, namely: (a) they must have “originated from the
government itself,” and (b) they must have been taken by former President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, and close associates by illegal means.
But settling the sources and the kinds of assets and property covered by E.O. No. 1 and related
issuances did not complete the definition of ill-gotten wealth. The further requirement was that the
assets and property should have been amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, and close associates both here and abroad. In this regard, identifying former President
Marcos, his immediate family, and relatives was not difficult, but identifying other persons
who might be the close associatesof former President Marcos presented an inherent difficulty,
because it was not fair and just to include within the term close associates everyone who had had
any association with President Marcos, his immediate family, and relatives.
Again, through several rulings, the Court became the arbiter to determine who were the close
associates within the coverage of E.O. No. 1.
In Republic v. Migriño, the Court held that respondents Migriño, et al. were not necessarily among
the persons covered by the term close subordinate or close associate of former President Marcos
by reason alone of their having served as government officials or employees during the Marcos
administration, viz:
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or
employee during the administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima
facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close
association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. This is so because otherwise
the respondent’s case will fall under existing general laws and procedures on the matter. x x x
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the Court declared that the petitioner was not a close associate as
the term was used in E.O. No. 1 just because he had served as the President and General Manager
of the GSIS during the Marcos administration.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Court stated that respondent Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas’
having been a Commanding General of the Philippine Army during the Marcos administration
“d[id] not automatically make him a subordinate of former President Ferdinand Marcos as this
term is used in Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close
association with former President Marcos.”
It is well to point out, consequently, that the distinction laid down by E.O. No. 1 and its related
issuances, and expounded by relevant judicial pronouncements unavoidably required competent
evidentiary substantiation made in appropriate judicial proceedings to determine: (a) whether the
assets or properties involved had come from the vast resources of government, and (b) whether the
individuals owning or holding such assets or properties were close associates of President Marcos.
The requirement of competent evidentiary substantiation made in appropriate judicial
proceedings was imposed because the factual premises for the reconveyance of the assets or
properties in favor of the government due to their being ill-gotten wealth could not be simply
assumed. Indeed, in BASECO, the Court made this clear enough by emphatically observing:
6. Government’s Right and Duty to Recover All Ill-gotten Wealth
There can be no debate about the validity and eminent propriety of the Government’s plan “to
recover all ill-gotten wealth.”
Neither can there be any debate about the proposition that assuming the above described factual
premises of the Executive Orders and Proclamation No. 3 to be true, to be demonstrable by
competent evidence, the recovery from Marcos, his family and his minions of the assets and
properties involved, is not only a right but a duty on the part of Government.
But however plain and valid that right and duty may be, still a balance must be sought with
the equally compelling necessity that a proper respect be accorded and adequate protection
assured, the fundamental rights of private property and free enterprise which are deemed
pillars of a free society such as ours, and to which all members of that society may without
exception lay claim.
x x x Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary

components freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of
happiness. Along with these freedoms are included economic freedom and freedom of
enterprise within reasonable bounds and under proper control. x x x Evincing much concern for
the protection of property, the Constitution distinctly recognizes the preferred position which real
estate has occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with every aspect of social life in a
democracy as democracy is conceived in the Constitution. The Constitution realizes the
indispensable role which property, owned in reasonable quantities and used legitimately, plays in
the stimulation to economic effort and the formation and growth of a solid social middle class that
is said to be the bulwark of democracy and the backbone of every progressive and happy country.
a. Need of Evidentiary Substantiation in Proper Suit
Consequently, the factual premises of the Executive Orders cannot simply be assumed. They
will have to be duly established by adequate proof in each case, in a proper judicial
proceeding, so that the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth may be validly and properly
adjudged and consummated; although there are some who maintain that the fact — that an
immense fortune, and “vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad,”
and they have resorted to all sorts of clever schemes and manipulations to disguise and hide their
illicit acquisitions — is within the realm of judicial notice, being of so extensive notoriety as to
dispense with proof thereof. Be this as it may, the requirement of evidentiary substantiation
has been expressly acknowledged, and the procedure to be followed explicitly laid down, in
Executive Order No. 14.
Accordingly, the Republic should furnish to the Sandiganbayan in proper judicial proceedings the
competent evidence proving who were the close associates of President Marcos who had amassed
assets and properties that would be rightly considered as ill-gotten wealth.
xxxx
As can be gleaned from the foregoing pronouncement, evidentiary substantiation of the
allegations of how the wealth was illegally acquired and by whom was necessary. For that
purpose, the mere holding of a position in the Marcos administration did not necessarily make
the holder a close associate within the context of E.O. No.1. According to Republic v.
35 36 37
Migriño, the term subordinate as used in E.O. No. 1 and E.O. No. 2 referred to a person
who enjoyed a close association with President Marcos and/or his wife similar to that of an
immediate family member, relative, and close associate, or to that of a close relative, business
associate, dummy, agent, or nominee. Indeed, a prima facie showing must be made to show that
one unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of a close association or relation with President
38
Marcos and/or his wife. It would not suffice, then, that one served during the administration
of President Marcos as a government official or employee.
The Republic particularly insists that Luz Bakunawa served as the Social Secretary or the
Assistant Social Secretary of First Lady Marcos; and mentions several other circumstances that
indicated her close relationship with the Marcoses, such as her assumption of office in the early
39
part of the Marcos administration, the accommodations extended to her during her various
40
travels, the fact that her close relationship with the Marcoses was of common knowledge
41
among the Masbateños, and the negotiated contracts the Bakunawas entered into during the
42
Marcos administration. cralaw virtualaw library
However, Luz Bakunawa maintains that she was not First Lady Marcos’ Social Secretary but a
mere member of the staff of the Social Secretary; and that the assets of the Bakunawas were
honestly earned and acquired well within the legitimate income of their businesses.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the evidence of the Republic was able to
establish, at best, that Luz Bakunawa had been an employee in Malacañang Palace during the
Marcos administration, and did not establish her having a close relationship with the Marcoses,
or her having abused her position or employment in order to amass the assets subject of this case.
Consequently, Luz Bakunawa could not be considered a close associate or subordinate of the
Marcoses within the context of E.O. No. 1 and E.O. No. 2.
The determination by the Sandiganbayan of the equiponderance or insufficiency of evidence

involved its appreciation of the evidence. We cannot undo such determination unless the
Republic makes a strong demonstration to us that the determination was whimsical or
43
capricious. Alas, the Republic did not make such demonstration. Its evidence could not
sustain the belief that the Bakunawas had used their influence, or the Marcoses’ influence in
acquiring their properties. Nor did it prove that the ties or relationship between the Bakunawas
and the Marcoses had been “similar to that of an immediate member of the family or a dummy.”
On another important aspect, the evidence of the Republic was likewise wanting. The
Sandiganbayan enumerated in its decision five activities in which the Bakunawas had acquired
their ill-gotten wealth, namely: (a) land-grabbing and cattle-ranching; (b) engaging in
government construction projects; (c) operating fishponds; (d) obtaining credit lines from
44
government financial institutions; and (e) importing heavy equipment. However, the decision
dwelt only on land-grabbing and the construction projects for the reason that the Republic
attempted to substantiate only those two activities. The Court is thus limited to the review of the
findings on the two activities.
Anent land-grabbing, the records show that although the Bakunawas had ignored the summons
from the Bureau of Forestry, and that the several persons occupying large tracts of land under
permits from the Bureau of Forestry or under still-pending applications had been dispossessed
thereof, the dispossessed persons whom the Republic presented as witnesses could not tell in
court that the Bakunawas had employed the people who had fenced or occupied the lands in
question. Such witnesses admitted that they did not put up much resistance against their forcible
dispossession because of their belief that the Bakunawas had been very influential and had
enjoyed very close ties with the Marcoses. However, they did not show that they had at the time
any direct contact or communication with the Bakunawas, which could only mean that they only
surmised and suspected the participation of the Bakunawas in their dispossession. As such, the
Republic’s evidence in that regard could not be sufficient, for surmises and suspicions could not
support any conclusion either that the Bakunawas had taken advantage of their close ties with the
Marcoses in order to dispossess the affected witnesses, or that Luz Bakunawa had abused her
influence arising from her close association with the Marcoses.
The Republic presented documents tending to prove that the dispossessed witnesses had retained
45
claims to the affected properties, and that the Bakunawas themselves had been issued pasture
46
leases over the same areas. Given that both the dispossessed witnesses and the Bakunawas
held legal rights of possession respecting the same areas independently of each other, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that “the plaintiff’s evidence is not conclusive proof of the
47
ill-gotten character of the lands in the possession of the defendants Bakunawas.” This is really
a good reason for the Sandiganbayan to hold that the Republic had not preponderantly shown
that the acts of dispossession and oppression had involved the improper use of her influence by
48
Luz Bakunawa on account of her close association with the Marcoses. cralaw virtualaw library
Concerning the negotiated construction contracts, the Republic posits that the contracts had been
entered into when Luz Bakunawa was a member of the Presidential Staff during the Marcos
administration, laying heavy emphasis on the notations and handwritten instructions by President
Marcos found on the written communications from Manuel Bakunawa to then DPWH Secretary
Baltazar Aquino.
Yet, the Republic offered the negotiated contracts solely to prove that the Bakunawas had been
incorporators or owners, or had held key positions in the corporations that entered into the
49
contracts. The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled, therefore, that the contracts could be considered
and appreciated only for those stated purposes, not for the purpose of proving the irregularity of
the contracts, opining as follows:
x x x. The documents appear to be public documents and are, therefore, considered prima
facie evidence of the fact of their issuance and that they were signed by the persons whose
signatures appear therein. It is, indeed, apparent on the face of the documents that government
projects were awarded to the defendants Bakunawas through negotiated contracts, and that at least
one was approved by then President Marcos himself. Outside of these, however, there can be no
other facts that can be inferred from the aforesaid documents.50cralaw virtualaw library
The Court upholds the Sandiganbayan. It was basic enough that the Sandiganbayan could not
consider any evidence that was not formally offered; and could consider evidence only for the
purposes it was specifically offered. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly states:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The need to formally offer evidence by specifying the purpose of the offer cannot be
overemphasized. This need is designed to meet the demand for due process by apprising the
adverse party as well as the trial court on what evidence the court would soon be called upon to
decide the litigation. The offer and purpose will also put the trial court in the position to
determine which rules of evidence it shall apply in admitting or denying admission to the
51
evidence being offered. According to Union Bank of the Philippines v. Tiu: cralaw virtualaw library
x x x a formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and
their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. It has several
functions: (1) to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is
presenting the evidence; (2) to allow opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility; and (3) to facilitate review by the appellate court, which will not be required to
review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. x x x.
Expounding on the office of the offer and statement of the purposes, the Court has cogently said
52
in Candido v. Court of Appeals: cralaw virtualaw library
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for
identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity to object
to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it. A formal offer is necessary
since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only - and strictly - upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a party to attach any document to his pleading
and then expect the court to consider it as evidence may draw unwarranted consequences. The
opposing party will be deprived of his chance to examine the document and object to its
admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty reviewing documents not previously
scrutinized by the court below. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the
inclusion on appeal of documentary evidence or exhibits in the records cannot be stretched as to
include such pleadings or documents not offered at the hearing of the case.
At any rate, the Court must point out that negotiated contracts are not per se illegal. A negotiated
contract is one that is awarded on the basis of a direct agreement between the Government and
the contractor, without going through the normal procurement process, like obtaining the prior
approval from another authority, or a competitive bidding process. It is generally resorted to for
convenience, or “when time is of the essence, or where there is a lack of qualified bidders or
contractors, or where there is conclusive evidence that greater economy and efficiency would be
53
achieved.” The Court has upheld the validity of a negotiated contract made pursuant to law,
like a negotiated contract entered into by a City Mayor pursuant to the then existing Local
54
Government Code, or a negotiated contract that eventually redounded to the benefit of the
55
general public, even if there was no specific covering appropriation pursuant to COA rules, or
56
a negotiated contract that was made due to an emergency in the health sector, or a negotiated
57
contract for long overdue repair and renovation needed to provide better health services. cralaw
virtualaw library
Absent evidence proving that the negotiated construction contracts had been irregularly entered
into by the Bakunawas, or that the public had been thereby prejudiced, it is pointless for the
Court to declare their invalidity. On the contrary, the Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the
58
presumption of the validity of the contracts prevailed. cralaw virtualaw library
It is true that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth should be relentlessly pursued. But the pursuit
should not be mindless as to be oppressive towards anyone. Due process requires that there be
sufficient competent evidence of the asset being ill-gotten wealth, and of the person or persons
charged with the illegal acquisition of ill-gotten wealth being a close associate or subordinate of
the Marcoses who took advantage of such ties with the Marcoses to enrich themselves. In that
effort, the Republic carries the heavy burden of proof, and must discharge such burden fully;
otherwise, the effort would fail and fall.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari for its lack of merit;
and AFFIRM the decision rendered on April 10, 2002, without pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS. BARRA
1
Before this Court is an appeal of the February 11, 2011 Decision of the Court of
2
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04155 affirming with modification the August
3
24, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, San Jose,
4
Camarines Sur in Crim. Case No. T-2678 and finding appellant Joseph Barra
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted robbery with homicide
instead of special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
5
On March 21, 2004, an information for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide was filed against appellant, to wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
That on or about 11:00 P.M. of October 9, 2003, at Barangay Tinawagan, Tigaon,

Camarines Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a firearm, after gaining entrance into the residence of his
victim, with intent to gain, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and steal money from Elmer Lagdaan y
Azur; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling him
to take and steal the money, the herein accused, with intent to kill, did then and there
feloniously shoot said Elmer Lagdaan, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound
which caused his death, to the prejudice of his heirs. (Emphases deleted.)
6
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued thereafter.
Dr. Peñafrancia N. Villanueva, Municipal Health Officer of Tigaon, Camarines

Sur, examined the corpse of Elmer Lagdaan and stated in her Postmortem
7
Report :cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Findings:
1. Gunshot wound, point of entry, 0.5 x 0.5 cms, circular, with inverted
edges at the mid left frontal area. Hematoma formation is noted at the
site of entry.
CAUSE OF DEATH:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
MASSIVE HE[M]ORRHAGE SECONDARY [TO] GUNSHOT WOUND
Dr. Villanueva testified that the victim sustained a gunshot wound due to the
circular and inverted edges of the point of entry. She concluded that since there
8
was no point of exit, the victim was shot at close range.
Ricardo de la Peña testified that he knew appellant for a long time. He stated that
he was on his way home to the neighboring barangay, when, at around 9:00 p.m.
on October 9, 2003, in the light of a bright moon, he saw appellant enter the house
of Lagdaan, which was lit with a lamp, and poked a gun to the victim’s right
forehead and demanded money. De la Peña hid behind a tree ten meters
away. When the victim stated that the money was not in his possession, appellant
9
shot him. He went home and reported the incident the following morning.
Ely Asor testified that on the night of October 9, 2003, he was on his way to the
victim’s house to collect his daily wage when he saw appellant in the yard of the
victim’s house. He inquired from appellant if the victim was around. Appellant
responded that the victim was not around. Asor went home. It was while Asor
was in his house that he heard a gunshot. It was the following morning that he
10
learned that the victim died. Asor then proceeded to report the incident.
The victim’s mother, Flora Lagdaan, testified that she spent for funeral and burial
expenses in the amount of P33,300.00.
In his defense, appellant denied the charges against him. Appellant claimed that he
was in Batangas City, with his brother Benjamin, visiting his sister when he was
arrested and brought to Camarines Sur and charged with the crime of “robbery
11
with murder.” Appellant’s brother, Benjamin, tried to corroborate his
12
testimony.
The RTC, after taking into consideration all the evidence presented, found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. It
stated that the affirmative testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses deserved more
weight than the appellant’s defense of denial and alibi. Thus, finding the
prosecution’s witnesses to be credible and that the killing of the victim to be by
reason of the robbery, the RTC decision’s decretal portion read:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the

accused, Joseph Barra GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide as defined and penalized under Article 291(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. To pay
the surviving heirs of Elmer Lagdaan, the sum of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity
for his death, as actual damages in the amount of Php55,579.80, as moral damages
in the sum of Php50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The accused is entitled to the full credit of his preventive imprisonment if he abides
by the disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners during his confinement,
otherwise he shall only be entitled to four-fifths (4/5) thereof.13
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals only found appellant guilty of attempted
robbery with homicide. It stated that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Regarding the trial court’s finding that accused-appellant is responsible for the death
of Lagdaan, WE will not disturb the same as it is well supported by the evidence on
record and in accord with prevailing law and jurisprudence. However, WE disagree
with its determination of the nature of the crime that accused-appellant committed.
Instead of robbery with homicide at its consum[m]ated stage, accused-appellant
should have been declared guilty only of attempted robbery with homicide.
As correctly observed by the OSG,14 the only evidence introduced by the

government to establish robbery is the statement of De la Peña that when accused-
appellant reached the victim’s place, the latter barged into the said residence, poked
a gun at the victim’s forehead, demanded money and when the victim refused to
accede to his demand, fired a gun and shot the victim. Indeed, no iota of evidence
was presented to establish that accused-appellant took away the victim’s money or
any property, for that matter.
The fact of asportation must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this fact
was not duly established, accused-appellant should be held liable only for the crime
of attempted robbery with homicide as defined and penalized under Article 297 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides –
“When by reason of or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide
is committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide
committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.”
The appellant is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide only when he
commenced the commission of robbery directly by overt acts and did not perform
all the acts of execution which would produce robbery by reason of some causes or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The claim of the defense that accused-appellant should be convicted only of the
crime of homicide is bereft of merit. The killing of the victim herein was by reason
of or on the occasion of robbery.
The attendant circumstances clearly show accused-appellant’s intent to rob the

victim. That motive was manifested by accused-appellant’s overt act of poking a gun
at the victim’s forehead demanding money from the latter. When the victim refused
to accede to the demand, accused-appellant shot the former. The killing was an
offshoot of accused-appellant’s intent to rob the victim. Accused-appellant was bent
on resorting to violent means to attain his end. Due to the victim’s failure to give his
money, the crime of robbery was, however, not consummated.15 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the Court of Appeals stated:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed Judgment is

hereby MODIFIED as follows -
1) Accused-appellant is adjudged GUILTY of the crime of Attempted Robbery with

Homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA,
2) Accused-appellant is directed to pay the heirs of Elmer Lagdaan the

following:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
a) the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
b) the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c) the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
d) the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
16
e) the cost of suit.
17
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on February 18, 2011.
After appellant’s confinement was confirmed, both the OSG and appellant
manifested that they would adopt the pleadings filed in the Court of Appeals in lieu
18
of supplemental briefs.
Appellant argues that his identity as the perpetrator of the crime was not
sufficiently established by the prosecution. Appellant stated that the testimonies of
the prosecution’s witnesses were rife with inconsistencies. Moreover, appellant
argued that the elements for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
were not proven particularly the element of taking of personal property.
We affirm the February 11, 2011 decision of the Court of Appeals with
modification on the award of damages.
19
In People v. Bocalan and Gatdula we stated that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
[F]indings of facts of the trial court, its calibration and assessment of the probative
weight of the testimonial evidence of the parties and its conclusions anchored on its
findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect,
because of the unique advantage of the trial court in observing at close range the
demeanor, conduct and deportment of the said witnesses as they testify, unless the
trial court ignored, misunderstood and misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances
which if considered will change the outcome of the case. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
In the present case, while appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution’s
witnesses, he does not present any sufficient evidence to prove that the RTC
indeed ignored, misunderstood and misinterpreted the facts and circumstances of
the case. We also found, after reviewing the records, nothing that would indicate
any misinterpretation or misapprehension of facts on the part of the appellate court
that would substantially alter its conclusions.
Appellant in this case was charged with robbery with homicide under Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. –

Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any
person shall suffer:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
1. The penalty of from reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on

occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed; or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape
or intentional mutilation or arson.
20
In People v. Quemeggen, this Court gave the requisites to be proven by the
prosecution for appellant to be convicted of robbery with homicide, to
wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or

intimidation against persons;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2. The property taken belongs to another;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and
4. By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is
committed. (Citation omitted.)
In the case before us, appellant’s intention was to extort money from the
victim. By reason of the victim’s refusal to give up his personal property - his
money - to appellant, the victim was shot in the head, causing his death. We,
however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the element of taking was not
complete, making the crime one of attempted robbery with homicide as opposed to
the crime appellant was convicted in the RTC. Appellant is, therefore, liable under
Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code, not under Article 294 as originally held by
the RTC. Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Article 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain
circumstances. — When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated
robbery a homicide is committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be
punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless
the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this
Code.
The elements to be convicted under Article 297 were discussed in People v.

21
Macabales, to wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The elements of Robbery with Homicide as defined in Art. 297 of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) There is an attempted or frustrated robbery. (2) A homicide is
committed.
In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the
victim refused to give his money to appellant and no personal property was shown
to have been taken. It was for this reason that the victim was shot. Appellant can
only be found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide, thus punishable under
Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the RTC and the Court of Appeals
found appellant’s crime to be aggravated by disregard of dwelling, the Court of
Appeals correctly imposed the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Anent the awards of damages by the Court of Appeals, after a careful review of
existing rules and recent jurisprudence, we find the same to be in order and need
22
not be disturbed.
However, in conformity with current policy, we impose on all the monetary awards
for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
23
Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the February 11, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04155 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
amount of exemplary damages shall be increased to P30,000.00 and all monetary
awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date
of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ALBERTO VS CA
When a putative father manifests openly through words and deeds his recognition
of a child, the courts can do no less than confirm said acknowledgment. As the
immortal bard Shakespeare perspicaciously said: "Let your own discretion be your
tutor; suit the action to the word, the word to the action." Herein deceased father
cannot possibly be charged with indecisiveness or vacillation for he suited his
action to his word and his word to his action.
In the instant case, we have, therefore, affirmed the decision of the probate court
declaring petitioner as having acquired the status of a natural child of the deceased
Juan M. Alberto and, as such, entitled to participate in the latter's estate.
On September 18, 1953, a child named Ma. Theresa Alberto was born out of
wedlock to one Aurora Reniva with Juan M. Alberto as the alleged father.
Accordingly, she used "Alberto" as her surname in all her school records and
correspondences.
On September 18, 1967, Juan M. Alberto, felled by a bullet from an assassin’s gun,
died intestate.
His widow, Yolanda R. Alberto, filed a petition for the administration of his estate
on January 10, 1968. After the publication of notices, she was appointed as the
administratrix of the estate. After the Inventory and Appraisal and the
Administratrix' Accounting were approved on August 1, 1970 and on April 29,
1971 respectively, the proceedings were ordered closed and terminated.
On September 15, 1978, Ma. Theresa Alberto filed a motion for leave to intervene
as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings praying that she be declared to have
acquired the status of a natural child and as such, entitled to share in the estate of
the deceased. The motion was granted by the probate court.
Upon the presentation by the parties of their respective evidence during the trial,
the probate court was convinced that indeed, Ma. Theresa Alberto had been in
continuous possession of the status of a natural child. Thereupon, it rendered a
decision compelling the decedent’s heirs and estate to recognize her as a natural
daughter and to allow her to participate in the estate proceedings. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of oppositor and

against the estate of the deceased Juan M. Alberto —
(a) Declaring oppositor Ma. Theresa R. Alberto as having acquired the

status of a natural child of the late Gov. Juan M. Alberto;
(b) Ordering the administratrix and widow of the deceased and their
children, namely, Mary Joy, Maria Rebecca, Juan, Jr., Juan III, Maria
Yolanda and Juan IV, all surnamed Alberto, to recognize and
acknowledge oppositor as an acknowledged natural child of the late
Gov. Alberto;
(c) Declaring oppositor as one of the heirs of the late Gov. Juan M.
Alberto;
(d) Ordering the administratrix to partition the deceased’s estate and

turn over to oppositor her participation therein equivalent to one-half
(1/2) of the share of each legitimate child; and
(e) Ordering the administratrix to pay oppositor the sum of

P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
Costs against the administratrix.
SO ORDERED. 1
The probate court’s findings are quoted hereunder, to wit:
1) In the case at bar, the Court believes, and so holds, that the
oppositor has been in continuous possession of the status of a child of
Juan Alberto by his direct acts as well as the acts of his family, as
follows:
(a) The deceased gave the oppositor sums of money for her schooling;
(b) The deceased made known to his friends and relatives that she was
his daughter; and
(c) He made known to the personnel of the International School where

oppositor was enrolled that she was his daughter.
2) The following incidents would show the direct acts of the family of
the deceased.
(a) When the deceased’s younger sister, Mrs. Aurita Alberto Solidum
asked that the oppositor be sent to her house in her Sunday best to
meet her father for the first time;
(b) When Fr. Arcilla brought the oppositor to the bedside of the
deceased in the hospital and Fr. Arcilla asked the guard to give way to
her as she was a member of the family;
(c) When the step-mother of the deceased, during the wake,

introduced the oppositor to her youngest sister as an elder sister.
3) Prescinding from the foregoing, there is sufficient evidence to

prove that the oppositor is the child of the deceased.
1. Oppositor’s mother, Aurora Reniva, testified:
(a) of an indiscretion that led to the conception of and giving birth to

the oppositor;
(b) that Mrs. Aurita Solidum arranged the meeting between the
oppositor and the deceased at the MOPC; (This particular testimony
was corroborated by Cristeta Andaya, former maid of Mrs. Solidum,
and by the oppositor) and
(c) that Juan Alberto had been sending her money from time to time.
2) Oppositor also testified that:
(a) She had her first meeting with her father at the MOPC where he
gave her P500.00 personally and two telephone numbers where he
could be contacted and where they talked about her name, age and
other matters.
(b) She had other meetings with her father at the MOPC on which
occasions her father also gave her money.
(c) The deceased visited her two times at the International School
whose rules on visitors were strict and when her father visited her, the
secretary of the principal told her that her father was waiting for her.
This showed that the deceased had identified himself to the personnel
of the school that he was the father of the oppositor.
(d) He promised to see her in her school during her birthday on

September 18, 1968 but was not able to do so because of his untimely
death.
(e) The deceased promised to bring the oppositor to Catanduanes but

failed likewise because of his death.
(f) When oppositor and her mother went to the PGH on the occasion
of her father’s death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand and asked the
guard to make way for her because she was a child of Juan Alberto.
(g) After the wake for her deceased father, the deceased’s step-
mother, Saturnina Alberto, introduced her as a sister to Joy Alberto
her half-sister.
(h) Congressman Jose Alberto allowed her associates, upon her

representations, to use the ballroom of the Regent of Manila for
practice purposes. Congressman Alberto was the owner of the Regent
of Manila.
(i) Her uncles and aunts, i.e., brothers and sisters of her father,
regarded her as their niece and introduced her to others as the eldest
daughter of Juan Alberto.
(j) The children of the brothers and sisters of Juan Alberto recognized
her as their cousin.
3) Jose Tablizo testified that:
(a) There was a strong physical resemblance between the deceased

and the oppositor.
(b) The deceased and the oppositor wrote similarly.
(c) It was known among the friends of the deceased, particularly the
Breeze Gang, composed of the witness, Jose Tablizo, the deceased
and 4 others.
(d) Sometime in 1967, the deceased showed him the report card of the
Oppositor and boasted of her high grades.
(e) The friends of the deceased had a party in Virac, Catanduanes for
the oppositor whom they considered as the deceased’s daughter. (This
was corroborated by Silverio Taberara.)
4) Atty. Martiniano Vivo testified that Commissioner of Immigration

Edmundo Reyes, as lawyer for the deceased, made an appointment
with him (Atty. Vivo) for a conference, at which they discussed the
latter’s letter to the deceased regarding the oppositor. In said
conference, Com. Reyes said that the deceased was not denying that
he was the father of the oppositor. And because of his marital status
and the fact that he was a public official, he wanted to avoid public
scandal with the promise to support the oppositor quietly through a
cousin, Fr. Arcilla. 2
The Court of Appeals reversed the above decision of the probate court on the
strength of the following observations:
Assuming the foregoing to be true, we do not believe they satisfy the

degree of proof to establish that oppositor was in continuous
possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased.
In one case, the following facts were proved; that two

nurses took care of the children at the expense of the
defendant; that said defendant kissed the children, called
them sons, and ordered that they be taken care of very
well; that he gave the money for the necessities of the
mother and the six children, the oldest of whom called
the father; that he visited the mother, complained of his
big family, and was publicly regarded as the father of the
children. It was held that these were not sufficient to be a
basis for a declaration of paternity. They may show that
the defendant was convinced of his paternity in relation
to the children; but they do not show any intent on his
part to place such children in the possession of status of
natural children. The continued possession of such
status cannot be founded on conjectures and
presumption. So, also, the mere fact that defendant’s
mother used to visit the child, cannot be considered as
conduct of his family sufficient to confer
the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural
child.
(1 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1983 ed., pp.
604-605, citing, Sentencia, 12 October 1907; Gustilo vs.
Gustilo, et al., 14 SCRA 149; Sentencia, 9 May 1921;
Potot vs. Ycong, No. 6651, 22 March 1941, 40 O.G. No.
4, 26 July 1941, p. 748)
We find the evidence of oppositor-appellee even weaker than that

proven in the aforequoted citation. As a matter of fact, oppositor's
Exhibit W-1, a letter written by oppositor to Jose Tablizo after the
death of the deceased, betrays a lack of association between the
deceased and oppositor such as normally characterizes the relationship
between father and child. It gives the impression that the deceased
studiously distanced himself from the oppositor and had no intention
whatsoever of recognizing oppositor as his child. The pertinent
portion of the letter reads:
I have always been proud to be JMA’s eldest daughter,

and I feel even prouder after I heard from people like
you. You were the ones that knew him most, shared his
dreams as a young man, and witnessed his struggle from
Palmera’s slums to Forbes Park. You saw him rise from
cargador to lawyer and, finally, to governor; I only heard
about them through Mama. His life was a novel, and if I
were to help write it, I would be able to contribute but a
few pages, for I knew him only as a Big Man. It is YOU
who had a part in the first adventures of that same novel,
and I envy you. (p. 35, Folder of Exhibits) 3
Hence this petition.

May the estate and heirs of deceased Juan M. Alberto be ordered to recognize
petitioner as the deceased’s natural daughter on the basis of the evidence presented
by petitioner to establish her claim that she has been in continuous possession of
the status of a natural child?
We rule in the affirmative.
In the probate court, the following have been established:
1) that prior to Juan M. Alberto's marriage to Yolanda Reyes, herein private

respondent, Juan M. Alberto and Aurora Reniva, mother of herein petitioner, were
sweethearts;
2) that as a consequence of an indiscretion, Aurora Reniva conceived and gave

birth to herein petitioner Ma. Theresa Alberto on September 18, 1953;
3) that petitioner used 'Alberto' as her surname in all her school records and Juan
M. Alberto was known to be her father;
4) that through Fr. Arcilla, a first cousin of Juan M. Alberto, money was given to
Aurora Reniva;
5) that when petitioner was about nine (9) years old, Mrs. Aurita Solidum, the
youngest sister of Juan M. Alberto, arranged the first meeting between petitioner
and Juan M. Alberto at the MOPC and during said meeting, they talked about
petitioner, the deceased gave petitioner P500.00 and two telephone numbers;
6) that Juan M. Alberto would have visited petitioner on her birthday in her school,
International School, if not for his untimely death on September 18, 1967;
7) that when petitioner and her mother went to the PGH on the occasion of Juan M.
Alberto’s death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand and asked the guard to make way
for her as she was a daughter of Juan M. Alberto;
8) that after the wake for deceased Juan M. Alberto, his step mother, Saturnina
Alberto introduced petitioner to Joy Alberto as the latter’s sister;
9) that the siblings of Juan M. Alberto regarded petitioner as their niece and
introduced her to their children as the eldest daughter of Juan M. Alberto;
10) that the children of Juan M. Alberto’s siblings regarded her as their cousin;
11) that petitioner was known by Juan M. Alberto’s friends as his daughter;
12) that Juan M. Alberto showed Jose Tablizo the grades of petitioner and
remarked that those were the grades of his daughter.
Private respondent, Yolanda Alberto, the sole witness for private respondents,
denied that Juan M. Alberto ever recognized Ma. Theresa Alberto as his daughter.
She presented in evidence Aurora Reniva’s letters to Juan M. Alberto dated
December 23, 1955, September 27, 1954 and March 15, 1960; Aurora Reniva’s
letter to Fr. Arcilla dated December 23, 1955; letter of Zenaida Reniva to Juan M.
Alberto dated September 16, 1953, to prove that Juan M. Alberto refused to
recognize Ma. Theresa Alberto as his own. 4
However, these letters do not prove that Juan M. Alberto refused to recognize Ma.
Theresa Alberto. All that the letters stated was that Aurora Reniva was having a
difficult time raising a child by her own self and therefore, she was seeking the
assistance of Juan M. Alberto. Private respondent quoted as Exhibit "3-B" the
portion of Aurora Reniva’s letter dated March 15, 1960 which says:
. . . I am just wondering why after all those years of patient waiting,

you still do not give a damn to her. 5
The full text of the paragraph, however, reads as follows:
On the 23rd of this month, Maria Theresa P. Alberto will graduate

from the Prep School of Holy Ghost College. I am just wondering
why after all those years of patient waiting, you still do not give a
damn to her. I thought, as I was told before by Fr. Arcilla, that I just
pray and wait because he said pretty soon you will be sending her
money for support. So far, only the 300 pesos was received by us last
October, 1959. For it, I am very grateful because it helped me a lot in
our wants. 6
The letter itself shows that Juan M. Alberto was not completely indifferent towards
Ma. Theresa Alberto. He did provide her support whenever he could.
The latest letter that was presented in evidence was dated March 15, 1960. At the
time, petitioner and Juan M. Alberto had not yet met. About two years later, when
petitioner was nine years old, Mrs. Aurita Solidum arranged the first meeting
between petitioner and the deceased. This initial meeting was followed by many
more. Moreover, it is noteworthy that Juan M. Alberto never took any step to stop
petitioner from using his surname. The testimony of Jose Tablizo established his
recognition of Ma. Theresa Alberto as his daughter. He testified that Juan M.
Alberto showed him two report cards of Ma. Theresa which showed straight "A's."
He said "Boy! Great!" and Juan M. Alberto said that those were the grades of his
daughter. 7 This testimony is now being discredited for being hearsay. This Court
holds that the same falls within the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Sec. 38, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
Sec. 38. Declaration Against Interest. — The declaration made by a

person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact asserted at the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to declarant's own interest that a reasonable man
in his position would not have made his declaration unless he believed
it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors in interest and against third persons.
As found by the trial court, recognition of petitioner's status as a natural daughter

of Juan M. Alberto was made, not only by the latter, but by his relatives as well —
Fr. Cipriano Arcilla, Jose Alberto, Aurita Solidum and Saturnina Alberto, among
others. Private respondent only had to present any one of those relatives to negate
petitioner's testimony that she had been acknowledged by them as the eldest
daughter of the deceased. Her failure to do so baffles this Court. If indeed Ma.
Theresa Alberto were fabricating her testimony, the family of the deceased would
have been more than willing to destroy the claims of an intruder. Under the
circumstances, it is safe for us to assume that had any of the relatives mentioned by
petitioner been presented as witness for private respondent, their testimonies would
be detrimental to the latter's cause.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner has been in continuous possession
of the status of a natural child of the deceased in accordance with Article 283 of
the Civil Code which provides, inter alia:
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to

recognize the child as his natural child:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of

the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family.
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision of the probate court, stated as
follows:
We find the evidence of oppositor-appellee even weaker than that

proven in the aforequoted citation. As a matter of fact, oppositor's
Exhibit W-1, a letter written by oppositor to Jose Tablizo after the
death of the deceased, betrays a lack of association between the
deceased and oppositor such as normally characterizes the relationship
between father and child. It gives the impression that the deceased
studiously distanced himself from the oppositor and had not intention
whatsoever of recognizing oppositor as his child. The pertinent
portion of the letter reads:
I have always been proud to be JMA’s eldest daughter, and I feel even
prouder after I heard from people like you. You were the ones that
knew him most, shared his dreams as a young man, and witnessed his
struggle from, palmera’s slums to Forbes Park. You saw him rise from
cargador to lawyer and, finally, to governor; I only heard about them
through Mama. His life was a novel, and if I were to help write it, I
would be able to contribute but a few pages, for I knew him only as a
Big Man. It is YOU who had a part in the first adventures of that same
novel, and I envy you. 8
What a poignant novel this daughter could well author as she now seeks to
establish indubitable parental links with a father who sired her some forty-one
years ago. Why he desisted from marrying the mother of this girl at a time when no
impediment blocked the way is a matter one can merely conjecture at.
While he did contract marriage subsequently with another woman, it was only too
clear that he had no intentions of closing definitively that chapter in his life when
he begat his first-born. Of the different categories of illegitimate children under the
old Civil Code, the natural child occupies the highest position, she being the child
of parents who, at the time of her conception, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other and could, therefore, have contracted a valid
marriage. Often the fruit of first love, she is ensconced firmly in her parent's hearts.
No subsequent liaisons, though blessed with legitimate offspring, can completely
obliterate those early memories.
A shared past intimacy between the putative parents and the clear marks of
heredity stamped on the brow of their offspring are not to be denied. Thus, whether
openly or furtively, a father in the situation of Juan M. Alberto could not have
resisted manifesting signs of concern and care insofar as his firstborn is concerned.
If, at an early age, the child shows much talent and great promise as petitioner in
this case apparently did, it is understandable, and even to be expected, that the
father would proudly step forward to claim paternity — either through his direct
acts or those of his family, or both, as in instant case.
In the case at bench, evidence is not wanting from which it may logically be
concluded that the deceased Juan M. Alberto took no pains to conceal his paternity.
No less than his younger sister, his stepmother, his priest-cousin, several relatives
and close friends were categorically informed of the relationship and they accepted
the same as fact.
Understandably, considering the strait-laced mores of the times and the social and
political stature of Juan M. Alberto and his family, those who were privy to the
relationship observed discreetness. But he himself openly visited his daughter in
school, had meetings with her at the MOPC on which occasions he gave her money
and introduced her proudly to his gangmates.
Where the daughter admits to envy in a letter to her father’s friend because the
latter played a greater role in her father’s life, this is but the natural expression of a
wistful longing of a child to reach out to her biological father. Far be it for us to
interpret such sentiment as a betrayal of "a lack of association between the
deceased and oppositor such as normally characterizes the relationship between
father and child." In this instance, the lack of association cannot be helped for the
relationship was far from normal.
Much less do we take it as giving the impression that the deceased "studiously
distanced himself from the oppositor and had no intention whatsoever of
recognizing oppositor as his child." On the contrary, during his lifetime, Juan M.
Alberto acted in such a manner as to evince his intent to recognize Ma. Theresa
Alberto, herein oppositor, as his flesh and blood, first, by allowing her from birth
to use his family name; second, by giving her and her mother sums of money by
way of support and lastly, by openly introducing her to members of his family,
relatives and friends as his daughter. Supplementing such unmistakable acts of
recognition were those of his kin and gangmates manifesting open acceptance of
such relationship. Taken altogether, the claimed filiation would be hard to
disprove.
Since the oppositor seeks a judicial declaration that she be recognized as a natural
child to enable her to participate in the estate of the deceased, Article 285 of the
Civil Code prescribing the period when such action should be brought governs. It
provides:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the
following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority.
xxx xxx xxx
The oppositor's case falls clearly under the above exception.
Juan M. Alberto died during the minority of petitioner, that is, on September 18,
1967 — the day petitioner turned fourteen. As such, petitioner had four years from
the time she reached twenty-one on September 18, 1974, which was then the age of
majority, within which to bring the aforesaid action. Thus, petitioner had until
September 18, 1978 within which to file the action for recognition. Petitioner filed
her motion for leave to intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings with
the prayer that she be declared to have acquired the status of a natural child and as
such, entitled to share in the estate of the deceased, on September 15, 1978. Said
motion was, therefore, seasonably filed three days before the expiration of the
four-year period.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby GRANTED, the

decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and that of the probate court
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
VIRAY VS PEOPLE
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 to reverse and set aside the August 31, 2012
1 2
Decision and January 7, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33076, which
affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 16 (RTC), in
Criminal Case No. 66-07.
The factual backdrop of this case is as follows:
An Information for qualified theft was filed against petitioner Ryan Viray before the RTC, which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about 19 October 2006, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, then being employed as a helper of ZENAIDA
VEDUA y SOSA with intent to gain and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously steal, take and carry away several pieces of jewelry, One (1) Gameboy, One (1) CD
player, One (1) Nokia cellphone and a jacket with a total value of P297,800.00 belonging to the said Zenaida S.
Vedua, without the latter’s consent and to her damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount of P297,800.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
4
When arraigned, the accused pleaded “not guilty.” At the pre-trial, the defense proposed the stipulation, and
the prosecution admitted, that the accused was employed as a dog caretaker of private complainant
ZenaidaVedua (Vedua) and was never allowed to enter the house and he worked daily from 5:00 to 9:00 in
5
the morning.
During trial, the prosecution presented evidence to prove the following:
6
Private complainant Vedua maintains seventy-five (75) dogs at her compound in Caridad, Cavite City. To
assist her in feeding the dogs and cleaning their cages, private complainant employed the accused who would
7
report for work from 6:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On October 19, 2006, at around 6:30 in the morning, accused
arrived for work. Half an hour later or at 7 o’clock, private complainant left for Batangas. Before leaving, she
locked the doors of her house, and left the accused to attend to her dogs. Later, at around 7:00 in the evening,
private complainant arrived home, entering through the back door of her house. As private complainant was
about to remove her earrings, she noticed that her other earrings worth PhP 25,000 were missing. She then
8
searched for the missing earrings but could not find them.
Thereafter, private complainant also discovered that her jacket inside her closet and her other pieces of jewelry
(rositas) worth PhP 250,000 were also missing. A Gameboy (portable videogame console), a compact disc
player, a Nokia cellular phone and a Nike Air Cap were likewise missing. The total value of the missing items
supposedly amounted to PhP 297,800. Private complainant immediately checked her premises and discovered
9
that the main doors of her house were destroyed. A plastic bag was also found on top of her stereo, which
was located near the bedroom. The plastic bag contained a t-shirt and a pair of shorts later found to belong to
10
accused.
Witness Nimfa Sarad, the laundrywoman of Vedua’s neighbor, testified seeing Viray at Vedua’s house at 6:00
a.m. By 11:00 a.m., she went out on an errand and saw Viray with an unidentified male companion leaving
11
Vedua’s house with a big sack.
Another witness, Leon Young, who prepares official/business letters for Vedua, testified that he went to
Vedua’s house between 10:00 and 11:00 am of October 19, 2006 to retrieve a diskette and saw petitioner with
a male companion descending the stairs of Vedua’s house. He alleged that since he knew Viray as an employee
of private complainant, he simply asked where Vedua was. When he was told that Vedua was in Batangas, he
12
left and went back three days after, only to be told about the robbery.
Prosecution witness Beverly Calagos, Vedua’s stay-out laundrywoman, testified that on October 19, 2006, she
reported for work at 5:00 a.m. Her employer left for Batangas at 7:00 am leaving her and petitioner Viray to go
about their chores. She went home around 8:30 a.m. leaving petitioner alone in Vedua’s house. Meanwhile,
13
petitioner never reported for work after that day.
For his defense, Viray averred that he did not report for work on the alleged date of the incident as he was then
down with the flu. His mother even called up Vedua at 5:30 a.m. to inform his employer of his intended
absence. Around midnight of October 20, 2006, Vedua called Viray’s mother to report the loss of some
valuables in her house and alleged that Viray is responsible for it. Petitioner’s sister and aunt corroborated his
14
version as regards the fact that he did not go to work on October 19, 2006 and stayed home sick.
After the parties rested their respective cases, the trial court rendered a Decision dated December 5,
15
2009, holding that the offense charged should have been robbery and not qualified theft as there was an
16
actual breaking of the screen door and the main door to gain entry into the house. Similarly, Viray cannot be
properly charged with qualified theft since he was not a domestic servant but more of a laborer paid on a daily
17
basis for feeding the dogs of the complainant.
In this light, the trial court found that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to conclude that Viray was the
18
one responsible for the taking of valuables belonging to Vedua. Hence, the RTC found petitioner
Viray guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery and sentenced him, thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused RYAN
VIRAY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of robbery and hereby sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) years, TWO (2) months and ONE (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.19
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.
The appellate court found that the Information filed against Viray shows that the prosecution failed to allege
one of the essential elements of the crime of robbery, which is “the use of force upon things.” Thus, to convict
him of robbery, a crime not necessarily included in a case of qualified theft, would violate the constitutional
20
mandate that an accused must be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Nonetheless, the CA held that a conviction of the accused for qualified theft is warranted considering that
Viray enjoyed Vedua’s confidence, being the caretaker of the latter’s pets. Viray committed a grave abuse of
this confidence when, having access to the outside premises of private complainant’s house, he forced open the
21
doors of the same house and stole the latter’s personal belongings. In its assailed Decision, the appellate
court, thus, modified the ruling of the trial court holding that the accused is liable for the crime of qualified
theft.
As to the penalty imposed, considering that there was no independent estimate of the value of the stolen
22 23
properties, the CA prescribed the penalty under Article 309(6) in relation to Article 310 of the Revised
24
Penal Code (RPC). The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads, viz: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision of the
court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant be convicted for the crime
of QUALIFIED THEFT and is hereby sentenced to suffer indeterminate imprisonment of four (4) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum. The appellant is also ordered to return the pieces of jewelry and other personal
belongings taken from private complainant. Should restitution be no longer possible, the accused appellant must
pay the equivalent value of the unreturned items.
SO ORDERED.25
26
When the appellate court, in the adverted Resolution of January 7, 2013, denied his motion for
27
reconsideration, Viray interposed the present petition asserting that the CA committed a reversible error in
finding him guilty. Petitioner harps on the supposed inconsistencies of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses in advancing his position that the evidence presented against him fall short of the quantum of
28
evidence necessary to convict him of qualified theft.
29
In the meantime, in its Comment on the present petition, respondent People of the Philippines asserts that
the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are so insignificant and do not affect
the credibility and weight of their affirmation that petitioner was at the crime scene when the crime was
30
committed. In fact, these minor inconsistencies tend to strengthen the testimonies because they discount the
31
possibility that they were fabricated. What is more, so respondent contends, these positive testimonies
32
outweigh petitioner’s defense of denial and alibi.
In resolving the present petition, We must reiterate the hornbook rule that this court is not a trier of facts, and
the factual findings of the trial court, when sustained by the appellate court, are binding in the absence of any
33
indication that both courts misapprehended any fact that could change the disposition of the controversy.
In the present controversy, while the CA modified the decision of the trial court by convicting petitioner of
qualified theft rather than robbery, the facts as found by the court a quo were the same facts used by the CA in
holding that all the elements of qualified theft through grave abuse of confidence were present. It is not,
therefore, incumbent upon this Court to recalibrate the evidence presented by the parties during trial.
Be that as it may, We find it necessary to modify the conclusion derived by the appellate court from the given
facts regarding the crime for which petitioner must be held accountable.
Art. 308 in relation to Art. 310 of the RPC describes the felony of qualified theft: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.– Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without
the latter’s consent.
x x x
Art. 310. Qualified Theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than
those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave
abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts
taken from the premises of the plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or property is taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance. (Emphasis supplied.)
The crime charged against petitioner is theft qualified by grave abuse of confidence. In this mode of qualified
theft, this Court has stated that the following elements must be satisfied before the accused may be convicted
of the crime charged:
1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.34
As pointed out by both the RTC and the CA, the prosecution had proved the existence of the first four
elements enumerated above beyond reasonable doubt.
First, it was proved that the subjects of the offense were all personal or movable properties, consisting as they
were of jewelry, clothing, cellular phone, a media player and a gaming device. Second, these properties belong
to private complainant Vedua. Third, circumstantial evidence places petitioner in the scene of the crime during
the day of the incident, as numerous witnesses saw him in Vedua’s house and his clothes were found inside the
house. He was thereafter seen carrying a heavy-looking sack as he was leaving private complainant’s house.
All these circumstances portray a chain of events that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner
took the personal properties with intent to gain, especially considering that, fourth, Vedua had not consented to
the removal and/or taking of these properties.
With regard to the fifth and sixths elements, however, the RTC and the CA diverge in their respective
Decisions.
The RTC found that the taking committed by petitioner was not qualified by grave abuse of confidence, rather
it was qualified by the use of force upon things. The trial court held that there was no confidence reposed by
the private complainant on Viray that the latter could have abused. In fact, Vedua made sure that she locked
the door before leaving. Hence, Viray was compelled to use force to gain entry into Vedua’s house thereby
committing the crime of robbery, not theft.
The CA, on the other hand, opined that the breaking of the screen and the door could not be appreciated to
qualify petitioner’s crime to robbery as such use of force was not alleged in the Information. Rather, this
breaking of the door, the CA added, is an indication of petitioner’s abuse of the confidence given by private
complainant. The CA held that “[Viray] enjoyed the confidence of the private complainant, being the caretaker
of the latter’s pets. He was given access to the outside premises of private complainant’s house which he
gravely abused when he forced open the doors of the same house and stole the latter’s
35
belongings.” Committing grave abuse of confidence in the taking of the properties, petitioner was found by
the CA to be liable for qualified theft.
This Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the taking committed by petitioner cannot be qualified by the
breaking of the door, as it was not alleged in the Information. However, we disagree from its finding that the
same breaking of the door constitutes the qualifying element of grave abuse of confidence to sentence
petitioner Viray to suffer the penalty for qualified theft. Instead, We are one with the RTC that private
complainant did not repose on Viray “confidence” that the latter could have abused to commit qualified theft.
The very fact that petitioner “forced open” the main door and screen because he was denied access to private
complainant’s house negates the presence of such confidence in him by private complainant. Without ready
access to the interior of the house and the properties that were the subject of the taking, it cannot be said that
36
private complaint had a “firm trust” on petitioner or that she “relied on his discretion” and that the same
trust reposed on him facilitated Viray’s taking of the personal properties justifying his conviction of qualified
theft.
To warrant the conviction and, hence, imposition of the penalty for qualified theft, there must be an allegation
in the information and proof that there existed between the offended party and the accused such high degree of
37 38
confidence or that the stolen goods have been entrusted to the custody or vigilance of the accused. In other
39
words, where the accused had never been vested physical access to, or material possession of, the stolen
goods, it may not be said that he or she exploited such access or material possession thereby committing such
40
grave abuse of confidence in taking the property. Thus, in People v. Maglaya, this Court refused to impose
the penalty prescribed for qualified theft when the accused was not given material possession or access to the
property:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Although appellant had taken advantage of his position in committing the crime aforementioned, We do not
believe he had acted with grave abuse of confidence and can be convicted of qualified theft, because his
employer had never given him the possession of the machines involved in the present case or allowed him
to take hold of them, and it does not appear that the former had any special confidence in him. Indeed, the
delivery of the machines to the prospective customers was entrusted, not to appellant, but to another employee.
Inasmuch as the aggregate value of the machines stolen by appellant herein is P13,390.00, the crime committed
falls under Art. 308, in relation to the first subdivision of Art.309 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes
the penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods. No modifying circumstance having attended
the commission of the offense, said penalty should be meted out in its medium period, or from 7 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months of prisión mayor. The penalty imposed in the decision appealed from is below
this range. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The allegation in the information that the offender is a laborer of the offended party does not by itself, without
more, create the relation of confidence and intimacy required by law for the imposition of the penalty
41
prescribed for qualified theft. Hence, the conclusion reached by the appellate court that petitioner committed
qualified theft because he “enjoyed the confidence of the private complainant, being the caretaker of the
latter’s pets” is without legal basis. The offended party’s very own admission that the accused was never
42
allowed to enter the house where the stolen properties were kept refutes the existence of the high degree of
43
confidence that the offender could have allegedly abused by “forc[ing] open the doors of the same house.”
Without the circumstance of a grave abuse of confidence and considering that the use of force in breaking the
door was not alleged in the Information, petitioner can only be held accountable for the crime of simple
theft under Art. 308 in relation to Art. 309 of the RPC.
As for the penalty, We note with approval the observation made by the appellate court that the amount of the
property taken was not established by an independent and reliable estimate. Thus, the Court may fix the value
of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case or impose the minimum penalty under
44
Art. 309 of the RPC. In this case, We agree with the observation made by the appellate court in accordance
with the rule that “if there is no available evidence to prove the value of the stolen property or that the
prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant should be the
45
minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the value of P5.00.” Accordingly, We impose the
prescribed penalty under Art. 309(6) of the RPC, which is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods.
The circumstance of the breaking of the door, even if proven during trial, cannot be considered as a generic
46
aggravating circumstance as it was not alleged in the Information. Thus, the Court finds that the penalty
prescribed should be imposed in its medium period, that is to say, from two (2) months and one (1) day to
three (3) months of arresto mayor.
Lastly, We delete the order for the reparation of the stolen property. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code is clear that
“one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him, as he has duly
proved.” Since, as aforesaid, the testimony of the private complainant is not sufficient to establish the value of
the property taken, nor may the courts take judicial notice of such testimony, We cannot award the reparation
47
of the stolen goods. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the CA Decision of August 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33076

is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Ryan Viray is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of SIMPLE THEFTand is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day
to three (3) months of arresto mayor. Further, for want of convincing proof as to the value of the property
stolen, the order for reparation is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
GARCIA VS DRILON
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million
Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million – adhering to the
teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as
their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her2 failed
to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women.
The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that,
for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms
of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed
by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's
groups, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It
took effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence
against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child.5 The law
provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the
commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities
of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social
workers, health care providers, and other local government officials in responding
to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as
being violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue
delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself
and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
(petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse;
emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on
the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support.7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the
former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann
J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private
respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J.
Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life
revolved around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-
Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from
his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately
isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even when she was
already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and
prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his
attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he
would have any man eyeing her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager
of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons.
Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in
2004. He even boasted to the household help about his sexual relations with said
bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just using the
woman because of their accounts with the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent

physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed
private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises
and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the
lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their
daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and
whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped
her many times. When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann
begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her
up. Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-
old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of his
cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink
of despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting
her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled
the house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized
for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor
apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been
undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she
intends to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for
jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and told private
respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told private respondent's
mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private respondent should
just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and
has not sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that
he would take her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner
had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would
not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep
wells. He is the President of three corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros
Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he and private
respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner
over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of
₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation.
Household expenses amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for
by private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by
the same corporation together with the bills for utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros
Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in
hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations.16 After private respondent
confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC
Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted,
thereby depriving her of access to full information about said businesses. Until the
filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an
accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of
pesos.17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against

the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a
TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling
or family home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining
Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from
the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable notwithstanding that the
house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No.
9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private
respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from
the Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or

anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove
things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the
family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on
Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will
attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds
out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her
household help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not
enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily
residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with

the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact
directly or indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts,
cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be
subject of a modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a

Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and
Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the
Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender any
unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including
rental of a house for them, and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash

he received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March
2006, which himself and as President of the corporations and his
Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006.
Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by
the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the
month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente

lite, and considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat
that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is
ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE
MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued
an amended TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the
following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of
the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros
Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in
Parañaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever
they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in

two sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of

One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental
expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the
matter of support could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the
TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and
(2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1)
removing one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to its
rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the
amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at
₱100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the
TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only
to the following modifications prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal
belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for
Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order
by his counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in

the conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police
Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight
(8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel,
and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners have left, so that
the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove things from the
conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment
and other things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for

rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to
the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children

upon presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to

faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her
and their children, private respondent filed another application24 for the issuance of
a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc.,
of which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of
recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the
children. A writ of replevin was served upon private respondent by a group of six
or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie
Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men
allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in
his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed
their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened her.26 The incident was reported
to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father
for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the
housemaids working at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and
illegal detention against private respondent. This came about after private
respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her children's
belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag
in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against
Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which
reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or

through another, acts of violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise

communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or
indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives,

employees or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her
children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook
Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita
Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household
helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the
subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from
the schools of the three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not
contact the schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner
including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise
he will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will be
rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and
a Walther PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and

Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006;
and support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of

Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No.
FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the
respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the
petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise

dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus
Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the
Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest in, especially the
conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision,
Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or those in
which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and
the respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2,"
including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona
shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and
are ordered not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of
these above-cited properties to any person, entity or corporation without the
personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her
signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of
petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order to effect the
encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal
partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted
TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within
which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified.
Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of
private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its
Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion.
Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued
renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted
hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the
Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and
extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty
(30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such
modifications as may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer

submitted the required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the
TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility."33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with
prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal
protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case
for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining
Order36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other
orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed 36 the
petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings
before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve
the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE

THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED
AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE
LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO

CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND
VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT

FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW

DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE
FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A.

No. 9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS
AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the

constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal
by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No.
01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in
the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC
of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and
jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a

statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same
level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family
Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of domestic violence against women and children.42 In accordance
with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the
Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities
identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A.
9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the
latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and
their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the
offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where
the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
(Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains
possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all
kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have
jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the
valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental
law."46The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare
the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only
in this Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that,
"plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have
jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or

the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or

executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A.

9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the
petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had
jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and
Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file
an opposition to the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the
petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a

counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the
opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A
counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending
party may have against an opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is
any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending
party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his
opponent's claim.52As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the
unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a
counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited
from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo
because the right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on
the very statute the validity of which is being attacked53 by petitioner who has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for
the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not
have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question
relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be
supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among
others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for
further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and
will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct

testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be

done in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the
effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing
when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a
temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or
renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment
is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection
order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private
respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the
constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the
adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R.
CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if
he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive relief.
However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of
a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in
this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders
pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its
normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is
prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection
shall not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only
for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of
itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the
Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with
respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter
of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the
community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal
acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized
and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its
extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks
its aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court
hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders
are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of
violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of
the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation
to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching
implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter
of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of private respondent's
plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize
spousal and child abuse, which could very well be committed by either the
husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father
of the remedies under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which

became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito
(better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a
"synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-
Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships
Act"63 – providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation"
but at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of
violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied
protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of the
deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some
women's groups have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if
we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as well as other
members of the household, including children or the husband, they fear that this
would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the main victims
or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in
a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator
respond to this kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call
themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include
men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women.
I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family, prescribing penalties
therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This includes the men,
children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the family.65
xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to
limit this to women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group.
The understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather
than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the

interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not
get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights
especially in the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had
the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years,
if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the
men, assuming they can at all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it
would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this
position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women in their
lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an
unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how empowered the women
are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic environment
where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior
to the Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with
this bill because the family members have been included in this proposed measure
since the other members of the family other than women are also possible victims
of violence. While women are most likely the intended victims, one reason
incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some
relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children are almost
always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough
protection extended to other family members particularly children who are
excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses
the special needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders
for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection
to men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against
women. However, we should also recognize that there are established procedures
and standards in our courts which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot
just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect
the family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power
relations between men and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation
to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate
family members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family
members as a critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with
various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator
Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus
specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed
amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen.
Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept
the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to
accept this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to
the amendment, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the
distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree.
Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong
mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree
that we remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment –
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a
matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-
year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their
fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about these
things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular

measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of
children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the
men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,
the amendment, as amended, is approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and
wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and
abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper challenge on said
grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it
is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as
erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal
by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that
determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only
step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was
sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-
repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another
in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very
idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All
that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that
the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member
of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is
based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did
not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are
more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias
and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the
accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality."70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for

Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is
deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women
and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and
traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take
on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions and
supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men
gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain
that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to
retain power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue,
passed its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence
Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a
manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women,
which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and
to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against
women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into
subordinate positions, compared with men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of
gender-based violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his
remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing
Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women.
The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on members of the
family under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the
institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally
inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women
whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they
were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his
wife if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other
religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated
structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the
eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and
wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and
through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of husbands
to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which
allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their
thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise
wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the
family was given more importance than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the
English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first
appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her
hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her
like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is
entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized.
The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They
considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they
demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering holes.
Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the
liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own
property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to
the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public
concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women

are the victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women
reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during
the past year. The [American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked
underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages women from
reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do
not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals
when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family
violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the
above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be
physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an
average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by
their male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual assault... In families
where wife beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the
most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and
economic isolation of women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because
they perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary
refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they have no other
source of income... Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal
Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims
in the United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide
victims are killed by their male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women
Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful.
The United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly
adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly
also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.
World conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in
Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a
Commission on the Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these
women's movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution
mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Our Senate has
ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its
two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No.
9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and
for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on
violence against women and children show that –
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002

representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of
2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%.
xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult circumstances served by
the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002,
there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases.
xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the
first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of
abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by
the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics

on violence against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of
2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW
categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 -

2011*
Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center
(WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and
violence against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low
and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to report the situation. In
the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever experienced domestic violence
did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of
men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women constituted 89% of
all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence.75Statistics
in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to
cause injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who
experience violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of
violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual
assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse are
in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or emotional abuse.76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated
against men in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of

animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure
emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways,
streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as violative of the
guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and
drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not utilized,
but similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there
may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their
number must be negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional,
compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace to the health of the
community."77 The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual
inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of
persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the
law is not thereby rendered invalid.78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing,
crimes against women are often treated differently and less seriously than other
crimes. This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now
Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in
defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority
under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the
widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against
victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" –
first at the hands of the offender and then of the legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill
No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a
private matter and advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the
complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the
complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or
reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence."80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our
women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J.

Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent
language in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A.
9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist"
and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called her a
"prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of
absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's
prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by
biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting
discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate
against men.82Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory
and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves
scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself
to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices
and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority
or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing
the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will
require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the
prosecution and the judges."85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262,
which is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in
its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the
dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly
women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed
against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed
under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines
ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW
was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This Convention
mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with men before the
law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of
equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on
the Rights of the Child and its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said
Conventions and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions
when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety
and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and
abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is
his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering,
or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the
following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a

woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or

her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive
remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body,
forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or
forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal
home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any

sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause

mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation,
harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to
witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to
which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness
abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to
custody and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from

engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on
valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the

right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property
owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely

controlling the conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are
attributable to research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery.
The acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination
of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that the
definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action
and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will
confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood
and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They
are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ
in its application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92that phrases like "depriving or
threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling
the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing
mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of
spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility,
rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds
of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because
it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions. 93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband
or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed
"against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had
a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian
relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy
under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses
Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be
proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and
their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting
her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the

due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs,
of all protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he:
"On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to
respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job,
future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of
what happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against

women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other
necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further
harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and
ability to regain control of their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or
offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a
perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of
violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member
safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts
that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court
to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial
support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and
verified by the petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil,
for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if
further violence is to be prevented,"99 the court is authorized to issue ex parte a
TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of
the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is
necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of
VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex
parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition,
but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the

right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued
without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could
be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property,102 in the
same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences
in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were
required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace
that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests,103among which is protection of
women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall
likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to
file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order
that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the
respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30)
days from service on the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate
issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an
opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the
preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the
notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary
or permanent protection order should not be issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection
order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an
opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of
family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all
in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of
an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in
court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days
earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for
the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the
trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within
which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he
chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in
futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only
for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued
renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do
so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of
law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the
VAWC case from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the
residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as
her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the
imagination suggest that this is so. It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended
party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose
of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights are
violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the
court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the
residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him
from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's

residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting
the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property
rights are violated. How then can the private respondent just claim any property
and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case

to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of

encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed
policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or
any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained
by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family
Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a

proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in
equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the
issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process
which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is
somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of
protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate
equally with the person against whom the protection order has been sought.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of

judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power
which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other
lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of
power to barangay officials to issue protection orders.111 The pertinent provision
reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. –
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the
Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under
Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications
1âwphi1
for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after
ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is
unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon
by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay
Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay
Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of
the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the
issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay
official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding

before the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong
Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely
orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her
child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such
function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance
of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances,"
and to "maintain public order in the barangay."114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into
the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine
what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private
rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary

inquiry or proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an
offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the
Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent
danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur
that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function.
The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay
officials and other law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to
victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain
objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated,
assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent
with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal

breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in
the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond
reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and
convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law
by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada
v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of
the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge
of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's
movement against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles
was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will
not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality but will be its
fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be,
sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

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CAPILI V PEOPLE

The factual antecedents are as follows: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.

THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD

We rule in the negative.

An opportunity to work as nurse in N.Y. USA. Alfredo opposed. Nonetheless,

In October 2005, Rosa finally learned of Alfredo’s extra-marital relationships.

Specifically to dispose of that issue, the Ombudsman scheduled a clarificatory

Ombudsman issued a Joint Order4 impleading Sia and de Leon as party-

Ombudsman issued herein assailed Resolution, disposing of the procedural

The Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in the determination of

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise

The Ombudsman merely followed the provisions of its Rules of Procedure.

Surely the procedural sequence of referral of the complaint to respondent for

The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of

WHEREFORE the petition is DISMISSED.

The prosecution alleged that on different occasions, appellant caused to be

The prosecution presented the following witnesses:

Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs Department of Metrobank,

Eliodoro M. Constantino, NBI Supervisor and a handwriting expert, testified that

Maria Dolores Miranda, a Loans Clerk at Metrobank Commercio Branch, testified

For his defense, appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee testified that he is a holder of a

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

1. In Criminal Case No. 98-163806, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of

2. In Criminal Case No. 98-163807, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of

3. In Criminal Case No. 98-163808, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of

4. In Criminal Case No. 98-163809, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of

5. In Criminal Case No. 98-163810, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of

Accused shall serve the said penalties imposed successively.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On December 29, 2006,15 petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA

The Parties’ Arguments

We find the Petition wanting in merit.

Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence.

The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession

Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement

Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,20 we declared that the right

Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry

Petitioner’s written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an

Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until

Forgery duly established.

"Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by the signing of another’s

Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has the prerogative to

Petitioner’s denial is unavailing.

Elements of falsification of commercial documents established.

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171

Falsification as a necessary means to commit estafa.

When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of

In Domingo v. People,36 we held:

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of

these, petitioner succeeded in withdrawing money from the bank. Once in

The Proper Imposable Penalty

ONG VS PEOPLE 659 SCRA 588 FENCING

Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.

The Petition has no merit.

In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

C. To Andres Lojero, Sr.

IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE AND

IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF

IN HOLDING THAT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY WAS PRESENT TO