Chinese Social Credit Initiatives and Af PDF

Chinese Social Credit initiatives and African Surveillance States
Bulelani Jili1
Jesus College, Cambridge University
FUTUREID3: Identification in the Era of Automated Decision Making
Abstract
The paper reviews the recent development of the Chinese social credit system. It challenges
some of the easy, and now common, suppositions about the development of an Orwellian scoring
nightmare. It chiefly brings attention to the denial of privacy that has been prompted by public
and private surveillance mechanisms and the automation of censorship. The project highlights
and explores the relationship between China and African countries, like Ethiopia, that have
adopted its model of economic development and surveillance. The paper questions the centrality
of delegated, commercial systems of automated surveillance in China by large firms, moreover,
explores how that might unfold in the context of Ethiopia’s hybridized surveillance order. The
ICT systems resourced by Chinese firms and loans have become instruments for development in
places like Ethiopia, but also contested sites for competing political visions, which bear little
resemblance to the matrix of private and public interests in China. This outcome suggests that the
fundamental architecture of the social credit system is not exportable.
Keywords: China-Ethiopia relations, Social Credit Systems, Scoring, Development,

Surveillance, ICTs, WeChat, Alibaba
1
Bulelani Jili is an incoming Ph.D. student at Harvard University (U.S.). In 2018, he was a
Derek Cooper Scholar at Cambridge University (UK). From 2016 to 2017, he was a Yenching
Scholar at Peking University (CN). Under Prof. He Yafei, former Vice-Minister of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, and Prof. Jiang Guo Hua, he studied Chinese geopolitical and economic
strategies. Currently, he is working at WISER (Wits institute for Social and Economic Research
in South Africa) as a research associate. Bulelani holds a MPhil in African Politics from
Cambridge University, M.A. in Economics from Peking University, and a B.A., honors, in
Politics, Philosophy, and Economics from Wesleyan University (CT).
Conference Paper 1
Introduction
This paper investigates the advances of the Chinese social credit system. Elucidating on the
nature of the social credit system and China’s involvement in Ethiopia, it essays to comprehend
China’s growing surveillance apparatus and its ability to be exported. The article challenges
illusions to a scoring Orwellian nightmare; moreover, accents the real threats around privacy.
Namely, while the social credit is a part of China’s broader plan to create a surveillance state, it
is one part. China’s push for the ubiquitous installation of CCTV video cameras and biometric
data collection are clearly more serious threats to privacy — and remain overlooked in
mainstream discussions.
The case of Ethiopia, as a nation seeking development, is underscored for its novel
approaches to Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems and its collaboration
with the Chinese state. Ethiopia is notorious for its low levels of internet penetration. Yet, with
the financial assistance of China, it has charted new avenues of ICT development and changed
the country’s modes of governance. That is to say, it has championed the use of ICT platforms as
instruments of development. These apparatuses have empowered development, but also
emboldened the ambitions to create a surveillance state. The paper examines the centrality of
delegated, commercial systems of automated surveillance in China by large firms, like Alibaba,
and how that might function in the context of Ethiopia’s hybridized surveillance order. The work
lucidly challenges the assumed neutrality of technology and it illustrates how technical devices
can be couriers of values and ambitions, which empower political visions.
Simply put, social credit is the Chinese Party State’s shorthand for its broad efforts to
advance reform in the market economy and security in the public arena. In 2014, China’s State
Council published an outline for establishing a social credit system by 2020. The concept of
2
social credit, shehui xinyong, (社会信用体系) is not clearly defined in any official national
documents. But its primary motivations are predicated on legal and economic development.2
The system’s intended goals are to (1) improve fundamental laws, regulations, and standards for
credit, (2) engender sharing credit information platforms, (3) build credit service markets, and (4)
make joint incentives and punishment mechanisms as a means to ameliorate problems with
institutional discipline. Principally, the state frames the social credit system as a set of
apparatuses providing rewards and punishments grounded on lawfulness and morally inclined
actions in the realm of economic, social, and political life.
At the same time, Western observers maintain that scoring in an Orwellian nightmare,
where a panopticon structure built on big data, conspires to realize the totalitarian impulses of the
Chinese party state. This objective may result, for the first time, in the capacity to monitor the
actions of citizens, which will be represented by a quantifiable score predicated on the
discretions of the state. Specifically, the data points will be made-up of purchases and publicly
expressed political opinions. In turn, this score will determine access to loans, travel options,
and critical public resources like education and health facilities3. The question is whether
trepidations are warranted? Yes, they are. However, the comparisons to an episode of Black
Mirror are misleading. Scoring is not the major conundrum. As I will show later, scoring done by
Sesame does not result in punishment. The critical matter is the social credit system’s capacities,
which augment the state’s surveillance ambitions.
2
“Social Credit Articles.” China Law Translate ,16 October 2018,
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/social-credit-articles/ (accessed 1 February 2019)
3
Josh Dehaas. “China’s social credit system uses technology to punish citizens.” The Loop, 19
December 2018, https://www.theloop.ca/ctvnews/chinas-social-credit-system-uses-technology-
to-punish-citizens/ (accessed 29 December 2018)
Conference Paper 3
I will attempt to corroborate this argument by examining media literature, identification
systems, International Telecommunication Union databases and Chinese official documents
concerning social credit systems. In so doing, I hope to discern the development of the social
credit system in China. I investigate how Chinese firms’ engagement in Ethiopia broadens our
understanding of what ICT systems can be used for, and how China’s involvement enables
tyrannical surveillance. In light of what is said above, I am aware that this article privileges the
actions and perspectives of policy makers, and those who occupy positions of authority, rather
than the engagements of ordinary folk. Yet, I maintain that such an analytical agenda is worth
pursuing as it illustrates some of the paramount political and economic decisions, which shape
the African continent.
These early days in social credit initiatives and Chinese built ICT systems, in Africa,
make any rigorous diagnosis tricky. Far more evidence, and substantial data, is necessary to
understand the long-term implications for these new systems and their related technologies.
Suffice it to say that, this paper will attempt to take stock of our current circumstances and
principally focus on the risks to privacy involved in the implementation of surveillance
technology and the social credit system.
While the scope and size of this project does not permit an exhaustive exploration into
Africa-China relations, it does offer a keen look into ICT systems. Focusing on China-Ethiopia
relations, it explores how Chinese investments have shaped the media space, local economies
and the unfolding of domestic politics. Secondly, the increasing focus on productive sectors in
fast growing economies in Africa suggests that there are opportunities for Chinese investors,
which can, and do, support the creation of jobs, markets, technology transfer, and needed
economic growth. Current strands of research from Bräutigam, Iginio, Borojo, and Alden are
4
exploring these potentialities, against the popular strain of discourse, and showing some of the
positive cooperative endeavors between Chinese actors and local firms in Tanzania, Ethiopia,
Rwanda, and Nigeria. Nevertheless, these benefits do not blossom without controversies and
constraints. Thus, assessing how and who benefits from China’s increased presence in the
African theater becomes paramount. It enables us to underscore the peculiarities that shape
relations.
To set the stage for my arguments about China’s initiatives, I first offer an analysis of the
social credit system, which illustrates its development over-time in China. It then moves on to an
analysis of the development of ICT systems in Ethiopia. The subsequent section investigates the
risks associated with the development of Chinese social credit systems and the exportation of
ICT technology in Africa, and particularly Ethiopia. This paper concludes with highlighting the
risks to privacy in China and Ethiopia because of weaker institutional capacities to safeguard
rights.
Social Credit
China’s fast-growing economy is making immense strides to transforming its planned
architecture into a market-based arrangement. However, the reorganization of banks has lagged
behind other reform movements. Chinese banks recently reformed risk management and internal
control mechanisms.4 Yet, even with these advances, such a strategy remains limited if there are
no structural mechanisms for sharing credit information. Zhang and Smyth, in “An Emerging
Credit-Reporting System in China”, illustrates this point. They maintain that if a borrower does
not repay a loan, and other banks are not aware of this, then the defaulting individual will
4
, Guibin Zhang and Russell Smyth, "An emerging credit-reporting system in China." Chinese
Economy 42.5 (2009): 41.
Conference Paper 5
successfully secure another loan.5 By learning and sharing information about customer’s
borrowing history, banks are able to lower the probability of defaulting clients. Thus, a credit
reporting system acts as a constraint on borrower’s behavior, reduces the likelihood of default,
and more broadly, meliorates the bank’s concerns with information asymmetry.
The literature on information asymmetry focuses on two key concepts: adverse selection
and moral hazard. Adverse selection occurs when lenders cannot distinguish between borrowers.
More specifically, a client’s ability to payback their loans. And so, the concern that clients can
be trusted to payback their loan is paramount. In other words, individuals either have good or bad
creditworthiness, and banks must be able to discern the likelihood that individuals will repay
their debts. In this context, a bank will offer terms, which are contingent on the average risk of
default.6 Needless to say, this is not fair because riskier borrowers are more likely to default,
thereby, raising the cost for lenders who are less likely to default. To solve this credit asymmetry
problem, lenders have developed credit-reporting systems. These institutions collect credit data
as means to learn about the borrower’s payment history and creditworthiness. By providing
credit information on individuals and businesses, credit-reporting bodies help those who issue
credit make the best decisions possible on their customers.
Relatedly, internet finance has developed rapidly, which helps manage financial risk. The
advent of big data and information technology helps banks accrue the necessary information to
circumvent the problems of information asymmetry. Huang, Lei, and Shen, echo these
sentiments: ‘the construction of credit reporting systems helps to alleviate adverse selection and
moral hazard caused by information asymmetry effectively controlling credit risk, which is the
5
Ibid., 41.
6
Guibin Zhang and Russell Smyth, "An emerging credit-reporting system in China." Chinese
Economy 42.5 (2009): 42.
6
most common form of financial risk.’7 Reports from the World Bank, and beyond, have further
demonstrated that a credit reporting system remarkably decreases default rates. And so, the
systems help enhance trust, and the confidence of investors in financial markets. Put differently,
in the language of game theory, the implementation of the credit rating system transforms the
interactions between lenders and borrows from a one-stage game into a multistage where the
information asymmetry is no longer a permanent impediment.8
The first high profile reference to a social credit system was by Secretary General Jiang
Zemin (江泽民) at the 16th Party Congress in 2002. The call to establish a social credit system
was a means to further the development of China’s nascent market economy.9 Trustworthiness,
yongxin, (永信) was identified as a critical means in supporting market transaction, and
deepening economic reform, which will foster economic growth. Specifically, the system was a
potential solution to the assumed absence of trustworthy behavior in the areas of intellectual
property, food control, and governance. I will elaborate on this last point later. But immediately,
though, two elements of the social credit system were distinct from its inception. Firstly, credit
referred to financial creditworthiness, which is similar to Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) scores in
the United States. On the other hand, it also suggested a broader conception of trust in
governance and society.
The People’s Bank of China, and related bodies, took initial steps to establish regulatory
measures for financial credit reporting. Notedly, building on the “Bank Credit Registry and
7
Huang, Zhuo, Yang Lei, and Shihan Shen. “China’s personal credit reporting system in the
internet finance era: challenges and opportunities.” China Economic Journal 9.3 (2016): 289.
8
Ibid.,291.
9
“Report at the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.” Chinese Communist
Party, 2002 http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/49007.htm (accessed 20 January 2019)
Conference Paper 7
Consulting System,” that was in place since 1997. The People’s bank in 2006 founded the
“Credit Reference Centre”, which was the only national credit-scoring bureau.10 Banks and other
commercial bodies were obligated to report their client’s creditworthiness. A Customer’s
creditworthiness is determined by their financial standing and their non-financial records. The
non-financial records are based on engagements with courts, government departments, and
telecommunication companies.11 China therefore built a government-dominated personal credit
reporting system, which garnered its information from commercial banks, but also supplemented
its data with publicly harvested information.
The first concrete policy and organizational measures to establish the social credit system
began in 2007. The State Council met in April to establish an interministerial joint conference
(IJC) for the formation of the social credit system. With most members in the meeting
representing economic interests. For example, the State Council General Office, People’s Bank
of China, Banking Regulatory Commission, Ministry of Commerce, and National Development
and Reform Commission.12 This meeting divulged the state’s desire to reform the market
architecture of the country. In other words, one of social credit’s goals was to nurture the
development of a private financial credit investigation and credit service industry, which would
provide credit products and applications. An accompanying State Council policy document
substantiates these claims. Firstly, it demanded the creation of an enhanced credit information
system, with a particular reference to tax compliance, product quality, and contract
10
internet finance era: challenges and opportunities.” China Economic Journal 9.3 (2016): 288.
11
Rogier Creemers, “China’s Social Credit System: An Evolving Practice of Control.” SSRN
(2018): 9.
12
“Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference System for the Construction of the State Council's Social
Credit System.” State Council Bulletin, 2007,
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2007/content_632090.htm (accessed 1 February 2019)
8
implementation.13 Secondly, it pointed to the creation of a social credit system for the
commercial sector.14 Thirdly, the document mentions the development of a credit service market,
with government departments playing a leading role in ensuring transparency in collected data.15
Broadly, the social credit system enables the exchange and sharing of data, in order, to create a
network that governs information flows across the nation. The conference was framed around
developing the system’s configuration, researching and drafting policy measures, and overseeing
its policy implementation.
While the founding efforts to engineer a social credit system chiefly focused on market
economic interests, the nexus between credit and social management began in the local
government arena. In Yichang (宜昌), a prefectural-level city of Hubei (湖北) province, this
undertaking resulted in the creation of a designation known as ‘credit community.’ This title was
bestowed on localities with good credit environments. The best reported example; however, is in
the county of Suining (睢宁), in Jiangsu (江苏) province. In 2010, Suining introduced a mass
credit system, dazhong xinyong, (睢宁县大众信用信息评估细则) which scored individual
conduct.16 County members were given 1000 credit points to start with. Points were added or
subtracted on the basis of individual behavior. A violation of legal, administrative or moral
norms occasioned a deduction in points. For instance, drunk driving cost 50 points, false
13
“State Council General Office Some Opinions concerning the Construction of a Social
Credit System.” China Copyright and Media, 2007
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2007/03/23/state-council-general-office-some-
opinions-concerning-the-construction-of-a-social-credit-system/ (accessed 24 January 2019)
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
(2018): 10.
Conference Paper 9
accusations and slander cost 100 points, and a failure to repay a loan cost 30 to 50 points.17
Nonetheless, points could be recovered after two to five years. On the basis of their scores,
citizens were classified from letters A to D.18 A-class citizens were awarded privileges like job
opportunities. While D-class citizens were deprived of resources and government sponsored
opportunities. The Suining government created a public record of the points system, and notedly
blacklisted the culprits who violated the rules.
The Suining project was eventually abandoned. Criticism from state media, namely the
Global Times, which focuses on international and domestic politics from the Chinese
government’s viewpoint, argued that the task of the national credit system is not to control
people in this fashion.19 Liu Zhun, a journalist at Global Times, highlighted that the experiment
was met with a public backlash, and had to be immediately revised. In their words, ‘this policy
failure should serve as a lesson for the upcoming national credit system. The range of the system
must be meticulously restricted, and it should only stay effective in people’s economic life and
part of their social life where laws and principles are clearly defined and widely recognized.’20
They later argue, ‘these doubts and worries can serve as warnings to the Chinese authorities
when they specify the system.’21 The Suining experiment is an example of the failure of local
leadership, and principally the disjunction between local and national bureaucratic ambitions.
The move to establish the social credit system is a means to improve the control of governing
mechanisms, including the quality of data gathering and sharing between governmental bodies
17
Chen Zhao, “Suining County Public Credit Information Evaluation Rules,” 20 May 2011,
https://wenku.baidu.com/view/25db9520192e45361066f5fa.html (accessed 12 January 2019)
18
Ibid.
19
Liu Zhun, “China’s social credit system won’t be Orwellian” Global Times, 1 November 2016,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1015248.shtml (accessed 3 January 2019)
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
10
across levels and regions. Accordingly, making the elimination of corruption and the
implementation of policy more possible and efficacious. Regardless, even with its termination,
the Suining model contained the nascent forms of organization, which inform later social credit
initiatives. Specifically, notions of identification and blacklisting, which become means for
social management.
Chinese leadership instigated a strategy towards fighting declension. The 6th Plenum of
the 17th Party Congress, in 2011, focused on cultural and ideological concerns. The Plenum
called for the invention of a social credit system, which promotes trust in society as a catalyst to
foster good governance.22 This policy position, lucidly illustrates how trust is not only an
ameliorant in the marketplace, but a mechanism to transform the instruments of governance and
national character. Subsequently, the membership scheme in the Interministerial Joint
Conference changed in order to reflect this shift. It expanded to include: Central Political and
Legal Affairs Committee (which oversees domestic security and safety); the Central Propaganda
Department, the Central Discipline Inspection Committee (the internal anti-corruption unit), and
the Central Leading Group for the Construction of a Spiritual Civilization.23 With all these
political organs together, the IJC began drafting a broader social credit system, which
materialized in the form of the 2014 social credit plan.
22
“Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Decision Concerning Deepening
Cultural Structural Reform.” China Copyright and Media, 2014,
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2011/10/18/central-committee-of-the-chinese-
communist-party-decision-concerning-deepening-cultural-structural-reform/ (accessed 12
January 2019)
23
“Institutional membership list of the Interministerial Joint Conference for the Construction of
the Social Credit System (2012).” Peking University Legal Information Network, 2012,
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?db=chl&gid=179820 (accessed 10 February 2019)
Conference Paper 11
Elaborating on the above arguments, the social credit system is a response to the
supposed moral dilemma in Chinese politics. The ubiquitous use of social media reveals the
public outcry and anger towards systemic corruption.24 The incessant scandals, particularly in the
local administrative level, intimated a weakening central government. For instance, Chen Xu (陈
旭), Prosecutor General of Shanghai, was sentenced to life in prison for accepting bribes worth
more than 74.2 million yuan (US$10.7 million) personally or through family members between
2000 and 2015.25 In addition, food security scandals such as the discovery of melamine in infant
milk formula, diluted trust in leadership.26 After taking office on the 15 November 2012, in his
first speech to the Politburo, Xi Jinping (习近平)warned that failing to act against corruption
would be the doom of the Chinese state and the party.27 The social credit system promotes the
creation of public constraints and punishment. Specifically, creating records of illegal and wrong
behavior and excluding those individuals and suppliers for a period of time. The system chiefly
aims to better check behavior, revitalize the party’s public image, and drives parts of Xi
Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign.
24
Keith Bradsher, “China’s Anticorruption Commission Investigates Senior Official” New York
Times, 5 December 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/world/asia/early-target-of-
chinas-anti-corruption-commission-identified.html?mtrref=en.wikipedia.org (accessed 30
December 2018)
25
“Shanghai’s jailed top prosecutor ‘implicates 100 other officials in corruption case’” South
China Morning Post, 12 November 2018,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2172762/shanghais-jailed-top-prosecutor-
implicates-100-other-officials (accessed 18 January 2019)
26
“China passes food safety law after melamine scandal” CTV News, 1 March 2009,
https://www.ctvnews.ca/china-passes-food-safety-law-after-melamine-scandal-1.374919
(accessed 21 December 2018)
27
Keith Bradsher, “China’s Anticorruption Commission Investigates Senior Official” New York
Times, 5 December 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/world/asia/early-target-of-
chinas-anti-corruption-commission-identified.html?mtrref=en.wikipedia.org (accessed 30
December 2018)
12
The 2014 “Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System” is the
official document on current social credit initiatives. Building on local ventures across the
country, the plan underscores the economic motivations for a credit system and the far-reaching
aims to enhance trust and governance through such an invention. Namely, it outlined a 2020 plan
to build an incentive and punishment apparatus, legal and regulatory constraints on the credit
system, credit oversight bodies, and further reform within the credit economy.28 These efforts
should enhance the efficiency of bureaucratic processes and trust in financial markets, healthcare
providers and the food industry. Relatedly — echoing Xi’s ambitions — the social credit system
should help promote lawful governance; furthermore, amplify trust in local and national
leadership.
To achieve these reforms in the market and society, the planning outline highlighted four
basic tactics. Firstly, the social credit system should aggregate and integrate information within
and across geographic regions and professional fields in China.29 Secondly, mechanisms like
blacklisting are to be built in order to incentivize trustworthy behavior and to punish dishonest
conduct.30 Thirdly, greater use of credit evaluation platforms must be encouraged in the realms
of employment and financial transactions.31 Lastly, all the strategies named above must work
towards fostering greater trust in the country.32 These basic strategies reveal that this system is
28
“Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System 2014-2020” China Copyright
and Media, 2014, https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-
for-the-construction-of-a-social-credit-system-2014-2020/ (accessed 20 January 2019)
29
“Establishment of a Social Credit System.” China Law Translate, 2015,
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/socialcreditsystem/ (accessed 3 February 2019)
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
Conference Paper 13
more than just a policy position, and more like an ideology of data, and how it will be
instrumentalized to govern.
The realization that credit systems can be used for social management overlapped with
the rapid advancement in identification and surveillance technology. The decision to take on this
new frontier was obviously motivated by the worry of chaotic governing processes and
corruption within the party. Xi at the third plenary session of the 19th Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection said: ‘efforts should be made to make sure officials don't dare to, are
unable to and have no desire to commit corruption, to improve Party and state oversight systems,
and to ensure the spirit of the 19th CPC National Congress and major decisions of the CPC
Central Committee are resolutely implemented, so as to greet the 70th anniversary of the
founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) with great achievements.’33 These ambitions
drive the establishing of cross-region and cross-departmental systems for rewards and
punishments. Through information sharing and joint incentive and discipline mechanisms, make
it so that poor behavior is dissuaded but good behavior rewarded. By utilizing technology to
police behavior, officials and judges are able to punish offenders and place them on blacklist
platforms like “Credit China.”34 By 2013, the first place in which this machinery was put in place
was the “untrustworthy persons subject to enforcement”, shixin bei zhixing, (失信被执行人名
单). This arrangement supposedly addresses the non-performances of legally binding
judgements. Consequently, compelling state departments across the country to engineer their
own blacklist systems as a means to punish and dissuade unwarranted actions.
33
Bianji Hongyu,“Xi calls for ‘greater strategic achievements’ in Party governance”
Xinhua,2019, http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0112/c90000-9537115.html (accessed 10 February
2019)
34
“Blacklist of untrustworthy” Credit China, 2019,
https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/xinyongfuwu/shixinheimingdan/ (accessed 5 January 2019)
14
Surveillance has become pervasive across China. Especially, in politically sensitive
provinces like Tibet and Xinjiang. I will discuss, the case of Xinjiang later. Immediately, though,
surveillance technology has been implemented in urban areas like Chongqing (重庆), Beijing (北
京), and Shanghai （上海). Grid management techniques, which couple communication and
information technologies with on the ground policing are installed across the country’s cities.35
For example, the mass surveillance network in Yizhuang (亦庄) named Xueliang (雪亮) or
Sharp Eyes was built in October 2017. The network connects security cameras around the city,
and additionally, integrates them into a single data-sharing platform.36 Xuanzun Liu, in a Global
Times article, reports that the Sharp Eyes project is extending Yizhuang’s surveillance network.37
Headed by the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Communist Party, the
Sharp Eyes project has installed 2243 high-definition security cameras, 277 vehicle recognition
cameras and 267 facial recognition cameras in an 18.18 square kilometer town.38 The aims of
these technologies are to enforce acquiescence to legal demands and to prevent destabilizing
risks.39 These ambitions underscore the state’s desire to harness big data and artificial
intelligence for the means of social management. This example pointedly illustrates how the
social credit system is an element in a growing ecology of surveillance, which bolsters the state’s
surveillance ambitions.
35
Qiang Wu, “Urban Grid Management and Police State in China: A Brief Overview” China Change, 12
August 2014, https://chinachange.org/2013/08/08/the-urban-grid-management-and-police-state-in-china-a-brief-
overview/ (accessed 20 December 2018)
36
Xuanzun Liu, “Ubiquitous surveillance cameras in a Beijing district reduce crimes by nearly
40%” Global Times, 1 August 2018, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1113386.shtml
(accessed 10 January 2019)
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
Conference Paper 15
The implementation of the social credit system is deeply dependent on the fundamental
information and communications infrastructure (ICTs). The infrastructure provides the
standardized means to record and share information in different departments of government. This
is to say that databases store information at the local and central levels of government, and the
devices enable the sharing of data within state bodies, but also with the public.40 For instance, in
2015, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the State Information
Centre jointly inaugurated the “Credit China” platform, designed in cooperation with Baidu, in
order, to provide accessible credit information from national and local government
departments.41 As aforementioned, this overcomes the problems of departmental protectionism
and encourages horizonal and vertical information sharing. The credit reporting systems support
a structure of rewards and punishment predicated on the means of blacklisting. Needless to say,
for these technologies to take effect, they require the capacity to accurately identify citizens and
to collect, store, process, and share this information.
The system must be able to uniformly identify citizens and store their identities in a
filling system, which assigns a unique marker. In 2004, a new generation identity card was
disseminated in China. It contained an 18-digit code, which holds the date of birth and the
issuing of the local authority.42 In 2013, when the social credit system introduced the punishment
and rewards scheme, it coupled it to the 18-digit code.43 The unique identifiers linked with legal
names enables the state to connect individuals and businesses to specific actions. These data
40
Establishment of a Social Credit System.” China Law Translate, 2015,
41
(2018): 21.
42
Ibid., 20.
43
Ibid., 20.
16
points are usually financially related or administrative facts. However, with the advent of facial
recognition cameras, for example, they are now able to accrue biometric information.
The development of information and communication technologies (ICT) has
progressively come with the capacity to collect and store data, but also the computational
faculties to process and analyze data to generate actionable insights. The most notable case of
this is the correlational big data analysis, which is able to sort individuals on the basis of
probabilistic computations.44 Large sample sizes come with unique computational and statistical
challenges, which include scalability, spurious correlation, incidental endogeneity, and
measurement errors.45 Nevertheless, in the context of China, there is no algorithmic processing
of data for social management purposes. The little that is done is focused on financial credit
scoring. The available state documents maintain that scores are mostly shaped by citizens’
purchasing histories.
Chinese private tech enterprises have also created their own social credit platforms. With
the aid of the Peoples’ Bank of China, this initiative fostered the development of personal credit
rating systems similar to the FICO scoring system in the U.S. By 2015, the bank selected eight
companies to begin developing credit reporting platforms. Most were eventually abandoned, but
the best-known outcome of this endeavor is the Sesame Credit system (also known as Zhima
Credit), which was developed by the Ant Financial Group, a corporation that is a subsidiary of
Alibaba. The service generates scores between 350 and 950 points, and the score is determined
by five key factors (1) credit history, (2) behavioral trends, which refers to when and how
44
(2018): 22.
45
Fan Jianging, Fang Han, Han Liu, “Challenges of Big Data analysis.” National Science Review
1.2 (2014): 293.
Conference Paper 17
accounts are settled, (3) stable revenue and personal assets, (4) personal information that is
verifiable, (5) and social relations, which refers to your interactions with your friends on the
platform.46 To be clear, little is known on exactly what actions, and to what extent they will
change your score. The lack of transparency in this regard raises concerns. Especially, among
Western audiences that assume that ambiguity signifies Orwellian social management.
As stated above, customers’ scores are based on their use of the affiliated services.
Zhima’s current operations can be better understood as loyalty reward programs. High credit
scores receive awards like deposit waivers. Enrollment is voluntary and there are no
consequences for a poor score.47
The eight pilot companies, including Zhima, in a move to get the People’s Bank of China
licensure, created a database of online non-bank lending information. And so, in May 2018,
Baihang Credit was established. It was the first licensed credit scoring firm in China. It was
created by the China Internet Finance Association and the eight commercial enterprises, marking
a joint endeavor by private and public entities. This endeavor produced a unified personal credit
investigation and services system.48 The venture received accreditation to do business in personal
credit information services. Baihang is able to stockpile stupendous amounts of personal data
from the eight financial and non-financial contributors.49 The information is stored in a unified
46
Tianxia Li, “Internet Finance and Big Data Risk Management.” Zhihu, 4 January 2017,
https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/24712959 (accessed 25 January 2019)
47
Jeremy Duam, “Chinathrough a glass, darkly” China Law Translate, 27 December 2017,
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/seeing-chinese-social-credit-through-a-glass-darkly/
(accessed 1 February 2019)
48
Duoguang Bei, Growing with Pain. Beijing: Chinese Academy of Financial Inclusion, 2018,
78.
49
Ibid.,79
18
platform, which functions as a supplement to the People’s Bank of China credit reference
system.
The notion of private enterprises working in conjunction with the Chinese state to enforce
social norms through credit reporting is contentious. The degree that Alipay and WeChat work in
concert with leadership to shape norms is an open question, which requires further research. Yet,
it is clear that there are forms of collaboration. Hu Tao, the general manager of Sesame Credit,
maintained that ‘Zhima Credit is dedicated to creating trust in a commercial setting and
independent of any government-initiated social credit system.’50 He later argues, ‘Zhima Credit
does not share user scores or underlying data with any third party including the government
without the user’s prior consent.’51 This is obviously not true. In 2015, Ant Financial helped the
government establish a blacklist platform, which holds over 6 million peoples data. Such
information flows should not suggest that Sesame’s scoring is linked with the lists’ penalties. As
Jeremy Duam makes clear: ‘Sesame Credit incorporates this publicly available court blacklist
into its scoring process, but to link the lists’ penalties in any way to Sesame Credit, as some have
done, doesn’t make much sense. A credit company’s consideration of delinquent child support
payments in their calculations doesn’t make them responsible for the wage garnishing that might
accompany it.’52 I should note that the application of credit systems to influence behavior has
historical precedence. Early forms of credit reporting systems in the United States, explicitly
50
Mara Hvistendahl, “Inside China’s Vast New Experiment in Social Ranking.” Wired, 14
December 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/age-of-social-credit/ (accessed 24 January 2019)
51
Tao Hu, “Zhima Credit does not share user scores or data.” Financial Times, 15 November
2017, https://www.ft.com/content/ec4a2a46-c577-11e7-a1d2-6786f39ef675 (accessed 28
December 2018)
52
Conference Paper 19
expressed the goal to discipline citizens. Creditors would inquire about race, gender, and
marriage status. It was only until the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970, that anti-
discrimination laws were put in place to ensure accuracy, fairness, and privacy to citizens. The
key areas of the Act are to underscore the protection of credit reporting information and the
standards for how credit information is recorded. The FCRA can be found in the United States
Code Title 15, Section 1681.53 With the radical transformation of the technological landscape
and the faculties of new devices, it raises questions about the state of data justice. Evidently,
more investigations must be conducted on the legal realities of data privacy.
Ant Financial solved a critical problem for Alibaba. Like FICO in the U.S. decades
earlier, Ant executives discussed how a data-driven approach would support borrowing for
people who otherwise were locked out from the formal economy. Particularly, the most rural and
vulnerable. China at the time, was predominately a cash-based economy, where few individuals
had access to credit cards. Alibaba’s model as an intermediary for sellers and customers, required
it to facilitate payments, especially as it desired further expansion. Alibaba decided to set up
Alipay, a mobile payment system. The sell for the 400 million Alipay customers is clear: your
data will give you access to credit. In turn, this system meant that Zhima could access its
customers creditworthiness. The chart below shows the number of service providers using Zhima
Credit.
53
“15 U.S. Code § 1681.Congressional findings and statement of purpose.” Legal Information
Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/1681 (accessed 12 January 2019)
20
Figure I: Credit-based Service Users
Sources: Research Report on the Development of Credit-Aided Sharing Economy jointly issued by the Sharing
Economy Research Center of the State Information Center and Ant Financial Research Institute
The chart precisely illustrates the number of users from January 2016 to April 2017.
Accordingly, it intimates the growth of the platform and its customer base. The users increased
by 270 percent representing an average 12.7 percent monthly growth. Hence, Alibaba could
finally achieve its aim to present itself as a trusted intermediary brokering between sellers and
buyers.
The line between state and private actors is unclear in China. Since 2014 the Chinese
state was able to establish a social credit system, which tracks individual behavior. Private
companies with the support of the People’s Bank of China built their own systems. These
systems help enforce traditional law enforcement tools. An example of this is blacklisting, which
exposes and limits the online conduct of enterprises and individuals caught committing fraud,
“rumor” spreading, and violating others’ rights. Importantly, conflating Sesame Credit with
broader Social Credit initiatives is problematic. By doing so, you inflame international
Conference Paper 21
trepidations about the application of information technologies in China. Secondly, Sesame is not
a mandatory application that engenders a score on the discretions of the state. Poor scores have
no bearing on citizens’ station in society. Such qualms resonate because we are becoming
gradually aware of the potentialities of big data to truncate liberties.
Worries have been expressed about consumer privacy in China. On Weibo, China’s
version of twitter, costumers have learnt how Zhima has shared their credit information with
Alipay. Fanny Wu, a spokesperson for Ant Financial, admitted that customers data was shared
with Alipay and some third-party companies.54 Dealing with this crisis of trust, Alipay has
updated its reporting landing page so that users now can elect to share their Zhima Credit scores.
In summary, the social credit initiative is not a single and nationwide integrated system.
Rather the system is an ecology of fragmented local initiatives, which share a common state goal
and operational framework. From the standpoint of the government, the principal objectives are
to improve legal and regulatory compliance in the economic and social domain.55 The core
mechanism of the social credit system operates on punishment and rewards. The mechanisms of
punishment like blacklisting platforms add a means to surveillance. While the private sector, has
been able to devise their own credit systems, which are centered on rating systems and loyalty
schemes. The conception of a social credit system began as an elixir to the lack of trust in
financial markets, and thereby, encouraging domestic consumption by supporting underbanked
citizens through verification and assessment by a mobile social credit system. In other words, the
social credit system enabled non-financial proxy categories to substitute for a well-measured
54
Liping Zhang, “Zhima credit admits it was stupid. “Sixth Tone, 4 January 2018
https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1001503/after-privacy-concerns%2C-zhima-credit-admits-it-
was-stupid (accessed 20 January 2019
55
(2018): 12.
22
creditworthiness record. Therefore, private enterprises that run their own social credit system, are
utilizing this tool to garner more customers, reward loyal users, and to ultimately render their
products more alluring to larger audiences. However, social credit systems, through state and
private collaboration, are also a device to monitor behavior and combat ‘corruption’.
No strings attached
In the case of technological infrastructure on the African continent, poor nations, like Ethiopia
and Rwanda, have embraced the supposed benefits of heavy investments in ICTs. As the late
Prime Minister of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi remarked:
Not long ago, many of us felt that we were too poor to afford to invest seriously in ICT.
We assumed that ICT was a luxury that only the rich could afford. We did not believe that serious
investment in ICT had anything to do with facing the challenges of poverty that kills. Now we
believe we are too poor not to save everything we can and invest as much of it as possible on
ICT. We recognize that while ICT may be a luxury for the rich, for us – the poor counties – it is a
vital and essential tool for fighting poverty.56
This understanding accounts for how policy makers now perceive technology as an instrument
for political ambitions. And so, rather than being an impartial means that responds to functional
imperatives, the technologies operate precisely for government purposes. Understanding the
provision of technology as a work of state representation pushes us to unearth the ways in which
they are implemented. Considering these dimensions in the process of technological adoption
and adaptation means underlining how devices influence the spaces they operate in, but also how
they are built and for what purposes they are institutionalized.57
56
Iginio Gagliardone and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, “The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia
and Rwanda: Towards a ‘Developmental’ Model?” Stability: International Journal of Security
and Development 5.1 (2016): 5.
57
It should be noted, that because technologies have their own material shape and design, they
cannot be completely reduced to the intentions, which they were are engineered for. They do not
simply enact relations of ideology.
Conference Paper 23
The application of ICT systems to bureaucratic processes has been introduced, on a mass
scale, across the global North. Such initiatives have promised to transform citizens’ experience
of governance by ensuring efficiency and transparency. That is to say, ICT systems, in the West,
were expressly designed to provide citizens information and accessible means to complete
transactions with the state.58 In the case of ICT platforms being engendered and exported by
China, many have raised concerns about China being a net exporter of authoritarianism, selling
its own strategies of surveillance and control, that undermine Western efforts to promote the
internet, and media specifically, as a democratizing apparatus. This section is, primarily,
concerned with exploring the problematics of China-Ethiopia relations, and focuses on how
Chinese engagement has influenced the development of the Ethiopian media sphere. I argue that
ICT systems are a conduit of development; however, they come with the possibilities of risk to
civil liberties, which are prone to countries with weak systems of political checks and balances.
China has received applause and criticism for its apathy. Simply put, their ‘no strings
attached’ policy that advocates for unconditional aid to low-income countries has been a
contentious point of discussion. This strategy has enabled collaboration in the media sector,
concretely with African nations, like Rwanda and Ethiopia, who are authoritarian and able to
combine centralized authority, “long-horizon planning and neo-patrimonial and clientelist
practice in ways that facilitate long-term investment and the use of rents for growth-generating
activities.”59 Some critics; nonetheless, maintain that the concept of neutrality embraced by the
Chinese is, in fact, another form of ideology. I should say, even more precisely, that the lack of
58
Randolph Kluver, “The architecture of control: A Chinese strategy for e-governance.” Journal
of Public Policy 25.1 (2005): 77.
59
Iginio Gagliardone and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, “The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia
24
conditions enables another kind of ideology, which presents China as a generous actor, and
ultimately enshrouds its political ambitions. Thus, how China chooses to intervene “neutrally”,
inevitably, enforces a particular change in the global arena. The looming debt crisis across Africa
is a case in point for critics.
On the other hand, some academics challenge the idea that China has geopolitical
ambitions to export authoritarianism. Alves and Alden argue compellingly that China’s aid does
not support the export of its values and ambitions. Rather it reinforces the processes that were
already in place in respective African countries.60 Thus, the supposition that China is a net
exporter of authoritarian values is contested. With that said, these views are principally based on
the assumption that, as Western countries have tried to promote their values and models in
Africa, China as a global actor exports its own. Martha Finnemore maintains that international
actors attempting to shape the behavior of nations are ‘active teachers.’61 China repudiates that
role, and advocates a politics of solidarity, which suggests a shared identity with fellow third
world states. Nonetheless, Beijing’s claims do not deny the possibilities of other nations copying
and adapting Chinese modes of governance, particularly after receiving support to build ICT
infrastructure.
China’s increasing engagement in the media sphere is an area of study that offers a
critical entry point into understanding the broader political and economic implications for China-
Africa relations. Since 2006, China has become a paramount player on the global stage,
60
Alden, Chris, and Cristina Alves, “History & identity in the construction of China's Africa
policy.” Review of African political economy 35.115 (2008): 55.
61
Martha Finnemore, “International organizations as teachers of norms: the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cutural Organization and science policy.” International
organization 47.4 (1993): 569.
Conference Paper 25
particularly as new development actor.62 It now functions as an alternative source for investment
beyond traditional donors, like the U.S. and U.K., helping to sponsor the development of ICT
systems across Africa.63 As stated above, this article seeks to meditate on some of the
consequences of China’s engagement on the development of ICT systems. Paying attention to
Ethiopia, and the development of its telecommunication sector, we accent the ramifications of its
development. As it will be discussed later, Ethiopia is the only African nation with a state-
controlled Internet service Provider. China at an ideational level, agreeing with Gagliardone, is
able to balance the growth of users and the control of information online, which makes it a model
and source of legitimation for repressive practices in Ethiopia, and other countries across the
globe. Chinese support of Ethiopian development does not categorically prove Beijing’s
authoritarian exportation. Yet, it draws attention to how it provides financial, technical and
ideational support for regimes pursuing suppressive practices.
In 2006, the Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation and Chinese telecom giant ZTE
signed a historical agreement. Backed by the China Development Bank, ZTE (partially state-
owned) offered a loan of 1.5 billion dollars, which ZTE contributed 400 million dollars.64 This
investment by ZTE was specifically aimed at replacing and expanding Ethiopia’s
telecommunications system. Therefore, the loan was spent in three phases; furthermore, expected
to be paid back within thirteen years. The first phase installed more than two thousand kilometers
of fibre optic cable — connecting Ethiopia’s thirteen largest cities.65 The second and third phase
62
Deborah Bräutigam, and Tang Xiaoyang. “African Shenzhen: China's special economic zones
in Africa.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 49.1 (2011): 28.
63
Ibid.,404.
64
Iginio Gagliardone, Nicole Stremlau, and Daniel Nkrumah, "Partner, prototype persuader?
China's renewed media engagement with Ghana." Communication, Politics
& Culture45.2 (2012): 179.
65
Iginio Gagliardone, and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, “The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia
26
continued with the building of telecommunication infrastructure across the country, and
principally expanded coverage to include the rural peripheries. This action augmented the
capacity of the system to support about 15.4 percent of individuals in Ethiopia from an initial
0.22 percent.66
China’s financial support has empowered the development of Ethiopia’s
telecommunication infrastructure, but also the means to retain its authoritarian predilections.
This is to say, China has capacitated the Ethiopian government to expand access while
maintaining Addis Ababa’s indifference towards freedom of information.67 Fear of government
reprisal has propelled the constraints on media in Ethiopia. This is made most obvious by the
arrests of twenty journalists during the tumultuous 2005 May election.68 In addition, foreign
journalists have had tremendous difficulty in acquiring authorization to work in Ethiopia, in fact,
an Associated Press reporter was deported in 2006 after ‘tarnish[ing] the image of the country.’69
Elsewhere in Africa, like Rwanda and Kenya, the liberalization of the market was driven by the
development of communication systems. Nations that chose to control telecommunication
systems lagged behind in the advancement of information infrastructure and services. However,
China’s support, that comes with ‘no strings’ attached, offers the financial aid and technical

66
“World telecommunication/ICT indicators database.” International Telecommunications
Union, 2009, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx
67
The state-owned Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC) and the Ethiopian
Telecommunication Agency (ETA) have exclusive control of Internet access throughout the
country. The ETA is not an independent regulatory body, but, in fact, its staff and
telecommunications policies are tightly controlled by the national government.
68
“Reporters Without Borders”, Reporters Without Borders Annual Report, 1 February 2007,
https:// www.refworld.org/docid/46e692a01a.html (accessed 3 November 2018)
69
“Internet filtering in Ethiopia” OpenNet Initiative, Creative Commons, 2009,
https://opennet.net/research/profiles/ethiopia
Conference Paper 27
support to sustain Ethiopia’s autocratic bearings, while fostering development. Admittingly,
without its support, the EPRDF would have been forced to liberalize or continue to lack
connectivity.
Despite the unprecedented loans made by China to Ethiopia, the country remains at the
bottom in Africa, and the world, in terms of access to ICTs. In 2017, around 15 percent of the
population has usage of the internet regularly. This is up from 12 percent the previous year.70
Mobile phone penetration is also considerably low at about 59.7 percent.71 Comparatively,
Kenya has usage of around 85 percent and 86.2 percent respectively.72 Low penetration rates
stem predominately from underdeveloped telecommunications infrastructure, which are almost
completely absent in rural areas, where about 85 percent of the Ethiopian population reside.
While Chinese financial support has boosted connectively and expanded access, the Ethiopian
state still lags behind its neighbors. This underdevelopment is partially driven by the
unwillingness to liberalize the sector. The Ethiopian state wishes to maintain a state monopoly
within the telecommunication sector.
Contrastingly, employing ICTs, the Ethiopian government has engineered some of the
most innovative projects to support development and service delivery. Woredanet and Schoolnet
operate on similar architectural design, which broadcasts between the center and the peripheries,
as a way to bolster state capacity. Woredanet, which stands for network of district (woreda)
administrations’ enables ministers in Addis Ababa to videoconference with regional woreda
offices in order to instruct them about the duties of their work. Schoolnet promulgates pre-
70
“World telecommunication/ICT indicators database.” International Telecommunications
Union, 2009, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx
71
International Telecommunication Union. Statistics, 2017,
https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx (accessed 10 January 2019)
72
Ibid.
28
recorded classes on a multiplicity of academic subjects to high school students across the
country.73 Both projects are a means to development, but also a way to convey a message of
unity after the Ethiopian civil war.
In 2011, the Ethio-Telecom, the country’s sole telecom operator, issued a tender to
further expand the country’s mobile-phone network to 50 million subscribers by 2015. Like the
ZTE case, the tender was founded on a vendor-financing basis. Yet, unlike the 2006 episode, it
was a public tender that invited competition. Matthew Dalton’s piece, “Telecom Deal by China's
ZTE, Huawei in Ethiopia Faces Criticism”, in The Wall Street Journal, more than anything else,
argued that financing won the day.74 The deal went to Chinese firms, ZTE and Huawei, which
pledged a total of 1.6 billion dollars.75 With the signing of two agreements worth 800 million
dollars, competition continued in the form of a rivalry between China’s leading
telecommunications equipment and consumer electronics companies. Huawei, it bears noting,
joined the fray because of ZTE’s poor work in Ethiopia.
With regard to the above, China continues to rebuff claims of wishing to export its
authoritarian strategies for development and governance, despite its financial support in
expanding ICT infrastructure. An obvious counter argument is China’s investment in democratic
countries like Kenya and Ghana. The Chinese government has invested 180 million dollars in
Ghana in order to establish an e-government system.76 Afforded by China’s Exim Bank through
73
Iginio Gagliardone, "“A country in order”: Technopolitics, nation building, and the
development of ICT in Ethiopia." Information Technologies & International Development 10.1
(2014): 10.
74
Matthew Dalton, “Telecom Deal by China’s ZTE, Huawei in Ethiopia Faces Criticism.” Wall
Street Journal, 7 January 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/telecom-deal-by-china8217s-zte-
huawei-in-ethiopia-faces-criticism-1389064617 (accessed 9 December 2018)
75
Ibid.
76
Iginio Gagliardone, Nicole Stremlau, and Daniel Nkrumah, "Partner, prototype or
Conference Paper 29
two concessionary loans of 30 million dollars in 2008 and 150 million dollars in 2010, the
Chinese have conveyed their commitment to development in Ghana. Chen, Dollar, and Tang
convincingly demonstrate how Chinese ODI in Africa, mainly in the service sector, appears to be
related to the profit-driven nature of ODI.77 Concretely, Chinese investments are concentrated in
capital intense sectors in capital scarce countries like Ghana and Ethiopia.78 Such a move
suggests a strong incentive to seek profit in risker environments.79 Relatedly, while this ‘no
strings attached’ investment policy may be consistent and enable the Chinese party state to be
involved in politically and economically moot projects, it; nevertheless, does not mean that its
impact is neutral. As previously asserted, Chinese investment privileges state actors, therefore,
assessing which countries benefit from China’s aid becomes important because it bears an
analytical approach, which captures how to understand a political milieu with a more financially
resourced state.
Gagliardone expounds how the Ethiopian government has tried to develop without
compromising political power and sovereignty.80 By doing so, he explores how Ethiopia is
greatly reliant on Chinese foreign investment for development. This support materialized initially
in the form of concessionary loans provided by the Chinese to build ICT systems.81 Chinese aid
meant that the Ethiopian state could ‘afford’ to exclude the private sector and have greater
persuader? China's renewed media engagement with Ghana," Communication, Politics &
Culture45.2 (2012): 185.
77
Chen, Wenjie, David Dollar, and Heiwai Tang, “Why is China investing in Africa? Evidence
from the firm level.” The World Bank Economic Review 32.3 (2016): 620.
78
Ibid., 622.
79
Ibid., 622.
80
Iginio Gagliardone, and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, “The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia
81
Ibid., 14.
30
control over the development of the internet. This argument underscores earlier contentions
about Beijing intervention.82 The absence of conditions for aid subsequently fortifies the
processes within countries. More saliently, it also revels the tendency, by the Chinese
Communist Party, to privilege state actors over private enterprises. This stands in sharp contrast
to Western governments, which have largely focused on supporting private institutions and civil
society in the media sphere.
In this context, can the Ethiopian state copy and adapt the Chinese social credit system,
and specifically modes of surveillance? No. The installment of social credit systems is greatly
dependent on sophisticated information and communication infrastructure. The social credit
system is a byproduct of private and public collaboration to build hardware and software
infrastructure. Behemoths like Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent have technically supported the
state’s labors to build a tool to remedy failures of trust within the marketplace, but also as a
means to drive social management. The absence of financially and technically powerful private
actors within the Ethiopian telecommunication landscape, makes it implausible to devise a credit
system, which depends on collecting, storing, and processing mechanisms. Above all, it must be
made clear that Ethiopian leadership is wary about technology. Their commitment to investing in
new technologies for development is matched with an equally strong resistance to its capacities
to give voice and autonomy to the local.83 This is to say, that there is opposition towards uses of
ICTs to challenge centralized power. In 2005, Ethiopian activists challenged the results of
parliamentary elections by propagating their opinions and disgruntlement via SMS and social
82
Iginio Gagliardone, Maria Repnikova, and Nicole Stremlau, “China in Africa: a new approach
to media development?” (2010): 4.
83
Iginio Gagliarone, The Politics of Technology in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2016, 2.
Conference Paper 31
media broadly. This compelled the state to further impede development and access to the
internet. At the same time, that ICTs have become useful tools for development, they also have
become contested sites, which are presumed to undermine centralized state power. The exclusion
of the private sector and the purposeful underdevelopment of ICTs is a means to maintain
political power.
Ethiopia does not have the technological sophistication to build a social credit system, yet
surveillance technologies can be purchased. American and European companies have exported
internet and cellular surveillance tools to countries with known human right violations. The EU
on December 2014 introduced the common export restriction policy in order to curb the sales of
intrusion software and internet surveillance devices.84 Human Rights Watch argues that further
regulation in the exportation of surveillance technology is necessary. Horne writes:
while people around the world are right to be shocked by former National Security
Agency contractor Edward Snowden’s revelations of mass surveillance by the U.S. government,
they should also be concerned that repressive governments such as Ethiopia’s are purchasing and
using advanced technologies to target independent voices beyond their borders. The export and
use of these European-made commercial products remains virtually unregulated. This is
particularly worrying given that evidence exists that similar technologies may be in the hands of
authoritarian regimes throughout the world.85
Ethiopia monitors dissenting voices inside and outside its borders. The government acquired
these monitoring tools through commercially available spyware — namely the U.K. and
German-based Gamma International FinFishers and the Italian based Hacking Team’s Remote-
Control System.86 These apparatuses extend the countries surveillance capacities, and effectively
84
Maaike Goslinga and Dimitri Tokmetzis, “The surveillance industry still sells to repressive
regimes. Here’s what Europe can do about it,” De Correspondent, 23 February 2017,
https://thecorrespondent.com/6249/the-surveillance-industry-still-sells-to-repressive-regimes-
heres-what-europe-can-do-about-it/679999251459-591290a5 (accessed 3 February 2019)
85
Felix Horne, “Ethiopia's borderless cyberespionage” Human Rights Watch, 7 April 2014,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/07/ethiopias-borderless-cyberespionage (accessed 8
February 2019)
86
Ibid.
32
enable access to files on targeted laptops.87 They also log keystrokes and password as a way to
switch on a device’s webcam and microphone, turning the computer into a spy gadget.
Even with Ethiopia’s limited technological faculties, a more critical question is what can
be learnt? In other words, what can be imported from China’s social credit system? Ethiopia’s
hybridized surveillance apparatus reveals the state’s capacity to do patchwork with diversely
sourced technology. I imagine that the fundamental logics of the social system can be adopted
and adapted. The heart of the social credit system is harnessing digital information to shape
conduct. Namely, the project requires improving operational mechanisms with an emphasis on
collecting, storing, and processing data. The Ethiopian state can gradually advance the exchange
and sharing of government information by creating networks that disseminate information
through all regions of the country, as a means to foster surveillance and compliance with law.
The logics of the credit system can ideationally support the state’s desire to formulate norms of
surveillance and compliance.
None data-driven surveillance, broadly normative tools of control, remain a threat in
Ethiopia. Echoing Purdekova, in “Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’”, ‘what are the
apparatuses through which the central power reaches people’?88 The present information
apparatuses at the state’s disposal is supplemented by webs of people. Put differently, rather than
spyware, another key instrument for surveillance is spreading webs of people. By utilizing local
administers as the ears and eyes of the central government, the state is able to supplant its
technological efforts and ultimately, engineer a system of control in the peripheries. Cooptation
87
Felix Horne, “Ethiopia's borderless cyberespionage” Human Rights Watch, 7 April 2014,
February 2019)
88
Andrea Purdeková, “‘Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’: surveillance and state
reach in Rwanda." The Journal of Modern African Studies 49.3 (2011): 478.
Conference Paper 33
through responsibility is a lateral system, instead of a vertical means of control and policing,
which relies on technology. For instance, Abdi (not his real name), a 32-year-old primary school
teacher from Ethiopia’s Oromia region, had been arrested for protesting local government
corruption.89 But, also for refusing to be an informant in his school for local authorities.90 This
case illustrates how Ethiopia’s technological feet are complimented by widespread and locally
embedded webs of surveillance.
Orwellian nightmare
China’s social credit initiative has instigated alarm in the West. U.S. Politicians like Vice
President Pence have claimed that an “Orwellian system premised on controlling virtually every
facet of human life” has emerged in China.91 This argument hinges on the advancement and
implementation of social credit technology in China. More than anything else, the historical
truncation of civil liberties underpins people’s suspicion about the party’s intentions to apply big
data and artificial intelligence for despotic rule. And so, the government’s motivation to collect
vast information on its citizenry, and its social credit system, raises many questions and concerns
beyond what the Chinese have claimed.
Jamie Horsley’s article, “China’s Orwellian Social Credit Score Isn’t Real”, argues the
contrary. It contends that mainstream media narratives on this subject are misleading. She justifies the
contention on the bases that Chinese authorities have not assigned a single score, which determines every
89
Felix Horne, “Ethiopia’s borderless cyberespionage.” Human Rights Watch, 7 April 2014,
November 2019)
90
Ibid.
91
Jamie Horsley, “China’s Orwellian Social Credit Score Isn’t Real.” Foreign Policy, 16 November
2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/16/chinas-orwellian-social-credit-score-isnt-real/ (accessed 25
December 2018)
34
aspect of citizen’s life.92 In short, the system does not yet exist — at least as it is generally discussed.
Thus, incumbent discourses are presumptive, and social credit technologies can still be seen as
empowering to Chinese publics. Echoing these sentiments, Kluver argues that surveillance is a
small portion of the government’s labors. In Kluver’s words:
It is true that the government devotes significant resources to surveillance and control
mechanisms to prevent the outright expression of political dissent, the intrusion of “foreign
nations” into domestic affairs, and to protect the online population from pornographic or
otherwise illegal content. These efforts, however, are really a small portion of the government’s
interactions with the network, as far more resources are devoted to building the infrastructure,
mandating official use of the Internet, and encouraging online participation than are spent on the
mechanisms of control.93
Above all else, Horsley argues that the social credit codes assigned to companies and individual
national ID numbers do not result in scores or rankings being produced. Currently, there is no
universal scoring system. She adds that enterprises and professionals in various sectors do
receive scores; however, such marks do not propound a social credit score, but rather a
mechanism used for specific regulatory purposes within industries.
Scoring on either public or private platforms does not result in punishment. Social credit
systems focus on information collection, consolidation, and aggregation rather than scoring. This
emphasis on scoring, particularly in Western media is hyperbolic. The confusion lies in the role
of Sesame credit and other private credit investigation systems and their relationship with
broader government social credit initiatives. Collaboration between the private and public has
supported the establishment of reward and punishment mechanisms. As noted earlier, Zhima
supports the operation of blacklist platforms. But, punishment is not an outcome of poor scoring.
92
Jamie Horsley, “China’s Orwellian Social Credit Score Isn’t Real.” Foreign Policy, 16 November
2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/16/chinas-orwellian-social-credit-score-isnt-real/ (accessed 25
December 2018)
93
Randolph Kluver, “The architecture of control: A Chinese strategy for e-governance.” Journal
of Public Policy 25.1 (2005): 83.
Conference Paper 35
The primary punishment instrument is blacklisting, which results from a violation of industry
regulations. Being entered into a blacklist can limit access to goods like private education,
airplane tickets, and entertainment. Getting off the list merely requires addressing the violation.
Even with all this said, concerns remain legitimate. Kluver admits to problematic
surveillance. Horsely’s contentions do not dispel suspicions at all. They merely intimate that
definitive remarks should be suspended until further evidence can be harvested. We know
Beijing regulates speech. We know that it polices association. Speaking from personal
experience, I have dealt with WeChat censorship. After the passing of Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波),
some friends and I attempted to honor his life by posting about his passing on WeChat. We
found that WeChat blocked our messages. Namely, when mentioning his medical treatment and
the establishment of chapter 08. This suggests that politically sensitive material does not get sent
on WeChat. A study by The Citizen Lab corroborates these claims and maintains that ‘WeChat
performs censorship on the server-side, which means that messages sent over the app pass
through a remote server that contains rules for implementing censorship. If the message includes
a keyword that has been targeted for blocking, the entire message will not be sent.’94
Consequently, the development of all technical systems that can support surveillance, in this
instance, the social credit system, should be monitored and eyed with misgivings because such
an invention can be utilized to curb rights.
Similarly, the little that is known about the application of surveillance technology and
social credit systems is locally sourced. In places like Chongqing (重庆市), facial recognition
technology is being deployed, which enables the police to verify people’s identities by analyzing
94
Lotus Ruan , Jeffrey Knockel, and Masashi Crete-Nishihata,“WE (CAN’T) CHAT”, The
Citizen Lab, 13 April 2017, https://citizenlab.ca/2017/04/we-cant-chat-709-crackdown-
discussions-blocked-on-weibo-and-wechat/ (accessed 9 February 2019)
36
their faces.95 The project is known as ‘Xue Liang’ (雪亮), which ties security cameras around the
city, and additionally, integrates them into a single nationwide surveillance and data-sharing
platform.96 Such advances pose a risk to citizen’s rights. More specifically, the data revolution is
primarily a technological revolution, which facilitates the power to process, intervene, share, and
sort copious amounts of information. But these means have not been coupled to a social justice
agenda by the bodies involved in collecting and sharing data. It is obvious that China does not
have overarching privacy laws or even the capacity to enforce these protections. Thus, the
creation of a social credit system warrants alarm and demands for information security and legal
privacy protections.
For Ethiopia, and other low-income countries, the implementation of ICTs, with the help
of China, raises even more pointed matters. Regardless of whether China is thought to be an
active teacher, which purposefully exports its anti-democratic developmental strategies,
Ethiopia’s weak rule of law, poor record of internet freedom, and limited independent oversight
over government programs means that ICT systems are likely to be abused. For instance, while
most countries in Africa are liberalizing internet provision, the Ethiopian government has
decided to introduce regulatory provisions. In December 2006, the state began requiring internet
cafes to log the names and addresses of customers, as an attempt to track users engaged in illegal
activities online.97 The lists are turned over to the police, and internet café owners who fail to do
95
Simon Denyer, “Beijing bets on facial recognition in a big drive for total surveillance.”
Washington Post, 7 January 2018,
file://localhost/Users/bulelanijili/Zotero/storage/7INK3CXN/in-china-facial-recognition-is-
sharp-end-of-a-drive-for-total-surveillance.html? utm_term=.fa462b2512d9 (accessed 8
December 2018)
96
Ibid.
97
Conference Paper 37
so face prison time.98 More recently, Human Rights Watch contends that, ‘the [Ethiopian]
government has gone to various lengths to restrict OMN [Oromia Media Network] – an
independent media network that covers current events in Oromia, Ethiopia – and other diaspora
media outlets. Given Ethiopia’s stranglehold on independent media and access to information,
diaspora media outlets provide an important source of information that is independent from
government, albeit often heavily politicized.’99 This example illustrates the state’s ambition and
capacity to control the internet and online media, despite its constitutional guarantees of freedom
of the press and access to information.
Risks to privacy are prone to be higher in countries like China and Ethiopia because of
weaker systems of political checks and balances. Admittingly, Jack Ma Co-founder and
Executive Chairman of Alibaba, during the Davos 2019 World Economic Forum, said: ‘embrace
the future. People here in Europe are talking about how can we regulate it [technology]? How
can we protect it? There is nothing that can protect you unless you have the capacity of knowing
the technology. That’s why we don’t go to America first. We don’t come to European countries
first. We go to the countries that believe in us first. Go to Africa.’100 In a conversation with
President Kagame and Zanny Beddoes, Editor-in-Chief at The Economist, Ma matinaied that
Africa is a promising site for investment because of its lack of legal and regulatory restrictions.
Arguments of this nature echo colonial imaginings that present Africa as a petri dish for new
98
Abate Groum, “Ethiopia Internet cafes start registering users.” Nazret, 27 December 2006,
http://nazret.com/blog/index.php/2006/12/27/ethiopia_internet_cafes_start_registerin (accessed
30 November 2018)
99
“Ethiopia: New Spate of Abusive Surveillance.” Human Rights Watch, 6 December 2017,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/06/ethiopia-new-spate-abusive-surveillance accessed (12
January 2019)
100
World Economic Forum, “Digitizing Emerging Markets.” World Economic Forum Annual
Meeting, 23 January 2019, https://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-annual-
meeting/sessions/digitalizing-emerging-markets (accessed 23 January 2019)
38
forms of social and political organization, which render its communities more vulnerable to
subjugation. Secondly, China’s ‘no strings attached policy’ currently aids troubling processes
within Ethiopia and beyond. While China’s financial support has allowed Ethiopia to modernize
its telecommunications infrastructure yet also enabled its authoritarian endeavors.
Another risk is political exclusion. The danger that the Chinese Communist party may
attempt to utilize the social credit system, as means to determine the creditability of citizens, on
the basis of their ethnicity or political persuasion, cannot be overlooked. China already outlaws
reporting on protests, spreading rumors online, and growing ‘abnormal’ beards in Xinjiang.101
Needless to say, novel surveillance tools have already helped authorities round up Uighurs, and
other Muslims, as a means to imprison them into clandestine camps known as “re-education
centers.”102 In the name of combating Islamic radicalism, China has turned Xinjiang, in Gay
McDougall words, a member of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, ‘something resembling a massive internment camp, shrouded in secrecy, a sort
of no-rights zone.’103
Similarly, in the context of Ethiopia, we are worried about the use of data for deepening
existing political bias against journalist and political opponents to the EPRDF. Specifically,
initiatives such as the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation have been used to override the existing
101
Charles Rollet, “In China’s Far West, Companies Cash in on Surveillance Program That
Targets Muslims.” Foreign Policy, 13 June 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/13/in-
chinas-far-west-companies-cash-in-on-surveillance-program-that-targets-muslims/ (accessed 15
November 2018)
102
Adrian Zens, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang.” The
Jamestown Foundation,15 May 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-for-chinas-
political-re-education-campaign-in-xinjiang/ (accessed 1 January 2019)
103
Nick Cumming-Bruce, “U.N. Panel Confronts China Over Reports That It Holds a Million
Uighurs in Camps.” The New York Times, 10 August 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-un-uighurs.html (accessed 20
December 2018)
Conference Paper 39
norms in the media space, to silence activists, threaten journalists, and to essentially police the
national information space.104 Corroborating these claims, Lewis Gordon, Sean Sullivan, Sonal
Mittal, and Kate Stone maintain, ‘Ethiopia’s anti-terrorism law is premised on an extremely
broad and vague definition of terrorist activity. It is a definition that permits the government to
repress internationally protected freedoms and to crack down on political dissent, including
peaceful political demonstrations and public criticisms of government policy…Worse still, it
permits long-term imprisonment and even the death penalty for “crimes” that bear no
resemblance, under any credible definition, to terrorism.’105 And so, these instances underscore
the risks related to these technologies, and how they can be weaponized to augment despotic
processes within Ethiopia and China.
With the growing technological advances, more countries are being propelled to
implement data privacy and protection measures. But such laws may not offer comfort in
Ethiopia, and other countries, where there is little technical or institutional capacity to protect
privacy and enforce the rule of law. Graham Greenleaf, in “the influence of European data
privacy standards outside Europe”, discusses how data privacy laws across the globe are
growing.106 However, even with these expanding ventures to ensure protection.
Alebachew Birhanu Enyew, in “Towards Data Protection Law in Ethiopia”, illustrates how
Ethiopian courts recognition of the right to privacy is negligible.107 The problem of ensuring
privacy of personal data is greater than simply whether a data privacy law is legally
104
Lewis Gordon, Sean Sullivan, Sonal Mittal, and Kate Stone, “Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorism
Law.” The Oakland Institute and Environmental Defender Law Center (2015): 9.
105
Ibid., 9.
106
Graham Greenleaf, “The influence of European data privacy standards out simplications for
globalization of Convention 108.” International Data Privacy Law 2.2 (2012): 2.
107
Alebachew Birhanu Enyew, "Towards Data Protection Law in Ethiopia." African Data
Privacy Laws (2016): 4.
40
engineered.108 Capacity to enforce and protect those rights is crucial in the quest for human
dignity.
Conclusion
Social credit systems originally emerged as a remedy to the lack of trust in the financial arena.
But, now, their purpose also combines concerns with social management. Concretely, China’s
social credit systems attempt to ameliorate issues of corruption and domestic consumption as
means to advance economic development.109 As a part of a broader strategy to utilize
information technologies to encourage consumer commerce by enabling citizens, particularly the
unbanked and underbanked, access to credit through mobile devices.110 In a word, ICTs offer a
means to engender transparency and accountability between departments and publics, which
functions as a political check to corruption. On the other hand, for private enterprises these
platforms operate as a means to reward loyalty and present their products as more attractive.
It should be said, that in China the line between state and non-state actors is unclear. The
private sector’s support of government initiatives, like blacklisting, amplifies state power. More
specifically, traditional law enforcements faculties are reinforced through collaboration with the
private sector and new technologies. In light of the fact, that private enterprises deny storing data
for the state, like Zhima, raises questions about the nature and the degree to which private actors
108
Alan Gelb and Anna Diofasi Metz, Identification Revolution: Can Digital ID be Harnessed
for Development? Brookings Institution Press, 2018, 137.
109
“Shanghai Municipal Social Credit Regulations.” China Law Translate, 30 June 2017,
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/%E4%B8%8A%E6%B5%B7%E5%B8%82%E7%A4%BE
%E4%BC%9A%E4%BF%A1%E7%94%A8%E6%9D%A1%E4%BE%8B/?lang=en (accessed
30 November 2018)
110
Meeting, 23 January 2019, https://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-annual-
meeting/sessions/digitalizing-emerging-markets (accessed 23 January 2019)
Conference Paper 41
help enforce social behavior. The extent to which Alipay, Zhima and WeChat works with the
Chinese Communist Party is a future line of research worth exploring. Needless to say, there is
little doubt that China’s police can access a wide range of government and private held data
when they feel it is necessary. How and to what extent the social credit system supports these
actions is worth asking.
The broader question of whether the social credit system functions as an instrument of
domination remains open. Indeed, the Chinese state is invested in social management; however,
the role and the degree of how social credit systems will operate towards these ends remains
open. The inquiry remains because of the need for further investigation, but also the reality of the
overt practice of power in China.111 The government already rules legitimately with its
unconcealed paternalistic predilections. The need for surreptitious modes of control seems rather
gratuitous. In Jeremy Duam’s words, “China’s Social Credit Plans aren’t secret. An outline for
progress through 2020 was release in 2014 laying out broad premises and mechanisms, and an
enormous wave of implementing rules and regulation has since followed.”112 Social control
practices in the West, which rely on inconspicuous approaches, like nudging, exploit
unconscious biases. The social credit system in China does not conceal its aspirations for reform,
civic virtue, and social management.
As is apparent from the discussion available, there is still much work that needs to be
done in the area of China-Africa relations, and technologies impact on development strategies.
Principally, a major priority is to understand China’s economic footprint across the continent, its
111
(2018): 26.
112
42
impact on the development of the internet, and how China-Africa relations fosters, and in some
ways constrains, the development of ICT systems. Secondly, more countries need to be surveyed
as there is still much to be understood about how these technologies operate locally, and what do
people on the ground think about the opportunities and obstacles erected by these new systems of
identification, punishment, reward and communication.
None of the above arguments maintain that China and Ethiopia’s initiatives have failed.
In fact, I argue that both have succeed in utilizing technology towards development. However,
these successes need to be understood within relative terms. In the case of China, tax revenues
have increased, legal reforms achieved, and aspects of governance have improved. These
achievements do not exonerate the social credit system, and some of its troubling potentialities,
but it does accent the myriad problems that have encumbered effective government in China. On
the other hand, in the case of Ethiopia, we see how ICT systems have impelled progress and
enabled the establishment of Woredanet and Schoolnet. Yet, this commitment to new
technologies for development are accompanied with equal resistance towards ICTs as conduits
for voice and representation. The Ethiopian state has purposefully undercut internet access as a
way to preserve central power. This decision suggests that ICTs can be analyzed as contested
sites, moreover, understood for their ability to be imbued with values and visions.
The consideration of China’s credit system cannot simply end with China Evil.113 This
reductive argument does not stimulate critical discourse or enable deep study. And so, instead,
we should be broadening our research on how law and cultural norms struggle to keep pace with
113
DeathbyChina, “Death by China: How America lost its manufacturing Base,” YouTube, 10
April 2016
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mMlmjXtnIXI&ab_channel=DeathByChina (accessed 10
January 2019)
Conference Paper 43
the changing technological and information landscape, and if China’s social credit system is
indeed unredeemable, then how do other nations do better, particularly African nations with
weak political systems of check and balances. Secondly, how do we devise the necessary laws
and policy provisions, which will promote civil liberates in the digital age? There needs to be
more inquiry on the legal realities of data privacy. As previously stated, the problems of ensuring
personal data is greater than simply crafting privacy laws. And so, scholarship needs to
comprehend how advancing legal capacity will enable the protection of data. There is research,
which investigates the spread of data privacy legislation; nevertheless, barely any explore the
inadequacy of current legal apparatuses and the possibility of new regulations that speak to the
local realities of low-income countries.
Obviously, a more nuanced debate and approach is needed to capture the efforts of
institutional development and the competing internal and global forces, which shape states across
Africa. Along with the concerns of rights and technology, the issues of Ethiopia are not unique to
it or Africa, governments across the globe are operating in political and economic environments
that are increasingly dealing with the impact of the technological revolution, which is changing
credit schemes, identification systems and communication. China’s engagement on the continent
is perceived as an opportunity for growth, but also a challenge to Western prescriptive
imaginations about development. By giving China a greater role on the part of development, it
may effectively create novel approaches to economic growth; however, these new ventures will
come with consequences that we must be prepared for.
44
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Chinese Social Credit initiatives and African Surveillance States

Keywords: China-Ethiopia relations, Social Credit Systems, Scoring, Development,

instruments of development. These apparatuses have empowered development, but also

can be couriers of values and ambitions, which empower political visions.

actions in the realm of economic, social, and political life.

actions of citizens, which will be represented by a quantifiable score predicated on the

which augment the state’s surveillance ambitions.

systems, International Telecommunication Union databases and Chinese official documents

the African continent.

principally focus on the risks to privacy involved in the implementation of surveillance

technology and the social credit system.

China’s fast-growing economy is making immense strides to transforming its planned

credit make the best decisions possible on their customers.

information asymmetry is no longer a permanent impediment.8

governance and society.

commercial bodies were obligated to report their client’s creditworthiness. A Customer’s

telecommunication companies.11 China therefore built a government-dominated personal credit

its data with publicly harvested information.

of China, Banking Regulatory Commission, Ministry of Commerce, and National Development

its policy implementation.

credit system, dazhong xinyong, (睢宁县大众信用信息评估细则) which scored individual

subtracted on the basis of individual behavior. A violation of legal, administrative or moral

blacklisted the culprits who violated the rules.

national character. Subsequently, the membership scheme in the Interministerial Joint

materialized in the form of the 2014 social credit plan.

Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign.

单). This arrangement supposedly addresses the non-performances of legally binding

own blacklist systems as a means to punish and dissuade unwarranted actions.

Surveillance has become pervasive across China. Especially, in politically sensitive

information and communications infrastructure (ICTs). The infrastructure provides the

departments.41 As aforementioned, this overcomes the problems of departmental protectionism

to collect, store, process, and share this information.

The development of information and communication technologies (ICT) has

challenges, which include scalability, spurious correlation, incidental endogeneity, and

measurement errors.45 Nevertheless, in the context of China, there is no algorithmic processing

consequences for a poor score.47

more investigations must be conducted on the legal realities of data privacy.

it to facilitate payments, especially as it desired further expansion. Alibaba decided to set up

Figure I: Credit-based Service Users

gradually aware of the potentialities of big data to truncate liberties.

financial markets, and thereby, encouraging domestic consumption by supporting underbanked

Prime Minister of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi remarked:

combine centralized authority, “long-horizon planning and neo-patrimonial and clientelist

is a case in point for critics.

consequences of China’s engagement on the development of ICT systems. Paying attention to

ideational support for regimes pursuing suppressive practices.

investment by ZTE was specifically aimed at replacing and expanding Ethiopia’s

China’s financial support has empowered the development of Ethiopia’s

maintaining Addis Ababa’s indifference towards freedom of information.67 Fear of government

development of communication systems. Nations that chose to control telecommunication

and Rwanda: Towards a ‘Developmental’ Model?” Stability: International Journal of Security

stem predominately from underdeveloped telecommunications infrastructure, which are almost

within the telecommunication sector.

administrations’ enables ministers in Addis Ababa to videoconference with regional woreda

unity after the Ethiopian civil war.

dollars, competition continued in the form of a rivalry between China’s leading

telecommunications equipment and consumer electronics companies. Huawei, it bears noting,

joined the fray because of ZTE’s poor work in Ethiopia.

expanding ICT infrastructure. An obvious counter argument is China’s investment in democratic

society in the media sphere.

dependent on sophisticated information and communication infrastructure. The social credit

regulation in the exportation of surveillance technology is necessary. Horne writes:

and sharing of government information by creating networks that disseminate information