Beyond BT Aholistic perspective of process Pe eer Mi tect accu De MMe ee ene ere ey Ero manure ENaCeun acer) Paes cieosin the past 40 years in improving the safety of our chemical plants. refineries and other applications. However, as our plants have grown larger and more complex, bottom-line thinking has caused us to operate closer to our safety limits to get the last drop out with as few personnel as pos~ sible (and sometimes fewer). Allthis, plus changing demographics and industry experience levels. has put a strain on achieving a safe operating environ- ment for our plants. Pe safety has made substantial progress Letus look at process safety in the past and present with some speculation about the future Abriet history Modern process safety efforts can probably be traced back to Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in the U.K. in the carly 1960s with the nascent development of the hazards and operability (HAZOP) analysis methodology, 2 term first coined by chemical safety engineer and author Trevor Kletz in 1983, Concern for process safety came tothe pub- lic Forefront with the disaster in Flixborough, U.K.,on June 1, 1974, which killed 28 people. The Seveso disaster in Italy on July 10, 1976 released diosin and exposed more than 00,000 people, which led to the European Seveso Direc- tive S2/501/EC on the control of majaraccident hazards involving dangerous substances. The directive has evolved into Seveso IIT and is the European equivalent to OSHA 1910.119—"Process Safety Management (PSM) of Highly Hazardous Chemicals” egulation, which eame along in 1992, driven by the same accidents as Seveso. But not be= fore some more significant accidents occurred (Table | Meanwhile, the development of the PLC in the late 1960 by Dick Morley and friends ushered in the age ofthe digital automation of process contre that was followed in the mid 1970s by the development of the DCS. The fear of the misapplication of the PLC and the potential unknown failute modes ofthe PLC in safety system service was one of he main driving forces forthe formation by ISA (wwwisa. org) of the $54 committee in 1984, which beeame a driving, foree for the safety instrumented system (SIS) standards. The $8 standard came out in 1996 and became ant ANSE wo wansiorg) standard. In the mid-1980s, TEC.ch) also began similar work which would eventually become IEC as61505—"Functional Safety of Electrical! he IEC (www PROCESS SAFETY Paes DESCRIPTION Cyciohexane explosionin Fixborough, UK. (seminal event for the development of management of change (MOC) DSM in Beskin the Netherlands Arsenic tioxide exposure in Mantredonia, aly Seveso dioxin exposure in Severo, aly vee Cae oes Newcastle, Dot. Powerplant inTacoa, Venezusla Mexico City (Sen usnico) LPG tank farm explosion Union Oi ratnary explosion at Romeovil I Union Carbide inca Li. (UCI) plant— mothy isocyanate (MIC) exposure in Bhopal india BP oll refinery hydrocracker explosion t Grangemouth, UK. Piper Ale, gas platform n the North ‘Seo, explosion an fre (eemnal event forofenore dusty) ‘Shell Nores refinery cat erackor unit ‘explosion stNoreo Ls. Philips high-densty polyethylene GF) lan eciosion a Poxedena ARCO at Channelview, Texas ‘Argus Chemicals in torington, Lo. Es 2 “ unknown Leknown us 502 15,000-20,000 16 B v t 4 W978 916 116 1900 1902 1984 908 wu 987 1908PROCESS SAFETY txeicsopint crit one inhi ti ght Te Wer nt of Cla Supra i a eh ed ed eck tree cae q 1998-2000, and was updated in 2010, mechanical integrity, SS implemen- Chernical Process Safety (wwwaiche | 00 eel Ler magenta rer i 45 ln 1553, CPS p+ hharmonized with TEC 61511 in 2004, safety fieldbuses, fire and gos, wireless lished the seminal book, Guidelines for a ee aeles & wating komma eae opener Bae ere as 5 eal | See a guicns be | Wooo GROUP Soe hea ina MUSTANG Z Layer of Protection Analysis Se Suet eekly Gaile ae val ecltoal Nenier lp Ee pau anya at 50 ENVision | THE BRAINS BEHIND AIR QUALITY EXCELLENCE | We lw aces po ivan berotvivr al oie wit arabia wala Jot wake-up eall to the industry, were \ ‘achieve air quality excellence: they enough? When one compares @ Manages milion of integtetedorrissions caiculations and the numberof serious acidents before CEMS Geta qualty requirements in real-time and afer 1992 (Table 2), there are sill «Generates timely alerts before incidents occur any ote although the total ea | sualties are down, + Maximizes operational eiciency by deivering information | ee aes front eM maroereet st ens pot ah + Integrates seamlessly wit al leacing EMIS packages | notin anyway cheap Ando qute the Marsh report (“The 100 Largest Losses 1974-2013. Large. Property. Damage Losses in the Hyerocarbon Inds ied http it y/P2PORD), "None ofthe losses listed in this document should be considered “black wan! cexents.”So whats going on? Many more faites ‘The economies of the world have ex panded inthe lst 20 yeas, leading to lasget, more complex petrochemical plants, and no doabs the total number of facilities has increased, too. World oil production from 1980 to 2015 has inereased by about 48%, while the ‘world GDP from 1980 to 2010 rose 40%, So weve been “keeping it in the pipe” for the most part, despite lage ifnot unprecedented, expansion ofthe industry. We mustbe doing something tight, or we would have alot more in- cients, even if wee having some. So ‘why cant we stop the acidents were still having?SIEMENS (One may subscribe to the Normal Accident Theory of Charles Perrow, emeritus logy professor at Yale University, who believes that multiple and unexpected ive and tightly coupled sys which also contain humans, Perrow says that some ace failures ate built into society’s complex, inter nts are inevitable, even tmavoidable and can’t necessarily be designed around using lin traditional methods. Perceived issues with modern, complex, technological syterns have led to the new field of resilience engineering to address these kinds of issues Yet many, if not most, ofthe accidents in Tables 1 and 2 could have been averted by following OSHAs PSM (www.osha gowSLTCiprocessafetymanagement) regu lations, both to the lett and spirit, and following one sinnple principle of "What Out here, AZ pont explosion inTouowse France 201 downtime is on atiopeti smo not an option. Foimosa Plescs Vinyl Co, chore explos BP retinery Texas City, Texas, ISOM unit explosion (seminal event fortedicton of personnel during startup) ee eeiilasasumnined Buncefeld oil storage depot explosion and fre in UK, (seminal 6 ‘event for tank farms and APIZ350), fons. a SINAMICS PERFECT HARMONY 8 Deepwater Horlzon—Gul of Mexico—rig explosion and fre joe delivers uptime, all the time. {aemina\ event for blowout protectors (OFS) jen you're on arig 20 miles F offshore, space is always at 2 Amuay refinery fre and explosion in Venezuela 22 prema nad When yet rotating on bottom with 10 feet Pemex finery explosion at Reynosa, Temouiipes, Mexico 0 mR 10.90, packing enough power isessential Mop Te Phut petrochemical plant in Thaland 2 ww Inthe oil and gas industry, ‘operating conditions will never be perfect—but atleast your Wiliams olefin piant explosion at Geismar La 2 23 drives can be. Jp to 11 kV Dupont chemical plant in LaPorte, Texas 4 20 20% more compact SINAMICS PERFECT HARMONY Pemex Abkatun A-Permanent platform explosion, Gulf of Mexico 3Why sit difficult to earn from other people's mistakes? Afterall, we have lot of hose to choose from, As novelist and editor Edger Watson Lowe said, A good scare ‘man than good advice.” isworth more What can we do? First, we need to continue to do what we're tinue to incrementally improve; expand our horizons to-a more holistic perspective of process safety; look for new, more comprehensive or supportive hazard and risk thodologies: and use emerging technologies to our advan of the approaches that may help us improve ae proc integrity, SIS and en jig, We must also look for ways to con: ing techn 6 Process hazards analysis (PHA) One of the most common citations associated with incidents is the failure of the PHA to identify the hazardous event or ils consequence. Today there's little excuse doing a PHA on a PSM-covered process and even for not-covered processes tunder the General Duty Clause 5 of the OSH Act of 1979. A successful PHA re= aquites having the right people, who are motivated with the right knowledge and experience in a condisive atmosphere, A systemstic and consistent approach lo en- suring these items for each PHA ean improve ther. A new look should be taken at the current PHA methodologies to analysis. Techniques should also be developed to analyze systematic errors, condi- tions or states that inerease the likelihood, susceptibility and/or fragility of the sys- tein for hazards o develop, (Changing demographics have reduced the anerag the process industries, nd inereased production pressure means more has to be accompli seople. This has led to less experienced personel being as signed to PH.As because experienced people may not be available, Many times, the PHA is still viewed as a regulatory cequitement, rather than a safety improvement process, Process safety engineering knowledge is another area that’s typically’ lack ing in PAs Another problem isthe “It can’t happen here” syndrome. It can, Just because it how to improve the comprehensiveness of the experience of personnel in by fewer hasn't yet doesn't mean itwon't Another area that can improve your PHA is using front-cnd engincering to feed the HAZOP to help ensure consistency and improve the information and expec: SIEMENS Up here, Colony erates tents not an option. Sees ad SINAMICS PERFECT HARMONY Document =r \,ProComSoL st there might be in gation, take simulated actions to see what e reducing or eliminating the hazaed pro Through the use of artificial i ill advisors ot personal assistants for operations, maintenance, engineering and safety that will have access to wide range of data, stored locally and in the cloud, with automated date analysis tols and reasoning engines capable of selEleatning. Al ean also be used for antiipatory control and safety syste, Wee made a lt of process safety progress over the past four decades, but we' ile, costly events inthe petrochemical industry that may bea whisker’ breath away from disasters with multiple fatalities and serious inj igence (AD), we'll see speci sill having ries, The continued demand and growth in the petrochern ive and stockholder pressures to keep costs down and profits up, will keep the ical arena worldwide, plus eom pressure on for us to usta ue eurrent progress The future is ours to make if were upto the challenge A MONITOR VISCOSITY SIMPLY SENSE MIXER MOTOR HORSEPOWER WITH UNIVERSAL POWER CELL EASY STALLATION ches is: ies 1 yom era ross veRsaMLe = One sats motos, om sat p 8 159 * Ws on sas, ed or are ‘ena 2 rd sg ab poner sexsmtve Yee mae ene beteoang mes ‘convent ouTeuTs "Fermi can computes 2a milangs 010 98s LOAD CONTROLS maNeoeSraes ‘rruuoiocowTnt con