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    8 Kant’s Self: Real Entity and Logical Identity TOBIAS ROSEFELDT To a certain extent Kant is a pretty good Strawsonian. In much of what he says about self-consciousness he seems to agree with Strawson’s claim that 10 be self-conscious one must conceive of oneself as a corporeal object among corporeal objects." At least he is saying that we cannot have kno ledge of ourselves as individual thinking beings in so far as we regard our- selves 2s mezely thinking beings, but rather only if we refer to ourselves as thinking human beings, i. beings whose bodies provide empirically applic able criteria for their identity chrough time.’ Unfortunately, Kant destroys this harmonious picture by making a couple of rather obscure remarks about something he calls ‘the constant and abiding I (of pure apperception) (A 135) of ‘the identical self to which T ascribe all my representations (A r29fB 138), and of which [have an ‘a priori consciousness’ (A 216). These remacks are obscure because the phrase ‘a priori consciousness’ makes clear ‘hat the object of such a consciousness (‘the identical self’) cannot be iden- tified with the object of empirical self-knoviledge, i.e. the thinking human being. On the other hand, Kant denies the claim, maintained in rational psychology, shat self-consciousness includes a priori knowledge af onreelves as immaterial, persisting, and non-composite thinking substances, So the object ofa priori sef-consciousness cannot be identified with such a thinking substance either ‘When Kant himself wies to explain what ‘she self" as the object ofa prior selfconsciousness is, and what it is not, he frequently makes use of the ! BE Suawson, The Bownds of Sense: An Eeszy on Kant's Critique of Pare Reason (Londons Mathuen, 1988), 202 TC. ete der remem Vernunf, B 425fA 362 and Prolegomene oe einer jeden hitfigen Mataphyui, ci ale Wisonchah wird aufneton KSnnen, § 48, 0, Kart, Gesanle Shron (G8), hevewngegaben von der Kénigich Preulichen Akademie der Woremchaten (Bern, {G.Rusmer now de Gruyter] 3900-335; my wanslon 42 Rosefeldt distinction between logical and real features of the self, ox, as he sometimes puts it, between features of the self as a real entity and the self as a merely logical enticy, the so-called ‘logical I'? He claims that we can only know that the self is the ‘permanent logical subject of thinking’, not that it is a ‘real subject of inherence’ (A 350); we can know that it is a “logically simple subject’, but not that it isa simple substance (B 407-8). He speaks of che ‘logical identity of the I’ in opposition to the numerical identity of a eeal thinking being (A 363), and he says that there is only a ‘logical” not a ‘real possibility for us to exist as thinking non-corporeal beings. In this chapter I shall present an interpretation of the role of the term ‘logical’ in Kant's theory of self-consciousness.* I will limie myself to an explanation of Kant's use of the expressions ‘logical subject’ and ‘logical identity’ and to some remarks on his general distinction between real and logical entities. I will also address Kanr’s theory of concepts and singular judgements, because I think thar only within the framework of this theory can Kant’s claims be made intelligible. To conclude my paper I shall propose that nothing Kant says contradicts Strawson’s insights into the essential role that the seference to our own bodies plays for sef-consciousness, but rather that in some things that Kant says we can find insights that even go beyond those of Strawson’s own theory. 1 AS AN ABSOLUTE LOGICAL SUBJECT OF JUDGEMENTS ‘The Paralogism of Substantiality in che frst edition of the Critique of Pure Reason reads as follows: ‘Thar, the representation of which is the absoluce subject of our judgements and cannot therefore be employed as determination of another thing, is substance. 1s thinking being, am the absolute subjecr of all my possible judgements, and this represensation of myself cannot be employed as predicate of any other ching. Therefore I, 25 thinking being soul), am substance. (A 348) Later Kant says that though I, as 2 shinking being, am the ‘permanent log- ical subject of thinking’, I do not therefore know that 1 am 2 ‘real subject of inherence’ {A 350). These remarks leave us with three questions. What is ‘an absolute subject of judgements? Why am I, as a shinking being, an absoluse subject of judgements? And why am I only an absolute logical subject of judgements nor a real subject of inherence? 2 The vee lopicalP is weed by Kant in ie are emmy Weer snd die wicker Forte, is sie Motap bya sez Leis und Wolf's Zeit n Dewschland gemsachs ba (GS 2% 27 Bid. (G5 xe Kant’s Selfi Real Entity and Logical Identity 343 To help answer the first question I will cite a passage from Kant's Prolegomena: ure reason requires us to seek for every predicate of thing is proper subject, and for this subject, which is tel? necessarily nothing but a predicate, is subjecs and 50 on indefinitely (or as far as we can zeach), But hence it follows that we ‘usenet hold anysbing, at which we can arrive, 10 be an ultimate subject. for the specific nature of our understanding consists in thinking everything discuss- Ively, that is by concepts, and so by mere predicates, 1o which cherefore che absolute subject must always be missing From this passage it should be clear that by ‘subject of a judgement’ Kant tmeans a thing of which we con aay something in a judgement. The subjece of a certain judgement is che thing that is cepresented by the concept used fs the subjece-concept in this judgement. Hence, an absolure subject of judgements would be something that is represented by a concept that only can be used as a subject-concept of a judgement but not as a predicate. Because, according to Kant, all concepts can be employed as predicates of possible judgements (A 69/B 94), we cannot represent absolute subjects of judgements by means of concepts. 1 the first premiss ofthe Paralogism of Substantialty Kant makes another imporcant remark on the absolute subjects of our judgements. He says that subscance is something the concept of which cannot be ‘employed as deter- rmination of another thing’, In order to understand this cemark one has £0 take into consideration the logical theory delineaced by Kant's predecessors ‘According co pre-Kantian logic, a concept that cannot be employed as dever- rmination of another thing would be a "singular concep®. A singular concep fs the kind of concept Leibniz calls ‘a complece concept of an individuum’, ive, a concept with a content so rich that there is only one possible object to ‘which it can be applied. Singular concepts refer to individual monads, and these monads are substances, for they are the ulsimate and simple parts of which everything else is composed. In the proof of the ‘thesis’ of the second ‘Antinory Kant calls these monads ‘elementary substances’, which are the “fist subjects of all composition’ (A 436/B 464)” « Profegumen § 46 (Sn 338 + HincPunsof ca wan ‘iuboacs ie asbiguus, forke wes itt 2 mann in wc te shore mening once), weno ocala ana parable oun a whch ‘aivevafos certo an mentary vince os tng wai i compontof ae Ser Rina 22 Sampontesobuane cf 8 5B 460) Altboagh Sawn ay be nh cae Perfor inc duction of aban the Analogies of Experiena te Bo meig she evan oe el Kant on Subway in BF Seawios, Ey and Iori ard Ober eye (OxtorOUsgyy aot, ta] ik ebro hatin toca om hep SB by numanc’ Fates an seca bance. The jet a = ik SOREN apr eatrans for eungie wonle aot make ony sme "sbeanse SES has oun i tor ndgcnene hs epreacon aso sppored by 8 as SESS ade ae sae thar by te expeson ‘ona’ Len ats someting Sha Envi pes ut sinleabrane og sears slo A ga5 472 344 Rosefelde So Kant’ claim char we do not have concepts that we can only use as subject-concepts in our judgements and never as ‘determination of another thing’ is equivalent to the claim thar we do not have singular concepts, a claim he makes in many of his remarks on logi.® If we want to make 4 judgement about ¢ certain individual thing, we cannor do so by employing a singular concept, for all concepts we have are general concepts. We must rather make what Kant calls ‘a singular use of a general concept. The site golar use of general concepts is possible, because the use of concepts is not the only means we have 10 refer to objects. Objects are given to us in intu- ition and an intuition is always a representation of a singular object (A 320f ' 376-7). the umportant point is, then, that applying a concept to an object given in intuition does not make this concept a singular concept, ie. a con- cept we cannot apply to ‘another thing’. If] point to 2 rose and say ‘This rose is red’ and then point to another and say “This cose is white’ Lam making two judgements about two numerically distinct roses, although the subject concept of my judgement is the same in both cases. Ican do this because, with regard to objects of intuition, Kant says, ‘we do not concern ourselves with comparing the concepts, but, although they may be in this respect per- fectly the same, the difference of their places atthe same time is a sufficient ground for asserting the numerical difference of these objects (of senses)’ (A 265/B 519). This means that I can distinguish berween two aumerically dliscincr objects by their position in space, although I mighe not be able to dis- tinguish between them by means of the concepts I apply to them. Hence, although I can refer 10 particular rose (the red one, say] using the concept “rose” a5 the subject-concep: of my judgement, the concept ‘rose’ is not the concept of an absolute subject, for it can also be predicated of ‘another thing’ (eg. che white rose). This situation would nor change ifL were able to give a more detailed description of the rose about which I intend co speak. For even in the case of a concept like ‘the pale red rose with the sweet smell, which has such-and-such a shape, etc. it is always possible that there is another cost at another place to which I could apply this concepe as well. That is to say that no concept—however rich its content may be—can be such thar it cannot be ‘employed as determination of another thing’. ‘The second question was why I, as a thinking being, am an absolute subject of judgements, the representation of which cannot be emploved as predicate of any other thing, The passage from the Prolegomena cited above continues: Now we appear to have this substance in the consciousness of onrselves ... for all the predicates of inner sense relate 1o the I as subject, and this cannot farher bbe choughe asthe predicate of any ocher subject. ih Poli (GS ma. 569, Jtche-Logit, 22 2. ysremology Review Kants Self: Real Entity and Logical Identity 45 Kant’s point here stems to be the following: the representation we have of ourselves as thinking beings, i. the concept “, as 2 thinking being’, fulfils the criterion for concepts of absolute subjects of judgements in so far as we cannot apply it to diferent possible objects. T is a concept that Tean apply aly to one possible object, ie. myself. This interpretation is supported by 4 passage from Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics, in which he formulates the rational psychologist’ argument for the substantiality of the soul as follows: iam a substance. The I zefess to the subject in so fer asi is nor the predicate af ‘another thing. That which is not the predicate of another thing is = substance. The {isthe common subject ofall predicates, all thinking, all acuoas, all possible judgements which we can make about ourselves as @ thinking being. 1 can only say: 1 am, 1 think, J act... bucF cannot predicare the Tof something else, Teannot say: another being is the 1° “Although these remarks are not formulated very clearly, i should be appar- feat char the reason why we regard ourselves as thinking substances is 1 peculiarity of the representation we have of ourselves as thinking beings. i cannot apply the concept ’ to any being other than myself in the same ‘manner as I can apply the concept ‘tose’ 10 different roses. Does this mean that ‘Tis 2 singular concept in the pre-Kantian logicians’ understanding of this term?!" Kant points out cwo fundamental differences. The first is that e singular concept is a concept with a content so cich that there is only one possible object to which it can be applied. Now itis true that I can only apply ‘T' to one possible object, ic. myself, bur this is not because the content of ‘T consists of a bundle of qualities that only I happen to have, On the contrary: ‘is an expression that is ‘completely empry with regard to its content’ (A 355), ie. its content is not richer than that of a con- cept like ‘a thinking being = x" (A 346/B 404]. The second difference between ‘T anda singular concept is that the description ‘can only be applied to one possible object’ is only «ruc of the concept ‘Tif itis completed by the restriction ‘by myself. For though itis true thet J can only apply the concept P to one possible objec, ic. myself it can nevertheless be applied to other possible objects by other thinking beings, if they apply it to themselves. Kant hints towards this characteristic of che concept ‘T by formulating the second ‘premiss of the Paralogism of Subscancialicy ina slighty different way fom the first. The first premiss states thar a substance is an absolute subject 1 Voresungen ier Measpyik(L1 nach Polis (GS so. 266). 1 Kons seeae ost be sce whather that which s expressed by the fiteperson pronoun ‘shouldbe called «concep at al. Athough see are some pasages is whic he calls‘ concept (Gl eg A aon A ja3iB 400, 3438 399) there are others in which he expliccyeeftss to 60 fo leh eg 8 se¥-dB 403-4 & Jah for derailed disunion of his nue See Rost, Das Iogiahe Tob, 25-23 x46 Rosefelde ‘of our judgements’, while the second only claims that I, as a chinking being, ‘am the absolute subject of all rey possible judgements’. Therefore, Kant says, itis only true that ‘everybody has to conceive of himself as a substance’ (A 349), for T is 2 concept that he can apply only to one thinking being, ie. himself, bat nor to ‘another thing’. Tais last remark obviously relates to Kane's claim that although ‘Tis in fone respect similar to a singular concept, which cannor ‘be employed as determination of another thing’, I nevertheless do not, by representing myself by this concept, know that I, as a thinking being, am a ‘real subject of inherence’, ie, a substance. So let us now come to our third question: what docs Kant mean by saying hat 1, as a thinking being, am only an absolute logical subject of judgements and not a real subject of inherence? Before 1 answer this question I would like to make some general remarks about Kant’s distinction between logical and real features of an object, of, ‘sone could also put it, Berween features of merely logical and chose of real LOGICAL PREDICATE AND LOGICAL SOMETHING The chapter on the Paralogism of Pure Reason is not the only text in which Kant makes use of the distinction beoween a concept understood in its “logical and in its ‘real’ meaning, Aside from making a distinction between 4 logical and a zeal subject, between logical and real simplicity, logical and real identity, and logical and reai possibility, he also distinguishes beeween logical and real essence,"? logical and real negation, a logical and a real reason (Grund), a5 well as logical and real necessity" The best known of these distinctions is that made between logical and a real predicate in Kant’s refutation of che oncological proof for the existence of God. Since this distinction seems co be the counterpart to the distinction between a logical and a real subject, I shall give a short reminder of what a logical opposed to a real predicate is 18 Existence, says Kant, is only a logical, not a real, predicate. Ir isa logical predicate because it can be predicated of thing, i. the concepr ‘existence’ can be used as a predicate-concept in a judgement, eg. in 2 judgement like “God exists’ It is not a real predicate because itis not the property of @ thing, but rather concerns the relation between a concept and an object. CE. eg, Vorlesungen aber Mecaphysk (22 nach Pais (GS xem. 553-3), 3 Ch eg. Vrsech den Begriff dar mrgativen Grifen in die Welevsheit sineren Si 1% Gh eg, bid, (G3 is 305). Chg. Vorlesingon aber Mecap hy (12 nach Pai) (GS rw 557-8, % forthe following ef A s98-aBb aber. Kant's Self: Real Entity and Logical Identity 347 Jn a judgement like ‘God exists’ we claim that there is an object ro which the concept ‘God? corresponds, but nor that there is an object, God, which has che property of existence. Because existence is not the property of 2 thing, the concep ‘existence’ cannot be part of the concept of a thing, and, hhence, a judgement like ‘God does nor exist’ can never entail a conceprual cconsradietion, From this we can conclude zhata logical predicates everything that can be predicated of a thing, i. everything that can be represeared by the predicate-concept of a judgement, while a real predicate represents a property that things can have or not have. Since not everything that can be predicated of a thing ia a judgement is 2 property of that thing, not every logieal preicare is also a real one. ‘How does this help us with Kanv’s distinction between a real subject of inherence and an absolute logical subject of judgements? If we ignore the attribute ‘absolute’ for @ while, we can transfer what Kant says about a real and a merely logical predicate in. the following way: a logical subject is everything of which we can predicate something, ie. everything the concept of which we can use as the subject-concept in 2 judgement, while areal sub- ject is something in which properties inhere, 2 substance. Kant’s distinction between logical and real subjects would then result from the fact that not everything of which we can predicate something in 2 judgement is a thing in which properties inhere. This seems like a rather sensible hing t0 say, foc we can even make judgements about properties, such as Red is my favourite colour’, although properties like the colour red are by definition not substances. Tn one of his Lectures on Metaphysics Kane calls something about which swe can make judgements alchough ie is not a real subject a “logical some- thing’. ‘By “something”’, he says, ‘we mean every object of thinking; this is the logical something. The concept of an object in general is called the high- est concept ofall knowiedge. Such an object is also called a something, but not a metaphysical, but only a logical, something." The distinction between a logical and a metaphysical something obviously corresponds to that between a fogical and a real subject. At the end of the Transcendental Analytic of the Critigue of Pure Reason Kant makes a similar claim. Among the chings chat fall under the concept of an object in general he distinguishes between objects that are ‘something’ (in the narrow, or ‘metaphysical sense of ‘something’) and those that are ‘nothing’, and hence, one could conclude, only something ia the logical sense of ‘something’ (A 290/B 346-7). Examples for objects of the latter kind are, among others, the so-called 1 Vorlesurgen ber Metpinik (2 nach Pols) (GS xi, 544) Ins esey Ensy and ‘eat Sttewson makes somewhat simiar eli by cscnguising berween entices which are ‘abuaosal objec’ and those which are objects oly ic the sense thas they are "he subjecs oF incispessble fem-orderpreicain’ ia Scawson, Znity and Idem, =£-5%, 8834), 148 Rosefeldt ‘objects of mere thought’ (A 292/B 348), ie. ‘object(s} of concept{s] to ‘which no corresponding intuition can be given’ (A 290/B 347). Kant’s most common example for such an ‘object of mere thought’ is a spicit, ie. a thinking non-

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