Case Digest Negotiable Instrument PDF

GR 184458
FACTS: The parties were friends and kumpadres for a long time already. Rivera obtained a loan from the
Spouses Chua evidenced by a Promissory Note. The relevant parts of the note are the following:
(a) FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I, RODRIGO RIVERA promise to pay spouses SALVADOR C. CHUA
and VIOLETA SY CHUA, the sum of One Hundred Twenty Thousand Philippine Currency (_120,000.00)
on December 31, 1995.
(b) It is agreed and understood that failure on my part to pay the amount of (_120,000.00) One Hundred
Twenty Thousand Pesos on December 31, 1995. I agree to pay the sum equivalent to FIVEPERCENT
(5%) interest monthly from the date of default until the entire obligation is fully paid for.
Three years from the date of payment stipulated in the promissory note, Rivera, issued
and delivered to Spouses Chua two (2) checks drawn against his account at Philippine Commercial
International Bank (PCIB) but upon presentment for payment, the two checks were dishonored forthe
reason “account closed.” As of 31 May 1999, the amount due the Spouses Chua was pegged at
P366,000.00 covering the principal of P120,000.00 plus five percent (5%) interest per month from 1
January 1996 to 31 May 1999.
The Spouses Chua alleged that they have repeatedly demanded payment from Rivera to no avail. Because
of Rivera’s unjustified refusal to pay, the Spouses Chua were constrained to file a suit before the MeTC,
Branch 30, Manila.
The MeTC ruled against Rivera requiring him to pay the spouses Chua P120,000.00 plus stipulated
interest at the rate of 5% per month from 1 January 1996, and legal interest at the rate of 12% percent per
annum from 11 June 1999 and was affirmed by the RTC of Manila. The Court of Appeals further affirmed
the decision upon appeal of the two inferior courts but with modification of lowering the stipulated
interest to 12% per annum. Hence, a petition at the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Promissory Note executed as evidence of loan falls under Negiotiable Instruments
Law.
2. Whether or not a demand from spouses Chua is needed to make Rivera liable.
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3. Whether or not the stipulated interest is unconscionable and should really be lowered.
Held: 1. NO, the Promissory Note executed as evidence of loan does not fall under Negotiable
Instruments Law. The instrument is still governed by the Civil Code as to interpretation of their
obligations. The Supreme Court held that the Instrument was not able to meet the requisites laid down by
Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law as the instrument was made out to specific persons, herein
respondents, the Spouses Chua, and not to order or to bearer, or to the order of the Spouses Chua as
payees.
cals not a negotiable instrument and therefore outside the coverage of Section 70 of the NIL which
provides that presentment for payment is not necessary to charge the person liable on the instrument,
Rivera is still liable under the terms of the Promissory Note that he issued. Article 1169 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist
when the obligation or the law expressly so declare. The clause in the Promissory Note containing the
stipulation of interest (letter B in the above facts) which expressly requires the debtor (Rivera) to pay a
5% monthly interest from the “date of default” until the entire obligation is fully paid for. Theparties
evidently agreed that the maturity of the obligation at a date certain, 31 December 1995, will give rise to
the obligation to pay interest.
3. YES, the stipulated interest is unconscionable and should really be lowered. The Supreme Court held
that as observed by Rivera, the stipulated interest of 5% per month or 60% per annum in addition to legal
interests and attorney’s fees is, indeed, highly iniquitous and unreasonable and stipulated interest rates if
illegal and are unconscionable the Court is allowed to temper interest rates when necessary. Since the
interest rate agreed upon is void, the parties are considered to have no stipulation regarding the interest
rate, thus, the rate of interest should be 12% per annum computed from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand. However, the 12% per annum rate of legal interest is only applicable until 30 June 2013, before
the advent and effectivity of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 reducing
the rate of legal interest to 6% per annum. Pursuant to our ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,30 BSP
Circular No. 799 is prospectively applied from 1 July 2013.
Patrimonio vs. Gutierrez
(G.R. No. 187769, June 4, 2014)
Doctrines: In order however that one who is not a holder in due course can enforce the instrument against
a party prior to the instrument’s completion, two requisites must exist: (1) that the blank must be filled
strictly in accordance with the authority given; and (2) it must be filled up within a reasonable time. If it
was proven that the instrument had not been filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and
within a reasonable time, the maker can set this up as a personal defense and avoid liability. However, if
the holder is a holder in due course, there is a conclusive presumption that authority to fill it up had been
given and that the same was not in excess of authority.
Facts: The petitioner and the respondent Napoleon Gutierrez (Gutierrez) entered into a business venture
under the name of Slam Dunk Corporation (Slum Dunk), a production outfit that produced mini-concerts
and shows related to basketball. In the course of their business, the petitioner pre-signed several checks to

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answer for the expenses of Slam Dunk; however, these checks had no payee’s name, date or amount. The
blank checks were entrusted to Gutierrez with the specific instruction not to fill them out without previous
notification to and approval by the petitioner. Without the petitioner’s knowledge and consent, Gutierrez
went to Marasigan to secure a loan in the amount of ₱200,000.00 and Gutierrez simultaneously delivered
to Marasigan one of the blank checks the petitioner pre-signed with Pilipinas Bank in the amount of
"₱200,000.00. When Marasigan deposited the check, it was dishonored for the reason "ACCOUNT
CLOSED" and so Marasigan sought recovery from Gutierrez and petitioner asking for the payment of
₱200,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not Marasigan is a holder in due course thus may hold petitioner liable.
Held: No, Marasigan is not a holder in due course. Section 52(c) & (d) of the NIL states that a holder in
due course is one who takes the instrument “in good faith and for value" and that it is necessary that at the
time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of
the person negotiating it. In the present case, Gutierrez was only authorized to use the check for business
expenses; thus, he exceeded the authority when he used the check to pay the loan he supposedly
contracted for the construction of petitioner's house. Marasigan’s knowledge that the petitioner is not a
party or a privy to the contract of loan, and correspondingly had no obligation or liability to him, renders
him dishonest, hence, in bad faith. Considering that Marasigan is not a holder in due course, the petitioner
can validly set up the personal defense that the blanks were not filled up in accordance with the authority
he gave; hence, Marasigan has no right to enforce payment against the petitioner and the latter cannot be
obliged to pay the face value of the check.
FIDELIZA J. AGLIBOT v. INGERSOL L. SANTIA, GR No. 185945, 2012-12-05
Facts:
Private respondent-complainant Engr. Ingersol L. Santia (Santia) loaned the amount of P2,500,000.00 to
Pacific Lending & Capital Corporation (PLCC), through its Manager, petitioner Fideliza J. Aglibot
(Aglibot). The loan was evidenced by a Promissory Note dated July 1,... 2003, issued by Aglibot in
behalf of PLCC, payable in one year subject to interest at 24% per annum.
Allegedly as a guaranty or security for the payment of the note, Aglibot also issued and delivered to
Santia eleven (11) post-dated personal checks drawn from her... own demand account maintained at
Metrobank, Camiling Branch.
Aglibot is a major stockholder of PLCC
Upon presentment of the aforesaid checks for payment, they were dishonored by the bank for having
been drawn against insufficient funds or closed account.
Consequently, eleven (11) Informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22)

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Issues:
Still maintaining that she was a mere guarantor of the said debt of PLCC when she agreed to issue her
own checks, Aglibot insists that Santia failed to exhaust all means to collect the debt from PLCC, the
principal debtor, and therefore he cannot now be permitted to go after her... subsidiary liability.
Ruling:
Aglibot cannot invoke the benefit of excussion
The Court must, however, reject Aglibot's claim as a mere guarantor of the indebtedness of PLCC to
Santia for want of proof, in view of Article 1403(2) of the Civil Code, embodying the Statute of Frauds,
which provides:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases
an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or... by his agent; evidence,
therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its
contents:
A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
Under the above provision, concerning a guaranty agreement, which is a promise to answer for the debt or
default of another,[17] the law clearly requires that it, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in
writing. Otherwise, it would be unenforceable unless... ratified,[18] although under Article 1358[19] of
the Civil Code, a contract of guaranty does not have to appear in a public document.
On the other hand, Article 2055 of the Civil Code also provides that a guaranty is not presumed, but must
be express, and cannot extend to more than what is stipulated therein. This is the obvious rationale why a
contract of guarantee is unenforceable unless made in... writing or evidenced by some writing.
Aglibot is an accommodation party... and therefore liable to Santia
It noted that she could have issued PLCC's checks, but instead she chose to issue her own checks, drawn
against her personal account with Metrobank.

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It concluded that Aglibot intended to personally assume the repayment of the loan, pointing out that in her
Counter-Affidavit, she even admitted that she was personally indebted to Santia, and only raised payment
as her defense, a clear admission of her liability for the said loan.
The facts below present a clear situation where Aglibot, as the manager of PLCC, agreed to accommodate
its loan to Santia by issuing her own post-dated checks in payment thereof.
She is what the Negotiable Instruments Law calls an accommodation party.
Sec. 29. Liability of an accommodation party. An accommodation party is one who has signed the
instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose
of lending his name to some other person. Such... a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for
value notwithstanding such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an
accommodation party.
An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, indorser, without
receiving value therefor and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such person is
liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding... such holder, at the time of the taking of
the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party. In lending his name to the accommodated
party, the accommodation party is in effect a surety for the latter. He lends his name to enable the
accommodated party to... obtain credit or to raise money.
The relation between an accommodation party and the party accommodated is, in effect, one of principal
and surety the accommodation party being the surety. It is a settled rule that a surety is bound equally and
absolutely with the principal and is deemed an original... promisor and debtor from the beginning. The
liability is immediate and direct.
Moreover, it was held in Aruego that unlike in a contract of suretyship, the liability of the accommodation
party remains not only primary but also unconditional to a holder for value, such that even if the
accommodated party receives an extension of the period for... payment without the consent of the
accommodation party, the latter is still liable for the whole obligation and such extension does not release
him because as far as a holder for value is concerned, he is a solidary co-debtor.
Principles:
The mere fact, then, that Aglibot issued her own checks to Santia made her personally liable to the latter
on her checks without the need for Santia to first go after PLCC for the payment of its loan.[28] It would
have been otherwise had it been shown... that Aglibot was a mere guarantor, except that since checks
were issued ostensibly in payment for the loan, the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law must
take primacy in application.

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ROBERT DINO v. MARIA LUISA JUDAL-LOOT, GR No. 170912, 2010-04-19
Facts:
syndicate... approached petitioner and induced him to lend the group P3,000,000.00 to be secured by a
real estate mortgage on the properties
Enticed and convinced by the syndicate's offer,... petitioner issued three Metrobank checks totaling
P3,000,000.00, one of which is Check No. C-MA-142119406-CA postdated 13 February 1993 in the
amount of P1,000,000.00 payable to Vivencia Ompok Consing and/or Fe Lobitana.[5]
Realizing he had been deceived, petitioner advised Metrobank to stop payment of his checks. However,
only the payment of Check No. C-MA-
142119406-CA was ordered stopped. The other two checks were already encashed by the payees.
Lobitana negotiated and indorsed Check No. C-MA- 142119406-CA to respondents in exchange for cash
in the sum of P948,000.00,... when respondents deposited the check with Metrobank, Cebu-Mabolo
Branch, the same was... dishonored by the drawee bank for reason "PAYMENT STOPPED."
Respondents filed a collection suit[6] against petitioner and Lobitana before the trial court. In their
Complaint,
Issues:
RESPONDENTS WERE HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE.
whether respondents are holders in due course of Metrobank Check No. C-MA 142119406 CA
Ruling:
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court

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Maria Luisa Judal-Loot and Vicente Loot are... holders in due course... ordered petitioner Robert Dino as
drawer, together with co-defendant Fe Lobitana as indorser, to solidarily pay respondents the face value of
the check, among others.
no privity between respondents and defendants.
respondents' lack of knowledge of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating it... respondents must be excluded from the ambit of petitioner's stop payment order.
Bognot vs. RRI Lending
Bognot vs. RRI Lending
GR No. 180144, September 24, 2014
Brion, J.:
Facts:
In September 1996, Leonardo Bognot and his younger brother, Rolando Bognot applied for and obtained
a loan of P500,000.00 from RRI Lending, payable on November 30, 1996. The loan was evidenced by a
promissory note and was secured by a post dated check dated November 30, 1996.
Evidence on record shows that Leonardo renewed the loan several times on a monthly basis. He paid a
renewal fee of P54,600.00 for each renewal, issued a new post-dated check as security, and executed
and/or renewed the promissory note previously issued. RRI Lending on the other hand, cancelled and
returned to Leonardo the post-dated checks issued prior to their renewal.
Leonardo purportedly paid the renewal fees and issued a post-dated check dated June 30, 1997 as security.
As had been done in the past, RRI Lending superimposed the date "June 30, 1997" on the promissory note
to make it appear that it would mature on the said date.
Several days before the loan’s maturity, Rolando’s wife, Julieta, went to the respondent’s office and
applied for another renewal of the loan. She issued in favor of RRI Lending a promissory note and a
check dated July 30, 1997, in the amount of P54,600.00 as renewal fee.
On the excuse that she needs to bring home the loan documents for the Bognot siblings’ signatures and
replacement, Julieta asked the RRI Lending clerk to release to her the promissory note, the disclosure
statement, and the check dated July 30, 1997. Julieta, however, never returned these documents nor issued
a new post-dated check. Consequently, RRI Lending sent Leonardo follow-up letters demanding payment
of the loan, plus interest and penalty charges. These demands went unheeded.
In his Answer, Leonardo, claimed, among other things, that the complaint states no cause of action
because RRI Lending’s claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished, and that the
one (1) month loan contracted by Rolando and his wife in November 1996 which was lastly renewed in
March 1997 had already been fully paid and extinguished in April 1997.
Issue:
Whether the parties’ obligation was extinguished by payment
Held:
Jurisprudence tells us that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; the burden rests on the
defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. Indeed, once the existence
of an indebtedness is duly established by evidence, the burden of showing with legal certainty that the
obligation has been discharged by payment rests on the debtor.
In the present case, Leonardo failed to satisfactorily prove that his obligation had already been
extinguished by payment. As the CA correctly noted, the petitioner failed to present any evidence that

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RRI Lending had in fact encashed his check and applied the proceeds to the payment of the loan. Neither
did he present official receipts evidencing payment, nor any proof that the check had been dishonored.
We note that the petitioner merely relied on the respondent’s cancellation and return to him of the check
dated April 1, 1997. The evidence shows that this check was issued to secure the indebtedness. The acts
imputed on the respondent, standing alone, do not constitute sufficient evidence of payment.
Article 1249, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code provides:
xxxx
The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile documents
shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when through the fault of the
creditor they have been impaired. (Emphasis supplied)
Also, we held in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Royeca:
Settled is the rule that payment must be made in legal tender. A check is not legal tender and, therefore,
cannot constitute a valid tender of payment. Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money
and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment. Mere delivery
of checks does not discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and
remains suspended until the payment by commercial document is actually realized.(Emphasis supplied)
Although Article 1271 of the Civil Code provides for a legal presumption of renunciation of action (in
cases where a private document evidencing a credit was voluntarily returned by the creditor to the
debtor), this presumption is merely prima facie and is not conclusive; the presumption loses efficacy
when faced with evidence to the contrary.
Moreover, the cited provision merely raises a presumption, not of payment, but of the renunciation of the
credit where more convincing evidence would be required than what normally would be called for to
prove payment. Thus, reliance by the petitioner on the legal presumption to prove payment is misplaced.
To reiterate, no cash payment was proven by the petitioner. The cancellation and return of the check dated
April 1, 1997, simply established his renewal of the loan – not the fact of payment. Furthermore, it has
been established during trial, through repeated acts, that the respondent cancelled and surrendered the
post-dated check previously issued whenever the loan is renewed.
BDO UNIBANK v. ENGR. SELWYN LAO, GR No. 227005, 2017-06-19
Facts:
On March 9, 1999, respondent Engineer Selwyn S. Lao (Lao) filed before the RTC a complaint for
collection of sum of money against Equitable Banking Corporation, now petitioner Banco de Oro
Unibank (BDO), Everlink Pacific Ventures, Inc. (Everlink), and Wu Hsieh a.k.a. George Wu (Wu).
In his complaint, Lao alleged that he was doing business under the name and style of "Selwyn Lao
Construction"; that he was a majority stockholder of Wing An Construction and Development

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Corporation (Wing An); that he entered into a transaction with Everlink, through its authorized
representative Wu, under which, Everlink would supply him with "HCG sanitary wares"; and that for the
down payment, he issued two (2) Equitable crossed checks payable to Everlink: Check No. 0127-
242249[4] and Check No. 0127-242250,[5] in the amounts of P273,300.00 and P336,500.00, respectively.
On August 24, 2001, Lao filed an Amended Complaint, wherein he impleaded Union Bank as additional
defendant for allowing the deposit of the crossed checks in two bank accounts other than the payee's, in
violation of its obligation to deposit the same only to the payee's account.
In its answer, Union Bank argued that Check No. 0127-242249 was deposited in the account of Everlink;
that Check No. 0127-242250 was validly negotiated by Everlink to New Wave; that Check No. 0127-
242250 was presented for payment to BDO, and the proceeds thereof were credited to New Wave's
account; that it was under no obligation to deposit the checks only in the account of Everlink because
there was nothing on the checks which would indicate such restriction; and that a crossed check continues
to be negotiable, the only limitation being that it should be presented for payment by a bank.
Tinimbang testified that Everlink was the payee of the two (2) crossed checks issued by their client, Wing
An; that the checks were deposited with Union Bank, which presented them to BDO for payment.
Atty. Buenaventura claimed that BDO gave credence to Union Bank's representation that the checks were
indeed credited to the account of Everlink. He stated that BDO's only obligations under the circumstances
were to ascertain the genuineness of the checks, to determine if the account was sufficiently funded and to
credit the proceeds to the collecting bank.
For its part, Union Bank presented as its witness Jojina Lourdes C. Vega (Vega), its Branch Business
Manager. Vega testified that the transaction history of Everlink's account with Union Bank and the
notation at the back of the check indicating Everlink's Account No. (005030000925) revealed that the
proceeds of Check No. 0127-242249 were duly credited to Everlink's account on September 22, 1997.
Issues:
whether or not the checks were actually delivered to the payee.
Ruling:
The RTC Ruling
The CA Ruling

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The Court's Ruling
Principles:
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
11 JULY 2016
DESIGNER BASKETS, INC. v. AIR SEA TRANSPORT, INC. and ASIA CARGO CONTAINER
LINES, INC., G.R. No. 184513, Third Div., March 9, 2016, JARDELEZA, J.
A) A common carrier may release the goods to the consignee even without the surrender of the bill of
lading.
This case presents an instance where an unpaid seller sues not only the buyer, but the carrier and the
carrier’s agent as well, for the payment of the value of the goods sold. The basis for ASTI and ACCLI’s
liability, as pleaded by DBI, is the bill of lading covering the shipment. A bill of lading is defined as “a
written acknowledgment of the receipt of goods and an agreement to transport and to deliver them at a
specified place to a person named or on his order.” It may also be defined as “an instrument in writing,
signed by a carrier or his agent, describing the freight so as to identify it, stating the name of the
consignor, the terms of the contract of carriage, and agreeing or directing that the freight be delivered to
bearer, to order or to a specified person at a specified place.”
Under Article 350 of the Code of Commerce, “the shipper as well as the carrier of the merchandise or
goods may mutually demand that a bill of lading be made.” A bill of lading, when issued by the carrier to
the shipper, is the legal evidence of the contract of carriage between the former and the latter. It defines
the rights and liabilities of the parties in reference to the contract of carriage. The stipulations in the bill of
lading are valid and binding unless they are contrary to law, morals, customs, public order or public
policy.
Here, ACCLI, as agent of ASTI, issued Bill of Lading No. AC/MLLA601317 to DBI. This bill of lading
governs the rights, obligations and liabilities of DBI and ASTI. DBI claims that Bill of Lading No.
AC/MLLA601317 contains a provision stating that ASTI and ACCLI are “to release and deliver the
cargo/shipment to the consignee, x x x, only after the original copy or copies of the said Bill of Lading is
or are surrendered to
them; otherwise they become liable to [DBI] for the value of the shipment.” Quite tellingly,
however, DBI does not point or refer to any specific clause or provision on the bill of lading supporting
this claim. The language of the bill of lading shows no such requirement. What the bill of lading provides
on its face is:
Received by the Carrier in apparent good order and condition unless otherwise indicated hereon,
the Container(s) and/or goods hereinafter mentioned to be transported and/or otherwise forwarded
from the Place of Receipt to the intended Place of Delivery upon and [subject] to all the terms and
conditions appearing on the face and back of this Bill of Lading. If required by the Carrier this Bill of
Lading duly endorsed must be surrendered in exchange for the Goods of delivery order. (Emphasis
supplied.)

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There is no obligation, therefore, on the part of ASTI and ACCLI to release the goods only upon the
surrender of the original bill of lading.
Further, a carrier is allowed by law to release the goods to the consignee even without the
latter’s surrender of the bill of lading. The third paragraph of Article 353 of the Code of Commerce is
enlightening:
Article 353. The legal evidence of the contract between the shipper and the carrier shall be the bills
of lading, by the contents of which the disputes which may arise regarding their execution and
performance shall be decided, no exceptions being admissible other than those of falsity and material
error in the drafting.
After the contract has been complied with, the bill of lading which the carrier has issued shall be
returned to him, and by virtue of the exchange of this title with the thing transported, the respective
obligations and actions shall be considered cancelled, unless in the same act the claim which the
parties may wish to reserve be reduced to writing, with the exception of that provided for in Article
366.
In case the consignee, upon receiving the goods, cannot return the bill of lading subscribed
by the carrier, because of its loss or any other cause, he must give the latter a receipt for the goods
delivered, this receipt producing the same effects as the return of the bill of lading. (Emphasis supplied.)
The general rule is that upon receipt of the goods, the consignee surrenders the bill of lading to the
carrier and their respective obligations are considered canceled. The law, however, provides two
exceptions where the goods may be released without the surrender of the bill of lading because the
consignee can no longer return it. These exceptions are when the bill of lading gets lost or for other cause.
In either case, the consignee must issue a receipt to the carrier upon the release of the goods. Such
receipt shall produce the same effect as the surrender of the bill of lading.
We have already ruled that the non-surrender of the original bill of lading does not violate the
carrier’s duty of extraordinary diligence over the goods. In Republic v. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, we
found that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence when it released the shipment to the consignee,
not upon the surrender of the original bill of lading, but upon signing the delivery receipts and surrender
of the certified true copies of the
bills of lading. Thus, we held that the surrender of the original bill of lading is not a condition precedent
for a common carrier to be discharged of its contractual obligation.
Under special circumstances, we did not even require presentation of any form of receipt by the
consignee, in lieu of the original bill of lading, for the release of the goods. In Macam v. Court of
Appeals, we absolved the carrier from liability for releasing the goods to the consignee without the bills
of lading despite this provision on the bills of lading:
“One of the Bills of Lading must be surrendered duly endorsed in exchange for the goods or delivery

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order.”(Citations omitted.)
In clearing the carrier from liability, we took into consideration that the shipper sent a telex to the
carrier after the goods were shipped. The telex instructed the carrier to deliver the goods without need of
presenting the bill of lading and bank guarantee per the shipper's request since “for prepaid shipt ofrt
charges already fully paid our end x x x.” We also noted the usual practice of the shipper to request the
shipping lines to immediately release perishable cargoes through telephone calls.
Also, in Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals, we absolved the carrier from liability for
releasing the goods to the supposed consignee, Consolidated Mines, Inc. (CMI), on the basis of an
Undertaking for Delivery of Cargo but without the surrender of the original bill of lading presented by
CMI. Similar to the factual circumstance in this case, the Undertaking in Eastern Shipping Lines
guaranteed to hold the carrier “harmless from all demands, claiming liabilities, actions and expenses.”
Though the central issue in that case was who the consignee was in the bill of lading, it is noteworthy how
we gave weight to the Undertaking in ruling in favor of the carrier:
But assuming that CMI may not be considered consignee, the petitioner cannot be faulted for
releasing the goods to CMI under the circumstances, due to its lack of knowledge as to who was the real
consignee in view of CMI’s strong representations and letter of undertaking wherein it stated that the bill
of lading would be presented later. This is precisely the situation covered by the last paragraph of Art. 353
of the [Code of Commerce] to wit:
“If in case of loss or for any other reason whatsoever, the consignee cannot return upon receiving
the merchandise the bill of lading subscribed by the carrier, he shall give said carrier a receipt of the
goods delivered this receipt producing the same effects as the return of the bill of lading.”
Clearly, law and jurisprudence is settled that the surrender of the original bill of lading is not absolute;
that in case of loss or any other cause, a common carrier may release the goods to the consignee even
without it.
Here, Ambiente could not produce the bill of lading covering the shipment not because it was lost, but
for another cause: the bill of lading was retained by DBI pending Ambiente’s full payment of the
shipment. Ambiente and ASTI then entered into an Indemnity Agreement, wherein the former asked the
latter to release the shipment even without the surrender of the bill of lading. The execution of this
Agreement, and the undisputed fact that the shipment was released to Ambiente pursuant to it, to our
mind,
operates as a receipt in substantial compliance with the last paragraph of Article 353 of the Code of
Commerce.
B) Articles 1733, 1734, and 1735 of the Civil Code are not applicable. DBI, however, challenges the
Agreement, arguing that the carrier released the goods pursuant to it, notwithstanding the carrier's
knowledge that the bill of lading should first be surrendered. As such, DBI claims that ASTI and ACCLI
are liable for damages because they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods pursuant to Articles 1733, 1734, and 1735 of the Civil Code.

Page 12 of 29
DBI is mistaken.
Articles 1733, 1734, and 1735 of the Civil Code are not applicable in this case. The Articles state:
Article 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. Such extraordinary
diligence in vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5,
6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in Articles
1755 and 1756.
Article 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods,
unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
Article 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article,
if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in
Article 1733.
Articles 1733, 1734, and 1735 speak of the common carrier's responsibility over the goods. They refer
to the general liability of common carriers in case of loss, destruction or deterioration of goods and the
presumption of negligence against them. This responsibility or duty of the common carrier lasts from the
time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for
transportation, until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or
to the person who has a right to receive them. It is, in fact, undisputed that the goods were timely
delivered to the proper consignee or to the one who was authorized to receive them. DBI’s only cause of
action against ASTI and ACCLI is the release of the goods to Ambiente without the surrender of the bill
of lading, purportedly in violation of the terms of the bill of lading. We have already found that Bill of
Lading No. AC/MLLA601317 does not contain such express prohibition. Without any prohibition,
therefore, the carrier had no obligation to withhold release of the goods. Articles 1733, 1734, and 1735 do
not give ASTI any such obligation.
The applicable provision instead is Article 353 of the Code of Commerce, which we have
previously discussed. To reiterate, the Article allows the release of the goods to the consignee even
without his surrender of the original bill of lading. In such case, the duty of the carrier to exercise
extraordinary diligence is not violated. Nothing, therefore, prevented the consignee and the carrier to
enter into an indemnity agreement of the same nature as the one they entered here. No law or public
policy is contravened upon its execution.

Page 13 of 29
C) Article 1503 of the Civil Code does not apply to contracts for carriage of goods.
In its petition, DBI continues to assert the wrong application of Article 353 of the Code of Commerce to
its Amended Complaint. It alleges that the
third paragraph of Article 1503 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision because: (a) Article 1503 is a
special provision that deals particularly with the situation of the seller retaining the bill of lading; and (b)
Article 1503 is a law which is later in point of time to Article 353 of the Code of Commerce. DBI
posits that being a special provision, Article 1503 of the Civil Code should prevail over Article 353 of the
Code of Commerce, a general provision that makes no reference to the seller retaining the bill of lading.
DBI’s assertion is untenable. Article 1503 is an exception to the general presumption provided in the
first paragraph of Article 1523, which reads:
Article 1523. Where, in pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller is authorized or required to send the
goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier, whether named by the buyer or not, for the purpose
of transmission to the buyer is deemed to be a delivery of the goods to the buyer, except in the cases
provided for in Articles 1503, first, second and third paragraphs, or unless a contrary intent appears.
Unless otherwise authorized by the buyer, the seller must make such contract with the carrier on
behalf of the buyer as may be reasonable, having regard to the nature of the goods and the other
circumstances of the case. If the seller omit so to do, and the goods are lost or damaged in the course of
transit, the buyer may decline to treat the delivery to the carrier as a delivery to himself, or may hold the
seller responsible in damages.
Unless otherwise agreed, where goods are sent by the seller to the buyer under circumstances in which
the seller knows or ought to know that it is usual to insure, the seller must give such notice to the buyer as
may enable him to insure them during their transit, and, if the seller fails to do so, the goods shall be
deemed to be at his risk during such transit. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 1503, on the other hand, provides:
Article 1503. When there is a contract of sale of specific goods, the seller may, by the terms of the
contract, reserve the right of possession or ownership in the goods until certain conditions have been
fulfilled. The right of possession or ownership may be thus reserved notwithstanding the delivery of the
goods to the buyer or to a carrier or other bailee for the purpose of transmission to the buyer.
Where goods are shipped, and by the bill of lading the goods are deliverable to the seller or his agent,
or to the order of the seller or of his agent, the seller thereby reserves the ownership in the goods. But, if
except for the form of the bill of lading, the ownership would have passed to the buyer on shipment of the
goods, the seller’s property in the goods shall be deemed to be only for the purpose of securing
performance by the buyer of his obligations under the contract.

Page 14 of 29
Where goods are shipped, and by the bill of lading the goods are deliverable to order of the buyer or
of his agent, but possession of the bill of lading is retained by the seller or his agent, the seller thereby
reserves a right to the possession of the goods as against the buyer.
Where the seller of goods draws on the buyer for the price and transmits the bill of exchange and bill
of lading together to the buyer to secure acceptance or payment of the bill of exchange, the buyer is
bound to return the bill of lading if he does not honor the bill of exchange, and if he wrongfully retains the
bill of lading he acquires no added right thereby. If, however, the bill of lading provides that the
goods are deliverable to the buyer or to the order of the buyer, or is indorsed in blank, or to the buyer by
the consignee named therein, one who purchases in good faith, for value, the bill of lading, or goods from
the buyer will obtain the ownership in the goods, although the bill of exchange has not been honored,
provided that such purchaser has received delivery of the bill of lading indorsed by the consignee named
therein, or of the goods, without notice of the facts making the transfer wrongful. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Articles 1523 and 1503, therefore, refer to a contract of sale between a seller and a buyer. In
particular, they refer to who between the seller and the buyer has the right of possession or ownership
over the goods subject of the sale. Articles 1523 and 1503 do not apply to a contract of carriage between
the shipper and the common carrier. The third paragraph of Article 1503, upon which DBI relies, does not
oblige the common carrier to withhold
delivery of the goods in the event that the bill of lading is retained by the seller. Rather, it only gives the
seller a better right to the possession of the goods as against the mere inchoate right of the buyer. Thus,
Articles 1523 and 1503 find no application here. The case before us does not involve an action where the
seller asserts ownership over the goods as against the buyer. Instead, we are confronted with a complaint
for sum of money and damages filed by the seller against the buyer and the common carrier due to
the non-payment of the goods by the buyer, and the release of the goods by the carrier despite non-
surrender of the bill of lading. A contract of sale is separate and distinct from a contract of carriage. They
involve different parties, different rights, different obligations and liabilities. Thus, we quote with
approval the ruling of the CA, to wit:
On the third assigned error, [w]e rule for the defendants-appellants [ASTI and ACCLI]. They are
correct in arguing that the nature of their obligation with plaintiff [DBI] is separate and distinct from the
transaction of the latter with defendant Ambiente. As carrier of the goods transported by plaintiff,
its obligation is simply to ensure that such goods are delivered on time and in good condition. In
the case [Macam v. Court of Appeals], the Supreme Court emphasized that “the extraordinary
responsibility of the common carriers lasts until actual or constructive delivery of the cargoes to the
consignee or to the person who has the right to receive them.” x x x
It is therefore clear that the moment the carrier has delivered the subject goods, its responsibility
ceases to exist and it is thereby freed from all the liabilities arising from the transaction. Any question
regarding the payment of the buyer to the seller is no longer the concern of the carrier. This easily
debunks plaintiff’s theory of joint liability. x x x (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
The contract between DBI and ASTI is a contract of carriage of goods; hence, ASTI’s liability should
be pursuant to that contract and the law on transportation of goods. Not being a party to the contract of
sale between DBI and Ambiente, ASTI cannot be held liable for the payment of the value of the goods
sold.

Page 15 of 29
D) In view of the foregoing, we hold that under Bill of Lading No. AC/MLLA601317 and the pertinent
law and jurisprudence, ASTI and ACCLI are not liable to DBI. We sustain the finding of the CA that only
Ambiente, as the buyer of the goods, has the obligation to pay for the value of the shipment. However, in
view of our ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, we modify the legal rate of interest imposed by the CA.
Instead of 12% per annum from the finality of this judgment until its full satisfaction, the rate of interest
shall only be 6% per annum.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The August 16, 2007 Decision and the
September 2, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79790 are hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that from the finality of this decision until its full satisfaction, the
applicable rate of interest shall be 6% per annum.
SO ORDERED.
. Montelibano vs Yap GR No. 197475
Promulgated: Dec. 6, 2017
Ponente: Justice Martires
Case: violation of B.P. 22
Remedial Law: In-court identification is not essential where there is no doubt that the person alleged to
have commited the crime and the persn charged in the information and subject of the trial are one and the
same. While positive identification by a witness is required by the law to convict an accused, it need not
always be by means of a physical courtroom identification.
Criminal Law: A fine instead of imprisonment is the proper penalty in view of Supreme Court
Adminstrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, establishing
arule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in BP Blg. 22. Since petitioner is
neither a habitual delinquent or a recidivist, the imposition of a fine is but proper and in accordance with
the policy of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness in favor of an accused.
Question:
Can a private complainant file a/an Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal/ Petition for Certiorari of a
criminal case by him/herself after the trial court acquits an accused?
Answer:
As a general rule, NO.
If a criminal case is DISMISSED by the trial court or if there is an ACQUITTAL, a

RECONSIDERATION of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally
feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only by the public
prosecutor; or in the case of an APPEAL, by the State only, through the OSG.
The above, however, is not without any exception. The two exceptions are: (1) when there is denial of due

Page 16 of 29
process of law to the prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the
State and the private offended party, and (2) when the private offended party questions the civil aspect of
a decision of a lower court.
The private complainant can also file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action
questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in (the) name of said complainant.
Question:
Why can’t the private complainant bring the appeal of the criminal action in the name of the People of the
Philippines?
Answer:
This is because jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court, or if
there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the Office of the Solicitor- General [OSG] that may bring an
appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People.
Under Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, The Office of
the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a
lawyer, and this includes representing the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in
all criminal proceedings.
The rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal
action is the People and not the private complainants who are mere complaining witnesses. For this
reason, the People are deemed as the real parties-in-interest in the criminal case and, therefore, only the
OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the appellate court or in the Supreme Court.
In view of the corollary principle that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled
to the avails of the suit, an appeal of the criminal case not filed by the People as represented by the OSG
is perforce dismissible.
RCBC vs. Hi-Tri Dev. Corp. , et. al, G.R. No. 192413, June 13, 2012
Facts: Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel, now deceased (Spouses Bakunawa) are registered owners
of six (6) parcels of land in Quezon City. These lots were sequestered by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government [(PCGG)]. Sometime in 1990, a certain Teresita Millan (Millan), through her
representative, Jerry Montemayor, offered to buy said lots for ₱6,724,085.71, with the promise that she
will take care of clearing whatever preliminary obstacles there may be to effect a completion of the sale.
The Spouses Bakunawa gave to Millan the Owners Copies of said TCTs and in turn, Millan made a
downpayment of ₱1,019,514.29 for the intended purchase. However, for one reason or another, Millan
was not able to clear said obstacles. As a result, the Spouses Bakunawa rescinded the sale and offered to
return to Millan her downpayment of ₱1,019,514.29. However, Millan refused to accept back the
₱1,019,514.29 down payment.
Consequently, the Spouses Bakunawa, through their company, the Hi-Tri Development Corporation (Hi-
Tri) took out on October 28, 1991, a Managers Check from RCBC-Ermita in the amount of
₱1,019,514.29, payable to Millan’s company Rosmil Realty and Development Corporation (Rosmil) c/o
Teresita Millan and used this as one of their basis for a complaint against Millan and Montemayor which
they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99.

Page 17 of 29
On January 31, 2003, during the pendency of the above mentioned case and without the knowledge of
[Hi-Tri and Spouses Bakunawa], RCBC reported the ₱1,019,514.29-credit existing in favor of Rosmil to
the Bureau of Treasury as among its unclaimed balances as of January 31, 2003. Allegedly, a copy of the
Sworn Statement executed by Florentino N. Mendoza, Manager and Head of RCBCs Asset Management,
Disbursement & Sundry Department (AMDSD) was posted within the premises of RCBC-Ermita.
On December 14, 2006, x x x Republic, through the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)], filed with
the RTC the action below for Escheat [(Civil Case No. 06-244)].
On April 30, 2008, [Spouses Bakunawa] settled amicably their dispute with Rosmil and Millan. Instead of
only the amount of ₱1,019,514.29, [Spouses Bakunawa] agreed to pay Rosmil and Millan the amount of
₱3,000,000.00, [which is] inclusive [of] the amount of []₱1,019,514.29. But during negotiations and
evidently prior to said settlement, [Manuel Bakunawa, through Hi-Tri] inquired from RCBC-Ermita the
availability of the ₱1,019,514.29 under RCBC Managers Check No. ER 034469. [Hi-Tri and Spouses
Bakunawa] were however dismayed when they were informed that the amount was already subject of the
escheat proceedings before the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the escheat (the reversion of property to the state on the owner’s dying without
legal heirs) of the account in RCBC is proper.
Held: No. There are checks of a special type called managers or cashiers checks. These are bills of
exchange drawn by the banks manager or cashier, in the name of the bank, against the bank itself.
Typically, a managers or a cashiers check is procured from the bank by allocating a particular amount of
funds to be debited from the depositors account or by directly paying or depositing to the bank the value
of the check to be drawn. Since the bank issues the check in its name, with itself as the drawee, the check
is deemed accepted in advance. Ordinarily, the check becomes the primary obligation of the issuing bank
and constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand.
Nevertheless, the mere issuance of a managers check does not ipso facto work as an automatic transfer of
funds to the account of the payee. In case the procurer of the managers or cashiers check retains custody
of the instrument, does not tender it to the intended payee, or fails to make an effective delivery, we find
the following provision on undelivered instruments under the Negotiable Instruments Law applicable:
Sec. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. Every contract on a negotiable instrument is
incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As
between immediate parties and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery, in
order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party making, drawing,
accepting, or indorsing, as the case may be; and, in such case, the delivery may be shown to have been
conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the property in the
instrument. But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by
all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed. And where the
instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and
intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved.
Since there was no delivery, presentment of the check to the bank for payment did not occur. An order to
debit the account of respondents was never made. In fact, petitioner confirms that the Managers Check
was never negotiated or presented for payment to its Ermita Branch, and that the allocated fund is still
held by the bank. As a result, the assigned fund is deemed to remain part of the account of Hi-Tri, which

Page 18 of 29
procured the Managers Check. The doctrine that the deposit represented by a managers check
automatically passes to the payee is inapplicable, because the instrument although accepted in advance
remains undelivered. Hence, respondents should have been informed that the deposit had been left
inactive for more than 10 years, and that it may be subjected to escheat proceedings if left unclaimed.
FAR EAST BANK v. PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, GR No. 172983, 2015-
07-22
Facts:
Issues:
The issue in this case is whether or not the PDIC, as the Liquidator of the PBC, may be compelled to
execute the deeds of sale over the nine (9)[67] disputed PBC fixed assets.
Ruling:
We rule in the affirmative, as there was a perfected contract of sale over the disputed fixed assets.
Specifically, contracts of sale are perfected by mutual consent, when the seller obligates himself, for a
price certain, to deliver and transfer ownership of a specified thing or right to the buyer over which the
latter agrees.
Mutual consent, as a state of mind, may only be inferred from the confluence of two acts of the parties: an
offer certain as to the object of the contract and its consideration, and an absolute acceptance of the offer,
i.e., with respect to the exact object and... consideration embodied in the offer. While it may not be
possible to expect the acceptance to echo every nuance of the offer, it is imperative that it assents to those
points in the offer that, under the operative facts of each contract, are not only material but... motivating
as well.[71]
Simply put, a contract of sale is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties on the essential
elements of the contract, i.e., consent, object certain, and the consideration of the contract.
Thus viewed, the parties clearly had a meeting of minds on the essential elements of the contract,
perfecting therefore their contract of sale. This meeting was embodied in their MOA which contained the
absolute acceptance of the offer and the essential elements of the... contract of sale.
A contract of sale is perfected by the meeting of the minds of the parties regardless of whether it was
reduced to writing.

Page 19 of 29
A binding contract may exist between the parties whose minds have met,... although they did not affix
their signatures to any written document, as acceptance may be expressed or implied.
a contract is the law between the parties. Absent any allegation and proof that the contract is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, it should be complied with in good faith.
Principles:
REPUBLIC v. BOLANTE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL,

Petitioners vs. JOCELYN I. BOLANTE, OWEN VINCENT D. BOLANTE, MA. CAROL D.
BOLANTE, ALEJO LAMERA, CARMEN LAMERA, EDNA CONSTANTINO, ARIEL C.
PANGANIBAN, KATHERINE G. BOMBEO, SAMUEL S. BOMBEO, MOLUGAN FOUNDATION,
SAMUEL G. BOMBEO, JR., and NATIONAL LIVELIHOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
(Formerly Livelihood Corporation), Respondents
G.R. No. 186717
April 17, 2017
Facts:
In April 2005, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) submitted to the Anti-Money Laundering Council
(AMLC) a series of suspicious transaction reports involving the accounts of Livelihood Corporation
(LIVECOR), Molugan Foundation (Molugan), and Assembly of Gracious Samaritans, Inc. (AGS).
According to the reports, LIVECOR transferred to Molugan a total amount of' ₱172.6 million in a span of
15 months from 2004 to 2005. On 30 April 2004, LIVECOR transferred ₱40 million to AGS, which
received another P38 million from Molugan on the same day. Curiously, AGS returned the P38 million to
Molugan also on the same day.
The transactions were reported '"suspicious" because they had no underlying legal or trade obligation,
purpose or economic justification; nor were they commensurate to the business or financial capacity of
Molugan and AGS, which were both lowly capitalized at P50, 000 each. In the case of Molugan, Samuel
S. Bombeo, who holds the position of president, secretary and treasurer, is the lone signatory to the
account. In the case of AGS, Samuel S. Bombeo shares this responsibility with Ariel Panganiban.
On 7 March 2006, the Senate furnished the AMLC a copy of its Committee Report No. 54 prepared by
the Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations.
Committee Report No. 54 narrated that former Undersecretary of Agriculture Jocelyn I. Bolante (Bolante)
requested the Department of Budget and Management to release to the Department of Agriculture the

Page 20 of 29
amount of ₱728 million for the purchase of farm inputs under the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani Program.
This amount was used to purchase liquid fertilizers from Freshan Philippines, Inc., which were then
distributed to local government units and congressional districts beginning January 2004. Based on the
Audit Report prepared by the Commission on Audit (COA), the use of the funds was characterized by
massive irregularities, overpricing, and violations of the procurement law and wanton wastage of scarce
government resources.
The AMLC issued Resolution No.75 finding probable cause to believe that the accounts of LIVECOR,
Molugan and AGS - the subjects of the suspicious transaction reports submitted by PNB - were related to
what became known as the "fertilizer fund scam. The acts involved in the "fertilizer scam" may constitute
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, x x x as well as violation or Republic Act No. 7080
(Plunder).
Thus, the AMLC authorized the filing of a petition for the issuance of an order allowing an inquiry into
the six accounts 18 of LIVECOR, Molugan, AGS, Samuel S. Bombeo and Ariel Panganiban. The AMLC
also required all covered institutions to submit reports of covered transactions and/or suspicious
transactions of these entities and individuals, including all the related web of accounts.
Petition was filed ex parte before the R TC and docketed as AMLC SP Case No. 06-003. On 17
November 2006, the trial court found probable cause and issued the Order prayed for. It allowed the
AMLC to inquire into and examine the six bank deposits or investments and the related web of accounts.
In view of this development, the AMLC issued Resolution No. 40.27 It authorized the filing of a petition
for the issuance of a freeze order against the 70 accounts found to be related to the fertilizer fund scam.
Hence, the Republic filed an Ex Parte Petition docketed as CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00014 before the CA,
seeking the issuance of a freeze order against the 70 accounts.
The CA issued a freeze order effective for 20 days. The freeze order required the covered institutions of
the 70 accounts to desist from and not allow any transaction involving the identified monetary
instruments. It also asked the covered institutions to submit a detailed written return to the CA within 24
hours from receipt of the freeze order.
The CA conducted a summary hearing of the application, after which the parties were ordered to submit
their memoranda, manifestations and comments/oppositions. The freeze order was later extended for a
period of 30 days until 19 August 2008.
Finding that there existed probable cause that the funds transferred to and juggled by LIVECOR,
Molugan, and AGS formed pati of the ₱728 million fertilizer fund, the CA extended the effectivity of the
freeze order for another four months, or until 20 December 2008. The extension covered only 31
accounts, which showed an existing balance based on the returns of the covered institutions.
In the meantime, the Republic filed an Ex Parte Application docketed as AMLC Case No. 07-001 before
the RTC. Drawing on the authority provided by the AMLC through Resolution No. 90, the ex parte
application sought the issuance of an order allowing an inquiry into the 70 accounts.
The RTC found probable cause and issued the Order prayed for. It allowed the AMLC to inquire into and
examine the 70 bank deposits or investments and the related web of accounts.
Hence, the Republic filed an Urgent Ex Parte Petition docketed as CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00024 before the
CA seeking the issuance of a freeze order against the 24 accounts.

Page 21 of 29
In the Resolution dated 4 February 2009, the CA issued a freeze order effective for 20 days. The freeze
order required the covered institutions of the 24 accounts to desist from and not allow any transaction
involving the identified monetary instruments. It also asked the covered institutions to submit a detailed
written return to the CA within 24 hours from receipt of the freeze order.
Issue:
Whether the Republic committed forum shopping in filing CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00024 before the CA.
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that there exists no probable cause to
allow an inquiry into the total of 76 deposits and investments of respondents.
Held:
Yes. The Republic committed forum shopping. As we ruled in Chua v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co,
forum shopping is committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action
and with the same prayer, where the previous case has not yet been resolved (the ground for dismissal is
litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer,
where the previous case has finally been resolved (the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action,
where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
While it is true that a previous freeze order was issued in CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00014 covering some of
the accounts subject of CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00024, CA-G.R. AAILC No. 00014 had already attained
finality when the second petition was filed, neither petitioner nor any of the respondents interposed an
appeal therefrom, pursuant to Section 57 of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil F01feiture, etc.
We are not even sure where the Republic got the notion that the CA found "that the filing of the second
petition for freeze order constitutes forum shopping on the ground of litis pendentia. In its assailed
Resolution, the appellate court aptly cited Quinsay v. CA, stating that "forum shopping concurs not only
when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another, but also where the elements of
litis pendentia are present."
Rule 10.2 of the Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9160, as Amended by
Republic Act No. 9194, defined probable cause as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity and/or a money
laundering offense is about to be, is being or has been committed and that the account or any monetary
instrument or property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any way related to said unlawful activity
and/or money laundering offense.

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Section 11, itself requires that it be established that "there is probable cause that the deposits or
investments are related to unlawful activities," and it obviously is the court which stands as arbiter
whether there is indeed such probable cause. The process of inquiring into the existence of probable cause
would involve the function of determination reposed on the trial court.
For the trial court to issue a bank inquiry order, it is necessary for the AMLC to be able to show specific
facts and circumstances that provide a link between an unlawful activity or a money laundering offense,
on the one hand, and the account or monetary instrument or property sought to be examined on the other
hand. In this case, the R TC found the evidence presented by the AMLC wanting. For its part, the latter
insists that the RTC's determination was tainted with grave abuse of discretion for ignoring the glaring
existence of probable cause that the subject bank deposits and investments were related to an unlawful
activity.
It was this excerpt that led the AMLC to connect the fertilizer fund scam to the suspicious transaction
reports earlier submitted to it by PNB. However, the R TC found during trial that respondent Bolante had
ceased to be a member of the board of trustees of LIVECOR for 14 months before the latter even made
the initial transaction, which was the subject of the suspicious transaction reports. Furthermore, the RTC
took note that according to the Audit Report submitted by the Commission on Audit, no part of the P728
million fertilizer fund was ever released to LIVECOR.
We note that in the RTC Order dated 17 November 2006 in AMLC SP Case No. 06-003, the AMLC was
already allowed ex parte to inquire into and examine the six bank deposits or investments and the related
web of accounts of LIVECOR, Molugan, AGS, Samuel S. Bombeo and Ariel Panganiban.
With the resources available to the AMLC, coupled with a bank inquiry order granted 15 months before
Eugenio was even promulgated, the AMLC should have been able to obtain more evidence establishing a
more substantive link tying Bolante and the fertilizer fund scam to LIVECOR. It did not help that the
AMLC failed to include in its application for a bank inquiry order in AMLC SP Case No. 06-003
LIVECOR's PNB account as indicated in the suspicious transaction reports. This PNB account was
included only in the application for a bank inquiry order in AMLC Case No. 07-001.
As it stands, the evidence relied upon by the AMLC in 2006 was still the same evidence it used to apply
for a bank inquiry order in 2008. Regrettably, this evidence proved to be insufficient when weighed
against that presented by the respondents, who were given notice and the opportunity to contest the
issuance of the bank inquiry order pursuant to Eugenio. In fine, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying the application.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 186717 is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolution dated 27
February 2009 in CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00024 is AFFIRMED.
The petition in G.R. No. 190357 is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 3 July 2009 and Order dated 13
November 2009 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 59, in AMLC Case No. 07-001 are
AFFIRMED.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this Court on 25 March 2009 is hereby LIFTED.
RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT v. REPUBLIC, GR No. 176944, 2013-03-06

Page 23 of 29
Facts:
On June 27, 2005, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC), filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application for the issuance of a freeze order with the CA
against certain monetary instruments and properties of... the petitioners
This application was based on the February 1, 2005 letter of the Office of the Ombudsman to the
AMLC,... recommending that the latter conduct an investigation on Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family for
possible violation of RA No. 9160.
Lt. Gen. Ligot declared in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) that as of
December 31, 2003, he had assets in the total amount of Three Million Eight Hundred Forty-Eight
Thousand and Three Pesos (P3,848,003.00).[11] In... contrast, his declared assets in his 1982 SALN
amounted to only One Hundred Five Thousand Pesos (P105,000.00).
side from these declared assets, the Ombudsman's investigation revealed that Lt. Gen. Ligot and his
family had other properties and bank accounts, not declared in his SALN,... Bearing in mind that Lt. Gen.
Ligot's main source of income was his salary as an officer of the AFP,[17] and given his wife and
children's lack of any other substantial sources of income,[18] the Ombudsman declared the assets...
registered in Lt. Gen. Ligot's name, as well as those in his wife's and children's names, to be illegally
obtained and unexplained wealth, pursuant to the provisions of RA No. 1379 (An Act Declaring
Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully
Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor).
the AMLC issued Resolution No. 52, Series of 2005, directing the Executive Director of the AMLC
Secretariat to file an application for a freeze order against the properties of Lt. Gen. Ligot and the
members of his family with the CA.
The appellate court granted the application in its July 5, 2005 resolution, ruling that probable cause
existed
Accordingly, the CA issued a freeze order against the Ligots' and Yambao's various bank accounts, web
accounts and vehicles, valid for a period of 20 days from the date of issuance.
On July 26, 2005, the Republic filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Effectivity of Freeze Order,
arguing that if the bank accounts, web accounts and vehicles were not continuously frozen, they could be
placed beyond the reach of law enforcement authorities... the CA granted the motion in its September 20,
2005 resolution, extending the freeze order until after all the appropriate proceedings and/or
investigations have been terminated.

Page 24 of 29
the Ligots filed a motion to lift the extended freeze order, principally arguing that there was no evidence
to support the extension of the freeze order. They further argued that the extension not only deprived them
of their property without due process;... it also punished them before their guilt could be proven.
The appellate court subsequently denied this motion
Meanwhile, on November 15, 2005,... Republic Act No.
9160, as Amended"[23] (Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases) took effect. Under this rule, a freeze order could
be extended for a maximum period of six months.
Ligots filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA's
When the CA denied this motion i
Ligots filed the present petition.
Lt. Gen. Ligot... maintains that the freeze order issued against them ceased to be effective in view of the
6-month extension limit of freeze orders provided under the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases.
the Republic claims that the CA can issue a freeze order upon a determination that probable cause exists,
showing that the monetary instruments or properties subject of the freeze order are related to the unlawful
activity
CA's September 20, 2005 resolution, granting the Republic's motion to extend the effectivity of the freeze
order, had already become final and executory, and could no longer be challenged.
Issues:
conflict between Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended, and Section 53(b) of the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases,
Ruling:
We find merit in the petition.

Page 25 of 29
Without challenging the validity of the fixed 6-month extension period, the Republic nonetheless asserts
that the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases does not apply to the present case because the CA had already
resolved the issues regarding the extension of the freeze order before... the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases
came into effect.
This reasoning fails to convince us.
Notably, the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect on December 15, 2005. Section 59 provides
that it shall "apply to all pending civil forfeiture cases or petitions for freeze order" at the time of its
effectivity.
A review of the record reveals that after the CA issued its September 20, 2005 resolution extending the
freeze order, the Ligots filed a motion to lift the extended freeze order on September 28, 2005.
Significantly, the CA only acted upon this motion on January 4, 2006,... when it issued a resolution
denying it.
While denominated as a Motion to Lift Extended Freeze Order, this motion was actually a motion for
reconsideration, as it sought the reversal of the assailed CA resolution. Since the Ligots' motion for
reconsideration was still pending resolution at the time the Rule in
Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect on December 15, 2005, the Rule unquestionably applies to the
present case.
Additionally, we would be giving premium to the government's failure to file an appropriate case until
only after six years (despite the clear provision of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases) were we to dismiss
the petition because of the filing of the forfeiture case... during the pendency of the case before the Court.
Substantive aspect... there are only two requisites for the issuance of a freeze order: (1) the application ex
parte by the AMLC and (2) the determination of probable cause by the CA.[33] The probable cause
required for the issuance... of a freeze order differs from the probable cause required for the institution of
a criminal action, and the latter was not an issue before the CA nor is it an issue before us in this case.
As defined in the law, the probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order refers to "such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe that an
unlawful activity and/or a money laundering offense is about to be, is... being or has been committed and
that the account or any monetary instrument or property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any way
related to said unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense.
In other words, in resolving the issue of whether probable cause exists, the CA's statutorily-guided
determination's focus is not on the probable commission of an unlawful activity (or money laundering)
that the Office of the Ombudsman has already determined to exist, but on... whether the bank accounts,

Page 26 of 29
assets, or other monetary instruments sought to be frozen are in any way related to any of the illegal
activities... a freeze order is not dependent on a separate criminal charge, much less does it depend on a
conviction.
As we previously noted in Republic v. Eugenio, Jr.,[36] "[t]o make such freeze... order anteceded by a
judicial proceeding with notice to the account holder would allow for or lead to the dissipation of such
funds even before the order could be issued."
A freeze order, however, cannot be issued for an indefinite period
A freeze order is an extraordinary and interim relief
The primary objective of a freeze order is to temporarily preserve monetary instruments or property that
are in any way related to an unlawful activity or money laundering, by preventing the owner from
utilizing them... during the duration of the freeze order.[39] The relief is pre-emptive in character, meant
to prevent the owner from disposing his property and thwarting the State's effort in building its case and
eventually filing civil forfeiture proceedings... and/or prosecuting the owner.
Our examination of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended, from the point of view of the
freeze order that it authorizes, shows that the law is silent on the maximum period of time that the freeze
order can be extended by the CA.
As correctly noted by the petitioners, a freeze order is meant to have a temporary effect; it was never
intended to supplant or replace the actual forfeiture cases where the provisional remedy - which means,
the remedy is an adjunct of or an incident to the main action of asking... for the issuance of an asset
preservation order from the court where the petition is filed is precisely available. For emphasis, a freeze
order is both a preservatory and preemptive remedy.
To stress, the evils caused by the law's silence on the freeze order's period of effectivity[46] compelled
this Court to issue the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases. Specifically, the Court fixed the maximum
allowable extension on the freeze order's... effectivity at six months. In doing so, the Court sought to
balance the State's interest in going after suspected money launderers with an individual's
constitutionally-protected right not to be deprived of his property without due process of law, as well as to
be presumed... innocent until proven guilty.
We are not unmindful that the State itself is entitled to due process. As a due process concern, we do not
say that the six-month period is an inflexible rule that would result in the automatic lifting of the freeze
order upon its expiration in all instances. An... inflexible rule may lend itself to abuse - to the prejudice of
the State's legitimate interests - where the property owner would simply file numerous suits, questioning
the freeze order during the six-month extension period, to prevent the timely filing of a money laundering
or... civil forfeiture case within this period. With the limited resources that our government prosecutors
and investigators have at their disposal, the end-result of an inflexible rule is not difficult to see.
Thus, as a rule, the effectivity of a freeze order may be extended by the CA for a period not exceeding six

Page 27 of 29
months. Before or upon the lapse of this period, ideally, the Republic should have already filed a case for
civil forfeiture against the property owner with the proper... courts and accordingly secure an asset
preservation order or it should have filed the necessary information.[47] Otherwise, the property owner
should already be able to fully enjoy his property without any legal process affecting it. However,
should... it become completely necessary for the Republic to further extend the duration of the freeze
order, it should file the necessary motion before the expiration of the six-month period and explain the
reason or reasons for its failure to file an appropriate case and justify the... period of extension sought.
The freeze order should remain effective prior to the resolution by the CA, which is hereby directed to
resolve this kind of motion for extension with reasonable dispatch.
In the present case, we note that the Republic has not offered any explanation why it took six years (from
the time it secured a freeze order) before a civil forfeiture case was filed in court, despite the clear tenor
of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases allowing the extension... of a freeze order for only a period of six
months. All the Republic could proffer is its temporal argument on the inapplicability of the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases; in effect, it glossed over the squarely-raised issue of due process. Under these
circumstances, we cannot but... conclude that the continued ext... ension of the freeze order beyond the
six-month period violated the Ligots' right to due process; thus, the CA decision should be reversed.
Principles:
Procedural aspect
Certiorari not proper remedy to assail freeze order; exception
Section 57 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases explicitly provides the remedy available in cases
involving freeze orders issued by the CA:
Section 57. Appeal. - Any party aggrieved by the decision or ruling of the court may appeal to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal shall
not stay the enforcement of the subject decision... or final order unless the Supreme Court directs
otherwise.
From this provision, it is apparent that the petitioners should have filed a petition for review on certiorari,
and not a petition for certiorari, to assail the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of the
freeze order over their properties.
Even assuming that a petition for certiorari is available to the petitioners, a review of their petition shows
that the issues they raise (i.e., existence of probable cause to support the freeze order; the applicability of
the 6-month limit to the extension of freeze... orders embodied in the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture) pertain to errors of judgment allegedly committed by the CA, which fall outside the Court's
limited jurisdiction when resolving certiorari petitions.
Clearly, the Ligots should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and not what is effectively a
second motion for reconsideration

Page 28 of 29
SEC. 28. Precedence of proceedings. - Any criminal case relating to an unlawful activity shall be given
precedence over the prosecution of any offense or violation under Republic Act No. 9160, as amended,
without prejudice to the filing of a separate... petition for civil forfeiture or the issuance of an asset
preservation order or a freeze order. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution. [italics supplied; emphases ours]
Section 10 of RA No. 9160 (allowing the extension of the freeze order) and Section 28 (allowing a
separate petition for the issuance of a freeze order to proceed independently) of the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases are only consistent with the very purpose of the freeze order,... which specifically is to
give the government the necessary time to prepare its case and to file the appropriate charges without
having to worry about the possible dissipation of the assets that are in any way related to the suspected
illegal activity.

Page 29 of 29

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GR 184458

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Patrimonio vs. Gutierrez

(G.R. No. 187769, June 4, 2014)

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FIDELIZA J. AGLIBOT v. INGERSOL L. SANTIA, GR No. 185945, 2012-12-05

Aglibot is a major stockholder of PLCC

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Aglibot cannot invoke the benefit of excussion

A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;

Aglibot is an accommodation party... and therefore liable to Santia

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She is what the Negotiable Instruments Law calls an accommodation party.

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RESPONDENTS WERE HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE.

Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional

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no privity between respondents and defendants.

Bognot vs. RRI Lending

Bognot vs. RRI Lending

GR No. 180144, September 24, 2014

Whether the parties’ obligation was extinguished by payment

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Article 1249, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code provides:

Also, we held in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Royeca:

BDO UNIBANK v. ENGR. SELWYN LAO, GR No. 227005, 2017-06-19

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whether or not the checks were actually delivered to the payee.

The RTC Ruling

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SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

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(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;

(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

(5) Order or act of competent public authority.

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Article 1503, on the other hand, provides:

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. Montelibano vs Yap GR No. 197475

Promulgated: Dec. 6, 2017

Ponente: Justice Martires

Case: violation of B.P. 22

As a general rule, NO.

If a criminal case is DISMISSED by the trial court or if there is an ACQUITTAL, a

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL,

G.R. No. 186717

April 17, 2017

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RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT v. REPUBLIC, GR No. 176944, 2013-03-06

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The appellate court subsequently denied this motion

Meanwhile, on November 15, 2005,... Republic Act No.