Civil Review 3rd Doctrine FC

G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.
*
JAIME O. SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
Civil Law; Marriages; Marriage License; The certification to be issued by the Local Civil
Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the
particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search.—The certification
to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not
exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent
search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Presumption of Regularity of Performance of Official Duty; The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty.—Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost
efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have
been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local
Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted. According to Section 3(m),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed is among the disputable presumptions. The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome
by other evidence as in the case at
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
429
VOL. 497, JULY 31, 2006 429

Savilla vs. Cardenas
bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and
second certifications.
Marriages; The rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds; Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.—The rule is settled that every intendment
of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled;
on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. The Court is mindful of the policy of the
1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Same; Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the State is vitally interested.—Our Constitution is committed to
the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based
on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State
is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.
Same; Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation,
an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested; Every intendment
of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.—“The basis of human society throughout the
civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but
it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner.430
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Savilla vs. Cardenas
Cervantes, Blanco, Jurisprudencia, Neri, Sta. Romana and Partners for

respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
G.R. No. 186400. October 20, 2010.*

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, petitioner, vs. DANILO T. BOLOS, respondent.
Husband and Wife; Marriages; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which the Court promulgated on 15 March 2003, extends
only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect
on 3 August 1988.—Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her
stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court
promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets
a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized
under the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Verba Legis (Plain Meaning Rule);
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt
or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation—there is only room for
application.—The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the
phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather
than to the word “marriages.” A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law
is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. There is only room for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
430

ANNOTATED
Bolos vs. Bolos
verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or “speech is the index of
intention.” Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or “from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.”
Same; Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Time and again the Court has
stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be
discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit.—There is no basis for
petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and importance
of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her
favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully
complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial
merit. As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain
proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to
orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are
regarded as mandatory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Motions for Reconsideration; The rule is and has been that
the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible.—The appellate court was
correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration
considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 473
SCRA 490 (2005), the rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court has made this clear as early as 1986
in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon, 142 SCRA 208 (1986). Since then, the Court has
consistently and strictly adhered thereto.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Appeals; While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural
right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-
litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from
the constraints of technicalities.—Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its
purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus,
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his
431
VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 431

Bolos vs. Bolos
right to appeal. In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Piñas City, Br. 254, 563
SCRA 447 (2008), the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural
right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-
litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from
the constraints of technicalities.
Same; Same; Same; Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested—the break up of
families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern
alone of the family members.—This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds
no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens
our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the
family members.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Aileen L. Duremdes for petitioner.
Clarence B. Jandoc for respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
G.R. No. 158298. August 11, 2010.*

ISIDRO ABLAZA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Marriages; As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be
changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.—A validmarriage is essential in
order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties,
and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid
marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time
the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated
cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. To illustrate, a
marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not
anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family
Code does not affect the void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void,
considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the
marriage ceremony.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
28

ANNOTATED
Ablaza vs. Republic
Same; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC); Section 2,
paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife;
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect
on 3 August 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined
only to proceedings commenced after 15 March 2003.—The Court has to clarify the impact to
the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took
effect on March 15, 2003. Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides
the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil
Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family
Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in
application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003. Based
on Carlos v. Sandoval, 574 SCRA 116 (2008), the following actions for declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit: 1. Those
commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and 2. Those
filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those
celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Same; Same; Legal Research; The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who
can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when.—The old and new Civil
Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and
when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (2000), the children were allowed to
file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s
marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage
license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and
explained how and when each might be impugned.29
VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 29
Ablaza vs. Republic
Same; Same; Parties; The right of a sibling to bring an action to declare the nullity of a
marriage contracted under the old Civil Code hinges upon a prior determination of whether
the decedent had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of
whether such sibling was the decedent’s surviving heir.—The petitioner alleged himself to be
the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he
claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will
be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit
not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of
a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil
Code, as follows: Article 1001, should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half. Article 1003, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. Pursuant to
these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the
deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased’s
estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon
a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children
(legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s
surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry
thereon involves questions of fact.
Same; Same; Same; The surviving spouse must be impleaded in an action for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage since he or she is an indispensable party—such party’s
absence renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.—We note that the petitioner did
not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano’s surviving wife, stood to be benefited or
prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that
not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required a marriage license for their
validity; hence, her participation in this action is made all the more necessary in order to
shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage li-
30

ANNOTATED
Ablaza vs. Republic
cense and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined
herein: x x x under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise
of judicial power. It is precisely “when an indispensable party is not before the court [that]
the action should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even as to those present.
Rosalito B. Apoya for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
Whether a pers
G.R. No. 103047. September 2, 1994. *
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND

ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Marriages; Absence of a marriage license renders the marriage void ab initio.—At the
time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital
relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.
Same; Evidence; Civil Registrars; The certification of “due search and inability to find”
issued by the civil registrar enjoys probative value and sufficiently proves that his office did
not issue a particular marriage license.—The above Rule authorized the custodian of
documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his
office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the
duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. The certification of “due search
and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being
the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
__________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
258

ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of “due search and
inability to find” sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182
to the contracting parties.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Secret marriage” is a legally non-existent phrase but
ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives
and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties.—The fact that private respondent
Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny
her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due
to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage
was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those
commonly known as a “secret marriage”—a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used
to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends
of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between
Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.

Parungo, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002. *
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)

MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO,
respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; The authority of the regional trial court judges and judges
of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court.—Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority
of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
Same; Same; Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside the court’s jurisdiction, there
is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability.—“A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the
faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop.
An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the
law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
403
VOL. 380, APRIL 11, 2002 403

Arañes vs. Occiano
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes
a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.”
Same; Same; Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.—In People vs. Lara, we held that
a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess
such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent
judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Same; Same; The withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect
of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.—Respondent judge cannot be exculpated
despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a
catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect
of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair
administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.
Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They
can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or
another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant
in a matter which involves the Court’s constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise,
that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair
the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law.
PUNO, J.:
G.R. No. 183896. January 30, 2013.*

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, petitioner, vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Formal Requisites of Marriage.―As the marriage of
Gloria and Syed was solemnized on Janu-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
647
VOL. 689, JANUARY 30, 2013 647

Abbas vs. Abbas
ary 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the
applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles
3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows: Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1)
Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided
for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age. Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). A defect in any of
the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable. Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: x x x x (3) Those
solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Disputable Presumptions; Presumption of Regularity; Under
Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty
has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary; The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.―Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it
is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, “The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty.” No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand.
In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license
do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the
registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.648

ANNOTATED
Abbas vs. Abbas
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Marriage License; Evidence; The certification of the
Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to
prove the non-issuance of said license.―In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, following the case
of Republic, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had
no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The
case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been
overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that
the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. Gloria has
failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid
marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the
marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was
presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria
and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and
Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.―All the evidence
cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract
was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).” Article 35(3) of the
Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter
2, Title I of the same Code.
Appeals.
649
VOL. 689, JANUARY 30, 2013 649

Abbas vs. Abbas
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa vs. Heirs of

Marciana
Rustia Vda. de Damian
Civil Law; Marriages; Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of

marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.—Although a
marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always
proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises, other
evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly
establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,
the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than
Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the properties in
the name of “Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado,” more than adequately support
the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Same; Same; Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in
fact married.—Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward
legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to
be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what
they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules
of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
Same; Same; Presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable.—Presumptions of
law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the
law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them.
On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of
_______________
venor was identified as “intervenor-respondent.” For clarity, we shall refer to them collectively as
“respondents” in this decision. The Court of Appeals was also impleaded as public respondent but this was not
necessary since this is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
336

ANNOTATED
Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian
which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient
evidence to the contrary.
Same; Succession; The right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in
favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces); It cannot be exercised by
grandnephews and grandnieces.—We note, however, that the petitioners before us are
already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under
Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place
only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it
cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers
and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972.
They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear on this
matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters
(or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,
they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new
Civil Code:
Same; Same; Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means
of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir of the estate.—Since Josefa Delgado had
heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s
estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir
of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is
the soleheir to the estate.
Same; Paternity and Filiation; Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or
voluntary; Cases of Compulsory Recognition.—Under the new law, recognition may be
compulsory or voluntary. Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases: (1) in cases
of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with
that of the conception; (2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of
the alleged father (or mother) by the direct acts of the latter or of his family; (3) when the
child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father; (4)
when the child has in his favor any evidence
337
VOL. 480, JANUARY 27, 2006 337

or proof that the defendant is his father. On the other hand, voluntary recognition may
be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing.
Same; Same; Dual limitation in a judicial action for compulsory acknowledgement: the
lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.—There was apparently no doubt
that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her
putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but
a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.
Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the
lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent. On the death of either, the action
for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right
to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on
February 28, 1974.
Same; Same; An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood
as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent.—The claim of voluntary recognition
(Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of
voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this
case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by
the father to be his. Did intervenor’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas and
Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under
the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear
the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor’s
parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly,
while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death
of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that
published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have
been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the
handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of
the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s
claim.
338

ANNOTATED
Remedial Law; Settlement of Estate; Administrator; Words and Phrases; An

administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the
decedent; Order of preference in the appointment of an administrator prescribes in Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.—An administrator is a person appointed by the court to
administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court
prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator.
Same; Same; Same; In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration
is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed; Order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators specially in cases where justice and equity demand that
opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates.—In the
appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of
the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-
administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.

Emilia Vidanes-Baloing and Padilla Law Office for petitioners.
Inocentes, Untalan, Untalan, Lacuanan & Associates Law Office for intervenor
G.S. Rustia.
CORONA, J.:
G.R. No. 206220. August 19, 2015.*
LUIS UY, substituted by LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ and SHIRLEY UY MACARAIG,

petitioners, vs. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA and ROSAURA** MENDOZA,
substituted by CORAZON BUENA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; Marriages; There is a presumption established

in our Rules “that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.”—The main issue in determining the validity of the sale
of the property by Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage.
There is a presumption established in our Rules “that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.” Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. However, this presumption may
be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In Pugeda v. Trias, 4 SCRA 849 (1962), the Supreme Court
(SC) held that testimony by one (1) of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to
the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has
been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.—Marriage may be proven by any
competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias, 4 SCRA 849 (1962), we held that
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage,
as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be
admissible to prove the fact of marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally
married to Rosca, their property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code
which applies when a couple living together were not incapacitated from getting married.—
Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was le-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
** Also referred to in the Records as Rosauro Mendoza.
673
VOL. 767, AUGUST 19, 2015 673

Uy vs. Lacsamana
gally married to Rosca, their property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the
Family Code which applies when a couple living together were not incapacitated from getting
married.
Civil Law; Co-ownership; Properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-
owned unless there is proof to the contrary.—The provision states that properties acquired
during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the contrary. We agree
with both the trial and appellate courts that Rosca was able to prove that the subject property
is not co-owned but is paraphernal.
Appeals.
San Buenaventura Law Offices for petitioners.
Arcinas Law Office for respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
G.R. No. 169766. March 30, 2011.*

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A.
TAMANO, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Certiorari; An application for certiorari is an independent action which

is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment
complained of.—Estrellita argues that the trials court prematurely issued its judgment, as it
should have waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and,
subsequently, before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ailed that
the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the trial
court. “An application for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a
continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of.”
Same; Answer; Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were
attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory
tactics to the prejudice of the other party.—Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to
present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit
from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial
court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita
to have waived her right to present her side of the story.
Civil Law; Marriages; The Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in effect
at the time of the celebration of their marriage.—Even granting that there was registration of
mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law,
the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective,
as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.
Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this
was in effect at the time of the celebration of their
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
638

ANNOTATED
Juliano-Llave vs. Republic
marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita
married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Family Code; Marriages; In a void marriage, any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage.—While the Family Code is silent with respect to the
proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place
and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties
to the marriage. Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of
the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party
in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit.
Appeals.
Laura Love Peñaranda-Guevarra for petitioner.
Carmina S. Abbas for private respondents.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
No. L-68470, October 8, 1985. *
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as
Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region
Pasay City, and RICHARD UPTON, respondents.
Certiorari; Denial of motion to dismiss may be the subject of a certiorari proceeding in

certain cases.—Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory
and is not subject to appeal. Certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question
the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of
discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically,
then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory
authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go
ahead with the proceedings. We consider the petition filed in this case within the exception,
and we have given it due course.
Husband and Wife; Judgments; Marriages; Divorce; A divorce decree granted by a U.S.
Court between a Filipina and her American husband is binding on the American husband.—
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Absolute divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines if valid under the national law of such an alien.—lt is true that
owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
140
ANNOTATED
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; Actions; An American granted absolute divorce in
his country with his Filipina wife is estopped from asserting his rights over property allegedly
held in the Philippines as conjugal property by him and his former wife.—Thus,pursuant to
his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by
his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Succession; An American granted absolute divorce with
Filipina wife is cut off from marital and successional rights with the latter.—To maintain, as
private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married
to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue
to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Br. CX Romillo, Jr. J.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In this Petition for Certiorari
R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989. *
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA,

in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
Criminal Law; Actions; Rule that the crime of adultery as well as four other crimes
against chastity cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse, a jurisdictional requirement.—Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted
except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional,
and not merely a formal, requirement. While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court
over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written
complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the
case.
Same; Same; Same; In prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else.—Now, the law
specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses
of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lascivi-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
654

ANNOTATED
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
ousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called
exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do
not apply to adultery and concubinage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Complainant must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.—Corollary to such
exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows
that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time
of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact,
lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined
as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes that
the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action
for adultery.—This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might
prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial.
Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of
the criminal action for adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said
provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the
spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and indubitably exist as of the time he initiates
the action.—In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated,
such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would
be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his
status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status
existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time
of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party
bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
655
VOL. 174, JUNE 30, 1989 655

Same; Same; Divorce; Fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country is admitted and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines.—In the present
case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Same; Same; Same; Rule under American jurisprudence that after a divorce has been
decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offender is in pari materia with ours.—American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes
in that jurisdiction which are in pari materiawith ours, yields the rule that after a divorce
has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against
the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive
right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly
commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the
criminal proceedings to a conclusion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court sees no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not
apply in this case and in our jurisdiction.—We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule
should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural
policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed.
Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is
meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent being no longer the husband of
petitioner has no legal standing to commence the adultery case.—Under the same
considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner,
had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Allegation that private respondent could not
have brought this case before the decree of divorce
656

ANNOTATED
for lack of knowledge even if true is of no legal significance or consequence.—The

allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of
divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this
case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there
would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage
is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family,
which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery,
since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of The severance of the
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. XXVI. Ibay-Somera, J.
REGALADO, J.:
G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005. *
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CRASUS L. IYOY, respondent.
Marriages; Annulment and Declaration of Nullity; Psychological

Incapacity; Guidelines; Characteristics; Words and Phrases; Psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support.—Issues most commonly arise as to what
constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for
determining its existence. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the term psychological incapacity
was defined, thus—“. . . [P]sychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
509
VOL. 470, SEPTEMBER 21, 2005 509

Republic vs. Iyoy
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated… The psychological incapacity must be characterized by—(a)
Gravity—It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) Juridical Antecedence—It must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and (c) Incurability—It must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Same; Same; Same; While it is no longer necessary to allege expert opinion in a petition
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, such psychological incapacity must be
established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.—A later case, Marcos v.
Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for
the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no
longer necessary to allege expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality
of the evidence presented during the trial.
Same; Same; Same; Divorce; Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the material bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves—
it refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
marriage.—It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of
the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
the said Article. As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 “is
not to be
510

ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Iyoy
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”
Same; Same; Same; Even when the rules have been relaxed and the personal examination
of a spouse by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage, the totality of evidence presented during trial by the spouse seeking
the declaration of nullity of marriage must still prove the gravity, judicial antecedence, and
incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity.—Fely’s hot-temper, nagging, and
extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and
even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may have hurt and
embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Nonetheless, the afore-described
characteristics, behavior, and acts of Fely do not satisfactorily establish a psychological or
mental defect that is serious or grave, and which has been in existence at the time of
celebration of the marriage and is incurable. Even when the rules have been relaxed and the
personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
the totality of evidence presented during trial by respondent Crasus, as the spouse seeking
the declaration of nullity of marriage, must still prove the gravity, judicial antecedence, and
incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity; which, it failed to do so herein.
Same; Same; Divorce; Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, by its plain and literal
interpretation, cannot be applied to the case of a Filipino couple where one spouse obtained a
divorce while still a Filipino citizen.—As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a
special situation wherein one of the married couple is a foreigner who divorces his or her
Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied
to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce,
she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself
admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus
511
VOL. 470, SEPTEMBER 21, 2005 511

Republic vs. Iyoy
sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her
American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status,
condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then
and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely
could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
Same; Same; Solicitor General; That Article 48 of the Family Code does not expressly
mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings
for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages.—That Article 48 does not expressly
mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings
for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal
law officer and legal defender of the Government. His Office is tasked to represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents
in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The
Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such,
shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. The intent of Article 48 of the Family
Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected
in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion
between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that
the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such
intent, rather than thwart it.
Same; Same; Same; While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates,
on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is
elevated to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.—The
512

ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Iyoy
general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on
behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this
Court or the Court of Appeals. While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is
elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for
taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable
and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of
the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of
the State.
Same; Same; Same; The issuance of the Supreme Court of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which became
effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts as to the authority of the Solicitor
General to file the instant petition for review on behalf of the State.—The issuance of this
Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other
doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant
Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to
intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts.
Same; Same; In the instant case, at most, the wife’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and
bigamy, give the husband grounds to file for legal separation, but not for declaration of nullity
of marriage—while the Court commiserates with the latter for being continuously shackled to
what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law
nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.—This Court arrives
at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the
validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s
abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for
513
VOL. 470, SEPTEMBER 21, 2005 513

Republic vs. Iyoy
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court
commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a
hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society
can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Jiniffer B. Singco for respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
G.R. No. 168785. February 5, 2010.*

HERALD BLACK DACASIN, petitioner, vs.SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN,
respondent.
Civil Law; Contracts; Parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement
subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.—In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the
terms of agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence,
deemed “inexistent and void from the beginning.” For lack of relevant stipulation in the
Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine substantive law serve as default parameters
to test the validity of the Agreement’s joint child custody stipulations.
Same; Same; The Family Code; Child Custody; Sole parental custody of a child less than
seven years old—The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or
in law is that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother; This is
mandatory grounded on sound policy of consideration; Agreement’s object to establish a post-
divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven
years old contravenes Philippine Law.—At the time the parties executed the Agreement on
28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having
been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were no longer married
under the laws of the United States because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine
law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law (under the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: “no child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother x x x.” (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody to the
mother is mandatory, grounded on sound policy consideration, subject only to a narrow
exception not alleged to obtain here.) Clearly then, the Agreement’s object to establish a post-
divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven
years old contravenes Philippine law.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
658
Same; Same; Same; Same; The agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced
or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live
together.—The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been
repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The
Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law
provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together. However, upon separation
of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years
old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody
regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a
child within this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the
separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to
the separated mother.
Same; Family Code; Marriages; Divorce; An alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a
divorce decree obtained abroad.—The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not
bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139 (1985)
settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree
obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee’s Philippine suit for accounting of
alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; It should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as
much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the
alien’s nationality irrespective of who obtained the divorce.—We reiterated Van
Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989) to dismiss criminal complaints for
adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his
former Filipino spouse because he no longer qualified as “offended spouse” entitled to file the
complaints under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign
divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it
does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.659
ABAD, J., Separate Opinion:
Family Code; Child Custody; In the matter of child custody, the mutual will of the child’s
parent takes precedence in the absence of circumstances that justify recourse to the law.—I
submit that, in the matter of child custody, the mutual will of the child’s parents takes
precedence in the absence of circumstances that justify recourse to the law. The law becomes
relevant, only as a default, if a separated couple cannot agree on the custody of their child.
The law should not supplant parental discretion or unnecessarily infringe on parental
authority.
Same; Same; The statutory preference for the mother’s custody comes into play only when
courts are compelled to resolve custody fights between separated parents; Where the parents
settle the matter out of court by mutual agreement, the statutory preference reserved to the
mother should not apply.—The second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code should
not be read as prohibiting separated couples from agreeing to a custody arrangement, other
than sole maternal custody, for their child of tender age. The statutory preference for the
mother’s custody comes into play only when courts are compelled to resolve custody fights
between separated parents. Where the parents settle the matter out of court by mutual
agreement, the statutory preference reserved to the mother should not apply.
Same; Same; No legislative policy is violated if separated parents are allowed to
voluntarily agree to a child custody arrangement other than sole maternal custody.—No
legislative policy is violated if separated parents are allowed to voluntarily agree to a child
custody arrangement other than sole maternal custody. It is not the policy of the state to
prohibit separated parents from compromising on child custody even if the child is of tender
age. On the contrary, voluntary custody agreements are generally favored as it can only work
for the best interest of the child.
PETITION for review on certiorari of orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Br. 60.
Puyat, Jacinto & Santos for petitioner.660
Poblador, Bautista & Reyes for respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010.*

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs.DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
Marriages; Family Code; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity; Divorce; The Family
Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages—void and voidable marriages—and in
both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage; Divorce contemplates the dissolution of
the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.—The Family Code recognizes only two
types of defective marriages—void and voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis for the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the
time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
union for cause arising after the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Through the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, Executive Order No. (EO) 227 effectively incorporated into the
law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989).—Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in
marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of
her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted Executive Order No. (EO)
227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
267
VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 267

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
wording, as follows: “Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.” Through the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s
holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174
SCRA 653 (1989). In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion
of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The
Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage
to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.—As the RTC
correctly stated, the provision was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.” The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided
the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.Without the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign
decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related
issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws
do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the
Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as
268

ANNOTATED
basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his
or her alien spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An action based on the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree—if
the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare
that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.—An action
based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a
similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree),
whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code—the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.—Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the
Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien
spouse can claim no right under this provision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Conflict of Laws; Recognition of Foreign
Judgments; The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip such aliens of legal interest to petition the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree—direct involvement or being the
subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment.—We qualify
our above conclusion—i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens—with the complementary statement that this conclusion
is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In
other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily
269
VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 269

strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with
the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. * * * To our mind, direct
involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with
the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an
alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to
his or her national law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The starting point in any
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws—the foreign judgment and its authenticity must
be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national
law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.—The starting point in
any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule,
“no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal
of another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
Conflict of Laws; Recognition of Foreign Judgments; In the instant case where the
foreigner seeking recognition of the foreign divorce decree attached to his petition a copy of the
divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include
a copy of the foreign law on divorce, the Court deems it more appropriate to remand the case
to the trial court to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the foreign divorce
law, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s obvious
270

ANNOTATED
conformity with the petition.—In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree
and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport
to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested
by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not
kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show
that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with
the Canadian divorce law. We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action,
given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties
to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right
by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our
laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.
Same; Same; More than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms.—More than the principle of comity that is
served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending
judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect,
as discussed above, will not
271
VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 271

obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Same; Same; Civil Registry; While the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the
civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize
the decree’s registration—there must first be a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect; The registration of the foreign divorce decree without
the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.—But
while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no
judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength
alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited National Statistics
Office (NSO) Circular No. 4, series of 1982, and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series
of 1982—both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a
foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,
nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration
of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and
cannot produce any legal effect.
Same; Same; Same; Cancellation of Entries; The recognition that the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) may extend to a foreign divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
cancellation of the entry in the civil registry—a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment
is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of
entries in the civil registry; The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
may be judicially cancelled or corrected—Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that
272

ANNOTATED
must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may
be annotated in the civil registry.—Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
recognition that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) may extend to the Canadian divorce decree
does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules
of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code
declares that “no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order.”
The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled
or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the
verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements
have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the
RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in
a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.—
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry—one
for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and
273
VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 273

tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag
City, Br. 11.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court
Gilbert U. Medrano for petitioner.
Michael P. Mejia for private respondent.
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal
Rep v manalo 2018
G.R. No. 112019. January 4, 1995. *
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND

JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Circular 28–91; Circular 28–91 requires a certification of non-forum

shopping.—Thepetition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular
28–91, which requires a certification of non-forum shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Civil Law; Family Code; Void and Void able Marriages; Psychological
Incapacity; Psychological incapacity must be characterized by a) gravity, b) juridical
antecedence, and c) incurability.—JusticeSempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I), who opines that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties, required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must
be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
Same; Same; Same; Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage.—It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and
most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the
use of the phrase ‘psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant
to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma’s “Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law,” quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder
by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson’s “Handbook II for Marriage
Nullity Cases”). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts
_______________
* EN BANC.
21
VOL. 240, JANUARY 4, 1995 21

Santos vs. Court of Appeals
in our law on marriages. Thus correlated, “psychological incapacity” should refer to no

less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensibility or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.—There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have
sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be “legitimate.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code.—The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of
a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the
degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
PADILLA, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Civil Law; Family Code; Void and Voidable Marriages; Psychological

Incapacity; Private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply
with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her
husband.—To my mind, it;is clear that private respondent has been
22

ANNOTATED
shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital

obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other
hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife,
herein private respondent
Same; Same; Same; Same; A spouse’s obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner
in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage.—A spouse’s obligation to live and cohabit
with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are
overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on
the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be
instances when, for economic and practical reasons; husband and wife have to live separately,
but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each
other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contacts with
the other to inform the latter of his/ her condition and whereabouts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no
intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband.—In the present case, it is apparent that
private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner,
her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does
not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living
and cohabiting with him.
ROMERO, J., Concurring:

Civil Law; Family Code; Void and Voidable Marriages; Psychological
Incapacity; Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the
understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a
case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes
psychological incapacity.—Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family
Code, the Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those
already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or
liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity
was the understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be
treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what
constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. But the law requires that the
23
VOL, 240, JANUARY 4, 1995 23

same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case
basis, must be guided by “experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, maybe given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.”—
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is
open to abuse. To prevent this, “the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.” Moreover, the judge,
in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by “experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 36 is a recognition of the reality that some marriages,
by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the
parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-
accepted means.—The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family will remain the
lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article
36 is not to be taken as an abandonment -of the ideal which we all cherish, If at all, it is a
recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the
contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of
putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.

Alexander G. Amor for petitioner.
Saleto J. Erames for private respondent.
VITUG, J.:

ANNOTATED
G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997. *
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
Family Code; Marriage; Psychological incapacity must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.—In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose
C. Vitug, ruled that “psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity x x x and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated.” Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote
that “the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
Same; Same; Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities”
in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.—On the other hand, in the present case, there
is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears
to us to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting
personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that
the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical)
illness.
Same; Same.—The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the
problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
____________________________
* EN BANC.
199
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 199

testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility,
not psychological incapacity.
Same; Same; Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code.—From their submissions and the Court’s own deliberations, the following guidelines
in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down
for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the
foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected”
by the state.
Same; Same; Root cause of psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.—The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Same; Same; The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration”
of the marriage.—The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration”
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness
200

ANNOTATED
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
Same; Same; Such incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.—Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
Same; Same; Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.—Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not
a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
Same; Same; Non-complied marital obligation(s) must be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision.—The essential marital obligations must
be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision. Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36
was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: “The following are incapable
of contracting mar-
201
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 201

riage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.”
Same; Same; Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state.—The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted
in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

Juanito A. Orallo for respondent.
Oscar V. Cruz and Ricardo C. Puno amici curiae.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000. *
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
Actions; Marriage; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity; Psychological

Incapacity; Words and Phrases; Guidelines Governing the Application and Interpretation of
Psychological Incapacity; The guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated—what is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition, for indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.—In Republic v. CA and
Molina, the guidelines govern-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
756

ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
ing the application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in

Article 36 of the Family Code were laid down by this Court as follows: x x x x x x x x x The
guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos
v. Court of Appeals: “psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.” The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There could be no conclusion of psychological
incapacity where there is absolutely no showing that the “defects” were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.—Although this Court is sufficiently
convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
“defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Divorce; Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves.—Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage,
it is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations
are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Separation; Neither is Article 36 to be equated
with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but
on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.—Neither is Article 36 to be
equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
757
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 19, 2000 757

Marcos vs. Marcos
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,

abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

Jimeno, Jalandoni & Cope Law Offices for petitioner.
Macaraig Law Office for private respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Perez
G.R. No. 184237. September 21, 2016.*
HENRY H. TENG, petitioner, vs. LAWRENCE C. TING, EDMUND TING and

ANTHONY TING, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Partition; Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court
states that “questions as to advancement made, or alleged to have been made, by the deceased
to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir.”—In the guise of raising a legal issue, petitioner urges the court a
quo to resolve once again an ownership issue. Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court states
that “questions as to advancement made, or alleged to have been made, by the deceased to
any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising
the questions and on the heir.” But the rule, as correctly interpreted by respondent,
presupposes a genuine issue of advancement.
Civil Law; Succession; Legitime; Words and Phrases; Legitime is defined as that part of
the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain
heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs.—Legitime is defined as that part of the
testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain
heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs. Petitioner essentially asserts that
properties were actually owned by Teng Ching Lay, and that Arsenio was merely a trustee of
the said properties. Verily, petitioner is claiming that Teng Ching Lay owned the Malate
property and therefore, it should be considered part of the legitime. This brings us precisely
to the purpose of an inclusion/exclusion proceeding. Where a party in a probate proceeding
prays for the inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property, the court
may provisionally pass upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a
separate action.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
615
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 21, 2016 615

Teng vs. Ting
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Under the doctrine of res
judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and
matters determined in the previous suit.—Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment
or decree, on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined
in the previous suit. The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties
ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact
has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it
remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them
in law or estate.
Same; Same; Conclusiveness of Judgments; Conclusiveness of judgment applies when a
fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a
former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction.—Conclusiveness of judgment applies when a
fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a
former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final judgment
or order binds the parties, to that action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-
in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains standing and
unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively settled fact
or question furthermore cannot again be litigated in any future or, other action between the
same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the
identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment.
Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Probate Courts; Jurisdiction; The
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as a probate court relates only to matters having
to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of a will of a deceased person, and does not
extend to the determination of a question of ownership that arises during the proceedings.—It
is significant to stress that the jurisdiction of the RTC as a probate court relates only to
matters having to
616

ANNOTATED
Teng vs. Ting
do with the settlement of the estate and probate of a will of a deceased person, and does
not extend to the determination of a question of ownership that arises during the proceedings.
This is true whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the estate, unless the claimants
to the property are all heirs of the deceased and they agree to submit the question for
determination by the probate or administration court and the interests of third parties are
not prejudiced; or unless the purpose is to determine whether or not certain properties should
be included in the inventory, in which case the probate or administration court may
decide prima facie the ownership of the property, but such determination is not final and is
without prejudice to the right of interested parties to ventilate the question of ownership in
a proper action. Otherwise put, the determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title by a court of competent
jurisdiction. The separate action contemplated by the rule had in fact already been instituted
by herein petitioner in Hko Ah Pao through a petition for cancellation of title and partition
with damages, which essentially questions ownership of the Malate property. At this juncture,
we hold that there is no need to ventilate the issue of advanced legitime vis-à-vis ownership
in another forum because res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment has
already set in.
Appeals.
Pantaleon Law Office for respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Re

Ting v ting 2009
G.R. No. 161793. February 13, 2009.*

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, petitioner, vs. ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE,
respondent, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity; Judgments; In hindsight, it may

have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity; The unintended consequences of Molina has taken its toll on people who have to
live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, con-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
194

ANNOTATED
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
sume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions—
far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes
to fit into and be bound by it.—In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to
impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as the
“most liberal divorce procedure in the world.” The unintended consequences of Molina,
however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity
and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very
foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the
Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.
Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase
and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on
account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.
Same; Same; In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological
incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting
the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological
disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining
in that sacred bond; To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will
simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.—The Court need not worry about the
possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against
this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor,
to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court
should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse,
domestic violence and incestuous rape. In dissolving marital bonds on account of either
party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but
it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted
with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital
obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be195
VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009 195

Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the
first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration
of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
Same; Same; Judgments; Legal Research; Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not
suggesting the abandonment of Molina in the instant case—it is simply declaring that there
is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36.—Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting
the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice
Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, 484 SCRA 353 (2006), there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that
each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Expert Witnesses; By the very nature of Article 36 of
the Family Code, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making,
must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.—The parties’ whirlwind relationship
lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged
marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert
testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern
falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. By the very nature of Article 36, courts,
despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but,
instead, must consider as 196

ANNOTATED
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental

temperaments of the parties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and
in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of
a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.—Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals, 320 SCRA 76 (1999) emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed
at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000) asserts,
there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation
of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity. Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest
the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed
psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state
of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to
arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not
dispense with the parties’ prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolutions of the Court of
Appeals.
Froilan M. Bacungan and Associates for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for oppositor.
197
VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009 197

Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological i
R. No. 139676. March 31, 2006. *
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NORMA CUISON-MELGAR and

EULOGIO A. MELGAR, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Family Code; Marriages; It is the policy of our Constitution to

protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family.—It bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State can
find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families
weakens our social and moral fabric and,
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
178

ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Cuison-Melgar
hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
Family Code; Marriages; Only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the
OSG will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties,
or the fabrication or suppression of evidence.—In this case, the State did not actively
participate in the prosecution of the case at the trial level. Other than the Public Prosecutor’s
Manifestation that no collusion existed between the contending parties and the brief cross-
examination which had barely scratched the surface, no pleading, motion, or position paper
was filed by the Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. Truly, only
the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the OSG will ensure that the interest of
the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.
Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20
(1995), the Supreme Court declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability—it should refer to “no less than a
mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage.—In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. It should
refer to “no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.” The intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.
Same; Same; Same; In Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000) the Supreme Court
clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a
179
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006 179

Republic vs. Cuison-Melgar
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity.—The Court clarified in Marcos v. Marcos that
there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined
by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be
established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Same; Same; Same; There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there
is absolutely no showing that the “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage
or that they are incurable.—In order that the allegation of psychological incapacity may not
be considered a mere fabrication, evidence other than Norma’s lone testimony should have
been adduced. While an actual medical, psychiatric or psychological examination is not
a conditio sine qua nonto a finding of psychological incapacity, an expert witness would have
strengthened Norma’s claim of Eulogio’s alleged psychological incapacity. Norma’s omission
to present one is fatal to her position. There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity
where there is absolutely no showing that the “defects” were already present at the inception
of the marriage or that they are incurable.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
G.R. No. 173294. February 27, 2008.*

RENNE ENRIQUE BIER, petitioner, vs. MA. LOURDES A. BIER and THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity; The

Supreme Court has been consistent in holding that if a petition for nullity based on
psychological incapacity is to be given due course, its gravity, root cause, incurability and the
fact that it existed prior to or at the time of celebration of the marriage must always be proved;
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.—The trial court apparently overlooked the fact that this Court has been
consistent in holding that if a petition for nullity based on psychological incapacity is to be
given due course, its gravity, root cause, incurability and the fact that it existed prior to or at
the time of celebration of the marriage must always be proved. As early as Santos v. CA, et
al., 240 SCRA 20 (1995), we already held that:[P]sychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
124

ANNOTATED
Bier vs. Bier
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. x x x This psychologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; The granting of a petition for nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.—These must be strictly complied with as the granting of a
petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This is specially so since the
Family Code does not define psychological incapacity. The determination thereof is left solely
to the discretion of the courts and must be made on a case-to-case basis.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Habitual alcoholism, chain-smoking, failure or refusal to meet
one’s duties and responsibilities as a married person and eventual abandonment of a spouse
do not suffice to nullify a marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity, if not shown to be
due to some psychological (as opposed to physical) illness.—Petitioner was able to establish
that respondent was remiss in her duties as a wife and had become a happy-go-lucky woman
who failed to attend to her husband’s needs and who eventually abandoned him. However,
the totality of her acts, as testified to by petitioner and his brother, was not tantamount to a
psychological incapacity, as petitioner would have us believe. Habitual alcoholism, chain-
smoking, failure or refusal to meet one’s duties and responsibilities as a married person and
eventual abandonment of a spouse do not suffice to nullify a marriage on the basis
of psychological incapacity, if not shown to be due to some psychological (as opposed to
physical) illness.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although absence can indeed make the heart grow fonder, the
opposite can just as well be true—out of sight, out of mind—the couple drifted apart and
respondent obviously
125
VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 27, 2008 125

Bier vs. Bier
fell out of love with petitioner.—The undeniable fact is that the marriage, according to
petitioner’s own evidence, was off to a good start. According to him, respondent used to be a
sweet, loving and caring wife who took good care of him and their home. She even willingly
consented to the difficult living arrangement of taking turns in going back and forth between
the Philippines and Saudi Arabia just so they could be together. Perhaps it was this unusual
arrangement which took a heavy toll on their relationship. They barely saw and spent time
with each other. Respondent could have gotten used to petitioner’s absence. And although
absence can indeed make the heart grow fonder, the opposite can just as well be true: out of
sight, out of mind. The couple drifted apart and respondent obviously fell out of love with
petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It was not enough that respondent, the party adverted to as
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations, had difficulty or was
unwilling to perform the same—proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse
integral element in respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated her from
complying with her essential marital obligations.—We agree with the CA that the change in
respondent’s feelings towards petitioner could hardly be described as a psychological illness.
It was not enough that respondent, the party adverted to as psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her marital obligations, had difficulty or was unwilling to perform the same.
Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in respondent’s
personality structure that effectively incapacitated her from complying with her essential
marital obligations, had to be shown. This petitioner failed to do. Consequently, we are
unconvinced that respondent’s condition was rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating
disorder.
Appeals.
Ferrer and Associates Law Office for petitioner.
126

ANNOTATED
Bier vs. Bier
CORONA, J.:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997. *

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI,
respondents.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriage; The prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.—“If a
spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
325
VOL. 266, JANUARY 16, 1997 325

of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.”
Same; Same; Same; One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”—Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is “To procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Same; Same; Same; While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction therefor is actually the
spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order.—While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is
actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order” (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is
shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage
is to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings
spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery
of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.

Arturo S. Santos for petitioner.
Prisciliano I. Casis for private respondent.
326

ANNOTATED
TORRES, JR., J.:
G.R. No. 150677. June 5, 2009.*

RENATO REYES SO, petitioner, vs. LORNA VALERA, respondent.
Family Code; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity;

Characterization of Psychological Incapacity; Psychological incapacity must be confined to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.—The petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that “a
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity
_______________
** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales per Special Order No. 646 dated
May 15, 2009.
*** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Special Order No. 631 dated
April 29, 2009.
* SECOND DIVISION.
320

ANNOTATED
So vs. Valera
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.” In Santos v. Court of Appeals (240 SCRA
20 [1995]), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to “no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage.” It must be confined to “the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for
the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.—A later
case, Marcos v. Marcos (343 SCRA 755 [2000]), further clarified that there is no requirement
that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in
a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability can be duly established.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological incapacity.—
In Molina (268 SCRA 198 [1997], we ruled that “mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological
incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, the root cause should be a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.”
Appeals.
Pangilinan, Britanico, Sarmiento and Franco and Abesamis Law Offices for
petitioner.
321
VOL. 858, JUNE 5, 2009 321

So vs. Valera
BRION, J.:
G.R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993. *
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD

AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
Marriages; A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact under
the. Family Code even for purposes other than remarriage.—Came the Family Code which
settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground
for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
573
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 573

Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
Same; Same.—In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and
void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage,
the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Same; Same.—That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause
denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained
only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a
party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation
of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support
of their common children and the delivery of the latters’ presumptive legitimes. In such cases,
evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence,
in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains
subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required
by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Same; Actions; Declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the
liquidation of property, custody and support of children, etc. There is no need of filing a
separate civil action for such purposes.—Based on the foregoing provisions, private
respondent’s ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary
consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus,
petitioner’s suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil
action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided
the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property
according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the
lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed
with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple’s properties.
Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible
574
ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
VITUG, J., Concurring:
Marriages; Certain effects of a valid marriage can flow out of a void marriage.—A void
marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the preferability for, and
justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will not give it
the status or the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific instances where
certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void marriage. Examples of these
cases are children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity) and
Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of presumptive
legitimes of children and recording thereof following the annulment or declaration of nullity
of a prior marriage), conceived or born before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void
marriages, who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
Bovis v bovis
Landicho

ANNOTATED
Ty vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000. *
OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and EDGARDO M.

REYES, respondents.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Bigamy; Where the second marriage of a person was
entered into in 1979, before Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986), during which time
the prevailing rule was found in Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977), People v. Mendoza,
95 Phil. 845 (1954) and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957), there was no need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of license and consent, before such person
may contract a second marriage.—A recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar
circumstances of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial
judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first
marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got
pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat,
Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the children
thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family
Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence at that time. Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of
private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule
was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being
void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nul-
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
87
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 27, 2000 87

lity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that
private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Same; Same; Same; Family Code; The provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied where to do so would prejudice the vested rights of a party and of her
children.—We find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to
the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be
impairment of vested rights.
Same; Same; Same; Marriage Licenses; That a marriage license was used legally in the
celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church
wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for the latter rites served not only to ratify but
also to fortify the first.—In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner
and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the
appellate court’s finding that despite private respondent’s “deceit and perfidy“ in contracting
marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to
the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent using
the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner
now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private
respondent’s allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we
find there was a marriage license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and
used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory
of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to
recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a
technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during
trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from giving her
defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting
the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality. In
our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal
requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the
two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony
does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties
to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify
the first. The appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense
of the defendant below which undoubtedly could have
88

ANNOTATED
tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial court.
But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting
the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls “his own deceit and perfidy.”
Same; Same; Same; Damages; Our laws do not comprehend an action for damages
between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation—there are other
remedies.—Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded
in the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private
respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife.
In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint
for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer,
we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or
common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common
sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action
for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.
There are other remedies.

Caguioa Law Office for petitioner.
Ceballos and Associates Law Office for private respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Cariño vs. Cariño
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001. *
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, vs.SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Property; For purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.—Under Article 40 of
the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare
a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who
is rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits’’ of the deceased.—It is clear therefore that
the Court is
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
128

ANNOTATED
Cariño vs. Cariño
clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this
case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject
“death benefits” of the deceased.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the
absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.—Under the
Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the
absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the
applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of
property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code
on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”—Accordingly, the declaration in the
instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao
does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. One of the
effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses
according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab
initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of
the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Article 148 of the Family Code, the properties acquired
by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.—Under
Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man
and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man,—x x
x In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home,
children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
129
VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 2, 2001 129

Cariño vs. Cariño

Gancayco, Balasbas and Associates for petitioner.
Agapito P. Oquindo, Jr. for respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010.*

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs.DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
Marriages; Family Code; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity; Divorce; The Family
Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages—void and voidable marriages—and in
both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage; Divorce contemplates the dissolution of
the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.—The Family Code recognizes only two
types of defective marriages—void and voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis for the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the
time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
union for cause arising after the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Through the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, Executive Order No. (EO) 227 effectively incorporated into the
law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989).—Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in
marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of
her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted Executive Order No. (EO)
227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
267
VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 267

wording, as follows: “Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.” Through the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s
holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174
SCRA 653 (1989). In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion
of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The
Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage
to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.—As the RTC
correctly stated, the provision was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.” The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided
the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.Without the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign
decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related
issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws
do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the
Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as
268

ANNOTATED
basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his
or her alien spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An action based on the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree—if
the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare
that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.—An action
based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a
similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree),
whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code—the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.—Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the
Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien
spouse can claim no right under this provision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Conflict of Laws; Recognition of Foreign
Judgments; The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip such aliens of legal interest to petition the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree—direct involvement or being the
subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment.—We qualify
our above conclusion—i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens—with the complementary statement that this conclusion
is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In
other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily
269
VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 269
strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with
the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. * * * To our mind, direct
involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with
the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an
alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to
his or her national law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The starting point in any
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws—the foreign judgment and its authenticity must
be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national
law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.—The starting point in
any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule,
“no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal
of another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
Conflict of Laws; Recognition of Foreign Judgments; In the instant case where the
foreigner seeking recognition of the foreign divorce decree attached to his petition a copy of the
divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include
a copy of the foreign law on divorce, the Court deems it more appropriate to remand the case
to the trial court to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the foreign divorce
law, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s obvious
270

ANNOTATED
conformity with the petition.—In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree
and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport
to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested
by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not
kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show
that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with
the Canadian divorce law. We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action,
given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties
to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right
by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our
laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.
Same; Same; More than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms.—More than the principle of comity that is
served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending
judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect,
as discussed above, will not
271
VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 271

obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Same; Same; Civil Registry; While the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the
civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize
the decree’s registration—there must first be a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect; The registration of the foreign divorce decree without
the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.—But
while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no
judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength
alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited National Statistics
Office (NSO) Circular No. 4, series of 1982, and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series
of 1982—both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a
foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,
nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration
of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and
cannot produce any legal effect.
Same; Same; Same; Cancellation of Entries; The recognition that the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) may extend to a foreign divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
cancellation of the entry in the civil registry—a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment
is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of
entries in the civil registry; The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
may be judicially cancelled or corrected—Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that
272

ANNOTATED
must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may
be annotated in the civil registry.—Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
recognition that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) may extend to the Canadian divorce decree
does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules
of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code
declares that “no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order.”
The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled
or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the
verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements
have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the
RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in
a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.—
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry—one
for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and
273
VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 273
tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag
City, Br. 11.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court
Gilbert U. Medrano for petitioner.
Michael P. Mejia for private respondent.
BRION, J.:
G.R. No. 188775. August 24, 2011.*

CENON R. TEVES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DANILO R.
BONGALON, respondents.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements.—Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states: The
penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings. The elements of this crime are as follows: 1. That the offender has been
legally married; 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code; 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and 4. That the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Same; Same; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.—It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed
the crime charged. His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once
and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity
of a mar-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
308
ANNOTATED
Teves vs. People
riage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting
a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
Same; Same; Same; The finality of the judicial declaration of the nullity of previous
marriage of the accused cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.—
Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of
the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by
law, and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is
material only for determining prescription. The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner
on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27
June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot
be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.

R.R. Mendez & Associates Law Offices for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996. *
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA I.P.I. 95-61-MTJ)

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY,
respondent.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage.—There is nothing
ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple.
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead,
a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven
that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or
presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
Same; Same; Same; Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part
of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom.—In the case
at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his
first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent
judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance
of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the
Family Code, “The following marriage shall be void from the beginning; (4) Those bigamous
x x x marriages not falling under Article 41.”
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
130

ANNOTATED
Navarro vs. Domagtoy
Same; Same; Same; Instances where a marriage can be held outside of the judge’s
chambers or courtroom.—As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside
of the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death,
(2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing
in a sworn statement to this effect.
Same; Same; Same; Article 8 which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of
the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer.—
Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the “authority of the solemnizing
officer.” Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, “any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.” Article 8, which is a directory
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3 which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.—A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to
marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed
by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites
of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions,
may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes
a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Judges; By citing Article 8 and the exceptions
therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.—Inasmuch as
respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was
not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte. By citing
131
VOL. 259, JULY 19, 1996 131

Navarro vs. Domagtoy
Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic
principles of civil law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court finds respondent to have acted in gross
ignorance of the law.—Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross
ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are
elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent’s failure to apply
them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Misconduct and

Inefficiency.
ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case
G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000. *
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO,

respondent.
Civil Law; Marriages; Judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not
necessary in the new Civil Code as long as the prescribed period of absence is met.—A judicial
declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period
of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are,
by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid “until declared null and void by a
competent court.” It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party
assailing the second marriage.
Same; Same; Conditions in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid.—Under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent
bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must
concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four
consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated
in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old
rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse
present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration.

Floresco P. Fronda for petitioner.
Lorna Salangsang Dee for respondent.
___________
* THIRD DIVISION.
202

ANNOTATED
Armas vs. Calisterio
VITUG, J.:
G.R. No. 159614. December 9, 2005. *
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION) and ALAN B. ALEGRO, respondents.
Civil Law; The Family Code; Declaration of Absence; The spouse present is burdened to
prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage.—The
spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded
belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos
racionales.”
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
278

ANNOTATED
Same; Same; Same; Belief may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence
which may tend even in a slight degree to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination
probably founded in truth.—Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of
an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend,
even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded
in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments,
prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives
of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw
light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
Same; Same; Same; Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.—The belief of the present spouse
must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring
before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the
inquiries made by present spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Court warned against collusion between the parties when they find
it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.—Although
testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the present spouse that
the absent spouse is already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco, the Court warned against collusion
between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through
existing legal means. It is also the maxim that “men readily believe what they wish to be
true.”

279
VOL. 477, DECEMBER 9, 2005 279

Anastacio D. Yong for respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
G.R. No. 187061. October 8, 2014.*
CELERINA J. SANTOS, petitioner, vs.RICARDO T. SANTOS, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment; Annulment of judgment is the

remedy when the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) judgment, order, or resolution has become
final, and the “remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies)
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.”—Annulment of judgment is the
remedy when the Regional Trial Court’s judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and
the “remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.” The grounds for annulment of judgment
are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos
v. City of Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523 (1999): For fraud to become a basis for annulment of
judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to
an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could
have been litigated. It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the
trial which prevents a party from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such
that there is no fair submission of the controversy.
Civil Law; Family Code; Declaration of Presumptive Death; The Family Code provides
that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four(4) consecutive years, coupled with a well-
founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a
justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.—The Family
Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled
with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that
constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by
the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears.
* SECOND DIVISION.
638

ANNOTATED
Santos vs. Santos
Same; Same; Same; Affidavit of Reappearance; The filing of an affidavit of reappearance

is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse
was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.—The Family Code
provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent
marriage by mere reappearance. The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission
on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated
when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead. Moreover, a close reading of the
entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is
subject to several conditions: (1) the nonexistence of a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of
the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of
reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of
reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined.
Same; Same; Same; When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial
declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead
and that the second marriage is legal.—When subsequent marriages are contracted after a
judicial declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is
already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the
continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse. The second marriage, as with all
marriages, is presumed valid. The burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not
properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even
if the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was “no step taken to terminate
the subsequent marriage, either by filing an affidavit of reappearance or by court action.”—
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the
subsequent marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon, 485 SCRA 376 (2006). This
court noted that mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the
parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was “no step . . . taken to terminate
the subsequent
639
VOL. 737, OCTOBER 8, 2014 639

Santos vs. Santos
marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]” “Since the
second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is
dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and
by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent
marriage is terminated as provided by law.”
Same; Same; Same; Conditions for a Bigamous Subsequent Marriage to be Considered
Valid.—A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous
subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are present: 1) The prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years; 2) The spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead; 3) There must be a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse; and 4) There is a court declaration
of presumptive death of the absent spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Bigamous Marriages; Marriages contracted prior to the valid
termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void.—A
subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court
declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the
spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated.
Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally
considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is
protected by law.
Same; Same; Same; A subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing “an action
in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or
termination of the subsequent marriage.”—The provision on reappearance in the Family Code
as a remedy to effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse
who was declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This
court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing
“an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of
dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.”
640
ANNOTATED
Santos vs. Santos
Same; Same; Same; Legitimate Children; Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage

under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the “children of such marriage
shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage
will be the same as in valid marriages.”—Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under
Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the “children of such marriage shall
be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be
the same as in valid marriages.” If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the
subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered legitimate.
Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for
bigamy. It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent
marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the
status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.

Cariño & Mabalot for petitioner.
Gil D. Genorga, Jr. for respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
G.R. No. 174451. October 13, 2009.*

VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, petitioner, vs. REY C. ALCAZAR,
respondent.
Family Law; Husband and Wife; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Article 45(5) of the
Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate; Incapacity to consummate denotes the
permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual
intercourse.—Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity
to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the
complete act of sexual intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of
the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the
anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears
arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic
causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the result of making the spouse
physically incapable of performing the marriage act.
Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; It is settled in this jurisdiction that the client is bound by
the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural technique.—One curious
thing, though, caught this Court’s attention. As can be gleaned from the evidence presented
by petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that
petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent
based on the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner attributes the filing of the
erroneous Complaint before the RTC to her former counsel’s mistake or gross ignorance. But
even said reason cannot save petitioner’s Complaint from dismissal. It is settled in this
jurisdiction that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of
procedural technique. Although this rule is not a hard and fast one and admits of exceptions,
such as where the mistake of counsel is so gross, palpable and inexcusable as to result in the
violation of his client’s substantive rights, petitioner
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
605
failed to convince us that such exceptional circumstances exist herein.

Same; Same; Declaration of Nullity; Psychological Incapacity; Words and Phrases;
“Psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend
all possible cases of psychoses—it should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.—In Santos v.
Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995) the Court declared that “psychological incapacity”
under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,”
a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.—Tayag concluded
in her report that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable
to the latter’s experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the basis
for the said conclusion. Tayag did not particularly describe the “pattern of behavior” that
showed that respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed
to explain how such a personality disorder made respondent psychologically incapacitated to
perform his obligations as a husband. We emphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner,
not just to prove that respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such
psychological disorder renders him “truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.”
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in
the performance of some marital obligations.
Same; Same; Same; To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse are
not necessarily signs of psychological illness, and neither can falling out of love be so labeled;
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.—In this instance, we have
606
been allowed, through the evidence adduced, to peek into petitioner’s marital life and,
as a result, we perceive a simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming
strangers to each other, with the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching
himself as much as possible from his wife. To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on
one’s spouse are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love
be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the
parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under
our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation—a
relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties; or
where one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the
marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could
not have validly entered into a marriage. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void
marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Sexual Infidelity; Sexual infidelity, per se, does not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.—As a last-ditch effort
to have her marriage to respondent declared null, petitioner pleads abandonment by and
sexual infidelity of respondent. In a Manifestation and Motion dated 21 August 2007 filed
before us, petitioner claims that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing
in the same barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is living-in with
another woman named “Sally.” Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Again, petitioner must
be able to establish that respondent’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered
personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state.
Appeals.
Michael E. David for petitioner.
607
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
A.C. No. 3405. June 29, 1998. *
JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG,

respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Immorality; Disbarment; Good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of
the bar.—Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law,
but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found
guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Immoral conduct is that conduct which is so
willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community.—Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so
willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral,
but grossly
________________
* EN BANC.
452

ANNOTATED
Narag vs. Narag
immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled

as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
Same; Same; Same; A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards.—We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol that, “as officers of the court, lawyers
must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself
as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards.”
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; Quantum of Proof; The burden of proof rests upon
the complainant, and the Supreme Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she
establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.—Respondent Narag is
accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order to live with Gina Espita. The
burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power
only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Handwritings; Handwriting may be proved through a

comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or treated by the respondent as
genuine.—Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent
had sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina and her
two children, whom he acknowledged as his own. In addition, complainant also submitted as
evidence the cards that she herself had received from him. Guided by the rule that
handwriting may be proved through a comparison of one set of writings with those admitted
or treated by the respondent as genuine, we affirm that the two sets of evidence were written
by one and the same person. Besides, respondent did not present any evidence to prove that
the love letters were not really written by him; he merely denied that he wrote them.
453
VOL. 291, JUNE 29, 1998 453

Narag vs. Narag
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; While the burden of proof is upon the complainant,
respondent has the duty not only to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit
to remain a member of the bar.—While the burden of proof is upon the complainant,
respondent has the duty not only to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally
fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral
character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is
imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the
investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of
Attorneys. This he failed to do.
Same; Same; Same; Parent and Child; Parents have not only rights but also duties—e.g.,
to support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good example;
and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual
guidance.—Respondent may have provided well for his family—they enjoyed a comfortable
life and his children finished their education. He may have also established himself as a
successful lawyer and a seasoned politician. But these accomplishments are not sufficient to
show his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession of law. We remind
respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties—e.g., to support, educate and
instruct their children according to right precepts and good example; and to give them love,
companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. As a husband,
he is also obliged to live with his wife; to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to
render help and support.
Same; Same; Same; Husband and Wife; A husband is not merely a man who has
contracted marriage—he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and
remain faithful to her until death.—Although respondent piously claims adherence to the
sanctity of marriage, his acts prove otherwise. A husband is not merely a man who has
contracted marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his
wife and remain faithful to her until death. We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova:
“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution
454

ANNOTATED
Narag vs. Narag
of marriage.” In Toledo vs. Toledo, the respondent was disbarred from the practice of
law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne
him a child.
Same; Same; Same; Disbarment; A lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.—In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting, “a lawyer may be disbarred
for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court.”
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.

Bugaring, Piedad, Oliva and Associates Law Offices for complainant.
Domingo Cayosa, Jr. for respondent.
PER CURIAM:
G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001. *
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL,

SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C.
TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A.
COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.
Actions; Appeals; Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court; Exceptions.—The general rule is that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject only to certain
exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises,
or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c)
where there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court
of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (j) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. It appearing that the Court of Appeals based its findings on evidence presented
by both parties, the general rule should apply.
Husband and Wife; Common-Law Relationships; Cohabitation; Words and
Phrases; Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties
is already old and may no longer be interested in sex—at the very least, cohabitation is the
public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as
man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such, and secret meetings or
nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of
cohabitation.—In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held that the term “cohabitation” or “living together
as husband and wife” means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
415
VOL. 370, NOVEMBER 22, 2001 415

Arcaba vs. Vda. de Batocael
sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse,

especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At
the very least, cohabitation is the publicassumption by a man and a woman of the marital
relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public
as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not
constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this jurisdiction, this
Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between
the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence of illegitimate children.
Same; Same; Same; Donations; Where it has been established by preponderance of
evidence that two persons lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of the other is void under
Article 87 of the Family Code.—Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence
that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under
Art. 87 of the Family Code.

Pacatang, Barbaso and Pacatang Law Offices for petitioner.
Feliciano M. Maraon for respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
G.R. No. 153788. November 27, 2009.*

ROGER V. NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge,
RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T. GO, doing business under the
name KARGO ENTERPRISES, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Parties; The 1977 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.—The 1977 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
1
2
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Navarro vs. Escobido
name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Civil Law; Conjugal Properties; Registration of the trade name in the name of one person—
a woman—does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers
alone, particularly when the woman is married; By law, all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in one
or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.—The registration
of the trade name in the name of one person—a woman—does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the trade name as a propertyis hers alone, particularly when the woman is
married. By law, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears
to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed
to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
Same; Same; The conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this chapter or
by spouses in their marriage settlement. In other words, the property relations of the husband
and wife shall be governed primarily by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the
Family Code and, suppletorily, by the spouses’ marriage settlement and by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code.—Under Article 108 of the Family Code, the conjugal
partnership is governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict
with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements. In other words, the property relations of the husband and wife shall be governed
primarily by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and,
suppletorily, by the spouses’ marriage settlement and by the rules on partnership under the
Civil Code. In the absence of any evidence of a marriage settlement between the spouses Go,
we look at the Civil Code provision on partnership for guidance.3
VOL. 606, NOVEMBER 27, 2009 3
Same; Partnership; In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that “[a]
partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property.” Taken with the
presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used to finance the four checks used to pay for
the petitioners’ stocks subscription, and with the presumption that the credits themselves are
part of the conjugal funds.—In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that
“[a] partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property.” Taken
with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used to finance the four checks used
to pay for petitioners’ stock subscriptions, and with the presumption that the credits
themselves are part of conjugal funds, Article 1811 makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman
co-owners of the alleged credit.
Same; Same; Only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the
recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are
not indispensable partners. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be
accorded in a suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been
filed for the benefit of all co-owners.—In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are
real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant
jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of
co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who
filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party
thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary
parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation,
since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
Civil Law; Property; Replevin; We see nothing in these provisions which requires the
applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action
for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ
of replevin.—We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior
demand on the
4
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand
is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.
Appeals.
Primitivo S. Bella, Jr. for petitioner.
Lagamon, Barba, Lupeba & Associates for private respondent.
BRION, J.:
This is a petition for re
G.R. No. 149615. August 29, 2006. *
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA BUENAVENTURA

MULLER, petitioner, vs. HELMUT MULLER, respondent.
National Patrimony; Aliens; The primary purpose of the constitutional provision

disqualifying aliens from acquiring lands of the public domain and private lands is the
conservation of the national economy.—Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands.
The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national
patrimony.
Same; Same; Trusts; Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, an
alien’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute—not even an
ownership in trust is allowed; Where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute
and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty
of the fraud.—Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly
admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property
titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently
asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals
erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view
of petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary
succession, respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute.
Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation
of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of
the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the
constitutional prohibition.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
66

ANNOTATED
Muller vs. Muller
Equity; It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that
to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly—he who seeks
equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.—Invoking
the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise
misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that
to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. He who seeks
equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter
is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done
inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of
equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. Thus, in the instant case, respondent
cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
National Patrimony; Aliens; The distinction made between transfer of ownership as

opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on alien spouse’s part—to allow reimbursement
would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to
own.—The distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is
a futile exercise on respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit
respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise
proscribed by law. As expressly held in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 193 SCRA
93 (1991): Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, “Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition.
Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and
his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in
attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly
violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has
no capacity or personality to
67
VOL. 500, AUGUST 29, 2006 67

Muller vs. Muller
question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so
doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To
sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition.
If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not
insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its
transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
Appeals.

King, Capuchino, Tan & Associates for petitioner.
Bernardo Q. Cuaresma for respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
G.R. No. 164401. June 25, 2008.*

LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte; THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHERIFF, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga Del
Norte; THE CLERK OF COURT OF MANILA, as Ex Officio Sheriff; and LAMBERTO
T. CHUA, respondents.
Obligations and Contracts; Interests; Words and Phrases; The legal interest at 12% per
annum under Central Bank (CB) Circular No. 416 shall be adjudged only in cases involving
the loan or forbearance of money, and for transactions involving payment of indemnities in
the concept of damages arising from default in the performance of obligations in general
and/or for money judgment not involving a loan or forbearance of money, goods, or credit, the
governing provision is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code prescribing a yearly 6% interest; The term
“forbearance,” within the context of usury law, has been described as a contractual obligation
of a lender or creditor to refrain,
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
276

ANNOTATED
Sunga-Chan vs. Court of Appeals
during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan or
debt then due and payable.—In Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., 139 SCRA 260 (1985), the Court
held that the legal interest at 12% per annum under Central Bank (CB) Circular No. 416
shall be adjudged only in cases involving the loan or forbearance of money. And for
transactions involving payment of indemnities in the concept of damages arising from default
in the performance of obligations in general and/or for money judgment not involving a loan
or forbearance of money, goods, or credit, the governing provision is Art. 2209 of the Civil
Code prescribing a yearly 6% interest. Art. 2209 pertinently provides: Art. 2209. If the
obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the
indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of
the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per
cent per annum. The term “forbearance,” within the context of usury law, has been described
as a contractual obligation of a lender or creditor to refrain, during a given period of time,
from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan or debt then due and payable.
Same; Husband and Wife; Absolute Community Property Regime; Family Code; Under
Article 94 of the Family Code, the absolute community property may be held liable for the
obligations contracted by either spouse.—The records show that spouses Sunga-Chan and
Norberto were married on February 4, 1992, or after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. Withal, their absolute community property may be held liable for the
obligations contracted by either spouse. Specifically, Art. 94 of said Code pertinently
provides: Art. 94. The absolute community property shall be liable for: (1) x x x x (2) All debts
and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for
the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of
the other. (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have been benefited. (Emphasis ours.) Absent
any indication otherwise, the use and appropriation by petitioner Sunga-Chan of the assets
of Shellite even after the business was discontinued on May 30, 1992 may reasonably be
considered to have been used for her and her husband’s benefit.277
VOL. 555, JUNE 25, 2008 277

Sunga-Chan vs. Court of Appeals
Appeals.
Manuel T. Chan, Romeo S. Salinas and Albon & Serrano Law Office for
petitioners.
Pacatan Law Office and Nelson A. Loyola for respondent Lamberto T. Chua.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
G.R. No. 190846. February 3, 2016.*
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., petitioner, vs. JOSE G. HOSANA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Supreme Court; The Supreme Court (SC) does
not address questions of fact which require us to rule on “the truth or falsehood of alleged
facts,” Exceptions.—This Court does not address questions of fact which require us to rule on
“the truth or falsehood of alleged facts,” except in the following cases: (1) when the findings
are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Same; Evidence; Preponderance of Evidence; Words and Phrases; Preponderance of
evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight
of the credible evidence.”—In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations
has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Moreover, the parties must
rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by
their opponent. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
“greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance
of evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
88

ANNOTATED
Tan, Jr. vs. Hosana
probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is

worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
Civil Law; Obligations; Payment; One who pleads payment has the burden of proving
it; the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove
nonpayment.—It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it; the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff
to prove nonpayment. A mere allegation is not evidence, and the person who alleges has the
burden of proving his or her allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence, which in civil
cases is preponderance of evidence.
Same; Contracts; Void Contracts; A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect
from the very beginning.—A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very
beginning. This rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law,
as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse’s written consent. A void
contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be
validated either by ratification or prescription. When, however, any of the terms of a void
contract have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow
restitution of what has been given under it. It is basic that if a void contract has already
“been performed, the restoration of what has been given is in order.” This principle springs
from Article 22 of the New Civil Code which states that “every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something
at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same.” Hence, the
restitution of what each party has given is a consequence of a void and inexistent contract.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Deed of Sale; The deed of sale as
documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the truthfulness of the
consideration stated and its actual payment.—The deed of sale as documentary evidence may
be used as a means to ascertain the truthfulness of the consideration stated and its actual
payment. The purpose of introducing the deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms
written in the contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The deed
of sale,
89
VOL. 783, FEBRUARY 3, 2016 89

Tan, Jr. vs. Hosana
rather, is used as a means to determine matters that occurred in the execution of such
contract, i.e., the determination of what each party has given under the void contract to allow
restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.
Same; Same; It is settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to
be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and
not reject them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent.—It is also settled
in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to be of doubtfulrelevancy,
incompetency, or admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and not reject them on doubtful
or technical grounds, but admit them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent;
for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they
are thereafter found relevant or competent. On the other hand, their admission, if they turn
out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding
them or ignoring them. In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by
positive provision of the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal property without the spouse’s
consent. It does not, however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the consideration
stated therein. The admission of the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal
policy of the court to admit the evidence which appears to be relevant in resolving an issue
before the courts.
Civil Law; Unjust Enrichment; Unjust enrichment exists “when a person unjustly retains
a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against
the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.”—Unjust enrichment
exists “when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person
retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity,
and good conscience.” The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of
the State and is based on Article 22 of the Civil Code. The principle of unjust enrichment
requires Jose to return what he or Milagros received under the void contract which
presumably benefited their conjugal partnership.
90

ANNOTATED
Tan, Jr. vs. Hosana
Appeals.
David C. Naval for petitioner.
Rosales & Associates Law Office for respondent.
BRION, J.:

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G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.

VOL. 497, JULY 31, 2006 429

430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Cervantes, Blanco, Jurisprudencia, Neri, Sta. Romana and Partners for

G.R. No. 186400. October 20, 2010.*

Husband and Wife; Marriages; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on

430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 431

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

G.R. No. 158298. August 11, 2010.*

28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Same; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

G.R. No. 103047. September 2, 1994. *

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND

258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002. *

(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)

VOL. 380, APRIL 11, 2002 403

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

G.R. No. 183896. January 30, 2013.*

VOL. 689, JANUARY 30, 2013 647

648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

VOL. 689, JANUARY 30, 2013 649

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa vs. Heirs of

Civil Law; Marriages; Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of

336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

VOL. 480, JANUARY 27, 2006 337

338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Remedial Law; Settlement of Estate; Administrator; Words and Phrases; An

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

G.R. No. 206220. August 19, 2015.*

LUIS UY, substituted by LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ and SHIRLEY UY MACARAIG,

Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; Marriages; There is a presumption established

VOL. 767, AUGUST 19, 2015 673

G.R. No. 169766. March 30, 2011.*

Civil Procedure; Certiorari; An application for certiorari is an independent action which

638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

No. L-68470, October 8, 1985. *

Certiorari; Denial of motion to dismiss may be the subject of a certiorari proceeding in

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

In this Petition for Certiorari

R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989. *

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA,

654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

VOL. 174, JUNE 30, 1989 655

656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

for lack of knowledge even if true is of no legal significance or consequence.—The

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005. *

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CRASUS L. IYOY, respondent.

Marriages; Annulment and Declaration of Nullity; Psychological

VOL. 470, SEPTEMBER 21, 2005 509

510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

VOL. 470, SEPTEMBER 21, 2005 511

512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

VOL. 470, SEPTEMBER 21, 2005 513

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.