SUCCESSION

G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G.
DE JESUS AND BIBIANA ROXAS DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS
& PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR., respondent. Raul S. Sison Law Office
for petitioners. Rafael Dinglasan, Jr. for heir M. Roxas. Ledesma,
Guytingco Velasco and Associates for Ledesa and A. R. de Jesus.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the
order of respondent Hon. Jose C. Colayco, Presiding Judge Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI disallowing the probate of
the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. The
antecedent facts which led to the filing of this petition are
undisputed. After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special Proceeding No. 81503 entitled "In
the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. de Jesus and
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus" was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas,
the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. On March 26,
1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator.
After Letters of Administration had been granted to the petitioner, he
delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. On May
26, 1973, respondent Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of the
probate of the holographic Win on July 21, 1973. Petitioner Simeon
R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as administrator, he
found a notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus
and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-win addressed
to her children and entirely written and signed in the handwriting of
the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found. The will is dated
"FEB./61 " and states: "This is my win which I want to be respected
although it is not written by a lawyer. ... The testimony of Simeon R.
Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de
Jesus and Manuel Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the
letter dated "FEB./61 " is the holographic Will of their deceased
mother, Bibiana R. de Jesus. Both recognized the handwriting of
their mother and positively Identified her signature. They further
testified that their deceased mother understood English, the
language in which the holographic Will is written, and that the date
"FEB./61 " was the date when said Will was executed by their
mother. Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed
an "opposition to probate" assailing the purported holographic Will
of Bibiana R. de Jesus because a it was not executed in
accordance with law, (b) it was executed through force, intimidation
and/or under duress, undue influence and improper pressure, and
(c) the alleged testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor
could have intended the said Will to be her last Will and testament
at the time of its execution. On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge
Jose C. Colayco issued an order allowing the probate of the
holographic Will which he found to have been duly executed in
accordance with law. Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a
motion for reconsideration alleging inter alia that the alleged
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was not
dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends
that the law requires that the Will should contain the day, month and
year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with.
On December 10, 1973, respondent Judge Colayco reconsidered
his earlier order and disallowed the probate of the holographic Will
on the ground that the word "dated" has generally been held to
include the month, day, and year. The dispositive portion of the
order reads:
WHEREFORE, the document purporting to be the holographic Will
of Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, is hereby disallowed for not having
been executed as required by the law. The order of August 24, 1973
is hereby set aside.
The only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on
the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a
valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil
Code and Article 688 of the Old Civil Code require the testator to
state in his holographic Win the "year, month, and day of its
execution," the present Civil Code omitted the phrase Año mes y
dia and simply requires that the holographic Will should be dated.
The petitioners submit that the liberal construction of the
holographic Will should prevail.
Respondent Luz Henson on the other hand submits that the
purported holographic Will is void for non-compliance with Article
810 of the New Civil Code in that the date must contain the year,
month, and day of its execution. The respondent contends that
Article 810 of the Civil Code was patterned after Section 1277 of the
California Code and Section 1588 of the Louisiana Code whose
Supreme Courts had consistently ruled that the required date
includes the year, month, and day, and that if any of these is
wanting, the holographic Will is invalid. The respondent further
contends that the petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of
Article 810 of the Civil Code because statutes prescribing the
formalities to be observed in the execution of holographic Wills are
strictly construed.
We agree with the petitioner.This will not be the first time that this
Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory
requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. We should not
overlook the liberal trend of the Civil Code in the manner of
execution of Wills, the purpose of which, in case of doubt is to
prevent intestacy —The underlying and fundamental objectives
permeating the provisions of the law on wigs in this Project consists
in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in
view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last
wishes, but with sufficien safeguards and restrictions to prevent the
commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the testator.
This objective is in accord with the modem tendency with respect to
the formalities in the execution of wills. (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 103)In Justice Capistrano's concurring opinion in
Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos (27 SCRA 327) he
emphasized that: xxx xxx xxx... The law has a tender regard for the
will of the testator expressed in his last will and testament on the
ground that any disposition made by the testator is better than that
which the law can make. For this reason, intestate succession is
nothing more than a disposition based upon the presumed will of
the decedent.Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of
the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith
but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary
privilege Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422).
If a Will has been executed in substantial compliance with the
formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the
exercise thereof is obviated, said Win should be admitted to probate
(Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282). Thus, xxx xxx xxx... More than
anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be
considered in the application of any given rule. If the surrounding
circumstances point to a regular execution of the wilt and the
instrument appears to have been executed substantially in
accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination should,
in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean
towards its admission to probate, although the document may suffer
from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential
defect. ... (Leynez v. Leynez 68 Phil. 745).
If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the
requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the
objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is
actually attained by the form followed by the testator.The purpose of
the solemnities surrounding the execution of Wills has been
expounded by this Court in Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, where
we ruled that: The object of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth
and authenticity. ...In particular, a complete date is required to
provide against such contingencies as that of two competing Wills
executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the
day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720).
There is no such contingency in this case.We have carefully
reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad
faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of
Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will
of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written,
dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known
to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due
execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness
of the holographic Will of their mother and that she had the
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The
objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is
that the holographic Will is fatally defective because the date "FEB./
61 " appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance
with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to
be entertained.
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the
day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case
at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence
and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the
only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the
holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil
Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the
principle of substantial compliance.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order
appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order
allowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus is reinstated.SO ORDERED. Teehankee
(Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente,
JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
G.R. Nos. 83843-44 April 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
MELECIO LABRADOR. SAGRADO LABRADOR (Deceased),
substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR, and
CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 1 GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS
LABRADOR, respondents-appellees.
Benjamin C. Santos Law Offices for petitioners.
Rodrigo V. Fontelera for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the alleged holographic
will of one Melecio Labrador is dated, as provided for in Article 8102
of the New Civil Code.
The antecedent and relevant facts are as follows: On June 10,
1972, Melecio Labrador died in the Municipality of Iba, province of
Zambales, where he was residing, leaving behind a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 1916 under Original Certificate of Title No.
P-1652, and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal,
Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all
surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will.
On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted
by his heirs), Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador, filed in the
court a quo a petition for the probate docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 922-I of the alleged holographic will of the late
Melecio Labrador.
Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now
deceased but substituted by his heirs), and Gaudencio Labrador
filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has
been extinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging therein
that on September 30, 1971, that is, before Melecio's death, for the
consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, testator Melecio
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and
conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916
and that as a matter of fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been cancelled
by T.C.T. No. T-21178. Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador
sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five Thousand (P5,000)
Pesos. (Rollo, p. 37)
Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his
brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the annulment of said purported
Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado
allegedly had already acquired by devise from their father Melecio
Labrador under a holographic will executed on March 17, 1968, the
complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-I, being
premised on the fact that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is
fictitious.
After both parties had rested and submitted their respective
evidence, the trial court rendered a joint decision dated February
28, 1985, allowing the probate of the holographic will and declaring
null and void the Deed of Absolute sale. The court a quo had also
directed the respondents (the defendants in Civil Case No. 934-I) to
reimburse to the petitioners the sum of P5,000.00 representing the
redemption price for the property paid by the plaintiff-petitioner
Sagrado with legal interest thereon from December 20, 1976, when
it was paid to vendee a retro.
Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of Appeals,
which on March 10, 1988 modified said joint decision of the court a
quo by denying the allowance of the probate of the will for being
undated and reversing the order of reimbursement. Petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision was denied by
the Court of Appeals, in the resolution of June 13, 1988. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioners now assign the following errors committed by
respondent court, to wit:
 ITHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING AND
APPROVING THE PROBATE OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF
THE TESTATOR MELECIO LABRADOR; andIITHE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ORDER OF THE
LOWER COURT DIRECTING THE REIMBURSEMENT OF THE
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS REPRESENTING THE REDEMPTION
PRICE WAS ERRONEOUS.
The alleged undated holographic will written in Ilocano translated
into English, is quoted as follows:
ENGLISH INTERPRETATION OF THE WILL OF THE
LATE MELECIO LABRADOR WRITTEN IN ILOCANO
BY ATTY. FIDENCIO L. FERNANDEZI — First PageThis is also
where it appears in writing of the place which is assigned and
shared or the partition in favor of SAGRADO LABRADOR which is
the fishpond located and known place as Tagale.And this place that
is given as the share to him, there is a measurement of more or
less one hectare, and the boundary at the South is the property and
assignment share of ENRICA LABRADOR, also their sister, and the
boundary in the West is the sea, known as the SEA as it is, and the
boundary on the NORTH is assignment belonging to CRISTOBAL
LABRADOR, who likewise is also their brother. That because it is
now the time for me being now ninety three (93) years, then I feel it
is the right time for me to partition the fishponds which were and
had been bought or acquired by us, meaning with their two
mothers, hence there shall be no differences among themselves,
those among brothers and sisters, for it is I myself their father who
am making the apportionment and delivering to each and everyone
of them the said portion and assignment so that there shall not be
any cause of troubles or differences among the brothers and
sisters.II — Second PageAnd this is the day in which we agreed
that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective
assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of
March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or
instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who
made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their
father.Now, this is the final disposition that I am making in writing
and it is this that should be followed and complied with in order that
any differences or troubles may be forestalled and nothing will
happen along these troubles among my children, and that they will
be in good relations among themselves, brothers and sisters;And
 those improvements and fruits of the land; mangoes, bamboos and
all coconut trees and all others like the other kind of bamboo by
name of Bayog, it is their right to get if they so need, in order that
there shall be nothing that anyone of them shall complain against
the other, and against anyone of the brothers and sisters.III —
THIRD PAGEAnd that referring to the other places of property,
where the said property is located, the same being the fruits of our
earnings of the two mothers of my children, there shall be equal
portion of each share among themselves, and or to be benefitted
with all those property, which property we have been able to
acquire.That in order that there shall be basis of the truth of this
writing (WILL) which I am here hereof manifesting of the truth and
of the fruits of our labor which their two mothers, I am signing my
signature below hereof, and that this is what should be complied
with, by all the brothers and sisters, the children of their two
mothers — JULIANA QUINTERO PILARISA and CASIANA
AQUINO VILLANUEVA Your father who made this writing (WILL),
and he is, MELECIO LABRADOR y RALUTIN (p. 46, Rollo)
The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is
really dated, although the date is not in its usual place, is impressed
with merit.
The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect
compliance with Article 810.1âwphi1 It is worthy of note to quote the
first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will, viz:
And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the
partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said
fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year
1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be
followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than
MELECIO LABRADOR, their father. (emphasis supplied) (p. 46,
Rollo)
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should
be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in
the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These
requirements are present in the subject will.
Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was
when the testator and his beneficiaries entered into an agreement
among themselves about "the partitioning and assigning the
respective assignments of the said fishpond," and was not the date
of execution of the holographic will; hence, the will is more of an
"agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof to
the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This
was thus a failure to comply with Article 783 which defines a will as
"an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities
prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of
his estate, to take effect after his death."
Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as
the date of the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the
succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the
will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador
who plainly knew that what he was executing was a will. The act of
partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the
testator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio
Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be
disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a
means to control the disposition of his estate.
Anent the second issue of finding the reimbursement of the P5,000
representing the redemption price as erroneous, respondent court's
conclusion is incorrect. When private respondents sold the property
(fishpond) with right to repurchase to Navat for P5,000, they were
actually selling property belonging to another and which they had
no authority to sell, rendering such sale null and void. Petitioners,
thus "redeemed" the property from Navat for P5,000, to immediately
regain possession of the property for its disposition in accordance
with the will. Petitioners therefore deserve to be reimbursed the
P5,000.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 10, 1988 is hereby REVERSED. The holographic will
of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED and ALLOWED probate. The
private respondents are directed to REIMBURSE the petitioners the
sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

G.R. No. L-14003 August 5, 1960

FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CESARIO SINGSON, oppositor-appellee.
F. Lavides and L.B. Alcuaz for appellant.
Vicente J. Cuna and P.S. Singson for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This appeal, taken on points of law from a decision rendered on 15
January 1958 by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in its
Special Proceedings No. Q-2640, involves the determination of the
quantity of evidence required for the probate of a holographic will.
The established facts are thus summarized in the decision
appealed from (Rec. App. pp. 22-24):
"Briefly speaking, the following facts were established by the
petitioner; that on September 9, 1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance
died at 13 Luskot, Quezon City, known to be the last residence of
said testatrix; that Francisco Azaola, petitioner herein for probate of
the holographic will, submitted the said holographic will (Exh. C)
whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the sole heir as against
the nephew of deceased Cesario Singson; that witness Francisco
Azaola testified that he saw the holographic will (Exh. C) one
month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as the same
was handed to him and his wife; that the witness testified also that
he recognized all the signatures appearing in the holographic will
(Exh. C) as the handwriting of the testatrix and to reinforce said
statement, witness presented the mortgage (Exh. E), the special
power of the attorney (Exh. F), and the general power of attorney
(Exh. F-1), besides the deeds of sale (Exhs. G and G-1) including
an affidavit (Exh. G-2), and that there were further exhibited in court
two residence certificates (Exhs. H and H-1) to show the signatures
of the testatrix, for comparison purposes; that said witness, Azaola,
testified that the penmanship appearing in the aforesaid
documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the testatrix as well
as the signatures appearing in the aforesaid documentary evidence
is in the handwriting of the testatrix as well as the signatures
appearing therein are the signatures of the testatrix; that said
witness, in answer to a question of his counsel admitted that the
holographic will was handed to him by the testatrix. "apparently it
must have been written by her" (t.s.n., p. 11). However, on page 16
on the same transcript of the stenographic notes, when the same
witness was asked by counsel if he was familiar with the
penmanship and handwriting of the deceased Fortunata Vda. de
Yance, he answered positively in the affirmative and when he was
asked again whether the penmanship referred to in the previous
answer as appearing in the holographic will (Exh. C) was hers
(testatrix'), he answered, "I would definitely say it is hers"; that it
was also established in the proceedings that the assessed value of
the property of the deceased in Luskot, Quezon City, is in the
amount of P7,000.00.
The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the
execution of the will was procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that
the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last
will, and that the same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th
day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on
the will.
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the
Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could
declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the
testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone
witness presented by the proponent "did not prove sufficiently that
the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."
The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to
produce more than one witness because the will's authenticity was
not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily
require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting
and signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be
denied by the adverse party.
Article 811 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following
effect:
ART. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary
that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature
of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in
the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three
of such witnesses shall be required.In the absence of any
competent witnesses referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if
the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.
(691a).
We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will
was not contested, he was not required to produce more than one
witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were
contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil
Code can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory
presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the
testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no
witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic
will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it
becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the
requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the
proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing
any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the
handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare
(truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express) "that the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There
may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or even if so
familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive
opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may
thus become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the
second paragraph of Article 811 prescribes that —
in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the
preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert
testimony may be resorted to.
As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified
witness may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no
competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the
will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the
deficiency.
It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three
witnesses be presented if the will is contested and only one if no
contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary
testaments (cf. Cabang vs. Delfinado, 45 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs.
Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). But it can not be ignored that the
requirement can be considered mandatory only in the case of
ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least
three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law
essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no
witness need be present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production
of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd
results are to be avoided.
Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is
conditioned by the words "if the Court deem it necessary", which
reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Court should be
convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of
witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony
that the ill is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for
expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is
available, or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may
still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of
the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the
state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention
of the testator be carried into effect.
Commenting on analogous provisions of Article 691 of the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889, the noted Commentator, Mucuis Scaevola (Vol.
12, 2nd Ed., p.421), sagely remarks:
La manera como esta concebida la redaccion del ultimo apartado
de dicho precepto induce la conclusion de que siempre o por lo
menos, en la mayor parte de los casos, el Juez debe acudir al
criterio pericial para que le ilustre acerca de la autenticidad del
testamento olografo, aunque ya esten insertas en los autos del
expediente las declaraciones testificales. La prudencia con que el
Juez debe de proceder en resoluciones de transcendencia asi lo
exige, y la indole delicada y peligrosa del testamento olografo lo
hace necesario para mayor garantia de todos los interes
comprometidos en aquel.En efecto, el cotejo pericial de letras
puede ser una confirmacion facultativa del dicho profano de los
testigos y un modo de desvanecer las ultimas dudas que pudieran
ocurrir al Juez acerca de la autenticidad que trata de averigaur y
declarar. Para eso se ha escrito la frase del citado ultimo apartado,
(siempre que el Juez lo estime conveniente), haya habido o no
testigos y dudaran o no estos respecto de los extremos por que son
preguntados.El arbitrio judicial en este caso debe formarse con
independencia de los sucesos y de su significacion, para responder
debidamente de las resoluciones que haya de dictar.
And because the law leaves it to the trial court if experts are still
needed, no unfavourable inference can be drawn from a party's
failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses
dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses.
Our conclusion is that the rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of
the Civil Code is merely directory and is not mandatory.
Considering, however, that this is the first occasion in which this
Court has been called upon to construe the import of said article,
the interest of justice would be better served, in our opinion, by
giving the parties ample opportunity to adduce additional evidence,
including expert witnesses, should the Court deem them necessary.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is set aside,
and the records ordered remanded to the Court of origin, with
instructions to hold a new trial in conformity with this opinion. But
evidence already on record shall not be retaken. No costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera

and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 123486 August 12, 1999

EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL,
petitioners,
vs.
EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and
UEFEMIA PATIGAS, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals1 and its resolution denying reconsideration, ruling:
Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay
and witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the authenticity of testators
holographic will has been established and the handwriting and
signature therein (exhibit S) are hers, enough to probate said will.
Reversal of the judgment appealed from and the probate of the
holographic will in question be called for. The rule is that after
plaintiff has completed presentation of his evidence and the
defendant files a motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence on
the ground that upon the facts and the law plaintiff has shown no
right to relief, if the motion is granted and the order to dismissal is
reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence
in his behalf (Sec, 1 Rule 35 Revised Rules of Court). Judgment
may, therefore, be rendered for appellant in the instant
case.Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and
judgment rendered allowing the probate of the holographic will of
the testator Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.2
The facts are as follows:
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and
Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of
the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a petition3 for
probate of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on
January 16, 1990.
In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde
Seño Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when
she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud,
undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the testator,
and will was written voluntarily.
The assessed value of the decedent's property, including all real
and personal property was about P400,000.00, at the time of her
death.4
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal
filed an opposition5 to the petition for probate, alleging that the
holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible.
This gives an impression that a "third hand" of an interested party
other than the "true hand" of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal
executed the holographic will.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or
appearing on will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the
deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced,
the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after the
dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. And
assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the
deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and
trickery.1âwphi1.nêt
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary
evidence. Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence, filed a
demurrer6 to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to establish
sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic
will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer
to Evidence having being well taken, same is granted, and the
petition for probate of the document (Exhibit "S") on the purported
Holographic Will of the late Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, is
denied for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merits.7
On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal,8 and
in support of their appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the
testimony of the following witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2)
Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad;
(5) Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.
To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses,
we recite an account of their testimonies.
Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental, where the special proceedings for the probate of the
holographic will of the deceased was filed. He produced and
identified the records of the case. The documents presented bear
the signature of the deceased, Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, for
the purpose of laying the basis for comparison of the handwriting of
the testatrix, with the writing treated or admitted as genuine by the
party against whom the evidence is offered.
Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was
presented to produced and identify the voter's affidavit of the
decedent. However, the voters' affidavit was not produced for the
same was already destroyed and no longer available.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seño
Vda. de Ramonal was her aunt, and that after the death of Matilde's
husband, the latter lived with her in her parent's house for eleven
(11) years from 1958 to 1969. During those eleven (11) years of
close association the deceased, she acquired familiarity with her
signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her
(deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal) in collecting rentals
from her various tenants of commercial buildings, and deceased
always issued receipts. In addition to this, she (witness Matilde
Binanay) assisted the deceased in posting the records of the
accounts, and carried personal letters of the deceased to her
creditors.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay further testified that at the time of the
death of Matilde Vda. de Ramonal, she left a holographic will dated
August 30, 1978, which was personally and entirely written, dated
and signed, by the deceased and that all the dispositions therein,
the dates, and the signatures in said will, were that of the deceased.
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he was appointed City
Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro, he was a practicing lawyer, and handled
all the pleadings and documents signed by the deceased in
connection with the proceedings of her late husband, as a result of
which he is familiar with the handwriting of the latter. He testified
that the signature appearing in the holographic will was similar to
that of the deceased, Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, but he can
not be sure.
The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region
10. She testified that she processed the application of the deceased
for pasture permit and was familiar with the signature of the
deceased, since the signed documents in her presence, when the
latter was applying for pasture permit.
Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that
she had lived with the deceased since birth, and was in fact
adopted by the latter. That after a long period of time she became
familiar with the signature of the deceased. She testified that the
signature appearing in the holographic will is the true and genuine
signature of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in
English as follows:
Instruction
August 30, 1978
1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikan
Street.(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
3. My jewelry's shall be divided among:1. Eufemia Patigas2.
Josefina Salcedo3. Evangeline Calugay(Sgd) Matilde Vda de
Ramonal
August 30, 1978
4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol, Indahag to
Evangeline R. Calugay(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
5. Give the 2,500 Square Meters at Sta. Cruz Ramonal Village in
favor of Evangeline R. Calugay, Helen must continue with the Sta.
Cruz, once I am no longer around.(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried.(Sgd) Matilde
Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
Gene and Manuel:Follow my instruction in order that I will rest
peacefully.MamaMatilde Vda de Ramonal
On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals, rendered decision9
ruling that the appeal was meritorious. Citing the decision in the
case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, penned by Mr. Justice J.
B. L. Reyes, a recognized authority in civil law, the Court of Appeals
held:
. . . even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested,
we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present civil code can
not be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of
three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under
penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have
been present at the execution of the holographic will, none being
required by law (art. 810, new civil code), it becomes obvious that
the existence of witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is
a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a
question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must
be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the
testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law
does not express) "that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator." There may be no available witness
acquainted with the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the
witness maybe unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with
the rule of paragraph 1 of article 811 may thus become an
impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second
paragraph of article 811 prescribes that —in the absence of any
competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the
court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.As
can be see, the law foresees, the possibility that no qualified
witness ma be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no
competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the
will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the
deficiency.It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that
three witnesses be presented if the will is contested and only one if
no contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary
testaments (CF Cabang vs. Delfianado, 45 PHIL 291; Tolentino v.
Francisco, 57 PHIL 742). But it can not be ignored that the
requirement can be considered mandatory only in case of ordinary
testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three
witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential
to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness
need be present (art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three
witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are
to be avoided.Again, under Art. 811, the resort to expert evidence is
conditioned by the words "if the court deem it necessary", which
reveal that what the law deems essential is that the court should be
convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of
witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony
that the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for
expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is
available, or none of those produced is convincing, the court may
still, and in fact it should resort to handwriting experts. The duty of
the court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the
state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention
of the testator be carried into effect.Paraphrasing Azaola vs.
Singson, even if the genuineness of the holographic will were
contested, Article 811 of the civil code cannot be interpreted as to
require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify
the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of the having the
probate denied. No witness need be present in the execution of the
holographic will. And the rule requiring the production of three
witnesses is merely permissive. What the law deems essential is
that the court is convinced of the authenticity of the will. Its duty is to
exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much
interested in the proponent that the true intention of the testator be
carried into effect. And because the law leaves it to the trial court to
decide if experts are still needed, no unfavorable inference can be
drawn from a party's failure to offer expert evidence, until and
unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the
lay witnesses.10
According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde
Ramonal Binanay and other witnesses definitely and in no uncertain
terms testified that the handwriting and signature in the holographic
will were those of the testator herself.
Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline
Calugay and witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the Court of
Appeals sustained the authenticity of the holographic will and the
handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the will to probate.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioners raise the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109
Phil. 102, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, was
applicable to the case.(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that private respondents had been able to present
credible evidence to that the date, text, and signature on the
holographic will written entirely in the hand of the testatrix.(3)
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the
signatures in the holographic will of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article
811 of the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory. The article
provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested
holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that
the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.
1âwphi1.nêt
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of
the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory
order. We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an
imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion
and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a
statute is mandatory.11
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against
an evil or mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal
to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the
evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals
who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the
testator.
So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present
petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased. An
exhaustive and objective consideration of the evidence is
imperative to establish the true intent of the testator.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the
respondents testified explicitly that they were familiar with the
handwriting of testator. In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk of court,
Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he merely identified the
record of Special Proceedings No. 427 before said court. He was
not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in
the holographic was that of the deceased.
Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City,
was presented to identify the signature of the deceased in the
voter's affidavit, which was not even produced as it was no longer
available.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that:
Q. And you said for eleven (11) years Matilde Vda de Ramonal
resided with your parents at Pinikitan, Cagayan de Oro City. Would
you tell the court what was your occupation or how did Matilde Vda
de Ramonal keep herself busy that time?A. Collecting rentals.Q.
From where?A. From the land rentals and commercial buildings at
Pabayo-Gomez streets.12x x x xxx x x xQ. Who
sometime accompany her?A. I sometimes accompany her.Q. In
collecting rentals does she issue receipts?A. Yes, sir.13x x x
xxx x x xQ. Showing to you the receipt dated 23 October
1979, is this the one you are referring to as one of the receipts
which she issued to them?A. Yes, sir.Q. Now there is that
signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal, whose signature is that Mrs.
Binanay?A. Matilde vda. De Ramonal.Q. Why do you say that is
the signature of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal?A. I am familiar with
her signature.Q. Now, you tell the court Mrs. Binanay, whether you
know Matilde vda de Ramonal kept records of the accounts of her
tenants?A. Yes, sir.Q. Why do you say so?A. Because we
sometimes post a record of accounts in behalf of Matilde Vda. De
Ramonal.Q. How is this record of accounts made? How is this
reflected?A. In handwritten.14x x x xxx x x xQ. In
addition to collection of rentals, posting records of accounts of
tenants and deed of sale which you said what else did you do to
acquire familiarity of the signature of Matilde Vda De Ramonal?A.
Posting records.Q. Aside from that?A. Carrying letters.Q.
Letters of whom?A. Matilde.Q. To whom?A. To her creditors.15x
xx xxx x x xQ. You testified that at time of her death
she left a will. I am showing to you a document with its title "tugon"
is this the document you are referring to?A. Yes, sir.Q. Showing
to you this exhibit "S", there is that handwritten "tugon", whose
handwriting is this?A. My Aunt.Q. Why do you say this is the
handwriting of your aunt?A. Because I am familiar with her
signature.16
What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of
the deceased, which she either mailed or gave to her tenants. She
did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write
a note.
Further, during the cross-examination, the counsel for petitioners
elicited the fact that the will was not found in the personal
belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of Ms.
Binanay. She testified that:
Q. Mrs. Binanay, when you were asked by counsel for the
petitioners if the late Matilde Seno vda de Ramonal left a will you
said, yes?A. Yes, sir.Q. Who was in possession of that will?A.
I.Q. Since when did you have the possession of the will?A. It was
in my mother's possession.Q. So, it was not in your possession?A.
Sorry, yes.Q. And when did you come into possession since as
you said this was originally in the possession of your mother?A.
1985.17x x x xxx x x xQ. Now, Mrs. Binanay was
there any particular reason why your mother left that will to you and
therefore you have that in your possession?A. It was not given to
me by my mother, I took that in the aparador when she died.Q.
After taking that document you kept it with you?A. I presented it to
the fiscal.Q. For what purpose?A. Just to seek advice.Q. Advice
of what?A. About the will.18
In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact
about the will from petitioners, the legally adopted children of the
deceased. Such actions put in issue her motive of keeping the will a
secret to petitioners and revealing it only after the death of Matilde
Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, the following were established:
Q. Now, in 1978 Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal was not yet a
sickly person is that correct?A. Yes, sir.Q. She was up and about
and was still uprightly and she could walk agilely and she could go
to her building to collect rentals, is that correct?A. Yes, sir.19x x x
xxx x x xQ. Now, let us go to the third signature of Matilde
Ramonal. Do you know that there are retracings in the word Vda.?
A. Yes, a little. The letter L is continuous.Q. And also in Matilde
the letter L is continued to letter D?A. Yes, sir.Q. Again the third
signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal the letter L in Matilde is
continued towards letter D.A. Yes, sir.Q. And there is a retracing
in the word Vda.?A. Yes, sir.20x x x xxx x x xQ.
Now, that was 1979, remember one year after the alleged
holographic will. Now, you identified a document marked as Exhibit
R. This is dated January 8, 1978 which is only about eight months
from August 30, 1978. Do you notice that the signature Matilde Vda
de Ramonal is beautifully written and legible?A. Yes, sir the
handwriting shows that she was very exhausted.Q. You just say
that she was very exhausted while that in 1978 she was healthy
was not sickly and she was agile. Now, you said she was
exhausted?A. In writing.Q. How did you know that she was
exhausted when you were not present and you just tried to explain
yourself out because of the apparent inconsistencies?A. That was
I think. (sic).Q. Now, you already observed this signature dated
1978, the same year as the alleged holographic will. In exhibit I, you
will notice that there is no retracing; there is no hesitancy and the
signature was written on a fluid movement. . . . And in fact, the
name Eufemia R. Patigas here refers to one of the petitioners?A.
Yes, sir.Q. You will also notice Mrs. Binanay that it is not only with
the questioned signature appearing in the alleged holographic will
marked as Exhibit X but in the handwriting themselves, here you
will notice the hesitancy and tremors, do you notice that?A. Yes,
sir.21
Evangeline Calugay declared that the holographic will was written,
dated and signed in the handwriting of the testator. She testified
that:
Q. You testified that you stayed with the house of the spouses
Matilde and Justo Ramonal for the period of 22 years. Could you
tell the court the services if any which you rendered to Matilde
Ramonal?A. During my stay I used to go with her to the church, to
market and then to her transactions.Q. What else? What services
that you rendered?A. After my college days I assisted her in going
to the bank, paying taxes and to her lawyer.Q. What was your
purpose of going to her lawyer?A. I used to be her personal
driver.Q. In the course of your stay for 22 years did you acquire
familiarity of the handwriting of Matilde Vda de Ramonal?A. Yes,
sir.Q. How come that you acquired familiarity?A. Because I lived
with her since birth.22x x x xxx x x xQ. Now, I am
showing to you Exhibit S which is captioned "tugon" dated Agosto
30, 1978 there is a signature here below item No. 1, will you tell this
court whose signature is this?A. Yes, sir, that is her signature.Q.
Why do you say that is her signature?A. I am familiar with her
signature.23
So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was
familiar with the handwriting of the deceased was because she lived
with her since birth. She never declared that she saw the deceased
write a note or sign a document.
The former lawyer of the deceased, Fiscal Waga, testified that:
Q. Do you know Matilde Vda de Ramonal?A. Yes, sir I know her
because she is my godmother the husband is my godfather.
Actually I am related to the husband by consanguinity.Q. Can you
tell the name of the husband?A. The late husband is Justo
Ramonal.24x x x xxx x x xQ. Can you tell this court
whether the spouses Justo Ramonal and Matilde Ramonal have
legitimate children?A. As far as I know they have no legitimate
children.25x x x xxx x x xQ. You said after becoming
a lawyer you practice your profession? Where?A. Here in
Cagayan de Oro City.Q. Do you have services rendered with the
deceased Matilde vda de Ramonal?A. I assisted her in terminating
the partition, of properties.Q. When you said assisted, you acted
as her counsel? Any sort of counsel as in what case is that, Fiscal?
A. It is about the project partition to terminate the property, which
was under the court before.26x x x xxx x x xQ.
Appearing in special proceeding no. 427 is the amended inventory
which is marked as exhibit N of the estate of Justo Ramonal and
there appears a signature over the type written word Matilde vda de
Ramonal, whose signature is this?A. That is the signature of
Matilde Vda de Ramonal.Q. Also in exhibit n-3, whose signature is
this?A. This one here that is the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de
Ramonal.27x x x xxx x x xQ. Aside from attending as
counsel in that Special Proceeding Case No. 427 what were the
other assistance wherein you were rendering professional service
to the deceased Matilde Vda de Ramonal?A. I can not remember
if I have assisted her in other matters but if there are documents to
show that I have assisted then I can recall.28x x x xxx
x x xQ. Now, I am showing to you exhibit S which is titled "tugon",
kindly go over this document, Fiscal Waga and tell the court
whether you are familiar with the handwriting contained in that
document marked as exhibit "S"?A. I am not familiar with the
handwriting.Q. This one, Matilde Vda de Ramonal, whose
signature is this?A. I think this signature here it seems to be the
signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal.Q. Now, in item No. 2
there is that signature here of Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell
the court whose signature is this?A. Well, that is similar to that
signature appearing in the project of partition.Q. Also in item no. 3
there is that signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell the
court whose signature is that?A. As I said, this signature also
seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal.Q. Why do
you say that?A. Because there is a similarity in the way it is being
written.Q. How about this signature in item no. 4, can you tell the
court whose signature is this?A. The same is true with the
signature in item no. 4. It seems that they are similar.29x x x
xxx x x xQ. Mr. Prosecutor, I heard you when you said that
the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal Appearing in exhibit S
seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal?A. Yes, it is
similar to the project of partition.Q. So you are not definite that this
is the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal. You are merely
supposing that it seems to be her signature because it is similar to
the signature of the project of partition which you have made?A.
That is true.30
From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals
allowed the will to probate and disregard the requirement of three
witnesses in case of contested holographic will, citing the decision
in Azaola vs. Singson,31ruling that the requirement is merely
directory and not mandatory.
In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals,32 we said that "the object
of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore,
the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to
attain these primordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must
not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain
and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document
being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the
holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to
declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased
but with one of the respondents, who kept it even before the death
of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that
the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before
the death of the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature
and the handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed
and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at
comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when
the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the
documents which contained the signature of the deceased with that
of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the
former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the
strokes are different when compared with other documents written
by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the
disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing
and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30,
1978,33 and the signatures in several documents such as the
application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980,34
and a letter dated June 16, 1978,35the strokes are different. In the
letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that
there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will.
We, therefore, cannot be certain that ruling holographic will was in
the handwriting by the deceased.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE.
The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin with
instructions to allow petitioners to adduce evidence in support of
their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the
deceased Matilde Seño vda. de Ramonal.1âwphi1.nêt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-12190 August 30, 1958

TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP
deceased. FAUSTO E. GAN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ILDEFONSO YAP, oppositor-appellee.
Benedicto C. Belran, Crispin D. Baizas and Roberto H. Benitez for
appellant.
Arturo M. Tolentino for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart
failure in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties
in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated them proceedings in
the Manila court of first instance with a petition for the probate of a
holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased, substantially
in these words:
Nobyembre 5, 1951.Ako, si Felicidad E. Alto-Yap, may asawa, at
ganap na pag-iisip, ay nagsasalaysay na ang aking kayamanan sa
bayan ng Pulilan, Bulacan ay aking ipinamamana sa aking mga
kamag-anakang sumusunod:Vicente Esguerra,
Sr. .............................................5 BahagiFausto E.
Gan .........................................................2 BahagiRosario E.
Gan .........................................................2 BahagiFilomena
Alto ..........................................................1 BahagiBeatriz
Alto ..............................................................1 BahagiAt ang aking
lahat ng ibang kayamanan sa Maynila at iba panglugar ay aking
ipinamamana sa aking asawang si Idelfonso D. Yap sa kondisyong
siya'y magpapagawa ng isang Health Center na nagkakahalaga ng
di kukulangin sa halagang P60,000.00 sa bayan ng Pulilan,
Bulacan, na nakaukit ang aking pangalang Felicidad Esguerra-Alto.
At kung ito ay may kakulangan man ay bahala na ang aking asawa
ang magpuno upang matupad ang aking kagustuhan.(Lagda)
Felicidad E. Alto-Yap.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap
asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any
testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon.
Ramon R. San Jose, Judge,1 refused to probate the alleged will. A
seventy-page motion for reconsideration failed. Hence this appeal.
The will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to establish its
contents and due execution by the statements in open court of
Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan
Jimenez, whose testimonies may be summarized as follows:
Sometime in 1950 after her last trip abroad, Felicidad Esguerra
mentioned to her first cousin, Vicente Esguerra, her desire to make
a will. She confided however that it would be useless if her husband
discovered or knew about it. Vicente consulted with Fausto E. Gan,
nephew of Felicidad, who was then preparing for the bar
examinations. The latter replied it could be done without any
witness, provided the document was entirely in her handwriting,
signed and dated by her. Vicente Esguerra lost no time in
transmitting the information, and on the strength of it, in the morning
of November 5, 1951, in her residence at Juan Luna Street, Manila,
Felicidad wrote, signed and dated a holographic will substantially of
the tenor above transcribed, in the presence of her niece, Felina
Esguerra (daughter of Vicente), who was invited to read it. In the
afternoon of that day, Felicidad was visited by a distant relative,
Primitivo Reyes, and she allowed him to read the will in the
presence of Felina Esguerra, who again read it.
Nine days later, he had other visitors: Socorro Olarte a cousin, and
Rosario Gan Jimenez, a niece. To these she showed the will, again
in the presence of Felina Esguerra, who read it for the third time.
When on November 19, 1951, Felicidad was confined at the U.S.T.
Hospital for her last illness, she entrusted the said will, which was
contained in a purse, to Felina Esguerra. But a few hours later,
Ildefonso Yap, her husband, asked Felina for the purse: and being
afraid of him by reason of his well-known violent temper, she
delivered it to him. Thereafter, in the same day, Ildefonso Yap
returned the purse to Felina, only to demand it the next day shortly
before the death of Felicidad. Again, Felina handed it to him but not
before she had taken the purse to the toilet, opened it and read the
will for the last time.2
From the oppositor's proof it appears that Felicidad Esguerra had
been suffering from heart disease for several years before her
death; that she had been treated by prominent physicians, Dr.
Agerico Sison, Dr. Agustin Liboro and others; that in May 1950
husband and wife journeyed to the United States wherein for
several weeks she was treated for the disease; that thereafter she
felt well and after visiting interesting places, the couple returned to
this country in August 1950. However, her ailment recurred, she
suffered several attacks, the most serious of which happened in the
early morning of the first Monday of November 1951 (Nov. 5). The
whole household was surprised and alarmed, even the teachers of
the Harvardian Colleges occupying the lower floors and of by the
Yap spouses. Physician's help was hurriedly called, and Dr.
Tanjuaquio arrived at about 8:00 a.m., found the patient hardly
breathing, lying in bed, her head held high by her husband.
Injections and oxygen were administered. Following the doctor's
advice the patient stayed in bed, and did nothing the whole day, her
husband and her personal attendant, Mrs. Bantique, constantly at
her side. These two persons swore that Mrs. Felicidad Esguerra
Yap made no will, and could have made no will on that day.
The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence for several
reasons, the most important of which were these: (a) if according to
his evidence, the decedent wanted to keep her will a secret, so that
her husband would not know it, it is strange she executed it in the
presence of Felina Esguerra, knowing as she did that witnesses
were unnecessary; (b) in the absence of a showing that Felina was
a confidant of the decedent it is hard to believe that the latter would
have allowed the former to see and read the will several times; (c) it
is improbable that the decedent would have permitted Primitivo
Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez and Socorro Olarte to read her will,
when she precisely wanted its contents to remain a secret during
her lifetime; (d) it is also improbable that her purpose being to
conceal the will from her husband she would carry it around, even
to the hospital, in her purse which could for one reason or another
be opened by her husband; (e) if it is true that the husband
demanded the purse from Felina in the U.S.T. Hospital and that the
will was there, it is hard to believe that he returned it without
destroying the will, the theory of the petitioner being precisely that
the will was executed behind his back for fear he will destroy it.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the
oppositor's evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have
executed such holographic will.
In this appeal, the major portion of appellant's brief discussed the
testimony of the oppositor and of his witnesses in a vigorous effort
to discredit them. It appears that the same arguments, or most of
them, were presented in the motion to reconsider; but they failed to
induce the court a quo to change its mind. The oppositor's brief, on
the other hand, aptly answers the criticisms. We deem it
unnecessary to go over the same matters, because in our opinion
the case should be decided not on the weakness of the opposition
but on the strength of the evidence of the petitioner, who has the
burden of proof.
The Spanish Civil Code permitted the execution of holographic wills
along with other forms. The Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190)
approved August 7, 1901, adopted only one form, thereby repealing
the other forms, including holographic wills.
The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its
arts. 810-814. "A person may execute a holographic will which must
be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed."
This is indeed a radical departure from the form and solemnities
provided for wills under Act 190, which for fifty years (from 1901 to
1950) required wills to be subscribed by the testator and three
credible witnesses in each and every page; such witnesses to attest
to the number of sheets used and to the fact that the testator signed
in their presence and that they signed in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
The object of such requirements it has been said, is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to prevent substitution of wills, to
guarantee their truth and authencity (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40
Phil., 476) and to avoid those who have no right to succeed the
testator would succeed him and be benefited with the probate of
same. (Mendoza vs. Pilapil, 40 Off. Gaz., 1855). However, formal
imperfections may be brushed aside when authenticity of the
instrument is duly proved. (Rodriguez vs Yap, 40 Off. Gaz. 1st
Supp. No. 3 p. 194.)
Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be
fulfilled when such will is submitted to the courts for allowance. For
that purpose the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses
would be sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If
there is, the three must testify, if available. (Cabang vs. Delfinado,
34 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). From the
testimony of such witnesses (and of other additional witnesses) the
court may form its opinion as to the genuineness and authenticity of
the testament, and the circumstances its due execution.
Now, in the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth
and veracity are demanded, since as stated, they need no
witnesses; provided however, that they are "entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself." The law, it is
reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as material
proof of authenticity, and as its own safeguard, since it could at any
time, be demonstrated to be — or not to be — in the hands of the
testator himself. "In the probate of a holographic will" says the New
Civil Code, "it shall be necessary that at least one witness who
knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly
declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. If the will is contested, at least three such witnesses shall
be required. In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with
decedent's handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary, expert
testimony may be resorted to."
The witnesses so presented do not need to have seen the
execution of the holographic will. They may be mistaken in their
opinion of the handwriting, or they may deliberately lie in affirming it
is in the testator's hand. However, the oppositor may present other
witnesses who also know the testator's handwriting, or some expert
witnesses, who after comparing the will with other writings or letters
of the deceased, have come to the conclusion that such will has not
been written by the hand of the deceased. (Sec. 50, Rule 123). And
the court, in view of such contradictory testimony may use its own
visual sense, and decide in the face of the document, whether the
will submitted to it has indeed been written by the testator.
Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of
opposition, and of assessing the evidence are not available. And
then the only guaranty of authenticity3 — the testator's handwriting
— has disappeared.
Therefore, the question presents itself, may a holographic will be
probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen
it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?
How can the oppositor prove that such document was not in the
testator's handwriting? His witnesses who know testator's
handwriting have not examined it. His experts can not testify,
because there is no way to compare the alleged testament with
other documents admittedly, or proven to be, in the testator's hand.
The oppositor will, therefore, be caught between the upper millstone
of his lack of knowledge of the will or the form thereof, and the
nether millstone of his inability to prove its falsity. Again the
proponent's witnesses may be honest and truthful; but they may
have been shown a faked document, and having no interest to
check the authenticity thereof have taken no pains to examine and
compare. Or they may be perjurers boldly testifying, in the
knowledge that none could convict them of perjury, because no one
could prove that they have not "been shown" a document which
they believed was in the handwriting of the deceased. Of course,
the competency of such perjured witnesses to testify as to the
handwriting could be tested by exhibiting to them other writings
sufficiently similar to those written by the deceased; but what
witness or lawyer would not foresee such a move and prepare for
it? His knowledge of the handwriting established, the witness (or
witnesses) could simply stick to his statement: he has seen and
read a document which he believed was in the deceased's
handwriting. And the court and the oppositor would practically be at
the mercy of such witness (or witnesses) not only as to the
execution, but also as to the contents of the will. Does the law
permit such a situation?
The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and
probate) of a lost or destroyed will by secondary — evidence the
testimony of witnesses, in lieu of the original document. Yet such
Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills which could
not then be validly made here. (See also Sec. 46, Rule 123; Art.
830-New Civil Code.)
Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills?
Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to
the holographic will is that it may be lost or stolen4 — an implied
admission that such loss or theft renders it useless..
This must be so, because the Civil Code requires it to be protocoled
and presented to the judge, (Art. 689) who shall subscribe it and
require its identity to be established by the three witnesses who
depose that they have no reasonable doubt that the will was written
by the testator (Art. 691). And if the judge considers that the identity
of the will has been proven he shall order that it be filed (Art. 693).
All these, imply presentation of the will itself. Art. 692 bears the
same implication, to a greater degree. It requires that the surviving
spouse and the legitimate ascendants and descendants be
summoned so that they may make "any statement they may desire
to submit with respect to the authenticity of the will." As it is
universally admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the
testator and by himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either
its execution or its contents, the above article 692 could not have
the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state whether they
know of the will, but whether in the face of the document itself they
think the testator wrote it. Obviously, this they can't do unless the
will itself is presented to the Court and to them.
Undoubtedly, the intention of the law is to give the near relatives the
choice of either complying with the will if they think it authentic, or to
oppose it, if they think it spurious.5 Such purpose is frustrated when
the document is not presented for their examination. If it be argued
that such choice is not essential, because anyway the relatives may
oppose, the answer is that their opposition will be at a distinct
disadvantage, and they have the right and privilege to comply with
the will, if genuine, a right which they should not be denied by
withholding inspection thereof from them.
We find confirmation of these ideas--about exhibition of the
document itself--in the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
June 5, 1925, which denied protocolization or probate to a
document containing testamentary dispositions in the handwriting of
the deceased, but apparently mutilated, the signature and some
words having been torn from it. Even in the face of allegations and
testimonial evidence (which was controverted), ascribing the
mutilation to the opponents of the will. The aforesaid tribunal
declared that, in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code
(Spanish) the will itself, whole and unmutilated, must be presented;
otherwise, it shall produce no effect.
Considerando que sentado lo anterior, y estableciendose en el
parrafo segundo del articulo 688 del Codigo civil, que para que sea
valido el testamento olografo debera estar escrito todo el y firmado
por testador, con expression del año, mes y dia en que se otorque,
resulta evidente que para la validez y eficacia de esos testamentos,
no basta la demostracion mas o menos cumplida de que cuando se
otorgaron se Ilenaron todos esos requisitos, sino que de la
expresada redaccion el precepto legal, y por el tiempo en que el
verbo se emplea, se desprende la necesidad de que el documento
se encuentre en dichas condiciones en el momento de ser
presentado a la Autoridad competente, para au adveracion y
protocolizacion; y como consecuencia ineludible de ello, forzoso es
affirmar que el de autos carece de validez y aficacia, por no
estarfirmado por el testador, cualquiera que sea la causa de la falta
de firma, y sin perjuicio de las acciones que puedan ejercitar los
perjudicados, bien para pedir indemnizacion por el perjuicio a la
persona culpable, si la hubiere, o su castigo en via criminal si
procediere, por constituir dicha omision un defecto
insubsanable . . . .
This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero
Juzgo, admittedly the basis of the Spanish Civil Code provisions on
the matter.6
PRECEDENTES LEGALES--Fuero Juzgo, libro segundo, titulo V,
ley 15--E depues que los herederos e sus fijos ovieren esta manda,
fasta ... annos muestrenla al obispo de la tierra, o al juez fasta VI
meses y el obispo o el juez tomen otros tales tres escritos, que
fuesen fechos por su mano daquel que fizo la manda; e por
aquellos escriptos, si semjara la letra de la manda, sea confirmada
la manda. E depues que todo esto fuere connoscido, el obispo o el
juez, o otras testimonios confirmen el escripto de la manda otra
vez, y en esta manera vala la manda. (Art. 689, Scaevola--Codigo
Civil.)
(According to the Fuero above, the will itself must be compared with
specimens of the testators handwriting.)
All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property
of the deceased in accordance with his holographic will, unless they
are shown his handwriting and signature.7
Parenthetically, it may be added that even the French Civil Law
considers the loss of the holographic will to be fatal. (Planiol y
Ripert, Derecho Civil Frances, traduccion por Diaz Cruz, 1946,
Tomo V, page 555).
Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the
conclusion that the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony
of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.8
Under the provisions of Art. 838 of the New Civil Code, we are
empowered to adopt this opinion as a Rule of Court for the
allowance of such holographic wills. We hesitate, however, to make
this Rule decisive of this controversy, simultaneously with its
promulgation. Anyway, decision of the appeal may rest on the
sufficiency, rather the insufficiency, of the evidence presented by
petitioner Fausto E. Gan.
At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to
explain why, unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved
by testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies
in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of
authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of
the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now).
The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium
of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are
available to authenticate.
In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three
witnesses (four with the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their
lies could be checked and exposed, their whereabouts and acts on
the particular day, the likelihood that they would be called by the
testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they were
intimates or trusted friends of the testator they are not likely to end
themselves to any fraudulent scheme to distort his wishes. Last but
not least, they can not receive anything on account of the will.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were
admissible9 only one man could engineer the fraud this way: after
making a clever or passable imitation of the handwriting and
signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and
credible witnesses see and read the forgery; and the latter, having
no interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they would in all good
faith affirm its genuineness and authenticity. The will having been
lost — the forger may have purposely destroyed it in an "accident"
— the oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the error,
because the document itself is not at hand. And considering that the
holographic will may consist of two or three pages, and only one of
them need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which
may be the most important ones, may go undetected.
If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more
objectionable feature — feasibility of forgery — would be added to
the several objections to this kind of wills listed by Castan, Sanchez
Roman and Valverde and other well-known Spanish Commentators
and teachers of Civil Law.10
One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the
three subscribing witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they
saw, namely the act of the testator of subscribing the will; whereas
in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as
to their opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an
opinion which can not be tested in court, nor directly contradicted by
the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.
Turning now to the evidence presented by the petitioner, we find
ourselves sharing the trial judge's disbelief. In addition to the
dubious circumstances described in the appealed decision, we find
it hard to believe that the deceased should show her will precisely
to relatives who had received nothing from it: Socorro Olarte and
Primitivo Reyes. These could pester her into amending her will to
give them a share, or threaten to reveal its execution to her
husband Ildefonso Yap. And this leads to another point: if she
wanted so much to conceal the will from her husband, why did she
not entrust it to her beneficiaries? Opportunity to do so was not
lacking: for instance, her husband's trip to Davao, a few days after
the alleged execution of the will.
In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and
probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by
herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and
inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear and distinct"
proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.11
Wherefore, the rejection of the alleged will must be sustained.
Judgment affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,

Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982IN THE MATTER OF THE

PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA
deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY.
LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.Luciano A. Joson for
petitioner-appellant. Cesar Paralejo for oppositor-appellee.
RELOVA, J.:This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of
Appeals for final determination pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court. As found by the Court of Appeals: ... On January 11,
1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla
and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by the appellees
Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla
Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds: (1) Appellant
was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to
produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as
required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court; (2) The alleged
copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of
property after death and was not intended to take effect after death,
and therefore it was not a will (3) The alleged hollographic will
itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise
it would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509;
and (4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or
otherwise, executed and attested as required by law. The appellees
likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case
Sp. Proc. No, 8275). Their motion was granted by the court in an
order dated April 4, 1977. On November 13, 1978, following the
consolidation of the cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss
the petition for the probate of the will. They argued that: (1) T h e
alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as
to the management and improvement of the schools and colleges
founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and (2) Lost or destroyed
holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike
ordinary wills. Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to
dismiss was denied by the court in its order of February 23, 1979.
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground
that the order was contrary to law and settled pronouncements and
rulings of the Supreme Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an
opposition. On July 23, 1979, the court set aside its order of
February 23, 1979 and dismissed the petition for the probate of the
will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:... It is our considered
opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will is lost, a
copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original. In the case of Gam
vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the
matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose,
regards the document itself as the material proof of authenticity of
said wills. MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged
holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo
B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the lapse of more than
14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the
decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be located
shows to our mind that the decedent had discarded before his
death his allegedly missing Holographic Will. Appellant's motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court of
Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's
petition is contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence. On July 7,
1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the
ground that the appeal does not involve question of fact and alleged
that the trial court committed the following assigned errors:I. THE
LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT BE PROVED BY A COPY
THEREOF;II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE DECEDENT HAS DISCARDED BEFORE HIS DEATH THE
MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED
IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S WILL.The only question here is
whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can
be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of
the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the
will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The
probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one
Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available,
experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying
witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been
lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be
probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of
the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison
between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made
with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs.
Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved
by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read
such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall
produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material
proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that
"Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy.
Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if
any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased
may be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently,
the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic
will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate
court. WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3,
1979, denying appellant's motion for reconsideration dated August
9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to
approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET
ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984ROSA K. KALAW,

petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI
of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW,
respondents.Leandro H. Fernandez for petitioner. Antonio
Quintos and Jose M. Yacat for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:On September 1, 1971, private
respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the sole heir of
his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the
probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.
The holographic Will reads in full as follows:My Last will and
Testament In the name of God, Amen.I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino
63years of age, single, and a resident of Lipa City, being of sound
and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare thus to be my
last will and testament.1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the
cemetery of the catholic church of Lipa City. In accordance with the
rights of said Church, and that my executrix hereinafter named
provide and erect at the expose of my state a suitable monument to
perpetuate my memory.xxx xxx xxxThe holographic Will, as first
written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole
heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw
opposed probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will
contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by
Article 814 of the Civil Code reading: Art. 814.I n c a s e o f a n y
insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will the
testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.ROSA's
position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be
given effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir
thereunder. After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an
Order, dated September 3, 197 3, reading in part: The document
Exhibit "C" was submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination. The NBI reported that the handwriting, the signature,
the insertions and/or additions and the initial were made by one and
the same person. Consequently, Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of
the decedent, Natividad K. Kalaw. The only question is whether the
win, Exhibit 'C', should be admitted to probate although the
alterations and/or insertions or additions above-mentioned were not
authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix pursuant to Art.
814 of the Civil Code. The petitioner contends that the oppositors
are estopped to assert the provision of Art. 814 on the ground that
they themselves agreed thru their counsel to submit the Document
to the NBI FOR EXAMINATIONS. This is untenable. The parties did
not agree, nor was it impliedly understood, that the oppositors
would be in estoppel. The Court finds, therefore, that the provision
of Article 814 of the Civil Code is applicable to Exhibit "C". Finding
the insertions, alterations and/or additions in Exhibit "C" not to be
authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix Natividad K.
Kalaw, the Court will deny the admission to probate of Exhibit "C".
WHEREFORE, the petition to probate Exhibit "C" as the
holographic will of Natividad K. Kalaw is hereby denied. SO
O R D E R E D . F r o m t h a t O r d e r, G R E G O R I O m o v e d f o r
reconsideration arguing that since the alterations and/or insertions
were the testatrix, the denial to probate of her holographic Will
would be contrary to her right of testamentary disposition.
Reconsideration was denied in an Order, dated November 2, 1973,
on the ground that "Article 814 of the Civil Code being , clear and
explicit, (it) requires no necessity for interpretation."From that Order,
dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, and the Order dated
November 2, 1973 denying reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition
for Review on certiorari on the sole legal question of whether or not
the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and
insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication
by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with
her as sole heir. Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections,
and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will litem
not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular
words erased, corrected or interlined.1 Manresa gave an Identical
commentary when he said "la omision de la salvedad no anula el
testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la
sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895." 2However, when as in this case,
the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision,
which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but
which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by
the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire
Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains
in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will
as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming
change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither
be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner
required by law by affixing her full signature, The ruling in Velasco,
supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations,
erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the
efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the essence and
validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and
alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be
determined with certitude. As Manresa had stated in his
commentary on Article 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, whence
Article 814 of the new Civil Code was derived: ... No infringe lo
dispuesto en este articulo del Codigo (el 688) la sentencia que no
declara la nulidad de un testamento olografo que contenga
palabras tachadas, enmendadas o entre renglones no salvadas por
el testador bajo su firnia segun previene el parrafo tercero del
mismo, porque, en realidad, tal omision solo puede afectar a la
validez o eficacia de tales palabras, y nunca al testamento mismo,
ya por estar esa disposicion en parrafo aparte de aquel que
determine las condiciones necesarias para la validez del
testamento olografo, ya porque, de admitir lo contrario, se Ilegaria
al absurdo de que pequefias enmiendas no salvadas, que en nada
afectasen a la parte esencial y respectiva del testamento, vinieran a
anular este, y ya porque el precepto contenido en dicho parrafo ha
de entenderse en perfecta armonia y congruencia con el art. 26 de
la ley del Notariado que declara nulas las adiciones apostillas
entrerrenglonados, raspaduras y tachados en las escrituras
matrices, siempre que no se salven en la forma prevenida, paro no
el documento que las contenga, y con mayor motivo cuando las
palabras enmendadas, tachadas, o entrerrenglonadas no tengan
importancia ni susciten duda alguna acerca del pensamiento del
testador, o constituyan meros accidentes de ortografia o de purez
escrituraria, sin trascendencia alguna(l). Mas para que sea
aplicable la doctrina de excepcion contenida en este ultimo fallo, es
preciso que las tachaduras, enmiendas o entrerrenglonados sin
salvar saan de pala bras que no afecter4 alteren ni uarien de modo
substancial la express voluntad del testador manifiesta en el
documento. Asi lo advierte la sentencia de 29 de Noviembre de
1916, que declara nulo un testamento olografo por no estar salvada
por el testador la enmienda del guarismo ultimo del año en que fue
extendido3(Emphasis ours). WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby
dismissed and the Decision of respondent Judge, dated September
3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs. SO ORDERED. Plana,
Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur. Relova, J., took no
part. Separate Opinions TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: I concur.
Rosa, having appealed to this Court on a sole question of law, is
bound by the trial court's factual finding that the peculiar alterations
in the holographic will crossing out Rosa's name and instead
inserting her brother Gregorio's name as sole heir and "sole
executrix" were made by the testatrix in her own handwriting. (I find
it peculiar that the testatrix who was obviously an educated person
would unthinkingly make such crude alterations instead of
consulting her lawyer and writing an entirely new holographic wig in
order to avoid any doubts as to her change of heir. It should be
noted that the first alteration crossing out "sister Rosa K. Kalaw"
and inserting "brother Gregorio Kalaw" as sole heir is not even
initialed by the testatrix. Only the second alteration crossing out
"sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and inserting "brother Gregorio Kalaw" as
"sole executrix" is initialed.) Probate of the radically altered will
replacing Gregorio for Rosa as sole heir is properly denied, since
the same was not duly authenticated by the full signature of the
executrix as mandatorily required by Article 814 of the Civil Code.
The original unaltered will naming Rosa as sole heir cannot,
however, be given effect in view of the trial court's factual finding
that the testatrix had by her own handwriting substituted Gregorio
for Rosa, so that there is no longer any will naming Rosa as sole
heir. The net result is that the testatrix left no valid will and both
Rosa and Gregorio as her next of kill succeed to her intestate
estate. Separate OpinionsTEEHANKEE, J., concurring: I concur.
Rosa, having appealed to this Court on a sole question of law, is
bound by the trial court's factual finding that the peculiar alterations
in the holographic will crossing out Rosa's name and instead
inserting her brother Gregorio's name as sole heir and "sole
executrix" were made by the testatrix in her own handwriting. (I find
it peculiar that the testatrix who was obviously an educated person
would unthinkingly make such crude alterations instead of
consulting her lawyer and writing an entirely new holographic wig in
order to avoid any doubts as to her change of heir. It should be
noted that the first alteration crossing out "sister Rosa K. Kalaw"
and inserting "brother Gregorio Kalaw" as sole heir is not even
initialed by the testatrix. Only the second alteration crossing out
"sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and inserting "brother Gregorio Kalaw" as
"sole executrix" is initialed.) Probate of the radically altered will
replacing Gregorio for Rosa as sole heir is properly denied, since
the same was not duly authenticated by the full signature of the
executrix as mandatorily required by Article 814 of the Civil Code.
The original unaltered will naming Rosa as sole heir cannot,
however, be given effect in view of the trial court's factual finding
that the testatrix had by her own handwriting substituted Gregorio
for Rosa, so that there is no longer any will naming Rosa as sole
heir. The net result is that the testatrix left no valid will and both
Rosa and Gregorio as her next of kill succeed to her intestate
estate.
Footnotes

G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994SPOUSES ROBERTO

AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND,
respondents.Miguel D. Larida for petitioners.Montilla Law
Office for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the
Court of
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the
dispositive portion of which reads;PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
questioned decision of November 19, 1988 of the trial court is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petition for probate is
hereby DISMISSED. No costs.The earlier Decision was rendered
by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, 2 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171,
and the instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of
the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982.In the will,
decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and
Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S.
Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand,
and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.On January 20, 1983,
petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of
decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its
execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under
duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect
capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.Private respondent
opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's
body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through
improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise
opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will
of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He
claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its
entirety, as she was not its sole owner.Notwithstanding the
oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will
to probate. It found, inter alia:Considering then that the probate
proceedings herein must decide only the question of identity of the
will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix,
this probate court finds no reason at all for the disallowance of the
will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor
for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.For one, no
evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different
from the will actually executed by the testatrix. The only objections
raised by the oppositors . . . are that the will was not written in the
handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers to the question of
its due execution, and not to the question of identity of will. No other
will was alleged to have been executed by the testatrix other than
the will herein presented. Hence, in the light of the evidence
adduced, the identity of the will presented for probate must be
accepted, i.e., the will submitted in Court must be deemed to be the
will actually executed by the testatrix.xxx xxx xxxWhile the fact that
it was entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the
testatrix has been disputed, the petitioners, however, have
satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will in question
was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of
the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who have convincingly shown
knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix have been presented
and have explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with
which the holographic will in question was written to be the genuine
handwriting and signature of the testatrix. Given then the aforesaid
evidence, the requirement of the law that the holographic will be
entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix
has been complied with.xxx xxx xxxAs to the question of the
testamentary capacity of the testratix, (private respondent)
Clemente Sand himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was
completely in her sound mind when he visited her during her
birthday celebration in 1981, at or around which time the
holographic will in question was executed by the testatrix. To be of
sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making
the will, knew the value of the estate to be disposed of, the proper
object of her bounty, and the characterof the testamentary act . . .
The will itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge
of the nature of her estate. She even identified the lot number and
square meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The objects of
her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And considering that
she had even written a nursing book which contained the law and
jurisprudence on will and succession, there is more than sufficient
showing that she knows the character of the testamentary act.In
this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution and
the testamentary capacity of the testatrix has to be resolved in favor
of the allowance of probate of the will submitted herein.Likewise, no
evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the
disallowance of herein holographic will. While it was alleged that the
said will was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person, the
evidence adduced have not shown any instance where improper
pressure or influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private
respondent) Clemente Sand has testified that the testatrix was still
alert at the time of the execution of the will, i.e., at or around the
time of her birth anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also
established that she is a very intelligent person and has a mind of
her own. Her independence of character and to some extent, her
sense of superiority, which has been testified to in Court, all show
the unlikelihood of her being unduly influenced or improperly
pressured to make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that the
undue influence or improper pressure in question herein only refer
to the making of a will and not as to the specific testamentary
provisions therein which is the proper subject of another
proceeding. Hence, under the circumstances, this Court cannot find
convincing reason for the disallowance of the will
herein.Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the
law on succession that in case of doubt, testate succession should
be preferred over intestate succession, and the fact that no
convincing grounds were presented and proven for the
disallowance of the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the
aforesaid will submitted herein must be admitted to probate. 3
(Citations omitted.)On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the
petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of
Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the
requirements for its validity." 4 It held that the decedent did not
comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which
read, as follows:Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing
in a holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last
disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior
dispositions.Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or
alteration in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the
same by his full signature.It alluded to certain dispositions in the will
which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It
also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made
thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.Thus, this appeal
which is impressed with merit.Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any of the following
cases:(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;(b) If the
testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will,
at the time of its execution;(c) If it was executed under duress, or
the influence of fear, or threats;(d) If it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of
some other person for his benefit;(e) If the signature of the
testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that
the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature
thereto.In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code
reads:Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following
cases;(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied
with;(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable
of making a will, at the time of its execution;(3) If it was executed
through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;(4)
If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence,
on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;(5) If the
signature of the testator was procured by fraud;(6) If the testator
acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed
should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.These
lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5
Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only
issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is,
indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will
was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law;
(3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity
at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of
the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. 6In
the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of
Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil
Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the
probate of said will. This is erroneous.We reiterate what we held in
Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that:The object of
the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore,
the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to
attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must
not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain
and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
testator's last will, must be disregarded.For purposes of probating
non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the
subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under
Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code.In the case of
holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is
the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by
the testator himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil
Code, thus:A person may execute a holographic will which must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis
supplied.)Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in
the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably
handwritten by the testator.A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil
Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If
the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the
result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however, does not render the whole testament void.Likewise, a
holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding
non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of
Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court
held:Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and
interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not
been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular
words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical
commentary when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula el
testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la
sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1985." 8 (Citations omitted.)Thus, unless
the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were
made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, 9
their presence does not invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of
authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.It is
also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of
changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions
(Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the
necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article
810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the
Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering
holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:Art. 678: A will is
called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form and
with the requisites required in Article 688.Art. 688: Holographic wills
may be executed only by persons of full age.In order that the will be
valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to the year
of its execution, written in its entirety by the testator and signed by
him, and must contain a statement of the year, month and day of its
execution.If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined
words, the testator must identify them over his signature.Foreigners
may execute holographic wills in their own language.This
separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that
only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code — and
not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are
essential to the probate of a holographic will.The Court of Appeals
further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of
the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its
entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.As a general rule,
courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in
exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the
situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of
the will. 11 In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated
in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name
of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero
to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as
correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the
whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.IN
VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30,
1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the
invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated
November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of
decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above
qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs.SO
ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.