Internal Boeing Messages Say 737

Max ‘Designed by Clowns’

Bloomberg | Article by Julie Johnsson and Ryan Beene
Published on 1/10/2020
(Bloomberg) -- Boeing Co. employees discussed deep unease with the 737 Max and the
flight simulators used to train pilots on the new jetliner while also mocking senior
managers and regulators in a trove of messages released by the manufacturer late
Thursday. “This airplane is designed by clowns, who in turn are supervised by
monkeys,” said one company pilot in messages to a colleague in 2016. The company
provided the documents in December to lawmakers and the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration, who are investigating the 737 Max and the process that cleared it to fly.
The internal communications threaten to upend Boeing’s efforts to rebuild public trust in
the 737 Max, which has been grounded since March after two crashes that killed a total
of 346 people. That will add to the hurdles for David Calhoun, a longtime board member
who will take over on Jan. 13 as chief executive officer after Dennis Muilenburg was
ousted last month. “These newly released emails are incredibly damning,” said U.S.
Representative Peter DeFazio, an Oregon Democrat who chairs a committee that is
investigating Boeing and the Max. “They paint a deeply disturbing picture of the lengths
Boeing was apparently willing to go to in order to evade scrutiny from regulators, flight
crews, and the flying public, even as its own employees were sounding alarms
internally,” DeFazio said in a statement. Boeing, which provided the documents under
pressure from U.S. lawmakers, apologized and said it was committed to “full
transparency” with the FAA. “These documents do not represent the best of Boeing,”
Greg Smith, the company’s interim CEO, said in a message to employees Friday. “The
tone and language of the messages are inappropriate, particularly when used in
discussion of such important matters, and they do not reflect who we are as a company
or the culture we’ve created.” The FAA said it has reviewed the Boeing messages and
found that “nothing in the submission pointed to any safety risks that were not already
identified as part of the ongoing review of proposed modifications to the aircraft.” Boeing
fell 1.6% to $330.92 at 11:52 a.m. in New York, the biggest drop on the Dow Jones
Industrial Average. The stock gained 1.5% Thursday after Western authorities said a
737 crash in Iran this week was caused by a missile, not mechanical failure. Through
Thursday, the shares had dropped 6.4% since the first Max crash in October 2018, while
the Dow advanced 17%. Southwest Airlines Co., the largest Max operator, called the
messages “disappointing,” but said it remained confident in the work Boeing has done
since the statements were made. “As we’ve shared previously, we will not introduce the
Max back into our fleet until it’s safe to fly,” said Brandy King, a spokeswoman for
Southwest. “We continue to make our procedures, training, and maintenance part of the
path and dedicated focus for return to service.” Simulator Reversal The Boeing
documents -- consisting of more than 100 pages of messages, emails and memos --
were released days after the company reversed its earlier opposition to requiring Max
pilots to undergo simulator training before the grounded plane resumes commercial
flight. “I just jedi mind tricked this fools. I should be given $1,000 every time I take one of
these calls. I save this company a sick amount of $$$$.” “Would you put your family on a
MAX simulator trained aircraft? I wouldn’t.” “I’ll be shocked if the FAA passes this turd.”
“This is a joke. This airplane is ridiculous.” “Best part is we are re-starting this whole
thing with the 777X with the same supplier and have signed up to an even more
aggressive schedule!” “Jesus, it’s doomed.” One of the company’s big selling points with
customers had been that pilots certified for an earlier generation of 737 jets only needed
a short computer course to brush up their skills for the Max. Those assurances helped
make the Max Boeing’s best-selling jetliner. The messages shared by the company at
times reveal the pressure on employees -- and customers -- to avoid the additional
training. They also highlighted the technical glitches that bedeviled Max simulators after
the jet began flying commercially in mid-2017. Boeing said that “any potential safety
deficiencies identified in the documents have been addressed.” In one exchange about
the Max flight simulators, an employee said, “honesty is the only way in this job --
integrity when lives are on the line on the aircraft and training programs shouldn’t be
taken with a pinch of salt. Would you put your family on a MAX simulator trained aircraft?
I wouldn’t.” Smith, the interim Boeing CEO, reminded employees to remain professional
in their interactions. “Notwithstanding the inappropriate tone and content of some of
these communications, we have examined these issues closely and remain confident in
our regulatory processes relating to the Max airplane and simulators.” The missives
were drafted by a small number of employees, primarily technical pilots and personnel
working to develop and qualify the Max simulators, a Boeing official said by email. While
all names were redacted, the company confirmed that some involved are the “same
individuals” behind incendiary emails revealed last year. ‘Jedi Mind Tricks’ In messages
disclosed in October, Mark Forkner, the former 737 Max Chief Technical Pilot, bragged
of employing “Jedi mind tricks” on regulators and described problems in a 737 Max
simulator. In instant messages, Forkner told a colleague that MCAS was “running
rampant in the sim on me,” referring to simulator tests of the aircraft. “Granted, I suck at
flying, but even this was egregious.” Those messages, shared early last year with
federal investigators -- but not the FAA -- sparked fury among lawmakers who later
unloaded on Muilenburg during congressional hearings that followed their release. The
latest batch of communications includes a 2017 email in which someone identified as
the chief technical pilot on the 737 crowed to Boeing colleagues, “Looks like my jedi
mind trick worked again!” Attached was a forwarded email exchange in which the person
warned an unnamed recipient against offering simulator training for Max pilots, pushing
instead for the computer-based course that regulators had already approved for flight
crews transitioning to Max from earlier 737 models. “I am concerned that if [redacted]
chooses to require a Max simulator for its pilots beyond what all other regulators are
requiring that it will be creating a difficult and unnecessary training burden for your
airline, as well as potentially establish a precedent in your region for other Max
customers,” the Boeing pilot wrote in the forwarded message. An unidentified Boeing
employee in a different text message exchange brags about swaying India’s regulator
“to make them feel stupid about trying to require any additional training requirements.”
Added the sender: “I just Jedi mind tricked this [sic] fools. I should be given $1000 every
time I take one of these calls. I save this company a sick amount of $$$$.” In another
2017 email, the 737 chief technical pilot again pushed back against simulator training for
pilots transitioning from the older 737 NG family to the Max. “Boeing will not allow that to
happen. We’ll go face to face with any regulator who tries to make that a requirement,”
the pilot wrote. MCAS Memo In a 2013 memo, an employee discussed new software on
the Max that would later be implicated in both crashes. The Maneuvering Characteristics
Augmentation System -- which wasn’t disclosed to pilots -- activated accidentally and
overwhelmed a Lion Air flight crew in 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines pilots last year. The
employee recommended describing MCAS as an addition to an existing speed trim
system, instead of as a new feature. “If we emphasize MCAS is a new function there
may be greater certification and training impact” In a memo on June 1, 2018, an
employee vented about a culture where managers only give lip-service to quality. The
sender was warning that Boeing might not be granted an extension to fix the Max
simulator at London’s Gatwick airport, which would put the device at risk of losing its
qualification. “We put ourselves in this position by picking the lowest cost supplier and
signing up to impossible schedules. Why did the lowest ranking and most unproven
supplier receive the contract? Solely based on bottom dollar. Not just MAX but also the
777X!” Added the employee: “I don’t know how to fix these things... it’s systematic. It’s
culture. It’s the fact that we have a senior leadership team that understand very little
about the business and yet are driving us to certain objectives. Its lots of individual
groups that aren’t working closely and being accountable. It exemplifies the ‘lazy B’” --
the nickname the person used for Boeing. --With assistance from Mary Schlangenstein.
To contact the reporters on this story: Julie Johnsson in Chicago at
jjohnsson@bloomberg.net;Ryan Beene in Washington at rbeene@bloomberg.net To
contact the editors responsible for this story: Brendan Case at bcase4@bloomberg.net,
Will Davies For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com ©2020
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