Republic vs Villanueva (2015) GR 210929

FACTS: Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City. In 1992, Edna worked as
domestic helper in Singapore while her husband worked as a mechanic in Valencia City, Bukidnon. In
1993, Edna heard the news from her children that Romeo had left their conjugal home without reason
or information as to his whereabouts. Thereafter, Edna took a leave from work and returned to the
country to look for Romeo. She inquired from her parents-in-law and common friends in Iligan City. Still,
she found no leads as to his whereabouts or existence. She also went to his birthplace in Escalante,
Negros Oriental, and inquired from his relatives. On August 6, 2009, Edna filed before the RTC a
petition5 to declare Romeo presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: W/N Romeo should be declared presumptively dead

RULING: NO. Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a judicial declaration of presumptive
death may be granted, the present spouse must prove that he/she has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead. In this case, Edna failed. The RTC and the CA overlooked Edna's patent non-
compliance with the said requirement. The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the
present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort (not a mere
passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack of any news
that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence
under the Civil Code would not suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the
present spouse the burden of complying with the stringent requirement of well-founded belief which
can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain not only the absent spouse's whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse
is still alive or is already dead.

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SSS vs Azote GR 29741 (2015)

FACTS: On June 19, 1992, respondent Edna and Edgardo, a member of the SSS, were married in civil
rites. On April 27, 1994, Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their three older children
as designated beneficiaries. Thereafter, Edgardo submitted another Form E-4 to the SSS designating his
three younger children as additional beneficiaries. On January 13, 2005, Edgardo passed away. Shortly
thereafter, Edna filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. It
appeared, however, from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form E-4 with a
different set of beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote
(Elmer),as dependent. Consequently, Edna’s claim was denied. Her children were adjudged as
beneficiaries and she was considered as the legal guardian of her minor children. Edna filed a petition
with the SSC to claim the death benefits, lump sum and monthly pension of Edgardo. She insisted that
she was the legitimate wife of Edgardo. In its answer, the SSS averred that there was a conflicting
information in the forms submitted by the deceased. Summons was published in a newspaper of general
circulation directing Rosemarie to file her answer. Despite the publication, no answer was filed and
Rosemarie was subsequently declared in default. SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for lack of merit. The SSC
further wrote that the National Statistics Office (NSO) records revealed that the marriage of Edgardo to
one Rosemarie Teodora Sino was registered on July 28, 1982. Consequently, it opined that Edgardo’s
marriage to Edna was not valid as there was no showing that his first marriage had been annulled or
dissolved.

ISSUE: W/N Edna should be adjudged as the widow of the deceased, thus, entitled to the benefits

RULING: No. The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA 8282. Applying Section 8(e) and (k)
of R.A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the
beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. In this case, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an
earlier marriage with another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract. Edgardo even
acknowledged his married status when he filled out the 1982 Form E-4 designating Rosemarie as his
spouse.
It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at the time when the
Family Code was already in force. For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without doubt, failed to establish
that there was no impediment or that the impediment was already removed at the time of the
celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Settled is the rule that "whoever claims entitlement to the
benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence." Edna could
not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or
whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo.
What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not able to
show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be
the beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo.

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Lasanas vs People GR 15903 (2014)

FACTS: On February 16, 1968, Judge Salazar of the MTC Iloilo solemnized the marriage of accused Noel
Lasanas and Socorro Patingo without the benefit of a marriage license. The records show that Lasanas
and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license. On
August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr.
Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo City. They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of
cohabitation for that purpose.7 Both ceremonies were evidenced by the corresponding marriage
certificates. In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences. On
December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a religious ceremony. Their
marriage certificate reflected the civil status of the accused as single. On July 26, 1996, the accused filed
a complaint for annulment of marriage and damages against Socorro. The complaint alleged that
Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in securing his consent to their marriage.

ISSUE: W/N Lasans committed bigamy

RULING: YES. This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas and private
complainant Patingo was void because of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of
cohabitation. The ratificatory religious wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage.
Neither can the church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the essential and
formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage
license except in those instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no
marriage license nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious
rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.

But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial declaration of
the nullity of his void marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually,
he did just that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.

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Republic vs Cantor

FACTS: The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband
and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January
1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach "sexual
climax" whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity
toward the respondent’s father.

After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever
saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his
whereabouts.

On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent
filed before the RTC a petition4for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death, docketed as SP
Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She
alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as
her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a
point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the
respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.

ISSUE: W/N the petition for the declaration of presumptive death should be granted

RULING: NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded
belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4)
essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it
superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that the absentee is already
dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest efforts"
to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:

(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends; and

(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients’ directory,
hoping to find Jerry.

These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence for the following reasons:

First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be inferred from the records
that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients’ directory therein were
unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits
were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these attempts
insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.

Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to
look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which the
present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse,
whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report his/her
absence to the police.

Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can
corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries,
were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present spouse’s bare assertion that he inquired from his
friends about his absent spouse’s whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends from whom he
made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.

Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that she conducted
a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief
other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husband’s
whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search"
where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to
conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that
her husband was already dead.

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IWASAWA VS GANGAN GR 204169

FACTS: Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his visits to
the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as “single” and “has never married before.” Since
then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the Philippines and
married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple resided
in Japan. In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something might
have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it. To his shock, private respondent
confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband passed away. Petitioner sought to
confirm the truth of his wife’s confession and discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond
Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to
file a petition for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground
that their marriage is a bigamous one.
ISSUE: W/N the marriage of petitioner and respondent is bigamous

RULING: YES. This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is
void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is
what transpired in the instant case. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits
taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the
ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: ( 1) that private
respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent
contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that
there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the
time she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date
that private respondent's marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and ( 4) that the
second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the first
marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.

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Republic vs Tampus GR 214243

FACTS: Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975. Three
days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the AFP, left respondent, and went to
Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no children. Since then, Nilda heard no news from
Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts proved futile. On April 14, 2009, she filed
before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging
that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of communication from him, she firmly
believes that he is already dead.
ISSUE: W/N Dante should be declared presumptively dead

RULING: NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded
belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that
the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a
well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already
dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence of the
spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still
alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.

In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries
with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not
know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to
find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information
about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself
in finding him. Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat
mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on the
status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's
mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts
to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree
of diligence required to create a "well-founded belief of his death.

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Capili vs People GR 183805

FACTS: On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case
for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-
Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the
charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.

RULING: NO. It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and
Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself
declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and

private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

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Wednesday, September 24, 2014

Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were accused of murder. Efren was
acquitted but Melecia and another person was found guilty and was sentenced to the penalty of death
and to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally for civil indemnity and damages.

Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ,
resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a
notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued.

Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.

ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for
the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.

HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.

The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be enforced against the
partnership assets if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the
above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced
against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have
been covered.

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People v. Lagrimas, G.R. No. L-25355, August 28, 1969

FACTS: Froilan Lagrimas was charged for the murder of Pelagio Cagro. Thereafter, the heirs of Cagro
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on the property of the accused, which
was granted. Lagrimas was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the appellants. The judgment became final. The lower court issued a writ of execution to
cover the civil indemnity. A levy was had on 11 parcels of land declared for tax purposes in the name of
the accused and the sale thereof at public auction was scheduled. However, the wife of the accused,
Mercedes Lagrimas, filed a petition to quash the said attachment contending that the property belonged
to the conjugal partnership and could not be held liable for pecuniary indemnity the husband was
required to pay. Her petition was granted. Another judge set aside the said order. But upon Mercedes’
filing a motion for reconsideration, a third judge revived the original order, declaring such attachment
and the writ of execution thereafter issued null and void.

ISSUE: WON properties from the conjugal properties of Mercedes and Froilan can be held liable for the
pecuniary indemnity incurred by the latter.

HELD: Yes. Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife “may be enforced against the
partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in article 161 have been covered, if the spouse
who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; xxx.”
It is quite plain, therefore, that the period during which such a liability may be enforced presupposes
that the conjugal partnership is still existing for the law speaks of “partnership assets.” That upon
complying with the responsibilities enumerated in article 161, the fines and indemnities imposed upon a
party of the conjugal partnership will be satisfied.

If the appealed order were to be upheld, Froilan would be in effect exempt therefrom and the heirs of
the offended party being made to suffer still further; that for a transgression of the law by either
husband or wife, the rest of the family may be made to bear burdens of an extremely onerous character.

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Ayala Investment v. CA, G.R. No. 118305, February 12, 1988

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching made himself jointly answerable to the
debt as added security. Upon PBM’s failure to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against
PBM and respondent Ching in the CFI of Pasig.

After trial, the court rendered decision in favor of AIDC ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching to jointly and
severally pay AIDC the principal amount of the loan with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment,
RTC issued a writ of execution and thereafter, the deputy sheriff caused the issuance and service upon
respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties.

Respondent spouses then filed an injunction contending that subject loan did not redound to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. Nevertheless, a certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder
for the property.
ISSUE: WON the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered “for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.”

HELD: No. Petition is DENIED.

RATIO: The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the benefit of PBM and not for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership of Ching.

PBM has a personality which is distinct from that of Ching’s family despite their being stockholders of
the said company. The debt incurred by Ching is a corporate debt and the right of recourse to
respondent as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stocks.

If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or
guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of
“obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”

The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or
his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Proof must be presented
to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.

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G-Tractors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-57402, February 28, 1985

FACTS: Luis R. Narciso, legally married to Josefina Narciso, is a businessman engaged in business as a
producer and exporter of Philippine mahogany logs and operates a logging concession at del Gallego,
Camarines Sur. G-Tractors, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged primarily in the business of leasing
heavy equipments such as tractors, bulldozers, and the like.

Luis entered into a Contract of Hire of Heavy Equipment with G-Tractors under the terms of which the
latter leased to the former tractors for the purpose of constructing switchroads and hauling felled trees
at the jobsite of Narciso's logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur. The contract provided for
payment of rental for the use of said tractors. Luis Narciso failed to pay; G-Tractors instituted an action
urging Luis to pay a certain amount (P155,410.25), representing the unpaid rentals. G-Tractors accepted
his offer for a compromise agreement, stating the mode of payment (installment plan); Luis failed to
comply; G-Tractors filed a motion for execution; Luis asked for suspension of the motion stating that he
still has a pending loan with a banking institution; request for suspension denied. Levy was accordingly
made by the City Sheriff of QC on certain personal properties of the spouses at their residence in
Quezon City. Auction sale was held, and G-Tractors was awarded with the sale of such. Luis then offered
to redeem such properties for the same amount; accepted; a Deed of Reconveyance was executed by G-
Tractors.

On February 12, 1975, the Sheriff of Quezon City made a levy on "all rights, interest, title, participation
which the defendant Luis R. Narciso" may have over a parcel of residential land of the Registry of Deeds
of QC which parcel of land is allegedly the conjugal property of the spouses Luis and Josefina. Sheriff
sold at public auction to the highest bidder for cash. Certificate of Sale was then issued to G-Tractors as
the highest bidder for P180,000.

On March 31, 1976, Josefina and Luis filed a complaint in CFI of Quezon City for "declaration of nullity of
levy on execution and auction sale of plaintiff's conjugal property with damages and injunction",
claiming that the conjugal property of the plaintiffs-spouses could not be made liable considering that
the subject matter was never used for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or of the family

ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal property of the spouses can be held answerable for the debt of the
husband
HELD: YES, the conjugal property of the spouses can be held answerable for the debt of the husband.
CA’s decision reversed and set aside

RATIO:

Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) All the debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership,
and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind
the partnership

His account with petitioner G-Tractors, Inc. represents rentals for the use of petitioner's tractors which
he leased for the purpose of constructing switchroads and hauling felled trees at the jobsite of the
logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur which is not his exclusive property but that of his
family. There is no doubt then that his account with the petitioner was brought about in order to
enhance the productivity of said logging business, a commercial enterprise for gain which he had the
right to embark the conjugal partnership.

It is very clear, therefore, that the obligations were contracted in connection with his legitimate business
as a producer and exporter in mahogany logs and certainly benefited the conjugal partnership.

The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and as long as he believes he is doing right
to his family, he should not be made to suffer and answer alone. So that, if he incurs an indebtedness in
the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal
partnership must equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he deliberately acted to the
prejudice of his family.

The sale at public auction belonging to the conjugal partnership of gains of the Narcisos in order to
satisfy the judgment debt of the private respondent Luis R. Narciso was validly and legally made in
accordance with law.

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Ando v. Campo, G.R. No. 184007, February 16, 2011

FACTS: Paquito Ando (petitioner) was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc.
(PACSI), an independent labor contractor. Andresito Campo and the other respondents were hired by
PACSI as pilers or haulers. Respondents were dismissed from employment. Consequently filing a case for
illegal dismissal and some money claims with the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled in respondents’ favor.
PACSI and Ando were directed to pay a total of P422,702.28 (for separation pay and award of attorney’s
fees). PACSI and Ando appealed to NLRC, which affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Respondents
moved for its execution. To answer for the reward, the NLRC acting sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on
Execution of Personal Property over a property in the name of “Paquito V. Ando xxx married to Erlinda S.
Ando.” Prompting Ando to file an action for prohibition before the RTC. Ando claims that the property
belonged to him and his wife and not the corporation, and hence, could not be the subject of the
execution sale. RTC denied the prayer for TRO and directed him to file a claim with the NLRC Sheriff.
Instead, Ando filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. Ando argued that the property to be levied
belonged to him – and his wife – in their personal capacity and thus the execution should not prosper. It
was likewise denied.

ISSUE: WON the property owned by Ando and his wife could be levied for reason of a debt incurred by
him, in his representative capacity and his company, PACSI.

HELD: No. The power of the NLRC to execute its judgment extends only to properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor alone. Thus, a sheriff has no authority to attach the property of any
person except that of the judgment debtor. The property in question belongs not only to Ando, but his
wife as well. She stands to lose the property subject to execution without ever being a party to the case
– which is tantamount to deprivation of property without due process.

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Ching v. CA, 423 SCRA 356, February 23, 2004

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a continuing guaranty with
the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans so ABC
filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI. Trial court issued a writ of preliminary
attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to attach all the properties of said Alfredo
Ching to answer for the payment of the loans. Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a
Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment allegeing inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied
on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds.
Petitioner spouses aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not
the controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks under Art. !21 and
that such presumption subsists even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses,
in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. According to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not
contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husband’s profession or business.44

ISSUE: WON 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the loans guaranteed
by petitioner Alfredo Ching

HELD: No.

RATIO: The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with
the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-husband was in the exercise
of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business.

The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The
private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his
exclusive money.

The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the said account of
PBMCI.
Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations contracted
by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for
the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.

For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there
must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses.

In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was
benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement
with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private
respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the
fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of
surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to
establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.

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Ayala V. CA, 289 SCRA 272

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC). As added
security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM,
executed security agreements on December 10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making himself jointly and
severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thereafter, AIDC
filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the CFI. The CFI
rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay
AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests. Pending appeal to the judgment, a writ of
execution granting upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three (3) of their conjugal
properties. Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied. Private
respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the
judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did
not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. The case was lifted to the Court of Appeals
by the petitioner but rendered judgment in favour of the respondent granting the auction sale. Hence,
the appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of
his employer are considered "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership" which are chargeable against
the conjugal partnership

HELD: NO

Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts contracted
by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family. Here, the property in
dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a
surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the
benefit of the family.

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Tarrosa v. De Leon, G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009

FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a lot
situated in Quezon City. On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had two children,
Danilo and Vilma. On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio upon full
payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, “single.”
On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of
Sale did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.

Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a
reconveyance suit allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner of the lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that
the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property because he was still single when he acquired it
from PHHC. They further alleged that they were not aware of the marriage between Bonifacio and Anita
at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.

The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the lot in question was the conjugal property of
Bonifacio and Anita. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the marriage although
some installments were paid during the marriage would be considered conjugal property

HELD: Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the Conditional Contract to
Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the property was only
passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment was
made more than 2 years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In effect, the property was
acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence, ownership to the property is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership.

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Jovellanos v. CA, G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992

Facts: Daniel Jovellanos contracted with Philamlife a lease and conditional sale agreement of a property.
When the agreement took place, Daniel was still married to his first wife, Leonor, with whom he had
three children. Leonor died on January 2, 1959. On May 30, 1967, Daniel was remarried to Annette
(respondent). On December 18, 1971, Mercy (daughter from first marriage) and her husband, built an
extension at the back of the said property. On January 8, 1975, the lease was paid and Philamlife
executed a deed of absolute sale to Daniel. The following day, he then donated the said property to his
children in the first marriage (petitioners). On September 8, 1985, Daniel died.

Annette now claims that the said property is the conjugal property belonging to the second marriage
due to the fact that the deed of absolute sale was dated during the celebration of their marriage (Jan. 8,
1975).

Issue: To which marriage does the property belong to as conjugal property?

Held: The Court held that the said property belongs to the second marriage, but also proclaims that
reimbursements should be made to the children of the first marriage (in line with ART 118 of the FC).

The contract entered into by Daniel and Philamlife is specifically denominated as a "Lease and
Conditional Sale Agreement" with a lease period of twenty years. During the twenty-year period, Daniel
had only the right of possession over the property. The lessor transfers merely the temporary use and
enjoyment of the thing leased. Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, however, the
ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made.

Only at the time when the payments are made in full will the deed of absolute sale be given, entitling
the buyer (Daniel) as the true owner, rather than just having inchoate rights to the property. The time
when he was able to pay the remaining balance, he was already married to his second wife, Annette,
which makes the said property as their conjugal property.

ART 118: “any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed”
Depriving the children from the first will be unfair due to the fact that the lease was contracted during
the first marriage, wherein a portion of the payment came from.

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Aguete v. PNB, G.R. No. 170166 April 6, 2011

FACTS: Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate
Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch before the CFI of Ilocos
Norte.

The information disclosed that Jose Ros (petitioner) obtained a loan of P115,000 from ONB and
executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land as security thereof. Upon maturity, the loan
remained unpaid and as a result, PNB initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the said
property. After which, the lot was sold to PNB as the highest bidder. Petitioner claims that she had no
knowledge of the loan incurred by her husband nor did she consent to the mortgage instituted on their
conjugal property. She then filed a complaint to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale
and consolidation of the property (after the lapse of 1 year). The trial court rendered its decision in favor
of petitioners but was later reversed by the appellate court upon appeal.

ISSUE: WON the property is considered as redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

HELD: Yes. Petition denied.

The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or
implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable.17 Article 173 of the Civil
Code allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article
does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be
declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.

It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very
nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services
to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business
or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on
behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Ros’ loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable
to the conjugal partnership.

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Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154

FACTS: Ponciano and Julia were married in 1915. The properties in question consisting of Lots 5 and 6,
were bought on installment basis. Thus, the spouses jointly obtained a loan to pay their balance. The
corresponding deed of absolute sale was executed where the vendee named is 'Julia de Reyes'. Her
signatures appear over the caption vendee and those of Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my marital
consent. As a result of these sales, TCTs were issued in the name of "JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO
REYES."

While Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots in question
Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as vendees, without the knowledge and consent of
Ponciano. At the same time the spouses were living separately and were not in speaking terms.
Ponciano filed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale of two parcels of land contending that
said properties were conjugal properties of himself and his wife and that she had sold them to
petitioners "all by herself" and without his knowledge or consent.

Petitioner Mendozas alleged that the properties were paraphernal properties of Julia and that they had
purchased the same in good faith and for adequate consideration. Julia testified that she bought the
two parcels of land on installment basis and that the first payment came from her personal funds. The
CFI declared the properties exclusive and paraphernal properties of Julia and ruled that she could validly
dispose of the same without the consent of her husband.

ISSUE: WON the disputed properties are conjugal properties.

HELD: Yes. The deed of sale is declared null and void with respect to one- half share of Ponciano.

Article 153 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:

That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

It is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage in order that the same may
be deemed conjugal property. There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous
title during the marriage.

Records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses. Under Article 161 of the Civil
Code, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership are liabilities of the partnership.

Julia’s claim of exclusive ownership is belied by the Income Tax Returns which she herself prepared and
filed in behalf of the conjugal partnership wherein she made the statement that the rentals paid to her
were income of the conjugal partnership, and she made to appear the properties in question as capital
assets of the conjugal partnership.
Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact that the land is later
registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. If the fact that
property acquired during marriage was registered in the name of the husband alone does not affect its
conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name of the wife.

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Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286 April 14, 2004

FACTS: On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court against her husband
Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas’ son with Pacita, Procopio Villanueva. Eusebia sought the
reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties (subject properties), claiming that such are
her conjugal properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas, having been
married on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children. Spouses Retuya
resided at Mandaue City. During their marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements
situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of land situated in
Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the
purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City. Some of the
properties earn income from coconuts leased to corporations

In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita
Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person
who received the income of the properties. Pacita, from the time she started living in concubinage with
Nicolas, has no occupation. She had no properties of her own from which she could derive income. From
the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his illegitimate son is already the one who has been
receiving the income of his properties
Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial court in favor of Eusebia Natuya. Petitioners
appealed. Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her heirs. CA upheld trial court’s decision

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between Eusebia and
Procopio are conjugal

HELD: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA affirmed

RATIO: The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between
Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code.

Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal
partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired
under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during
the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming
that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties must first be
proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal.

Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936.
Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners
themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No.
152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.

Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties
of Nicolas and Eusebia.

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Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012

FACTS: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977. They had no
separate properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they produced four
children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with another
woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties
pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal age), the three minor children remains in the
custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to the respective
legitimes of their children; however, Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the FC.

A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial court. By
2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.

After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define “Nets
Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of
the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.”

Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that NET PROFIT
EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However, it later reverted
to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couple’s property
relations.
HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of exchange of martial
vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the
property relations between them is the system of relative community or the conjugal partnership of
gains. Under this property relation, “the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their work and industry. The husband and wife also own in
common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.