Linguistic Provinces to Homelands: Shifting Paradigms of State Making in North

East India

Sajal Nag
Professor, Department of History
Assam University, Silchar

The Post colonial Indian Polity had been a site of acrimonious contestations. While the
romantic nationalists imagined it as one ‘India,’ subnationlists wanted a piece of this
territory as their exclusive hegemony. This contest between idealistic nationalists and
aggressive sub-nationalists threatened to tear apart the polity – a situation seen by an
American political Scientist as ‘the dangerous decades.’ The reorganization of the Indian
provinces was a committed nationalist agenda. Hence the autonomy groups were
impatient to see its implementation. A slight postponement by the centre resulted in
upheaval as was evident in the Andhra state movement led by Pottu Sitaramalu. The State
Reorganization Commission was formed with the objective of delineating potential areas
which could be converted into autonomous federal units. The principle of state
reorganization was already laid down in the Motile Nehru Committee. It was the
principle of linguistic provinces. Following its recommendation a series of new states
were created. As far as north east was concerned the SRC categorically rejected any idea
of a small state which was economically unviable. This was despite the fact that a number
of tribal communities submitted representations for a separate state for themselves to be
carved out of then Assam. By this time Nehru’s adherence to the idea of linguistic
provinces was also shaken mainly by the violent turmoil that India witnessed over the
state demands following independence. He felt small states create small minds and big
states create big minds. He had experienced the parochialism that regionalist forced gave
to and wanted to halt its rise by creating a cosmopolitan mind and multicultural society in
the form of big states containing a number of linguistic communities in one political unit.
So, small states were ruled out. But despite it, a new State of Nagaland was created in
1961 without any recommendations from the SRC or even any strong movement for it.
That too, under the jurisdiction of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was followed by the
creation of a number of such small states during the regime of Indira Gandhi. It became
obvious that the SRC and its recommendation had become irrelevant for north east India.
The moves spiraled into the a number of demands which including demands for Karbi
Anglong State, Dimaraji (North Cachar State), Ahom state, Bodo State, Garo State, Kuki
State, Hmar State, merger of Naga areas in Manipur with the Naga areas of Nagaland,
and so on. The SRC was rendered irrelevant because states were now not seen as a
linguistic area in north east because almost every village in some parts is a different
linguistic area. People saw states as ‘homelands.’ Demands for states were thus not just
an autonomous area but homeland and domain of hegemony. The principle of state
reorganization in north east India has therefore experienced a shifting paradigm which
has the potential of posing much serious concerns for the Indian state.

1
Romanticism to Practicalities: Shift from Linguistic Principle
The SRC report then delineated the rationale of reorganization. It agreed that the demand
for the reorganization of states is often equated with the demand for the formation
linguistic provinces. This is because the movement for redistribution of British Indian
provinces was in a large measure a direct outcome of the phenomenal development
amongst them of a consciousness of being distinct cultural units. When progressive
public opinion in India therefore crystallized in favour of rationalization of administrative
units the objective was conceived and sought in terms of linguistically homogenous units.
The Linguistic principle as an ostensible factor in territorial changes figured for the first
time in a letter from Sir Herbert Risley, Home Secretary, Government of India to the
government of Bengal dated 3rd December 1903 in which the proposal for partition was
first mooted. Later in the partition resolution of 1905 and in the dispatch of Lord
Hardinge government to the secretary of state dated 25th August 1911 proposing the
annulment of partition, language was again prominently mentioned. The linguistic
principle was however pressed into service on these occasions only as a measure of
administrative convenience and to the extent it fitted into a general pattern which was
determined by political exigencies. In actual effect the partition of Bengal involved a
flagrant violation of linguistic affinities. The settlement of 1912 also showed little respect
for the linguistic principles in that it drew a clear line of distinction between the Bengali
Muslims and Bengali Hindus. The authors of the Montagu Chemsford report of 1918
examined the suggestion for the formation within the existing provinces, of sub provinces
on a linguistic and racial basis with a view mainly to providing suitable units for
experiment in responsible government. Although they rejected the idea as impracticable,
they commended the objective of smaller and more homogeneous states. “We cannot
doubt that he business of government would be simplified if administrative units were
both smaller and more homogeneous and when we bear in mind the prospect of the
immense burdens of government in India being transferred to comparatively
inexperienced hands such considerations acquire additional weight. It is also a strong
argument in favour of linguistic or racial units of government that by making it possible
to conduct the business of legislation in the vernacular, they would contribute to draw
into the arena of public affairs men who were not acquainted with English.” Twelve years
later on the question of factors which should govern redistribution of provinces the Indian
Statutory Commission stated, “if those who speak the same language from a compact and
self contained area, so situated and endowed as to be able to support its existence as a
separate province there is no doubt that the use of common speech is a strong and natural
basis for provincial autonomy. But it is not the only test- race, religion, economic interest,
geographical contiguity, a due balance between country and town and between coast line
and interior may all be relevant factors. Most important of all perhaps, for practical
purposes, is the largest possible measure of general agreement on the changes proposed,
both on the side of the area that is gaining and on the side of the area that is losing
territory.”1
The commission then recounted the adherence to the principle of linguistic provinces by
the Nehru Committee of the All Parties Conference; 1928.Between 1928 and 1947 the
Indian National Congress reaffirmed its adherence to linguistic principles on three
occasions. One at the Calcutta session held in October1937, at a resolution passed at

2
Wardha in 1938 and the on election manifesto of 1945-46, on each occasion specifically
speaking about Andhra, Karnataka and Kerala for reorganization.

The change was visible only after independence. Speaking before the constituent
Assembly the Prime Minister while conceding the linguistic principle remarked, ‘first
things must come first and the first thing is the security and stability of India.’ This was
followed by the appointment, on the recommendation of the Drafting Committed of the
Constituent Assembly, of a linguistic provinces commission known as Dar commission
for the purpose of enquiring into and reporting on the desirability or otherwise of the
creation of any of the proposed provinces of Andhra, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra
and fixing their boundaries and assessing the financial, economic and administrative and
other consequences in those provinces and adjoining territories of India. It appeared from
the terms of reference of this commission that reconstitution of provinces solely on a
linguistic basis was no longer taken for granted. The Dar Commission in his report to the
Constituent Assembly in 1948 was not only against any reorganization of provinces under
the circumstance that existed then but also that relying exclusively on linguistic principle
for state creation was inadvisable. It wanted geographical contiguity, absence of pockets
and corridors, financial self-sufficiency, administrative convenience, capacity for future
development and large measure of agreement within its borders and amongst the people
speaking the same language in its formation and non-imposition of the majority language
on the minority of the area.
The Dar commission report found echo in Congress’ own backyard. The JVP committee
constituted by the Indian National Congress in its Jaipur session in 1948 to examine the
Dar commission report and the new circumstance that arose after independence, sounded
a note of warning against the principle of linguistic principle saying 1) when Congress
had approved of the principle its had not envisaged the practical problems and
implications of such reorganization. 2) the primary consideration must be the security,
unity and economic prosperity of India while discouraging separatist and tendencies in
the polity. 3) Linguistic provinces could only be applied after careful consideration of
each individual case without creating administrative dislocation or internal conflicts.
The JVP committee was adopted by the congress working committee in 1949 and formed
part of its manifesto in 1951. The manifesto declared that the reorganization of states
would depend on the wishes of the people. The linguistic principle would apply but
economic, administrative and financial consideration would also be taken into account.
Hence when Andhra Pradesh state was created it was because the Andhra Provincial
congress, the Tamilnad congress and the Madras government had agreed to it but
withheld support to the proposal of Karnataka state for want of agreement of the majority
of the people of Mysore state. Before the Andhra State was created Justice Wancho was
appointed to enquire into the financial and other implications of the decision. On August
10, 1953 the Andhra state formation bill was presented in the Lok Sabha and passed. It
was against this background that State Reorganization commission was formed when the
romantic idea of linguistic principle of state formation slowly gave way to composite
state systems under emerging situation which saw violent uprising over the question of
province formation and big-nationality-small nationality conflicts. Nehru was forced to
say small states makes small minds and was all for multi-lingual, multi cultural
formations. But evolving nationalities would not hear any of it.

3
The Making of the State Reorganization Commission Report

On 22nd December 1953, the Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru made a statement
in Parliament to the effect that a Commission would be appointed to examine ‘objectively
and dispassionately’ the question of reorganization of the States of Indian Union so that
the welfare of the people of each constituent unit as well as the nation as a whole was
promoted. This was followed by the appointment of the Commission under the resolution
of the government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs No. 53/69/53-Public dated
29th December 1953. The task before the commission was set out in the paragraph 7 of
this resolution in the following words:
“The commission will investigate the conditions of the problem, the historical
background, the existing situation and the bearing of all important and relevant factors
thereon. They will be free to consider any proposal relating to such reorganization. The
government expect that the commission would in the first instance not go into the details
but make recommendations in regard to broad principles which should govern the
solution of this problem and if they so choose the broad lines on which particular states
should be reorganized and submit interim reports for the consideration of the
government.”2 Under this Resolution the commission was required to make
recommendations to the Government of India not later than 30 th June 1955 which was
subsequently extended to 30th September 1955. According to their terms of reference the
commission was at liberty to devise their own procedure for collecting information and
for ascertaining public opinion. After giving careful thought to the procedure to be
followed, the commission issued a Press Note on 23rd February 1954 inviting written
memoranda from members of the public as well as public associations interested in the
problems of reorganization of states:
“The States Reorganizations commission after giving due consideration to the procedure
that would be most suitable for the expeditious execution of the task entrusted to them
have decided to dispense with a questionnaire. They invite members of the public as well
as public associations interested in the problem of the reorganization of States to put their
views and suggestions before the commission by submitting written memoranda on
matters on which they feel they can assist them. The commission expects that wherever
any concrete suggestions are made they will be supported by historical and statistical data
and if any proposal regarding the formation of any new state or states is made, it will if
possible be accompanied by one or more maps, as the case may be.”3
In response to the press note by the end of the time a total number documents that
reached the commission was a staggering 1, 52,250. The bulk of these communications
comprised of simple telegrams, printed resolutions etc. denoting the wishes of particular
localities to be included within one or the other unit. The number of well considered
memoranda was about 2000. Side by side there were 9000 interviews of people of a cross
section of people which continued till July 1955 covering 104 place of the country
covering about 38000 miles. Linguistic reorganizations had to do a lot on mother tongue
figures of the Census. The census of 1951 was completed according to what were known

4
as ‘Census Tracts.’ Therefore it was difficult to estimate the mother tongue figures on a
taluk or tehsil basis.
The SRC report began with a study of the existing structure of the states of Indian union
which it concluded was a ‘result of accident and the circumstances attending the growth
of the British power in India and partly a by-product of historic process of the integration
of former Indian states. ‘It agreed the British were guided by a two-fold purpose in the
organization of provinces in India. One, to uphold the direct authority of the supreme
power in areas of vital economic and strategic importance and two, to fill the political
vacuum arising from the destruction of collapse of former principalities. Of these two the
first was the primary objective which obviously required suppression of traditional
regional and dynastic loyalties. This was sought to be achieved by erasing old frontiers
and by crating new provinces ignoring natural affinities and common economic interests.
The administration organization of these provinces was intended to secure their
subordination to the central government which inevitably led to the formation of units
with no natural affinity. With the emergence of nationalism in the nineteenth century
another factor emerged in the consideration of reorganization. The policy of balance and
counterpoise began to override purely administrative considerations in making
administrative changes. Thus Bengal which included Bihar and Orissa then was divided
with a view to disperse revolutionary elements as to securing more manageable
administrative units.
The integration of Indian states saw a revolutionary change in them. Firstly, 216 states
having a population of little over 19 million were merged in the provinces. Secondly, 61
states having a population of about 7 million were constituted into new centrally
administered units and thirdly, 275 states with a population of about 35 million were
integrated to create new administrative units namely Rajasthan, Madhya Bharat,
Travancore-Cochin, Saurashtra and PEPSU.4 Only three states namely Hyderabad,
Mysore and Jammu and Kashmir survived these processes of integration but the internal
structure of these states as also their relationship with the Centre were case into a new
mould so as to fit them into the constitutional structure of India. “While factors such as
linguistic and ethnic homogeneity or historical tradition were taken into consideration to
the extent practicable in the process of integrating these diverse units with adjoining
provinces or constituting them into separate administrative units, the compulsion of the
dynamic urges of time necessitated prompt decisions. A number of settlements therefore
made in respect of these states had to be in the nature of transitional expedients.” 5 Hence
they too needed to be considered for reorganization.
A peculiar feature of the Indian constitution is the disparate status of the constituent units
of the Union. The constitution recognizes three categories of states and gives each
category a pattern and status of its own. The status of the first of two categories of staes
i.e those specified in Parts A and B of schedule I of the constitution was based on the
concept of federalism. Apart from the institution of Rajpramukh the main feature that
distinguishes Part B states from Part A states was the provision contained in Article 371
which vested in the central executive supervisory authority over the governments of these
states for a specified period. This provision no doubt un-federal in character, does not
however alter the basic relationship between states and the Centre which essentially rests
on the principle of a clear division of powers between the centre and the states. Part C
states which ranked lowest in the hierarchy were administered by the Centre on a unitary

5
basis. The devolution of powers to the legislature and governments of some of these
states under the government of Part C States Act 1951 did not detract from the legislative
authority of Parliament over these states or from the responsibility of the Union
government to Parliament for their administration.
Apart from the states of the Union, there were also territories specified in Part D of
Schedule I which form part of India. In respect of such territories as also of any territory
comprised within the territory of India but not specified in this Schedule, the Central
government had not only full authority but also regulation-making power.6
In the colonial period, even before the Act of 1935 was introduced, the federal principle
in governance of the country the relative status of administrative units’ vis-à-vis the
central government had varies one category to another. By the close of the nineteenth
century there were in existence three different forms of provincial governments, namely
those under a governor and executive council, those administered by a Lieutenant
governor and those administered by a chief commissioner. Many of the British Indian
provinces such as Assam Bihar and Orissa, the Central Provinces, the North West
Frontier Province, the Punjab and the United Provinces passed through one or both the
earlier stages before acquiring the governor and Council form of government. A
distinction was also made between ‘major provinces’ and ‘minor administrations.’ In the
first category were included the Governor’s provinces, Lt.Governor’s provinces and the
two larges chief commissionerships i.e. Assam and Central Provinces whose chief
commissioners were in practice entrusted with powers nearly as wide as those of
Lt.Govenors. all the other chief commissionerships were called minor administrations
and were administered under the direct control of the Central Government acting except
in the case of Ajmer-Merwara, British Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province
mainly through the Home Department. The Government of India Act 1935 recognized in
the circumstances in which it was formulated three categories of component units,
namely Governor’s Provinces, federating Indian states and Chief Commissioner’s
Provinces. The classification is reflected in the grouping of states of the Indian Union as
Part A, B and C states except that not all former Indian states are now represented by Part
B states a number of them having been merged in the provinces or consolidated into
centrally administered areas. A departure however from the old classification was the
recognition under the Constitution of two categories of centrally administered areas
namely Part C and Part D territories as against only one such category recognized under
the Act 1935. At them time of the commencement of the Constitution there were nine Part
A states, eight Part B states and ten Part C states. Since then Parliament had by law
established a new part A states namely Andhra Pradesh and merged one Part C states
namely Bilaspur with another such state Himachal Pradesh. Another feature of the states
of Indian union was that none of them represented a pre-existing sovereign unit. It was
only in the case of former Indian states that the right of accession on a negotiated basis
was conceded. Rulers of these states no doubt claimed a measure of sovereignty, but this
sovereignty was severely overborne by the paramountcy of the British Crown not only in
the field of external affairs but also respect of internal administration. Whatever content
of sovereignty of the rulers it was surrendered by them to the national government of
India before the commencement of the constitution.

6
The SRC Report as the sacred text

The SRC report felt that though the provinces of India were reorganized many a time
from colonial period, the time for redrawing the political map comprehensively and
without delay had arrived. However it had considered the cost of change and the
paramount question of Unity and Security of India in making the recommendations,
arguments both for and against linguistic states importance of language for administrative
and other purposes and constitutional relationship between the Centre and the States of
Indian Union and came to the conclusion that ‘it is neither possible nor desirable to
reorganize states on the basis of the single test of either language or culture but that a
balanced approach to the whole problem is necessary in the interests of the nation.’ This
was because Indian Nationalism was ‘still to develop into a positive concept’ whereas
culture based regionalism centering round the idea of linguistic homogeneity represents
to the average Indian, values easily intelligible to him’’ ‘The Indian nationalism must
acquire a deeper content before it becomes ideologically adequate to withstand the
gravitational pull of traditional narrower loyalties.’7 In other word the SRC had noted the
rise of regionalism in its vicious form and its devastative impact on nation-building.
‘Undue emphasis on linguistic principle is likely to impede the rapid development of new
areas…’8 “It felt the multilingual units will prevent the utilization of the machinery of the
state for furthering programmes of linguistic exclusiveness and in favourable conditions
may lead to tolerance and adjustment especially if the importance which is now attached
to economic development diverts attention from the less important questions and barren
controversies regarding languages and culture…a composite state which makes adequate
provision for the protection of culture and the encouragement of local languages would
help to prevent the growth of anti-national trends.”9
In its final proposal for reorganization it conceded that the states of the Indian Union
were very unequal in size, population and resources and were even unequal before the
law. It did see that the public opinion both within and without the part B and Part C states
has bee severely critical of the present anomalous arrangement which often violated the
principle of equal rights and opportunities for the people of India. If the states of the
union were to be treated on equal footing and if the status of Part A states was the
standard, then part B and Part C states must disappear. Similarly if the states of the union
were to enjoy a uniform status if was necessary that each state should be inherently
capable of survival as a viable administrative unit.
As far as north east was concerned the main discussion was around Assam. It stated that
from a historical point of view Assam and north east India had been naturally a meeting
place of many tribes and races. Right through its history there has been immigration into
and settlement in the state from various sources with the result that till comparatively
very recent times, that is to say up to 1931 when linguistic tabulations was last
undertaken, Assamese was not in fact a language spoken by a majority of the inhabitants
of the state. Assam also owed a great deal to capital and enterprise from outside the state
and its tea, coal and oil industries have been built mainly as the result of such enterprise.
The proposals presented to the Commission from Assam were as follows. The Assam
Pradesh Congress committee, the local Communist Party and the Tripura State Congress
Committee and the Government of Assam were broadly in favour of the status quo.
Assam however would welcome the merger, if possible, of Cooch Bihar, Manipur and

7
Tripura and closer connection with the administration of North East Frontier Agency
which was then constitutionally a part of Assam.
The hill districts of Assam had demanded the formation of a hill state. The demand was
reiterated at the Tura Conference of the tribal leaders in October 1954 contemplates the
unification of all the hill districts mentioned in Part A of the table appended to the Sixth
Schedule to the Constitution including the Naga Hills district. The Naga National Council
seeks independence from Assam and India and to remain aloof from the proposed hill
state. As a compromise between these extreme positions but for entirely different reasons
the formation of a Kamatapur state comprising of Goalpara, Garo hills, Cooch Bihar,
Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri or of a Purbanchal Pradesh state consisting of the area round
Cachar was also suggested. Related to this was also a claim from the West Bengal
Government of the transfer of Goalpara district of Assam to it.

The SRC first dealt with the demand of the creation of hill state out of Assam. The
Commission noted that during Bordoloi committee such demands, except for the
independence of Naga Hills were not made. Hence the demand for a hill state was of
recent origin. “There is no denying the fact that the demand for a hill state partly reflects
the separatist pull of the extremist party. Other factors which have lent support to the
demand were:
1. suspicion and distrust of the people of the plains by the tribal people of this area
2. The diversity of races and culture and the different levels of social, educational
and political development in the different areas of this region which have
prevented the tribal people from coming up to the level of the plains.
3. lack of communications in these areas which has made it difficult for the various
tribes to come in close contact with the rest of India
4. economic backwardness of the region.

In addition, the commission also recognized it as a ‘problem’ inherited from the colonial
days. The British kept the tribal isolated and away as a part of their ‘national park’ policy
from the non-tribal through various constitutional devices through which the economic
exploitation of the tribal people was administered rigorously so as to exclude all contact
between them and the inhabitants of the plains district. The demand for a separate state is
partly a hang over this policy. After the departure of the British there is now a growing
awareness amongst the tribal people of their political rights as full and equal citizens of
the Indian Union which they did not have and indeed under the conditions which
prevailed could not well have had before independence. The Inner Line Regulations
policy was a deliberate policy of complete segregation between the plains and tribal
people and divides the tribal people themselves and to create as a result of British and
missionary influences a new class which has so far remained quite distinct from the
general population either in the hills or plains. The Creation of new hills state will in our
opinion accentuate these distinctions. It will therefore prove in the long run against the
interests of the scheduled tribes. Moreover separation from Assam will add to the cost of
administration and the co-ordination of policies and programmes between the state of
Assam and the hill areas on the one hand and between the hill districts themselves on the
other will become more difficult. Generally the United Mikir and North Cachar hills and
Mizo (Lushai) Hills are not in favour of a separate state and the District Council in the

8
Lushai Hills and Karbia Darbar (Mikir Hills National Council) are in favour of the status
quo. The agitation in favour of a hills state is therefore confined to Garo and the Khasi
and Jaintia Hills. Owing to their geographical position these two districts have
necessarily a closer association with adjoining plains district than the rest of the hill or
tribal areas; even in these two districts therefore an influential section of opinion view
with disfavour the formation of a separate hill state. The impression which the SRC
formed as a result of their tour of the area was that a substantial body of public opinion,
even in the tribal areas of Assam, has not, by any means, been converted to the view that
a new hill state should be formed.
Taking all these factors into consideration the SRC had come to the conclusion that the
formation of a hill state in this region was neither feasible nor in the interest of the tribal
people themselves. The hill districts therefore should continue to form part of Assam and
no major changes should be made in their present constitutional pattern. 10 There was also
a discussion on the increase of the quantum of autonomy of the district councils like the
Khasi-Jaintia and the Lushai where as another opinion felt as a body District councils had
failed in its objective. The SRC did not want to into this debate but wanted more
emphasis on the development of infra structure by them. It then moved on to another
proposal for the formation of Purbanchal State. It was raised in 1948 earlier and was
examined by the Congress but was not pursued. The scheme envisages the constitution of
Cachar, Tripura, Manipur, the Lushai Hills, the Naga Hills and the NEFA into a
composite state. The demand was forwarded by the Cachar State Reorganization
Committee. The committee itself recognized that it would be a financially deficit state
and have international boundary on three sides. The genesis of the demand lay in the fact
that a major part of Sylhet district was cut off and transferred to Pakistan during partition.
The Bengalis in Assam who used to feel that culturally and even geographically they
belonged to Bengal have found themselves isolated and under an uncongenial
environment. The persecution of Bengalis and their language in post independent Assam
was cited as a cause of resentment. But the SRC felt creation of Purbanchal state would
mean exchanging one set of problems for another and therefore not an appropriate
remedy for the grievances of the minorities.
A similar demand was that of Kamatapur state, north west of Purbanchal state, consisting
of Goalpara, Garo hills, Jalpaiguri, Cooch Bihar and Darjeeling. The SRC refused to
entertain this demand for same reasons.
Next was the issue of Tripura a part C state with a population of 639,029. According to
the opinion of SRC as a small state Tripura could not stand by itself…its merger in
Assam in our opinion can be supported among other reasons on the ground that it will be
desirable to bring the entire border between India and Pakistan under single control that
of Assam Government. Such merger will also make it possible to co ordinate
development in Cachar and the contiguous area of Tripura. The Bengali speaking
population Assam after the merger will be a little more than one fifth of the total
population of the state. It should not be difficult for the Assam Government to allay the
apprehensions of the Bengali speaking people by treating this area, which requires
development as a separate administrative division under a Commissioner. The special
position of Bengali in this division should be recognized for official and educational
purposes. With safeguards the merger of Tripura with Assam will achieve for its people

9
the fulfillment of their aspirations of representative government at the state level without
prejudicing their linguistic and cultural interests.11
As far as North East Frontier Agency was concerned the SRC rejected the proposal of
Assam to integrate it fully with Assam and felt the current arrangement of the area being
ruled by the President of India through the Governor of Assam with a separate cadre for
the superior posts recruited on all India basis should continue. Similarly for Naga Hills
too it did not suggest any change and should continue to remain a part of Assam. Even
the transfer of Tuensang district from NEFA was rejected. As far as Manipur was
concerned since Manipur refused to be part of proposed Purbanchal and Assam should
not be added of additional problem of administering this border area, this erstwhile
princely state should continue to be a centrally administered territory. But it was also
conceded that Manipur could not insist on its separate existence for long time and hence
it has to be ready to join a larger unit of the neighborhood.
As a result of all these the configuration of the new state of Assam would include Tripura
and a population of 9.7 million and area of 89,040 square miles. Linguistically it would
be a composite state with even the Assamese not having any substantial majority. The
new state which we propose will have important problems to tackle. This area has been
subject to periodical floods against which protection will have to be sought in part by
building irrigation or flood protection works not considered so far and flood control has
to be handled as a regional problem. The road rail system in north east India is moreover
admittedly unsatisfactory in relation to the growing needs of this area including Manipur.
The task of economic development can be undertaken and substantial cultural autonomy
can be enjoyed by the various linguistic and racial groups only if two conditions are
fulfilled namely that the state of Assam is compact, rich and resourceful and that there
exists within this state mutual tolerance and goodwill. Particularistic and if we may say
so chauvinistic trends are bound to retard the progress of the state. They should therefore
be discouraged in every way.12
The SRC seems did not adhere to the principle of linguistic provinces in North East India.
It not only rejected the numerous demands for newer states but also recommended the
merger of hostile areas to create a composite state of Assam where even neither the
dominant Assamese nor the challenger Bengali would have majority. The tribal had to
swallow their complaints and grievances against the Assamese ruling class and live
within Assam. In fact it was felt that the SRC had ‘approached them problem of a hill
state with a prejudiced mind.”13 It said that the demand for a separate hill state emanated
from the extremist with separatist tendency. This separatist tendency was thought to be a
result of the British policy of divide and rule the hill and plainsmen through devises like
Excluded Area and Inner Line Regulation being perpetuated by the Government of India
as well. A critic found that ‘this is a familiar argument advanced by the politicians of the
plains. the commission however forgot the point that there is a line system in Assam
devised by the people of the plains. The Inner Line was demanded and is till demanded
by the tribal themselves. If there had not been the Inner line the situation in the hill areas
would have been explosive.’14 The SRC felt that individually or collectively the hill
district would not be able to command the resources, money material and man power
need to implant the development schemes. Therefore no hill state should be created. Two
considerations weighed with the SRC when it did not recommend the formation of hill
states. First small states should not be created and second the security of the frontiers

10
should not be affected. The rejection of the concept of hill state by the SRC fuelled
stronger pan-tribal sub nationalism. The autonomy aspiration grew stronger. The chief
executive member of the Garo hills district council Captain Williamson A Sangma
convened a meeting of the chief executive member of all district councils in Shillong on
16th and 17th June 1954. The chairmen of the meeting B M Roy in his address stressed on
two points 1) formation of a separate hill state and 2) amendment of the sixth schedule. In
the memorandum that was drafted it stated that the “the younger generation especially are
feeling very unhappy and they see that they will in time be extinct. The fear of their
future destiny naturally makes them feel that it will be far better for them to have a Hill
State of their own..’15 The next step was the All Hills Tribal Leader’s Conference held
Tura from 6th to 8th October 1954. After the tour of the SRC the conference decided to
form a Hills Tribal Union and elected W A Sangma as the Chairman and B B Lyngdoh as
Secretary of its ad hoc executive body. The rejection of the hill state demand was not
compensated for by the enlargement of the powers of the district councils. On 28 th August
1955 Nehru during his visit to Shillong appealed to a delegation of tribal leaders for calm
and dispassionate consideration of SRC report. The next conference of the Hill leaders
met in Aizawl to express grave concern of the SRC’s inability to ‘to appreciate the
aspirations and demand of the tribal people of this part of the country’ and reiterated the
demand of bringing all hill areas under one administration. It was in this conference that
the Eastern India Tribal Union was formed in October 1955. The move to declare
Assamese as the official language of Assam unified and further strengthened the Hill
State movement. In June 1960 Capt Sangma called a conference of the leaders of all the
hill parties to be held on 6 and 7th July 1960 in which the All Party Hill Leaders
Conference was born in suppression of the EITU. The conference vehemently opposed
the move to introduce Assamese language on the hill people. When the Assam
government still went ahead with the proposal the third APHLC conference in its 16-18
November 1960 meeting resolved that, ‘(the passage of the language bill) was a clear
proof of unfair attitude and firm determination of the Assamese community to avail
themselves of undue advantages and thereby enhance their domination over the hill
people and the rest of the people of the state of Assam. ..The only solution of the crisis
was ‘the creation of a separate hill state.’16 After the conference two APHLC deputations
were sent to meet the Prime Minister. In November 1960 Nehru offered the hill leaders
Scottish pattern autonomy for the hills. The APHLC rejected the plan as did not solve the
basic problem but a faction of it ‘Assam Hill Peoples Conference’ later decided to accept
it. Accordingly the Pataskar commission was formed to look into the quantum of
autonomy that could be given to them. The commission proposed ‘no basic change’ in the
6th Schedule’ disappointing the hill leaders and making them raise the issue of separate
hill state again. When the APHLC decided to boycott the 1967 general election the new
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Shillong during 11 to 13 January 1967 and
promised the reorganization of Assam. Following the 22nd amendment of the Indian
Constitution on 24 December 1969 parliament created history by passing the Assam
Reorganization (Meghalaya) Bill simultaneously in the two houses to create ‘an
autonomous state to be know as Meghalaya within the state of Assam comprising the
United Khasi and Jaintia hills and Garo hills district as defined in the Sixth Schedule.The
most important feature of the Meghalaya Act was that it crated a new tier in India’s state
structure similar to the autonomous republics of USSR. The execute power of the new

11
unit was vested in the governor of Assam aided and advised by the Council of Ministers
of Meghalaya, in relation to the autonomous state. A legislative assembly was also
created. In late 1971 the President of India issued the North East Frontier
(Administration) Supplementary Regulation creating an Agency Council (later replaced
by a Pradesh Council). The same year parliament passed five Acts: the North Eastern
Areas (Reorganization) Act, the 27th Amendment of the Constitution of India Act, the
Government of the Union Territories (Amendment) Act, the Manipur Hill Areas Act and
the North Eastern Council Act. With these Manipur, Tripura dn Meghalaya with Shillong
as its capital became full fledged states. Mizoram district and North East Frontier Tracts
became the Union Territories of Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh respectively.

Naga Homeland

In the demand of Hill states Naga Hills did not figure because the Naga National Council
wanted a Naga homeland outside India. It did not want a state within India hence did not
join most of the autonomy demand movements. The SRC noted that ‘the Naga National
Council seeks independence from Assam and India and to remain aloof from the
proposed hill state.’17 Though there was no proposal for a Naga province from the
people, the SRC found that ‘the Naga hills district present a special problem. Owing to
the activities of the extremist elements, the law and order situation in this area has been
unstable in recent years. The Nagas boycotted the elections to the autonomous bodies
with the result that the area has had to be administered directly by the Assam
Government. It has been represented to us that the law and order problem in the Naga
hills district is the same as in Tuensang area of NEFA and that unless the entire area is
brought under the authority the situation cannot be effectively dealt with. However it has
been stated on behalf of the Assam government that the Naga hills district has been
relatively quiet during the last two or three years and that there are indications of the
people of the area abjuring violence in favour of peaceful methods. After taking the
relevant factors into account we have come to the conclusion that it would not be
desirable to suggest any change in regard the Naga hills district.’18
In fact after the disappointing report of the SRC as far as north eastern region was
concerned, the tribal leaders stepped up the hills state movement wherein they invited the
Naga leaders as well. Though the Nagas participated in one such meeting they were not
enthusiastic about the concept. They still adhered to the idea of sovereignty. In a
discussion between the Khasi leaders and a Naga delegation led by Phizo, the latter
commented, ‘I feel the Hill state demand had already achieved its mission. It has shaken
the Assamese. In Politics it is not mere majority but a matter of organization…If one day
we achieve independence it will not mean that India granted it, it will be because India
can no longer stand against the voice of the world. You can help us much in this matter by
speaking about us to the many tourists. If we come down it will not be helpful to you.”19
After the promulgation of the Indian Constitution in 1950 the provision of the Akbar
Hydari-NNC understanding in the sixth schedule though the NNC went underground and
began open rebellion. The movement of the Indian army to suppress the rebellion and the
consequent encounter between the hostile Nagas and security forces continued bringing
unavailing havoc to the Naga social fabric. A large body of the Naga people decided to

12
rescue Naga Hills from this devastation and bring semblance of stability. The Naga
Peoples Convention held in August 1957 at Kohima which resolved,
1. that the political future of the Naga people lay within the Union of India
2. that pending a final solution, a single administrative unit comprising the Naga
hills comprising the Naga hills District of Assam and the Tuensang Frontier
Division of NEFA be constituted under the Ministry of External Affairs
3. that the government of India might consider granting amnesty to the misguided
underground elements who realized the futility of their claims
The convention thus submitted the famous 16 point memorandum of their claims to the
Prime Minister which appeared as a parliamentary alternative to militancy in the strife-
torn Naga Hills. The government of India agreed to these demands and the Naga Hills
Tuensang Area was created on the first of December 1957. The second Naga Peoples
convention was held in May 1958 at Ungma at which the delegates reiterated their
previous stand. The third Naga peoples convention held in October 1959 at Mokokchong
spelt out in convert terms of the Naga political impasse. In July 1960 the terms were
discussed by the Prime Minister with the Naga Peoples Convention leaders resulting in
the 16-Point Agreement whereby the government India agreed to constitute a Nagaland as
the sixteenth state of India.

Bodo Homeland
The first concrete plains tribal aspiration may be traced back to January 4, 1929 when not
less than four memoranda were submitted to the Simon commission. Autonomy
aspirations of the plains tribal however required about four more decades to be articulated
and in fact on February 1967 with the birth of Plains Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA) a
more assertive phase begun. PTCA who stood for the Barmans of Cachar, the Bodo-
Kachari, the Deoris, the Hojais, the Mishings, the Kacharis including Sonowals, Lalungs,
Mechs and Rabhas submitted a memorandum to the President of India on May 20, 1967
demanding full autonomy in the predominantly plains tribal areas of the northern tract of
Goalpara, Kamrup, Darrang, Lakhimpur and Sibsagar districts including all the tribal
belts and blocks of those areas so that tribal can a) adequately protect their land b) give
effective check to economic exploitation of tribal by non tribal c) conserve their
language, culture, custom and what is best in them d) counter political domination by
non-tribals over tirbals and imposition of anything which would disrupt their traditions
and customs and e) grow according to their own genius and traditions. PTCA demand for
any autonomous Region of 1967 was upgraded to a demand for Udayachal, a Union
Territory in 1973. But in 1977 a section of leadership withdrew their demand for Union
Territory and reverted to the original demand of Autonomous Region resulting in
breaking of the PTCA into two in which the PTCA (progressive) reiterated their demand
for a Union Territory called Mishing-Bodoland for which they submitted a number of
memoranda between 1980 and 983. The All Bodo Students Union was active in all these
years to bring the fighting PTCA factions to unite while also submitting memoranda to
the centre demanding union territory. The twentieth conference of the ABSU in
December 19-22, 1988 ushered in a more militant phase in the movement. The
conference shed off all other demand and upgraded the demand to a full fledged state
called Bodoland. It demanded Divide Assam fifty-fifty to create the new state. ‘However

13
Bodoland is not meant for only the Bodos, but is merely a nomenclature of a tribal state
including all the plains tribal of Assam. The non tribal would also be guaranteed with all
the constitutional rights in the proposed Bodoland,’ The movement took a violent turn
when two underground - Bodo Security Force and National Democratic Front of
Bodoland, organizations came up to support not just statehood but sovereignty for the
Bodos.

14
1
Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol.II, para, 38
2
Report of the State Reorganisation Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, 1955, p i.
3
Ibid, p. ii
4
White Paper on Indian States, 1950, para 147 cited ibied. P 5
5
Report of the State Reorganisation commission, Government of India, New Delhi, 1955, p 5.
6
Constitution of Inda, Article 243.
7
Report of the State Reorganisation Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, 1955, p 43
8
Ibid ,p.43
9
Ibid, p. 45
10
Ibid, pp. 187-188
11
Ibid, p 192
12
Ibid, p194-95.
13
V V Rao, A Century of Tribal Politics in North East India 1874-1974, S Chand & Co, New Delhi, 1976, pp. 346-347
14
Ibid, p.347
15
S K Chaube, Hill Politics in North East India, 2nd edn, Orient Longman, Hyderabad, 1999, p. 122
16
Ibid, p. 132
17
SRC Report, p 184
18
Ibid, p. 193
19
Chaube, p.124