PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
FAMILY CODE (art.35-54) VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years
of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally
authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages
were contracted with either or both parties believing in
good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal
authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those
covered the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing
under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting
party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under
Article 53.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by
Executive Order 227)
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and
void from the beginning, whether relationship between the
parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree;
and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or
half blood. (81a)
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate
or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent
and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child
and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of
the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to
marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his
or her own spouse. (82)
- Ninal v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000, 328
SCRA 122
Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. She was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without
any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident
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After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners
have no cause of action since they are not among the persons
who could file an action for annulment of marriage under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as
husband and wife for at least five years exempts them from
obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action
against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit,
their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead
Ruling:
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived
together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit
of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the
basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the
union. In other words, the five-year common law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for
the absence of the marriage. The five-year period should be the
years immediately before the day the marriage and it should be
a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning
no third party was involved at any time within the five years,
and continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year
cohabitation period is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those
who lived faithfully with their spouse.
(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages
are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid.
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL &
PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September
26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11,
1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their
father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was
filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners
have no cause of action since they are not among the persons
who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that
the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to
resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against
defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit,
their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased
father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the
validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to
their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed
the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of
the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons
who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2
Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a
pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's
averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and
correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which
produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the
law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional
mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the
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Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social
institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code
considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"
12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a
lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil
Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such
case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation
of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons
from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure
and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of
their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy
and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to
respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that
"they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried,
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue
that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code
to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license.
Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year
continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both
parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their
being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation
period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived
together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit
of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the
basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the
union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for
the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the
years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should
be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity —
meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5
years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as
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such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and
later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted
that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone
who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union
of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the
local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons
having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise
the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to
the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note
down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present,
absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by
the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage
subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse
shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in
cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or
annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in
that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having
of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband
and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent
had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It
should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time
when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial
that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one
as "husband and wife".
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Having determined that the second marriage involved in this
case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage
void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family
Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime
before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47
pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise
declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio
is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and
cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while
the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be
assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which
case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects
except those declared by law concerning the properties of the
alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through
actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born
to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to
Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family
Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable
marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's
father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their
marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial
decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make
the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient
that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and
declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25
"Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage,
so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And
therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage
may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the
death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon
mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not
like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the
Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that
effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action
or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party
would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense,
then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article
40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need
not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of
the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
- Carlos V. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008
FACTS: Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos
were brothers who each had three parcels of land by virtue of
inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by his
wife Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon
Teofilo’s death, two parcels of land were registered in the
name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos
commenced an action for the annulment of the marriage
between Teofilo and Felicidad. In his complaint, Carlos asserted
that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a
nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license.
He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither
the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He
argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title,
including the sums received by respondents as proceeds,
should be reconveyed to him.
ISSUE: Who may file an action for annulment of marriage?
HELD: A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
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Exceptions:
(1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
(2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed
by any party outside of the marriage.
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an
aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment
of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is
of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate
rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On
the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its dissolution. The Rule extends only
to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of
the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage
case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended
to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their
successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under
the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to
cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the
marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code.
This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15,
2003 is prospective in its application.
Carlos commenced the nullity of marriage case against
Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated
on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when
the marriage took place.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil
Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an
action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the
time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code,
there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate “proper interest” can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus,
in Ninal v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the
personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner, vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE
CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD
SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II,
respondents. D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond
for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family
Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The
nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession
of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set
aside the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a
child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and
damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare
unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They
left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos
and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No.
6137 of the Court of Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is
specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159,
situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa,
Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand
Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC]
Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion
of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by
Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot
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159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W,
points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd.
plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ.
METERS, more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090,
being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No.
6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by
Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B
of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND
AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de
Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la
parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle
Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el
cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta
manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,
situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De
Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la
parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle
Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el
cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de
esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de
Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de
CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.3
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his
estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid
the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to
deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir,
petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred
and registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are
now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No.
139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is
now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II).
Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the
name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II.
The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos.
219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Manila.
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before
the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964.
In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval
of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise,
the parties acknowledged their respective shares in the
proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land.
This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said
land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first
parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331
square meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in
favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter
portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise
agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil
Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental
compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in
August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided
between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as
Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a
quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of
nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property;
(d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The
complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between
his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity
in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He
likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the
natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he
entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the
subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of
the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He
argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title,
including the sums received by respondents as proceeds,
should be reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer.
They denied the material averments of petitioner's complaint.
Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding
the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's
marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was
the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with
another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for
the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked
that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney's fees, be granted.
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But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial,
respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the
motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who
solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the
Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the
certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad
were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for
summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the
contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath,
petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil
Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record
of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for
summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in
another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No.
89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255,
Las Piñas. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that
co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.5
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa
submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation,
discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's)
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's
(petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad
Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on
May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted
in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite
marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not
the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late
Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff
the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon
at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint
until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the
parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of
Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to
cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering
the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058
6
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of
defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II
and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another
title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of
defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II
and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another
title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's
evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on
June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.6
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal,
respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary
judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad
and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo,
Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is
entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary
judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy
as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was
appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial
court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not
being an action "to recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a
declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to
an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine
issue was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition
of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The
first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly
prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage
upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the
affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment
practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by
the law.
We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the
foregoing safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent
collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages
and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had
effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact,
however, that appellee's own brother and appellant Felicidad
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Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty years
and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by
which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in
the estate left by the former call for a closer and more
thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case.
Rather that the summary nature by which the court a quo
resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that the
material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of
marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails
to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations
of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of
that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved."
(Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the
rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal
of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for
appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily
conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal
requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to
Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial
number of the marriage license on the marriage contract
evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as
appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence
to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of
the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the
following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo
Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned
marriage, to wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license
issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said
marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad
Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was
inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the
reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in
the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the
same."
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We
are of the considered view that the veracity and credibility of
the foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying
the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case
on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary
evidence of marriage - is not proof that a marriage did not take
place, neither should appellants' non-presentation of the
subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was
not procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party
who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may
be said of the trial court's rejection of the relationship between
appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of
7
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements.
Although it had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims
regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the
averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of
appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose
the possibility of the said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his
right to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to
inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
We find appellee's bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos
II was merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what
could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from
his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her
previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration
regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more
credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during
the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said
appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household.
The least that the trial court could have done in the premises
was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to
thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of
appellant Teofilo Carlos II.8
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration
and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De
Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following
issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment
under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioner's
Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F
hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage,
petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals
committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and
101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of
this case are different from that contemplated and intended by
law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not
theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in
a manner probably not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment
and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a
serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now
Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment
on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary
Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment
and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made
findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures,
or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)
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Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage
may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the
pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a
trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the
capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for
nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor
summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails
to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations
of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of
that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules
of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on
judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely
within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings.
In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered
the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the
rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal
of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for
appellee would still not be warranted. x x x11
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or
summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules
on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no
place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and
even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the
application of summary judgments or even judgment on the
pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been
stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the
said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 200312 is found in
Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct
the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a
commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving
property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall
be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
8
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We excluded actions for nullity
or annulment of marriage from the application of summary
judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment
of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation,
summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.14
(Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested
the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case.
The participation of the State is not terminated by the
declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists
between the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the
judgment was rendered.15
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court
should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene
for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees
to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly,
even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public
prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented
or laid down before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage,
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the
public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on
the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.
(Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or
the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of
nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.16
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1)
Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the
effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed
by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it
exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
(Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband
or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
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Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and,
hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.17
(Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the
sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are
the only ones who can decide when and how to build the
foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers
of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and
actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone
can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in
accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth
a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule
extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of
the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.18
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of
the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage
case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended
to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their
successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under
the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.19
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to
cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the
marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code.
This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15,
200320 is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in
Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is
prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against
respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends
upon when the marriage took place.23
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of its celebration.24 But the Civil
Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an
action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the
Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to
institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to
be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real
party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every
action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest.26
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest
or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment
of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the
question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no
material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real
party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack
of cause of action.27
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of
Appeals,28 where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the
time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code,
there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus,
in Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the
personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare
the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the
absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it.
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether
the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando's
remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondent's
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the
amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the
contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must
dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the
ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the same.29 (Underscoring supplied)
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III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not
petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died
intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are
respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on
succession, successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are
called to succeed by operation of law.30
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are
transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were
respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse
and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs,
to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by
legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the
Civil Code.31
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory
heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does
not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a
right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the
New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to
one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance
with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or
illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from
succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the
deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.32
Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.33
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be
the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo,
petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad.
This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother
10
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the
decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the
direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents.
He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is
finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of
the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the
widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This
makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with
respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be
void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of
petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent
upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate,
adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally
adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality
to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and
respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has
no successional right to be protected, hence, does not have
proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may
be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would
not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant,
illegitimate,34 or even an adopted child35 excludes the
collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the
merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject
marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to
dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if
it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate,
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the
deceased brother of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of
respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to
vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes
of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the
ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the
filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We
should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically
raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration
is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.36
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having
been conducted in the case, petitioner's bare allegation that
respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is
insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from
his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support
its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad
as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more
credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such
declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded
credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by
Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of
legitimacy of a child, to wit:
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ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate
status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article
167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is
unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child
born or conceived within a valid marriage.37
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner
for causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery of
property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so,
as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the
marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard
to the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between
respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos,
the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity
of marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its
decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the
merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its
calendar.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by
Executive Order 227)
- Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995
Facts: Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20,
1986. A year after the marriage, the couple when quarreling
over a number of things including the interference of Julia’s
parents into their marital affairs. On May 18, 1998, Julia finally
left for the United States. Leouel was then unable to
communicate with her for a period of five years and she had
then virtually abandoned their family. Leouel filed a case for
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Regional
Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the grounds of psychological
incapacity in this case should be appreciated.
Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the petition.
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. The psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated and
must be incurable. Mere abandonment cannot therefore
qualify as psychological incapacity on the part of Julia.
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO
BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial
provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as
amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of
Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision
which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of
the court a quo1 and the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in
beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage
with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of
First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia.
On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before
Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City,
followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and
Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound,
La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby
boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy,
however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel
averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents
into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple
would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like
when and where the couple should start living independently
from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own
parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of
America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01
January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When
Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he
underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he
desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with,
Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed
with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a
complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the
Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was
served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in
Negros Oriental.
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On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through
counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact,
been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of
nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly
been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately
filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor
submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the
decision of the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its
non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the
very least to communicate with him, for more than five years
are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words,
Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to
communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five
years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological
incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family
Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can,
however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason
or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law,
Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in
sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say
"wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice
Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason."
Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one
is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise
of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the
marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that
lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of
12
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and
void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested
that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in
sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a
psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a
ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the
appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground
for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer
to consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the
word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa
concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word
"mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to
psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one
but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it
is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact
that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code,
the Committee used a language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added
that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the
Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said
that this is precisely the reason why they should make a
distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in
marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity"
a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals,
while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase
"even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified
to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the
marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the
phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first
one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all
the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.
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xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological
incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it
will encourage one who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand
the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose
way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of
incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is
less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it
is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage
because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He
emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero
inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence
of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from
consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately,
consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is
that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a
valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the
validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations
attendant to marriage, which are completely different from
each other, because they require a different capacity, which is
eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological
incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not
be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of
convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no
prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been
cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the
defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the
action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is
instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one
might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the
action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of
the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not
cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated
that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not
be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still
insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they
invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice
Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is
not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not
be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a
lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods
when there is an understanding of the consequences of
13
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the
ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage
was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to
copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes
commented that in some instances the impotence that in some
instances the impotence is only temporary and only with
respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can
specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the
term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in
medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can
also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that
"psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it
is enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later
on if already he can comply with the essential marital
obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa
explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity
may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at
the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed
that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations,
which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is
possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity
become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and
Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow
him to remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void
from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest
after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with
"although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that
the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create
the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on
the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity
is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the
minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
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"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity
to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental"
precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained
that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding
of the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting,
they have decided not to go into the classification of
"psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on
it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a
special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having
been annulments of marriages arising from psychological
incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law
because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision
in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a
provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages
annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of
psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law?
The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be
retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is
their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages,
which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand,
Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the
avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which
the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for
prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and
Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive
period of ten years within which the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee
approved the suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision
Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with
less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law
as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has
been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon.
Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8
14
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological
incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given
and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that
persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the
code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an
account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been
framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any
doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule.
A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage
because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to
the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae
psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological
anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it
would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the
cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to
assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
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Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity"
defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be
of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage,"
written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck,
the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some
psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can
be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in
legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real
inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be
compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding
contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b)
this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life
and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to
a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming
these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon
contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates
a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R.
Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared
invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that
the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the
defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving
consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by
these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila
(Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in
Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association;
Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases").
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some bearing
on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity
must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so
that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We
should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then
enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in
Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union
between a man a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
(Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic
nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are
doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
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The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all,
can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of
marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably,
neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific
answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
- Republic of the Philippines v. Molina, G.R. No. 108763,
February 13, 1997
FACTS: The case at bar challenges the decision of CA
affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity.
The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo
manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as
husband and a father preferring to spend more time with
friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his
parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his
wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an
intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged.
Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in
Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her
and their child. Since then he abandoned them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
HELD: The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and
remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is
not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit
inclinations which would not meet the essential marital
responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness.
Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest
such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel
merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with
each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither
its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the
expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as
psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of
psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:
o burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
o root causes of the incapacity must be medically and
clinically inclined
o such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the
marriage
o such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person
in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of
marriage
o such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as
Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
o decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or
the Catholic Church must be respected
o court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal
assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA,
respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new
ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void
based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In
the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has
labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive
of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to
resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14,
1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3
Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel
Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the
ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were
married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila;
that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them;
that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his
job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had
a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship
was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her
job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City;
that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child,
and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus
shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and
habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a
king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best
interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order
to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that
he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and
wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting
on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage;
(2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such
as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household
and handle their finances.
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During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were
stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14,
1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three
years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the
petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own
testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted
documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring
the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the
Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision.
Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of
Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the
phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of
the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to
the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision
tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage
between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that
"the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil
laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically
incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct
on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards
the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the
other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for
the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause
the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives
of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses
to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no
indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did,
17
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of
the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and
conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the
neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities
and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru
Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical)
incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear
showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties
as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she
and her husband could nor get along with each other. There
had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony
of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison
testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based
on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
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Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically
fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity
existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort
was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's
part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part
of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of
antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows
love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the
beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely
ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family
Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two
amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice
Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these
friends of the Court for their informative and interesting
discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996,
which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
18
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given
qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due
to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family
Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
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harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law
on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should
also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church — while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already
ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more
cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
- Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119190, January
16, 1997
FACTS: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988.
After the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the
house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual
intercourse between them during their first night and same
thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have
their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but
Gina’s relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual
intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk
during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room.
Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the
same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989.
The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed,
while that of the husband was kept confidential even the
medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason
why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency
status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile
with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on
the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand,
the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled
because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part
and is physically and psychologically capable and since their
relationship is still young, they can still overcome their
differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another
physical examination and the result was there is not evidence
of impotency and he is capable of erection.
19
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual
intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.
HELD: The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious
personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court
clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning
of Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marital obligations and the refusal
is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is to procreate children thus constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a
marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been
placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all
things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife
against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner
appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial
Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly
denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial
court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its decision are
as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were
preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant
at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced
by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception
at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the
house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room
for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her
expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy
making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the
defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then
turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
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intercourse between them during the first night. The same
thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where
they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and
wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with
her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were
all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in
Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was
no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just
sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They
slept together in the same room and on the same bed since
May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period,
there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
[S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private
parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the
Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is
healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's
examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential.
No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked
by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had
observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that,
according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen,
to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country
and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their
marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological
incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife
annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very
much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically
and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is
still very young and if there is any differences between the two
of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if
either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty
that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any
defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to
have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him
and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his
wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue
because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
20
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why
the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that
she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of
jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant,
will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid
because they are still very young and there is still a chance to
overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His
penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of
finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr.
Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is
stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh.
"2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to
find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out
that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1)
inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant
had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his
soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual
intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no
collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not
fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID
the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant
on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev.
Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this
decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City.
Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was
no sexual intercourse between the parties without making any
findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity
inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
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in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and
the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties
decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that
there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the
allegations in her complaint; that since there was no
independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between
the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's
conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public
policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should
retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion
drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of
the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is
misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and
that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails
to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations
of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of
that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the
pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment
of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based
on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent
testified under oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented
evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his
side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988,
until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as
stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no
judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a
101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment
without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not
want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there
is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted
that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual
contact with each other, he must have been only telling the
truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the
challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate
Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
21
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this
Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of
whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to
discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review
of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record.
Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with
his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears
that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such
abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder
which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code
(See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in
holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the
failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about
the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of
the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due
to physchological disorders" because there might have been
other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or
other discomforts, — why private respondent would not want
to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15,
1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner
and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the
other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been
coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare
the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to
have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on
record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted
to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private
respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical
disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have
discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing
her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to
have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there
is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or
discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he
presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there
is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.5
Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological
but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent,
it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent
to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
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spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-
fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the
husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse
with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the
entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he
occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty
for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having
asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs.
Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330).
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from
incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek
the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her
marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is
hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public
scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were
not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital
status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the
evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to
perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity,
and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After
almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with
his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has
not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged
approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a
serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually
the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife
and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared
with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a
partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This
is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist
has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation.
It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner
and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by
22
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is
needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the
marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but
for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love
amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which
the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
- Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, December
08, 1999
Facts: (describe events bet. the parties leading to the
litigation, how the case came before the court that’s now
deciding it, who the plaintiff and defendant are, basis for
plaintiff’s suit, ruling whether the court affirmed or reversed
the case)
Lucita Estrella Hernandez and Mario C. Hernandez were
married and had three children. Lucita, petitioner, filed before
the RTC of Tagaytay City a petition for annulment on the
ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent, Mario.
The petitioner claimed that the respondent failed to perform
his obligation to support the family and contribute to the
management of the household. Respondent engaged in
drinking sprees, gambled and womanized at which came a
point that he had an illegitimate child.
Petitioner also added in her petition full custody of her three
children, Php 9,000 monthly financial support for the children,
sole ownership of the parcel of land purchased during their
marriage as well as of the jeep which private respondent took
when he left his family. RTC dismissed the petition. This
decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: (WoN, question that the court must decide to resolve,
rule of law that governs the dispute) Whether or not the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated at the time of his
marriage to the petitioner
Ruling: (answer to the issue, supported by the court’s
reasoning explaining and supporting the decision) The
petitioner failed to provide evidence proving that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated. The
respondent’s habitual alcoholism, womanizing and
cohabitation with those he’s had extra-marital affairs with do
not constitute psychological incapacity. Art. 36 of the Family
Code requires that incapacity must be psychological, not
physical, although the manifestations or symptoms are
physical.
As for the other claims prayed for by the petitioner, the Court
believed that those should be litigated in a separate proceeding
for legal separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or
custody of children. Judgment affirmed.
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LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals, dated January 30, 1996, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City,
dated April 10, 1993, which dismissed the petition for
annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent
Mario C. Hernandez were married at the Silang Catholic Parish
Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A). 2 Three
children were born to them, namely, Maie, who was born on
May 3, 1982 (Exh. B), 3 Lyra, born on May 22, 1985
(Exh. C), 4 and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D). 5
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the
annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the
ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged
that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing
of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation
to support the family and contribute to the management of the
household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking
sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private
respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another
woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having
affairs with different women, and that, because of his
promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by
infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She
averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature
and unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner
prayed that for having abandoned the family, private
respondent be ordered to give support to their three children
in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be
awarded the custody of their children; and that she be
adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don
Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmariñas, Cavite,
purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which
private respondent took with him when he left the conjugal
home on June 12, 1992. 6
On October 8, 1992, because of private respondent's failure to
file his answer, the trial court issued an order directing the
assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to
determine if there was collusion between the
parties. 7 Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on
November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no
evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be set
for trial. 8
Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts
are as follows:9
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine
Christian University in Dasmariñas, Cavite. Petitioner, who is
five years older than private respondent, was then in her first
year of teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent, a
college freshman, was her student for two consecutive
semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when
she was no longer private respondent's teacher. On January 1,
1981, they were married.
23
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Private respondent continued his studies for two more years.
His parents paid for his tuition fees, while petitioner provided
his allowances and other financial needs. The family income
came from petitioner's salary as a faculty member of the
Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented her
earnings by selling "Tupperware" products, as well as engaging
in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a
stable job, it was agreed that he would help petitioner in her
businesses by delivering orders to customers. However,
because her husband was a spendthrift and had other women,
petitioner's business suffered. Private respondent often had
smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on
fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child,
petitioner discovered two love letters written by a certain
Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew Villena as a
married student whose husband was working in Saudi Arabia.
When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted
having an extra-marital affair with Villena. Petitioner then
pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with private
respondent. For his part, private respondent said he would end
the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the
conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When
private respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted
him, despite private respondent's infidelity in the hope of
saving their marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private
respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in
San Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite in 1986. However, private
respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991, because
he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by the
company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but
instead of spending the amount for the needs of the family,
private respondent spent the money on himself and consumed
the entire amount within four months of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc.,
his smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing became worse.
Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on
relationships with different women. He had relations with a
certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was an
operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a "Japayuki"; Myrna
Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master Driver's School in
Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a
while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named
Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh. E). 10 When
petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship
with Tess, he beat her up, as a result of which she was confined
at the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmariñas,
Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F).
11
According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in
extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As
a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected
petitioner. They both received treatment at the Zapote Medical
Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from October 22,
1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H). 12
Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument,
private respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a
year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children
as he was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them.
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On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh.
J) 13 with F & C Realty Corporation whereby she agreed to buy
from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights
Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmariñas, Cavite and placed a
partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full
payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests
from monthly installments, a deed of absolute sale(Exh. K) 14
was executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M) 15
was duly issued.
According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a
handwritten
letter 16 to private respondent expressing her frustration over
the fact that her efforts to save their marriage proved futile. In
her letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to
sell their owner-type jeepney 17 and to divide the proceeds of
the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also told private
respondent of her intention to fill a petition for the annulment
of their marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to
petitioner's letter. By this time, he had already abandoned
petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner
learned that private respondent left for the Middle East. Since
then, private respondent's whereabouts had been unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioner's childhood friend and co-teacher at the
Philippine Christian University, testified during the hearing on
the petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June
1979, petitioner introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro)
as the former's sweetheart. Alfaro said she was not impressed
with private respondent who was her student in accounting.
She observed private respondent to be fun-loving, spending
most of his time with campus friends. In November 1980, when
petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at
her forthcoming wedding, Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner
from going through with the wedding because she thought
private respondent was not ready for married life as he was
then unemployed. True enough, although the couple appeared
happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long
thereafter that private respondent started drinking with his
friends and going home late at night. Alfaro corroborated
petitioner's claim that private respondent was a habitual
drunkard who carried on relationships with different women
and continued hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed
that petitioner was once hospitalized because she was beaten
up by private respondent. After the first year of petitioner's
marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private respondent, but the
latter accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro
said that private respondent was not close to his children and
that he had abandoned petitioner. 18
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision 19
dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads: 20
The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances
mentioned by the petitioner in support of her claim that
respondent was "psychologically incapacitated" to marry her
are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the
grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) — not
as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or
annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as
follows:
24
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of
the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of
the petitioner;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without
justifiable cause for more than one year.
xxx xxx xxx
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which
mentions psychological incapacity as a ground for the
declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include
the above-stated circumstances as constitutive of such
incapacity, then the same would not have been enumerated as
grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in
favor of the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the
Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the
"gonorrhea" transmitted to the petitioner by respondent
occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after petitioner's
marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The
provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law should
be taken in conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the
same code, and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of
the law would require the existence of this ground (fraud) at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the
annulment of petitioner's marriage with the respondent on this
ground, as alleged and proved in the instant case, cannot be
legally accepted by the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January
30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the
trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 21 the
Court of Appeals held: 22
It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for
declaration of nullify of marriage, must exist at the time of the
celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity,
abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not
grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant
failed to prove that her respondent-husband was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. Certainly, petitioner-appellant's declaration that
at the time of their marriage her respondent-husband's
character was on the "borderline between a responsible person
and the happy-go-lucky," could not constitute the psychological
incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In
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fact, petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her
respondent-husband's youth and very good looks, who was
admittedly several years younger than petitioner-appellant
who, herself, happened to be the college professor of her
respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant even described her
respondent-husband not as a problem student but a normal
one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant
happened after the marriage and there is no proof that the
same have already existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage to constitute the psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent
Court of Appeals erred —
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE
CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING
THE AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO
PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING
THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN
THE AMOUNT OF P3,000,00 PER CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY
PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of
petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the
ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that petitioner failed to show that private respondent's
psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. She argues that the fact that the acts of
incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after
the celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the
annulment of their marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. 23
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 24 we held:
"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
25
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality, disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some bearing
on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity
must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so
that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations,
petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were
married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological
defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was
presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant
of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved
that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and
not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of their
marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work for
his family. Private respondent's parents and petitioner
supported him through college. After his schooling, although he
eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early
retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire
amount he received on himself. For a greater part of their
marital life, private respondent was out of job and did not have
the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and
engaged in philandering, and later abandoned his family.
Petitioner concludes that private respondent's condition is
incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and
defeating the very objectives of marriage.
However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering
from psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are
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manifestations of a disordered personality which make private
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private
respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being
handsome, as the appellate court held. As pointed out in
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals: 25
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (citing
Salaita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to
establish the precise cause of private respondent's
psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed
at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage rests upon rests petitioner. The
Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. 26 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage. 27
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of
respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the
trial court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private
respondent's psychological incapacity at the time of the
marriage, are entitled to great weight and even finality. 28 Only
where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious,
and arbitrary can these be overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to
pass upon petitioner's contentions on the issue of permanent
custody of children, the amount for their respective support,
and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over
the real property. These matters may more appropriately be
litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation,
dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children
which petitioner may bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED
- Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000
Facts: Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in
1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband
failed to provide material support to the family and have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a
case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity.
The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36
which was however reversed by CA.
26
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Issues:
Whether personal medical or psychological examination of
the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show
psychological incapacity.
Held: Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the
nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the
respondent be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this
Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide
material support to the family and may have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does
not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part.
There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed
to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully
employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this
period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give
material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi
driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the
marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to observe the
guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of
a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however, that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the
marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA
Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B.
Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on
September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab
initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal
properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles
126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and
52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties'
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children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children,
their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation
rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was
solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila
and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their
appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were
married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized
by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig
(Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev.
Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential
Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh.
A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B,
C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the
Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand,
joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air
Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a
discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were
assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee
Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became
acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No.
1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit
which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation
when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military
service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures
that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him
to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of
her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his
failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often
quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He
would even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children
for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised
them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he
would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living
separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling
"magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military,
she would first make deliveries early in the morning before
going to Malacañang. When she was discharged from the
military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she
became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until
27
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS
Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October
16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already
living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she
was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent,
inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who
came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and
their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's
house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical
examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters
and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look
for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad.
After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran
after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children
were renting a house in Camella, Parañaque, while the
appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan,
the children described their father as cruel and physically
abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A.
Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp.
207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because
of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity
had not been established by the totality of the evidence
presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the
root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which
should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently
proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough
to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the
essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71
and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such
non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in
the petition, established by evidence and explained in the
decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any
psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological
findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan
were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee.
Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
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psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were
or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly
incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming,
or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In
fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not
psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed
incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or
clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently
proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that
would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity
which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent
that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming:
that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage
and [was] incurable."4
Hence, this Petition.5
Issues
In her Memorandum,6 petitioner presents for this Court's
consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set
aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological
incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not
subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the
demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition."7
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or
psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the
totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of
various tests that were submitted to determine respondent's
psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage
should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals,
simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself.
Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources
of information in order to determine the psychological capacity
of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such
tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelines governing the
application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity
referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code9 were laid down by
this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of
28
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxx xxx xxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of
the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I
do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential
to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
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controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."10
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:11
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence
presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of
petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the
social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently
convinced that respondent failed to provide material support
to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present
at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact
that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a
period of more than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi
driver.1âwphi1
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
29
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68
to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.12 At
best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce
law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its
invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully
observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the
marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the
guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision
AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical
examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity. No costs
- Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127358, March
31, 2005
FACTS: Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are
certain deeds of sale of real property executed by defendant
parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of
their co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates
of title issued in their names because of:
1.a) Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the
deeds of sale xxx over the properties in litis;
2.b) Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in
the sums reflected in the questioned deeds, the properties are
more than three-fold times more valuable than the measly
sums appearing therein;
3.c) Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express
the true intent of the parties (vendors and vendees); and
4.d) Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis
was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly
deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of
their legitime.
Defendants, on the other hand, aver (1) that plaintiffs do not
have a cause of action against them as well as the requisite
standing and interest to assail their titles over the properties
in litis; (2) that the sales were with sufficient considerations
and made by defendants parents voluntarily, in good faith, and
with full knowledge of the consequences of their deeds of sale;
and (3) that the certificates of title were issued with sufficient
factual and legal basis.
ISSUE: Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for the gross
inadequacy of price.
RULING: No. Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances
mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470 of the Civil Code which
would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale. Indeed,
there is no requirement that the price is equal to the exact
value of the subject matter of sale. All the respondents
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believed that they received the commutative value of what
they gave.
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA,
respondents.
x-------------------x
G.R. No. 127449 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA,
Respondents.D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J.:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on
July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein
respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with
leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he
and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent
filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was
psychologically incapacitated.1
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between
plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh
Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the
amount of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1
million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision
plus attorney’s fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of
litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal
partnership property[,] particularly the plaintiff’s
separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank
[and] Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty
percent (50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79 or
P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per annum from the
date of this decision and one-half (1/2) of his outstanding
shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident
Group of Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son
Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00 monthly,
subject to modification as the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh
Buenaventura to his mother, the herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use
of her maiden family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil
registry and registries of properties.
SO ORDERED.2
30
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals.
While the case was pending in the appellate court, respondent
filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support
pendente lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner
filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or that
such incident be set for oral argument.3
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution increasing the support pendente lite to P20,000.4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the
said Resolution.5
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a
Decision dismissing petitioner’s appeal for lack of merit and
affirming in toto the trial court’s decision.6 Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied. From the
abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court
of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
the September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the
monthly support for the son.7 Petitioner filed a Petition for
Certiorari to question these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari8 and the
Petition for Certiorari9 were ordered consolidated by this
Court.10
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that
the Court of Appeals decided the case not in accord with law
and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL
DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE
OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEY’S FEES AND
P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF
HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST
BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM
THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID
RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK
WITH THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT
GROUP OF COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK
WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES; AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER
THE PARTIES’ MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS
OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS
TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS
PERSON.11
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In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following
contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR
INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES’ SON FOR HEARING.12
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO
INCREASE JAVY’S MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING
GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES.13
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF
JAVY’S SUPPORT, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE
EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT
IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD
OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000
INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS "TOO MINIMAL."14
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN
PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME
TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVY’S
SUPPORT.15
With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of
Appeals articulated:
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact
ascertained from the testimonies not only of the parties
particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the
two psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21,
2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived
the defendant-appellee into marrying him by professing true
love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy
parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he
married defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter
into marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his
first priority; that he was unable to relate not only to
defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a
father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work
such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that
of leaving defendant–appellee and their son; that he had no
desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by
his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their
separation; that the aforementioned caused
defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years
the parties were together but also after and throughout their
separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial court’s decision on the
ground that unlike those arising from a breach in ordinary
contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may
not be awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no
decided case by the Supreme Court where damages by reason
of the performance or non-performance of marital obligations
were awarded, it does not follow that no such award for
damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically
prayed for moral and exemplary damages in the total amount
of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its
discretion, found full justification of awarding at least half of
31
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
what was originally prayed for. We find no reason to disturb
the ruling of the trial court.16
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on
Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of
the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 221917 of
the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which moral damages
may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the
instances. It must be noted that Article 21 states that the
individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is
a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete
freedom. In granting moral damages, therefore, the trial court
and the Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that the
acts on which the moral damages were based were done
willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages
would have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the
parties null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code,
due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel
Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. . . .18
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of
the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological
incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and
hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is
contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological
incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because
of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the
same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as
psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral
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damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of
moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of
entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was
done deliberately and with malice by a party who had
knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed
the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in
this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that
one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one
must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it
removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner
purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private
respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the
part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages
was without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows
that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the
Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.19
With respect to the grant of attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation the trial court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorney’s fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code
authorizes an award of attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the
plaintiff’s act or omission has compelled the defendant to
litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to protect her
interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and
equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should
be recovered. (par. 11)20
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and
exemplary damages is fully justified, the award of attorney’s
fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is likewise fully
justified.21
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to
deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the
complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be
considered as unduly compelling the private respondent to
litigate, since both are grounded on petitioner’s psychological
incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity
causing an utter inability to comply with the obligations of
marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral
and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank
and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the Manila Memorial
Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court
said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do
with the assets of the conjugal partnership in the event of
declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable
Supreme Court has held that the declaration of nullity of
marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of
property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818,
32
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572 – 573, 586). Thus, speaking
through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this
case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that
the final judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children and the delivery
of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in the previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and
therefore, all property acquired during the marriage, whether
the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to
be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family
Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code
enumerates what are conjugal partnership properties. Among
others they are the following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for
the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession
of either or both of the spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during
the marriage from the common property, as well as the net
fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice
to requiring an inventory of what are the parties’ conjugal
properties and what are the exclusive properties of each
spouse, it was disclosed during the proceedings in this case that
the plaintiff who worked first as Branch Manager and later as
Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received
separation/retirement package from the said bank in the
amount of P3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions
amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount of
P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995
(Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown debts or obligations
other than those deducted from the said retirement/separation
pay, under Art. 129 of the Family Code "The net remainder of
the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits,
which shall be divided equally between husband and wife,
unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary
waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code." In
this particular case, however, there had been no marriage
settlement between the parties, nor had there been any
voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wife’s
share in the conjugal partnership properties. The previous
cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share
in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680
of the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque, Metro Manila, in favor
of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement
dated July 12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial
Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in
full settlement of any and all demands for past support. In
reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession in
favor of the plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be
followed, in the process of liquidation of the conjugal assets,
the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall,
unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to
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the spouse with whom their only child has chosen to remain
(Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half (1/2)
portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that she will
not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half
was transferred to their only child as his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant
wife by way of her share in the conjugal properties, and it is but
just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of
the separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the
same being part of their conjugal partnership properties having
been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or
profession of said defendant husband in accordance with Art.
117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For the same reason, she is
entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares of stock of
the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park and the
Provident Group of Companies.22
The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of
the trial court for him to give one-half of his
separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank & Trust
Company and half of his outstanding shares in Manila
Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies to the
defendant-appellee as the latter’s share in the conjugal
partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision
approving the Compromise Agreement entered into by the
parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had
agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved.
Thereafter, no steps were taken for the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of
the separation/retirement benefits which plaintiff-appellant
received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his
retirement as Vice-President of said company for the reason
that the benefits accrued from plaintiff–appellant’s service for
the bank for a number of years, most of which while he was
married to defendant-appellee, the trial court adjudicated the
same. The same is true with the outstanding shares of
plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and Provident
Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the
plaintiff-appellant at the time he was married to
defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as
her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to
disturb the ruling of the trial court.23
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a
bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to
Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership
of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general
rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab
initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated,
partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,24
this Court expounded on the consequences of a void marriage
on the property relations of the spouses and specified the
applicable provisions of law:
33
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be,
of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the
Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it
provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his
or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and
owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith,
the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default
of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a
woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term
"capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law)
refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e.,
any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards
not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and
38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules
on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition
of the property shall still be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above
extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition,
the law now expressly provides that —
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(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos
[of] his or her share in co-ownership property, without the
consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall
forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their
common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of
the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to
the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the
termination of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the
marriage.
…
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the
settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court
acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed
likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in
ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family
home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well
as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the
property owned in common by them, the provisions on
co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52,
in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should
aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of
either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of
gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article
50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5)
of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable
marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article
40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage
before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a
special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an
old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very
beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their
nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously
contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away
with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second
marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43,
in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the
effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted
during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be
assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident
property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid
and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other,
between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages,
leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on
co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article
148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even
as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the
Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in
Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and
effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.25
34
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a
quo were found, both by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties,
the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a
separate property of one of the parties appear to have been
included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties owned in common
by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should,
therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and
not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child,
Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot since he is about to
turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 200526 and has,
therefore, attained the age of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for
Certiorari, these would also now be moot, owing to the fact
that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has
attained the age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated December 10, 1996
which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No.
127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation and
costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the
retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust
Co. and one-half of petitioner’s shares of stock in Manila
Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is
sustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358)
contesting the Court of Appeals’ Resolutions of September 2,
1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the support
pendente lite in favor of the parties’ son, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly,
DISMISSED.
- Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006
FACTS: Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne
Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after their
first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a
subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A
child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently
lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things.
She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which
she represented to her husband as adopted child of their family.
They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for
reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991.
Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage
with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the
Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family
Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and void.
HELD: Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to
understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his
own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical
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psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme
jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and
corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, which
amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic
ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious
characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that
made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.
The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have been
medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by
experts. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity
was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended
to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their
consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological
liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses
based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is
incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her
but her behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his
cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent. D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad
truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony.
Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity,
is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled
in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir
tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse’s
capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001
and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the
judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring
the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie
Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful
consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner
was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a
year after their first meeting, they got married before a
minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a
subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish,
Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of
their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died
five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his
marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his
petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that
respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological
incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an
illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner
as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth
about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it
from other sources after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David,
attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident
occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her
obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her
friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when
she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent
affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet,
not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged
singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she
postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine
Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to
that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the
Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken
place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez,
and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner
claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number
one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2
million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself
was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she
admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise
realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments
of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in
or connected with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus,
she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a
higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but
told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture
dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended
up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the
extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts.
When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he
separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a
reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally
left her for good in November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante
Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on
the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a
normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On
the other hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and
constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the
basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and
respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme
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jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia
since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that
petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They
concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she
performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs
of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the
allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner
because she was afraid of losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill
her because she surmised such intent from David’s act of
touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had
been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two
(2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an
executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3)
commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of
Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She
told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although
she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported
to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a
luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine
Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not
written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea
Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the
United States while Babes Santos was employed with
Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her
husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a
diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from
petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she
supported almost ten people from her monthly budget of
P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure
of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to
her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her
stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not
sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her
part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr.
Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her
psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of
tests conducted by his assistant,33 together with the screening
procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating
Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive
behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor
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control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the
presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from
respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the
evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one
who administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological
evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called
CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the
results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s
evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about
almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing
abilities and her income, among others−had been duly
established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic
ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled
her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of
giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial
court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the
Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled
the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of
due discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the
pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the
Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with modification
by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which
held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of
due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota
of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by
the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the
RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not
have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence
presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in
the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the
application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had
not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement,
petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein
that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily
influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual
allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil
procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the
appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony
which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is
likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not
dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner.
Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was
not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent.43
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Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of
petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question
remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by
petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the
Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also
known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals
cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at
bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court
has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact, even before
Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming
Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively
concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated
under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the
misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the
Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is
concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did
ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly
onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still
leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper
circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree
of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its
allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a
ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws,
although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a
ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting
marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their
reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with
such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class as
marriages with underage parties and persons already married,
among others. A party’s mental capacity was not a ground for
divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage
where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its
celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the
Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse’s
incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted
during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the
Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of
"unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil
Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack
thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for
declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the
marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the
Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a
vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely
given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59
The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and
Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee
that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological
incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the
spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a
marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights
and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990
edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of
Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino
opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating
the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under
Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been
a cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same
time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were
psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital
obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent
to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered,
beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court,
through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the
inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed
to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed
in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice
(now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence
[to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then
has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological
incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with
its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to
comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the
same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court
that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the
law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding
specific examples that would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law."70
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We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more
than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts.
In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment
of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of
psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee,
was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of
psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case,
current trends in psychological and even canonical thought,
and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate
ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the
Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997.
Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary
framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the
Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative
intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation,
and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding
of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present,
and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on
that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in
Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law
experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is
but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee
had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological
incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as one member
admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages
already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under
civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence
of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent
understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church
is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of
Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived
from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and
subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular
progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological
incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial
decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are
binding on lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common
legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this
Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have
favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution,
which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State." These provisions highlight the
importance of the family and the constitutional protection
accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of
state protection to marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the province of the
legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe
the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on
whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and
subject of course to the qualification that such legislative
enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put
into operation the constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present
through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines
marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal
effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family
life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity
and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the
judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective
of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action
in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a
constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not
be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into
account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages
contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a
nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this
constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State
interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family,
which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State to defend against
marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio
marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the
State concerning marriage and family, as they promote
wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their
will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the
present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently
recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity
under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina
since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein
operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
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protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological–not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those
who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage
due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family
Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law
on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also
be decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the
Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement
however was dispensed with following the implementation of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that
the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in
this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of
respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any
event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the trial
court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now
deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the
refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these
facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had
consistently lied about many material aspects as to her
character and personality. The question remains whether her
pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological
incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina
guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the
guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving
the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own
testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his
allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from
Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon
which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged
singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from
the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior
of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In
any event, both courts below considered petitioner’s evidence
as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged
that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration
of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of
action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the
action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between
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private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family
Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through
the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the
petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of
collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such
proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological
incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in
the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly
explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint
alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual
and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating
ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations,"
of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of
lying about her actual occupation, income, educational
attainment, and family background, among others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were
further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses
from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such
witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had
headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major
hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit
provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that
[are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of
things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in
the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and
repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on
assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or
pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these
actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of
performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes
towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards
the person, and it is also something that endangers human
relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication
between individuals and what we generally communicate are
our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and
expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth.
And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going
to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it
undermines that basic relationship that should be based on
love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior
of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories,
she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the
marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza,
who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the
respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates
and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him
on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated
on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can
you say about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is
paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her
suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman,
if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is
not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also
lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in
extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in
reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with
another woman and if she persistently believes that the
husband is having an affair with different women, then that is
pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be
considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic
obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Ma’am.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not
only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the
psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that
respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie
[and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological
incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts
of respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits
of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85
that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically
incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by
petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical
conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s common
conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged
heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner’s version as the
true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted
the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause
to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
therefrom by petitioner’s expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the
trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its
decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly
from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for
telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her
state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has
this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe
making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and
significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and
constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the
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basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on
love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist
presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and
pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to
have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up
letters from fictitious characters well before she married
petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her
natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the
latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is
sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the
parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation
before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such
circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it
likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological
incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that
any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were
not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner
into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the
part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least
abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court
were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling
lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which
according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to
understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and
reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal
nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and
the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including
parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected
to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since
respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation,
she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital
obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her
psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the
marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to
fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondent’s ability to
even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is
impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly
disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the truth, her
avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be
accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family
Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46
which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under
the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation
or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages
between misrepresentations made by respondent and the
misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud
under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is
lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying
spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent
41
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article
36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the
essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of
the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it
is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be
able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take
into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was
annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court
apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no
reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision
despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its
attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of
Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese
of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a
Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due
discretion" on the part of respondent.90 Such decree of nullity
was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact,
respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave
that a restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of
nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another
marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial
consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore
judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in
possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with
a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired
from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and
implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude
required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in
Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and
Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option
in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly
antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the
Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the
integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its
deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a
discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment
formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern,
the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding
matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the
Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due
discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
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Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was
arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical
bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church
rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since
they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of
the veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court
instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct, and the
appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the
Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished
persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the
judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that
are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in
Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this
score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear
certain that respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr.
Abcede did not testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife
initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their
marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior
remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories,
and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws
the conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively
concluded that respondent’s condition is incurable? It would
seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a
cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been
easier had petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized
respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they remained
silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or
incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the
experts’ taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995,
and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995.
These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in
1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological
incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly
stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in
January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the
deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the
opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its
formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological
incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion
expressed during the deliberations that "psychological
incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese
of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized
"by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on
psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any
reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological
incapacity.101
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months
before the trial court came out with its own ruling that
remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological
incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly
mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be
established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there
was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case
and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision
that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite
arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on
appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered
an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply
retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction
placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of
the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this
present case from utterly practical considerations. The
requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that
necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in
this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert
witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was
curable or incurable simply because there was no legal
necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate
question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply
Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice
to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those
presently on appellate review, where presumably the
respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not
have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may
hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not
pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the
interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case
perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this
case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since
the parties would have had no impelling cause to present
evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the
RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the
evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of
respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by
the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the
fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably
consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological
incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so
incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that
annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause
of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred
in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition,
pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been
inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent,
despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner,
as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for
nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on
respondent’s avowed commitment to remain in the marriage.
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Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not
vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more
than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live
together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC
dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of
the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended by
Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533; The phrase
"However, in case of marriage celebrated before the
effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such
action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code
shall taken effect"has been deleted by Republic Act No. 8533
[Approved February 23, 1998]).
- Ninal v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000, 328
SCRA 122 see art. 35-38
- Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, G.R. No. 173614,
September 28, 2007
FACTS: The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad
Medinaceli filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico,
alleging that Eulogio and Trinidad were married in June 1962
and begot seven children, herein respondents. On May 1, 2004,
Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married petitioner
before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan without the
requisite of a marriage license. Eulogio passed away six months
later. They argued that Article 34 of the Family Code, which
exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for
at least five years without any legal impediment from securing
a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio.
Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad
was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004,
which was barely three months from the date of marriage of
Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could
not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional
ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious
illness which made its performance impossible.
In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived
together as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years
openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license. She further contended that
the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of
Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an
affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on
the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living
who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
ISSUES: Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the
declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita
RULING: No. Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
effective March 14, 2003, covers marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines does not allow it. The marriage of
petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on August 26, 2004 which
falls within the ambit of the order. The order declares that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife. But it does not mean
that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional
right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment
of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of
the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration
of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.
LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner, vs.
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD
CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO,
Respondents. D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the Order,1 dated 3 May
2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan,
Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of
its Order,2 dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating
respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B.
Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad)
filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico.
Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and
Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.3
They begot seven children, herein respondents, namely:
Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph
Lloyd.4 On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.5 On 26 August 2004,
Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo,
Cagayan.6 Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio
passed away.7
In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio, respondents
averred that the same was entered into without the requisite
marriage license. They argued that Article 348 of the Family
Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been
living together for at least five years without any legal
impediment from securing a marriage license, was not
applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not
have lived together under the circumstances required by said
provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to
Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter’s death, or on 1
May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of
marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and
Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised
the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to
Eulogio’s serious illness which made its performance
impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived
together as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years
openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born
Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28
October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further
contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the
Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the
Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the
dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the
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contracting parties while living who can file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,9 granting the
dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,10 dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by
the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its
position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the
Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides
in Section 2, par. (a)11 that a petition for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain and
simple which states that such a petition may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal that
only the husband or the wife may file the petition for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading
of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is exclusive
and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs
of the deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in
bringing the action to declare the marriage null and void.12
(Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative
defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with
costs de officio. 13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
Following the filing by petitioner of her Comment to the said
motion, the RTC rendered an Order14 dated 3 May 2006,
reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC
reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed
Order ignored the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog,15 which was on
the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse
have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death
of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC,
which provides that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, applies only where both parties to a void marriage are
still living.16 Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC
held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage
void. The RTC expounded on its stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal vs.
Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme
Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person
may file a petition for the declaration of his marriage after his
death. The Order subject of this motion for reconsideration
held that the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog is now superseded by
the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages
(hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme
Court has rejected the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog by approving
the Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages. The Order further held
that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only
parties allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of
their marriage and such right is purely personal and is not
transmissible upon the death of the parties.
44
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the
case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view
of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Niñal vs.
Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to
determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the
legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage
will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their successional
rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only
an inchoate right over the property of the said parents. Hence,
during the lifetime of the parent, it would be proper that it
should solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a
petition to declare his marriage void. However, upon the death
of the parent his heirs have already a vested right over
whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right should
not be frustrated by any rules of procedure such as the Rule.
Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by substantive
law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage
entered by their parent, especially when the marriage is illegal
and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such union
because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the
annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a
semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the
petition after the death of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable only
when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon
the death of anyone of the guilty party to the void marriage, his
heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void,
but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband
or the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which
shall be applicable.17
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006
states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for
reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this
case.18
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
foregoing Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the
said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised
therein.19
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure on the sole question of whether the case law as
embodied in Niñal, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court
applies to the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated
route to this Court, countenancing the hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has
the concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to
issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants
are well advised against taking a direct recourse to this
Court.20 Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief
from the lower courts. As a court of last resort, this Court
should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in
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the first instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ
is concurrently within the competence of the Court of Appeals
or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of
courts.21 However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the
discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.22
Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant
Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy
of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case
grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the
instant case. A contrario, respondents posit that it is Niñal
which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased person
were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein
petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of
their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason
that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Niñal
recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of
the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was
the law in effect at the time of their celebration.23 What we
have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage
sought to be declared void was entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts,
petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in
2004.1âwphi1
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment
of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no
room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages
entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on 3 August 1988.24
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003,
following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to
reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling
in Niñal, because they vary in scope and application. As has
been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages
under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in
its application. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was
celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the
ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
45
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
(n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore
non indiget. When the language of the law is clear, no
explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife
to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages
and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in
the following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
[Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and
hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.25 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a
quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate
heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can
still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate
heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch
6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the
validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B.
Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the latter. No costs.
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Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
- Ty v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127406, November 27, 2000
FACTS: Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married
with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March 1977 in
Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977.
Both weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of
marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the
decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty
herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding
in Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued in August
1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to
have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void.
AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior
marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent
marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that
the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice the
vested rights of the petitioner and of her children.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to
Ofelia Ty.
HELD: SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no
damages should be awarded to the wife who sought damages
against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her
mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social
humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from the
fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent
held valid and subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her
status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages
would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife
damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would
make the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine
laws do not comprehend an action for damages between
husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital
obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and
Reyes is declared valid and subsisting and the award of the
amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly
support to their 2 children for as long as they are of minor age
or otherwise legally entitled thereto.
OFELIA P. TY, petitioner,vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES,
respondents.D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24,
1996, of the Court of Appeals in C.A. – G.R. CV 37897, which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract between private
respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null
and void ab initio. It also ordered private respondent to pay
P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children Faye Eloise
Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent
married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on
March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on
August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their
marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage
46
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also
declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the
parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to
Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein
petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the
judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had
a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J
with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying that his marriage to
petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had
no marriage license when they got married. He also averred
that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to
Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner
the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not
been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna
Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil
marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent,
pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted
without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage
License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979,
as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this document
when it was submitted in evidence. Petitioner also submitted
the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void
his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated
on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to said Anna Maria
on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as
evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore
deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that the
civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place
on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior
marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also appears
indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a
church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.1
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondent’s civil suit and
declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab
initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties
appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that
a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna
Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage
could be validly contracted. Said the appellate court:
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by
defendant’s counsel that ‘no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of void marriages.’ It does not say,
however, that a second marriage may proceed even without a
judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and void,
ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are
unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a marriage is valid
or not is for each married spouse to determine for himself – for
this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed
to a second marriage even before a competent court issues a
judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results would
be disquieting, to say the least, and could not have been the
intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil
Code on marriage.
xxx
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WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the
appealed Decision in this wise:
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein
private respondent] Eduardo M. Reyes and
defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared
null and void ab initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give
monthly support in the amount of P15,000.00 to his children
Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4,
1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
instant petition asserting that the Court of Appeals erred:
I.
BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING
FOR THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONER’S MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.
II
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO
VS. COURT OF APPEALS.
III
IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS
RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE.
IV
IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity
of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage
can be entered into validly? To resolve this question, we shall
go over applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed light on the
assigned errors, particularly the first and the second which we
shall discuss jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the
marriage of petitioner to private respondent null and void for
lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between
private respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court
rejected petitioner’s claim that People v. Mendoza3 and People
v. Aragon4 are applicable in this case. For these cases held that
where a marriage is void from its performance, no judicial
decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. But the appellate
court said these cases, decided before the enactment of the
Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O No. 227), no
longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be
read into the provisions of law previously obtaining.5
In refusing to consider petitioner’s appeal favorably, the
appellate court also said:
47
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is
mandatory precedent for this case. Although decided by the
High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of the
now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code, as in the instant
case.
xxx
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .6
At the outset, we must note that private respondent’s first and
second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively,
are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The present
case differs significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v.
Bobis7 and Mercado v. Tan,8 both involving a criminal case for
bigamy where the bigamous marriage was contracted during
the effectivity of the Family Code,9 under which a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil
Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years,
is generally considered as dead and before any person believed
to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted
shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and
void by a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage
is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express provision to
that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to
be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,10 and People v. Aragon,11
this Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish
the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same
factual milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during
the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of his first
wife, accused contracted a third marriage during the
subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a
complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the
ground that the second marriage is void, having been
contracted during the existence of the first marriage. There is
no need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is
void. Since the second marriage is void, and the first one
terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting
valid marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex
Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that it is not for the
spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or
not.
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In Gomez v. Lipana,12 and Consuegra v. Consuegra,13 however,
we recognized the right of the second wife who entered into
the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and
in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The
Court observed that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the
first marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for
judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage).
And since the death of the husband supervened before such
declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to share in
the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.14
But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),15 the Court adverted to
Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We exonerated a clerk of
court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his
marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void, since
she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales in
February of the same year. The Court held that no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages.
This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.16
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),17 the Court held that
there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she
married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the
Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to
Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. The
Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:18
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the
existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing
Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes
she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel;
accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would
be regarded VOID under the law. (Emphasis supplied).
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,19 however, the Court found the
second marriage void without need of judicial declaration, thus
reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest
under the Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and
Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family
Code.20 Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage –
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Terre v. Terre (1992)21 the Court, applying Gomez,
Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we
disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage during
the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first
marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already
married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have known
that the prevailing case law is that "for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage,
a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void
ab initio is essential."
48
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v.
Court of Appeals (1993),22 the Court held:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as
a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family
Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See
also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).23
However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the
peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero,
(1997)24 the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of
immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge
claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely
forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On
the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat,
Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage
took place and all the children thereunder were born before
the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family
Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private
respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that
time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and
Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for
lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial
declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private
respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code
cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so
would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her
children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals,25 the Family Code
has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested
rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of
petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not
quite prepared to give assent to the appellate court’s finding
that despite private respondent’s "deceit and perfidy" in
contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her
silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the
church ceremony wherein petitioner married private
respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier
in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised
this matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful
private respondent’s allegation that he wed petitioner but they
lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage
license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979
and used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the
church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As
petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused
to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical
marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to
raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues
that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from
giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that
the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of
marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such
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technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had
complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid
marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the
first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in
the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the
ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same
parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served
not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court
might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense
of the defendant below which undoubtedly could have
tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by
her before the trial court. But we are now persuaded we
cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the
wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls "his own deceit and
perfidy."
On the matter of petitioner’s counterclaim for damages and
attorney’s fees.1âwphi1 Although the appellate court admitted
that they found private respondent acted "duplicitously and
craftily" in marrying petitioner, it did not award moral damages
because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her
claim.26
Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages
should be awarded in the present case, but for another reason.
Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid
and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate
wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her
husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their
marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from
her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a
situation where the husband pays the wife damages from
conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the
application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense,
militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not
comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife
merely because of breach of a marital obligation.27 There are
other remedies.28
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its Resolution
dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that the
marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent
Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING;
and the award of the amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and
MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children, Faye
Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of
minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against
private respondent.
- Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104818, September 17,
1993
FACTS: Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in
1976, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo
had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She
came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit
of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home
from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she
discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and
had been disposing some of her properties which is
administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their
marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is
unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad
49
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the
purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the
separation and distribution of properties acquired during the
marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration
should only be filed for purposes of remarriage.
RULING: The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed
required for purposed of remarriage. However, it is also
necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who
believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully
married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed
from being charged with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final
judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Other specific
effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children
of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except
that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the
other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as
irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad
faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse
by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in
bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations
by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by
one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.
Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the
necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that
for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to
be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property according
to the regime of property relations governing them.
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by
her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's
ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's
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order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property"
against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among
others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the
YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract
Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036
issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous
marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which
marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the
prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz
sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present,
she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to
the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month
annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since
1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and
completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence;
out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal
properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00,
which are under the possession and administration of Roberto;
sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she
further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted
him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R.
Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he
failed and refused to turn over the possession and
administration of said properties to her
brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer
and possess the same on account of the nullity of their
marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining
Roberto from exercising any act of administration and
ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null
and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties
acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties
be placed under the proper management and administration of
the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
petition stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab
initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore,
superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private respondent
has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an
Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She
explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first
marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and void
(citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and
no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap
case there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted by
respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with
another woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or
not the second marriage should first be judicially declared a
nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de
50
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms,
thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed
to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage
was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of
its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the
previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of
Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner
has no property in his possession is an issue that may be
determined only after trial on the merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous
application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the absence of
justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On
September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for
reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from
receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special
civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the
lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the
petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited by
petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the
lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there
being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the
successional rights of the second wife while the instant case
prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration
of nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and
subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the
union can be had only upon proper determination of the status
of the marital relationship between said parties, whether or
not the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner.
Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of
suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in
this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of
the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the
Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised
together with other incidents of their marriage such as the
separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the
Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the
motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy
ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the
trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on
appeal. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently
denied for lack of merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case
are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void
marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same
should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
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Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of
private respondent to recover certain real and personal
properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People
v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private
respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary and
superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of
Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for
purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J
contains no allegation of private respondent's intention to
remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity
of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for
purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the
separation and distribution of the properties acquired during
coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage
with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As
such, it is from the beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not
dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied
upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled
that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of
a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that
Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions
stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage
was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for
the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not.
That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in
subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v.
Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon
and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order
forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property
acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if
the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the
application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial
declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for
that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, that
"although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab
initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such
nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and
applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting
the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful
surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of
her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage
that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime
of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no
51
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13
the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there
was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior
marriage of her first husband at the time they married each
other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and
for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as
a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 14 Where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of
the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage
should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void
even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the following
minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees where the present Article 40, then Art.
39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should
include not only void but also voidable marriages. He then
suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot
determine for himself whether or not his marriage is valid and
that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly
proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of
a final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
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Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no
question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a
judgment of annulment, they still have to produce the
judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of
a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared
invalid, does it include the annulment of a marriage and the
declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in
the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments,
even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno
suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is
to require first a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not
annullable marriages, with which the other members
concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are
presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which
the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this
is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might
result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if
what they are referring to in the provision is the declaration
that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with
collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa
explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be
a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should
not declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void,
while the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that
they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that
point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are
brought on the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then
asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the defense
that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void?
Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no
judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it
will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a
unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa
saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit
the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39
be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage
may be invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage
only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent
marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only
be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
52
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too
broad and will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He
proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is
that if one enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining
a final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage,
said subsequent marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go
back to the original wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in
Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of
a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her
first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that
there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the
recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the
defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly
immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage
and living with another woman other than complainant while
his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that
"for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be
maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to
allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will
warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position
in the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same
shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void." Realizing the need for careful
craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee
members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did
not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case
"solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of
remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the
interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that
is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
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invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering
irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant
clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of
remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances
where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as
in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and
separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well
as an action for the custody and support of their common
children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes.
In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such
a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring
such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a
party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains
subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is
legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the
previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other
words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute
nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other
evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution
as an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State."20 In more
explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the
family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore,
the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting
another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so
defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract
of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal
effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social
institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on
very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying
marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human
ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social significant
institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts,
and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not
only would such an open and public declaration by the courts
definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but
the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible
to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no
impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one of the
parties may be gleaned from new information required in the
Family Code to be included in the application for a marriage
53
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of
Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive.
Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in
the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will
result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His
misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced
emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the
members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued
to refer to "for purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that
"only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that
they say "on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera
suggested that they use the legal term "solely" instead of
"only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for
absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests
that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil
action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been
acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower
court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be
clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and
ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually
nothing to separate or partition as the petition admits that all
the properties were acquired with private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded
that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
may be raised together with the other incident of their
marriage such as the separation of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that
the final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children, and the delivery
of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific
effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children
of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except
that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the
other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as
irrevocable; and
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(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad
faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse
by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in
bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations
by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by
one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n)
26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's
ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of
the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion
that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary
civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The
Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration
of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations
governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before
whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is
likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental
questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the
respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that
the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the
Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
- Valdez v. RTC, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in
1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992
for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is
null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of
their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which
they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision
regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common
property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on
the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire
to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based
on co-ownership.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents.
VITUG, J.:p
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an
alleged error committed by the Regional Trial Court in Civil
54
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has
failed to apply the correct law that should govern the
disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage
is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on
the part of either or both parties in the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not
in dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05
January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children.
In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration
of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 102). After the hearing the parties
following the joinder of issues, the trial court,1 in its decision of
29 July 1994, granted the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent
Consuelo Gomez-Valdez is hereby declared null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital
obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin
and Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they would want
to stay with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of
their mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over
the children who are in the custody of the other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with
the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code,
within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar
of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper recording in the
registry of marriages.2 (Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the
decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the
Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common
property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during
the hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit
expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio
Valdez, herein petitioner.
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the
following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code
explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties
during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are
presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of
the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff
and defendant will own their "family home" and all their
properties for that matter in equal shares.
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In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common
by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on ownership
found in the Civil Code shall apply.3 (Emphasis supplied.)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of
the family dwelling, the trial court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio,
pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and
respondent shall be governed by the rules on ownership.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds
no application since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute
community of property.4
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The
motion was denied on 30 October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50,
51 and 52 of the Family Code should be held controlling: he
argues that:
I
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where
the parties are psychologically incapacitated.
II
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the
Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in
cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a
marriage declared void by reason of the psychological
incapacity of the spouses.
III
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages
declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological
incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with
Article 129.
IV
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of
the children wish to stay.5
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be,
of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the
Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases;6 it
provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
55
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his
or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and
owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith,
the share of the party in bad faith in the ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default
of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the
termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a
woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term
"capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law)
refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e.,
any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards
not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and
38"7 of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules
on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition
of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household."8 Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the
above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in
addition, the law now expressly provides that —
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his
or her share in co-ownership property, without consent of the
other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall
forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their
common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of
the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to
the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the
termination of the cohabitation9 or declaration of nullity of the
marriage. 10
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When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment
to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other
(as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of
them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned in common and in
proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions
and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed
to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership,
as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the
party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
already heretofore expressed. 11
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the
settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court
acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed
likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in
ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family
home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well
as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the
property owned in common by them, the provisions on
co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52,
in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code,
should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation
of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles
50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95)
of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable
marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article
40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a
subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void
marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter
is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and
an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very
beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their
nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously
contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away
with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second
marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43,
in relation to Articles 41 15 and 42, 16 of the Family Code, on
the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be
made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be
assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident
property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid
and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other,
between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages,
leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on
co-ownership subject to the provisions of the Family Code on
the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter
2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of
the property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and
30 October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
- Mercado v. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 01, 2000 (include
Justice Vitug’s Dissenting Opinion)
FACTS: The accused, Vincent Mercado was in lawful
wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony
solemnized on April 10, 1976. Despite the prior marriage he got
married to complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991. On
October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by
complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of
Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of
the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr.
Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated
January 22, 1993. On November 13, 1992, or more than a
month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s
Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City,
and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between
Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null
and void. Despite this, the Trial Court charged Vincent with
bigamy since his prior marriage was still subsisting at the time
he had contracted his second marriage. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The petitioner then filed a
case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Is the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior
marriage necessary for remarriage?
RULING: The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed
the assailed decision. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final
judgment declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage
came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but
after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already
tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the
act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent
marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally
dissolved.
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from
the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a
voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage.
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO,
petitioner,vs.
CONSUELO TAN, respondent. D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is
necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statute as "void."
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July
14, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-GR CR No.
19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying
reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case
No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as
follows:
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"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G.
Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of Bigamy
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have
been proven beyond reasonable doubt, [the court hereby
renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three (3)
years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days of prision
correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to
eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as
maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.
Costs against accused."2
The Facts
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial
court’s judgment, as follows: "From the evidence adduced by
the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent
Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on
June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J.
Ibañez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly
executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said
document, the status of accused was ‘single’. There is no
dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the
wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married
man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a
marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge
Leonardo B. Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage
Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony
was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10,
1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In
the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and
complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29,
1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar,
Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated
when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore
accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired
by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
"On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by
complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of
Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of
the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr.
Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated
January 22, 1993.
"On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the
bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused
filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma.
Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision
dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado
and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
"Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second marriage
with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991
when at that time he was previously united in lawful marriage
with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City,
without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As
shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the
essential elements of the crime are present, namely: (a) that
the offender has been previously legally married; (2) that the
first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
57
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for
validity. x x x
"While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s],
accused posited the defense that his previous marriage ha[d]
been judicially declared null and void and that the private
complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of accused.
"It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was
entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991,
accused’s prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was
subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any
judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior
marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the
nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of
his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married man
when he contracted such second marriage with complainant on
June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his
first wife."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
"Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.’ But here, the final judgment declaring null and
void accused’s previous marriage came not before the
celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case
for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And
what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person
who shall contract a second subsequent marriage ‘before’ the
former marriage has been legally dissolved."4
Hence, this Petition.5
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
"A
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is
present in order to convict petitioner.
"B
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in
relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the
guilt of petitioner.
"C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the
basis of reasonable doubt."6
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
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Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides:
"The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings."
The elements of this crime are as follows:
"1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity."7
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the
elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that
petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu
City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a
second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan
who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike
voidable marriages which are considered valid until set aside by
a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed
never to have taken place at all.8 Thus, he concludes that there
is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the
commentaries9 of former Justice Luis Reyes that "it is now
settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is
a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is
voidable, it is not a defense."
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage
was declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code,
but she points out that that declaration came only after the
Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had
already been consummated. She argues that a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be
obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.
We agree with the respondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has been
characterized as "conflicting."10 In People v. Mendoza,11 a
bigamy case involving an accused who married three times, the
Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that
case, the accused contracted a second marriage during the
subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he married for
the third time. The second wife then charged him with bigamy.
Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was
void ab initio because it had been contracted while the first
marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was
obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there was no
need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused
58
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
did not commit bigamy when he married for the third time.
This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon,12
which involved substantially the same facts.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a
judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v. GSIS,13
Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first
marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death, the Court
awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to
the first wife and the other half to the second wife and her
children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second
marriage. It held: "And with respect to the right of the second
wife, this Court observes that although the second marriage
can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,14 however, the Court again held that
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage was not
necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death
Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving spouse.
The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in
the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the first wife,
holding that "the second marriage that he contracted with
private respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse is null
and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage."
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,15 the Court stressed the need for such
declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel
on the ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage.
After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present
evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had
previously been married to another woman. In holding that
there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: "x x x
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the
existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs, according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such
fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x."
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,16 the Court reverted to the ruling
in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was no need for such
declaration of nullity.
In Domingo v. CA,17 the issue raised was whether a judicial
declaration of nullity was still necessary for the recovery and
the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the
affirmative, the Court declared: "The Family Code has settled
once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse
who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void,
marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his
or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy."18
Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other
cases herein cited was not a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
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Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new
provision of the Family Code, which came into effect several
years after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act
No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:
"Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by
any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal
and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or the
absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in
either case until declared null and void by a competent court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision
"plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any
person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void
from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable
marriages."19
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under
Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family
Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision,
expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage, as follows:
"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such marriage void."
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final
judgment declaring such marriage void was necessary. Verily,
the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel.
Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code
Revision Commitee has observed:
"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the
Supreme Court that the marriage of a person may be null and
void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact
before that person can marry again; otherwise, the second
marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86,
143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This
provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal
and void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary
to establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People
v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033)."20
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and
Aragon – that there is no need for a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of
the Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary before one
can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we
hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy.
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in
Terre v. Terre,21 which involved an administrative Complaint
59
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyer’s
argument that he was free to enter into a second marriage
because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: "for
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential." The Court
further noted that the said rule was "cast into statutory form
by Article 40 of the Family Code." Significantly, it observed that
the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration
that the first marriage was void, was "bigamous and criminal in
character."
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose
earlier work was cited by petitioner, changed his view on the
subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in
1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent
marriage:22
"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void
from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with
a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage.
Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code
Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not
be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is
the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of
their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x
x x."
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage
although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a
letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a
second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he
committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the
crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his
view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy
cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action
as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow
that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the
charge against him.
Damages
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside
the ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar as it denied her claim
of damages and attorney’s fees.23
Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA
against her; hence, she cannot obtain affirmative relief from
this Court.24 In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set
aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which we
quote hereunder:
"We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented
in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that
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she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the
previous marriage when she contracted matrimony with Dr.
Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this,
and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies.
xxx xxx xxx
"Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of
his previous marriage does not inspire belief, especially as she
had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We
are convinced that she took the plunge anyway, relying on the
fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr. Mercado,
she being by then already living with another man.
"Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case
where she was fully conscious of the consequences of her act.
She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the
event the truth [would] come out, as it did in this case,
ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are
indeed damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own
willful making."25
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
- Nicdao Carino v. Carino, G.R. No. 132529, February 02, 2001
Facts: During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he
contracted two marriages, the first with Susan Nicdao Carino
with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with
Susan Yee Carino with whom he had no children in their almost
ten year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away under the
care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the
deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao was able
to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of
P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money
against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter with
Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage was
solemnized without the required marriage license. The trial
court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of
acquired death benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and
Susan Nicdao is void for lack of marriage license.
Ruling: Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when
the marriage of Nicdao and Carino was solemnized in 1969, a
valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the
absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the
marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the marriage does
not fall within any of those exceptions and a marriage license
therefore was indispensable to the validity of it. This fact is
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of
Nicdao and Carino has been sufficiently overcome and cannot
stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab initio as well
for lack of judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino and
Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The marriages are
bigamous; under Article 148 of the Family Code, properties
acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution
shall belong to the co-ownership. The decision of the trial court
and Court of Appeals is affirmed.
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity
of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4
Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the subject
of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married.
1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to
set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No.
Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he
contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with
petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and
Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November 10, 1992,
with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as
Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten
year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due
to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed
away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who
spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and
respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM,
[and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a total
of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant
case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan
Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return
to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand
pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as “death
benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of
summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the
trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the
deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without
first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed
that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that
she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased,
where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of
the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of
money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage license. In support
thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of
the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage
license number; 5 and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994,
from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which
reads –
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage
license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN
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NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969.
Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or
transcription of Marriage License number from the records of
this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee
Cariño for whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent,
Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was
paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death
of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in the amount
of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA.
DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE
CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE
BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE
ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law,
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However,
for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage,
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. 10 In
such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such
a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring
such previous marriage void. 11
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this
case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is
rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits” of the
deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages
exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage.
This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court
held that such a certification is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the
local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It
then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their
marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage
license. Although she was declared in default before the trial
court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and
explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings
before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner
conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from
pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence,
the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not
being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however,
that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny
would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate,
under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also
be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao
does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage
was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee
and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
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One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is
the separation of the property of the spouses according to the
applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two
marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime
would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of
property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles
147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions
Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the
property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 -
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions ...”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the
co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong
to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of
care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral
inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized
during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed
to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the
application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and
PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police
officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the
contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary
benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent
and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and
respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By
intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased
shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the
legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article
applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence
of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith,
the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default
of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages
and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation
shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be
divided equally between them, even if only one party earned
the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. 19
Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were
earned by the deceased alone as a government employee,
Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling
the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no
allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the
first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half
of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the
petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other
half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate
succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan
Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals
relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service
Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the
retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the
other half, to the second wife, holding that:
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been
dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established
by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under
the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his
death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as
conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such
putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s share in the
property here in dispute....” And with respect to the right of the
second wife, this Court observed that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still
there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And
inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second
marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity,
“[t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to
recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half
in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider
the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the
first marriage.” 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is
premised on the rule which requires a prior and separate
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judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why
in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties
in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court,
construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior
and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all
important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage.
That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a
second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree
declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could
contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage
would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage
is patently void because the parties are not free to determine
for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage.
However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a
case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage
claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of
nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present
evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that
the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid.
Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the
issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved
and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in
accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in
Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering
petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus
attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (83a)
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of
the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to
the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case
such fact is disputed. (n)
- Republic of the Philippines v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053, March
17, 1993
Facts: On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed
before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, involving
Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondent’s wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through
the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized
to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic
argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead; and second,
Nolasco’s attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same
proceeding was a cunning attempt to circumvent the law on
marriage.
Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he
had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in
England during one of his ship’s port calls. From that chance
meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent
Nolasco on his ship for six months until they returned to
respondent’s hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November
1980 after his seaman’s contract expired. On 15 January 1982,
respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique,
in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the
Cathedral of San Jose.
He obtained another employment contract as a seaman and
left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in
January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a
letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had
given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet
Monica had left Antique.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her
himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless.
He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing
spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the
address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were
all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from
among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
The trial court granted Nolasco’s petition hereby declaring the
presumptively death of Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without
prejudice to her reappearance.
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that
the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to
show that there existed a well founded belief for such
declaration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a
basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
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Issue: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief
that his wife is already dead.
Ruling: No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco
failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded belief” that she is
dead. Pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code, a marriage
contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In fine,
respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded
belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead
that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s decision declaring
Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby reversed
and both Decisions are hereby nullified and set aside.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.R E S O L U T I O N
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica
Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition
prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead
or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and
void.1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through
the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized
to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic
argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead,"2 and second,
Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same
proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on
marriage.3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman
and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject,
in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that
chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with
respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they
returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19
November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15
January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San
Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van
Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage
celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a
seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique.
Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent
received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet
Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed
him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he
then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return
home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her
himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless.
He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing
spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the
address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were
all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from
among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with
and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of
knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his
wife continued to refuse to give him such information even
after they were married. He also testified that he did not report
the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine
government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as
his witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica
had expressed a desire to return to England even before she
had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When
asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave
Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never
got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia
Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica
from leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days
before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet
Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22
December 1982 for England. She further claimed that she had
no information as to the missing person's present
whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated
12 October 1988 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of
the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as
amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court
hereby declares as presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker
Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance.4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that
the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to
show that there existed a well founded belief for such
declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding
that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a
belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this
Court on a Petition for Review where the following allegations
are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's
finding that there existed a well-founded belief on the part of
Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's
declaration that the petition was a proper case of the
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family
Code.5
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The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is
"[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his
wife is already dead."6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to
Article 41 of the Family Code which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil
Code, which it superseded,7 the following crucial differences
emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the
presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years;
however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death to enable the spouse present to remarry.8 Also, Article
41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil
Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that
there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the
absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be
so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article
390 and 391 of the Civil Code.9 The Family Code, upon the
other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the
absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4)
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all
these requirements.11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this:
that respondent failed to prove that he had complied with the
third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief"
that the absent spouse is already dead.
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a
search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to
a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of
diligence required in searching for a missing spouse. In that
case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of
bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief that his
first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had
not exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his
first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries
concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of
whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the
parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of Pampanga,
for the purpose of securing information concerning her
whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion only that his
first wife was dead. He admits that the only basis of his
suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation
allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain
Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the
basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after
learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the
help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he
secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast
city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts
to inquire the whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to
London and I went to London to look for her I could not find
her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused
London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed
efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's
justification of the mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the
geographical difference between London and Liverpool, for a
humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one
— place in England, the port where his ship docked and where
he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave
home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or
Parañaque, would announce to friends and relatives, "We're
going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of places of
destination does not appear to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its
neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on
the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are
around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not
consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London
with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular
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person there — which is in effect what Nolasco says he did —
can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica
declined to give any information as to her personal background
even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an
excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said
of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife
which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent
said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified
circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's
bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her
whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify
those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that
since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it
is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature,
be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with
credibility. 18 As noted before, there are serious doubts to
respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as
evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the
missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their
common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his
mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short his
employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However,
he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from January
1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to
November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose. Respondent,
moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without
inquiring about her parents and their place of residence. 19
Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to
get the help of the police or other authorities in London and
Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of
Janet Monica's departure and respondent's subsequent
behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that
Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its
purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relationship for life
and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by
virtue of any contract they make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the
simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the
conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the
policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that
respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the
trial court in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion
between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve
the marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young
son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements of
the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the
clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law
does not view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of
the Family Code emphasizes that.
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between
a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for
the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly
the need to protect.
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in
the preservation of which the State bas the strongest interest;
the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind.
In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the
following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of
the Philippines in Article 149:
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social
institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no
custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall
be recognized or given effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the
well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife was
already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
February 1990, affirming the trial court's decision declaring
Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED
and both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs
against respondent.
- Social Security System v. De Bailon, G.R. No. 165545, March
24, 2006
Facts: Where a person has entered into two successive
marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of the
second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the
validity of the second marriage to prove that the first marriage
had not been dissolved.
Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage. More
than 15 years later, a Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death has been filed before the Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon, which has been granted. Bailon, subsequently,
contracted marriage with respondent Teresita Jarque and
designated her the Social Security System (SSS) beneficiary of
the former.
SSS cancelled the claim of respondent Teresita Jarque of her
monthly pension for death benefits on the basis of the opinion
rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon
was void as it was contracted during the subsistence of Bailon’s
marriage with Alice.
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Teresita protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for
death benefits asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not
declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful.
Hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and
purposes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Clemente
Bailon and respondent Teresita Jarque may terminate by mere
reappearance of the absent spouse of Bailon
HELD: The second marriage contracted by a person with an
absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the competent
court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article
87 of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing
spouse, which action for annulment may be filed.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code,
the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it
is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case
instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of
the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a
subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof
provides the subsequent marriage shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of
the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the
previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action,
such absentee‘s mere reappearance, even if made known to
the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate
such marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouse‘s physical
reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be
regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage
is terminated as provided by law.
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance
with law, Bailon‘s and Teresita‘s marriage prior to the former‘s
death in 1998, Teresita is rightfully the dependent
spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent. D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and
Resolution dated September 28, 20043 reversing the
Resolution dated April 2, 20034 and Order dated June 4, 20035
of the Social Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No.
4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for review on
certiorari.
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz
(Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon.6
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More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a
petition7 to declare Alice presumptively dead.
By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the
petition notwithstanding the publication of the Notice of
Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country,
Alice Diaz is hereby declared to [sic] all legal intents and
purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead.
SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared
presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted
marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran,
Sorsogon.10
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social
Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree pensioner
thereof effective July 1994, died.11
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and
was granted P12,00012 by the SSS.
Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for
death benefits13 which was also granted by the SSS on April 6,
1998.14
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of
Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the
release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She
claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime,
the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the
third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together
with her siblings, paid for Bailon’s medical and funeral
expenses; and all the documents submitted by respondent to
the SSS in support of her claims are spurious.
In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon
Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit dated February 13,
199915 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon
and Elisa who cohabited as husband and wife as early as 1958;
and they were reserving their right to file the necessary court
action to contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent
as they personally know that Alice is "still very much alive."16
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz,
claiming to be the brother and guardian of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed
before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s
death,17 he further attesting in a sworn statement18 that it
was Norma who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for
death benefits as Bailon’s beneficiaries before the SSS.20
Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol
Cluster, Naga City recommended the cancellation of payment
of death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an
order for the refund of the amount paid to her from February
1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the denial of the
claim of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon
Bailon for support during his lifetime; and the payment of the
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balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to Bailon’s
beneficiaries according to the order of preference provided
under the law, after the amount erroneously paid to
respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of the
Memorandum read:
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been
misled by misrepresentation in declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic]
Diaz, as presumptively dead.
xxxx
x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz
Presumptively Dead," did not become final. The presence of
Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.
xxxx
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz
[sic] Diaz. He, being in bad faith, and is the deserting spouse,
his remarriage is void, being bigamous.
xxxx
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting
spouse and who remarried, thus his marriage to Teresita Jarque,
for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require
affidavit of reappearance to terminate the second marriage is
not necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz [sic] Diaz, the
first wife, and a voidable marriage [sic], to speak of.21
(Underscoring supplied)
In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August
16, 2000,22 advised respondent that as Cecilia and Norma
were the ones who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses, she
should return the P12,000 paid to her.
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999,23 the SSS
advised respondent of the cancellation of her monthly pension
for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal
department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was
contracted while the latter’s marriage with Alice was still
subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring
Alice presumptively dead did not become final, her "presence"
being "contrary proof" against the validity of the order. It thus
requested respondent to return the amount of P24,000
representing the total amount of monthly pension she had
received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension
for death benefits by letter to the SSS dated October 12,
1999.24 In a subsequent letter dated November 27, 199925 to
the SSC, she reiterated her request for the release of her
monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon was
not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or
unlawful, hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal
intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his
beneficiary.
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21,
2000,26 maintained the denial of her claim for and the
discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her,
however, that she was not deprived of her right to file a
petition with the SSC.
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the
SSC for the restoration to her of her entitlement to monthly
pension.
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was
returning, under protest, the amount of P12,000 representing
the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and
her siblings "forcibly and coercively prevented her from
spending any amount during Bailon’s wake."28
After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondent’s petition, and
the parties filed their respective Position Papers, one Alicia P.
Diaz filed an Affidavit30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS
Naga Branch attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had
only recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to
declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she
disappeared as Bailon could have easily located her, she having
stayed at her parents’ residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after
she found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and
Bailon used to visit her even after their separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage
of respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore, she was "just
a common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows,
quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that
petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the legitimate spouse
and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the
SSS the amount of P24,000.00 representing the death benefit
she received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May
1999 as well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon
the appropriate death benefit arising from the demise of SSS
member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and
(k) as well as Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its
prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this Commission
of its compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this
Commission comes to the inevitable conclusion that the
petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.
xxxx
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary
to the declaration of the then CFI of Sorsogon (10th Judicial
District), the first wife never disappeared as the deceased
member represented in bad faith. This Commission accords
credence to the findings of the SSS contained in its
Memorandum dated August 9, 1999,32 revealing that Alice
(a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona, Sorsogon, after her
separation from Clemente Bailon x x x.
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the
deceased member using artifice and by exerting fraud upon the
unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving
the deceased member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear
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that the marriage to the petitioner is void, considering that the
first marriage on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously
annulled, invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime
of the parties thereto. x x x as determined through the
investigation conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the
abandoning spouse, not Alice Diaz Bailon.
xxxx
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the
petitioner was just a common-law wife of the deceased
member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a
primary beneficiary, to the latter’s death benefit. x x x
xxxx
It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the
legitimate surviving spouse and primary beneficiary of
Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of
death benefit she received from the SSS for the period from
February 1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle of
solutio indebiti x x x
Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually
defrayed the cost of the wake and burial of Clemente Bailon,
she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier
given to her by the SSS as funeral benefit.33 (Underscoring
supplied)
Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration34 having been
denied by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a petition for
review35 before the Court of Appeals (CA).
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the
April 2, 2003 Resolution and June 4, 2003 Order of the SSC and
thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits
due her. Held the CA:
x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue
of whether or not the decision of the then CFI, now RTC,
declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality
but, more importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS
and Commission can validly re-evaluate the findings of the RTC,
and on its own, declare the latter’s decision to be bereft of any
basis. On similar import, can respondents SSS and Commission
validly declare the first marriage subsisting and the second
marriage null and void?
xxxx
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person
presumptively dead never attains finality as the finding that
"the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a
presumption juris tantum," the second marriage contracted by
a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is
only the competent court that can nullify the second marriage
pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the
reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for
annulment may be filed. Nowhere does the law contemplates
[sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly declare the
second marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own
investigation and declare that the decision of the RTC declaring
one to be presumptively dead is without basis.
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to
review the decision of the regular courts under the pretext of
determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members.
Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the findings
of the RTC, it should extend due credence to the decision of the
RTC absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the contrary.
xxx
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually
possesses the authority to declare the decision of the RTC to be
without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the
principle of fair play and thus its findings are of doubtful quality
considering that petitioner Teresita was not given ample
opportunity to present evidence for and her behalf.
xxxx
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an
Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry is no longer
practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first
marriage to restore as the marital bond between Alice Diaz and
Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the latter’s
death. Neither is there a second marriage to terminate because
the second marriage was likewise dissolved by the death of
Clemente Bailon.
However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the
filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry
where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already
inutile, the respondent SSS has now the authority to review the
decision of the RTC and consequently declare the second
marriage null and void.36 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for
Reconsideration37 which were both denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the SSS’ present petition for review on certiorari38
anchored on the following grounds:
I Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS
CONTRARY TO LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.39
The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the
findings of facts of the SSC on the prior and subsisting marriage
between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the
SSC to determine to whom, between Alice and respondent, the
death benefits should be awarded pursuant to Section 540 of
the Social Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not
give respondent due process or ample opportunity to present
evidence in her behalf.
The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to
the CFI proceedings are of no moment to the present
controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter
dicta in view of the SSC’s finding of the existence of a prior and
subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by virtue of which
Alice has a better right to the death benefits."41
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The petition fails.
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect
to SSS coverage, benefits and contributions, there is no doubt.
In so exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much
less reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the
case at bar when it declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI
Order was obtained through fraud and subsequently
disregarded the same, making its own findings with respect to
the validity of Bailon and Alice’s marriage on the one hand and
the invalidity of Bailon and respondent’s marriage on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC
virtually acted as an appellate court. The law does not give the
SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts
in the exercise of its authority to determine the beneficiaries of
the SSS.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code,
the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.42
Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years,
is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent
marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is
illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first
annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the three
exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage
under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid "until
declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that
the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing
the second marriage.44
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent
for 15 consecutive years45 when Bailon sought the declaration
of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not
even a requirement then for purposes of remarriage.46
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased)
commented:
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a
presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second
marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
of the second marriage to prove that the first marriage had not
been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first marriage, for
it must also be shown that it had not ended when the second
marriage was contracted. The presumption in favor of the
innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of the
legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the
presumption of the continuance of life of the first spouse or of
the continuance of the marital relation with such first
spouse.47 (Underscoring supplied)
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,48
it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case
instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of
the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a
subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof
provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of
the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless
there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to
the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case
such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit
provided by the above-quoted provision of the Family Code
does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the
reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of
dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.49
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action,
such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to
the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate
such marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is
dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s
physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must
still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent
marriage is terminated as provided by law.51
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of
an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by
death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the
death of either spouse, the effects of dissolution of valid
marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse
can no longer be raised, because, as in annullable or voidable
marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in a
direct action for annulment.52 (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab
initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the
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Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted
with the first wife having been an absentee for seven
consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed
dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as
soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as
provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that
the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime
of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the
liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have
resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse,"
as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and
not in the annulment proceeding.54 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid.55 Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio.56
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance
with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to the
former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent
spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other
issues raised has been rendered unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
- Manuel v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165842,
November 29, 2005
Facts: Eduardo Manuel married Rubylus Gaña on July 28,
1975. He met Tina Gandalera in 1996. Eduardo proposed
marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single.
Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s
parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo. They were married on
April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes. It appeared in
their marriage contract that Eduardo was “single”. However,
starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went
to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and
whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.
In January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not
return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support. In August
2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the NSO in
Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously
married.
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in
1995 in a bar where she worked as a GRO. He fell in love with
her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage
to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him.
Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when
he noticed that she had a “love-bite” on her neck. He then
abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he
was “single” in his marriage contract with Tina because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did
not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification
of his first marriage before marrying Tina. He insisted that he
married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer
valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20
years.
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
The lower court found Eduardo guilty of bigamy. He was
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and
ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum,
and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina
Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral
damages, plus costs of suit. Eduardo appealed the decision to
the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy
because when he married the private complainant, he did so in
good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained
that at the time that he married the private complainant, he
was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer
subsisted. The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of
the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the lower
court’s decision in awarding a moral damage when it has no
basis in fact and in law.
Ruling: Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of
the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. An award for moral
damages requires the confluence of the following conditions:
first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or
psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there
must be culpable act or omission factually established; third,
the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the
award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in
Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code. Indeed, bigamy is
not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral
damages to the private complainant/offended party.
Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private complainant
for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, “every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” This
provision contains what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but
also in the performance of one’s duties. The standards are the
following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe
honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a)
there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
In the present case, the Eduardo courted Tina and proposed to
marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought
his parents to Tina’s house where he and his parents made the
same assurance – that he was single. Thus, Tina agreed to
marry the him, who even stated in the certificate of marriage
that he was single. She lived with Eduardo and dutifully
performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he
was her lawful husband. For two years or so until Eduardo
heartlessly abandoned her, Tina had no inkling that he was
already married to another before they were married.
Thus, Tina was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery
and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act
alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he
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maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the
private complainant, who changed her status from a single
woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes
and support of a single man she could have married lawfully
and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a
man who it turned out was not her lawful husband.
The Court rules that the Eduardo’s collective acts of fraud and
deceit before, during and after his marriage with Tina were
willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the
latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar
to an award for moral damages. The Court thus declares that
the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good
morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner,vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City,
Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal
Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on
November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P.
MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to
RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the said marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA
GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know
the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL
to Rubylus [Gaña].
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975,
Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano
Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the
Province of Rizal.4 He met the private complainant Tina B.
Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She
stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a
friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial
student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to
Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another,
they went to a motel where, despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo
succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed
marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single.
Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s
parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week
of March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before
Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of
Baguio City, Branch 61.5 It appeared in their marriage contract
that Eduardo was "single."
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
The couple was happy during the first three years of their
married life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to build
their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However,
starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went
to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and
whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.6
Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left,
and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made
inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila
where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married.
She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.7
She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that
Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged
their own vows.8
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in
1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest Relations Officer
(GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed
Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she
nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship
was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a
"love-bite" on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo
further testified that he declared he was "single" in his
marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith
that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had
to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage
before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his
first wife because she threatened to commit suicide unless he
did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter
imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never
saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that
his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard
from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding
Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and
ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum,
and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina
Gandalera the amount of ₱200,000.00 by way of moral
damages, plus costs of suit.9
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that
Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved
because of his first wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did not
exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this
Court in People v. Bitdu,10 the trial court further ruled that
even if the private complainant had known that Eduardo had
been previously married, the latter would still be criminally
liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he
was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married
the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without
any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he
married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief
that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that
conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must
be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not
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motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant
because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have
a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have
taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To
support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in
United States v. Peñalosa11 and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals.12
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo’s
defense of good faith and reliance on the Court’s ruling in
United States v. Enriquez13 were misplaced; what is applicable
is Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of
the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco,14 the OSG further posited that as provided in Article
41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration
of presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the
present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first marriage
was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge
for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for
resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private
complainant’s knowledge of the first marriage would not afford
any relief since bigamy is an offense against the State and not
just against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty
imposed by the trial court was erroneous and sought the
affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the
decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the
accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the
elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the
appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before
Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant, there
should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s presumptive
death as the absent spouse. The appellate court cited the
rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan15 and Domingo v. Court
of Appeals16 to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision
promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as
it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED
in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.17
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari, insisting that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER’S FIRST WIFE CANNOT
BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL
CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF
PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF
THE FAMILY CODE.
II
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS
MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.18
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove
the second element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage has
not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the
Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996,
Gaña had been "absent" for 21 years since 1975; under Article
390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of
law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390
of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years,
whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for
all purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph
refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with respect to
succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent
spouse arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction of two
requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse’s reasonable belief
that the absentee is dead. He insists that he was able to prove
that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he
had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still
alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the
presumptive death of Gaña had arisen by operation of law, as
the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are
present. The petitioner concludes that he should thus be
acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences
provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein on
legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under
Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there must first
be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on
presumptive death would apply. He further asserts that
contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the
requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a requirement for
the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA
erred in awarding moral damages in favor of the private
complainant. The private complainant was a "GRO" before he
married her, and even knew that he was already married. He
genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial
support. He also pointed out that she had an illicit relationship
with a lover whom she brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the
decision of the CA affirming the petitioner’s conviction is in
accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record.
To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in
Republic v. Nolasco.19
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and
penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
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declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal
Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse
legítimamente disuelto el anterior, será castigado con la pena
de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve
and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law.20
The phrase "or before the absent spouse had been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal
Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression
that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the
presumption of death after an absence of a number of years,
the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of
marriage should be a justification for bigamy."21
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is
burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally
married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage
without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage.22 It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it
not for the subsistence of the first marriage.23 Viada avers that
a third element of the crime is that the second marriage must
be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente)
which is an essential element of a felony by dolo.24 On the
other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two
elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has
not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second
marriage. It does not matter whether the first marriage is void
or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until
lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.25 As
the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals26 and Mercado
v. Tan,27 under the Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the
same view as Viada and declared that there are three (3)
elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new
marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony
of the act.28 He explained that:
… This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is
undoubtedly incorporated in the principle antedating all codes,
and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that,
where there is no willfulness there is no crime. There is no
willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this
must be supported by very strong evidence, and if this be
produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime.
Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in the
reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead,
because of the many years that have elapsed since he has had
any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find
her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because
there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the essential
elements of the crime.29
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is
charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is
deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed,
a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is
classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary.30
Although the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of
the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word
"voluntary."31
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an
overt act without legal excuse or justification from which
another suffers injury.32 When the act or omission defined by
law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by
the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.33
Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends
the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the
absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must
prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of
the whole evidence.34
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must
be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.35
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner
was married to Gaña in 1975, and such marriage was not
judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to
subsist.36 The prosecution also proved that the petitioner
married the private complainant in 1996, long after the
effectivity of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil
intent when he married the private complainant. As a general
rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid
defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense
negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the
law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know
the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that
when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of
the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from
her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced
in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the
presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family
Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the
petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent
on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a
consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such
case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on the
proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not
an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement
for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse
is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the
pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely
because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if
the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found
incredible.
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The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of
the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the
"State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social institution
of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the
interest of society require that the marital relation should be
surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the
manner prescribed and the causes specified by law.37 The laws
regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest,
safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the
validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered
society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones;
it enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage;
two willing spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the
parties assume new relations to each other and the State
touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The
consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent
parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take
means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most
positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse38 after the lapse of
the period provided for under the law. One such means is the
requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the
present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a
well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed,
"men readily believe what they wish to be true," is a maxim of
the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a
first because one of the parties believed the other to be dead
would make the existence of the marital relation determinable,
not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic
ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
individuals.39 Only with such proof can marriage be treated as
so dissolved as to permit second marriages.40 Thus, Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage
dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but
upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial
cognizance,41 namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of
the absent spouse.
The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as
basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide –
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of
opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of
five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an
aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four
years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and
has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent
for seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee
still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of
judicial declaration.42 However, Article 41 of the Family Code,
which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death,
reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.43
With the effectivity of the Family Code,44 the period of seven
years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code
was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse
present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must
institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee spouse,45 without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee
spouse. As explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:46
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a
subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a)
The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been
absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is
danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391
of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which
purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last
condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement
of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided
in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement
of instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to
enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage
and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such
provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion
spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent
authorities on Criminal Law.
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As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v.
Hortiguela47 that, for purposes of the marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an
absentee before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence
made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has
for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for
the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires
that the former spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse
present does not know his or her former spouse to be living,
that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and
the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.48 In In Re Szatraw,49 the Court declared that a
judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead,
because he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being
a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof,
cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that
proof of actual death of the person presumed dead being
unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in
another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a
person presumptively dead because he or she had not been
heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory
even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which
an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable
and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such
a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no
benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not
waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous
and meaningless act.50 The Court also took note that a petition
for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse
may even be made in collusion with the other spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court declared
that the words "proper proceedings" in Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law
such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the
administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased
person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,52 the Court
rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under
Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are authorized to
declare the presumptive death of a person after an absence of
seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban
and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that
"the provision of Article 349 or "before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
reached in the proper proceedings" is erroneous and should be
considered as not written. He opined that such provision
presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not been legally
dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared
presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings, the
subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the
supposition is not true.53 A second marriage is bigamous only
when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of
the Civil Code are not present.54 Former Senator Ambrosio
Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to
require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of
absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good
faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second
marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
rise to bigamy.55 Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other
hand, was of the view that in the case of an absent spouse who
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code,
the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy
in case he/she contracts a second marriage.56
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed
the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to
conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a
case where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after
securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the
absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy;
the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead.57 Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present
spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if
the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee
spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As
explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
… Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised
Penal Code providing that the present spouse must first ask for
a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in
order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that
for the purpose of the present spouse contracting a second
marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as
provided in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter’s
reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the present
spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349
of the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration
that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of
the present spouse in contracting a second marriage is already
established.58
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now
Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things are now
clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is
now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary
proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not
be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible clarificatory
examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full
grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as
presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the said absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority
is that the clause "before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead x x x" should be disregarded because of
Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law,
there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee,
otherwise, there is bigamy.59
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law, in some cases
where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must
be a judicial declaration of presumptive death, which could
then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his
estate.60 Before such declaration, it was held that the
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remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in
good faith.61 Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary
views because of the ruling in Jones and the provisions of
Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears to have
been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, "which
requires a summary hearing for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can
remarry."
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a
declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles
239 to 247 of the same Code.62
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial
court and the CA for awarding moral damages in favor of the
private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral
damages may be awarded only in any of the cases provided in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them.
The petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to apply
its ruling in People v. Bondoc,63 where an award of moral
damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner
maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence
to prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private
complainant on its finding that she adduced evidence to prove
the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not
included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages
against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not
bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se debió
indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Código Civil de
Filipinas autoriza la adjudicación de daños morales en los
delitos de estupro, rapto, violación, adulterio o concubinato, y
otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeración el delito de
bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar
aquí los daños de ₱5,000.00 arriba mencionados.64
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based
on the evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the
CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant’s wrongful act or omission.65 An award for moral
damages requires the confluence of the following conditions:
first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or
psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there
must be culpable act or omission factually established; third,
the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the
award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in
Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.66
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party
only in criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1,
3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,
referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral
damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters
may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the
order named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be
awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has suffered
mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar
injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise,
there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of
specific acts in Article 221967 and analogous cases (which refer
to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to
some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form,
proportion, relation, etc.)68
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may be
ordered to pay moral damages to the private
complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is
liable to the private complainant for moral damages under
Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code.
According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." This
provision contains what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but
also in the performance of one’s duties. The standards are the
following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe
honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a)
there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.69
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Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions
of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be responsible.70 If the provision
does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code
would be proper. Article 20 provides that "every person who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same." On the other
hand, Article 21 provides that "any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages." The latter provision
is adopted to remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury should
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of
moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to
prove for specifically in the statutes." Whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or
other applicable provisions of law depends upon the
circumstances of each case.71
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private
complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her that
he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the
private complainant where he and his parents made the same
assurance – that he was single. Thus, the private complainant
agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the
certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the
petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his wife,
believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two
years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the
private complainant had no inkling that he was already married
to another before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
petitioner’s chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud
consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of
acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a
lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman,
lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single man she
could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and
humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not
her lawful husband.72
The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and
deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private
complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and
caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical
injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in
Morris v. Macnab,73 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent
physical injuries, damages for shame, humiliation, and mental
anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent.
See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031
(1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong
is willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the
ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though they
consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct.
1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super,
579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38.
Here the defendant’s conduct was not merely negligent, but
was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in
shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and
when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not
only to compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel
v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers,
etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, "Exemplary Damages in the Law
of Torts," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that
because of the defendant’s bigamous marriage to her and the
attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and
"ashamed to go out" but "couldn’t sleep" but "couldn’t eat,"
had terrific headaches" and "lost quite a lot of weight." No just
basis appears for judicial interference with the jury’s
reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first
count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d
298 (App. Div.74 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against
public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a
social institution, good morals and the interest and general
welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral
damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would
not prevent her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v.
Groswald:75
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of
another to do an act which, in consequence of such
misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral,
but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action
against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by
him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v.
Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370,
17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false
representation by the defendant that he was divorced from his
former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him,
gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been
assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the
law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him
would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a
ground for enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff
was said to be in her being led by the promise to give the
fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her
husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition that
proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury
were held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass.
395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her
cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself
but upon the defendant’s misrepresentation. The criminal
relations which followed, innocently on her part, were but one
of the incidental results of the defendant’s fraud for which
damages may be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to
enter into the marriage relation have been maintained in other
jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17
L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324;
Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v.
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Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of
public policy would not prevent recovery where the
circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no
moral turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by
the defendant’s misrepresentation, and that she does not base
her cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself.
Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused
to lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal on its
face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a
party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded.
Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R.
958.76
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court
finds the award of ₱200,000.00 for moral damages to be just
and reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have
the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over
but below twenty-one, and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parents,
guardian or person having substitute parental authority
over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the
age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the
other and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such
party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge
of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by
force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same
having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a
sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and
appears to be incurable. (85a)
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute
fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article:
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final
judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time
of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than
her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease,
regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism
or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of
the marriage.
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health,
rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will
give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a)
- Republic of the Philippines v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780,
October 16, 2013
FACTS: Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22,
2004, before the sala of Judge Calo in Mandaluyong City. 2
years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with
the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Fringer. According to her, the marriage was a marriage in jest
because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship
and even arranged to pay him $2,000 in exchange for his
consent. Adding that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they
never really had any intention of entering into a married state
and complying with their marital obligations. The court even
sent summons to the husband but he failed to file an answer.
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the
marriage was void ab initio for lack of consent because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as
they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only
as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.. However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
elevated the case to the SC. According to the OSG, the case do
not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest as the parties
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage.
That the parties here intentionally consented to enter into a
real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of
Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered
futile.
ISSUE: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00,
void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
RULING: NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the
marriage. In fact, there was real consent because it was not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.
Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship.
There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it was that precise
legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it
must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer.
A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles
45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation,
and undue influence. None of these are present in the case.
Therefore, their marriage remains valid.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent. D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court,
Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer
(Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from
the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios
were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced
by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged
that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had
any intention of entering into a married state or complying with
any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab
initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer.
On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for
pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and
determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the
Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not
make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at
the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor
appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly
notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the
merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage
void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel
Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease
using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any
right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she
remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for
convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it
stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to
enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and
never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did
not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce
and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5,
2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that
the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to
freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means
to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA
affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite
of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly
did not understand the nature and consequence of getting
married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It
further explained that the parties never intended to enter into
the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband
and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was
primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign
citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN
IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF
OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to
acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid
$2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the
marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that
marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being
bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be
distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to
the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within
the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American
citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition,
reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a
marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the
beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its
arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
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The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring
American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab
initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the
phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of
immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits.
This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole
purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular
purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as
"limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a
child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned
with the intention of the couple at the time of their
marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use
marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration
cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom
did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were
married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA),
which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted
from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It
must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for
immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule
on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as
a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is
also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive
ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in
order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had
agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce
within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand,
ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent
permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there
being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all.
Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter
what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through
indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in
fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no
exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all.
x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent
consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the
outside world and with the understanding that they will put an
end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent
to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is
not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to
deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v.
Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered
into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States,
stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely
because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21
further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was
intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent
has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The problem
being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal
marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts
have generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose"
marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular
purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that
when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce
and should not be recognized from its inception. In its
resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the
RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void
because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and
used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence
of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the
marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the
parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of
American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never
intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended
to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the
parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family
Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of
the same Code provides that the absence of any essential
requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1)
freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting
parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
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intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication,
drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios
and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood
the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences
of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship.
There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it was that precise
legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the
CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A
marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but
entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into
the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that
the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed
by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a
relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real
and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever,
hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest
are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent
consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no
genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no
intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage
in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention
to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow
the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine
consent to be married would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an
apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and
to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine
consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family
Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life.
The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real
intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to
nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law.
The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law
that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the
essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present,
and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by
law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex.
The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital
privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to
have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so
on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited
or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money,
status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause
for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may
validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s
attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot
declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s
marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the
purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues
to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the
ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only
the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous
conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the
wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a
sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug
addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground
for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for
the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify
under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under
Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the
injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to
enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of
marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared
void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The
Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the
parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have
availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it.
These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the
courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of
convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get
herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in
violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage
may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the
parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29,
2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414
is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter
lack of merit.
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
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attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no
judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment. (88a)
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence
of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the
spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the
spouses and the custody and support of their common
children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the
moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of
the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in
Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of
the other parent. (n)
- Supreme Court En Banc Resolution AM 02-11-10 dated
March 04, 2003
PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
RESOLUTION
Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the
Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this
Court's consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the Court Resolved to
APPROVE the same.
The Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003
following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation
not later than March 7, 2003
March 4, 2003
Davide, C.J. Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna
Ynares-Santiago, on leave
Corona, on official leave
RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID
MARIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment
of voidable marriages under the Family Code of te Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
(n)
(b) Where to file. - The petition shal be filed in the Family
Court.
(c) Imprecriptibility ofaction or defense. - An Action or defense
for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage shall not
prescribe.
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of Family Code
shall specially allege te complete facts showing the either or
both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time
of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but
expert opinion need not be alleged.
Section 3. Petition for annulment of voidable marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - The following persons may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriage based on any of the grounds
under article 45 of the Family Code and within the period
herein indicated:
(1) The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or person
exercising substitute parental authority did not give his or her
consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one
unless, after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely
cohabitated with the other as husband or wife; or the parent,
guardian or person having legal charge of the contracting party ,
at any time before such party has reached the age of
twenty-one;
(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the other's
insanity; or by any relative, guardian, or person having legal
charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either
party; or by the insane spouse during the a lucid interval or
after regaining sanity, provided that the petitioner , after
coming to reason, has not freely cohabited with the other as
husband or wife;
(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by fraud,
within five years after the discovery of the fraud, provided that
said party, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the
fraud, has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or
wife;
(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by force,
intimidation, or undue influence, within five years from the
time the force intimidation, or undue influence disappeared or
ceased, provided that the force, intimidation, or undue
influence having disappeared or ceased, said party has not
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(5) The injured party where the other spouse is physically
incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and
such incapability continues and appears to be incurable, within
five years after the celebration of marriage; and
(6) Te injured party where the other party was afflicted with a
sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears
to be incurable, within five years after the celebration of
marriage.
(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the Family
Court.
Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family
Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
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respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to
the date of filing. Or in the case of non-resident respondent,
where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the
petitioner.
Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall
allege the complete facts constituting the cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of
the parties and specify the regime governing their property
relations, as well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written
agreement between the parties, the petitioner may apply for a
provisional order for spousal support, the custody and support
of common children, visitation rights, administration of
community or conjugal property, and other matters similarly
requiringurgent action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied celebration of
marriage. (b) Where to file.-The petition shall be filed in the
Family Court.
Section 4. Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the Family
Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to
the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent,
where he may be found in the Philippines at the election of the
petitioner.
Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall
allege the complete facts constituting the cause of action.
(2) it shall state the names and ages of the common children of
the parties and specify the regime governing their property
relations, as well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written
agreement between the parties, the petitioner may apply for a
provisional order for spousal support, custody and support of
common children, visitation rights, administration of
community or conjugal property, and other matters similarly
requiring urgent action.
(3) it must be verified and accompanied by a certification
against forum shopping. The verification and certification must
be signed personally by me petitioner. No petition may be filed
solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the
verification and certification against forum shopping shall be
authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine
embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or
consular agent in said country.
(4) it shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a
copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days
from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such
service within the same period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition.
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Section 6. Summons. - The service of summons shall be
governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and by the following
rules:
(1) Where the respondent cannot be located at his given
address or his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service of summons may, by
leave of court, be effected upon him by publication once a
week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines and in such places as the court
may order In addition, a copy of the summons shall be served
on the respondent at his last known address by registered mail
or any other means the court may deem sufficient.
(2) The summons to be published shall be contained in an order
of the court with the following data: (a) title of the case; (b)
docket number; (c) nature of the petition; (d) principal grounds
of the petition and the reliefs prayed for; and (e) a directive for
the respondent to answer within thirty days from the last issue
of publication.
Section 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the
petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties;
provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a
dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in
an answer.
Section 8. Answer. - (1) The respondent shall file his answer
within fifteen days from service of summons, or within thirty
days from the last issue of publication in case of service of
summons by publication. The answer must be verified by the
respondent himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact.
(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not
declare him or her in default.
(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender
an issue, the court shall order the public prosecutor to
investigate whether collusion exists between the parties.
Section 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. - (1) Within
one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in
paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall
submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in
collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their
respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall
state the on the finding of collusion within ten days from
receipt of a copy of a report The court shall set the report for
hearing and If convinced that the parties are in collusion, it
shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the
court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the
public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Section 10. Social worker. - The court may require a social
worker to conduct a case study and submit the corresponding
report at least three days before the pre-trial. The court may
also require a case study at any stage of the case whenever
necessary.
Section 11. Pre-trial. -
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(1) Pre-trial mandatory. - A pre-trial is mandatory. On motion or
motu proprio, the court shall set the pre-trial after the last
pleading has been served and filed, or upon receipt of the
report of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between
the parties.
(2) Notice of pre-trial. - (a) The notice of pre-trial shall contain:
(1) the date of pre-trial conference; and
(2) an order directing the parties to file and serve their
respective pre-trial briefs in such manner as shall ensure the
receipt thereof by the adverse party at least three days before
the date of pre-trial.
(b) The notice shall be served separately on the parties and
their respective counsels as well as on the public prosecutor. It
shall be their duty to appear personally at the pre-trial.
(c) Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent even if he
fails to file an answer. In case of summons by publication and
the respondent failed to file his answer, notice of pre-trial shall
be sent to respondent at his last known address.
Section 12. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The pre-trial brief shall
contain the following:
(a) A statement of the willingness of the parties to enter into
agreements as may be allowed by law, indicating the desired
terms thereof;
(b) A concise statement of their respective claims together with
the applicable laws and authorities;
(c) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts, as well as
the disputed factual and legal issues;
(d) All the evidence to be presented, including expert opinion, if
any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose
thereof;
(e) The number and names of the witnesses and their
respective affidavits; and
(f) Such other matters as the court may require.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with
its required contents shall have the same effect as failure to
appear at the pre-trial under the succeeding paragraphs.
Section 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - {a) If the
petitioner fails to appear personally, the case shall be dismissed
unless his counsel or a duly authorized representative appears
in court and proves a valid excuse for the non-appearance of
the petitioner.
(b) If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to appear,
the court shall proceed with the pre-trial and require the public
prosecutor to investigate the non-appearance of the
respondent and submit within fifteen days thereafter a report
to the court stating whether his non-appearance is due to any
collusion between the parties. If there Is no collusion, the court
shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or
fabrication of evidence.
Section 14. Pre-trial conference. -At the pre-trial conference,
the court:
(a) May refer the issues to a mediator who shall assist the
parties in reaching an agreement on matters not prohibited by
law.
The mediator shall render a report within one
month from referral which, for good reasons, the court may
extend for a period not exceeding one month.
(b) In case mediation is not availed of or where it fails, the
court shall proceed with the pre-trial conference, on which
occasion it shall consider the advisability of receiving expert
testimony and such other makers as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the petition.
Section 15. Pre-trial order. - {a) The proceedings in the pre-trial
shall be recorded. Upon termination of the pre-trial, the court
shall Issue a pre-trial order which shall recite in detail the
matters taken up In the conference, the action taken thereon,
the amendments allowed on the pleadings, and except as to
the ground of declaration of nullity or annulment, the
agreements or admissions made by the parties on any of the
matters considered, including any provisional order that may
be necessary or agreed upon by the parties.
(b) Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall contain a
recital of the following;
(1) Facts undisputed, admitted, and those which need not be
proved subject to Section 16 of this Rule;
(2) Factual and legal issues to be litigated;
(3) Evidence, including objects and documents, that have been
marked and will be presented;
(4) Names of witnesses who will be presented and their
testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(5) Schedule of the presentation of evidence.
(c) The pre-trial order shall also contain a directive to the public
prosecutor to appear for the State and take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties at any stage of the proceedings
and fabrication or suppression of evidence during the trial on
the merits.
(d) The parlies shall not be allowed to raise issues or present
witnesses and evidence other than those stated in the pre-trial
order.
The order shall control the trial of the case, unless modified by
the court to prevent manifest injustice.
(e) The parties shall have five days from receipt of the pre-trial
order to propose corrections or modifications.
Section 16. Prohibited compromise. - The court-shall not allow
compromise on prohibited matters, such as the following:
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(a) The civil status of persons;
(b) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation;
(c) Any ground for legal separation;
(d) Future support;
(e) The jurisdiction of courts; and
(f) Future legitime.
Section 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally
conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of the reception of
evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to
matters involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall
be allowed.
(3) The court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all
persons, including members of the press, who do not have a
direct interest in the case. Such an order may be made if the
court determines on the record that requiring a party to testify
in open court would not enhance the ascertainment of truth;
would cause to the party psychological harm or inability to
effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or
timidity; would violate the right of a party to privacy; or would
be offensive to decency or public morals.
(4) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or perusal of
the records of the case or parts thereof be made by any person
other than a party or counsel of a party, except by order of the
court.
Section 18. Memoranda. - The court may require the parties
and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the
Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda support of
their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to
file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to
the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein
provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision,
with or without the memoranda.
Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of
absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the
court only after compliance with Article 50 and 51 of the Family
Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition
and Distribution of Properties.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision
personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned
by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive
part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of
general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen
days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be
made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal Is
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
filed by any of the parties the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor
General.
(4) Upon the finality of the decision, the court shall forthwith
issue the corresponding decree if the parties have no
properties.
If the parties have properties, the court shall
observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of this Rule.
The entry of judgment shall be registered in the
Civil Registry where the marriage was recorded and In the Civil
Registry where the Family Court'granting the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage is
located.
Section 20. Appeal. -
(1) Pre-condition. - No appeal from the decision shall be
allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion for
reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of
judgment.
(2) Notice of appeal. - An aggrieved party or the Solicitor
General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of
Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion
for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a
copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody,
support of common children and delivery of their presumptive
iegltimes. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition,
or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of
the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on
motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,
including custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of
the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.
Section 22. Issuance of Decree of Declaration of Absolute
Nullity or Annulment of Marriage." (a) The court shall issue the
Decree after;
(1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition
for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage in the Civil
Registry where the marriage was celebrated and in the Civil
Registry of the place where the Family Court is located;
(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, in the proper Register of Deeds
where the real properties are located; and
(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in cash,
property, or sound securities.
(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion
of the judgment entered and attach to the Decree the
approved deed of partition.
Except in the case of children under Articles 36 and
53 of the Family Code, the court shall order the Local Civil
Registrar to issue an amended birth certificate indicating the
new civil status of the children affected.
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Section 23. Registration and publication of the decree; decree
as best evidence. - (a) The prevailing party shall cause the
registration of the Decree in the Civil Registry where the
marriage was registered, the Civil Registry of the place where
the Family Court is situated, and in the National Census and
Statistics Office. He shall report td the court compliance with
this requirement within thirty days from receipt of the copy of
the Decree.
(b) In case service of summons was made by publication, the
parties shall cause the publication of the Decree once in a
newspaper of general circulation.
(c) The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove
the declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage
and shall serve as notice to third persons concerning the
properties of petitioner and respondent as well as the
properties or presumptive legitimes delivered to their common
children.
Section 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court
or Appellate Court. - (a) In case a party dies at any stage of the
proceedings before the entry of judgment, the court shall order
the case closed and terminated, without prejudice to the
settlement of the estate in proper proceedings in the regular
courts.
(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or
annulment, the judgment shall be binding upon the parties and
their successors in interest in the settlement of the estate in
the regular courts.
Section 25. Effectlvity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15,
2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation not later than March 7, 2003.
- Sin V. Sin, G.R. No. 137590, March 26, 2001
FACTS: Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a
Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence filed in
September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their
respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June
1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and throughout
its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings.
While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation
dated November 1994 stating that he found no collusion
between the parties, he did not actively participated therein.
Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing
more was heard of him.
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared
even with the absence of the participation of the State in the
proceedings.
HELD: Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases
of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to
it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have
ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition.
The records are bereft of an evidence that the State
participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is
remanded for proper trial.
FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN, petitioner,vs.
PHILIPP T. SIN, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
The Family Code emphasizes the permanent nature of marriage,
hailing it as the foundation of the family.1 It is this inviolability
which is central to our traditional and religious concepts of
morality and provides the very bedrock on which our society
finds stability.2 Marriage is immutable and when both spouses
give their consent to enter it, their consent becomes
irrevocable, unchanged even by their independent wills.
However, this inviolability depends on whether the marriage
exists and is valid. If it is void ab initio, the "permanence" of the
union becomes irrelevant, and the Court can step in to declare
it so. Article 36 of the Family Code is the justification.3 Where it
applies and is duly proven, a judicial declaration can free the
parties from the rights, obligations, burdens and consequences
stemming from their marriage.
A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code requires the application of procedural and
substantive guidelines. While compliance with these
requirements mostly devolves upon petitioner, the State is
likewise mandated to actively intervene in the procedure.
Should there be non-compliance by the State with its statutory
duty, there is a need to remand the case to the lower court for
proper trial.
The Case
What is before the Court4 is an appeal from a decision of the
Court of Appeals5 which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City6 dismissing petitioner
Florence Malcampo-Sin's (hereafter "Florence") petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological
incapacity for insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts
On January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and
engagement, Florence and respondent Philipp T. Sin (hereafter
"Philipp"), a Portugese citizen, were married at St. Jude
Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila.7
On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, a complaint for "declaration of
nullity of marriage" against Philipp.8 Trial ensued and the
parties presented their respective documentary and
testimonial evidence.
On June 16, 1995, the trial court dismissed Florence's petition.9
On December 19, 1995, Florence filed with the trial court a
notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.10
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
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"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Appeal is
DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Cost
against the Appellant."11
On June 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.12
On January 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.13
Hence, this appeal.14
The Court's Ruling
We note that throughout the trial in the lower court, the State
did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jose Danilo
C. Jabson15 filed with the trial court a manifestation dated
November 16, 1994, stating that he found no collusion
between the parties,16 he did not actively participate therein.
Other than entering his appearance at certain hearings of the
case, nothing more was heard from him. Neither did the
presiding Judge take any step to encourage the fiscal to
contribute to the proceedings.
The Family Code mandates:
"ARTICLE 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed (italics ours).
"In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no
judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment."
It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the
petition, the evil sought to be prevented (i.e., dissolution of the
marriage) did not come about, hence, the lack of participation
of the State was cured. Not so. The task of protecting marriage
as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous
participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just
the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an
invalid one as well. This is made clear by the following
pronouncement:
"(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision,17 briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095 (italics
ours)."18
The records are bereft of any evidence that the State
participated in the prosecution of the case not just at the trial
level but on appeal with the Court of Appeals as well. Other
than the "manifestation" filed with the trial court on November
16, 1994, the State did not file any pleading, motion or position
paper, at any stage of the proceedings.
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
In Republic of the Philippines v. Erlinda Matias Dagdag,19 while
we upheld the validity of the marriage, we nevertheless
characterized the decision of the trial court as "prematurely
rendered" since the investigating prosecutor was not given an
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the
judgment was rendered. This stresses the importance of the
participation of the State.
Having so ruled, we decline to rule on the factual disputes of
the case, this being within the province of the trial court upon
proper re-trial.
Obiter Dictum
For purposes of re-trial, we guide the parties thus: In Republic
vs. Court of Appeals,20 the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code are as follows
(omitting guideline [8] in the enumeration as it was already
earlier quoted):
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The
Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
"(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a)
medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c)
sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically (sic) ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
"(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
"(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
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not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
"(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
"(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
"(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts."
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51304,
promulgated on April 30, 1998 and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 3190, dated
June 16, 1995.
Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for proper trial.
- Maquilan v. Maquilan, G.R. No. 155409, June 08, 2007
Facts: Virgilio and Dita were spouses. Their relationship
turned bitter when Virgilio discovered that Dita had a
paramour. Virgilio filed a case of adultery against Dita and her
paramour. The two were convicted of the crime charged.
Subsequently, Virgilio filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Damages before the RTC, imputing
psychological incapacity on Dita. During the pre-trial, Virgilio
and Dita entered into a Compromise Agreement wherein they
agreed to partially separate their conjugal properties without
prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of
nullity of marriage. The RTC approved the compromise
agreement.
Virgilio, however, later filed an Omnibus Motion, praying for
the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and the
reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement
by the respondent judge on the grounds that his previous
lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the
consequential effects of the Compromise Agreement. The
respondent Judge denied the motion.
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Virgilio appealed, contending that the Compromise Agreement
is void because it circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty
spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage,
from sharing in the conjugal property. Since the respondent
was convicted of adultery, the petitioner argues that her share
should be forfeited in favor of the common child under Articles
43(2) and 63 of the Family Code.
To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to
disqualify the spouse convicted of adultery from sharing in the
conjugal property; and because the Compromise Agreement is
void, it never became final and executory. Moreover, the
petitioner cites Article 2035 of the Civil Code and argues that
since adultery is a ground for legal separation, the Compromise
Agreement is therefore void. He also argued that since the
proceedings before the RTC were void in the absence of the
participation of the provincial prosecutor or solicitor, the
voluntary separation made during the pendency of the case is
also void.
Issues:
1. Do Articles 43 and 63 of the Family code applies to the
instant case?
2. Does Article 2035 of the Civil Code also apply to the instant
case?
3. Does the Compromise Agreement circumvent the law
prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal
properties?
4. Does the absence of the public prosecutor nullify the
compromise agreement?
5. May the compromise agreement be nullified on the ground
that petitioner was not intelligently and judiciously informed by
his counsel of the consequential effects of the agreement?
Held:
1. No. The foregoing provisions of the law are inapplicable to
the instant case. Article 43 of the Family Code refers to a
subsequent marriage that is terminated because of the
reappearance of an absent spouse; while Article 63 applies to
the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present case
involves a proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is
sought to be declared under the ground of psychological
capacity.
2. Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The
Compromise Agreement partially divided the properties of the
conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not
deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not
among those that are expressly prohibited by Article 2035.
3. The contention that the Compromise Agreement is
tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty
spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced.
Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such
disqualification.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property
may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to
judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement
which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of
property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true
even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of
marriage was still pending. However, the Court must stress that
this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of
all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other
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persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the
Family Code.
4. While the appearances of the Solicitor General and/or the
Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure of the RTC to
require their appearance does not per se nullify the
Compromise Agreement. This Court fully concurs with the
findings of the CA:
x x x. It bears emphasizing that the intendment of the law in
requiring the presence of the Solicitor General and/or State
prosecutor in all proceedings of legal separation and
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage is to curtail or
prevent any possibility of collusion between the parties and to
see to it that their evidence respecting the case is not
fabricated. In the instant case, there is no exigency for the
presence of the Solicitor General and/or the State prosecutor
because as already stated, nothing in the subject compromise
agreement touched into the very merits of the case of
declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary of
any possible collusion between the parties. At the risk of being
repetitive, the compromise agreement pertains merely to an
agreement between the petitioner and the private respondent
to separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice
to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of
marriage.
5. It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the
client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a
lawyer within the scope of his general or implied authority is
regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or
negligence of petitioners' counsel may result in the rendition of
an unfavorable judgment against them. Exceptions to the
foregoing have been recognized by the Court in cases where
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of
due process of law, or when its application "results in the
outright deprivation of one's property through a technicality."
None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the
present case. (Maquilan vs. Maquilan, G.R. NO. 155409, June 8,
2007)
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner,vs.
DITA MAQUILAN, respondent. D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated
August 30, 2002 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 69689, which affirmed the Judgment on
Compromise Agreement dated January 2, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley,
and the RTC Orders dated January 21, 2002 and February 7,
2002 (ORDERS) in Civil Case No. 656.
The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses
who once had a blissful married life and out of which were
blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated
romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private
respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour,
which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery
against private respondent and the latter’s paramour.
Consequently, both the private respondent and her paramour
were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight (8)
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
months, minimum of prision correccional as minimum penalty,
to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty one (21) days,
medium of prision correccional as maximum penalty.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and
Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on
June 15, 2001 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed as Civil Case No. 656,
imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private
respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT in the
following terms, to wit:
1. In partial settlement of the conjugal partnership of gains, the
parties agree to the following:
a. ₱500,000.00 of the money deposited in the bank jointly in
the name of the spouses shall be withdrawn and deposited in
favor and in trust of their common child, Neil Maquilan, with
the deposit in the joint account of the parties.
The balance of such deposit, which presently stands at
₱1,318,043.36, shall be withdrawn and divided equally by the
parties;
b. The store that is now being occupied by the plaintiff shall be
allotted to her while the bodega shall be for the defendant. The
defendant shall be paid the sum of ₱50,000.00 as his share in
the stocks of the store in full settlement thereof.
The plaintiff shall be allowed to occupy the bodega until the
time the owner of the lot on which it stands shall construct a
building thereon;
c. The motorcycles shall be divided between them such that the
Kawasaki shall be owned by the plaintiff while the Honda
Dream shall be for the defendant;
d. The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff who shall pay the
defendant the sum of ₱75,000.00 as his share thereon and in
full settlement thereof;
e. The house and lot shall be to the common child.
2. This settlement is only partial, i.e., without prejudice to the
litigation of other conjugal properties that have not been
mentioned;
xxxx
The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur
by the respondent judge in the assailed Judgment On
Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously dated January
2, 2002.2
However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion dated January 15,
2002, praying for the repudiation of the Compromise
Agreement and the reconsideration of the Judgment on
Compromise Agreement by the respondent judge on the
grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and
judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the
Compromise Agreement.
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The respondent Judge in the assailed Order dated January 21,
2002, denied the aforementioned Omnibus Motion.
Displeased, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforesaid Order, but the same was denied in the assailed Order
dated February 7, 2002.3 (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court claiming that
the RTC committed grave error and abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (1) in upholding the
validity of the Compromise Agreement dated January 11, 2002;
(2) when it held in its Order dated February 7, 2002 that the
Compromise Agreement was made within the cooling-off
period; (3) when it denied petitioner’s Motion to Repudiate
Compromise Agreement and to Reconsider Its Judgment on
Compromise Agreement; and (4) when it conducted the
proceedings without the appearance and participation of the
Office of the Solicitor General and/or the Provincial
Prosecutor.4
On August 30, 2002, the CA dismissed the Petition for lack of
merit. The CA held that the conviction of the respondent of the
crime of adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her from
sharing in the conjugal property, especially considering that she
had only been sentenced with the penalty of prision
correccional, a penalty that does not carry the accessory
penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the
rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property
inter vivos; that Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code, which
pertain to the effects of a nullified marriage and the effects of
legal separation, respectively, do not apply, considering, too,
that the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Marriage
filed by the respondent invoking Article 36 of the Family Code
has yet to be decided, and, hence, it is premature to apply
Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code; that, although adultery is
a ground for legal separation, nonetheless, Article 63 finds no
application in the instant case since no petition to that effect
was filed by the petitioner against the respondent; that the
spouses voluntarily separated their property through their
Compromise Agreement with court approval under Article 134
of the Family Code; that the Compromise Agreement, which
embodies the voluntary separation of property, is valid and
binding in all respects because it had been voluntarily entered
into by the parties; that, furthermore, even if it were true that
the petitioner was not duly informed by his previous counsel
about the legal effects of the Compromise Agreement, this
point is untenable since the mistake or negligence of the lawyer
binds his client, unless such mistake or negligence amounts to
gross negligence or deprivation of due process on the part of
his client; that these exceptions are not present in the instant
case; that the Compromise Agreement was plainly worded and
written in simple language, which a person of ordinary
intelligence can discern the consequences thereof, hence,
petitioner’s claim that his consent was vitiated is highly
incredible; that the Compromise Agreement was made during
the existence of the marriage of the parties since it was
submitted during the pendency of the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage; that the application of Article 2035 of the
Civil Code is misplaced; that the cooling-off period under Article
58 of the Family Code has no bearing on the validity of the
Compromise Agreement; that the Compromise Agreement is
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, and
public policy; that this agreement may not be later disowned
simply because of a change of mind; that the presence of the
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Solicitor General or his deputy is not indispensable to the
execution and validity of the Compromise Agreement, since the
purpose of his presence is to curtail any collusion between the
parties and to see to it that evidence is not fabricated, and,
with this in mind, nothing in the Compromise Agreement
touches on the very merits of the case of declaration of nullity
of marriage for the court to be wary of any possible collusion;
and, finally, that the Compromise Agreement is merely an
agreement between the parties to separate their conjugal
properties partially without prejudice to the outcome of the
pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage.
Hence, herein Petition, purely on questions of law, raising the
following issues:
I.
WHETHER OF NOT A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER
CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, CAN STILL SHARE IN THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP;
II
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ENTERED
INTO BY SPOUSES, ONE OF WHOM WAS CONVICTED OF
ADULTERY, GIVING THE CONVICTED SPOUSE A SHARE IN THE
CONJUGAL PROPERTY, VALID AND LEGAL;
III
WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT FOR ANNULMENT AND LEGAL
SEPARATION IS A PRE-REQUISITE BEFORE A SPOUSE
CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, BE
DISQUALIFIED AND PROHIBITED FROM SHARING IN THE
CONJUGAL PROPERTY;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISQUALIFICATION OF A CONVICTED
SPOUSE OF ADULTERY FROM SHARING IN A CONJUGAL
PROPERTY, CONSTITUTES CIVIL INTERDICTION.5
The petitioner argues that the Compromise Agreement should
not have been given judicial imprimatur since it is against law
and public policy; that the proceedings where it was approved
is null and void, there being no appearance and participation of
the Solicitor General or the Provincial Prosecutor; that it was
timely repudiated; and that the respondent, having been
convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified from sharing in
the conjugal property.
The Petition must fail.
The essential question is whether the partial voluntary
separation of property made by the spouses pending the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.
First. The petitioner contends that the Compromise Agreement
is void because it circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty
spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage,
from sharing in the conjugal property. Since the respondent
was convicted of adultery, the petitioner argues that her share
should be forfeited in favor of the common child under Articles
43(2)6 and 637 of the Family Code.
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To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to
disqualify the spouse convicted of adultery from sharing in the
conjugal property; and because the Compromise Agreement is
void, it never became final and executory.
Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 20358 of the Civil Code
and argues that since adultery is a ground for legal separation,
the Compromise Agreement is therefore void.
These arguments are specious. The foregoing provisions of the
law are inapplicable to the instant case.
Article 43 of the Family Code refers to Article 42, to wit:
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article9 shall be automatically terminated by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse,
unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to
the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case
such fact is disputed.
where a subsequent marriage is terminated because of the
reappearance of an absent spouse; while Article 63 applies to
the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present case
involves a proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is
sought to be declared under the ground of psychological
capacity.
Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The
Compromise Agreement partially divided the properties of the
conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not
deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not
among those that are expressly prohibited by Article 2035.
Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is
tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty
spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced.
Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such
disqualification.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property
may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to
judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement
which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of
property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true
even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of
marriage was still pending. However, the Court must stress that
this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of
all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other
persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the
Family Code.
Second. Petitioner’s claim that since the proceedings before
the RTC were void in the absence of the participation of the
provincial prosecutor or solicitor, the voluntary separation
made during the pendency of the case is also void. The
proceedings pertaining to the Compromise Agreement involved
the conjugal properties of the spouses. The settlement had no
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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
relation to the questions surrounding the validity of their
marriage. Nor did the settlement amount to a collusion
between the parties.
Article 48 of the Family Code states:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(e) of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.- x x x x
xxxx
(e) Where no defaults allowed.— If the defending party in
action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion
between the parties exists if there is no collusion, to intervene
for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is
not fabricated. (Emphasis supplied
Truly, the purpose of the active participation of the Public
Prosecutor or the Solicitor General is to ensure that the interest
of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.10 While the appearances of the
Solicitor General and/or the Public Prosecutor are mandatory,
the failure of the RTC to require their appearance does not per
se nullify the Compromise Agreement. This Court fully concurs
with the findings of the CA:
x x x. It bears emphasizing that the intendment of the law in
requiring the presence of the Solicitor General and/or State
prosecutor in all proceedings of legal separation and
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage is to curtail or
prevent any possibility of collusion between the parties and to
see to it that their evidence respecting the case is not
fabricated. In the instant case, there is no exigency for the
presence of the Solicitor General and/or the State prosecutor
because as already stated, nothing in the subject compromise
agreement touched into the very merits of the case of
declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary of
any possible collusion between the parties. At the risk of being
repetiti[ve], the compromise agreement pertains merely to an
agreement between the petitioner and the private respondent
to separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice
to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of
marriage.11
Third. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory
of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code
provides for the consequences of civil interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. – Civil interdiction shall deprive the
offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of
parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or
property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to
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manage his property and of the right to dispose of such
property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code.
The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional – Its accessory penalties. – The
penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of
suspension from public office, from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of
said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender
shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the
crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil
interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage
her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.
Fourth. Neither could it be said that the petitioner was not
intelligently and judiciously informed of the consequential
effects of the compromise agreement, and that, on this basis,
he may repudiate the Compromise Agreement. The argument
of the petitioner that he was not duly informed by his previous
counsel about the legal effects of the voluntary settlement is
not convincing. Mistake or vitiation of consent, as now claimed
by the petitioner as his basis for repudiating the settlement,
could hardly be said to be evident. In Salonga v. Court of
Appeals,12 this Court held:
[I]t is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the
client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a
lawyer within the scope of his general or implied authority is
regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or
negligence of petitioners' counsel may result in the rendition of
an unfavorable judgment against them.
Exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the Court
in cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives
the client of due process of law, or when its application "results
in the outright deprivation of one's property through a
technicality." x x x x13
None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the
present case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the subject
Compromise Agreement is VALID without prejudice to the
rights of all creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest
in the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains.
93