Most of the damage occurred in informal

neighbourhoods in the south of the city. Challenges

included access and circulation, rubble removal,
demolition of unsafe buildings, space for shelter and
basic utilities. Difficult conditions in the neighbourhoods
contributed to large-scale displacement to formal
and spontaneous camps. Neighbourhood recovery,
including community planning, could not advance until
emergency needs were met. Political instability, cholera
and hurricanes in 2010 protracted the emergency phase
(GFDRR 2016).
Figure 4. Visual assessment map of damage and habitability in Bristou-Bobin, in the Petionville suburb of Port-au-Prince
Source: UN-Habitat (2012). Used with permission.
Figure 5. Typical informal neighbourhood immediately after the earthquake
Credit: Alain Grimard/UN-Habitat
Learning from community pLanning foLLowing the 2010 haiti earthquake
16 www.iied.org
1.4.3 Displacement and the
humanitarian response
The number of people displaced in camps reached
1.5 million in the summer of 2010 as many city residents
returned after being initially displaced to rural areas.
Tents and shelters occupied footpaths, streets and
private and public spaces. Camps became a defining
feature of the crisis in the city, a political priority for the
incoming government in 2011 and a key measurement
of the humanitarian response. The return of displaced
households to their neighbourhoods was facilitated
by removing debris, rehabilitating services, repairing
damaged houses, providing temporary shelters on
the sites of destroyed houses and subsidising rent
(Fitzgerald 2012).
1.4.4 Institutional context for urban
planning and the built environment
In Haiti, the central government is responsible
for national urban policy and strategic planning.
Municipalities have planning responsibilities in their area
but must comply with national policies. Port-au-Prince
comprises seven municipalities but has no mechanisms
for metropolitan-level governance.
Before the earthquake, national agencies with
responsibility for urban development included:
• Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération
Externe/Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation
(MPCE)
Figure 6. Camps with tents and tarpaulins (left) and with shelters made from salvage materials and tarpaulins (right), 2011
Credit: Maggie Stephenson
Figure 7. Spontaneous camp (left) and a planned camp north of the city at Corail Cesselesse (right), 2010
Credit: Giovanni Cassani/IOM
IIED WorkIng papEr
www.iied.org 17
• Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports et
Communications/Ministry of Public Works, Transport,
and Communications (MTPTC)
• Comité Interministériel d’Aménagement du Territoire/
Interministerial Committee for Territorial Management
and Planning (CIAT)
• Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités
Territoriales/Ministry of Interior and Local
Governments (MICT)
• Individual municipalities, and
• From mid-2011 (formally from July 2012) the new
Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments
Publics/Housing and Public Buildings Construction
Unit (UCLBP), responsible for coordinating and
implementing reconstruction policies and projects.
Before the earthquake, Haiti was characterised by
weak and fragmented government. Extensive losses
of premises, data and key personnel further weakened
government capacity to lead or manage recovery,
exacerbating policy vacuums and delays in decision
making and limiting the institutionalisation of urban
development and risk reduction measures.
1.4.5 Economic situation
Haiti ranked 149 out of 182 in the 2009 Human
Development Index (UNDP 2009). In 2008, GDP
per capita was US$729 and inflation was at 15.5%.
Remittance inflows constituted 18.7% of GDP in 2007
(ALNAP 2010). Almost three-quarters of the population
was living on less than US$2 a day (World Bank 2009).
Income distribution was highly unequal: in 2001, 20%
of the poorest households had 2% of total income and
20% of the richest households had 68%. Inequality
worsened after the earthquake, suggesting the poorest
households continued to lose more after the disaster
while the wealthier moved towards recovery.
“Households are not borrowing to recover; they are
borrowing to survive” (Feinstein International Centre/
INURED 2013).
The low economic capacity of most of the people
living in the informal neighbourhoods affected by
the earthquake was a key factor in housing and
neighbourhood reconstruction.
1.4.6 Political situation and foreign
assistance
The 2010 earthquake precipitated a massive
international response in terms of institutional and
public financial assistance, number and diversity of
humanitarian organisations and intensity of media
attention. The Haiti earthquake was a global story.
Overwhelming international attention is not new
to the country. The disaster exposed centuries
of underdevelopment and mismanagement at
times exacerbated by foreign policy and foreign
aid interventions. Understanding the dynamics of
the emergency response and recovery required
appreciating the historical and political context,
including key geopolitical interests and relationships
— with the United States, Canada, France, other
Caribbean and Latin American countries — and
understanding the dominant size and role of the
non-governmental sector in Haiti (Schuller and
Morales 2012).
Elections were due in February, as 2010 was t