ISSUE: W/N there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CFI denying the allowance of Will.
Rule 75 – Production of Will, Allowance of Will
Necessary
1.MANINANG V. CA
FACTS: On 21 May 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died.
She left a holographic will, the pertinent portions of which
provides that all her properties shall be inherited by Dra.
Soledad L. Maninang (with whose family she have lived
continuously for around the last 30 years). It was also
indicated that Clemencia does not consider Nonoy
(Respondent) as her adopted son.
On 9 June 1977, Petitioner filed a Petition for probate of
the Will. On 25 July 25, 1977, Respondent Bernardo
Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir
of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate
proceedings with the CFI Pasig. Cases were consolidated.
Respondent filed a MTD on the ground that he was
preterited. Petitioner opposed on the ground that in a case
for probate of a Will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited
to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic
validity of the will; and that respondent Bernardo was
effectively disinherited by the decedent.
CFI denied the petition for probate.
HELD: Yes. No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rules of Court. The law enjoins the probate of the
Will and public policy requires it, because unless the will
is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world,
the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may
be rendered nugatory.
Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its
intrinsic validity. The authentication of a will decides no
other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the
testator and the compliance with those requisites or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of
wills. It does not determine nor even by implication
prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions. These
may be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating
to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be
raised even after the will has been authenticated.
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the
provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate
proceeding because its only purpose is merely to
determine if the will has been executed in accordance with
the requirements of the law. Exception: Instances when
intrinsic validity can be determined - practical
considerations so demanded if the probate of the will
would become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to
be intrinsically void.

An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction

may be corrected by Certiorari. And even assuming the
existence of the remedy of appeal, we harken to the rule
that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for
certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal
would not afford speedy and adequate relief.
2. BONILLA V. ARANZA

Facts
 Pettioner filed for a petition for the probate of the
holographic will of Bonilla.
 Aranza opposed the petition due to the alleged that
the alleged holographic will itself and not alleged
copy thereof must be produced.
Issue:
Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be
found can be proved by means of photostatic copy.
However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed
and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated
because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of
the handwritten statement of the testator and the
handwritten will.
But, a photostatic copy or Xerox copy of the holographic
will may be allowed because comparison can be made with
the standard writings of the testator.

Ruling

Yes

The photostatic or Xerox copy of the lost or destroyed

holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be
determined by the probate court.

Probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by

the court after its due execution has been proved. The
probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least
one identifying witness is required and, if no witness is
available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least
three identifying witness are required
3. CUENCO VS. CA
DOCTRINE: The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He
was survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing in
Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in
Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage,
filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court
of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died
intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties
in Cebu and Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI
Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where
she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition
and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in
abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon
shall have acted on the probate proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss
in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or
improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The
opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon
appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of
prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUEs:
 Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of
prohibition.
 Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction
over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI
Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to
the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law
in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City
court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and
annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the last will and
testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-
widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the
deceased testator's wish.
 Regarding the issue on venue and jurisdiction, it is
provided under Rule 73 that the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The residence of the decent or the location of his
estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter but merely of venue. Otherwise, it would affect the
prompt administration of justice.
The court with whom the petition is first filed must
also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in
order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all
other courts.
4. ALABAN v CA
FACTS:
Respondent Provido filed a petition for the probate of the
Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad
Elevencionado, who died in Iloilo. Provido alleged that he
was the heir of the decedent and executor of her will. RTC
allowed the probate of the will and directed issuance of
letters testamentary to Provido.
More than 4 months later, petitioners filed a motion for
the reopening of the probate proceedings. Likewise, they
filed an opposition to the allowance of the will, as well as
letters testamentary claiming that they are the intestate
heirs of the decedent. They claim that RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the
correct docket fees, defective publication and lack of notice
to other heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the will could
not have been probated.
RTC denied the petitioners' motion. Resolving the issue of
jurisdiction, RTC held that petitioners were deemed
notified and non-payment of docket fees is not a ground
for outright dismissal. Moreover, RTC's decision was
already final and executory before petitioners' filing of the
motion to reopen.
CA dismissed petitioners' petition. It found that there was
no showing that petitioners failed to avail of the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment or other approriate remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners have become parties to the
proceedings
HELD: YES
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee
named in a will, or any other person interested in the
estate may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will
must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as
furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees,
and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that a
proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that
with the corresponding publication of the petition the
court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said
will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the
proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort against
the right sought to be established. It is the publication of
such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the
case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide it. Thus, even though petitioners were not
mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually
became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication
of the notice of hearing.
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally
given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted
as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews
and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor
testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate
proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal
obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for
probate, or to personally notify them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled
to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the
publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon
the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a
jurisdictional requisite.
The non-inclusion of petitioners’ names in the petition and
the alleged failure to personally notify them of the
proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners
were not denied their day in court, as they were not
prevented from participating in the proceedings and
presenting their case before the probate court.

5. UY KIAO ENG, Petitioner, vs. NIXON LEE,
Respondent.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, mother of the respondent
Nixon Lee, is in the custody of the holographic will
of Nixon Lee’s father who allegedly died on June 22,
1992.
 In 2001, the respondent filed a petition for
mandamus with damages before the RTC Manila to
compel petitioner Uy Kiao Eng to produce the will
so that probate proceedings for the allowance could
be instituted.
 Allegedly, the respondent had already requested his
mother Uy Kiao Eng to settle and liquidate the
patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs
their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused
to do so without any justifiable reason.
 Petitioner Uy Kiao Eng asserted that the petition
should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action, for lack of cause of action, and for non-
compliance with a condition precedent for the
filing.
 Petitioner also denied that she was in custody of the
original holographic will and that she knew of its
whereabouts. She asserted that photocopies of the
will were given to respondent and to his siblings.
 As a matter of fact, respondent was able to
introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will before the
RTC of Valenzuela City.
 Petitioner further contended that respondent
should have first exerted earnest efforts to amicably
settle the controversy with her before he filed the
suit.
 The RTC granted the demurrer filed by the
petitioner.
 The CA reversed the RTC ruling and issued the writ
of mandamus and ordered the production of the
will.
ISSUE: Whether a writ of mandamus is the proper
remedy for the production of a will
RULING:
NO. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law
of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified, which
duty results from the official station of the party to whom
the writ is directed or from operation of law. This
definition recognizes the public character of the remedy,
and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for
the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in
which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper
recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and
to compel the performance of a public duty, most
especially when the public right involved is mandated by
the Constitution.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel
an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or
which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will
mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial
dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although
objection raising a mere technical question will be
disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious.
As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of
the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or
person against whom the action is taken unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or
station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has
unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily
ascertaining whether the obligation involved here—the
production of the original holographic will—is in the
nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy
of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee
because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that
respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks
the production of the original for purposes of probate. The
Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from
instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the
will whether the same is in his possession or not. Rule 76,
Section 1 relevantly provides:
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of
will.—Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a
will, or any other person interested in the estate,
may, at any time, after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the
will allowed, whether the same be in his possession
or not, or is lost or destroyed.
An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75,
Sections 2 to 5, for the production of the original
holographic will. Thus—
SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.—The
person who has custody of a will shall, within
twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the
testator, deliver the will to the court having
jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept
or refuse trust.—A person named as executor in a
will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of
the death of the testator, or within twenty (20) days
after he knows that he is named executor if he
obtained such knowledge after the death of the
testator, present such will to the court having
jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in
any other manner, and shall, within such period,
signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the
trust or his refusal to accept it.
SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to
fine for neglect.—A person who neglects any of the
duties required in the two last preceding sections
without excuse satisfactory to the court shall be
fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.
SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be
committed.—A person having custody of a will after
the death of the testator who neglects without
reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered
so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be
 committed to prison and there kept until he delivers
the will.

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the

ordinary course of law for the production of the subject
will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice
it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his
petition.