Aldaba vs.

COMELEC,
G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which
creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1,
2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before
the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill
1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then
Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as
projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.

Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population
threshold of 250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative in Congress.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos,
Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000
actual or projected.

Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 isunconstitutional for being violative
of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at
least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification
which is based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the
Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following
statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which
provides:

The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the
Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have been
declared official by the NSCB.

The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer, in
which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.

The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the Certification
issued by Director Miranda was undated.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the
Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.

It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative
reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.
Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995

Facts: Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as
unconstitutional.

Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati
only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to be
passed by Congress within 3 years following the return of every census. Also, the addition of
another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as
of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional

Held: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not
more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can
only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts
allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a
new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or
province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at
only 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at
least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood
at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of 250,000.
Tobias v. Abalos G.R.No. L-114785 08 December 1994

FACTS:
Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”, Mandaluyong and San Juan
belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong
whether or not they approved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said
conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas “7, 911” voted “no”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and
26(1)

HELD/RULING:
For the purposes of discussion, let’s breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987
Constitution.

Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.

The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
distinct from the subject of its conversion. Moreover, a liberal construction of the “one-title-one-
subject” rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v.
Comelec).

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis on the latter clause
indicates that the number of the House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a
legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation is not
unconstitutional.

Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.

The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself
which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law.
The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Montejo vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995

Facts: The province of Leyte is composed of 5 legislative districts. Biliran, located in the third
district of Leyte, was made its sub-province by virtue of RA 2141. When Biliran was converted into
a regular province, 8 municipalities of the third district composed the new province. As a
consequence, the composition of the third district was reduced to 5 municipalities. To remedy the
resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in Leyte, the
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of
the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of
Leyte.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities from one legislative
district to another legislative district

Held: The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of
its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But
based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to the COMELEC the major
power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only
empowered the COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment made. Consistent
with the limit of its power to make minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the
COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district.

It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought
about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5 legislative districts of Leyte.
But the issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner’s remedy
lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power
to reapportion. The Court held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated a resolution transferring the municipality of Capoocan of
the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of
Leyte.
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, plaintiff vs. COMMISSION OF
ELECTIONS, defendant
248 SCRA 300

Facts:

March 23,1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the
COMELEC alleging that Imelda-Romualdez Marcos did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. March 29, 1995, Marcos filed a corrected certificate of candidacy changing the entry
“seven” months to “since childhood”. The COMELEC en banc denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration declaring her not qualified to run for the position of the member of the House of
Representatives for the First District of Leyte. In a supplemental petition, Marcos averred that she
was the overwhelming winner of the election.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

Held:

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987
Constitution. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the
degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of
origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos
lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. Having determined that Marcos posses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside.
Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative
of the First District of Leyte.
AQUINO vs. COMELEC
(248 SCRA 400)

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representativefor the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy,
Aquino stated that he was aresident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a
petition for disqualification, he amended theentry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to
1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Electionsdismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed
Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on amotion for reconsideration of the
above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspendingthe proclamation of
Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Electionsfound
Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of
residence.

Issue:
Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant
thedisqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.

Held:
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no
matterwhere he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that towhich the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law. The purpose is toexclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and
needs of the community from takingadvantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election
indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose,Concepcion, Tarlac for more
than 52 years prior to that election. Aquino’s connection to the Second District of Makati City is an
alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish
apermanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying
one. The shortlength of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated
domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose
in transferring his physical residence is not toacquire a new, residence or domicile but only to
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second Districtof Makati City. Aquino was thus
rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections
COQUILLA VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002 [Citizenship; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided
there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy.
In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued
making several trips to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar
which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating
that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material
misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed
the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the
elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.

RULING:
No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for “two years” at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is
whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for
this reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy,
thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false
statement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of
candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus
fully justified.
Atong Paglaum Inc. v. COMELEC

This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs
COMELEC.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the
May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as
representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.

Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the
said party-lists.

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani
and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in
the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:

I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing
is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking

in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and
underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized
and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-
defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent
those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of
national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a
statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided
that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).

Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”

Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners
deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to
develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno
emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of
the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the
marginalized sectors.)

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
“marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”.
It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that
all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or
sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national
election system like the party-list system of elections.

If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself
unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.

As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins
of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its
provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically
marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-
defined political constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented
by its Secretary General George “FGBF George” Duldulao,
petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]

FACTS:

Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through its
resolution, denying also the latter’s motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of
Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:

x x x x

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others
the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913
before it became the law in question.

ISSUES:

Political Law

(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.

(2) Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)

(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.
RULINGS:

Political Law

(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it
cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and
unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as
PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.

(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for [it] was
given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC resolution]. The
essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to
administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not
at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is
frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that] under the attendant
circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)

(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The doctrine of
stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are
established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the
rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to
be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on
the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument.

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a
particular case override the great benefits derived by [SC’s] judicial system from the doctrine of
stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the
language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, [SC]
cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC]
now abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case law.
CASE DIGEST: WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,Respondent.

FACTS:
Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List(AGPP) filed with the Commission on Elections its Manifestation of
Intent to Participate in theMay 10, 2010elections. Subsequently, onMarch 23, 2010, AGPP filed its
Certificate of Nomination together with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees.
OnMarch 25, 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8807which prescribed the rules of
procedure applicable to petitions to disqualify a party-list nominee for purposes of theMay 10,
2010elections.
OnMarch 25, 2010, petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, and Bayan Muna Party-List,
represented by TeodoroCasi, (collectively referred to ascertiorari petitioners) filed with the
COMELEC a petition for disqualification against Arroyo, pursuant to Resolution No. 8696, in
relation with Sections 2 and 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 (the Party- List System Act).
The certiorari petitioners argued that not only must the party-list organization factually and truly
represent the marginalized and the underrepresented; the nominee must as well be a Filipino
citizen belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
citing in this regard the case ofAng Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC. On this basis,
thecertioraripetitioners concluded that Arroyo cannot be considered a member of the marginalized
and underrepresented sector, particularly, the sector which the AGPP represents tricycle drivers
and security guards because he is not only a member of the First Family, but is also (a) an
incumbent member of the House of Representatives; (b) the Chairman of the Houses Energy
Committee; and, (c) a member of key committees in the House, namely: Natural Resources,
Aquaculture, Fisheries Resources, Ethics and Privileges, Justice, National Defense and Security,
Public Works and Highways, Transportation and Ways and Means.
On April 6, 2010, petitioners Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (mandamus petitioners)
wrote the COMELEC Law Department a letter requesting for a copy of the documentary evidence
submitted by AGPP, in compliance with Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807.On the same day, the
COMELEC Law Department replied that as of that date, the AGPP had not yet submitted any
documentary evidence required by Resolution No. 8807.
Themandamuspetitioners requested the COMELEC and its Law Department to act, consistently
with Section 10 of Resolution No. 8807, and declare the disqualification of the nominees of AGPP
for their failure to comply with the requirements of Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807. Section 6 of
the Resolution provides that the party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary
evidence to duly prove that the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector/s, and to the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent. It
likewise provides that the COMELEC Law Department shall require party-list groups and nominees
to make the required documentary submissions.
In its May 7, 2010 Joint Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petitions for
disqualification against Arroyo. It noted that Section 9 of RA 7941 merely requires the nominee to
be "abona fidemember [of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for] at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the elections." The COMELEC En Banc refused to reconsider.
Themandamuspetitioners filed with the Supreme Court their Petition forMandamusand Prohibition
with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction,docketed asG.R.
No. 191998.They sought to compel the COMELEC to disqualifymotu propriothe AGPP nominees
for their failure to comply with Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807, and to enjoin the COMELEC from
giving due course to the AGPPs participation in the May 10, 2010 elections.
On July 23 and 29, 2010, thecertioraripetitioners elevated their case to the Supreme Courtviatwo
(2) separate petitions forcertiorari, docketed asG.R. Nos. 192769 and192832, to annul the
COMELEC Second Divisions May 7, 2010 joint resolution and the COMELECen bancsJuly 19,
2010 consolidated resolution that dismissed their petitions for disqualification against Arroyo as
AGPPs nominee.
In the interim, AGPP obtained in theMay 10, 2010elections the required percentage of votes
sufficient to secure a single seat.This entitled Arroyo, as AGPPs first nominee, to sit in the House
of Representatives. OnJuly 21, 2010, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers,
proclaimed Arroyo as AGPPs duly-elected party-list representative in the House of
Representatives.
ISSUES:
I. Whetheror not mandamuslies to compel the COMELEC to disqualify AGPPs nomineesmotu
proprioor to cancel AGPPs registration;
II. Whether or not the COMELEC can be enjoined from giving due course to AGPPs participation in
the May 10, 2010 elections, the canvassing of AGPPs votes, and proclaiming it a winner; and
III. Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyos qualifications as AGPPs
nominee after his proclamation and assumption to office as a member of the House of
Representatives.
HELD: The petitions are dismissed.
REMEDIAL LAW; MANDAMUS
First Issue: For a writ ofmandamusto issue (inG.R. No. 191998), Petitioners must comply with the
condition that there be "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
However, they failed to do so.Under Section 2, in relation with Section 4, of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8807 (quoted below), any interested party may file with the COMELEC a petition for
disqualification against a party-list nominee. Furthermore, under Section 6 of RA 7941, any
interested party may file a verified complaint for cancellation of registration of a party-list
organization. These provisions effectively provide the "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" that
themandamuspetitioners should have taken. In filing the present petition, themandamuspetitioners
also violated the rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies. The rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies to give the
administrative agency an opportunity to decide and thus prevent unnecessary and premature
resort to the courts.
REMEDIAL LAW; MOOTNESS
Second Issue: The court finds that the second issue has been mooted by the supervening
participation, election and proclamation of AGPP after it secured the required percentage of votes
in the May 10, 2010 elections.The prohibition issue has been rendered moot since there is nothing
now to prohibit in light of the supervening events.A moot case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon (in this case,
the prevention of the specified acts) can no longer be done.
POLITICAL LAW; HRET
Third Issue: The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the
qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office; they are, for
all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of Representatives although the entity
directly voted upon was their party. In the present case, it is not disputed that Arroyo, AGPPs first
nominee, has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of
Representatives.The court takes judicial notice, too, of the filing of two (2) petitions forquo
warrantoagainst Arroyo, now pending before the HRET.The court holds that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the present petitions and that the HRET now has the exclusive original jurisdiction
to hear and rule upon Arroyos qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives.

ABC (ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS) PARTY LIST,

REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, JAMES MARTY LIM,Petitioner,
v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MELANIO MAURICIO, JR.,
Respondents.

FACTS:

On May 25, 2010, private respondent Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a petition with the COMELEC for
the cancellation of registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-Liston the ground that
petitioner is a front for a religious organization; hence, it is disqualified to become a party-list group
under Section 6 (1)of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.

On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC, Second Division issued a Resolution dismissing the petition.
The dismissal on procedural grounds was grounded on the lack of proper verification of the
petition.According to the COMELEC, Second Division, the Verification with Certification Re: Forum
Shopping and Special Power of Attorney was not duly notarized in accordance with the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice, as amended. Sections 1 and 6, Rule II require that the person appearing
before a notary public must be known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity. In this case, the "Acknowledgment" at the end of the verification did
not contain the name of private respondent who supposedly appeared before the notary public,
and he was not identified by any competent evidence of identity as required by the rules on notarial
practice. The COMELEC, Second Division also dismissed the petition based on substantial
grounds, as it found that ABC is not a religious sect, and is, therefore, not disqualified from
registration.

However, the COMELEC en banc found that the petitions verification page substantially complied
with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, and that the records of the case showed that the
Resolution of the Second Division was issued without any hearing, contrary to RA No. 7941, which
deprived Mauricio of the opportunity to submit evidence in support of his petition.
In filing this petition, Petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc no longer had jurisdiction to
entertain the petition for cancellation of registration and accreditation of ABC Party-List after it was
already proclaimed as one of the winners in the party-list elections of May 10, 2010. Further,
petitioner submits that Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, which states that the COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition, is
applicable only to a non-winning party-list group.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Comelec has jurisdiction to hear the case on ABC party lists cancellation of
registration

Whether or not a cancellation case should be summary

HELD:

The petition is denied.

POLITICAL LAW: Jurisdiction and powers of the Comelec to cancel party list registration.

First issue: Section 2 (5), Article IX-Cof the Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority to
register political parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the registration of
the same on legal grounds. The said authority of the COMELEC is reflected in Section 6 of R.A.
No. 7941. In the case of the party-list nominees/representatives, it is the HRET, in accordance with
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, that has jurisdiction over contests relating to their
qualifications.Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives,but it is the
party-list nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of Representatives. Thus, the
jurisdiction of the HRET over contests relates to the qualifications of a party-list nominee or
representative, while the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over petitions for cancellation of
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition.In sum, the
COMELECen banchad jurisdiction over the petition forcancellation of the registration and
accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List for alleged violation ofSection 6 (1) of R.A. No. 7941.

Second issue: Petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of
discretion when it singled out this case and directed that it be set for hearing when other cases of
the same nature were summarily and motu proprio dismissed by the COMELEC, citing the cases
of BANAT v. CIBAC Foundation and BANAT v. 1-Care and APEC. However, in both cases, the
proceedings were summary because the registration/qualification/cancellation of the party lists had
already been decided in another case.

DISMISSED.
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST (ABANG LINGKOD), Petitioner, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

FACTS:

ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant farmers and
fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. It failed to
obtain the number of votes needed in the May 2010 elections for a seat in the House of
Representatives.

On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC August 9, 2012
resolution, filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with
the requirements under R.A. No. 7941.

In a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc cancelled ABANG LINGKOD
registration as a party-list group. It pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track
record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered
photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections.

ABANG LINGKOD field a petitioner for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list system. The said petition was
consolidated with the separate petitions filed by 51 other party-list groups whose registration were
cancelled or who were denied registration under the party-list system. The said party-list groups,
including ABANG LINGKOD, were able to obtain status quo ante orders from the court.

The Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-list groups,
including that of ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether they are qualified under the party-list
system pursuant to the new parameters laid down by the Court and, in the affirmative, be allowed
to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections.

On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution, which, inter alia, affirmed
the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration under the party-list system. The COMELEC
issued the Resolution dated May 10, 2013 sans any summary evidentiary hearing, citing the
proximity of the May 13, 2013 elections as the reason therefor.

On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the COMELEC's Resolution
dated May 10, 2013. However, on May 15, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD withdrew the motion for
reconsideration it filed with the COMELEC and, instead, instituted the instant petition with this
Court, alleging that there may not be enough time for the COMELEC to pass upon the merits of its
motion for reconsideration considering that the election returns were already being canvassed and
consolidated by the COMELEC.

ISSUE: hether or not ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process?

HELD: BANG LINGKOD was not denied of due process.

POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative or

quasi-judicial proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the
absolute lack of notice or hearing.

In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due process, the Court finds that
the COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity to present evidence
establishing its qualification as a party-list group. It was notified through Resolution No. 9513 that
its registration was to be reviewed by the COMELEC. That ABANG LINGKOD was able to file its
Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the
requirements under R.A. No. 7941, which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three
separate dates, belies its claim that it was denied due process.

There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing to
assess the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD pursuant to Atong Paglaum. ABANG LINGKOD's
Manifestation of Intent and all the evidence adduced by it to establish its qualification as a party-list
group are already in the possession of the COMELEC. Thus, conducting further summary
evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of determining ABANG LINGKOD's qualification under the
party-list system pursuant to Atong Paglaumwould just be a superfluity.

Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD's claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not categorically require
the COMELEC to conduct a summary evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining the
qualifications of the petitioners therein pursuant to the new parameters for screening party-list
groups.

POLITICAL LAW: cancellation of party-list registration

Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the registration of
ABANG LINGKOD under the party-list system. The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG
LINGKOD's registration on the ground that it declared untruthful statement in its bid for
accreditation as a party-list group in the May 2013 elections, pointing out that it deliberately
submitted digitally altered photographs of activities to make it appear that it had a track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's registration
was cancelled on the ground that it failed to adduce evidence showing its track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented.

R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system to submit
proof of their track record as a group. The track record requirement was only imposed in Ang
Bagong Bayani where the Court held that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
seeking registration under the party-list system must prove through their, inter alia, track record
that they truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented.

In Atong Paglaum, the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential doctrines on who
may register under the party-list system and the representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented. For purposes of registration under the party-list system, national or regional
parties or organizations need not represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector; that
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented is only required of sectoral organizations
that represent the sectors stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their nature,
economically marginalized and underrepresented.

Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD,
are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that
they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that
their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise
stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards
the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.

Dissenting, Mr. Justice Leonen, however, maintains that parties or organizations intending to
register under the party-list system are still required to present a track record notwithstanding the
Court's pronouncement in Atong Paglaum; that the track record that would have to be presented
would only differ as to the nature of their group/organization. He opines that sectoral organizations
must prove their links with the marginalized and underrepresented while national or regional
parties or organizations must show that they have been existing as a bona fide organization.

GRANTED.