The Phil. Intl. Trading Corp.

(PITC), petitioner
vs. Hon. Zosimo Z. Angeles, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC; et. al., respondents.
236 SCRA 446

FACTS:
The Philippine Trading International Corporation (PITC) issued Administrative Order
No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 which commands that applications to the PITC for importation
from the People�s Republic of China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable and
confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the importer
himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to
the value of the importation from PROC being applied for at one is to one ratio.

The private respondents Remington and Firestone, both domestic corporations,

applied for authority to import with the petitioner. However, they failed to comply
with the mandates of AO SOCPEC 89-09-01 so that further import applications were
withheld by PITC. Because of this, Remington filed for a petition for prohibition
and madamus with prayer for the issuance of a TRO against PITC and was joined by
Firestone later.

Hon. Zosimo Angeles, the judge handling the case at the trial court, granted the
petitioners� request and declared as null and void and unconstitutional the
administrative order issued by the PITC. Among his reasons for the judgment was the
fact that the AO was not published. Later on, President Fidel Ramos directed the
Department of Trade and Industry and the PITC to cease implementing the said AO.

The respondents contend that the case has been moot and moved for its early
resolution. PITC, however, disagreed that the case is moot because the respondents
still have an outstanding liability.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Administrative Orders issued by the Petitioner valid without
complying with Publication Requirements?
2. Does the administrative order have a binding effect even if it had not been
published?
3. Can the respondents be made liable for an unpublished administrative order?

HELD:
1. No, although the Petitioner was legally empowered to issue Administrative
Orders, as a valid exercise of a power ancillary to legislation. This does not
imply however, that the subject Administrative Order is a valid exercise of such
quasi-legislative power because the petitioner failed to published the said order
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The questioned
Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context
of Article 2 of Civil Code, which states that Laws shall take effect fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette (or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is otherwise
provided. The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order were filed with, and
published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not
cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order. The
Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which should be
published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

2. No. As provided by Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws is an

indispensable step in making the law effective. The administrative order in
question should have been implemented because its purpose is to �enforce and
implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.� Therefore, even before
the president has directed that the AO cease to be implemented, it had never been
legally effective.

3. No. The unpublished administrative order had no effect in pursuance to Article 2

of the Civil Code so any liability incurred because of it is invalid.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Felicidad Anzaldo, petitioner

vs. Jacobo C. Clave as Chairman of CSC and as Pres. Exec. Asst.; Jose R. Melo as
Commissioner of CSC;and Eula L. Venzon, respondents.
119 SCRA 353

FACTS:
Petitioner, seeks to annul the decision of PEA Respondent dated March 20, 1980,
revoking her appointment dated January 5, 1978 as Science Research Supervisor II
and directing the appointment to that position of Doctor Respondent. The contested
position became vacant in 1974 when its incumbent, Doctor Quintin Kintanar, became
Director of the Biological Research Center. Doctor Kintanar recommended that Doctor
Respondent be appointed to that position. Petitioner protested against that
recommendation. The NIST Reorganization Committee found her protest to be valid and
meritorious. Because of that impasse, which the NIST Commissioner did not resolve,
the position was not filled up. At the time the vacancy occurred, or on June 30,
1974, both Petitioner and Respondent Doctor were holding similar positions in the
Medical Research Department: that of Scientist Research Associate IV. Both were
next-in-rank to the vacant position. Later, Doctor Pedro G. Afable, Vice-Chairman,
became the Officer-in-Charge of the NIST. Effective January 5, 1978, he appointed
Petitioner to the contested position. The appointment was approved by the Civil
Service Commission. Doctor Venzon in a letter dated January 23, 1978, addressed to
Jacobo C. Clave, appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. The
appeal was forwarded to the NIST Petitioner to the contested position. The appeal-
protest was later sent to the Civil Service Commission. Chairman Clave of the Civil
Service Commission and Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo recommended in August 23, 1979
that Respondent Doctor be appointed to the contested position, a recommendation
which is in conflict with the 1978 appointment of Doctor Anzaldo which was duly
attested and approved by the Civil Service. The resolution was made pursuant to
section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, Presidential Decree
No. 807 (which took effect on October 6, 1975) and which provides that �before
deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the President shall consult the
Civil Service Commission.� Upon denial on January 5, 1980, Petitioner appealed to
the Office of the President of the Philippines. As stated earlier, Respondent PEA
(who was concurrently Chairman of the Civil Service Commission) in his decision of
March 20, 1980 Petitioner �s appointment and ruled that, �as recommended by the
Civil Service Commission� (meaning Chairman Clave himself and Commissioner Melo),
Respondent Doctor should be appointed to the contested position but that Doctor
Anzaldo�s appointment to the said position should be considered �valid and
effective during the pendency� of Doctor Venzon�s protest. August 14, 1980,
Respondent PEA denied Petitiioner�s motion which lead for her filing of special
civil action of certiorari in the SC.

What is manifestly anomalous and questionable about that decision of Presidential

Executive Assistant Clave is that it is an implementation of Resolution No. 1178
dated August 23, 1979 signed by Jacobo C. Clave, as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission and concurred in by Commissioner Jose A. Melo.

In that resolution, Commissioner Clave and Melo, acting for the Civil Service
Commission, recommended that Doctor Venzon be appointed Science Research Supervisor
II in place of Doctor Anzaldo.
When Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision that he was
�inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission�, what he
meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave�s recommendation: he was
concurring with himself

ISSUE: Whether Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in deciding the

appeal in favor of Doctor Venzon?

HELD: Yes, It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of
Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission.where it was held that the decision
of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave affirming his own decision when he is
still Chairman of the Civil Service Commission was void because it was rendered
with grave abuse of discretion and was a mockery of administrative justice as per
the courts decision in Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of Appeals, L-49711,
November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 261. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is
not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should
decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission,
as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be appointed Science
Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.
Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service
Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a
person different from the person in the Office of the President who would decide
the appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment. In this case, the person
who acted for the Office of the President is the same person in the Civil Service
Commission who was consulted by the Office of the President: Jacobo C. Clave. The
Civil Service Decree could not have contemplated that absurd situation for, as held
in the Zambales Chromite case, that would not be fair to the appellant.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Luis A. Tabuena, petitioner,

vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, and the People of the Ph., respondents.
268 SCRA 332

FACTS:
Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the
president�s office and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to
the 7 January 1985 memorandum of then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin.
Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then
private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986
reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President
Marcos� verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G.
Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means
of three (3) withdrawals. On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25
Million, following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the
PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a
manager�s check for said amount payable to Tabuena. The check was encashed,
however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor
branch counted the money after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25
Million in cash was delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs.
Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money received. Similar circumstances
surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 Million,
made on 16 January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January 1986
for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena�s co-signatory to the letter- request for a
manager�s check for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor
branch as Tabuena requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the
counting, the money was loaded in the trunk of Tabuena�s car. Peralta did not go
with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez� office. It was only upon
delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts
she received from Tabuena. The receipt was dated January 30,1986. Tabuena and
Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao remained at large. One
of the justices of the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a
defense witness and of the accused themselves; the volume of the questions asked
were more the combined questions of the counsels. On 12 October 1990, they were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions
for review, appealing the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October 19990 and the
Resolution of 20 December 1991.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.

HELD:
Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation. Tabuena
acted in strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum. The order emanated from the
Office of the President and bears the signature of the President himself, the
highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was
regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law
makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent
tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Records
show that the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense
witness and of the accused themselves. The questions of the court were in the
nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and
insinuation. Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised the issue as an error, there
is nevertheless no impediment for the court to consider such matter as additional
basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole
case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such
errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the
subject of assignments of error or not.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Hubert J. P. Webb, petitioner,

vs. Hon. Raul E. De Leon, the Presiding Judge (RTC Paranaque); et. al.,
respondents.
247 SCRA 652

FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the
Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael
Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and
Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her
sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes
Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.

Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by

Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary
investigation.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the
credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the
inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They
criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses
to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.

Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge
Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the
required preliminary examination.

Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process
and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the
prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding
that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing
warrants of arrest against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due
process during their preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when
it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.

HELD:

1. NO.
The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

2. NO.
The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In
arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and
that the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides
that �upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant
for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that
respondent judges should have conducted �searching examination of witnesses� before
issuing warrants of arrest against them.

3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the
opportunities to be heard. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more
evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more
fully.

4. NO.
Petitioner�s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the
decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the
courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution
of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal
power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators (See
R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).

With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the
Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing
that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth.

With regard to the petitioners� complaint about the prejudicial publicity that
attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records
that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the
DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on
the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and
beyond knowing.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

The PP of Ph., plaintiff-appellee,

vs. Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez, et. al., accused-appellants.
GR No. 121039-45, Oct. 18, 2001

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Antonio Sanchez and others were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. In his motion for reconsideration, he
avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the attendant publicity deprived Webb and the others of their
right to fair trial?

HELD:
We cannot sustain appellant�s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial
due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave
the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake
criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial
is not incompatible to a free press. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity,
there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not
simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the
records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as
a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his
case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable
of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to
prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Hon. Alfredo Lim & Rafaelito Garayblas, petitioners,

vs. The Court of Appeals, Hon. Wilfredo Reyes, et. al, respondents.
GR No. 111397, Aug. 12, 2002

FACTS:
On 7 December 1992, Bistro Pigalle Inc. filed before the trial court a petition for
mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, against Alfredo Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of
Manila. The Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lim�s instructions
inspected and investigated the Bistro�s license as well as the work permits and
health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in the Bistro�s
night club and restaurant operations (i.e. the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic
Garden Restaurant). Lim also refused to accept the Bistro�s application for a
business license, as well as the work permit applications of the Bistro�s staff,
for the year 1993. Acting on the Bistro�s application for injunctive relief, the
trial court issued the temporary restraining order on 29 December 1992, ordering
Lim and/or his agents to refrain from inspecting or otherwise interfering in the
operation of the establishments of the Bistro. At the hearing, the parties
submitted their evidence in support of their respective positions. On 20 January
1993, the trial court granted the Bistro�s application for a writ of prohibitory
preliminary injunction. However, despite the trial court�s order, Lim still issued
a closure order on the Bistro�s operations effective 23 January 1993, even sending
policemen to carry out his closure order. Lim insisted that the power of a mayor to
inspect and investigate commercial establishments and their staff is implicit in
the statutory power of the city mayor to issue, suspend or revoke business permits
and licenses. This statutory power is expressly provided for in Section 11 (l),
Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and in Section 455,
paragraph 3 (iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991. On 25 January 1993, the
Bistro filed an "Urgent Motion for Contempt" against Lim and the policemen who
stopped the Bistro�s operations on January 23, 1993. At the hearing of the motion
for contempt on 29 January 1993, the Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that
Lim would respect the court�s injunction. However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26 and
27, and on March 1 and 2, 1993, Lim, acting through his agents and policemen, again
disrupted the Bistro�s business operations. Meanwhile, on 17 February 1993, Lim
filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order and to dismiss the case. The trial
court denied Lim�s motion to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case in an
order dated 2 March 1993. On 10 March 1993, Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Bistro and Judge
Wilfredo Reyes. The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders in a decision on 25
March 1993, and denied Lim's motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated 13
July 1993. On 1 July 1993, Manila City Ordinance 778314 took effect. On the same
day, Lim ordered the Western Police District Command to permanently close down the
operations of the Bistro, which order the police implemented at once. Lim filed the
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:Whether the Bistro should be given an opportunity to rebut the allegations

that it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits.

HELD:
From the language of Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City
of Manila and Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code, it is clear that
the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes
the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same.
However, the power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly
premised on the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses. The laws
specifically refer to the "violation of the condition(s)" on which the licenses and
permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses and
permits is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of
such licenses and permits.

The mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers, which means that the
mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard. True,
the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits.

However, the mayor has no power to order a police raid on these establishments in
the guise of inspecting or investigating these commercial establishments. Lim has
no authority to close down Bistro�s business or any business establishment in
Manila without due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter
of the City of Manila and the Local Government Code. There is no provision in these
laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private
commercial establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there is, such
provision would be void. The due process clause of the Constitution requires that
Lim should have given the Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it
violated the conditions of its licenses and permits.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

The PP of Ph., plaintiff-appelle,

vs. Roberto Estrada, accused-appellant
GR No. 130487, June 19, 2000

FACTS:
On 27 December 27, 1994, Roberto Estrada y Lopez sat at the bishop�s chair while
the sacrament of confirmation was being performed at the St. John�s Cathedral,
Dagupan City. Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral, was summoned by
some churchgoers. Mararac went near Estrada and told him to vacate the Bishop's
chair. Mararac twice tapped Estrada�s hand with his nightstick. When Mararac was
about to strike again, Estrada drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and
stabbed him, hitting him below his left throat. Mararac fell. Wounded and bleeding,
Mararac slowly dragged himself down the altar. SP01 Conrado Francisco received a
report of the commotion inside the cathedral, went inside the cathedral,approached
Estrada who was sitting on the chair, and advised the latter to drop his knife.
Estrada obeyed.

However, when Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, who was also at
the confirmation rites,went near Estrada, Estrada embraced Rosario and two wrestled
with each other. Rosario was able to subdue Estrada. Estrada was brought to the
police station and placed in jail. Maranac expired a few minutes after arrival at
the hospital. On 29 December 1994, Estrada was charged with the crime of murder for
the killing of Mararac. On 6 January 1995, at the arraignment, the Public
Attorney's Office, filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit
Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital." It was alleged that
Estrada could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering
from a mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he was confined at
the psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. The motion was
opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several
questions on Estrada. Finding that the questions were understood and answered by
him "intelligently," the court denied the motion that same day. The arraignment
proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on Estrada's behalf. On
23 June 1997, the trial court (RTC Dagupan City, Branch 44, Criminal Case 94-00860-
D) rendered a decision upholding the prosecution evidence and found Estrada guilty
of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, and ordered him to pay
P50,000 for indemnity, P18,870 for actual expenses, and P100,000 as moral damages.
Estrada�s counsel appealed.

ISSUE: Whether a mental examination of the accused should be made before the
accused may be subjected to trial.

HELD:
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the
accused, rather than of the public. It has been held that it is inhuman to require
an accused disabled by act of God to make a just defense for his life or liberty.
To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a
violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process of law.
Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a "mental
examination." An intelligent determination of an accused's capacity for rational
understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive diagnosis of his
mental condition than laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior.
Once a medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of
incompetency be determined by the trial court. By depriving appellant of a mental
examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial. The
trial court's negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process;
and for this reason, the proceedings before the said court must be nullified.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

The Summary Dismissal Board and the Regional Appelate Board, PNP, Region VI,
petitioners,
vs. C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, respondent.
330 SCRA 153

FACTS:
On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his
aide, PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat,
were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by
one Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del
Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up
has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision almost took
place, it accelerated speed and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation
owned by the congressman. The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it
reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the confrontation with del
Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but the same had no
effect.

PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and that it is
dangerous for them to continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up.
Torcita,upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the
place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were. On 6 July 1994, 12
verified administrative complaints were filed against Torcita for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and
Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The
12 administrative complaints were consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct
unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find
sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor
that a serious confrontation took place
between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and held that the
charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while
the Board found that Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties" when
the incident happened, he allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance
of duty (for being in the influence of alcohol while in performance of duty) and
was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same period of time. Torcita
appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the Philippine National
Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.

Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense
for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due process of law). The Board
filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The RTC granted the petition for
certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision insofar
as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty. The
Board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not have
been guilty of irregularity considering that the 12 cases were eventually
dismissed. The Board filed the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal
discipline, when the original charges against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a
Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile,
and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.

HELD:
Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent be informed of the
specific charges against him. The absence of specification of the offense for which
he was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can
be no short-cut to the legal process. While the definition of the more serious
offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no
matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be
countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process. Herein,
the 12 administrative cases filed against Torcita did not include charges or
offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in
the performance of official duty. There is no indication or warning at all in the
summary dismissal proceedings that Torcita was also being charged with breach of
internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance
of his duties. The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him
guilty of the offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Further, the
cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that
Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the
performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring
to this particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of
duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in
the
performance of duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of
liquor; he was on a private trip fetching his wife.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Bailinang P. Marohombsar, complainant,

vs. Judge Santos B. Adiong, respondent.
AM RTJ-02-1674, Jan. 22, 2004

FACTS:
Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in Civil Case for �injunction with prayer
for preliminary injunction.� The case was filed by Yasmira Pangadapun, daughter of
Judge Yusoph Pangadapun of RTC Branch 10, Marawi City. In the said complaint,
Pangadapun questioned the legality of Marohombsar�s appointment by DSWD Regional
Secretary Salic-Malna as provincial social welfare officer V of the DSWD-ARMM.
Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge issued a TRO and set the
hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint and a notice indicating that a
preliminary conference would be held was also served on both parties. Marohombsar
filed an ex parte urgent motion to dissolve the TRO. Pangadapun was asked to
comment and, pending the filing of the same, the TRO was extended. Respondent
issued an order stating that a preliminary conference had been held and that both
parties had waived the raffle of the case. He reset the hearing on the application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondent extended the TRO
to let Pangadapun submit her comment. During the hearing on the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, none of the lawyers appeared. Hence,
respondent considered it submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary
injunction the following day. In his partial Comment respondent denied that: (1) he
issued the TRO in favor of Pangadapun without benefit of a hearing; (2) in his
order dated March 22, 1999, he made it appear that a preliminary conference was
held where the parties agreed to waive the raffle of the case, when in fact there
was none; (3) he falsified the records of the case and (4) he granted the
preliminary injunction without a hearing. He alleged that the complaint was purely
a harassment case filed by a disgruntled party because of the latter�s failure to
obtain a favorable resolution from him. Although respondent judge admitted that
Judge Yusoph Pangadapun and Judge Abdulhakim Ibrahim were his distant relatives and
townmates, he stressed that �never in our careers in the judiciary have we
interfered nor influenced one another on any pending case before our
courts.�adrianantazo.wordpress.com

ISSUE: Whether the complainant was denied due process because the preliminary
injunction was issued without hearing.

HELD:
No, In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior
notice and hearing before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that
not all petitions for preliminary injunction need undergo a trial-type hearing, it
being doctrinal that a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all
instances, essential to due process. The essence of due process is that a party is
afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may
have in support of his defense. In the present case, complainant was able to move
for a reconsideration of the order in question; hence her right to due process was
not in anyway transgressed. The court ruled that a party cannot claim that he has
been denied due process when he has availed of the opportunity to present his
position. Even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent judge erred in
ordering the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, in Equatorial Realty
vs. Anunciacion, Jr. that, as a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in
his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts
are erroneous, provided he acts in good faith and without malice. Respondent judge,
or any other member of the bench for that matter, is presumed to have acted
regularly and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Ph. Communications Satellite Corp., petitioner,

vs. Jose Luis A. Alcuaz, as NTC Commissioner; and National Telecommunications
Commission, respondent.
180 SCRA 218

FACTS:
By virtue of Republic Act 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate
in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations
and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite
communications," the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as
needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite
system and ground terminal
or terminals." By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, it is also the
sole signatory for the Philippines in the Agreement and the Operating Agreement
relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT),
as well as in the Convention and the Operating Agreement of the International
Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), which two global commercial
telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively established by various
states in line with the principles set forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the United
Nations�s General Assembly. Since 1968, It has been leasing its satellite circuits
to PLDT, Philippine Global Communications, Eastern Telecom, Globe Mackay Cable and
Radio Corp. ITT, and Capitol Wireless or their predecessors-in-interest. The
satellite services thus provided by PHILCOMSAT enable said international carriers
to serve the public with indispensable communication services, such as overseas
telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live television in full
color, and television standard conversion from European to American or vice versa.
It was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However, pursuant to Executive Order
(EO) 196 issued on 17 June 1987, it was placed under the jurisdiction, control and
regulation of NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of
rates. Implementing said executive order, NTC required PHILCOMSAT to apply for the
requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities
and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates
therefor. On 9 September 1987, PHILCOMSAT filed with NTC an application for
authority to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been
continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the
international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing
since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services.
Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can
continue to operate and maintain the facilities, provide the services and charge
therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. On 16 September 1987, PHILCOMSAT
was granted a provisional authority to continue operating its existing facilities,
to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then
charging.

This authority was valid for 6 months from the date of said order. When said
provisional authority expired on 17 March 1988, it was extended for another 6
months, or up to 16 September 1988. Thereafter, the NTC further extended the
provisional authority of PHILCOMSAT for another 6 months, counted from 16 September
1988, but it directed PHILCOMSAT to charge modified reduced rates through a
reduction of 15% on the present authorized rates. PHILCOMSAT assailed said order.

ISSUE: Whether the NTC is not required to provide notice and hearing to PHILCOMSAT
in its rate-fixing order, which fixed a temporary rate pending final determination
of PHILCOMSAT�s application.

HELD:
The NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements
of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates,
which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of
legislative power. The NTC order violates procedural due process because it was
issued motu proprio, without notice to PHILCOMSAT and without the benefit of a
hearing. Said order was based merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a
unilateral evaluation, but had PHILCOMSAT been given an opportunity to present its
side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate
reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been
shown and demonstrated to NTC. The order pertains exclusively to PHILCOMSAT and to
no other. Reduction of rates was made without affording PHILCOMSAT the benefit of
an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements
warranted a corresponding rate reduction. PHILCOMSAT was not even afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which NTC based
its questioned order. While the NTC may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of PHILCOMSAT, such ratefixing order, temporary
though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of
notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that
such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and
confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not
perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than
would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise
provided by the applicable law. NTC has no authority to make such order without
first giving PHILCOMSAT a hearing, whether the order be temporary or ermanent, and
it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary
investigation, or upon the commission's own motion.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, petitioner,

vs. The PP of the Ph., the Hon. Nicasio Yatco (Judge of CFI Rizal, QC), et. al,
respondents.
101 Ph. 833

FACTS:
On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years,
filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney
of Quezon City, alleging that on or about June 21, 1954, the accused took Alicia
Nubla from St. Paul's College in Quezon City with lewd design and took her to
somewhere near the University of the Philippines (UP) compound in Diliman and was
then able to have carnal knowledge of her. On 15 December 1954, after an
investigation, an Assistant City Attorney recommended to the City Attorney of
Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954
attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City
wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney
referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed against Suntay. On 10
January 1955, Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of
Foreign Affairs (5981 [A39184]). On 20 January 1955, Suntay left the Philippines
for San Francisco, California, where he is at present enrolled in school. On 31
January 1955, Alicia Nubla subscribed and swore to a complaint charging Suntay with
seduction which was filed, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) Quezon City, after
preliminary investigation had been conducted (Criminal case Q-1596). On 9 February
1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order
"directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National
Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of
having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law." On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion. On 7 March
1955 the Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to
order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to Suntay
and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the
criminal charges against him. However, this order was not implemented or carried
out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in order that the issues raised
may be judicially resolved. On 5 July 1955, Suntay�s counsel wrote to the Secretary
requesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered, and filed in
the criminal case a motion praying that the Court reconsider its order of 10
February 1955. On 7 July 1955, the Secretary denied counsel's request and on 15
July 1955 the Court denied the motion for reconsideration. Suntay filed the
petition for a writ of certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether Suntay should be accorded notice and hearing before his passport may
be cancelled.

HELD:
Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is
exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing
of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed
with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of
such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution;
and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and
capricious because of the absence of such hearing.
If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law
clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte
would be violative of the said clause. Hearing would have been proper and necessary
if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but
doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our
courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion (Section 25, EO 1, S. 1946, 42
OG 1400) to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted
whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Suntay�s
suddenly leaving the country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be
interpreted to mean as a deliberate attempt on his part to flee from justice, and,
therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of the law should
join together to bring him back to justice.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

George De Bisschop, petitioner-appellee,

vs. Emilio L. Galang (in his capacity as Commissioner of Immigration), respondent-
appellant.
8 SCRA 244

FACTS:
George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in this country for 3
years, expiring 1 August 1959, as a prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production,
Inc., of which he is president and general manager. He applied for extension of
stay with the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959. In view,
however, of confidential and damaging reports of the Immigration Office, Benjamin
de Mesa, to the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a gambling
front than the enterprise for promotions of local and imported shows that it
purports to be, and that de Bisschop is suspected of having evaded payment of his
income tax, the Commissioner of Immigration (Emilio L. Galang), in a communication
of 10 September 1959, advised him that his application for extension of stay as a
prearranged employee has been denied by the Board of Commissioners, and that he
should depart within 5 days. Thereafter, counsel of de Bisschop requested for a
copy of the adverse decision of said Board, but the legal officer of the Bureau of
Immigration replied that, pursuant to immigration practice and procedure and as is
usual in such cases where the result is a vote for denial, for reasons of
practicability and expediency, no formal decision, order or
resolution is promulgated by the Board. Thereafter, Mr. Bisschop was simply advised
of said denial as per letter dated 10 September 1959. No request for
reinvestigation was made with the Bureau of Immigration.

Instead, to forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation
proceedings, de Bisschop filed the case on 18 September 1959. Pending resolution of
the main case for prohibition, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued ex-parte
by the Court of First Instance (CFI) Manila (with Judge Antonio Canizares
presiding, Civil Case 41477) on the same day ordering the Commissioner of
Immigration to desist from arresting and detaining de Bisschop. During the hearing,
only documentary evidence were presented. On 27 March 1961, the lower court granted
the petition for prohibition and ordered the Commissioner of Immigration to desist
and refrain from arresting and expelling de Bisschop from the Philippines unless
and until proper and legal proceedings are conducted by the Board of Commissioners
of the Bureau of Immigrations in connection with the application for extension of
stay filed by de Bisschop with said Board.
The Commissioner of Immigration appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the right to notice and hearing is essential to due process in
administrative proceedings, and whether the Board of Commissioners are required to
render written decisions on petitions for extension of stay.

HELD:
The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility
of the Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely
discretionary on the part of immigration authorities. Since CA 613 (Philippines
Immigration Act of 1940) is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these
cases, the Courts are inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no
jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration
authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances
may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. This would not violate
the due process clause as, in the case at bar, the letter of appellant-commissioner
advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary step,
and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's
answer to the complaint, the "requirement to leave before the start of the
deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that unless he departs
voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion". It is
already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of
right in administrative proceedings. Further, the immigration laws specifically
enumerate when the decisions of the Board of Commissioners shall be in writing, to
wit: (1) in cases of appeal from a decision of the Board of Special Inquiry as to
matters of admission or exclusion of aliens, as provided in Section 27(c) of the
Immigration Act; and (2) the decision of the Board of Commissioners in cases of
deportation under Section 37, paragraph (a) and (c). There is nothing in the
immigration law which provides that the Board of Commissioners must render written
decisions on petitions for extension of stay. Section 8 of the Immigration Act
merely refers to the number of �votes� necessary to constitute the decision of said
Board.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Var-Orient Shipping Co., Inc. and Comninos Bros., petitioners,

vs. Tomas D. Achacoso (in his capacity as Administrator of POEA), et. al.,
respondents.
161 SCRA 232

FACTS:
Var-Orient Shipping Co. Inc. and Comninos Bros. filed a complaint with the Workers'
Assistance and Adjudication Office (WAAO), Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) against the Edgar T. Bunyog, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio
Capalad, Raul Tumasis, Antonio Tanio-an, Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela and Roberto
Genesis, crew members of the MPV "Silver Reefer," for having allegedly violated
their Contracts of Employment with them, which supposedly resulted in damages
arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the International Transport Workers'
Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986.

After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on 4 March 1987 with both parties
required to submit memoranda. Only the seamen submitted memoranda. On 10 June 1987,
the seamen filed a motion to resolve, which the companies' counsel did not oppose.
Thus, on the basis of the pleadings and memoranda, Achacoso rendered a decision on
9 September 1987 ordering (1) the dismissal of the case with a reprimand and
against Navarro, Capalad, Tumasis, Tanio-an, Cagon, Manela and Genesis, against the
commission of the same or similar offense otherwise it shall be dealt with more
severe penalty; (2) exclusion of Llanes from the case; (3) reprimanding Var-Orient
Shipping Co. for failure to comply with its obligations pursuant to POEA rules and
regulations and warning against committing the same or a similar offense otherwise
it shall be dealt with more severely; (4) archiving the case of Arsolon, A. dela
Cruz, Montero and D. de la Cruz with their names included in the POEA watchlist
until they shall have voluntarily submitted themselves to WAAO�s jurisdiction; (5)
payment by the companies jointly and severally, unto Navarro, Capalad, Tumasis,
Tanio-an, Cason, Manela and Genesis the amount of P1,550.59 each, representing
deductions from allotments, plus P1,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and (6)
payment by the companies jointly and severally unto Bunyog the amount of
US$4,680.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing his salaries
for the unserved portion of his employment contract plus P4,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees; to be tendered thru WAAO, 10 days from receipt of the decision. A
copy of the decision was sent by registered mail and delivered
by the postman to the companies' counsel, then Attorney Francisco B. Figura through
the receptionist, Marlyn Aquino on 21 September 1987. Atty. Figura alleged he did
not receive the envelope containing the decision.

The companies allegedly learned about the decision only when the writ of execution
was served on them on 20 November 1987 by National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) Deputy Sheriff Rene Masilungan and Attorney Wilfredo Ong. Previously, on 19
October 1987, the seamen filed "Motion for Execution of Decision," the companies'
counsel did not oppose. On 23 November 1987, the companies, through new counsel,
Atty. Quintin Aseron, Jr., filed an "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" on
the ground that the
decision had not been received by them, hence, it was not yet final and executory.
On 19 January 1988, the POEA Administrator (Tomas D. Achacoso). In due time, the
companies filed the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the decision of the POEA administrator has been received, rendering
said decision final and unappealable.

HELD:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Herein, the
parties agreed that they would file their respective memoranda at the 4 March 1987
hearing and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision. This procedure is
authorized by law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes. Atty. Figura's
affidavit involving that he has not received the decision is self-serving. The
companies failed to submit an affidavit of the receptionist Marlyn Aquino
explaining what she did with the decision which she received for Atty. Figura.
Under the circumstances, the Administrator's ruling that the decision had been
properly served on companies' counsel and that it is now final and unappealable,
should be sustained. The issuance of the writ of execution is therefore not
premature.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Ang Tibay (rep. by Toribio Teodoro, manager & proprietor), and National Workers
Brotherhood, petitioners,
vs. The Court of Industrial Relations & National Labor Union Inc., respondents.
69 Phil. 635

FACTS:
Toribio Teodoro, the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, laid off 89 laborers, who
were members of the National Labor Union (NLU), due to alleged shortages of leather
materials. The National Labor Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice
against Ang Tibay, alleging therein, among others, that Toribio dominates the
National Workers� Brotherhood (NWB) of Ang Tibay, another union in the company, and
that Toribio discriminated against the NLU and unjustly favoring the NWB, which he
allegedly dominated. The Court of Industrial Relations ruled in favor of NLU, due
to the failure of Ang Tibay to present records of the Bureau of Customs and Books
of Accounts of native dealers in leather and thus to disprove NLU�s allegation that
the lack of leather materials as a scheme to discharge NLU members. The Supreme
Court, however, reversed the decision, finding no substantial evidence that the 89
workers were dismissed due to their union affiliation or activities. Thus, the
Solicitor General, in behalf of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a motion
for reconsideration, while the NLU filed a motion for new trial, praying that the
case be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations.

ISSUE: Whether the CIR�s freedom from the rigidity of procedural requirements
prescribe special requirements of due process in administrative cases.

HELD:
The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity
and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms
and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." The fact, however, that the
CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore
or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials
and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character, to wit:

a. Right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected
to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and
property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair
play.

b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented, after the party is given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts. The right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding
duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously
futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it
aside without notice or consideration.

c. Wile the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it
is a nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more
fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to
the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon
power.

d. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be "substantial." Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing
in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this
and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of
technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed
incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order.
But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not
go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence.
e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by
confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can
the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It
should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing
evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy.
Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining
the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory.
(Section 9, CA 103.) The CIR may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute of
any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a
provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such
board or public official such powers and functions as the CIR may deem necessary,
but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its
powers (Section 10)

f. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work
is such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the CIR personally
to decide all controversies coming before them. There is no statutory authority to
authorize examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to
appeal to board or commission, to solve the difficulty.

g. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable
from the authority conferred upon it.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Ateneo De Manila University, petitioner,

vs. Court of Appeals, & Sps. Romeo G. Guanzon and Teresita Regalado, respondents.
15 SCRA 100

FACTS:
On 12 December 1967, Juan Ramon Guanzon (from Bacolod, son of Romeo Guanzon and
Teresita Regalado), first year student of AdMU Loyola Heights, and boarder at the
Cervini Hall) struck at the left temple of Carmelita Mateo, a waitress in the
Cervini Hall cafeteria. Other boarders held him from striking again, but the
boarders hid the incident from Fr. Campbell. The university conducted an
investigation of the slapping incident. On the basis of the investigation results,
Juan Ramon was dismissed from the university.

The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a complaint for damages by
his parents against the university in the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Negros Occidental at Bacolod City. The complaint states that Juan Ramon was
expelled from school without giving him a fair trial in violation of his right to
due process and that they are prominent and well known residents of Bacolod City,
with the unceremonious expulsion of their son causing them actual, moral, and
exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. In its answer, the university denied
the material allegations of the complaint and justified the dismissal of Juan Ramon
on the ground that his unbecoming behavior is contrary to good morals, proper
decorum, and civility, that such behavior subjected him as a student to the
university's disciplinary regulations' action and sanction and that the university
has the sole prerogative and authority at any time to drop from the school a
student found to be undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity and
discipline so indispensable for its existence as an institution of learning. After
due trial, the lower court found for the Guanzons and ordered the university to pay
them P92.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorney's
fees and to pay the costs of the suit. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the
university, the trial court's decision was initially reversed and set aside.
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the appellate court
reversed its decision and set it aside through a special division of five. The
motion for reconsideration had to be referred to a special division of five in view
of the failure to reach unanimity on the resolution of the motion, the vote of the
regular division having become 2 to 1. Hence, the University filed a petition for
review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the absence of notice to the dismissed student�s parents negates the
compliance of the requirements of administrative due process.

HELD:
Besides the administrative body undertaking a fair and objective investigation of
the incident, due process in administrative proceedings also requires consideration
of the evidence presented and the existence of evidence to support the decision.
Herein, the original Court of Appeals decision (penned by Justice Gancayco) showed
that the procedures in the expulsion case were fair, open, exhaustive, and
adequate. There were nothing in the records to reverse the findings in the
reconsideration. Clearly, there was absolutely no indication of malice, fraud, and
improper or wilful motives or conduct on the part of the Ateneo de Manila
University. Juan Ramon was given notice of the proceedings. He actually appeared to
present his side. The investigating board acted fairly and objectively. All
requisites of administrative due process were met. It cannot be negated by the fact
that the parents of Juan Ramon were not given any notice of the proceedings.

Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18 years of age, was already a college student,
intelligent and mature enough to know his responsibilities. He was fully cognizant
of the gravity of the offense he committed as he asked if he could be expelled for
what he did. When informed about the 19 December 1967 meeting of the Board of
Discipline, he was asked to seek advice and assistance from his guardian and or
parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent and did not inform them about his
case, not even when he went home to Bacolod City for his Christmas vacation, was
not the fault of the University.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Felix Montemayor, petitioner,

vs. Araneta University Foundation, et. al, respondents.
77 SCRA 321

FACTS:
Felix Montemayor was a full-time professor of Araneta University Foundation (AUF),
serving as head of its Humanities and Psychology Department. On 17 April 1974, a
complaint for immorality lodged against him by the Chaplain of the AUF for alleged
immorality. Its then President, Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., created a committee to
investigate such charge. The accusation centered on conversations on sex and
immoral advances committed against the person of Leonardo de Lara. The first
hearing, which took place on 24 April 1974, was attended by Montemayor as well as
the complainant with his two witnesses. Montemayor sought the postponement of the
investigation to 3 May 1974, which was granted. On 28 May 1974, he filed a motion
to dismiss or to hold the hearing in abeyance, and on 17 June 1974, he filed an
affidavit to sustain his defense.

On 8 July 1974, the report and recommendation of the investigating committee came,
and was adverse to Montemayor. The recommendation was for his demotion in rank by
one degree. On 5 August 1974, Salcedo adopted such recommendation and thereafter
referred the same to the Board of Trustees of the AUF for appropriate action. On 8
November 1974, new charges were filed by Professor Luis R. Almazan, one Jaime
Casta�eda, and Jesus Martinez against Montemayor for conduct unbecoming of a
faculty member. Another committee was appointed. Montemayor moved to postpone the
hearing set for 18 and 19 November 1974, but was denied. The hearing proceeded in
his absence. On 5 December 1974, the Committee submitted its report finding the
charges against Montemayor to have been sufficiently established and recommending
to the President and the Board of Trustees of the AUF his separation from the
University, in accordance with Sections 116 and 351 of the Manual of Policies of
the University. On 10 December 1974, his dismissal was ordered effective 15
November 1974, the date of his preventive suspension. On 12 December 1974, the
University filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a report of
his suspension and application for clearance to terminate his employment.
Meanwhile, on 21 November 1974, Montemayor in turn lodged a complaint with the NLRC
against AUF for reinstatement and payment of back wages and salaries, with all the
privileges, benefits and increments attendant thereto. There was a motion to
dismiss on the part of the latter. Both the labor arbiter and the NLRC found in
favor of Montemayor. He was ordered reinstated to his former position with back
wages and without loss of seniority and other privileges.

Montemayor's complaint for unfair labor practice was, however, dismissed. AUF
appealed to the Secretary of Labor who, on 14 July 1976, set aside the Commission's
order for his reinstatement, finding Montemayor's dismissal justified. The AUF was,
however, required to pay Montemayor the amount of P14,480.00 representing the
latter's accrued back wages which the former voluntarily offered to extend him.
Dissatisfied with the Secretary's decision, Montemayor filed a petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether Montemayor was absolutely denied of due process in the proceedings
relating to his dismissal from AUF.

HELD:
In procedural due process, there must be a hearing before condemnation, with the
investigation to proceed in an orderly manner, and judgment to be rendered only
after such inquiry. Academic due process, a term coined, is a system of procedure
designed to yield the best possible judgment when an adverse decision against a
professor may be the consequence with stress on the clear, orderly, and fair way of
reaching a conclusion. Every university or college teacher should be entitled
before dismissal or demotion, to have the charges against him stated in writing, in
specific terms and to have a fair trial on these charges before a special or
permanent judicial committee of the faculty or by the faculty at large. At such
trial the teacher accused should have full opportunity to present evidence. Herein,
the procedure followed in the first
investigation of Montemayor (June 1974) satisfied the procedure due process
requisite. The second investigation (November 1974), however, did not. The motion
for postponement therein was denied, the hearing proceeded as scheduled in the
absence of Montemayor, and the committee lost no time in submitting its report
finding the charges against Montemayor to have been sufficiently established and
recommending his removal. The deficiency, however, was remedied, as Montemayor was
able to present his case before the Labor Commission. Denial of due process
happened only in the proceeding he had before the investigating committees and not
in the proceedings before the NLRC wherein he was given the fullest opportunity to
present his case, the latter being the subject matter of the petition for
certiorari. Montemayor was afforded his day in court.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Manila Electric Company, petitioner,

vs. Public Service Commission Etc., et. al, respondents.
11 SCRA 317

FACTS:
On 10 March 1955, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) filed two applications with
the Public Service Commission (PSC), one, for revision and reduction of its rates
for commercial and other nonresidential customers for general lighting, heating
and/or power purposes (PSC Case 85889) and the other for revision and reduction of
its residential meter rate, schedule RM-3 (PSC Case 85890). These applications were
approved by the PSC in a decision rendered on 24 September 1955. On 24 August 1955,
the Meralco filed another application for revision and reduction of its general
power rate, Schedule GP-2 (PSC Case 89293), which was provisionally approved on 31
August 1955. Previous to these applications, Meralco filed 7 other applications for
revision and reduction rates. On 9 June 1954, upon petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the
Commission requested the Auditor General to cause an audit and examination of
Meralco's books of accounts.

The General Auditing Office (GAO) examined and audited the books and under date of
11 May 1956, it presented a report which was submitted to the Commission on 28 May
1956. On 30 May 1956, the PSC, thru Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo, reset the
hearing of the cases for 22 June 1956 "for the purpose of considering such further
revision of applicant's rates as may be found reasonable." On said date, the
parties appeared and Atty. Venancio L. de Peralta, Technical Assistant and Chief of
the Finance and Rate Division of the PSC, who was duly authorized to receive the
evidence of the parties, announced that the hearing was an "informal hearing", and
its purpose was to hear any remarks or statements of the parties and to define the
issues "so that at the hearing we know exactly what are disputed at this informal
hearing". Dr. Pedro Gil submitted the 3 cases on the report of the GAO dated 11 May
1956 and on a letter dated 7 June 1956 he sent to the Commission, in which he asked
the Commission, inter alia, to allow the Meralco "a rate of return of only 8% on
its invested capital.". The Solicitor General submitted the case on the same report
and letter of Dr. Gil and on a letter-report addressed by the Deputy Auditor
General to the Commission on 21 November 1955.

Other parties made common cause with Dr. Gil. Meralco was given by the Commission a
period of 30 days within which to file an answer, specifying its objections to the
report of the GAO. On 31 July 1956, the Meralco filed its answer to the GAO's
report, specifying its objection, and prayed that the cases be reset for hearing to
enable the parties to present their proofs. Without having (1) first reset the said
3 cases for hearing; (2) Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as
requested by it, to cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared the report
dated May 11, 1956, on which report the Commission based its decision; and (3)
Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to present
evidence in support of its answer to refute the facts alleged in said report and
controverted by Meralco, on 27 December 1957, the PSC handed down a decision,
granting the petition for the reduction of rates. The motion for reconsideration
and to set aside decision, filed on 14 January 1958 by Meralco, was denied by the
Commission on a 2 to 1 vote, on 3 March 1958. Meralco filed the petition for review
with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the informal hearing held 22 June 1956 serves the purpose of �proper
notice and hearing� in administrative cases.
HELD:
The record shows that no hearing was held. On 22 June 1956, parties appeared before
"Attorney Vivencio L. Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief, Finance and Rate
Division, Public Service Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the
evidence of the parties", and the record shows that the hearing held before the
said Commissioner was merely an informal hearing because, using his own words, "I
said at the beginning that this is only preliminary because I want that the parties
could come to some kind of understanding." Meralco has not been given its day in
court. The decision of 27 December 1957 was not promulgated "upon proper notice and
hearing", as required by law, and that therefore it can not serve as a legal basis
for requiring the Meralco to put in effect the reductions ordered in the decision.
It is the cardinal
right of a party in trials and administrative proceedings to be heard, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence presented considered
by the tribunal. Even if the Commission is not bound by the rules of judicial
proceedings, it must how its head to the constitutional mandate that no person
shall be deprived of right without due process of law, which binds not only the
government of the Republic, but also each and everyone of its branches, agencies,
etc. Due process of law guarantees notice and opportunities to be heard to persons
who would be affected by the order or act contemplated.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Sophia Alcuaz, et. al, petitioners,

vs. Phil. School of Business Administration, QC Branch (PSVA, et. al, respondents.
161 SCRA 7

FACTS:
Sophia Alcuaz, Ma. Cecilia Alindayu, Bernadette Ang, Irna Anonas, Ma. Remedios
Baltazar, Corazon Bundoc, John Carmona, Anna Shiela Dinoso, Rafael Encarnacion, et.
al., are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration
(PSBA) Quezon City. As early as 22 March 1986, the students and the PSBA, Q.C. had
already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the
school. In spite of the agreement, the students felt the need to hold dialogues.
Among others they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was
turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school
entrances. Subsequently dialogues proved futile. Finally, on 8 October 1996, the
students received uniform letters from PSBA giving them 3 days to explain why the
school should not take/mete out any administrative sanction on their direct
participation and/or conspiring with others in the commission of tumultuous and
anarchic acts on October 2, 3, and 7. On 22 October 1982, the letter was answered
by the counsel for the students in a reply letter. During the regular enrollment
period, the students were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second
semester of SY 1986-1987. On 28 October 1986 the President of the Student Council
filed a complaint with the Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports (MECS) against the PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council
Officers and student leaders. Simultaneously on the same date, the student council
wrote the President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the
schools final decision regarding their enrollment. Another demand letter was made
by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romullo Yap, also to the President, Board of
Trustees, to enroll his clients within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding, no
relief appeared to be forthcoming. The students filed a petition for review on
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction.

ISSUE: Whether the students were deprived of due process in the refusal of PSBA to
readmit them.
HELD:
After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing
contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. The contract
having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be
compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers. The right
of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and
violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by the Court, as
it is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as
valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. Due process in disciplinary
cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings may
be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof.

Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of
procedural due process are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3)
they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right
to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case. Herein, conditions 3, 4 and 5 had not been
complied with.

The Court, however, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school

authorities in the interest of justice. Further, it is well settled that by reason
of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific
matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords
respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless the
factual findings are not supported by evidence; where the findings are vitiated by
fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual
findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. Herein, a careful
scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating Committee
shows it does not fall under any of the above exceptions. Thus, the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition, but in the light of compassionate equity, students who
were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during
the school year when the petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to
graduate in due time.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Ariel Non, et. al, petitioners,

vs. Hon. Sancho Danes II (in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of 5th RTC, Branch
38, Daet, Camarines Norte), et. al, respondents.
GR No. 89317, May 20, 1990

FACTS:
Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano, Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes
Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba, Sonny Moreno. Giovani Palma, Joselito
Villalon, Luis Santos and Daniel Torres, students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet,
Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year
1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school
in the preceding semester. They thus filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court
of Daet (Branch 38) seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but
the trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated 8 August 1988. A motion
for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on 24
February 1989; stating that they waived-their privilege to be admitted for re-
enrollment with respondent college when
they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school
year 1988-89. In addition, for the same semester, they duly signed pledges "to
abide and comply with all the rules and regulations laid down by competent
authorities in the College Department or School in which I am enrolled." Hence, the
affected students filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the school exclude students because of failing grades when the cause
for the action taken against them relates to possible breaches of discipline.

HELD:
The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is
imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory
powers over all educational institutions. The authority for schools to refuse
enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one
semester, has already expired, cannot be justified. Still, institutions' discretion
on the admission and enrollment of students as a major component of the academic
freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher learning. The right of an institution
of higher learning to set academic standards, however, cannot be utilized to
discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech
and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal
protection. Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford
its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue.
However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain
the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court
should not review the discretion of university authorities. Excluding students
because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them
undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due
process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play. Further,
the failures in one or two subjects by some cannot be considered marked academic
deficiency. Neither can the academic deficiency be gauged from the academic
standards of the school due to insufficiency of information. Herein, the students
could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the mass
actions, but the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the
offense committed and it must be imposed only after the requirements of procedural
due process have been complied with (Paragraph 145,Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools). But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of
administrative sanctions have become moot and academic; as the students have been
refused readmission or re-enrollment and have been effectively excluded from for 4
semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of
discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass
actions that resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to
disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further
aggravate the strained relations between the students and the officials of the
school which necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Francisco I. Chavez, petitioner,

vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), et. al, petitioners-in-
intervention
GR No. 130716, December 9, 1998

FACTS:
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative
duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national
interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and
agreements pertaining to PCGG�s task of recovering the Marcoses� ill-gotten wealth.
He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves
an issue of �paramount public interest,� since it has a �debilitating effect on the
country�s economy� that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of
the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the
transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.

Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the
Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner�s action is premature, because
there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the
Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any
disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not
become effective and binding.

ISSUE: Whether the constitutional right to information may prosper against

respondents� argument that the �should be disclosed� proposed terms and conditions
of the Agreements are not yet effective and binding

HELD: Yes.

Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is

incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of
ill-gotten wealth, subject to some of the following recognized restrictions:
(1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets
and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential
information.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreements dated
December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared
NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG,
its officers and all government functionaries and officials who are or may be
directly or indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public
the terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement,
relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions
embodied in this Decision.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

The PP of the Ph., plaintiff-appellee,

vs. Moro Isnain, defendant-appellant.
85 Phil. 648

NO DIGEST FOUND. FULL CASE:

G.R. No. L-2857 February 28, 1950

BENGZON, J.:

In the morning of March 7, 1947, Urbano Cruz, the encargado of the coconut grove of
Arturo Eustaquio in Latuan and Balagtasan, City of Zamboanga, was informed by
Lazaro Viernes, one of the guard, that there were three persons stealing coconuts
in the said plantation. Cruz called Ernesto Fargas, the truck driver of Eustaquio
and accompanied by some laborers, both proceeded to the plantation. There the group
saw three persons, chopping coconuts. When they approached, the trespassers started
to run away, but Cruz fired a shot into the air, and one stopped and was
apprehended. He turned out to be the herein appellant, Moro Isnain, who upon
investigation by the precinct commander of the corresponding police station (Lt.
Bucoy) acknowledged his culpability, asked for pardon and identified his
confederates as Moros Addi and Akik (who are still at large). Before the justice of
the peace he pleaded guilty to the charge.

However, in the court of first instance he changed his mind. He admitted he had
been arrested during the raid, but submitted the flimsy excuse that he had merely
gone to the place because he was thirsty. Anyway, he confessed that he joined the
other two thieves in order to drink � and did drink � coconut water. This naturally
constitutes theft of the coconuts. He also owned to having asked pardon from
Lieutenant Bucoy "even to the extent of kissing his hand." Therefore there is no
question in our minds that the appellant, with the other two runaways unlawfully
picked coconuts from the plantation of Arturo Eustaquio, fruits which, according to
the evidence, were valued at more than thirty-three pesos (P33.76).

The only question raised with much earnestness by his attorney de oficio is that
article 310 of the Revised Penal Code classifying as qualified theft, the stealing
of coconut is unconstitutional, because it punishes the larceny of such products
more heavily than the taking away of similar produce, such as rice and sugar, and
thereby denies him the equal protection of the laws. It is unquestionable that the
constitutional guaranty requires the treatment alike, in the same place and under
like circumstances and conditions, of all persons subject to state legislation. but
a state, "as a part of its police, may exercise s large measure of discretion,
without violating the equal protection guaranty, in creating and defining criminal
offenses, and may make classification as to persons amenable to punishment, so long
as the classifications are reasonable and the legislation bears equally on all in
the same class, and, where a reasonable classification is made as between persons
or corporations, the persons or corporation in each class may be dealt with in a
manner different from that employed with regard to the persons or corporations in
other classes."1

Thus it means no violation of the constitutional provision to make it a felony

fraudulently to sell a part of a stock of trade whereas the fraudulent sale of
other property is made a misdemeanor only, and petty theft to steal other kinds of
animals.2

In the matter of theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier penalty is to

encourage and protect the development of the coconut industry as one of the sources
of our national economy.3 Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where the range of
vision is unobstructed, coconut groves can not be efficiently watched because of
the nature of the growth of coconut trees; and without a special measure to protect
this kind of property, it will be, as it has been in the past the favorite resort
of thieves.4 There is therefore, some reason for the special treatment accorded the
industry; and as it can not be said that the classification is entirely without
basis, the plea of unconstitutionality must be denied.

The crime is punished by article 309, paragraph 5, in connection with article 310
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 417. (Republic Act
No. 120, enacted after the offense, is not applicable.) The penalty is prision
correccional to its full extent. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, the
appellant should be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 4 years and 2
months of arresto mayor nor more than 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional.
Thus modified, the appealed decision will be affirmed, with costs. so ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ.,
concur.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Mayor Pablo R. Olivarez, petitioner,

vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division), et. al, respondents.
248 S 700

FACTS:
Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member charged
petitioner Para�aque Mayor Olivarez with Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue a mayor�s permit despite request
and follow-ups to implement Para�aque Sangguniang Bayan Resolution which petitioner
himself approved. the resolution authorized BCCI to set up a night manufacturer�s
fair during the Christmas fiesta celebration of and at Baclaran for 60 days for
which they will use a portion of the service road of Roxas Boulevard from the
corner of Opena to Rivera Streets. BCCI requesting assistance for the issuance of a
mayor�s permit, BCCI counsel Atty. Renato Dilag to petitioner formally demanding
implementation of Resolution. petitioner replied letter to Atty. Dilag stating
among others that the non-implementation of Resolution was due to BCCI�s failure to
apply for appropriate permit and license to operate the Night Manufacturer�s Fair
which was one of the conditions in the authorization.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner disregarded right to the Equal Protection of BCCI?

HELD:
Yes, petitioner failed to show, in apparent disregard of BCCI�s right to equal
protection, that BCCI and the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors� associations
were not similarly situated as to give at least a semblance of legality to the
apparent haste with which said executive order was issued. It would seem that if
there was any interest served by such executive order, it was that of herein
petitioner. As the mayor of the municipality, the officials referred to were
definitely under his authority and he was not without recourse to take appropriate
action on the letter-application of BCCI although the same was not strictly in
accordance with normal procedure. There was nothing to prevent him from referring
said letter-application to the licensing department, but which paradoxically he
refused to do. Whether petitioner was impelled by any material interest or ulterior
motive may be beyond us for the moment since this is a matter of evidence, but the
environmental facts and circumstances are sufficient to create a belief in the mind
of a reasonable man that this would not be completely improbable, absent
countervailing clarification. Lastly, it may not be amiss to add that petitioner,
as a municipal mayor, is expressly authorized and has the power to issue permits
and licenses for the holding of activities for any charitable or welfare purpose,
pursuant to the Local Government Code of. Hence, he cannot really feign total lack
of authority to act on the letter-application of BCCI.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Ph. Rural Electric Cooperatives Assoc., Inc. (PHILRECA), et. al, petitioners,
vs. The Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, et. al, respondents
GR No. 143076; June 10, 2003

FACTS:
#1 A class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of other
electric cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269, as amended, and
registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA). Accordingly,
petitioners enjoys Assistance; Exemption from Taxes, Imposts, Duties, Fees;
Assistance from the National Power Corporation. Petitioners contend that they are
exempt from payment of local taxes, including payment of real property tax. With
the passage of the Local Government Code, however, they allege that their tax
exemptions have been invalidly withdrawn. In particular, petitioners assail
Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code on the ground that the said
provisions discriminate against them, in violation of the equal protection clause.
Further, they submit that the said provisions are unconstitutional because they
impair the obligation of contracts between the Philippine Government and the United
States Government.

#2 This is a petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to annul as
unconstitutional sections 193 and 234 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code. A class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in
behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269 who
are members of petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc.
(PHILRECA). Petitioners contend that pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 269, as
amended, and the provision in the loan agreements of the government of the
Philippines with the government of the United State of America, they are exempt
from payment of local taxes, including payment of real property tax. With the
passage of the Local Government Code, however, they allege that their tax
exemptions have been invalidly withdrawn. In particular, petitioners assail
Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code on the ground that the said
provisions discriminate against them, in violation of the equal protection clause.
Further, they submit that the said provisions are unconstitutional because they
impair the obligation of contracts between the Philippine Government and the United
States Government.

ISSUE: Whether the assailed provisions of the Local Government Code violates the
rights of the Petitioners to the Equal Protection clause by unreasonable
classifying them and withdrawing their Tax exemption

HELD:
There is No Violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The equal protection clause
under the Constitution means that �no person or class of persons shall be deprived
of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes
in the same place and in like circumstances.� Thus, the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a law based on reasonable classification.
The court hold that there is reasonable classification under the Local Government
Code to justify the different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered
by P.D. No. 269, as amended, and electric cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938.

First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as
amended, and cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938. These distinctions are manifest in
at least two material respects which go into the nature of cooperatives envisioned
by R.A. No. 6938 and which characteristics are not present in the type of
cooperative associations created under P.D. No. 269, as amended.

Capital Contributions by Members Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives

Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is

germane to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that every local
government unit shall enjoy local autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of
power by local governments is beyond regulation by Congress. Thus, while each
government unit is granted the power to create its own sources of revenue,
Congress, in light of its broad power to tax, has the discretion to determine the
extent of the taxing powers of local government units consistent with the policy of
local autonomy.