410.

Bayot v Sandiganbayan; G.R. Nos. L-61776-861; 23 Mar 1984; 128 SCRA 383

FACTS:

While petitioner and several of his co-accused were appealing their conviction for multiple counts of
estafa, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed amending, among others, Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019. Said amendatory law imposes suspension pendent lite of any public officer accused of offenses
involving fraudulent use of public funds.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not Section 13 of RA 3019, as amended, violates the constitutional prohibition against the
enactment of ex post facto law.

RULING:

NO. Suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute
proceedings is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings but is merely a
preventive measure before final judgment.

Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

411.

People v Ferrer; G.R. Nos. L-32613-14; 27 Dec 1972; 43 SCRA 381

FACTS:

Private respondents were among those charged with violations of the Anti-Subversion Act which
outlawed the Communist Party of the Philippines and other “subversive associations,” and punishes any
person who “knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a
member” of the Party or of any other similar “subversive” organization. Respondent judge ruled that Act
as unconstitutional for being a bill of attainder.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the Act is indeed a bill of attainder.

RULING:

NO. It is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of
attainder. It is also necessary that the statute must apply retroactively and reach past conduct in order
that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder.

Questioned resolution is SET ASIDE. The two cases are REMANDED to the court a quo for trial on the
merits.
412.

People v Sandiganbayan; G.R. No. 101724; 03 Jul 1992; 211 SCRA 241

FACTS:

Private respondent was charged in 1989 with a violation of Republic Act 3019 for acts allegedly
committed in 1976. The Sandiganbayan granted his motion to quash on the ground of prescription.

[Write a little the passage of BP 195, increasing prescription from 10 years to 15.]

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, an amendatory law which increased prescription from 10
years to 15, is applicable to the case at bar.

RULING:

NO. To apply, BP 195 to private respondent would make it an ex post facto law for it would alter his
situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been
extinguished under the law existing when it was committed.

Petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

413.

WRIGHT vs CA, 235 SCRA 341, August 15, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for indictable crimes in his
country. Extradition proceedings were filed against him which ordered the deportation of petitioner.
Said decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals; hence, petitioner came herein by way of review on
certiorari, to set aside the order of deportation, contending that the provision of the Treaty giving
retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Can extradition treaty be applied retroactively?

RULING:

NO. Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of retrospective application,
whether civil or criminal. However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist and
other early U.S. state constitutions in Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept was limited only to
penal and criminal statutes.

As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are

1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when committed;
2) laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which
prescribes greater punishment for a crime already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of
evidence so as to make it substantially easier to convict a defendant.
“Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal
legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused.” This being so, there is no absolutely no
merit in petitioner’s contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty’s retroactive
application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty’s coming into force and effect,
violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. “It
merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which
offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.”