347.

Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 703

Facts:

Francisco Guerrero is a pilot who allegedly through his negligence causes the improper emergency
landing which resulted to the instant death of 3 passengers. The incident happened May 1969, due to
several postponements, all filled the petitioner the petitioner was able to finally able to start presenting
its evidence on sept. 1972 and he pleaded not guilty.

On January 1979 Judge Pardo ordered to file their memorandum; however the petitioner filled his
memorandum December 1979.

March 1990, the case was re-raffled to Judge Aquino and ordered the parties to complete transcript of
stenographic notes but the same was found incomplete and needs retaking of testimonies. On Nov
1990, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his right to speedy trial was violated.

Issue:

Whether or not the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated.

Ruling:

The right to speedy trial is violated only where there is unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay
without the participation or fault of the accused or when the unjustified postponements are sought
which prolong the trial for unreasonable lengths of time.

In the present case, there is no question that the petitioner raised the violation against his own right to
speedy disposition only when the respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume
that he would have just continued to sleep on his right - a situation amounting to laches - had the 7%
not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records and of ordering the remedy
precisely so he could dispose the case.
348.

Chavez v CA; G.R. No. L-29169; 19 Aug 1968; 24 SCRA 663

FACTS:

Petitioner was convicted of qualified theft of a motor vehicle. During his trial, he was presented as a
witness for the prosecution. His counsel objected by later submitted after being assured by the court
that petitioner will not be compelled to answer any question that would incriminate him.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the accused may refuse to take the witness stand.

RULING:

YES. An ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each
question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the
witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For in reality, the purpose of calling an
accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. The rule positively intends to avoid
and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person “to furnish the missing evidence
necessary for his conviction.”

Petitioner is ordered to be RELEASED unless he is also held or detained for any cause other than the
subject criminal case.
349.

Pascual v Board of Medical Examiners; G.R. No. L-25018; 26 May 1969; 28 SCRA 345

FACTS:

At the initial hearing of an administrative case for malpractice against petitioner, he was presented as
the first witness for the complainants. His counsel objected, invoking petitioner’s right to be exempt
from being a witness against himself. Respondent Board of Examiners took note of the plea but stated
that petitioner would be called upon to testify as such witness unless he could secure a restraining order
from a competent authority.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the respondent in an administrative charge may not be compelled to take the witness
stand.

RULING:

YES. The accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but also to
take the witness stand. The same principle shall apply to the respondent in an administrative proceeding
where the respondent may be subjected to sanctions of a penal character, such as the cancellation of his
license to practice medicine.

Decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED.

350.

Cabal v. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1064, G.R. No. L-19052, December 29, 1962

Facts:

Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner
Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the AFP, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, and
other equally reprehensible acts". The President of the Philippines created a committee to investigate
the charge of unexplained wealth. The Committee ordered petitioner herein to take the witness stand in
the administrative proceeding and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his
aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Petitioner objected to the order of the Committee,
invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take
the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be
incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take
the witness stand.

The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem proper. The
City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" of contempt for failing to obey the
order of the Committee to take the witness stand. The "charge" was assigned to the sala of respondent
judge Kapunan. Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash, which was denied. Hence this
petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness stand violates his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.

HELD:

Yes. Although the said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of unexplained
wealth, it seems that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of the Anti-
Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which
is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property. However, such forfeiture has been held to
partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed
criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be
witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.

No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition
against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies to criminal, quasi-
criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason
of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or
remedial in nature.

The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the witness a
question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a prohibition
of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to incriminate but, where a
witness exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason
for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is improper.

The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self-
incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the
witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in
support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions.

Note: It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory
questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.
351.

U.S. v Tan Teng; G.R. No. 7081; 07 Sep 1912; 23 Phil 145

FACTS:

Appellant was charged with the crime of rape. He was arrested and taken to the police station, stripped
of his clothing and examined. The result of the examination showing that the defendant was suffering
from gonorrhea was admitted in evidence.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not admitting the medical result in evidence was violative of appellant’s right against self-
incrimination.

RULING:

NO. The prohibition against self-incrimination is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract
from the defendant’s own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The medical result does not call
upon the accused as a witness – it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial responsibility.

Judgment is MODIFIED.
352.

Villaflor v Summers; G.R. No. 16444; 08 Sep 1920; 41 Phil 62

FACTS:

Petitioner and her paramour were charged with the crime of adultery. The court ordered her to submit
her body to examination to determine if she was pregnant or not.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the examination was a violation of petitioner’s right against self-incrimination.

RULING:

NO. The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. On a proper
showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible.

Writ of habeas corpus prayed for is DENIED.

353.

People v Tranca; G.R. No. 110357; 17 Aug 1994; 35 SCRA 455

FACTS:

Appellant was charge with the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. After he was arrested in a buy-bust
operation, he was made to undergo ultraviolet radiation to determine the presence of fluorescent
powder dusted on the money used.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not appellant’s right against self-incrimination was violated.

RULING:

NO. What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material. 18 Stated otherwise, it is simply a prohibition against his will, an
admission of guilt.

Challenged decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

354.

BELTRAN VS. SAMSON, 53 PHIL 570; G.R. NO. 32025; 23 SEPT 1929

Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting
as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the
prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued
that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself.

Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of
comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to
be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional
provision under examination.

Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and
forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of
submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or
the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and
attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to
determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except
that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels
in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity
between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a
specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against
himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the
petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance
that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained
genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or
specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a
personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed
in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of
the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
355.

Galman v Pamaran; G.R. Nos. L-71208-09 and L-71212-13; 30 Aug 1985; 138 SCRA 274

FACTS:

Private respondents were charged as accessories for the killing of Sen. Benigno Aquino and Rolando
Galman. In the course of the joint trial, the prosecution offered in evidence their individual testimonies
before the Agrava Board, the ad hoc Fact Finding Board created under Presidential Decree 1886 to
determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not their testimony before the Board made private respondents immune from prosecution
by virtue of their right against self-incrimination.

RULING:

NO. PD 1886 grants merely immunity from use of any statement give before the Board, but not
immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing
evidence do not render the witness immune from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the
right against self-incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement and
nothing more.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

356.

Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA 783

FACTS:

Petitioner herein was charged with violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices.However he was
granted an immunity from suit by the PCGG related to the previous charges against him, provided that
he will testify as witness against the Marcoses in criminal proceedings in the United States Vs Ferdinand
Marcos, during the RICO, where Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, Imelda Marcos were being tried for
charges of corruption. All the expenses of Mapa were shouldered by the PCCG when they flew to New
York to testify against the Marcoses. During the trial, Ferdinand Marcos died and La Bella, the American
prosecutor dispensed the testimony of Mapa and thereby acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since Mapa, was
not able to testify, it was contended that the immunity from suit of Mapa took without force and effect.
However, the record shows that the petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the
prosecution of the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in effect and force.

HELD:

Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant immunity to any person from being
prosecuted provided they will meet the conditions provided by the PCGG.

In the case at bar, Mapa was granted immunity from the prosecution or criminal case where he is being
tried, and the PCGG even shouldered all the expenses of Mapa when they flew to New York to testify
implying that Mapa was able to meet the conditions and the PCGG accepted the information given by
him (MAPA) to testify against the Marcoses during the RICO trial. Failure of the petitioner to testify on
the RICO can not nullify the immunity given to him by the PCGG since the petitioner was able to satisfy
the requirements both of the law and the parties’ implementing agreements. Though the petitioners
were not able to testify against the Marcoses in RICO, it can be said that it not their own fault.

Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted on the basis of the immunity granted by the PCGG, which
under the law has the power to grant immunity.

TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY CAN BE GRANTED:

1. Transactional Immunity - is broader aint he scope of its protection. By its grant the witness can no
longer be prosecuted for any offence whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.
2. Used-and-derivative-use - a witnessed is only assured that his or her particular testimony and
evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.