Abalos vs Macatangay
transaction between Esther and
Facts:
 Petitioner, Arturo R. Abalos, and his
wife, Esther, are the registered
owners of a parcel of land with
improvements.
 Armed with a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) purportedly issued
by his wife, Petitioner executed a
Receipt and Memorandum of
Agreement (RMOA), in favor of
Respondent, Dr. Galicano S.
Macatangay, Jr., binding himself to
sell to respondent the subject
property and not to offer the same
to any other party within thirty (30)
days from date.
 Respondent gave an earnest money
amounting to P5,000.00 to be
deducted from the purchase price
of P1,300,000.00 in favor of the
spouses.
 Apparently however, Esther and
Arturo were having a rocky
relationship.
 Esther executed a SPA in favor of
her sister and that she is selling her
share in the conjugal property to
Respondent.
 Respondent informed the couple
that he has prepared a check to
cover the remainder of the amount
that needs to be paid for the land
but the spouses failed to deliver the
land.
RTC Ruling:
 Dismissed the complaint because
the SPA could not have authorized
Arturo to sell the property to
Macatangay as it was falsified.
CA Ruling:
 Reversed the decision, ruling that
the SPA in favor of Arturo, assuming
it was void, cannot affect the
Respondent.
 On the other hand, the CA
considered the RMOA executed by
Arturo valid to effect the sale of his
conjugal share in the property.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the
property is valid.
Ruling:
No, the sale of the property is not
valid.
In San Juan Structural and Steel
Fabricators, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the
Court ruled that neither spouse could
alienate in favor of another, his or her
interest in the partnership or in any
property belonging to it, or ask for
partition of the properties before the
partnership itself had been legally
dissolved.
In this case, even on the supposition
that the parties only disposed of their
respective shares in the property, the sale,
assuming that it exists, is still void for as
previously stated, the right of the husband
or the wife to one-half of the conjugal
assets does not vest until the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership.
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank vs
Dailo, GR No. 153802
Facts:
 Respondent, Miguela Dailo married
her husband, Marcelino, in 1967.
 During their marriage, the spouses
purchased a house and lot,
however, the Deed of Absolute Sale
was executed only in favor of the
Marcelino as vendee, to the
exclusion of his wife.
 In 1993, Marcelino executed a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in
favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo,
which authorized the latter to
obtain a loan from Petitioner-Bank
to be secured by the said house and
lot.
 Gesmundo then obtained the loan
and executed a Real Estate
Mortgage (REM) in favor of
Petitioner-bank. The transaction,
including the execution of the SPA,
took place without the knowledge
and consent of Respondent.
 Upon maturity, the loan remained
outstanding. As a result, Petitioner-
bank instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgaged property. After the
extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in
favor of Petitioner-bank as the
highest bidder. The ownership was
consolidated after the lapse of one
year without the property being
redeemed.
 Claiming that she had no
knowledge of the mortgage
constituted on the subject
property, Respondent instituted a
case for the nullification of the real
estate mortgage and the deed of
sale and reconveyance.
RTC Ruling:
 Granted the petition and nullified
the deed of real estate, certificate
of sale and affidavit of
consolidation of ownership and the
property was ordered reconveyed.
CA Ruling:
 Affirmed the finding that the
subject property was conjugal in
nature, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to rebut the
presumption that the subject
property acquired during the
marriage of spouses Dailo belonged
to their conjugal partnership.
Issue:
Whether or not the mortgage
constituted by Marcelino on the subject
property is valid.
Ruling:
No, the mortgage is not valid.
Art. 124 of FC partly provides: “[T]he
administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong
to both spouses jointly. . . . In the event that
one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. .
. .”
In this case, in the absence of
(court) authority or written consent of the
other spouse, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property
shall be void.
Jocson vs. CA 170 SCRA 333
Facts:
 Petitioner (Moises) & Respondent
(Agustina) are brother and sister,
children of Alejandra (who died first
intestate) & Emilio Jocson
 Before Emilio’s death, he and
Respondent executed 3 coverture. Acquisition of title and
documents, Deed of Sale, Deed of
Absolute Sale, Deed of EJ Partition
and Adjudication and Sale which
covered almost all of his properties
(1/3 share in Alejandra’s estate).
 By virtue of these docs, Certificates
of Title were issued in the name of
Respondent.
 Petitioner now questions the
validity of the 3 documents.
CFI Ruling:
 Ruled in favor of Petitioner, stating
that the considerations were
simulated & fictitious.
CA Ruling:
 Reversed the decision, stating that
Emilio intended the documents to
be effective and binding.
that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife.”
In this case, the fact that the
properties were registered in the name of
“Emiliano Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete” is no proof that the properties
were acquired during the spouses'
registration thereof are two different acts.
It is well settled that registration does not
confer title but merely confirms one
already existing.
 The phrase “married to” in the
registration of the property is
merely descriptive of the civil status
of the registered owner and cannot
mean be interpreted to mean that
the other spouse is also a registered
owner.
 The property could have been
acquired by the spouse while still
single, but was only registered after
marriage

Issue:
Whether or not the properties in question
are conjugal.
 Petitioner’s contention that the
properties were conjugal because
they were registered as “Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete”.

Ruling:
No, the properties in question are
not conjugal.

Art. 160 of NCC: “All property of the

marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it is proved
Francisco vs Master Iron Works &
Construction Corporation, GR No. 151967
Facts:
 Petitioner, Josefina Castillo, was 24
years old when she married
Eduardo Francisco.
 The latter was then employed as
Vice President in a Private
Corporation.
 Petitioner then acquired two
parcels of land where Imus Bank
executed a deed of absolute sale in
favor of Josefina, married to
Eduardo.
 An affidavit of waiver was executed
by Eduardo where he declared that
prior to his marriage with
Petitioner, the latter purchased the
land with her own savings and that
he waived whatever claims he had
over the property, and when
Petitioner mortgaged the property
for a loan, Eduardo affixed his
marital conformity to the deed.
 Eduardo who was then a General
Manager, bought bags of cement
from defendant but failed to pay
the same, in which the latter filed a
complaint for recovery.
 The trial court rendered judgment
against Eduardo and the sheriff
issued a notice of levy on execution
over the alleged property of
Josefina for the recovery of the
balance of the amount due.
 Josefina filed a third-party claim
over the 2 parcels of land in which
she claimed as her paraphernal
property, and filed a complaint for
damages against Respondents.
 Before she could commence
presenting her evidence, Josefina
filed a petition to annul her
marriage to Eduardo in the RTC on
the ground that when they were
married in 1983, Eduardo was
already married to one Carmelita
Carpio.
RTC Ruling:
 Found the levy on the subject
property and the sale thereof at
public auction to be null and
void.
 RTC also held that the property
levied by Sheriff Alejo was the
sole and exclusive property of
Josefina.
 RTC also held that MIWCC failed
to prove that Eduardo
contributed to the acquisition of
the property.
CA Ruling:
 Reversed RTC’s decision
Issue:
Whether or not the subject
properties were paraphernal property of
Petitioner and cannot be held liable for the
Eduardo’s personal obligations.
Ruling:
No, the subject properties were not
paraphernal properties of Petitioner.
in Tumlos v. Fernandez held that
Article 144 of the New Civil Code applies
only to a relationship between a man and a
woman who are not incapacitated to marry
each other, or to one in which the marriage
of the parties is void from the very
beginning. It does not apply to a
cohabitation that is adulterous or amounts
to concubinage, for it would be absurd to
create a co-ownership where there exists a
prior conjugal partnership or absolute
community between the man and his
lawful wife.
In this case, the petitioner admitted
that when she and Eduardo cohabited, the
latter was incapacitated to marry her.
However, she failed to adduce
preponderance of evidence that she
contributed money, property or industry in
the acquisition of the subject property and,
hence, is not a co-owner of the property.
Toda, Jr. vs Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 713
Facts:
 Petitioner, Benigno Toda, Jr., and
Private Respondent, Rose Marie
Tuason, were married and blessed
with two children.
 Individual differences and the
alleged infidelity of Petitioner,
however, marred the conjugal
union thereby prompting Private
Respondent to file in the former
Court of First Instance of Rizal, a
petition for termination of conjugal
partnership for alleged
mismanagement and dissipation of
conjugal funds against Petitioner.
 After hearings were held, the
parties in order to avoid further
“disagreeable proceedings,” filed a
joint petition for judicial approval of
dissolution of conjugal partnership
under Article 191 of the Civil Code,
which was consolidated with the
aforesaid civil case.
 This petition embodied a
compromise agreement allocating
to the spouses their respective
shares in the conjugal partnership
assets and dismissing with
prejudice the first Civil Case.
Ruling:
Yes, the compromise agreement
takes effect on the time when it was
approved by the trial court.
Under Article 134 of the Family
Code: “in the absence of the express
declaration in the marriage settlements,
the separation of the property between
the spouses during the marriage shall not
take place save in virtue of a judicial order.”
Hence, the separation of property is not
effected by mere execution of a contract or
agreement of the parties but by the decree
by the court approving the same.
In this case, the compromise
agreement becomes effective only upon
the judicial approval, without which it is
void. Article 137 of this code explicitly
provides that the conjugal partnership is
dissolved only upon the issuance of a
decree of separation of property.

CFI Ruling:
 The said petition and the
compromise agreement were
approved by the Court.
 Further, the Court issued several
orders pertaining to the
interpretation and implementation
of the said compromise agreement.

Issue:
Whether or not the compromise
agreement takes effect on the time when
it was approved by the trial court.
Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz, GR No. 19565 In order for abuse to exist, there
must be a willful and utter disregard of the
Facts: interest of the partnership evidenced by
 Plaintiff, Estrella, and Defendant, the repetition of deliberate acts or
Severino, were married in Bacolod omissions prejudicial to the latter.
and begotted 6 children.
 During their coverture, they In this case, failure of the husband,
acquired several parcels of land and as administrator of the conjugal properties,
were engage in various businesses. to inform the wife of the progress of the
 Plaintiff filed an action against her business does not constitute abuse.
husband for the separation of their
properties, and further alleged that
her husband, aside from
abandoning her, also mismanaged
their conjugal properties.
 On the other hand, Defendant
contended that even though he had
not slept in the conjugal dwelling
and instead stayed in his office, he
paid short visits in the conjugal
home, which was affirmed by
Plaintiff.
 The latter suspected that her
husband had a mistress named
Nenita Hernandez, hence, the
urgency of the separation of
property for the fear that her
husband might squander and
dispose the conjugal assets in favor
of the concubine.

RTC Ruling:
 Ruled in favor Plaintiff

CA Ruling:
 Certified the case to the SC

Issue:
Whether or not there has been
abuse of his authority as administrator of
their conjugal properties.

Ruling:
No, there has been no abuse of
authority.
Ochida vs. Cabarroguis, AM No. 1594

Facts:
