The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No.

111, approved on public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes

CASE DIGEST: BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMMISSION ON October 31, 1936), entitled "An Act to Create a Public within the class of "public corporations" defined by paragraph 2,
AUDIT. G.R. No.177131; June 7, 2011. Corporation to be Known as the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and Article 44 of the Civil Code and governed by the law which
to Define its Powers and Purposes" created the BSP as a "public creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the same Code. DENIED.
FACTS: This case arose when the COA issued Resolution No. 99- corporation"
011on August 19, 1999 ("the COA Resolution"), with the subject
"Defining the Commissions policy with respect to the audit of the There are three classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of the
Boy Scouts of the Philippines." In its whereas clauses, the COA Civil Code and the BSP, as presently constituted under Republic
Resolution stated that the BSP was created as a public Act No. 7278,falls under the second classification.Article 44 reads:
corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations
Commission, the Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted (1) The State and its political subdivisions;
under its charter, was a "government-controlled corporation (2)Other corporations,institutions and entities for public interest or
within the meaning of Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution"; and purpose created by law; their personality begins as soon as they
that "the BSP is appropriately regarded as a government have been constituted according to law;
instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code." The COA (3) Corporations, partnerships and associations forprivate interest
Resolution also cited its constitutional mandate under Section or purposeto which the law grants a juridical personality, separate
2(1), Article IX (D).Finally, the COA Resolution reads: and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the The BSP, which is a corporation created for a public interest or
COMMISSION PROPER HAS RESOLVED, AS IT DOES HEREBY purpose, is subject to the law creating it under Article 45 of the
RESOLVE,to conduct an annual financial audit of the Boy Scouts Civil Code, which provides:
of the Philippines in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards, and express an opinion on whether the Art. 45.Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the
financial statements which include the Balance Sheet, the preceding article are governed by the laws creating or
Income Statement and the Statement of Cash Flows present fairly recognizing them.
its financial position and results of operations.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application
xxxx on the subject.

BE IT RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, that for purposes of audit
supervision,the Boy Scouts of the Philippines shall be classified
among the government corporations belonging to the
Educational, Social, Scientific, Civic and Research Sectorunder
the Corporate Audit Office I, to be audited, similar to the
subsidiary corporations, by employing the team audit approach
ISSUE: Does COA have jurisdiction over BSP?
HELD: After looking at the legislative history of its amended charter
and carefully studying the applicable laws and the arguments of
both parties, [the Supreme Court found] that the BSP is a public
corporation and its funds are subject to the COA's audit
jurisdiction.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are
governed by the provisions of this Code concerning partnerships.
The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows
that it was created in order to implement a State policy declared
in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution, which reads:
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage
their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a
Limbona vs. Mangelin (G.R. No. 80391) - Digest
Facts:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the
Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu
Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs
of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity
as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a
consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner
accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members
through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in
November as his presence was needed in the house committee
hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the
Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice,
where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the
session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it
declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending
further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from
the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership
therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case
before the Supreme Court against some members of the
Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within
the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now
submit that the petition had become "moot and academic"
because of its resolution.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending
litigation) has made the case moot and academic.
2. Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao
subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words,
what is the extent of self-government given to the two
autonomous governments of Region 9 and 12?
Ruling:
1. The Court does not agree that the case is moot and academic
simply by reason of the expulsion resolution that was issued. If the
expulsion was done purposely to make the petition moot and
academic, it will not make it academic. On the ground of due
process, the Court hold that the expulsion is without force and
effect. First, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had
conducted an investigation. It also does not appear that the
petitioner had been made aware that he was charged with graft
and corruption before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore
that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations.
As it stands, the charges now are leveled amount to mere
accusations that cannot warrant expulsion. Thus, the Court
ordered reinstatement of the petitioner.
2. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in
Regions 9 and 12 by Presidential Decree No. 1618. In relation to
the central government, the Presidential Decree provides that
“the President shall have the power of general supervision and
control over the Autonomous Regions...” Now, autonomy is either
decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power
and in the process to make local governments “more responsive
and accountable,” “and ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the pursuit of national development and social progress.” At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The president exercises “general supervision” over
them, but only to “ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law.” He has not control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local government
units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future
with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to the Supreme Court, an examination of the very
Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us to believe that they were never meant to
exercise autonomy through decentralization of power. The
Presidential Decree, in the first place, mandates that “the
President shall have the power of general supervision and control
over Autonomous Regions.” In the second place, the
Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to dischage
chiefly administrative services. Thus, the SC assumes jurisdiction.
Upon the facts presented, the Court finds two sessions held on
November to be invalid. Wherefore, the petition is Granted. The
petitioner is reinstated as Member and speaker of the
Sanggunian.
BASCO v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649 (Digested Case)
G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES
MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR),
respondent.
Re: Principle of Local Autonomy
FACTS: The PH Amusement and Gaming Corp. was created by PD
1067-A and granted a franchise under PD 1067-B. Subsequently,
under PD 1869, the Government enabled it to regulate and
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law, under declared policy. But the petitioners think
otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to
annul the PAGCOR Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly
contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because of the
following issues:
ISSUES:
(1) WON it waived the Manila City gov't's right to impose taxes
and license fees, which is recognized by law.
(2) WON it has intruded into the LGUs' right to impose local taxes
and license fees, and thus contrary to the principle of local
autonomy enshrined in the Constitution.
(3) WON it violates the equal protection clause as it allows some
gambling acts but also prohibits other gaming acts.
(4) WON it violates the Cory gov't's policy of being away from
monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise
and privatization.
HELD:
(1) No. The fact that PAGCOR, under its charter, is exempt from
paying tax of any kind is not violative of the principle of local
autonomy. LGUs' have no inherent right to impose taxes. LGUs'
power to tax must always yield to a legislative act which is
superior having been passed by the state itself which has the
inherent power to tax. The charter of LGUs is subject to control by
Congress as they are mere creatures of Congress. Congress,
therefore, has the power of control over LGUs. And if Congress
can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it
can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
(2) No. LGUs' right to impose license fees on "gambling", has long
been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments
to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or
permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested
exclusively on the National Government. Furthermore, LGUs' have
no power to tax instrumentalities of the gov't such as PAGCOR
which exercises governmental functions of regulating gambling
activities.
(3) No. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals
who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long
as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does
not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. The
Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact
or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.
(4) No. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can
only declare what the law is and not what the law should be.
Under our system of government, policy issues are within the
domain of the political branches of government and of the
people themselves as the repository of all state power. On the
issue of monopoly, the same is not necessarily prohibited by the
Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest
demands that monopolies be "regulated" or prohibited. Again,
this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide. The judiciary
can only intervene when there are violations of the statutes
passed by Congress regulating or prohibiting monopolies.
Lina, Jr. v. Paño, G.R. No. 129093, [August 30, 2001]
DOCTRINE: The game of lotto is a game of chance duly
authorized by the national government through an Act of
Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows
it to operate the lotteries. This statute remains valid today. While
lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government
deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a
resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits.
Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by
law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by
ordinance or resolution.
FACTS: On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was
appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He
asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a
mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor
Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said
denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995
which was issued on September 18, 1995. The ordinance reads:
ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA “ILLEGAL
GAMBLING” LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA
SAPAGKA’T, ang sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna ay talamak
na;
SAPAGKA’T, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng masasamang
impluwensiya lalo’t higit sa mga kabataan;
KUNG KAYA’T DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina Kgg. Kgd. Juan M.
Unico at Kgg. Kgd. Gat-Ala A. Alatiit, pinangalawahan ni Kgg.
Kgd. Meliton C. Larano at buong pagkakaisang sinangayunan ng
lahat ng dumalo sa pulong;
IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN
ang ano mang uri ng sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna lalo’t
higit ang Lotto;
IPINASIYA PA RIN na hilingin tulad ng dito ay hinihiling sa the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro cannot avail of
Panlalawigang pinuno ng Philippine National Police (PNP) Col. Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of
[illegible] na mahigpit na pag-ibayuhin ang pagsugpo sa lahat Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said
ng uri ng illegal na sugal sa buong lalawigan ng Laguna lalo na resolution is nothing but an expression of the local legislative unit
ang “Jueteng”. 3 concerned. The Board’s enactment, like spring water, could not
rise above its source of power, the national legislature.
As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the
injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, national government through an Act of Congress. Republic Act
respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which
Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the
injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants lotteries. This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a
to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. game of chance, the national government deems it wise and
1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an
outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise,
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto,
a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon
Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from In our system of government, the power of local government units
implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a
1995. delegated power coming from Congress. Ours is still a unitary
form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of
autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be
limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central
ISSUE: WON the local government may deny the operation of lotto authority. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987
in the said locality. Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It does not make
local governments sovereign within the state.
HELD: NO. The ordinance, Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, merely states the
“objection” of the council to the operation of lotto. It is but a
mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is
not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit
the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even
petitioners admit this in their petition. As a policy statement
expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such
resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy
to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national
government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views
does not mean that local governments may actually enact
ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress.
Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not
and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance
prohibiting the operation of lotto. To conclude our resolution of
G.R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. No. 82217 January 29, 1990
LILIA YARANON and BONA BAUTISTA, assisted by their spouses,
BRAULIO D. YARANON and DEMETRIO D. BAUTISTA, JR.,
respectively; JAMES BRETT and SINAI C. HAMADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. CATALINO MACARAIG,
Executive Secretary, HON. VICENTE JAYME, Secretary of Finance,
HON. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and
Management, and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC National
Treasurer, respondents.
Background of the case:
In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the (Cordillera
Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary ground that it
pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and
the creation of' the autonomous region in the Cordilleras
conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.
Relative to the creation of autonomous regions, the constitution,
in Article X, provides:
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multi-
sectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of
government for the region consisting of the executive
department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be
elective and representative of the constituent political units. The
organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal,
family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions
of this Constitution and national laws.
FACTS: recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under
E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A.
In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Conrado No. 6766.
M. Balweg, S.V.D., broke off on ideological grounds from the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm the ISSUES:
New People's Army. (NPA).
I Whether or not the issuance of E.O. No. 220 by the President has
After President Aquino was installed into office by People pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an
Power, she advocated a policy of national reconciliation. The organic act and created an autonomous region in the
Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) heeded this call of the Cordilleras.
President. After the preliminary negotiations, President Aquino
and some members of her Cabinet flew to Mt. Data in the II Whether or not CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.
Mountain Province on September 13, 1986 and signed with Fr.
Conrado M. Balweg (As Commander of the CPLA) and Ama
III Whether or not the creation of the CAR contravened the
Mario Yag-ao (as President of Cordillera Bodong Administration,
constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces
the civil government of the CPLA) a ceasefire agreement that
(Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province)
signified the cessation of hostilities (WHEREAS No. 7, E.O. 220).
and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.
On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as Chief
Negotiator of the government], in pursuance of the September
13, 1986 agreement, flew to the Mansion House, Baguio City, and
RULING:
signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman of the Cordillera panel) a
joint agreement.
I The Supreme Court held in the negative. A reading of E.O. No.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was 220 will reveal that it does not create the autonomous region
drafted and signed into law by the President. contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory
measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and
the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the
Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the
ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the
exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the
provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions. The
1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region
President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the first
(CAR) , which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio
measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the
[secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate economic and
meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the
social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment
autonomous region created. These measures we find in E.O. No.
of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3]. The CAR shall
220
have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body
and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm [secs.
7, 8 and 10]. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall The transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it
exist until such time as the autonomous regional government is is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim
established and organized [sec. 17]. autonomous region in the Cordilleras."
The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled
the autonomous region composed of an elective executive and
"An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
legislature and special courts with personal, family and property
Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law. The Act
law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18]. Using this as a guide, we find that
E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional
government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for
administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating
the planning and implementation of programs and services.
The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing
local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous
government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for
an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments,
the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic
groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a
concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220, the Congress, after it
was convened, enacted Republic Act No. 6658 which created
the Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission. The President
then appointed its members. The commission prepared a draft
organic act which became the basis for the deliberations of the
Senate and the House of Representatives. The result was Republic
Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous
region, which was signed into law on October 23, 1989. A
plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to be conducted
shortly, shall complete the process outlined in the Constitution.
In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effect for
more than two years and we find that, despite E.O. No. 220, the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras is still to be created, showing
the lack of basis of petitioners' assertion. Events have shown that
petitioners' fear that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the creation
of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras was totally
unfounded.
II The SC found that E.O. No. 220 did not create a new territorial
and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger
subdivision.
The Constitution provides in Article X:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions
of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras,
provided. which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant
of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy these
xxx xxx xxx regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous
regional government with a basic structure consisting of an
executive department and a legislative assembly and special
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or
courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each
barangay may be created, divided, merged,
of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating
subject to approval by a majority of the votes agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of
affected. transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political
subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy
into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political
subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality,
unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with
the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g.
the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of
property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As
stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the
planning and implementation of programs and services in the
covered areas.
The CAR may be considered more than anything else as a
regional coordinating agency of the National Government,
similar to the regional development councils which the President
may create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These councils
are "composed of local government officials, regional heads of
departments and other government offices, and representatives
from non-governmental organizations within the region for
purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the
autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic
and social growth and development of the units in the region."
[Ibid.] In this wise, the CAR may be considered as a more
sophisticated version of the regional development council.
III The Supreme Court held that the creation of CAR did not
contravene the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy for
the provinces. It must be clarified that the constitutional
guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2]
refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units
or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority.On the other hand, the creation of
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, GR No. 195770, 2012-07-17
Facts:
In 207, the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy with
the poorest of the poor as target beneficiaries.[2] Dubed " Ahon
Pamilyang Pilipino, " it was pre-pilotested in the municipalities of
Sibagat and Esperanza in Agusan del Sur; the... municipalities of
Lopez Jaenand Bonifacio in Misamis Occidental, the Caraga
Region; and the cities of Pasay and Calocan[3] upon the release
of the amount of P 50 Million Pesos under a Special Allotment
Release Order (SARO) issued by the Department of Budget... and
Management.
On July 16, 208, the DSWD issued Administrative Order No. 16,
series of 208 (A.O. No. 16, s. 208),[5] setting the implementing
guidelines for the project renamed "Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino
Program " (4Ps), upon the following stated objectives, to... wit:
To improve preventive health care of pregnant women and
young children
To increase enrollment/attendance of children at elementary
level
To reduce incidence of child labor
To raise consumption of poor households on nutrient dense foods
To encourage parents to invest in their children's (and their own)
future
To encourage parent's participation in the growth and
development of young children, as well as involvement in the
community
Under A.O. No. 16, s. 208, the DSWD also institutionalized a
coordinated inter - agency network among the Department of
Education (DepEd), Department of Health (DOH), Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), the National Anti - Poverty
Commission (NAPC) and the local... government units (LGUs),
identifying specific roles an d functions in order to ensure effective
and efficient implementation of the CCTP . As the DSWD takes on
the role of lead implementing agency that must "oversee and
coordinate the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of...
the program," the concerned LGU as partner agency is
particularly tasked to... a. Ensure availability of the supply side on
health and education in the target areas.
b. Provide necessary technical assistance for Program
implementation... c. Coordinate the
implementation/operationalization of sectoral activities at the
City/Municipal level to better execute Program objectives and
functions... d. Coordinate with various concerned government
agencies at the local level, sectoral representatives and NGO to
ensure effective Program implementation... e. Prepare reports on
issues and concerns regarding Program implementation and
submit to the Regional Advisory Committee, and... f. Hold monthly
committee meetings
Congress, for its part, sought to ensure the success of the CCTP by
providing it with funding under the GA of 208 in the amount of
Two Hundred Ninety - Eight Million Five Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos ( P 298,50,0.0).
This budget allocation increased tremendously to P 5 Billion
Pesos in 209, with the amount doubling to P 10 Billion Pesos in
2010. But the biggest allotment given to the CCTP was in the GA
of 201 at Twenty One Billion One Hundred Ninety - Four Million
One Hundred Seventeen Thousand Pesos ( P 21,194,17,0.0).
Petitioner Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a former Senator, joined by Sergio
Tadeo, incumbent President of the Association of Barangay
Captains of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, and Nelson
Alcantara, incumbent Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta.
Monica, Quezon City , challenges before the
Court the disbursement of public funds and the implementation
of the CCTP which are alleged to have encroached into the local
autonomy of the LGUs.
Issues:
THE P 21 BILLION CTP BUDGET ALLOCATION UNDER THE DSWD IN
THE GA FY 201 VIOLATES ART. II, SEC. 25 & ART. X, SEC. 3 OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION IN RELATION TO SEC. 17 OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 191 BY PROVIDING FOR THE
RECENTRALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE DE LIVERY OF BASIC SERVICES ALREADY
DEVOLVED TO THE LGUS.
Ruling:
The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the
autonomy of local governments[14] and even devotes a ful
article on the subject of local governance[15] which includes the
following pertinent provisions:
Section 3. The Congres shall enact a local government code
which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum,... allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications , election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other maters relating to the... organization and
operation of the local units.
xxx
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development
councils or other similar bodies composed of local government
officials, regional heads of departments and other government
offices, and representatives from non - governmental
organizations within the... regions for purposes of administrative
decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein
and to accelerate the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region. (Underscoring supplied)
In order to fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and meaningful
autonomy that would develop them into self - reliant communities
and effective partners in the attainment of national goals, [16]
Section 17 of the Local Government Code vested upon the
LGUs... the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic
services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. (a) Local government
units shall endeavor to be self - reliant and shall continue
exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the
functions and... responsibilities of national agencies and offices
devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units
shall like wise exercise such other powers and discharge such
other f unctions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate,
or incidental to efficient and... effective provision of the basic
services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited
to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on
the functions and responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect
of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective
jurisdictions , paragraph (c)... of the same provision provides a
categorical exception of cases involving nationally - funded
projects, facilities, programs and services, thus:
Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government
powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services
cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs
against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded from
taking a direct hand in the... formulation and implementation of
national development programs especially where it is
implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public

works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs
and services funded by the National Government under the
annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent
executive... orders, and those wholly or partially funded from
foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in
those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly
designated as the implementing agency for such projects,
facilities, programs and services.

(Underscoring supplied)

The essence of this express reservation of pow er by the national

government is that, unles an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has ben provided by the national government under the
anual general... apropriations act, even if t he program involves
the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.

Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government

powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services
cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs
against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded from
taking a direct hand in the... formulation and implementation of
national development programs especially where it is
implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of... proving the

invalidity of the provisions under the GAA of 2011.

The allocation of a P21 billion budget for an intervention program

formulated by the national government itself but implemented in
partnership with the local government units to achieve the
common national goal... development and social progress can
by no means be an encroachment upon the autonomy of local
governments.

Principles:
LLDA v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. 120865-71, Dec. 7,1995
Facts: Executive Order No. 927 was issued to further define and
enlarge the functions and powers of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) and named and enumerated the
towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna
de Bay Region." EO 927 also included in particular the sharing of
fees. Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government
Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region
interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly
passed law gave municipal govemments the exclusive jurisdiction
to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because
R.A. 7160 provides that municipalities shall have the exclusive
authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and
impose rental fees or charges therefor. Municipal governments
then assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen
permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to
establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the LLDA.
Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, occupied almost one-third of
the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation
drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in
1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were
all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the LLDA on
fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. The
implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate
independent policies in the operation of fishpens and fishcages
within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake and
their indiscriminate grant of fishpens permits saturated the lake
area with fishpens, and aggravated the current environmental
problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake. LLDA served
notice that the fishpens, fishcages and other aquaculture
structures which were not registered or has no pending
application with LLDA are considered illegal, and as such are
subject to demolition. A month after, LLDA sent notices to the
concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages
and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their
respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof,
otherwise, demolition shall be effected. The affected fishpen
owners filed injunction cases against the LLDA before various
regional trial courts. LLDA filed motions to dismiss the cases
against it on jurisdictional ground but were invariably denied.
Meanwhile, temporary reskaining order/writs of preliminary
mandatory injunction were issued enjoining the LLDA from
demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in question. The
LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
before the Supreme Court. Impleaded as parties-respondents are
the various regional trial courts and respective private parties,
and the municipalities and/or respective Mayors of Binangonan,
Taguig and Jala-jala, who issued permits for the construction and
operation of fishpens in Laguna de Bay. The petition sought to
nullifu the TROs issued, permanent prohibition against the trial
courts from exercising jurisdiction over the cases involving the
LLDA which is a coequal body and judicial pronouncement that
RA 7160 did not repeal, alter or modifu the provisions of RA 4850
empowering the LLDA to issue permits for fishpens, fishcages and
other aquaculture structures in Laguna de Bay and that the LLDA
is the government agency vested with exclusive authority to issue
said permits. The SC referred the case to the CA. MDG-F 1919:
Enhancing Access to and Provision of Water Services with the
Active Participation of the Poor for the Compilation and Analysis
of Jurisprudence on Water Supply Case Digests with of Appellate
Court's Ruling: The CA dismissed the LLDA consolidated petitions
and held that: (a) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial
agencies of government whose decision or order are appealable
only to the Court of Appeals; (b) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA
with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (c)
the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in
Laguna de Bay are concemed had been repealed by the Local
Government Code of 1991; (d) in view of the aforesaid repeal,
the power to grant permits devolved to respective local
government units concerned.
Issue: Which agency of the Government - the Laguna Lake
Development Authority or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region - should exercise jurisdiction over the
Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for
fishery privileges is concerned?
Supreme Court's Ruling: The LLDA should prevail over the LGUs
insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is
concerned. RA 4850, PD 813, and EO 927 specifrcally provide that
the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting
the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation
of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other
hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive
authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The
Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish
corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area
within a definite zone of the municipal waters. The Court held that
the provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the
aforementioned laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter
water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region as
it does not contain any express provision which categorically
expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. There was no intent
on the part of the legislature to repeal RA 4850 and its
amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and
expressed. The LLDA charter constitutes a special law. RA 7160,
the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. The
enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be
construed to have repealed a special law. Where there is a
conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special
statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more
clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as
an exception to the general law in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because
implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect
must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law
cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent
general law by mere implication. Thus, it has to be concluded
that the LLDA charter should prevail over the Local Government
Code of 1991. Considering the reasons behind the establishment
of the Authority, which are environmental protection,
navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every
indication that the legislative intent is for LLDA to proceed with its
mission.
The power of the LGUs to issue fishing privileges was clearly
granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power of
the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-
culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and
monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake
quality control and management. It does partake of the nature of
police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and
the most demanding of all State powers including the power of
taxation. Accordingly, the LLDA charter, which MDG-F 1919:
Enhancing Access to and Provision of Water Seryices with the
Active Participation of the Poor for the Compilation and Analysis
of Jurisprudence on Water Supply Case Digests with Analysis of
Development lmplications embodies a valid exercise of police
power, should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991
on matters affecting Lagmade Bay. LLDA has express powers as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases
with authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and on matters
affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures in Laguna de -nay. However, the LLDA is
not co-equal to the RTCs. On actions necessitating the resolution
of legal questions affecting the powers of the LLDA as provided
for in its charter, the RTCs have jurisdiction.

The Local Government Code of 1991 has not repealed the

provisions of the charter of the LLDA. Thus, the LLDA has the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery
privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities
situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are
by its charter vested on it. Removal from the LLDA of the aforesaid
licensing authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise
stated, the abrogation of this power would render useless its
reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the
LLDA. The Local Government Code of 1991 had never intended
to do this. J. Padilla's concuting opinion: While the exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether or not projects or activities in the
lake area should be allowed, as well as their regulation, is with the
LLDA, once the LLDA grants a permit, the permittee may still be
subjected to an additional local permit or license for revenue
purposes of the LGUs concerned.
MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association (G.R. No. 135962)
Facts:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a
notice requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune
Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the
same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter
separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner,
praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction
enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the
demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court denied issuance of
a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the appellate court ruled
that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune
Street, and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that
the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by
ordinance.
MMDA said it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is
an agent of the Government endowed with police power in the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From the premise of
police powers, it follow then that it need not for an ordinance to
be enacted first.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Does MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public
traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers?
Ruling:
According to SC, Police power is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty. Police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature, which the latter can delegate to the President and
administrative boards, LGU or other lawmaking bodies.
LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a
legislative body empowered to enact ordinances, approved
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality.
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development
authority." All its functions are administrative in nature.The powers
of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation,implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a
system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that
grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the
welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting through their
respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and
police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any
ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street,
hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.
G.R. No. 135962 Case Digest
G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioner
vs Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., respondent
POnente: Puno
Facts:
MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air is a non-stock, non-profit
corporation whose members are homeowners of Bel-Air Villagee
in Makati City. Bel-Air is the registered owner of the Neptune
Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
December 30, 1995 Bel-Air received a notice from MMDA
requesting Bel-Air to open Neptune St. to public vehicular traffic.
On the same day, MMDA apprised that the perimeter wall
separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue
would be demolished.
January 2, 1996, MMDA instituted a case for injunction against
Bel-Air; and prayed for a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining
Neptune St. and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.
Court issued a TRO the next day.
After due hearing, RTC denied the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. MMDA question the denial and appealed to the CA.
CA conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune St. then issued a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the MMDA proposed
action.
On January 27, 1997, appellate court rendered a decision finding
MMDA no authority to order the opening of Neptune St. It held
that the authority is in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
The motion for reconsideration is denied hence this recourse.
Issues: (1) MMDA has the authority to mandate the opening of
Neptune St. to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police
powers? (2) Is passage of an ordinance a condition precedent
before the MMDA may order the opening of subdividion roads to
public traffic? (3) Is Bel-Air estopped from denying the authority of
MMDA? (4)Was Bel-Air denied of due process despite the several
meetings held between MMDA and Bel-Air? (5) Has Bel-Air come
to court with unclean hands?
MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an
agent of the Government endowed with police power in the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From the premise of
police powers, it follow then that it need not for an ordinance to
be enacted first.
**Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police
power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature, which the
latter can delegate to the President and administrative boards,
LGU or other lawmaking bodies.
**LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a
legislative body empowered to enact ordinances, approved
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality.
**Metro Manila is declared as a special development and
administrative region in 1995. And the administration of metro-
wide basic services is under the MMDA.Which includes, transport
and traffice management. It should be noted that MMDA are
limited to the acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting
of policies and installation of a system and administration. MMDA
was not granted with legislative power.
Ruling:
(1) The basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is G.R. No. 149848 November 25, 2004
contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner
to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not
ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR M.
cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
DIMALOTANG, petitioners,
of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the
vs.
proposed opening of Neptune St.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS SIMEON A. DATUMANONG and THE SECRETARY OF
(2) The MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang.
BUDGET and MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, respondents.
Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an
examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of
the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which
were not bestowed on the present MMDA.

(3) Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units

became primarily responsible for the governance of their
respective political subdivisions. The MMA's jurisdiction was limited
to addressing common problems involving basic services that
transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power.

Petition Denied.