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Case Title : THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. Go CHICO, defendant
and appellant.Case Nature : APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. Smith, J.
Syllabi:
Ponente: MORELAND
Padilla vs. Dizon 158 SCRA 127 , February 23, 1988
Syllabi:
He not only acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai, but directed in his
decision the release to the accused of at least the amount of
US$3,000.00, allowed, according to respondent, under Central Bank
Circular No. 960. This, in spite of the fact that forfeiture proceedings
had already been instituted by the Bureau of Customs over the
currency listed in the information, which according to the respondent
should be respected since the Bureau of Customs "has the exclusive
jurisdiction in the matter of seizure and forfeiture of the property
involved in the alleged infringements of the aforesaid Central Bank
Circular." In invoking the provisions of CB Circular No. 960 to justify the
release of US$3,000.00 to the accused, the respondent judge again
displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. There is
nothing in the said CB Circular which could be taken as authority for the
tri al court to release the said amount of U.S. Currency to the accused.
According to the above-cited CB Circular, tourists may take out or send
out from the Philippines foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding
such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them; for the purpose
of establishing such amount, tourists or non-resident temporary visitors
bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other
foreign currencies must declare their foreign exchange at points of
entries upon arrival in the Philippines. In other words, CB Circular No.
960 merely provides that for the purpose of establishing the amount of
foreign currency brought in or out of the Philippines, a tourist upon
arrival is required to declare any foreign exchange he is bringing in at
the time of his arrival, if the same exceeds the amount of US$3,000.00
or its equivalent in other foreign currencies. There is nothing in said
circular that would justify returning to him the amount of at least
US$3,000.00, if he is caught attempting to bring out foreign exchange
in excess of said amount without specific authority from the Central
Bank.
Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court Judge,
Baltazar R. Dizon, guilty of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the
law and grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and
efficiency, and consistent with the responsibility of this Court for the
just and proper administration of justice and for the attainment of the
objective of maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary (People vs.
Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712), it is hereby ordered that the Respondent
Judge be DISMISSED from the service, All leave and retirement
benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled are hereby forfeited
with prejudice to his being reinstated in any branch of government
service, including government-owned and/or controlled agencies or
corporations.
Division: EN BANC
Dispositive Portion:
Syllabi:
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the
statutory definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key
phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts”
foundinSec.1,par.(d),andSec.2,and the word “pattern” in Sec. 4. These
omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny
him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not
rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them;
much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to
define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted
in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the
words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness
or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at
least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed
in the Plunder Law.
It cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair
warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the
circumstances, petitioner ’s reliance on the “void-for-vagueness”
doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in
various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that
specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every
component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the
import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an
amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and
every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by
the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate,
supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder
with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The
prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient
to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable
doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that
plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus,
he says, in his Concurring Opinion—x x x Precisely because the
constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be
proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended
information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed “willfully,
unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part
of petitioner.
18. Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law; Constitutional Law; Death
Penalty Law (R.A. 7659); It is now too late in the day to resurrect
the issue of the constitutionality of R.A. 7659, the same having been
eternally consigned by People v. Echega-ray, 267 SCRA 682 (1997), to
the archives of jurisprudential history.-
Hence, strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing
with the regulation of speech, gender, or race and facial challenges are
allowed for this purpose. But criminal statutes, like the Anti-Plunder
Law, while subject to strict construction, are not subject to strict
scrutiny. The two (i.e., strict construction and strict scrutiny) are not
the same. The rule of strict construction is a rule of legal hermeneutics
which deals with the parsing of statutes to determine the intent of the
legislature. On the other hand, strict scrutiny is a standard of judicial
review for determining the quality and the amount of governmental
interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. It is
set opposite such terms as “deferential review” and “intermediate
review.”
Thus, under deferential review, laws are upheld if they rationally further
a legitimate governmental interest, without courts seriously inquiring
into the substantiality of such interest and examining the alternative
means by which the objectives could be achieved. Under intermediate
review, the substantiality of the governmental interest is seriously
looked into and the availability of less restrictive alternatives are
considered. Under strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of
compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the
absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if
facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the
area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, “we have not recognized an
‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment.” In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that “claims of
facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words” and, again,
that “overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct.” For this reason, it has been held that “a facial
challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” As for the
vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on
its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. “A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of
the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.”
Thus, resort to the deliberations in Congress will readily reveal that the
word “combination” includes at least two different overt or criminal acts
listed in R.A. No. 7080, such as misappropriation (§1(d)(1)) and taking
undue advantage of official position (§1(d)(6)). On the other hand,
“series” is used when the offender commits the same overt or criminal
act more than once. There is no plunder if only one act is proven, even
if the ill-gotten wealth acquired thereby amounts to or exceeds the
figure fixed by the law for the offense (now P50,000,000.00). The overt
or criminal acts need not be joined or separated in space or time, since
the law does not make such a qualification. It is enough that the
prosecution proves that a public officer, by himself or in connivance
with others, amasses wealth amounting to at least P50 million by
committing two or more overt or criminal acts.
But this is also the case whenever other special complex crimes are
created out of two or more existing crimes. For example, robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons under Art. 294, par. 5 of the
Revised Penal Code is punished with prision correccional in its
maximum period (4 years, 2 months, and 1 day) to prision mayor in its
medium period (6 years and 1 day to 8 years). Homicide under Art. 249
of the same Code is punished with reclusion temporal (12 years and 1
day to 20 years). But when the two crimes are committed on the same
occasion, the law treats them as a special complex crime of robbery
with homicide and provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
for its commission. Again, the penalty for simple rape under Art. 266-B
of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua, while that for homicide
under Art. 249 it is reclusion temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20
years). Yet, when committed on the same occasion, the two are treated
as one special complex crime of rape with homicide and punished with
a heavier penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Obviously, the
legislature views plunder as a crime as serious as robbery with
homicide or rape with homicide by punishing it with the same penalty.
Most of us in the legal profession are all too familiar with the vagaries
of stenographic note-taking, especially in courtrooms and legislative
halls. Too often, lawyers, parties-litigants and even judges find
themselves at the mercy of stenographers who are unfamiliar with
certain legal terms; or who cannot hear well enough or take notes fast
enough; or who simply get confused, particularly when two or more
persons happen to be speaking at the same time. Often, transcripts of
stenographic notes have portrayed lawyers, witnesses, legislators and
judges as blithering idiots, spouting utterly nonsensical jargon and plain
inanities in the course of a proceeding. The Record in question is no
exception.
37. Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law; It goes without saying that the
legislature is well within its powers to provide higher penalties in view
of the grave evils sought to be prevented by R.A. 7080.-
At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is essentially
judicial. To declare what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to
declare what the law is or has been is judicial. Statutes enacted by
Congress cannot be expected to spell out with mathematical precision
how the law should be interpreted under any an all given situations.
The application of the law will depend on the facts and circumstances
as adduced by evidence which will then be considered, weighed and
evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it is the constitutionally mandated
function of the courts to interpret, construe and apply the law as would
give flesh and blood to the true meaning of legislative enactments.
While I simply cannot agree that the Anti-Plunder Law eliminated mens
rea from the component crimes of plunder, my bottom-line position still
is: regardless of whether plunder is classified as mala prohibita or in se,
it is the prerogative of the legislature—which is undeniably vested with
the authority—to determine whether certain acts are criminal
irrespective of the actual intent of the perpetrator.
44. Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law; I join the view that when we
speak of plunder, we are referring essentially to two or more instances
of mala in se constituting one malum prohibitum.-
Without being facetious, may I say that, unlike the act of discharging a
gun, the acts mentioned in Section 1(d)—bribery, conversion,
fraudulent conveyance, unjust enrichment and the like—cannot be
committed sans criminal intent. And thus, I finally arrive at a point of
agreement with petitioner: that the acts enumerated in Section l(d) are
by their nature mala in se, and most of them are in fact defined and
penalized as such by the Revised Penal Code. Having said that, I join
the view that when we speak of plunder, we are referring essentially to
two or more instances of mala in se constituting one malum
prohibitum. Thus, there should be no difficulty if each of the predicate
acts be proven beyond reasonable doubt as mala in
se,evenifthedefenseoflackofintentbe taken away as the solicitor general
has suggested. In brief, the matter of classification is not really
significant, contrary to what petitioner would have us believe. The key,
obviously, is whether the same burden of proof—proof beyond
reasonable doubt—would apply.
The argument that higher penalties may be imposed where two or more
distinct criminal acts are combined and are regarded as special complex
crimes, i.e., rape with homicide, does not justify the imposition of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua todeathincase plunder is committed.
Taken singly, rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua; and homicide,
by reclusion temporal. Hence, the increase in the penalty imposed
when these two are considered together as a special complex crime is
not too far from the penalties imposed for each of the single offenses.
In contrast, as shown by the examples above, there are instances
where the component crimes of plunder, if taken separately, would
result in the imposition of correctional penalties only; but when
considered as forming part of a series or combination of acts
constituting plunder, could be punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. The disproportionate increase in the penalty is certainly violative
of substantive due process and constitute a cruel and inhuman
punishment.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 states that “[a]ny person who participated
with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In
the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided
by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.” Both
parties share the view that the law as it is worded makes it possible for
a person who participates in the commission of only one of the
component crimes constituting plunder to be liable as co-conspirator for
plunder, not merely the component crime in which he participated.
While petitioner concedes that it is easy to ascertain the penalty for an
accomplice or accessory under R.A. No. 7080, such is not the case with
respect to a co-principal of the accused. In other words, a person who
conspires with the accused in the commission of only one of the
component crimes may be prosecuted as co-principal for the
component crime, or as co-principal for the crime of plunder, depending
on the interpretation of the prosecutor. The unfettered discretion
effectively bestowed on law enforcers by the aforequoted clause in
determining the liability of the participants in the commission of one or
more of the component crimes of a charge for plunder undeniably
poses the danger of arbitrary enforcement of the law.
The Solicitor General enjoins the Court to rectify the deficiencies in the
law by judicial construction. However, it certainly would not be feasible
for the Court to interpret each and every ambiguous provision without
falling into the trap of judicial legislation. A statute should be construed
to avoid constitutional question only when an alternative interpretation
is possible from its language. Borrowing from the opinion of the court in
Northwestern, the law “may be a poorly drafted statute; but rewriting it
is a job for Congress, if it so inclined, and not for this Court.” But where
the law as the one in question is void on its face for its patent
ambiguity in that it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application, the Court cannot breathe life to it through the
guise of construction.
The acts enumerated in Section 1(d) are mostly defined and penalized
by the Revised Penal Code, e.g. malversation, estafa, bribery and other
crimes committed by public officers. As such, they are by nature mala
in se crimes. Since intent is an essential element of these crimes, then,
with more reason that criminal intent be established in plunder which,
under R.A. No. 7659, is one of the heinous crimes as pronounced in one
of its whereas clauses.
The fact that the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 were
made criminal by special law does not necessarily make the same mala
prohibita where criminal intent is not essential, although the term
refers generally to acts made criminal by special laws. For there is a
marked difference between the two. According to a well-known author
on criminal law: There is a distinction between crimes which are mala in
se, or wrongful from their nature, such as theft, rape, homicide, etc.,
and those that are mala prohibita, or wrong merely because prohibited
by statute, such as illegal possession of firearms. Crimes mala in se are
those so serious in their effects on society as to call for almost
unanimous condemnation of its members; while crimes mala prohibita
are violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more
orderly regulation of the affairs of society. (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary,
Rawle’s3rdRevision)(1)Inactsmala in se, the intent governs; but in
those mala prohibit the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?
(People vs. Kibler, 106 N.Y., 321, cited in the case of U.S. vs. Go Chico,
14 Phil. 132) Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are
prohibited for reasons of public policy, as in illegal possession of
firearms. (People vs. Conosa, C.A., 45 O.G. 3953)
With due respect, I vote to grant the petition on the second ground
raised therein, that is, multiplicity of offenses charged in the amended
information. Consequently, the resolution of the Sandiganbayan must
be set aside, and the case remanded to the Ombudsman for the
amendment of the information to charge only a single offense.
I agree with petitioner’s concern over the danger that the trial court
may allow the specifications of details in an information to validate a
statute inherently void for vagueness. An information cannot rise higher
than the statute upon which it is based. Not even the construction by
the Sandiganbayan of a vague or ambiguous provision can supply the
missing ingredients of the Plunder Law. The right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is most
often exemplified in the care with which a complaint or information
should be drafted. However, the clarity and particularity required of an
information should also be present in the law upon which the charges
are based. If the penal law is vague, any particularity in the information
will come from the prosecutor. The prosecution takes over the role of
Congress. The fact that the details of the charges are specified in the
Information will not cure the statute of its constitutional infirmity. If on
its face the challenged provision is repugnant to the due process clause,
specification of details of the offense intended to be charged would not
serve to validate it. In other words, it is the statute, not the accusation
under it, that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and warns against
transgression. No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are
entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.
72. Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law; Albeit the legislature did not
directly lower the degree of proof required in the crime of plunder, it
nevertheless lessened the burden of the prosecution by dispensing with
proof of the essential elements of plunder.-
75. Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law; I believe that R.A. No. 7080
should have provided a cutoff period after which a succeeding act may
no longer be attached to the prior act for the purpose of establishing a
pattern.-
76. Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law; A statute that does not provide
adequate standards for adjudication, by which guilt or innocence may
be determined, should be struck down.-
Lastly, the terms “combination” and “series” are likewise vague. Hence,
on the basis of the law, a conviction of an accused cannot be sustained.
A statute that does not provide adequate standards for adjudication, by
which guilt or innocence may be determined, should be struck down.
Crimes must be defined in a statute with appropriate certainty and
definiteness. The standards of certainty in a statute prescribing
punishment for offenses are higher than in those depending primarily
on civil sanctions for their enforcement. A penal statute should
therefore be clear and unambiguous. It should explicitly establish the
elements of the crime which it creates and provide some reasonably
ascertainable standards of guilt. It should not admit of such a double
meaning that a citizen may act on one conception of its requirements
and the courts on another.
On the argument that this Court may clarify the vague terms or explain
the limits of the over-broad provisions of R.A. No. 7080, I should
emphasize that this Court has no power to legislate. Precision must be
the characteristic of penal legislation. For the Court to define what is a
crime is to go beyond the so-called positive role in the protection of civil
liberties or promotion of public interests. As stated by Justice
Frankfurter, the Court should be wary of judicial attempts to impose
justice on the community; to deprive it of the wisdom that comes from
self-inflicted wounds and the strengths that grow with the burden of
responsibility. A statute which is so vague as to permit the infliction of
capital punishment on acts already punished with lesser penalties by
clearly formulated law is unconstitutional. The vagueness cannot be
cured by judicial construction.
Division: EN BANC
Counsel: Agabin, Verzola, Hermoso & Layaoen Law Offices, Jose B. Flaminiano,
Saguisag, Carao & Associates, Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar, The Solicitor General
Ponente: BELLOSILLO
Dispositive Portion:
Case Title : HENRY T. GO, petitioner, vs. THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN
and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
respondents.Case Nature : MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the
Supreme Court.
1. Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); Public
Officers;The first element of the crime punished by Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 is
that the accused must be a public officer who enters into a contract on behalf of the
government.—Petitioner, a private individual, stands charged with violation of
Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, the clear terms of which punishes public
officers who, on behalf of the government, enter into contracts or transactions
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby. The first element of the crime is that the
accused must be a public officer who enters into a contract on behalf of the
government. The philosophy behind this is that the public officer is duty bound to
see to it that the interest of the government is duly protected. Thus, should the
contract or transaction entered into by such public officer is manifestly or grossly
disadvantageous to the government’s interests, the public officer is held liable for
violation of Section 3(g), whether or not this public officer profited or will
profit thereby.
2. _______________
4. 131
5. Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases;An act which is declared malum prohibitum,
malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial; Section 3(g), R.A. No. 3019,
applies restrictively only to public officers entering into a contract on behalf of the
government manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the government.—InLuciano v.
Estrella, 34 SCRA 769 (1970), Justice J.B.L. Reyes opines that the act treated in
Section 3(g) partakes of the nature of malum prohibitum; it is the commission of
that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. An act which is
declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
Section 3(g), however, applies restrictively only to public officers entering into a
contract on behalf of the government manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
7. 132
8. Same; Same; Same; Same; It is well-settled that penal statutes are strictly construed
against the State and liberally for the accused, so much so that the scope of a penal
statute cannot be extended by good intention or by implication; Section 3(g), R.A. No.
3019, can only be violated by a public officer.—It is well-settled that penal statutes
are strictly construed against the State and liberally for the accused, so much so
that the scope of a penal statute cannot be extended by good intention or by
implication. The Information lumping petitioner with a public official for conspiracy
to violate Section 3(g), is totally infirm. Section 3(g) can only be violated by a public
officer. The acts for which private persons can be charged together with the public
officials are enumerated in the last paragraph of Section 3 and Section 4,
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Republic Act No. 3019. If warranted, petitioner Go should
be charged for violation of Section 4(b) in relation to Section 3(g).
10. Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Conspiracy; Right to be
Informed; There is a need to distinguish where the conspiracy is an element of the
offense itself and not merely a circumstance that increases the penalty; Where the
conspiracy is constitutive of the offense, it should be alleged with more specifics than
where it merely increases the penalty to that of the most guilty.—I agree that there is
no difference between Sec. 3 (h) and Sec. 3 (g) in this respect. If a private individual
can be charged for conspiracy with a public official in Sec. 3 (h)—directly or
indirectly having a financial or pecuniary interest in any contract, business or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having
an interest, so can a private individual be charged with conspiracy with a public
official under Sec. 3 (g) for entering into a contract under terms and conditions
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. Petitioner, however,
rightly claims that in the Domingo case, the information allegedsufficient
specifics as to what constituted the conspiracy, namely, by acting as a dummy for the
public official and allowing his business to be used by him. Normally, an allegation
of conspiracy is sufficient, leaving the details to be established by the evidence at the
trial. There is, however, a need to distinguish the instance, as in this case, where the
conspiracy is an element of the offense itself and not merely a circumstance
11. 133
12. that increases the penalty. For the only way a private individual can be liable under
Sec. 3 (g) is if he acted in conspiracy with the public official. Where the conspiracy
isconstitutive of the offense, it should be alleged with more specifics than where it
merely increases the penalty to that of the most guilty. Otherwise, there would be a
failure to accord the accused his constitutional right to be informed of the nature of
the offense of which he stands charged. The allegation in this case against petitioner
simply stated that he acted “in conspiracy with” the accused public official. I find
this insufficient.
14. Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Conspiracy; There can be no
denying that there are certain offenses which are limited to or can be committed only
by a certain class of persons, meaning only they can be successfully prosecuted and
punished for acts punishable as such offense, and Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is such
offense.—Justice Santiago’s dissent is correct or at least defensible. Section 3(g) of
the Anti-Graft Law (RA 3019) which punishes the act of entering, on behalf of the
government, into a contract or transaction grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government may, as the dissent stressed, be committed only by public officers.
As may be gathered from settled jurisprudence, the first element of the crime of
violating Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019 is that the accused is a public officer, irresistibly
implying that only a public officer can be adjudged guilty for the offense, implying,
in turn, that a private individual cannot be held liable under Sec. 3(g), applying the
conspiracy principle. There can be no denying that there are certain offenses which
are limited to or can be committed only by a certain class of persons, meaning only
they can be successfully prosecuted and punished for acts punishable as such
offense. Section 3(g) of RA 3019, where only one authorized to sign and conclude
government contracts may be proceeded against, as only he can enter into contract
on behalf of the government, is such offense. Mention may also be made of felonies
punishable under Articles 204 to 207 of the Revised Penal Code and falling under
the category of “Malfeasance and Misfeasance in Office,” which only judges, in the
exercise of judicial functions, can be held liable of.
15. 134
16. Same; Same; Same; If at all then, a private individual, if charged in conspiracy with
a public officer, can be prosecuted and convicted under Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019, but such
private individual cannot plausibly be charged either directly or in conspiracy with a
public officer, and be convicted for violation of Sec. 3(g).—The conclusion negating
the conspiracy scenario under Sec. 3(g) becomes all the more compelling if we
consider Sec. 3(g) side by side with the preceding Sec. 3(e). Section 3(e) punishes the
act of causing undue injury to any party or giving such party undue benefits thru
evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence. By case law,
one of the elements to be proven in order to constitute a violation of Sec. 3(e) is that
the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former. The conspiracy angle under Sec. 3(e) is not present in the enumeration of the
essential elements of the crime penalized under Sec. 3(g). The absence must have
some legal and logical basis. What comes immediately to mind is what is adverted to
earlier, i.e., that a private person cannot plausibly agree with a public officer to
enter into a contract manifestly disadvantageous to the government and then act on
that agreement by conclud-ing/signing one. Surely, the private person cannot, for
want of authority, agree in the first place to execute/sign a government contract. If
at all then, a private individual, if charged in conspiracy with a public officer, can be
prosecuted and convicted under Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019. But such private individual
cannot plausibly be charged either directly or in conspiracy with a public officer, and
be convicted for violation of Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019.
18. Judgments; The Court does not sanction the piecemeal interpretation of a decision to
advance one’s case.—The Court does not sanction the piecemeal interpretation of a
decision to advance one’s case. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no
specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be
considered in its entirety.
19. Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Pleadings and Practice; The allegation of conspiracy in
the information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be
required to prove it.—It bears stressing that the allegation of conspiracy in
the information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that
20. 135
VOL. 532, SEPTEMBER 3, 2007 1
35
Go vs. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan
22.
Dispositive Portion:
Syllabi:
—The fact that petitioner lost in the congressional race in the May 14,
2007 elections did not effectively moot the issue of whether he was
disqualified from running for public office on the ground that the crime
he was convicted of involved moral turpitude. It is still a justiciable
issue which the COMELEC should have resolved instead of merely
declaring that the disqualification case has become moot in view of
petitioner’s defeat. Further, there is no basis in the COMELEC’s findings
that petitioner is eligible to run again in the 2010 elections because his
disqualification shall be deemed removed after the expiration of a
period of five years from service of the sentence. Assuming that the
elections would be held on May 14, 2010, the records show that it was
only on May 24, 2005 when petitioner paid the fine of P10,000.00 he
was sentenced to pay in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, 447 SCRA 309
(2004). Such being the reckoning point, thus, the five-year
disqualification period will end only on May 25, 2010. Therefore he
would still be ineligible to run for public office during the May 14, 2010
elections. Hence, it behooves the Court to resolve the issue of whether
or not petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves
moral turpitude.
—the key element, directly derived from the word “turpitude,” is the
standard of depravity viewed from a scale of right and wrong.—Even a
cursory examination of the above-listed readily reveals that while the
concept of “moral turpitude” does not have one specific definition that
lends itself to easy and ready application, the Court has been fairly
consistent in its understanding and application of the term and has not
significantly deviated from what it laid down in In re Basa. The key
element, directly derived from the word “turpitude,” is the standard of
depravity viewed from a scale of right and wrong. The application of
this depravity standard can be made from at least three perspectives or
approaches, namely: from the objective perspective of the act itself,
irrespective of whether or not the act is a crime; from the perspective
of the crime itself, as defined through its elements; and from the
subjective perspective that takes into account the perpetrator’s level of
depravity when he committed the crime.
—In Re Basa, 41 Phil. 275 (1920), a 1920 case, provided the first
instance for the Court to define the term moral turpitude in the context
of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the disbarment of a
lawyer for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Carlos S.
Basa, a lawyer, was convicted of the crime of abduction with consent.
The sole question presented was whether the crime of abduction with
consent, as punished by Article 446 of the Penal Code of 1887, involved
moral turpitude. The Court, finding no exact definition in the statutes,
turned to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary for guidance and held: “Moral
turpitude,” it has been said, “includes everything which is done contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” (Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision can be
found which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt
that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent
nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the accepted
rule of right conduct.
4. Same; Same; In the Philippines, the term moral turpitude was first
introduced in 1901 in Act No. 190, otherwise known as the Code of Civil
Actions and Special Proceedings.-
—In the Philippines, the term moral turpitude was first introduced in
1901 in Act No. 190, otherwise known as the Code of Civil Actions and
Special Proceedings. The Act provided that a member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as lawyer by the Supreme Court
upon conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Subsequently, the
term “moral turpitude” has been employed in statutes governing
disqualifications of notaries public, priests and ministers in solemnizing
marriages, registration to military service, exclusion and naturalization
of aliens, discharge of the accused to be a state witness, admission to
the bar, suspension and removal of elective local officials, and
disqualification of persons from running for any elective local position.
5. BRION, J., Concurring Opinion:; The term “moral turpitude” first
took root under the United States (U.S.) immigration laws-
—its history can be traced back as far as the 17th century when the
States of Virginia and Pennsylvania enacted the earliest immigration
resolutions excluding criminals from America, in response to the British
government’s policy of sending convicts to the colonies.—The term
“moral turpitude” first took root under the United States (U.S.)
immigration laws. Its history can be traced back as far as the 17th
century when the States of Virginia and Pennsylvania enacted the
earliest immigration resolutions excluding criminals from America, in
response to the British government’s policy of sending convicts to the
colonies. State legislators at that time strongly suspected that Europe
was deliberately exporting its human liabilities. In the U.S., the term
“moral turpitude” first appeared in the Immigration Act of March 3,
1891, which directed the exclusion of persons who have been convicted
of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude; this marked the first time the U.S. Congress used the term
“moral turpitude” in immigration laws. Since then, the presence of
moral turpitude has been used as a test in a variety of situations,
including legislation governing the disbarment of attorneys and the
revocation of medical licenses. Moral turpitude also has been judicially
used as a criterion in disqualifying and impeaching witnesses, in
determining the measure of contribution between joint tortfeasors, and
in deciding whether a certain language is slanderous.
8. Same; Same; Two modes by which a public officer who has a direct
or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
transaction may violate Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019.-
—There are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or
indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is
when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from
having such an interest by the Constitution or by law. In Teves v.
Sandiganbayan, 447 SCRA 309 (2004), petitioner was convicted under
the second mode for having pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit
which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of
1991.
Division: EN BANC
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO
Dispositive Portion:
Case Title : LEONILO SANCHEZ alias NILO, appellant, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, appelleesCase Nature : PETITION for
review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi:
—Under Subsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse refers
to the maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes
any of the following: (1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect,
cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by
deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3) Unreasonable
deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child
resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his
permanent incapacity or death.
—We reject appellant’s claim that the Information filed against him was
defective. In Resty Jumaquio v. Hon. Joselito C. Villarosa, 576 SCRA
204 (2009), we held that what controls is not the title of the
information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited
therein. Without doubt, the averments in the Information clearly make
out the offense of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
The following were alleged: (1) the minority of VVV; (2) the acts
constituting physical abuse, committed by appellant against VVV; and
(3) said acts are clearly punishable under R.A. No. 7610 in relation to
P.D. No. 603. Indeed, as argued by the OSG, the commission of the
offense is clearly recited in the Information, and appellant cannot now
feign ignorance of this.
—The penalty for Other Acts of Child Abuse is prision mayor in its
minimum period. This penalty is derived from, and defined in, the
Revised Penal Code. Although R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the rules
in the Revised Penal Code for graduating penalties by degrees or
determining the proper period should be applied. Thus, where the
special law adopted penalties from the Revised Penal Code, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law will apply just as it would in felonies.
—Appellant could only proffer the defense of denial. Notably, the RTC
found VVV and MMM to be credible witnesses, whose testimonies
deserve full credence. It bears stressing that full weight and respect are
usually accorded by the appellate court to the findings of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge had the opportunity
to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Equally noteworthy is the
fact that the CA did not disturb the RTC’s appreciation of the witnesses’
credibility. Thus, we apply the cardinal rule that factual findings of the
trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its
conclusions anchored on such findings, are accorded respect, if not
conclusive effect, especially when affirmed by the CA. The exception is
when it is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked,
misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which,
if considered, will change the outcome of the case.
—Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered
as child abuse but merely as slight physical injuries defined and
punishable under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant
conveniently forgets that when the incident happened, VVV was a child
entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by
the Constitution. As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical
abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of
appellant falls squarely within this definition. We, therefore, cannot
accept appellant’s contention.
Division: THIRD DIVISION
Ponente: NACHURA
Dispositive Portion:
Dispositive Portion:
Syllabi:
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of
the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at
Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic
chemist therein, confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that
the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from appellant were
positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana. Thus, the
corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with certainty and
conclusiveness.
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor
any barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the
lack of pictures taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he
was not reported to or booked in the custody of any barangay official or
police authorities. These are absurd disputations. No law or
jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be
witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other civilian, or be
accompanied by the taking of pictures.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty
under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is
prision correccional, to be taken from the medium period thereof
pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no
attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
Ponente: REGALADO
Dispositive Portion:
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the
judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo
against accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is
AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he should be,
as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as the maximum thereof.
Syllabi:
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Dispositive Portion:
Syllabi:
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property;
(2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done
with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of
the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Theft is
qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the
theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed
with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a
motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen
consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the
property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the
property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.
In the 2000 case of People v. Tan where the accused took a Mitsubishi
Gallant and in the later case of People v. Lobitania which involved the
taking of a Yamaha motorized tricycle, this Court held that the unlawful
taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping law and
not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.
Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES
Dispositive Portion:
Case Title : SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN
and JUANITA L. TAN, respondentsCase Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari
of the resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 94.
Syllabi Class : Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (R.A.
No. 9262) ; Conspiracy ; Statutory Construction ; Words and Phrases ;
Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (R.A. No. 9262); Conspiracy;
Words and Phrases; “Violence against Women and Their Children,” Defined;While Section 3
of R.A. No. 9262 provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
** The present petition impleaded the Court of Appeals as respondent. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the name of the Court of Appeals is deleted from the title.
232
does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).—Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ‘‘[v]iolence against women
and their children’’ as “any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has
or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.” While the said provision
provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of
the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Same; Same; If the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) is applied to B.P. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein, with
more reason could the same principle be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262
because of the express provision of Section 47 that the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
shall be supplementary to said law.—Most recently, inLadonga v. People, 451 SCRA
673 (2005), the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article
8 of the RPC to B.P.Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein. With
more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may
be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section
47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the
RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one
is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation
of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.
Same; Same; Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against
women and their children may be committed by an offender through another.—It must be
further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence
against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence against233
VOL. 567, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 2
33
Go-Tan vs. Tan
Women and Their Children.—The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts: x x x (h) Engaging in
purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that
alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or
her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: x x x
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The intent of the statute is the law.—It
bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law and that this intent must be
effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262
reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the
attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit—
the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The maxim “expressio unios est
exclusio alterius” is only an ancillary rule of statutory construction which should be
applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise
manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the
legislature.—Contrary to the RTC’s pronouncement, the maxim “expressio unios est
exclusio alterius” finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim
is only an “ancillary rule of statutory construction.” It is not of universal
application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of
discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be
permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.
Counsel: Alfred Joseph T. Jamora
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Dispositive Portion:
Case Title : CITIBANK N.A. AND THE CITIGROUP PRIVATE BANK, petitioners, vs.
ESTER H. TANCO-GABALDON, ARSENIO TANCO & THE HEIRS OF KU TIONG LAM,
respondents.Case Nature : PETITIONS for review on certiorari of a resolution of
the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi:
2. Same; Same; Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.-
—Hand in hand with Section 1, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 states that
“prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.” In Republic v. Cojuangco, Jr., 674 SCRA
492 (2012), the Court ruled that Section 2 provides two rules for
determining when the prescriptive period shall begin to run: first, from
the day of the commission of the violation of the law, if such
commission is known; and second, from its discovery, if not then
known, and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
3. Administrative Law; Laches; Words and Phrases;Laches has
been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus, giving rise to a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it.-
Ponente: REYES, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED for lack of merit.
Syllabi:
4. Same; Same; The filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s Office
suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.-
—In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494 (1967),
this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of
the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling was
broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 122 SCRA 538 (1983), when it held that the filing of the
complaint with the Fiscal’s Office also suspends the running of the
prescriptive period of a criminal offense.
Ponente: PEREZ, J.
Dispositive Portion:
Syllabi:
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if
not collateral to the resolution of the principal issues. As consistently
held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that
the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight
and substance that could affect the outcome of the case.
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the
victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage
certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral
evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if
such proof is not objected to.
3. Criminal
Law; Parricide; Evidence; Admission;Exceptions; Axiomatic is the
rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it,
with exceptions.-
When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to
prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing
evidence. Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense
(and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden
of proof from the prosecution to the defense.
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering
incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience
profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and
nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been
viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness
and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered
woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen
again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this “good,
gentle and caring man” is the real person whom she loves. A battered
woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional
stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels
responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of
his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim,
especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him
does he seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in
this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly
tormented psychologically. The illusion of absolute inter dependency is
well-entrenched in a battered woman’s psyche. In this phase, she and
her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other—she for
his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this
miserable cycle of ‘‘tension, violence and forgiveness,” each partner
may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one
may really feel independent, capable of functioning without the other.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who
resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the
peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following
requisites and effect of self-defense: “Art. 11. Justifying
circumstances.—The following do not incur any criminal liability: “1.
Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur; First. Unlawful aggression; Second.
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.”
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons
by employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party
might make. In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the
circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as the killing
itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures,
which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Because of the
gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as
conclusively as the killing itself.
Division: EN BANC
Ponente: PANGANIBAN
Dispositive Portion:
Syllabi:
—the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of
the pudendum constitutes rape.—In sum, we are convinced that
petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a prosecution
for rape, the complainant’s candor is the single most important factor.
If the complainant’s testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused
can be convicted solely on that basis. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
did not doubt AAA’s credibility, and found no ill motive for her to charge
petitioner of the heinous crime of rape and to positively identify him as
the malefactor. Both courts also accorded respect to BBB’s testimony
that he saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger
sister. While petitioner asserts that AAA’s poverty is enough motive for
the imputation of the crime, we discard such assertion for no mother or
father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low as to subject their
daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial
knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their
daughter’s psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true. We find
petitioner’s claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by Dr. Jocson
in the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money from petitioner’s
parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in most cases of
rape committed against young girls like AAA who was only 6 years old
then, total penetration of the victim’s organ is improbable due to the
small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held that actual penetration of
the victim’s organ or rupture of the hymen is not required. Therefore, it
is not necessary for conviction that the petitioner succeeded in having
full penetration, because the slightest touching of the lips of the female
organ or of the labia of the pudendum constitutes rape.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; While R.A. No. 9344 exempts children
15 years old and below from criminal liability, Section 6 thereof
expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil
liability.-
—While the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2)
counts of rape committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly
provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil liability.
Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by
the CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is inthe nature of actual or
compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.
Ponente: NACHURA
Dispositive Portion:
Syllabi:
ln further outlining the distinction between the words “in- tent” and
“discernment,” it is worthy to note the basic reason behind the
enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of
the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or
intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In
expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert has
stated: “The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this
power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to
distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because...
the infant (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal
liability.”
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below
are not capable of performing a criminal act. On the other hand, minors
above nine years of age but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt.
However, they are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which
presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were
“capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is,
that (they) acted with discernment,” The preceding discussion shows
that “intelligence” as an element of dolo actually embraces the concept
of discernment as used in Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the
aforecited case of People vs. Doquenca, supra, It could not therefore be
argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes “intent” for they
refer to two different concepts. Intelligence, which includes
descernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a means of committing an
offense.
The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not
been complied with, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case.
This erroneous perception has been corrected long before. As intimated
in the case of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated
in Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.
Ponente: PARAS
Dispositive Portion:
Case Title : THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. VALENTIN
DOQUEÑA, defendant and appellant.Case Nature : APPEAL from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Bejasa, J.
Syllabi:
Ponente: DIAZ
Dispositive Portion:
Syllabi:
—For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the
year 1999, the accused-appellant was already 17 years old. We likewise
find that in the said instances, the accused-appellant acted with
discernment. In Madali v. People, 595 SCRA 274 (2009), the Court had
the occasion to reiterate that “[d]iscernment is that mental capacity of
a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such
capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in
each case.”
—In People v. Pruna, 390 SCRA 577 (2002), the Court established the
guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance, as follows: 1. The best evidence to prove the
age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In the absence of a certificate of
live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice
to prove age. 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of
the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify
on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of
the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the
victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to
be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years
of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years
old; 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document,
or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the
victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is
expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 5. It is the prosecution
that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding
age shall not be taken against him. (Emphases ours.)
—That the carnal knowledge in this case was committed through force,
threat or intimidation need no longer be belabored upon. “[I]n rape
committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, step-father, uncle,
or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that
actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or ascendancy
takes the place of violence and intimidation.”
—We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused-appellant’s defense
of alibi deserves scant consideration. “Alibi is an inherently weak
defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit
approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence
that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the
crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed.” “[S]ince
alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over
and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by a credible
witness that an accused perpetrated the crime.”
—It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and
distinct crime that the law requires to be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution’s evidence must pass the exacting test of moral
certainty that the law demands to satisfy the burden of overcoming the
appellant’s presumption of innocence.” Thus, including the first incident
of rape, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish three instances
when the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her.
11. Same; Same; Evidence; The date of the commission of the rape
is not an essential element of the crime of rape.-
—In People v. Macafe, 636 SCRA 221 (2010), we explained the concept
of statutory rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in this
wise: “Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed statutory rape
as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law
punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below
twelve years old. Hence, force and intimidation are immaterial; the only
subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and
cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the
child’s consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to
discern evil from good.”
Dispositive Portion:
Case Title : RAYMUND MADALI AND RODEL MADALI, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
1. Criminal Law; Witnesses; Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning
values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed
by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimonies in
light of the declarant’s demeanor, conduct and position to discriminate between truth
and falsehood.—Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the
trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimonies in light of
the declarant’s demeanor, conduct and position to discriminate between truth and
falsehood. This is especially true when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed
by the appellate court, because said findings are generally conclusive and binding
upon this Court, unless it be manifestly shown that the lower courts had overlooked
or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in the case.
2. Same; Evidence; Denials; Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence that deserves no weight in law—it
cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness
who testifies on affirmative matters.—Against the damning evidence adduced by the
prosecution, petitioners Raymund and Rodel could only muster mere denial.
Unfortunately for them, their defense was much too flaccid to stay firm against the
weighty evidence for the prosecution. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence that deserves no weight
in law. It cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible
witness who testifies on affirmative matters. Between the self-serving testimonies of
petitioners and the positive identification by the eyewitness, the latter deserves
greater credence.
3. Same; Same; Alibis; Elements; Testimonies of relatives and friends corroborative of
an accused’s alibi are viewed with suspicion
4. _______________
5. * THIRD DIVISION.
6. 275
9. Same; Same; Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its incapacity to
assimilate all material details of a given incident, slight inconsistencies and
variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative value.—
Petitioners also place much premium on the alleged contradiction between
Jovencio’s narrative—which claimed that Emerson de Asis and Michael Manasan
saw the victim in the company of the malefactors immediately prior to the killing—
and the testimonies of these two witnesses denying such allegation. Unfortunately,
this is just a minor inconsistency. The common narration of Emerson de Asis and
Michael Manasan that they did not see the perpetrators with the victim prior to the
killing are too insignificant, since their narration did not directly relate to the act of
killing itself. Said inconsistency does not dilute the declarations of Jovencio. Given
the natural frailties of the human mind and its incapacity to assimilate all material
details of a given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of
a witness hardly weaken their probative value. It is well settled that immaterial and
insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant
point bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the
witnesses corroborate one another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein
cannot destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine
the integrity of a prosecution witness. The minor inconsistencies and contradictions
only serve to attest to the truthfulness of the witnesses and the fact that they had
not been coached or rehearsed.
10. Same; Same; Exempting Circumstances; Minority; Republic Act No. 9344; An
accused who was only 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime is exempt
from criminal liability and should be released to the custody of his parents or
guardian pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344.—As to the
criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals,
Raymund, who was only 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime, should
be exempt from criminal liability and should be released to the custody of his
parents or guardian pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility.—A child fifteen (15) years of age
or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant
to Section 20 of this Act. x x x x The
11. 277
12. exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
13. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 9344 is given retroactive effect in
favor of the accused who is not a habitual criminal.—Although the crime was
committed on 13 April 1999 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20 May
2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Raymund who was
not shown to be a habitual criminal. This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides: Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same. While Raymund is exempt from
criminal liability, his civil liability is not extinguished pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No. 9344.
14. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to
fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act, which capacity may be known
and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case.—As to Rodel’s situation, it must
be borne in mind that he was 16 years old at the time of the commission of the
crime. A determination of whether he acted with or without discernment is
necessary pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344, viz.: SEC. 6. Minimum
Age of Criminal Responsibility.—x x x. A child above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be
subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act. Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and
should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances
afforded by the records in each case.
15.
Dispositive Portion:
Syllabi:
While it is true that Dr. Castillo did not find any abrasion or laceration
in the private complainant’s genitalia, such fact does not negate the
latter’s testimony that the petitioner had carnal knowledge of her. The
absence of abrasions and lacerations does not disprove sexual abuses,
especially when the victim is a young girl as in this case. According to
Dr. Castillo, the hymen is elastic and is capable of stretching and
reverting to its original form. The doctor testified that her report is
compatible with the victim’s testimony that she was sexually assaulted
by petitioner.
Case law is that the calibration by the trial court of the evidence on
record and its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, as well as its
findings of facts and the conclusions anchored on said findings, are
accorded conclusive effect by this Court unless facts and circumstances
of substance were overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted, which,
if considered would merit a nullification or reversal of the decision. We
have held that when the offended party is young and immature, from
the age of thirteen to sixteen, courts are inclined to give credence to
their account of what transpired, considering not only their relative
vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they
would be exposed if the matter to which they testified is not true.
That petitioner ravished the victim not far from the street where
residents passed by does not negate the act of rape committed by
petitioner. Rape is not a respecter of time and place. The crime may be
committed by the roadside and even in occupied premises. The
presence of people nearby does not deter rapists from committing the
odious act. In this case, petitioner was so daring that he ravished the
private complainant near the house of Teofisto even as commuters
passed by, impervious to the fact that a crime was being committed in
their midst.
Case law has it that in view of the intrinsic nature of rape, the only
evidence that can be offered to prove the guilt of the offender is the
testimony of the offended party. Even absent a medical certificate, her
testimony, standing alone, can be made the basis of conviction if such
testimony is credible. Corroborative testimony is not essential to
warrant a conviction of the perpetrator. Thus, even without the
testimony of Teofisto Bucud, the testimonies of the offended party and
Dr. Castillo constitute evidence beyond reasonable doubt warranting
the conviction of petitioner.
Dispositive Portion:
Ponente: PANGANIBAN
Dispositive Portion:
Syllabi:
—In People v. Espino, Jr., 554 SCRA 682 (2008), we said: “Time and
again, we have held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of
witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court’s
observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often
accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered,
would alter the result of the case. The trial judge enjoys the advantage
of observing the witness’ deportment and manner of testifying, her
“furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or
sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an
oath”—all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a
witness’ honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better
determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal
position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of
substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the
opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even
more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the
Court of Appeals.”
—Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, whenever the crime of
rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. The
prosecution was able to sufficiently allege in the Information, and
establish during trial, that a gun was used in the commission of rape.
Since no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was established in the
commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Thus, we
affirm the penalty of reclusion perpetua meted by the courts below.
—The fact that not one of AAA’s textmates was presented as witness
would not detract from her credibility. Jurisprudence has steadfastly
been already repetitious that the accused may be convicted on the sole
testimony of the victim in a rape case, provided that such testimony is
credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. AAA repeatedly stated that petitioner sexually
abused her against her will. The straightforward narration by AAA of
what transpired, accompanied by her categorical identification of
petitioner as the malefactor, sealed the case for the prosecution.
—In rape cases, the essential element that the prosecution must prove
is the absence of the victim’s consent to the sexual congress. The
gravamen of the crime of rape is sexual congress with a woman by
force or intimidation and without consent. Force in rape is relative,
depending on the age, size and strength of the parties. In the same
manner, intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime
and not by any hard and fast rule. Petitioner’s act of holding a gun and
threatening AAA with the same showed force or at least intimidation
which was sufficient for her to submit to petitioner’s bestial desire for
fear of her life.
Ponente: PERALTA, J.
Dispositive Portion:
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law|Dangerous Drugs Act|Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006 (R.A. No. 9344)|Penalties|Suspension of Sentence
Syllabi:
—In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, the RTC imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section 98 of the same law. A
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life
imprisonment to death; however, in Section 98, it is provided that,
where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life
imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion
perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the penalty can now be
graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties
provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; A child in conflict with the law may,
after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections
(BUCOR), in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD).-
—This Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia, 599 SCRA 20 (2009),
that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence
can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement
of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension
of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. The
provision states: SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law
to Court.—If the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been
fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to
comply with the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the
court for execution of judgment. If said child in conflict with the law has
reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence,
the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child
reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
—As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the
marking of the confiscated item which, in the present case, was
complied with, thus: Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking
of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they are
seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in
the custodial link, thus, it is vital that the seized contraband are
immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will
use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or
related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until
they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating
switching, “planting,” or contamination of evidence.
—In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also
correct in finding that the appellant is equally guilty of violation of
Section 11 of RA 9165, or the illegal possession of dangerous drug. As
an incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after the consummation
of the buy-bust operation, the arresting officers had the authority to
search the person of the appellant. In the said search, the appellant
was caught in possession of 0.6131 grams of shabu. In illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
—The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred.
Once again, this Court stresses that a buy-bust operation is a legally
effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending
drug peddlers and distributors. It is often utilized by law enforcers for
the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of
their nefarious activities. In People v. Roa, 620 SCRA 359 (2010), this
Court had the opportunity to expound on the nature and importance of
a buy-bust operation, ruling that: In the first place, coordination with
the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities
may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 86 of
Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation,
PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain “close coordination with
the PDEA on all drug-related matters,” the provision does not, by so
saying, make PDEA’s participation a condition sine qua non for every
buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in
flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of the
Court, which police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending
violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA. A buy-bust
operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
Ponente: PERALTA, J.
Dispositive Portion:
Criminal Law; Evidence; It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which
are factual in nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect
when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and
unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.—It is a fundamental rule that
findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve the credibility of
witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and
speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The
reason for this, being, that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of
witnesses having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said
findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals as in this case.
Same; Same; Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2000 (R.A. No. 9165); What is
material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of
corpus delicti.—In the prosecution of offenses involving this provision of the statute, it is
necessary that the following elements be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and
seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefore. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti.
Evidence; Frame-Ups; We view the defense of frame-up with disfavor as it can easily be
concocted and is commonly used as a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising
from illegal sale of drugs.—Like alibi, we view the defense of frame-up with disfavor
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
538
Arrests; The rule is settled that an arrest made after an entrapment does not require a
warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court.—The rule is settled that an arrest made after an
entrapment does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless
arrest pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court which states: SEC. 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act;Penalties; Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code
shall not be used in the determination of the penalty to be imposed on the accused—since
Section 98 of the said law contains the word “shall,” the non-applicability of the Revised
Penal Code provisions is mandatory, subject only to the exceptions in case the offender is a
minor.—Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code shall not be used in the determination of
the penalty to be imposed on the accused. Since Section 98 of the said law contains the word
“shall,” the non-applicability of the Revised Penal Code provisions is mandatory, subject
only to the exception in case the offender is a minor.
Syllabi:
—An immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out a review by this
Court of the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion. Like all other officials
under our constitutional scheme of government, all their acts must
adhere to the Constitution.
Ponente: BRION, J.
Dispositive Portion:
People vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) 699 SCRA 713 , June 26,
2013
Syllabi:
Ponente: ABAD, J.
Dispositive Portion:
Mapa, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan 231 SCRA 783 , April 26, 1994
Case Title : PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR. and J. LORENZO VERGARA, petitioners, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.Case Nature : PETITION for certiorari to set aside
the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
Syllabi:
There are obvious differences between the powers granted to the PCGG
under sections 4 and 5. Section 4 deals with the power which PCGG can
use to compel an unwilling witness to testify. On the other hand,
section 5 speaks of the power which PCGG can wield to secure
information from a friendly witness. Under section 4, the hostile witness
compelled to testify is not immunized from prosecution. He can still be
prosecuted but “no testimony or other information compelled under the
order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any
criminal case . . . .” In contrast, under section 5, the friendly witness is
completely immunized from prosecution.
We also rule that there was nothing irregular when PCGG granted a
section 5 immunity to petitioners while they were already undergoing
trial in Criminal Case No. 11960. Section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended,
does not prohibit the PCGG from granting immunity to persons already
charged in court and undergoing trial. As long as the privilege of
immunity so given will in the judgment of the PCGG assist it in attaining
its greater objectives, the PCGG is well within legal grounds to exercise
this power at any stage of the proceedings. This section 5 immunity
frees and releases one from liability, and as it inures to the benefit of
an accused, it can be invoked at any time after its acquisition and
before his final conviction. Our regard for the rights of an accused
dictates this result. Thus, we have consistently held that laws that
decriminalize an act or a grant of amnesty may be given retroactive
effect. They constitute a bar against the further prosecution of their
beneficiaries’ regardless of the appearance of their guilt.
Division: EN BANC
Ponente: PUNO
Dispositive Portion:
Ampatuan, Jr. vs. De Lima 695 SCRA 159 , April 03, 2013
Case Title : DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN, JR., petitioner, vs. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as
Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State
Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE
MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, respondents.Case
Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of an order of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Br. 26.
Syllabi:
5. Same; Same; Same; Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or more of several accused
with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made
upon motion by the Prosecution before resting its case.-
—Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by
the trial court of one or more of several accused with their consent so
that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the
Prosecution before resting its case. The trial court shall require the
Prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statements of the
proposed witnesses at a hearing in support of the discharge. The trial
court must ascertain if the following conditions fixed by Section 17 of
Rule 119 are complied with, namely: (a) there is absolute necessity for
the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is
no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) the
testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be most guilty;
and (e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age when she
was raped in 2001. Moreover, these inconsistencies, which the RTC and
the Court of Appeals did not consider material, were elicited while BBB
was testifying in open court. Our observations in People v. Perez, 270
SCRA 526 (1997), on the appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in the
testimony of rape victims who happen to be minors are instructive,
thus: We note that these alleged inconsistencies refer, at best, only to
trivial, minor, and insignificant details. They bear no materiality to the
commission of the crime of rape of which accused-appellant was
convicted. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Appellee’s
Brief, the seeming inconsistencies were brought about by confusion and
merely represent minor lapses during the rape victim’s direct
examination and cannot possibly affect her credibility. Minor lapses are
to be expected when a person is recounting details of a traumatic
experience too painful to recall. The rape victim was testifying in open
court, in the presence of strangers, on an extremely intimate matter,
which, more often than not, is talked about in hushed tones. Under
such circumstances, it is not surprising that her narration was less than
letter-perfect. “Moreover, the inconsistency may be attributed to the
well-known fact that a courtroom atmosphere can affect the accuracy of
testimony and the manner in which a witness answers questions.”
Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted
because of the grudge of CCC towards his deceased father. It is
outrageous to even suggest that a mother will subject her daughters to
the humiliating experience of coming before the court and narrating
their harrowing experience just because she was tagged by her father-
in-law as lazy. In addition, CCC’s father-in-law had died several years
before the criminal charges against appellant were ever instituted. If
CCC truly wanted to retaliate and damage the reputation of her father-
in-law, she could have done so when the latter was still alive. No
member of a rape victim’s family would dare encourage the victim to
publicly expose the dishonor of the family, more specifically if such
accusation is against a member of the family, unless the crime was in
fact committed.
The delay in reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to BBB and AAA is
understandably justified, considering that appellant repeatedly
threatened to kill them and their family should they disclose the
incidents to anyone. It has been held time and again that delay in
revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated
charge. Such intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim’s
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime
and not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that the intimidation
produces a fear that if the victim does not yield to the perverse
impulses of the accused, something would happen to her at the
moment, or even thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if
she would report the incident.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the two counts of rape in
Criminal Case Nos. 6906-G and 6908-G were not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, but only the two separate incidents of attempted
rape. It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape when
the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does
not perform all acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. In Criminal Case No. 6906-G, the records show that there
was no penetration or any indication that the penis of appellant touched
the labia of the pudendum of AAA. This was evident in AAA’s testimony
at the hearing on 17 October 2001.
The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were
construed as having eliminated the reference to “death” in Article 71
would run across the board in our penal laws. Consistent with Article 51
of the Revised Penal Code, those convicted of attempted qualified rape
would receive the penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed by
law, now Rep. Act No. 9346, for qualified rape. There are principles in
statutory construction that will sanction, even mandate, this
“expansive” interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346. The maxim
interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi embodies
the principle that a statute should be so construed not only to be
consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the
same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible
system—a uniform system of jurisprudence. “Interpreting and
harmonizing laws with laws is the best method of interpretation. x x x x
This manner of construction would provide a complete, consistent and
intelligible system to secure the rights of all persons affected by
different legislative and quasi-legislative acts.” There can be no
harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and the Revised Penal Code
unless the later statute is construed as having downgraded those
penalties attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under
Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge
as to the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies,
and for accessories and accomplices.
11. Criminal Law; Rape; Penalties; Due Process; The Court can
tolerate to a certain degree the deliberate vagueness sometimes
employed in legislation, yet constitutional due process demands a
higher degree of clarity when infringements on life or liberty are
intended.-
The impression left by Muñoz was that the use of the word “imposition”
in the Constitution evinced the framer’s intent to retain the operation of
penalties under the Revised Penal Code. In the same vein, one might
try to construe the use of “imposition” in Rep. Act No. 9346 as a means
employed by Congress to ensure that the “death penalty,” as applied in
Article 71, remain extant. If the use of “imposition” was implemented
as a means of retaining “death” under Article 71, it would have been a
most curious, roundabout means indeed. The Court can tolerate to a
certain degree the deliberate vagueness sometimes employed in
legislation, yet constitutional due process demands a higher degree of
clarity when infringements on life or liberty are intended. We have
ruled, on due process grounds, as arbitrary and oppressive a tax
assessed on a standard characterized as “nothing but blather in search
of meaning.” In the matter of statutes that deprive a person of physical
liberty, the demand for a clear standard in sentencing is even more
exacting.
Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death penalty in
the Philippines, also effectively classified the crimes listed therein as
“heinous,” within constitutional contemplation. Such reclassification
under Rep. Act No. 7659 was accompanied by certain legal effects
other than the imposition of the death penalty, such as the increase in
imposable fines attached to certain heinous crimes. The categorization
of certain crimes as “heinous,” constituting as it does official recognition
that some crimes are more odious than others, has also influenced this
Court in adjudging the proper pecuniary indemnities awarded to the
victims of these crimes. Hence, a general inclination persists in levying
a greater amount of damages on accused found guilty of heinous
crimes. It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty
through Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly declassify those
crimes previously catalogued as “heinous.” The amendatory effects of
Rep. Act No. 9346 extend only to the application of the death penalty
but not to the definition or classification of crimes. True, the penalties
for heinous crimes have been downgraded under the aegis of the new
law. Still, what remains extant is the recognition by law that such
crimes, by their abhorrent nature, constitute a special category by
themselves. Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346 does not serve as basis for
the reduction of civil indemnity and other damages that adhere to
heinous crimes.
Division: EN BANC
Ponente: TINGA
Dispositive Portion:
Syllabi Class :
Syllabi:
—Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules
of Court, the review on appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein
the CA imposes a penalty other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, is by petition for review on certiorari. A petition for
review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules
of Court, explicitly so provides, viz.: Section 1. Filing of petition with
Supreme Court.—A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or
other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may
include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other
provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must
be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional
remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at
any time during its pendency.
— The petition for review replicates Batistis’ appellant’s brief filed in the
CA, a true indication that the errors he submits for our review and
reversal are those he had attributed to the RTC. He thereby rests his
appeal on his rehashed arguments that the CA already discarded. His
appeal is, therefore, improper, considering that his petition for review
on certiorari should raise only the errors committed by the CA as the
appellate court, not the errors of the RTC.
Ponente: BERSAMIN
Dispositive Portion:
ACCORDINGLY, we affirm the decision dated September
13, 2007 rendered in CA-G.R. CR No. 30392 entitled
People of the Philippines v. Juno Batistis, but modify the
penalty to imprisonment ranging from two years, as
minimum, to three years, as maximum, and a fine of
P50,000.00. The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
Llamado vs. Court of Appeals 174 SCRA 566 , June 29, 1989
Syllabi:
It will be noted that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, the trial court
could grant an application for probation “at any time” “after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant” and certainly after “an
appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction.” Thus, the filing
of the application for probation was “deemed—[to constitute] automatic
withdrawal of a pending appeal.”
Ponente: FELICIANO
Dispositive Portion:
Citation Ref:
Salgado vs. Court of Appeals 189 SCRA 304 , August 30, 1990
Case Title : AGUSTIN SALGADO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
(Fourteenth Division) and HON. ANTONIO SOLANO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the RTC-Quezon City (Branch 86) and FRANCISCO LUKBAN, respondents.
Ponente: MEDIALDEA
Dispositive Portion:
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
305
Probation; Execution; Appeal; Considering that the decision was never appealed, the
trial judge had no authority to defer the immediate enforcement of the civil award.—I
submit that the trial judge had no authority to in effect defer the immediate enforcement of
the civil award of P176,633.50 by requiring the probationer to pay it at the rate of only
P2,000.00 a month, a paltry amount, indeed, considering the total obligation. The fact that
the victim accepted the payments did not validate the condition, which was void ab initio as
far as he was concerned. At any time he saw fit, he could have disregarded that condition as
an invalid amendment of the decision and demanded the immediateissuance of a writ of
execution for the fullamount of the civil award.
Francisco vs. Court of Appeals 243 SCRA 384 , April 06, 1995
Case Title : PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for
review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi:
The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accused—to wager on the result of his
appeal—that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the
moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence
inevitable, he now applies for probation as an “escape hatch” thus
rendering nugatory the appellate court’s affirmance of his conviction.
Consequently, probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by
convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, who manifest
spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
Therefore, that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for
probation if the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply
contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec. 4 of the Probation
Law, as amended, which opens with a negative clause, “no application
for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.”
Ponente: BELLOSILLO
Dispositive Portion:
Syllabi:
—With the enactment of P.D. No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976), this
Court held that the rule that if the accused appeals his conviction solely
to reduce the penalty, such penalty already probationable, and the
appellate court grants his appeal he may still apply for probation, had
already been abandoned. We explained that the intention of the new
law is to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies. Thus,
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is not probationable, and
the appellate court modifies the penalty by reducing it to within the
probationable limit, the same prohibition should still apply and he is not
entitled to avail of probation.
—On the other hand, probation should not be granted to the accused in
the following instances: 1. When the accused is convicted by the trial
court of a crime where the penalty imposed is within the probationable
period or a fine, and the accused files a notice of appeal; and 2. When
the accused files a notice of appeal which puts the merits of his
conviction in issue, even if there is an alternative prayer for the
correction of the penalty imposed by the trial court or for a conviction
to a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the crime in which he
was convicted where the penalty is within the probationable period.
—In view of the provision in Section 4 of the Probation Law that “no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction,”
prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually
exclusive remedies because the law is unmistakable about it.
—In Sable v. People, 584 SCRA 619 (2009), the Court stated that
“[Section 4 of] the Probation Law was amended to put a stop to the
practice of appealing from judgments of conviction even if the sentence
is probationable, for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying
for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid.” Thus, probation
should be availed of at the first opportunity by convicts who are willing
to be reformed and rehabilitated; who manifest spontaneity, contrition
and remorse.
10. Same; Same; Originally, P.D. No. 968 allowed the filing of an
application for probation even if an appeal had been perfected
by the convicted offender under Section 4; With the subsequent
amendment of Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 by P.D. No. 1990, the
application for the probation is no longer allowed if the accused has
perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.-
11. Same; Same; Wisdom Behind the Enactment of Our Own Probation
Law.-
—In this jurisdiction, the wisdom behind the enactment of our own
Probation Law, as outlined in the said law, reads: (a) promote the
correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with
individualized treatment; (b) provide an opportunity for the reformation
of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve
a prison sentence; and (c) prevent the commission of offenses.
13. Same; Same; The Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty not of
frustrated homicide but only of attempted homicide is an original
conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty.-
—In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of
frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original
conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have
found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right
penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have
afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
14. Same; The Probation Law; The Probation Law, said the Court in
Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation.-
15. Same; Same; When the accused intended to kill his victims as a
shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted but
the victim did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime is
frustrated murder or frustrated homicide, if the victim’s wounds are not
fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.-
Division: EN BANC
Ponente: ABAD, J.
Dispositive Portion:
Case Title : MANUEL V. BALA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO M.
MARTINEZ, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and PAUL AYANG-ANG, Probation
Officer, Manila Probation Office No. 4, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. 20, Martinez, J.
Syllabi:
At any time during the probation, the court may issue a warrant for the
arrest of a probationer for violation of any of the conditions of proba-
tion. The probationer, once arrested and detained, shall immediately be
brought before the court for a hearing which may be informal and
summary, of the violation charged. x x x If the violation is established,
the court may revoke or continue his probation and modify the
conditions thereof. If revoked, the court shall order the probationer to
serve the sentence originally imposed. An order revoking the grant of
proba- tion or modifying the terms and conditions thereof shall not be
appealable.
Ponente: SARMIENTO
Dispositive Portion:
Division: EN BANC
_______________
* EN BANC.
21
to rule that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses can be explained
by their age and their inexperience with court proceedings, and that even the most candid
of witnesses commit mistakes and make confused and inconsistent statements. This is
especially true of young witnesses, who could be overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the
courtroom. Hence, there is more reason to accord them ample space for inaccuracy.
Same; Rape; The rape victim’s delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not
destroy the truth of the charge nor it is an indication of deceit.—The rape victim’s delay or
hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an
indication of deceit. It is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear of her aggressor
and the lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually abused. In People
v. Coloma, 222 SCRA 255 (1993) we even considered an 8-year delay in reporting the long
history of rape by the victim’s father as understandable and not enough to render incredible
the complaint of a 13-year-old daughter. Thus, in the absence of other circumstances that
show that the charge was a mere concoction and impelled by some ill motive, delay in the
filing of the complainant is not sufficient to defeat the charge. Here, the failure of AAA’s
parents to immediately file this case was sufficiently justified by the complainant’s father
in the latter’s testimony.
Same; Same; Where the girl is below 12 years old, as in this case, the only subject of
inquiry is whether “carnal knowledge” took place.—Accused-appellant also contends that he
could not be liable for rape because there is no proof that he employed force, threats or
intimidation in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Where the girl is below 12 years old, as in
this case, the only subject of inquiry is whether “carnal knowledge” took place. Proof of
force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since none of these is an element of statutory
rape. There is a conclusive presumption of absence of free consent when the rape victim is
below the age of twelve.
Same; Same; The Court has consistently ruled that the presence of lacerations in the
victim’s sexual organ is not necessary to prove the crime of rape and its absence does not
negate the fact of rape.—Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the
conclusion quoted as follows: “negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars, which
means, in layman language, that there was no
22
showing of any scar or wound.” The Court has consistently ruled that the presence of
lacerations in the victim’s sexual organ is not necessary to prove the crime of rape and its
absence does not negate the fact of rape. A medical report is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape. What is important is that AAA’s testimony meets the test of
credibility, and that is sufficient to convict the accused.
Same; Rape; Evidence; Alibi; Denials; Categorical and consistent positive identification,
absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter,
prevails over the appellant’s defense of denial and alibi.—Categorical and consistent
positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellants’ defense of denial and alibi. The
shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that he was accused of raping AAA
due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this Court. On this score, the
trial court aptly reached the following conclusion: ...True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted
AAA’s family file the instant case against the accused, but the Court believes [AAA’s]
parents finally decided to file the rape case because after they have come to realize after
what happened to Mae Christine Camu that what previously [AAA and her cousin] told her
mother and which the latter had continually ignored is after all true. AAA was barely 9
years of age when she testified. It has been stressed often enough that the testimony of rape
victims who are young and immature deserve foil credence. It is improbable for a girl of
complainant’s age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and her family had she not
been truly subjected to the painfol experience of sexual abuse. At any rate, a girl of tender
years, innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as
rape to any man if it were not true. Parents would not sacrifice their own daughter, a child
of tender years at that, and subject her to the rigors and humiliation of public trial for rape,
if they were not motivated by an honest desire to have their daughter’s transgressor
punished accordingly. Hence, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists
and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
Same; Rape; Penalties; The penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is
a child below seven years of age.—Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, was the governing law at the time the accused-appellant committed
the rape in question. Under the said law, the penalty of death
23
shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven years of age. In this ease, as
the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time the rape was committed, was alleged
in the information and proven during trial by the presentation of her birth certificate,
which showed her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be imposed.
Same; Same; Same; In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of
minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused.—This Court finds ground for
modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot agree with the CA’s conclusion that
the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the commission of the
offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to
Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant testified on March 14,
2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of
age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place “in any month and
date in the year 1996.” Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time
when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or
after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being
more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this
circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age.
Damages; The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise
compensatory in nature.—The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are
likewise compensatory in nature. In San Andres v. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 81 (1982)
we held: xxx Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category
of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. In another case, this Court also explained: What we
call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory
damagesawarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong
(25 C.J.S. 815).
Same; The fact of minority of the offender at the time of the commission of the offense
has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury caused to victim and her family,
particularly considering the
24
more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense charged. It reads: Sec. 38. Automatic
Suspension of Sentence.—Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time
of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt. Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the
child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the,
Supreme Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law. The above-quoted provision makes no
distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law,
unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule
provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with
the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the
Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a
minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a
lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic
suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a
heinous crime.
Same; Same; If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence or to extend the suspended sentence
for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.—While Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be
applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the
said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus: Sec.
40. Return of the
26
Child in Conflict with the Law to Court.—If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled,
or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of
his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be
brought before the court for execution of judgment. If said child in conflict with the law has
reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order, execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
Same; Same; A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of
the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections
(BUCOR), in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development.—To
date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been
promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38
and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. However, accused-
appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which
provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows: Sec. 51. Confinement of
Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities.—A child in
conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve
his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural
camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD. The civil liability resulting from
the commission of the offense is not affected by the appropriate disposition measures and
shall be enforced in accordance with law.
Counsel: The Solicitor General
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00717 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of
death imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2)
accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount of P75,000.00 and
P30,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages, respectively. The award of
civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is maintained. However, the case shall
be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with
Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344
Syllabi:
1. Criminal Law; Rape; Witnesses; The credible, natural, and
convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the
accused, more so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal
findings of the examining physician.-
2. Same; Same; While the suspension of sentence lasts only until the
child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one
(21) years, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the
promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend
even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years,
so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child.-
4. Same; Same; Civil Liability; The fact that the offender was still a
minor at the time he committed the crime has no bearing on the gravity
and extent of injury suffered by the victim and her family.-
—In a more recent case, the Court En Banc, through the Honorable
Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, clarified: Under Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the
proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.
Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is
reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, appellant should
be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
—Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15)
years but below eighteen (18) years of age from criminal liability,
unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case,
“the appropriate proceedings” in accordance with the Act shall be
observed. We determine discernment in this wise: Discernment is that
mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined
by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by
the records in each case. x x x The surrounding circumstances must
demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was
wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime
and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness. In the present case, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that: “(1) choosing an isolated and dark place
to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the
victim x x x, to weaken her defense” are indicative of then seventeen
(17) year-old appellant’s mental capacity to fully understand the
consequences of his unlawful action.
—with more reason, the law should apply where the conviction by the
lower court is still under review.—In the determination of the imposable
penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered Republic Act No.
9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission
of the crime three (3) years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006. We
recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in
People v. Sarcia, 599 SCRA 20 (2009): [Sec. 68 of Republic Act No.
9344] allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of
this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of
the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply
to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under
review.
—Time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be
physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis
at the time of the commission of the crime. Physical impossibility refers
to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the
location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must
demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been
physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity
when the crime was committed.
10. Same; Same; Same; A victim of rape could readily identify her
assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to her, considering that
she could have a good look at him during the commission of the crime.-
12. Same; Same; Same; Alibi; The defense of alibi cannot prevail
over the victim’s positive identification of the perpetrator of the crime,
except when it is established that it was physically impossible for the
accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the
commission of the crime.-
—Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s positive
identification of the perpetrator of the crime, except when it is
established that it was physically impossible for the accused to have
been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.
Ponente: PEREZ, J.
Dispositive Portion:
1. Criminal Law; Piracy; Grave Coercion;There is piracy, not grave coercion, where, as
part of the act of seizing their boat, the occupants of the vessel were compelled to go
elsewhere other than their place of destination.—Under the definition of piracy in PD
No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code,
this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that
Eugene and Juan, Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of
destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The
testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the
vessel through force and intimidation.
2. Same; Same; Same; To sustain the defense and convert the instant case of piracy into
one of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in
Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons.—To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into
one of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in
Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly
approached them and boarded their pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at
them as he ordered
3. _________________
4. * FIRST DIVISION.
5. 762
6. complaining witness Eugene Pilapil to “dapa” or lie down with face downwards, and
then struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after
which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.
7. Same; Same; Same; Statutes; P.D. No. 532;The issuance of PD No. 532 was designed
to avert situations like the case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in
Philippine waters.—The incident happened at 3:00 o’clock in the morning. The
sudden appearance of another pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers to
them, easily intimidated the Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to submit in
complete surrender to the marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the other
pumpboat he had full control of his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his
hand drove them to submission. Hence the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert
situations like the case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine
waters.
8. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To impede the livelihood of small fishermen would
be to deprive them of their very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the
purview of P.D. No. 532 are the obstacle to the “economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people.”—The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose
only means of livelihood is fishing in sea waters. They brave the natural elements
and contend with the unknown forces of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It
is on these small fishermen that the townspeople depend for the daily bread. To
impede their livelihood would be to deprive them of their very subsistence, and the
likes of the accused within the purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to
the “economic, social, educational and community progress of the people.” Had it not
been for the chance passing of another pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers,
left alone helpless in a floundering, meandering outrigger with a broken prow and a
conked-out engine in open sea, could not be ascertained.
9. Same; Same; Same; The fact that the revolver used by the accused to seize the boat
was not produced in evidence cannot exculpate them from the crime.—The fact that
the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in evidence
cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again, that
Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation the
pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.
10.
Ponente: BELLOSILLO
Dispositive Portion:
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit “20”,
Record) was executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco,
and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting
the evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer.
Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as
covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with the
full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-
appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical
manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature
and legal consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they
voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the
truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11,
1992, pp. 7-59).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial
investigation may not be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel, x x x Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384
U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine
which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial
investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more stringent
requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the
presence of counsel.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions
on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction
between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there
is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree
did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to
protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against
the law of nations. As expressed in one of the “whereas” clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is “among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries.” For this
reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was
committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that
unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of “M/T Tabangao” (renamed
“M/T Galilee” by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine
waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to
Singapore where its cargo was off loaded, transferred, and sold. And
such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong’s direct
supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the
attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in
Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its
cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need
not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal
Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal
law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were
charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code
but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes
piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should
be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to
discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan,
278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the
law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the
whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
Counsel: The Solicitor General, Rodrigo, Berenguer & Guno, Britanico, Consunji &
Sarmiento Law Offices
Ponente: MELO
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants
justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby
AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.
People vs. Olivarez, Jr. 299 SCRA 635 , December 04, 1998
1. Criminal Law; Complex Crimes; The categorization by the prosecution of the crime of
robbery with double homicide is erroneous; Essential elements of robbery with
homicide.—The categorization by the prosecution of the crime of robbery with double
homicide is erroneous because the word “homicide” in Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) should be taken in its generic sense, absorbing not only acts which
results in death (such as murder) but also all other acts producing anything short of
death (such as physical injuries) committed during the robbery, and regardless of
the multiplicity of the victims which is only considered as an aggravating
circumstance. The indictable offense is still the complex crime of robbery with
homicide (which is its proper nomenclature), the essential elements of which are: a.)
the taking of personal property with the
2. __________________
3. * SECOND DIVISION.
4. 636
5. use of violence or intimidation against a person; b.) the property thus taken belongs
to another; c.) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; d.)
on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide which is
therein used in a generic sense, was committed.
6. Criminal Procedure; Evidence; The evidence adduced against appellants are
inadmissible to sustain a criminal conviction.—In this case, there were no
eyewitnesses to the killing and robbery and thus, no direct evidence points to
appellants’ criminal liability. The prosecution’s principal evidence against them is
based solely on the testimony of the police officers who arrested, investigated and
subsequently took their confession. Such evidence when juxtaposed with appellants’
constitutional rights concerning arrests and the taking of confessions leads to a
conclusion that they cannot be held liable for the offense charged despite the
inherent weakness of their defenses of denial and alibi, not because they are not
guilty but because the evidence adduced against them are inadmissible to sustain a
criminal conviction.
10. This is the clear mandate of the Constitution when it provides that those illegally
obtained evidence being “the fruits of the poisonous tree” are “inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.” The foregoing constitutional protection on the
inadmissibility of evidence (which are the product of an illegal search and arrest)
known as the exclusionary rule, applies not only to criminal cases but even extends
to civil, administrative and any other form of proceedings. No distinction is made by
the Constitution; this Court ought not to distinguish.
11. Same; Same; Same; Same; The invalid waiver of the right to counsel during
custodial investigation makes the uncounselled confession, whether verbal or non-
verbal, obtained in violation thereof as also “inadmissible in evidence.”—Under the
Constitution, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right, among others, to have a counsel, which right can be validly waived.
In this case, the said confession was obtained during custodial investigation but the
confessant was not assisted by counsel. His manifestation to the investigating officer
that he did not need the assistance of counsel does not constitute a valid waiver of
his right within the contemplation of our criminal justice system, this
notwithstanding the fact that the 1973 Constitution does not state that a waiver of
the right to counsel to be valid must be made with the assistance or in the presence
of counsel. Although this requisite concerning the presence of counsel before a
waiver of the right to counsel can be validly made is enshrined only in the 1987
Constitution, which further requires that the waiver must also be in writing, yet
jurisprudence is replete even during the time of appellants’ arrest where it has been
categorically ruled that a waiver of the constitutional right to counsel shall not be
valid when the same is made without the presence or assistance of counsel.
Consequently, the invalid waiver of the right to counsel during custodial
investigation makes the uncounselled confession, whether verbal or non-verbal,
obtained in violation thereof as also “inadmissible in evidence” under Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
12. Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites in order for a confession to be admissible.—
Under the present laws, a confession to be admissible must be: 1.) express and
categorical; 2.) given voluntarily, and intelligently where the accused realizes the
legal significance of his act; 3.) with assistance of competent and independent
counsel; 4.) in writing, and in the language known to and understood by the con-
13. 638
14. fessant; and 5.) signed, or if the confessant does not know how to read and write,
thumbmarked by him.
15. Same; Same; Same; Same; The purpose of providing counsel to a person under
custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession even
by the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false;
Extrajudicial confession of one accused may not be utilized against a co-accused
unless they are repeated in open court or unless there is an opportunity to cross-
examine the other on his extrajudicial statements.—The purpose of providing counsel
to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of
extracting confession even by the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to
admit something false. What is sought to be avoided is the “evil of extorting from the
very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense,
the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him.” These
constitutional guarantees have been made available to protect him from the
inherently coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such investigation.
In any case, said extra-judicial confession of one accused may not be utilized against
a coaccused unless they are repeated in open court or when there is an opportunity
to cross-examine the other on his extrajudicial statements. It is considered hearsay
as against said accused under the rule on res inter alios acta, which ordains that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
17.
Ponente: MARTINEZ
Dispositive Portion:
Syllabi:
—Both Aringoy and Lalli, in their respective Appeal Briefs, assail the
testimony of Lolita due to its alleged inconsistency on immaterial facts,
such as the status of Lolita’s grandfather, the name of the village she
was in, the date she was brought to Labuan, Malaysia, and the like. In
a long line of cases, the Court has ruled that inconsistencies pointed out
by the accused in the testimony of prosecution witnesses relating to
minor details do not destroy the credibility of witnesses. On the
contrary, they indicate that the witnesses were telling the truth and not
previously rehearsed.
—In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, found
Lalli, Aringoy and Relampagos to have conspired and confederated with
one another to recruit and place Lolita for work in Malaysia, without a
POEA license. The three elements of syndicated illegal recruitment are
present in this case, in particular: (1) the accused have no valid license
or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the accused engaged in this
activity of recruitment and placement by actually recruiting, deploying
and transporting Lolita to Malaysia; and (3) illegal recruitment was
committed by three persons (Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos),
conspiring and confederating with one another.
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
Dispositive Portion:
Ponente: PANGANIBAN
1.
Dispositive Portion:
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
618
Criminal Law; Illegal Possession of Firearms; An M-14 rifle could not be licensed in
favor of, or carried by, a private individual.—Duly proven from the foregoing were the two
elements of the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Undoubtedly, the established fact
that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the approaching police officers clearly showed
the existence of the firearm or weapon and his possession thereof. Suffic-ing to satisfy the
second element was the prosecution’s Certification stating that he had not filed any
application for license to possess a firearm, and that he had not been given authority to
carry any outside his residence. Further, it should be pointed out that his possession and
use of an M-14 rifle were obviously unauthorized because this weapon could not be licensed
in favor of, or carried by, a private individual.
Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; Maintenance of a Drug Den; The failure of the accused to
deny ownership of the house and its extension which was used as a drug den lends credence
to the prosecution’s story that he maintained it as a drug den.—We agree with the trial
court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an offense for which he was
correctly sentenced toreclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly established by the testimony
of Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself had used the extension house
of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the time of the raid. The former’s
testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified before the court.
That appellant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to the
prosecution’s story.
Same; Direct Assault; The act of the accused of firing an M-14 rifle at the policemen
who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant constitutes the complex crime of
direct assault with multiple counts of
619
attempted homicide.—The trial court was also correct in convicting appel-lant of direct
assault with multiple counts of attempted homicide. It found that “[t]he act of the accused
[of] firing an M-14 rifle [at] the policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to serve a
search warrant x x x” constituted such complex crime.
Same; Same; Same; Same; If the intention of the law in the second paragraph of Section
1 of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should
have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph.—Just as unacceptable is the
interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for limiting the proviso in the
second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of
simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that “no other crime was committed by the
person arrested.” If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to
homicide and murder, it should
620
have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court is aware that the ruling in the instant case
effectively exonerates the accused of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which
normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault, as indeed, the accused may
evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an
even lighter offense, but this consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of
RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Court’s review—the Court has no discretion to
give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the
legislature.—The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal
possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that
for direct assault. While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is
onlyprision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of
firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and
scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto menor. This
consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is
not subject to the Court’s review. Any perception that the result reached here appears
unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give
statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the
legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence
to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.
Legamia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 131 SCRA 478 , August 28,
1984
Syllabi:
In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20
years. He introduced her to the public as his wife and she assumed that
role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal material
gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but
for Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her guardianship.
Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what
Corazon had done especially because some of them probably had their
own Corazons.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby set
aside; the petitioner is acquitted of the charge. No costs.
Division: EN BANC
1. Criminal Law; Illegal Use of Alias; Definition of an Alias; There must be a sign or
indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to
his real name from that day forth for the use of alias to fall within the prohibition
contained in Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 142 as amended.—How this law is
violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an alias—“a name or names
used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly andhabitually usually in
business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth
or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority.”
There must be, in the words ofUrsua, a “sign or indication that the user intends to be
known by this name (the alias)in addition to his real name from that day forth… [for
the use of alias to] fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.”
2. Same; Same; The repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed
“habitual” as it does not amount to a customary
3. _______________
4. * EN BANC.
5. 303
9. maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to
have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact
alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time. The same
holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez,
assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estrada’s
representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of
intention of publicity.
10. Same; Same; Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of signing the documents as
“Jose Velarde” related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim
that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the
signing.—We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of
privacy. Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of signing the documents as “Jose
Velarde” related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that
there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the
signing. We need not even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by
R.A. No. 1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy
situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily
guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction
was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly.
11.
Ponente: BRION
Dispositive Portion:
Republic vs. Cabrini, Green & Ross, Inc. 489 SCRA 644 , May 05,
2006
Ponente: CORONA
Dispositive Portion:
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc. 542 SCRA
95 , January 18, 2008
Same; Same; Same; Same; The venue of civil forfeiture cases is any Regional Trial
Court of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or proceeds
representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense
are located.—Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture,
therefore, the venue of civil forfeiture cases is any RTC of the judicial region where the
monetary instrument, property
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
96
Same; Same; Two Conditions When Applying for Civil Forfeiture; It is the preliminary
seizure of the property in question which brings it within the reach of judicial process.—RA
9160, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations lay down two conditions
when applying for civil forfeiture: (1) when there is a suspicious transaction report or a
covered transaction report deemed suspicious after investigation by the AMLC and (2) the
court has, in a petition filed for the purpose, ordered the seizure of any monetary
instrument or property, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, related to said report. It
is the preliminary seizure of the property in question which brings it within the reach of the
judicial process. It is actually within the court’s possession when it is submitted to the
process of the court. The injunctive writ issued on August 8, 2003 removed account no. CA-
005-10-000121-5 from the effective control of either Glasgow or CSBI or their
representatives or agents and subjected it to the process of the court.
Same; Same; A criminal conviction for an unlawful activity is not a prerequisite for the
institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding—a finding of guilt for an unlawful activity is not
an essential element of civil forfeiture.—Whether or not there is truth in the allegation that
account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 contains the proceeds of unlawful activities is an
evidentiary matter that may be proven during trial. The complaint, however, did not even
have to show or allege that Glasgow had been implicated in a conviction for, or the
commission of, the unlawful activities of estafa and violation of the Securities Regulation
Code. A criminal conviction for an unlawful activity is not a prerequisite for the institution
of a civil forfeiture proceeding. Stated otherwise, a finding of guilt for an unlawful activity
is not an essential element of civil forfeiture.
97
Same; Same; Dismissal of Cases; While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non
prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances,
plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude.—In Marahay v. Melicor, 181 SCRA 811 (1990), this Court ruled: While a court
can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such
power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due
diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern
or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the
mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at
bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to
dismiss. (emphasis supplied)
Ponente: CORONA
Dispositive Portion:
Sto. Tomas vs. Salac 685 SCRA 245 , November 13, 2012
Case Title : SPOUSES SIMPLICIO AND MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of
deceased daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma), petitioners, vs. WHITE FALCON
SERVICES, INC. and BECMEN SERVICES EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC.,
respondents.Case Nature : PETITION to review the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Act of 1995 (R.A. No. 8042)
Division: EN BANC
Ponente: ABAD
Dispositive Portion:
Syllabi:
—Both Aringoy and Lalli, in their respective Appeal Briefs, assail the
testimony of Lolita due to its alleged inconsistency on immaterial facts,
such as the status of Lolita’s grandfather, the name of the village she
was in, the date she was brought to Labuan, Malaysia, and the like. In
a long line of cases, the Court has ruled that inconsistencies pointed out
by the accused in the testimony of prosecution witnesses relating to
minor details do not destroy the credibility of witnesses. On the
contrary, they indicate that the witnesses were telling the truth and not
previously rehearsed.
—In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, found
Lalli, Aringoy and Relampagos to have conspired and confederated with
one another to recruit and place Lolita for work in Malaysia, without a
POEA license. The three elements of syndicated illegal recruitment are
present in this case, in particular: (1) the accused have no valid license
or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the accused engaged in this
activity of recruitment and placement by actually recruiting, deploying
and transporting Lolita to Malaysia; and (3) illegal recruitment was
committed by three persons (Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos),
conspiring and confederating with one another.
3. Labor Law; Illegal Recruitment; Illegal Recruitment is commited
by persons who, without authority from the government, give the
impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for
employment purposes.-
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
Dispositive Portion:
Syllabi:
Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES
Dispositive Portion:
Division: EN BANC
Criminal Law; Cybercrime Law; Penalties; Section 6 of the cybercrime law imposes
penalties that are one degree higher when the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code and
certain special laws are committed with the use of information and communication
technologies (ICT).—Section 6 of the cybercrime law imposes penalties that are one degree
higher when the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code and certain special laws are
committed with the use of information and communication technologies (ICT). Some of the
petitioners insist that Section 6 is invalid since it produces an unusual chilling effect on
users of cyberspace that would hinder free expression.
Same; Same; Compared to traditional crimes, cybercrimes are more perverse;
Cybercriminals enjoy the advantage of anonymity, like wearing a mask during a heist.—
Compared to traditional crimes, cybercrimes are more perverse. In traditional estafa for
example, the offender could reach his victim only at a particular place and a particular
time. It is rare that he could consummate his crime without exposing himself to detection
and prosecution. Fraud online, however, crosses national boundaries, generally depriving
its victim of the means to obtain reparation of the wrong done and seek prosecution and
punishment of the absent criminal. Cybercriminals enjoy the advantage of anonymity, like
wearing a mask during a heist.
Same; Prescription of Crimes; Prescription is not a matter of procedure over which the
Court has something to say. Rather, it is substantive law since it assumes the existence of
an authority to punish a wrong, which authority the Constitution vests in Congress
alone.—Prescription is not a matter of procedure over which the Court has something to
say. Rather, it is substantive law since it assumes the existence of an authority to punish
a wrong, which
116authority the Constitution vests in Congress alone. Thus, there is no question that
Congress may provide a variety of periods for the prescription of offenses as it sees fit.
What it cannot do is pass a law that extends the periods of prescription to impact crimes
committed before its passage.
Same; Libel; Libel, like obscenity, belongs to those forms of speeches that have never
attained Constitutional protection and are considered outside the realm of protected
freedom.—The majority of the movants believe that the Court’s decision upholding the
constitutionality of Section 4(c)(4), which penalizes online libel, effectively tramples upon
the right to free expression. But libel is not a protected speech. There is no freedom to
unjustly destroy the reputation of a decent woman by publicly claiming that she is a paid
prostitute. As early as 1912, the Court held that libel is a form of expression not protected
by the Constitution. Libel, like obscenity, belongs to those forms of speeches that have
never attained Constitutional protection and are considered outside the realm of protected
freedom.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech; Freedom of the Press; As long as the
expression or speech falls within the protected sphere, it is the solemn duty of courts to
ensure that the rights of the people are protected.—The constitutional guarantee against
prior restraint and subsequent punishment, the jurisprudential requirement of “actual
malice,” and the legal protection afforded by “privilege communications” all ensure that
protected speech remains to be protected and guarded. As long as the expression or speech
falls within the protected sphere, it is the solemn duty of courts to ensure that the rights
of the people are protected.
Criminal Law; Cybercrime Law; Cyberlibel; Online libel is not a new crime. It is
essentially the old crime of libel found in the 1930 Revised Penal Code and transposed to
operate in the cyberspace. Consequently, the mass of jurisprudence that secures the freedom
of expression from its reach applies to online libel.—The movants argue that Section 4(c)(4)
is both vague and overbroad. But, again, online libel is not a new crime. It is essentially
the old crime of libel found in the 1930 Revised Penal Code and transposed to operate in
the cyberspace. Consequently, the mass of jurisprudence that secures the freedom of
expression from its reach applies to online libel. Any
117apprehended vagueness in its provisions has long been settled by precedents.
124
Leonen, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Criminal Law; Libel; View that it is not enough that we proclaim, as the majority does,
that libel is unprotected speech.—It is not enough that we proclaim, as the majority does,
that libel is unprotected speech. The ponencia’s example, i.e., “[t]here is no freedom to
unjustly destroy the reputation of a decent woman by publicly claiming that she is a paid
prostitute,” fails to capture the nuances of criminalizing libel in our jurisprudence and in
reality. It is a precarious simplification of the issue inferred from one imagined case. This
obfuscation practically neuters the ability of this court to do incisive analysis in order to
provide the necessary protection to speech as it applies to the internet.
Same; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012; Freedom of Speech; View that the text of
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 is a swing towards lesser protection
of the primordial right to speech.—The majority now condones the same 1930s text
definition of libel effectively discarding the carefully crafted exception painstakingly built
from the assertion of fundamental rights in this court. This condonation reveals the
legislative blinders to the radically different context of the internet. The text of Section
4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 is a swing towards lesser protection of the
primordial right to speech. The position taken by the majority deserves a second hard look,
if only to ensure the constitutional guarantee that our people truly have freedom of
expression as a means to assert their sovereignty and governmental authority in
cyberspace.
Same; Same; Cyberlibel; View that criminal libel has an in terrorem effect that is
inconsistent with the contemporary protection of the primordial and necessary right of
expression enshrined in our Constitution.—The chilling effect on various types of speech
with just the possibility of criminal libel prosecution compared with the consequences of
civil liabilities for defamation presents another dimension that have been glossed over by
the main opinion and the resolution on the various motions for reconsideration. We have
to acknowledge the real uses of criminal libel if we are to be consistent to protect speech
made to make public officers and government accountable. Criminal libel has an in
terrorem effect that is inconsistent with the contemporary protection of the primordial and
neces-
125sary right of expression enshrined in our Constitution. The history and actual use
of criminal libel should be enough for us to take a second look at the main opinion in this
case. The review should include a consideration of the nature of cyberspace as layered
communities used to evolve ideas. Such review should result in a declaration of
unconstitutionality of criminal libel in the Revised Penal Code and in the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012.
Same; Same; View that the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 does not prohibit
advertising. It simply requires that whoever advertises must be accountable to the user, not
use false identities and allow for opt out mechanisms so that the user will not continue to
receive unwelcome advertising ad nauseum.—I view the current provisions as sufficiently
narrow and tailored to meet legitimate and compelling state interests. It protects the
ordinary internet user against unwarranted intrusions. Certainly, freedom of expression
should not evolve into a fundamental and protected right to badger. The Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 does not prohibit advertising. It simply requires that whoever
advertises must be accountable to the user, not use false identities and allow for opt out
mechanisms so that the user will not continue to receive unwelcome advertising ad
nauseum.
Ponente: ABAD, J.
Dispositive Portion: