Maria Jesse Anne B.

Gloria Law 4A

Lagman, et. Al. Vs. Medialdea, et. Al., G.R. Nos. 231658/231771/231774, July 4, 2017
Case Digest of the Majority Opinion

FACTS:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. Within the timeline set
by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May
25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion
and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time. The
President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to capture
the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was
conducted. These groups, which have been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however,
confronted the government operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed
not only against the government authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians
and their properties. The events that unfolded on May 23, 2017 led the President to conclude that
the activities of the aforementioned groups constitute not simply a display of force, but a
clear attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned
establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao; thereby
necessitating the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
After the submission of the report and briefings before Congress, both houses of Congress
expressed full support to the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas of corpus.
However, Proclamation No. 216 was contested by three petitions. All three petitions allege
that there is no sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. In particular, the Lagman petition asserts that there is only a threat of rebellion
which is not a ground to justify the act of the President. The Cullamat petition avers that the
proclamation is unconstitutional insofar as it covered areas outside of Marawi City. Lastly, the
Mohamad petition posits that the President does not have the discretion to choose which
extraordinary power to use since the exercise thereof is sequential and must be commensurate to
the exigencies of the situation. In this case, the factual situation in Marawi was not so grave as to
require the imposition of martial law.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the President can validly
rely upon intelligence reports submitted to him in assessing whether or not actual rebellion exists
and public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. The veracity of the facts relied upon by the President is immaterial as the
yardstick in determining the constitutionality of the exercise by him of the extraordinary powers
granted to him by the Constitution is not correctness but arbitrariness. In this case, the President
did not commit grave abuse of discretion when he determined that there is sufficient factual basis
for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUES:
1. What are the parameters in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for declaring
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
2. Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?

RULING:
1. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: 1)
actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements
must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there
is actual rebellion or invasion. These parameters are set by Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution.

The rebellion mentioned in the Constitution could only refer to rebellion as defined under
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In determining the existence of rebellion,
the President only needs to himself that there is probable cause that a rebellion was
committed or is being committed. The acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and
 the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or establishments
but likewise against civilians and their properties. The particular scenarios that
transpired on May 23, 2017 convinced the President that the atrocities had already
escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare martial
law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus have been properly
and fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there
being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires
the martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

2. There was sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising in Marawi City. However,
they insist that the armed hostilities do not constitute rebellion in the absence of
the element of culpable political purpose. The contention lacks merit.

The assessment by the President of the facts that transpired on and before 10:00PM of May
23, 2017 led him to a conclusion that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable
purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government
a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers
and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that
the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires
the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to
show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there was an armed
public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance
of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the
President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical
consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden
of proof. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of
probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.

As the parameters set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution have been met, there
was sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Maria Jesse Anne B. Gloria Law 4A

Lagman, et. Al. Vs. Medialdea, et. Al., G.R. Nos. 231658/231771/231774, July 4, 2017
Case Digest of the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Leonen

FACTS:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. Within the timeline set
by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May
25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion
and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time. The
President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to capture
the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was
conducted. These groups, which have been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however,
confronted the government operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed
not only against the government authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians
and their properties. The events that unfolded on May 23, 2017 led the President to conclude that
the activities of the aforementioned groups constitute not simply a display of force, but a
clear attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned
establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao; thereby
necessitating the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
After the submission of the report and briefings before Congress, both houses of Congress
expressed full support to the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas of corpus.
However, Proclamation No. 216 was contested by three petitions. All three petitions allege
that there is no sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. In particular, the Lagman petition asserts that there is only a threat of rebellion
which is not a ground to justify the act of the President. The Cullamat petition avers that the
proclamation is unconstitutional insofar as it covered areas outside of Marawi City. Lastly, the
Mohamad petition posits that the President does not have the discretion to choose which
extraordinary power to use since the exercise thereof is sequential and must be commensurate to
the exigencies of the situation. In this case, the factual situation in Marawi was not so grave as to
require the imposition of martial law.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the President can validly
rely upon intelligence reports submitted to him in assessing whether or not actual rebellion exists
and public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. The veracity of the facts relied upon by the President is immaterial as the
yardstick in determining the constitutionality of the exercise by him of the extraordinary powers
granted to him by the Constitution is not correctness but arbitrariness. In this case, the President
did not commit grave abuse of discretion when he determined that there is sufficient factual basis
for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUES:
1. What are the parameters in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for declaring
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
2. Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?

RULINGS
1. The Constitution does not only require that government alleges facts, it must show
that the facts are sufficient. The facts are sufficient when (a) it is based on credible
intelligence and (b) taken collectively establishes that there is actual rebellion and
that public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas
Corpus and the exercise of defined powers within the rubric of martial law.

2. There is no sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis
of declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the aforementioned parameters serve as a guide.
The intelligence relied upon, taken collectively, does not establish rebellion. The group
committing atrocities in Marawi are terrorists. They are not rebels. They are
committing acts of terrorism. They are not engaged in political acts of rebellion.
They do not have the numbers nor do they have the sophistication to be able to
hold ground. The armed hostilities were precipitated by government's actions to serve
a judicial warrant on known terrorist personalities. Many of them already had pending
warrants of arrests for the commission of common crimes. They resisted, fought
back, and together with their followers, are continuing to violently evade arrest.
There is no rebellion that justifies martial law. There is terrorism that requires more
thoughtful action.

Neither do the facts show convincingly that "public safety" requires martial law.
Respondents did not show how the available legal tools magnified by the call out
of the armed forces would not be sufficient. Public safety is always the aim of the
constitutional concept of police power. Respondents failed to show what martial law
would add.

Unlike the previous versions, the present Constitution provides for the limitations
for the declaration of martial law. Therefore, any declaration must clearly articulate
the powers that would be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief. It
cannot now just be a declaration of a state of Martial Law. Otherwise, it would be
unconstitutionally vague. It would not be possible to assess the sufficiency of the
facts used as basis to determine "when public safety requires it." "It" refers to the
powers that are intended to be exercised by the President under martial law.

The scope of Martial law as contained in Proclamation No. 216 issued last May
23, 2017 expands with every new issuance from its administrators. Proclamation No.
1081 of 1972, which ironically was more specific, evolved similarly. Martial law as
proclaimed is vague, thus unconstitutional.

In sum, there is no sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus as there was no actual rebellion, public safety
did not require it, and its proclamation, being vague, did provide a means as to determine
the sufficiency of factual basis.
Maria Jesse Anne B. Gloria Law 4A

Lagman, et. Al. Vs. Medialdea, et. Al., G.R. Nos. 231658/231771/231774, July 4, 2017
Case Digest of the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio

FACTS:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. Within the timeline set by the
Constitution, the President submitted to Congress, a written Report on the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216.
After the submission of the report and briefings before Congress, both houses of Congress
expressed full support to the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas of corpus.
However, Proclamation No. 216 was contested by three petitions. All three petitions allege
that there is no sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the President
did not commit grave abuse of discretion when he determined that there is sufficient factual basis
for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUES:
1. Whether there is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
2. What are the consequences of martial law?

RULING:
1. There is sufficient basis for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus only in Marawai City and not in the rest of Mindanao.

In exercising the power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ,
the 1987 Constitution requires that the President establish the following: (1) the
existence of actual rebellion or invasion; and (2) public safety requires the declaration
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the
instant case, probable cause exists that there is actual rebellion in Marawi City and
that public safety requires the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ in Marawi City. The armed and public uprising in Marawi City
by Maute-Hapilon armed fighters, with the announced intention to impose Shariah
Law in Marawi City and make it an Islamic State, is concrete and indisputable
evidence of actual rebellion; thereby justifying Proclamation No. 216. However, this
finding does not apply to the rest of Mindanao. Proclamation No. 216 and the President's
Report to Congress do not contain any evidence whatsoever of actual rebellion
outside of Marawi City. The President attempts to justify Proclamation No. 216 by citing
the capacity to rebel of the earlier mentioned groups in the rest of Mindanao. Capability to
rebel, absent an actual rebellion or invasion, is not a ground to declare martial law
or suspend the privilege of the writ under the 1987 Constitution. Thus, there is a clear
violation of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The consequences of martial law are:

a. Courts can take judicial notice of the fact of actual rebellion;
b. Rebels then can be validly subjected to a warrantless arrest;
c. In terms of detention, those arrested for rebellion may be judicially charged for an
extended period up to three days;
d. When authorized by law, the right to privacy of communication and freedom to
travel may be restricted; and,
e. When authorized by law, the President may be granted emergency powers to take
over privately-owned public utilities and businesses affected with public interest.
Maria Jesse Anne B. Gloria Law 4A

Lagman, et. Al. Vs. Medialdea, et. Al., G.R. Nos. 231658/231771/231774, December 5, 2017
Case Digest on the first extension of Martial Law

FACTS:
Proclamation No. 216 issued on May 23, 2017 expired on July 23, 2017. It was
extended until December 31, 2017 by virtue of RBH No. 11 issued by Congress on July 22, 2017.
The petitions in this case are based on Proclamation No. 216. Considering that it has expired and
the continued existence of martial now finds justification under RBH No. 11, the questions raised
in the petitions are now moot. Although the motions of reconsideration which this resolution
addresses are dismissible for being moot, the Court deems it prudent to emphasize its discussion
on the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis.

RESOLUTION:

The Constitution requires sufficiency of factual basis, not accuracy.

To recall, we held that "the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are
as follows: 1) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two
requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that
there is actual rebellion or invasion."

The phrase sufficiency of factual basis' in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the President's power to declare
martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus." Requiring the Court
to determine the accuracy of the factual basis of the President contravenes the Constitution
as Section 18, Article VII only requires the Court to determine the sufficiency of the
factual basis. Accuracy is not the same as sufficiency as the former requires a higher
degree of standard. As explained in the Court’s decision dated July 4, 2017:

In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension,
the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not
piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts
stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected
to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the
situation. To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden
him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making. This is consistent with our
ruling that "the President only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or
evidence showing that more likely than not more likely than not a rebellion was committed
or is being committed." The standard of proof of probable cause does not require absolute
truth.

Thus, Proclamation No. 216 was issued based on sufficient facts. In reviewing the validity of such
proclamation, the test is sufficiency and not accuracy.
Maria Jesse Anne B. Gloria Law 4A

Lagman, et. Al. Vs. Pimentel III, et. Al.

G.R. Nos. 235935/236061/2361145/236155, February 6, 2018
Case Digest on the second extension of Martial Law

FACTS:
On May 23, 2017 the President declared martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. On June 22, 2017, Congress extended the period of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas from July 23, 2017 until December 31, 2017, by
virtue of RBH No. 11.
On December 8, 2017, acting upon the recommendation of Defense Secretary Lorenza, the
President requested through a letter that Congress extend martial law from January 1, 2018 until
December 31, 2018. On December 13, 2017, Congress in a joint session adopted RBH No. 4 which
further extended the period of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas.
The extension was assailed by the consolidated petitions filed under Section 18(3), Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis for the extension of the period of martial
law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus?
2. Whether or not Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law
and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus?

RULING:
1. There is sufficient factual basis for the extension of the period of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The requisites of extension under
Section 18(3), Article VII of the Constitution are: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists;
and (b) public safety requires the extension. As to the first requisite, the word "persist"
means "to continue to exist," "to go on resolutely or stubbornly in spite of opposition,
importunity or warning," or to "carry on." The termination of armed combat in
Marawi does not conclusively indicate that the rebellion has ceased to exist. Modern
day rebellion has other facets than just the taking up of arms, including financing,
recruitment and propaganda, that may not necessarily be found or occurring in the
place of the armed conflict. Rebellion in Mindanao persists as the “remnants” of rebel
groups have been resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao,
carrying on through the recruitment and training of new members, financial and
logistical build-up, consolidation of forces and continued attacks. As to the second
requisite, the magnitude of the atrocities already perpetrated by these rebel groups
reveals their capacity to continue inflicting serious harm and injury, both to life
and property. The sinister plans of attack, as uncovered by the AFP, confirm this
real and imminent threat. Thereby, public safety requires the extension of the period of
martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

2. Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial and determine
the period of martial law and the suspension of the law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
clearly gave Congress the authority to decide on the duration of the extension. While
same provision did not specify the number of times that the Congress is allowed to
approve an extension of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the framers evidently gave enough flexibility on the part of the
Congress to determine the duration and frequency of the extension. Plain textual reading
of Section 18, Article VII and the records of the deliberation of the Constitutional
Commission buttress the view that as regards the frequency and duration of the
extension, the determinative factor is as long as "the invasion or rebellion persists
and public safety requires" such extension.
Maria Jesse Anne B. Gloria Law 4A

Lagman, et. Al. Vs. Medialdea, et. Al.

G.R. Nos. 243522/243677/243745/243797, February 19, 2019
Case Digest on the third extension of Martial Law

FACTS:
On May 23, 2017 the President declared martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. On June 22, 2017, Congress extended the period of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas from July 23, 2017 until December 31, 2017, by
virtue of RBH No. 11. It was again extended from January 1, 2018 until December 31, 2018 by
virtue of RBH No. 4.
On December 12, 2018, Congress in a joint session, adopted RBH No. 6, entitled
"Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao for another period of one (1) year from January 1,
2019 to December 31, 2019." This resolution is assailed by consolidated petitions filled under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.

ISSUES:
1. Whether there exists sufficient factual basis for the extension of martial law?
2. Whether or not the manner by which Congress approved the extension of martial law
is a political question and is not reviewable by the Court?

RULING:
1. The requirements of rebellion and public safety are present to uphold the extension of
martial law in the extension of martial law in Mindanao from January 1, 2019 to December
31, 2019.

Rebellion, within the context of the situation in Mindanao, encompasses no definite

time nor particular locality of actual war and continues even when actual fighting
has ceased. Recognizing the political realities in the country, the geography of
Mindanao, the increasing number of local and foreign sympathizers who provide
financial support, and the advances in technology that have emboldened and reinforced
the terrorists' and extremists' capabilities to disturb peace and order, the declaration
of martial law cannot be restricted only to areas where actual fighting continue to
occur. Meanwhile, the need of public safety is an issue whose existence, unlike the
existence of rebellion, is not verifiable through the visual or tactile sense. The
President is in a better position to determine the same.

2. The manner by which Congress approved the extension of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a political question that
is not reviewable by the Court.

No less than the Constitution, under Section 16 of Article VI, grants the Congress
the right to promulgate its own rules to govern its proceedings. Thi constitutionally-
vested authority is recognized as a grant of full discretionary authority to each House
of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As
such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and
interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the
power as will constitute a denial of due process.