CRIM 2 SD
By any person/s who, without public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or
Feb 8 2018
C2021
RIVERA v PEOPLE (2005)
Petitioner: Enrique Totoy Rivera Y De Guzman
Topic: Direct Assault (Art 148)
FACTS
- (March 93) Police Inspector Leygo (Deputy Chief of Police for Operation and
Patrol of the La Trinidad Police Station) and SPO1 Basquial came upon a truck
unloading sacks of chicken dung at the stall of accused Rivera.
- Leygo advised driver to stop unloading the manure as it violates La Trinidad Mun.
Ord. No. I-91 (Ex C) which prohibits the loading and unloading of chicken manure
along the sidewalks or road shoulders or within 15m from the center of Halsema
Highway in Trinidad, Benguet – driver complied and they escorted truck back to
Poblacion, La Trinidad
- Not long after, they were conducting patrols and found a truck doing the same thing
in the same place where they were earlier apprehended
- After a chase, Leygo asked Rivera why he insisted on defying the ban. Instead of
answering, he pointed a finger to the policeman and said: “Babalian kita ng buto”,
“Ilalampaso kita”, and “Pulis lang kayo”
- Leygo got a little angry = warned Rivera to stop uttering insults, told him to take it
easy, and informed him that he was being arrested for violating the dung ordinance
- Rivera removed his jacket, placed it inside the vehicle, assumed a fighting stance
and challenged the policeman – Leygo again warned him he was being arrested
- Rivera responded by punching Leygo in the face (on his lip) – they grappled – was
later subdued with the help of other policemen
- Rivera was pushed into police car but resisted until Castro (fellow chicken dung
dealer) went in car to accompany him
- Rivera’s version: Leygo was drunk and he was the one who directed insults toward
Rivera + slapped and punched him in the stomach
o “Ang tigas ng ulo mo. Sige, bumunot ka.” = you’re very stubborn. Go
ahead, draw your gun. (how it was translated in the case lol)
o pointing his left forefinger on Rivera’s face while his right hand was
poking a gun on him
- Leygo’s injury was described as a contusion with laceration to the left side of his
upper lip with a 5-7 day healing period
ISSUE:
W/N crime committed was direct assault.
- YES. Direct assault (crime against public order), may be committed in 2 ways:
1. By any person/s who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or
intimidation to attain any of the purposes enumerated in defining crimes of
rebellion and sedition
2.
seriously intimidate or resist person in authority or any of his agents, while
engaging in the performance of official duties, or on the occasion of such
performance.
- Petitioner’s case falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of
assault and is aggravated when:
a) assault is committed with a weapon
b) offender is a public officer/ employee
c) offender lays hand on person in authority
W/N Leygo was performing official duties when he was attacked
- YES. At time of assault, Leygo was wearing the designated police uniform, in a
police car, conducting a patrol when he came upon the truck unloading chicken
manure.
o Unloading of chicken dung was a violation of Mun. Ord. No. 1-91 = he
ordered driver to return from where he came
o But Rivera, in defiance of lawful order, commanded driver to return to the
place where the truck was first intercepted, and on being informed that the
same truck had returned, Leygo had every reason to assume it returned to
unload its cargo of chicken dung = had to stop it
- Obersvations of the Court: Demeanor of Rivera on the witness stand shows that
he’is the kind who is impatient with authority. His manner of answering questions
bespeaks of one who has trouble abiding with authority. He portrayed a very
aggressive manner and his answers were always on the defensive as if he had every
right in this world to do and say whatever he wanted to. Over all, he exuded an aura
of arrogance and defiance of authority.
HELD Petition DENIED
PANGAN v GATBALITE
G.R. No. 141718 | Jan. 21, 2005
Azcuna, J.
Group 2
FACTS
Petitioner, Benjamin Pangan, was indicted for simple seduction.
During the trial of the case, Atty. Eduardo Pineda, counsel for petitioner, submitted the
case for decision without offering any evidence, due to the petitioners constant absence at
hearings.
The petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was sentenced to serve a penalty of
two months and one day of arresto mayor.
The case was called for promulgation of the decision in the court of origin. Despite due
notice, counsel for the petitioner did not appear. Notice to petitioner was returned
unserved with the notation that he no longer resided at the given address. As a
consequence, he also failed to appear at the scheduled promulgation.
The petitioner was apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. Petitioner
filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City.
He impleaded as respondent the Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga.
Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that:
(a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in
five years under No. 3, Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and
(b) having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years,
his criminal liability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 [of the]
Revised Penal Code.
After his transfer to the City Jail of Angeles City, petitioner filed an Amended Petition with
the Regional Trial Court, impleading herein respondent Col. James D. Labordo, the Jail
Warden of Angeles City, as respondent.
In response, the Jail Warden alleged that petitioner’s detention was pursuant to the order of
commitment, issued by Marlon P. Roque, Clerk of Court III of the Municipal Trial Court of
Angeles City.
Respondent Judge rendered the decision, which is the subject of this present appeal, which
pronounced:
The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the petitioner that the penalty
imposed on him in the decision adverted to above had already prescribed, hence,
his detention is illegal for under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code
ISSUE
WON the penalty already prescribed – NO
RATIO
Petitioner claims that:
xxx the period for the computation of penalties under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code
begins to run from the moment the judgment of conviction becomes final and the
convict successfully evades, eludes, and dodges arrest for him to serve sentence.
Petitioner supports his claim based on the ruling of Infante vs. Warden. However, the court
held that the Infante ruling cannot be applied in this case because the ruling says that the
convict must escape from jail during the service of the sentence to be considered as an
evasion of one’s sentence.
Petitioner, however, disagrees because he claimed that if it were the intention of the law,
then the phrase “should evade the service of sentence” in Article 93 should have been written
as “should escape during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty”
The court claimed, the legislature wrote should evade the service of sentence to cover or
include convicts like him who, although convicted by final judgment, were never arrested or
apprehended by government for the service of their sentence. With all the powers of
government at its disposal, petitioner was able to successfully evade service of his 2 months
and 1 day jail sentence for at least nine (9) years. This is approximately 3 years and 5 months
longer than the 5-year prescriptive period of the penalty imposed on him.
The duty of government, therefore, to arrest petitioner and compel him to serve his sentence
began on August 9, 1991 (the date of the promulgation of his judgment of conviction). The
5-year prescriptive period of his arresto mayor penalty also began to run on that day
considering that no relief was taken therefrom. Since petitioner never gave himself up
[n]or was [he], until January 20, 2000, ever captured, for the service of his sentence nor
did he flee to some foreign country with which [our] government has no extradition
treaty, that 5-year prescriptive period of his penalty ran continuously from August 9,
1991 when his judgment of conviction was promulgated in absentia and was never
interrupted.
For reasons known only to it, however, government failed or neglected, for almost nine (9)
years, to arrest petitioner for the service of his arresto mayor sentence [which] should not be
taken against petitioner. He was able to successfully evade service of his sentence for a period
longer than the 5-year prescriptive period of his penalty and, as such, is entitled to total
extinction of his criminal liability.
To say, as was said in Infante, that the prescriptive period of the penalty never began to
run in favor of petitioner because he never escaped from jail during the service of his
sentence imposes a condition not written in the law. It also violates the basic principle that
the criminal statutes are construed liberally in favor of the accused and/or convict and is
contrary to the spirit behind or essence of statutes of limitations [and] prescription, in
criminal cases.
The Court pronounces that the prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised
Penal Code, applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are serving
sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty. The period for prescription of penalties
begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January
20, 2000 and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the term of his
service, the period for prescription never began.
 Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his sentence of two months and one
day of arresto mayor and should forthwith be released unless he is being detained for another
offense or charge.
People v Ponce de Leon
No. 34228 |December 31, 1931
Imperial, J.,
Group 3, Pajarito
Topic: Evasion of Service
FACTS:
1. Accused Miguel Ponce de Leon y Ballesteros (appellee) was charged for the
violation of a conditional pardon
2. March 13, 1923: Accused was charged with parricide
a. Penalty: Three years of banishment from within a radius of 25 km from
the Roman Catholic Church in Santa Ana
3. February 16, 1924: His Excellency the Governor-General pardoned him on
condition that he should never again be guilty of any misconduct
4. October 8, 1928: appellee violated Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code
for illegal possession of a number of cartridges and a clip for an automatic pistol,
and fined P25
5. June 7, 1930: Assistant Fiscal Albert prayed that after the proper investigation he
be compelled to serve the unexpired portion of the penalty of banishment
a. court said that they had no jurisdiction
b. the Government, represented by the Attorney-General, appealed
ISSUES:
I. W/N the decision is appealable
II. W/N the court had jurisdiction to order the appellee to serve the unexpired portion
of the penalty of banishment inasmuch as he had violated the condition of his pardon
RATIO:
I original sentence may be enforced against him
1. Act No. 1524 does not establish the right to appeal from the order or judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance denying or dismissing a petition for the
enforcement of said conditions. Appellee contends that the judgment from which
the Attorney-General has appealed is not open to such a recourse.
2. But section 44 of General Orders, No. 58 as amended by section 4 of Act No. 2886
recognizes the right of the Government to appeal from orders sustaining a demurrer
or dismissing a complaint or information. Inasmuch as the law cited above is silent
with reference to appeals by the State, we see no good reason why the general
provisions of section 44, General Orders, No. 58, should not also be applicable to
the order in question.
3. The ground upon which rests the principle prohibiting an appeal from a judgment
or order of acquittal, is that the accused is placed in double jeopardy of conviction
for one and the same offense. This fundamental reason does not exist in the present
case: the appellee was not placed in double jeopardy of conviction for one and
the same offense, for what the prosecution sought was that he be compelled to
serve out the unexpired portion of the penalty of banishment from which he
had been relieved by a conditional pardon. In case it is finally decided that he
must serve out the unexpired portion of the penalty of banishment, he is not
sentenced to a new penalty or found guilty of the same crime of which he was
convicted, but he is merely restored to the status in which he was before being
pardoned.
II
1. Section 4 of Act No. 1524 is applicable:
"SEC. 4. If the court shall find from said investigation that one or more of the conditions
of such pardon, hereto fore or hereafter 'granted, has been violated by the person so
pardoned, the court shall order the recommitment and confinement of such person.
In the proper prison f or the unexpired portion of his original sentence. Such order of the
court shall be sufficient authority to the custodian of any public prison designated therein
to receive and safely keep the body of the person so conditionally pardoned during the
unexpired portion of his original sentence."
2. It was argued that since the appellee could not be re-imprisoned because he had
been sentenced to banishment, the law was inapplicable and the court had no
jurisdiction to grant the fiscal's petition. The court does not agree. What is meant in
that section is that if the investigation shows that the accused has violated the
condition of the pardon, he shall be recommitted or confined with a view to serving
that portion of his sentence which has remained unextinguished on account of the
conditional pardon.
3. Us v. Ignacio:
a. When a pardoned person violates the conditions of his pardon, he is left in
the exact situation in which he was when the pardon was granted, and the
4. "If the condition of the pardon upon which the accused secures his release from
imprisonment has been violated by him, after his release, the pardon thereby
becomes void and the petitioner may be arrested and compelled to undergo so much
of the original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his release”
JUDGMENT:
 The accused is to serve the period of banishment to which he was sentenced and
which remained unextinguished by reason of the conditional pardon granted him

DISSENT:
1. Malcolm, J.: The case is legally non-appealable. No appeal lies from such a
judgment which, right or wrong, has the effect of an acquittal, and thus of placing
the accused in jeopardy. The law applicable to the enforcement of conditions made
by the Governor-General in granting pardons may be defective in phraseology, but
those defects may not be supplied by loose judicial amplification.