1.

Bisis ng Manggagawa v NLRC

Facts:

petitioner union1 struck on April 6, 1992 protesting issues ranging from unfair labor practices and
union busting allegedly committed by the private respondent.2 The union picketed the premises of
the private respondent at Bagumbayan and Longos in Quezon City; Angono and Antipolo in Rizal;
San Fernando, Pampanga and San Pedro, Laguna.

The strike hurt the private respondent. On April 8, 1992, it filed with the NLRC a petition for
injunction3 to stop the strike which it denounced as illegal.

On April 13, 1992, the NLRC heard the evidence of the company alone. The ex parte hearing started
at 2:30 p.m. where testimonial and documentary evidence were presented.4 Some thirty (30) minutes
later, an Ocular Inspection Report was submitted by an unnamed NLRC representative
Before the day was over, the respondent NLRC (First Division) issued a temporary restraining order
against the union

Held:

Strike has been considered the most effective weapon of labor in protecting the rights of
employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. It may be that in highly
developed countries, the significance of strike as a coercive weapon has shrunk in view of the
preference for more peaceful modes of settling labor disputes. In underdeveloped countries,
however, where the economic crunch continues to enfeeble the already marginalized working
class, the importance of the right to strike remains undiminished as indeed it has proved many
a time as the only coercive weapon that can correct abuses against labor. It remains as the
great equalizer.

In the Philippine milieu where social justice remains more as a rhetoric than a reality, labor has
vigilantly fought to safeguard the sanctity of the right to strike.

NLRC failed to comply with the letter and spirit of Article 218 (e), (4) and (5) of the Labor Code in
issuing its Order of May 5, 1992.
no less than Mr. Ronnie Mercado, the Assistant Manager for Operations of the Company, testified
that after the issuance of the ex parte temporary restraining order, the barricade blocking the gates
were removed and people were allowed free ingress and egress
Moreover, the records reveal the continuing misuse of unfair strategies to secure ex parte temporary
restraining orders against striking employees. Petitioner union did not receive any copy of private
respondent's petition for injunction in Case No. 000249-92 filed on April 8, 1992. Its address as
alleged by the private respondent turned out to be "erroneous". 15 Consequently, the petitioner was
denied the right to attend the hearing held on April 13, 1992 while the private respondent enjoyed a
field day presenting its evidence ex parte. On the basis of uncontested evidence, the public
respondent, on the same day April 13, 1992, temporarily enjoined the petitioner from committing
certain alleged illegal acts. Again, a copy of the Order was sent to the wrong address of the
petitioner. Knowledge of the Order came to the petitioner only when its striking members read it after
it was posted at the struck areas of the private respondent.

2. SSS employees v CA 175 SCRA 686

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands
concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages
with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike.
The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for
preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error
in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the
National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS
contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and
regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore
the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides
guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities
such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular
No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by
Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation
allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government
employees” and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original
charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and
are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction
in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the
issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

3. 7 SCRA 826 or 86 Baker v SSS

Facts:
- Zamora is an employee of Baker. Baker company ceased its operation for a period of
time. Zamora was not able to render service during such period. He then went on sick
leave without pay until his death
 - When his family was processing his death claim, they learned that the company did not
pay the premiums for the period in which he did not render service.

Held:

- payment of contributions by an employer is compulsory during its coverage, and in accordance with
the provisions of Section 9 of the Social Security Act, coverage is determined solely by the existence
of an employer-employee relationship. While an employee is on leave, even without pay, he is still
an employee of his employer, their contract of employment has not yet terminated. So much so
that the employee may still return to work and the employer is still bound to accept him. His
responsibility as an employee still exists. He is still entitled to the benefits of the System when he
returns. Consequently, his employer is still liable to pay his contributions to the Commission on
account of its employee who is on leave without pay." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

- Neither does the absence of compensation for the employee for a particular month militate against
the adoption of a theoretical salary upon which the premium contributions are to be based. In such
cases, this Commission has adopted the policy that where an employee does not earn any
compensation for a particular month, the basis for his premium contributions shall be the salary for
the month immediately preceding the wageless month or, in case of a variable wage earner, then, it
shall be his daily rate of compensation multiplied by the number of days in which he would have
worked for that wageless month (Circular Nos. 21 and 24). The adoption of such a theoretical salary
is justified on the ground that during the period when the employer-employee relationship subsists,
there is a legal obligation to remit premium contributions to the System for the benefit of the
employee." cralaw vi rt ua1aw lib rary

- The obligation of the employer to contribute its share of the premiums to the Social Security System
is effective during the existence of the employer-employee relationship. The time when an
employee may not be actually receiving compensation, as when he is on sick leave without pay, is
not excepted.
- The provision of the Social Security Act should be liberally construed in favor of those seeking its
benefits.

4. Jimenez v Republic 109 Phil 273

FACTS:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed a complaint praying of a decree annulling his marriage with
Remedios Canizares. He claimed that the orifice of her genitals was too small to allow the
penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation. He also claimed that the condition of her
genitals existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist. The wife was summoned and
served with a copy of the complaint but she did not file an answer. The court entered an order
requiring defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to
determine her physical capacity for copulation. Defendant did not submit herself to the
examination and the court entered a decree annulling the marriage. The City Attorney filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, among the grounds that the defendant’s impotency has not been
satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had not been physically examined
because she refused to be examined.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife is impotent.
HELD:
The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in
question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give
testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks.
Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established
because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein.
Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on
her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence
could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy
and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority.
A physical examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She is not charged with any
offense . She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself.
“Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in
favor of potency.” The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of
sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as
husband and wife.

Ruling: The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.

5. Garcia v FA or Faculty Loyola School Committee 68 SCRA 277

FACTS:
Nov. 28, 1975
 Epicharis T. Garcia
 The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology (Fr. Antonio B. Lambino)
1. Petitioner has been barred from being allowed re-admission into the respondent school,
which is a seminary for the priesthood in collaboration with the Ateneo de Manila
University. Petitioner was taking her studies leading to an M.A. in Theology at the time,
but was no longer allowed to enroll in the Academic Year of 1975-1976. 

2. Petitioner contends that the reason behind the respondent’s refusal to re-admit her (as
stated in a letter from the respondent), which is due to the fact that her frequent
questions and difficulties that were slowing down the progress of the class, does not
constitute valid legal ground for expulsion for they neither present any violation of any
of the school’s regulation, nor are they indicative of gross misconduct. She was advised
to enroll in the University of Santo Tomas Graduate School (Ecclesiastical Faculty),
where she will have to take up Philosophy (4-5 years, compared to 2 years in Ateneo)
before she will be allowed to take Theology. She was, however, allowed to take some
 courses for credit, free of charge, during the summer sessions of the respondent school
in 1975, but was not acknowledged to be enrolled in any degree program. 

3. Petitioner then filed for a writ of Mandamus to compel the respondent to allow her
admission. 

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the petitioner is deemed to possess a right to be respected by the respondent
in terms being denied re-admission? 

2. Whether the Faculty Admission Committee had to authority to bar the petitioner from
continuing her studies in their institution? 

RULE/S:
ARTICLE XIV
 SEC. 1 The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all.
SEC. 5 (2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
ANALYSIS:
1. Due to the fact that the respondent school the petitioner was enrolling to was a seminary for
priesthood and for men, the most she could claim for is a privilege, and not a right.
Furthermore, she was admittedly enrolling into a course that was not for the priesthood.
Besides, even if, for the sake of argument, she was qualified to study for the priesthood, there
is still no duty on the part of the respondent to admit her for the discretion to accept or reject
qualified applicants still lies on the respondent school.
2. Also, taking into consideration Sec. 5 of Art. XIV, the aforementioned discretion is backed by
the Constitution.
CONCLUSION:
Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

6. Roe v Wade 1973

Statement of the Facts:

Texas Resident, Jane Roe, wanted to terminate her pregnancy. However, Article 1196
of the Texas Penal Code limited abortions to circumstances when “procured or
attempted by medical advice for the purposes of saving the life of the
mother.” Claiming the statute unconstitutionally restricted her right to an abortion,
Roe sued Texas official Wade in court.
Procedural History:
The Federal District Court issued declaratory relief and held that the statute was both
vague and overbroad. When Roe was not granted Injunctive relief, she appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
Issue and Holding:
Is a woman’s right to have an abortion protected under the constitutional right to
privacy? Yes.
Judgment:
Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion that the Texas law was unconstitutional and a
woman’s right to an abortion is protected under the constitutional right to privacy.
Reasoning:
Criminal abortion laws were enacted for three main reasons:
 To discourage illicit sexual conduct
 To protect pregnant woman against hazardous abortion procedures
 To preserve the state’s interest in protecting the sanctity of life
The court held the first reason, though traditional, is not seriously considered by the
courts. The second reason is outdated due to modern medical techniques. The court
held the third reason of protecting prenatal life is partially negated after considering
that a pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of an abortion.
In reaching a decision, the Court acknowledged that a woman’s right to an abortion is
covered under the fundamental right to privacy and how each fundamental right is
subject to strict scrutiny (regulation must be justified by a compelling state interest and
legislation must be narrowly tailored to further the stated interest). However, although
a woman’s privacy right outweighs any state interest during the early stages of
pregnancy, the state interest in protecting both the mother and unborn fetus grows
throughout the pregnancy.
The Court ultimately decided that prior to completion of the first trimester, a woman
may have an abortion and electing to do so may not be criminalized.
After the first trimester, the state may regulate abortion in a manner reasonably related
to the mother’s health because the state has an interest in preserving the health of the
mother.
The remainder of the pregnancy after the fetus reaches viability, the state may regulate
or prevent abortion unless such procedure is vital to protect the mother’s life. This
authority is based on the state’s interest to protect the life of the unborn child.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:
Under the constitution, the right to privacy protects a woman’s right to have an
abortion. The state may regulate abortions after the first trimester and may be
prohibited once the fetus reached viability. Exceptions are made when the life of the
mother is in jeopardy.

7. Marina v CA 1948 or 1998

Facts:
- MARINA is a corporation engaged in real estate development. Among its project is a
condominium complex. CARLOS is its principal contractor and as an incentive, it was
allowed to purchase a condo unit.
- After paying more than half of the purchase price, CARLOS demanded the delivery of
the unit but MARINA refused due to CARLOS’ abandonment of the construction and
subsequently cancelled the contract.
- CARLOS filed a case with the HLURB

Held:
- MARINA's cancellation of the Contract To Buy and To Sell was clearly illegal. Prior to
MARINA's unilateral act of rescission, H.L. CARLOS had already paid P1,810,330.70, or
more than 50% of the contract price of P3,614,000.00. Moreover, the sum H.L. CARLOS had
disbursed amounted to more than the total of 24 installments, i.e., two years' worth of
installments computed at a monthly installment rate of P67,024.22, inclusive of the
downpayment.
- among the requirements of R.A. No. 6552, 23 in order to effect the cancellation of a contract,
a notarial cancellation must first be had. 24 Therefore, absent this, MARINA's cancellation of
its contract with H.L. CARLOS was void.
- the award of P30,000.00 as actual damages for unearned monthly rental income starting
from March 1990 until the delivery of the property to H.L. CARLOS was arbitrary. Article
2199 of the Civil Code provides that one is entitled to adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as is duly proved. 18 Actual damages, to be recoverable, must
not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty. 19 Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining
the fact and amount of damages. 20 As the Court of Appeals correctly found here that no
proof was submitted by H.L. CARLOS to substantiate the recovery of actual damages in the
form of monthly rentals, the deletion of such award was but appropriate.

8. In re: Arguisino 246 SCRA 14

FACTS:

On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan stemmed from the affliction of
severe physical injuries uponhim in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation
rites. On February 11, 1993, the accused were consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period
ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.Eleven (11) days later, Mr.
Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The application was
granted on June 18 1993. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's
initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him. Less than a month later, Argosino filed a
petition to take the bar exam. He was allowed and he passed the exam, but was not allowed to take the
lawyer's oath of office.On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath
and be admitted to the practice of law. He averred that his probation period had been terminated. It is noted
that his probation period did not last for more than 10 months.

ISSUE:

Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be admitted to the practice of law

HELD:

Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those who are seeking admission to the bar. He should
show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of
the deceased student and to the community at large. In short, he mustshow evidence that he is a different
person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the profession of law.
He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names of the parents
or brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice.

9. Estanos v Philippine Government

10. Reyes v Bagatsing 125 SCRA 553

FACTS:
Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City
of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting
from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once
there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. There was likewise an
assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all
the necessary steps would be taken by it “to ensure a peaceful march and rally.” Petitioner filed suit for
mandamus unaware that permit was denied, because it was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusal
of permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing
such permit at this time and at the place applied for.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of permit for the conduct peaceable assembly to the gates of U.S. Embassy may
be validly enforced.
HELD:
NO. Mandatory injunction prayed was granted.
RATIO:
[T]he Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful
assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: “No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the Government for redress of grievances.”. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence
of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace
rally would start. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the US
Embassy, hardly two block-away at the Roxas Boulevard.
There is merit to the observation that except as to the novel aspects of a litigation, the judgment must be
confined within the limits of previous decisions. The law declared on past occasions is, on the whole, a safe
guide, So it has been here. While the General rule is that a permit should recognize the right of the
applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice, another place may be designated by the
licensing authority if it be shown that there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such
change were made.
By way of a summary The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority
of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed
well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections
to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place.

11. De Lima v Guerrero 229 SCRA 781 GR 229781

Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule and direct resort to this Court were allowed
in some instances. These exceptions were summarized in a case of recent vintage, Aala v. Uy, as
follows:

In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the following grounds are
present: (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately;
(2) when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6)
when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain,
speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that
may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the
order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was considered as an
inappropriate remedy.51

Unfortunately, none of these exceptions were sufficiently established in the present petition so as to
convince this court to brush aside the rules on the hierarchy of courts.

Petitioner's allegation that her case has sparked national and international interest is obviously not
covered by the exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of courts. The notoriety of a case, without more,
is not and will not be a reason for this Court's decisions. Neither will this Court be swayed to relax its
rules on the bare fact that the petitioner belongs to the minority party in the present administration. A
primary hallmark of an independent judiciary is its political neutrality. This Court is thus loath to
perceive and consider the issues before it through the warped prisms of political partisanships.

12. People v Ramos 39 or 89 SCRA 236

 13. GR 78742 1989

Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious challenges
to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential
Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia
of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that
no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They
contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is
traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in
Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision
that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing
rules required under the above-quoted decree.

Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain

Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent
domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same
subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the
public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals.
The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the
power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable
taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe
retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation,
it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of
the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain
for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the
physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor
of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the
power of eminent domain
JANUARY 30, 2020

1. Valmores v Achacosok (freedom of religion)

Facts:
- Valmores is enrolled in the college of medicine of MSU and is also a member of Seventh
day adventist which prevents its members to attend in any non-religious activity during
Saturdays. At the start of semester, he requested to be excused for any school activity
which would fall on a Saturday.
- One exam however fell on a Saturday which he was not able to take and was not given a
special exam despite formal letters from him and their religious leader. As a result, he
was given a failing grade.
- Valmores addressed the matter to CHED, but his request was still ignored. The school
posits that there were students before him who are members of the same religion who
were able to graduate without any problem.
Held:
- In a nutshell, the Constitution guarantees the freedom to believe absolutely, while the
freedom to act based on belief is subject to regulation by the State when necessary to
protect the rights of others and in the interest of public welfare. 45
- In the 2010 CHED Memorandum, the CHED laid down guidelines for the exemption of
teachers, personnel, and students from participating in school or related activities due
to compliance with religious obligations and giving them remedial courses thereby.
- The enforcement of the 2010 CHED Memorandum is compellable by writ of mandamus

2. People vs Fabillar; 68 Phil 584 (1939)

Facts:
- Director of the National Library issued a certificate to the accused, then a parish priest
of the Independent Church in Capiz, wherein he was authorized to solemnize marriages
within the jurisdiction. The accused has never renewed this authorization after its
expiration on May 1, 1936. On 1936, he solemnized the marriages mentioned in the
informations.
- It seems to be the contention of the appellant that, under the above provisions, as far
as the authority to solemnize marriages is concerned, the authorization, once issued,
continues in force and that the requirement for its renewal is intended solely for
revenue purposes.
Held:
- The duty conferred to the national library is not one of inquiry into the organization or
doctrine of a particular church or religion, but a duty to distinguish and discriminate
between a legitimately established religion or church and one that pretends to be as
such, as a prerequisite to the issuance of a certificate of authority. The law, therefore, in
no sense prohibits nor impairs the free exercise of any religion. On the contrary, it
purports to protect every legitimately established religion from the imposture of pseudo
or spurious religious organizations which ostensibly appear to be dedicated to the
 practice of religion and the exercise of particular faith but which in reality are mere
marriage agencies.

3. Ebralinag v Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu 1995

FACTS: School authorities in Cebu expelled students who did not salute to the flag
and did not recite the National Anthem pursuant to RA 1265 which makes the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. The students who were
expelled belonged in a religious group, Jehova’s Witness, wherein they believed
that according to their bible, to salute any form of symbol is a forbidden act by
their god and that their non-compliance showed devotion to their god. They also
said that their non-compliance was not a sign of disrespect to the flag or the
country; and that their love for their country is shown in many gestures such as
being law abiding citizens, paying their taxes and not inciting any anti-
government acts. The respondents contend that they have the responsibility to
teach the students the values of nationalism and patriotism which would shape
them to be productive members of the society.

The respondents seeks reconsideration of the SC’s decision annulling the expulsion
orders made by the school.

ISSUE: Whether or not the compulsory flag salute and the expulsion of the children
was unconstitutional.

HELD: Yes. It violates the Free Exercise Clause. It prohibits and denies the children
of their religious belief as well as their right to basic education.

4. De Lima v Gatdula

FACTS:
- Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo De Lima “to cease and
desist from framing up Gatdula for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of
Frustrated Murder against him in relation to the alleged ambush incident.”
- Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons
and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer.
- The case was set for hearing and proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case,
even without a Return nor an Answer, and ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda.
- The RTC rendered a “Decision” granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo, and the
interim reliefs prayed for.
- Petitioners thus came to this Court assailing the RTC “Decision” through a Petition for
Review on Certiorari via Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Petition for Review under Rule 45 is the proper remedy in this case. No, but in
the interest of justice it was allowed.

RULING:
- The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to
safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987
Constitution. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme
Court’s power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.
- Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was
devised to afford swift but decisive relief.
- The insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as
the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The
requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a
speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are
threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge
Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.
- The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that petitioners
used in elevating the matter to this Court.
In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in order to
promote a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
The rules can be suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property, (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4)
a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

In the interest of justice, the Court RESOLVES to NULLIFY all orders that are the subject of this
Resolution issued by Judge Pampilo, and DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within 48 hours
from his receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the
basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.

5. Castillo v Cruz

CASTILLO vs. CRUZ, G.R. No. 182165, November 25, 2009, En Banc
Facts:
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses
Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to
vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the
Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects.
Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the property. The pertinent
case among the filed cases was the issuance by the MTC an alias Writ of Demolition in favor of
the Province. Respondents filed a motion for TRO in the RTC, which was granted. However, the
demolition was already implemented before the TRO issuance.
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were
deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R.
Mendoza instructing him to “protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property,”
entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the
RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved
petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for
Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Issue:
WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights; and,
WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case already filed.
Held:
On the 1st issue:
Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the
writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not
only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
It is not a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ
that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.”
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an
unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute
between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between
the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and security, the Court
will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property.
It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or
continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations of petitioners will not suffice
to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention
was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their
arrest.

6. Ordoñez vs Vinarao; 239 Scra 114 (1994)

This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed directly before this Court in behalf of Oscar
de Guzman y Enriquez, who was tried and convicted by the Regional Trial Court of San Jose
City — Branch 39 in G.R. No. 76742, "People of the Philippines v. Oscar de Guzman y
Enriquez," 188 SCRA 407 (G.R. No. 76742. August 7, 1990), for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, alleging in particular the fact that de Guzman wilfully and unlawfully sold two
(2) sticks of marijuana.

Upon review by SC, the trial court's decision sentencing de Guzman to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment plus payment of P20,000 fine and costs was affirmed in toto and the appeal
was dismissed with costs against accused-appellant.
Under the provisions of Sec. 20, R.A. 6425 as last amended by R.A. 7659, which became
effective on December 31, 1993, and as interpreted by this Court in the case of Peoplev.
Simon, if the quantity of the marijuana involved is less than
250 grams, the imposable penalty, in the event that the
conviction should be affirmed, shall be within the range
of prision correccional (from six (6) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years). Clearly, de Guzman is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty
introduced by the new law.

Petitioners allege that since de Guzman has been serving sentence since July 1984 or
for more than ten (10) years now , his continued detention in the National
Penitentiary is a violation of his basic human rights and that, therefore, he
should be released from prison without further delay. In aid of judicial
administration, petitioners further recommend that all prisoners similarly situated be likewise
released from prison.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty upon a verified petition setting forth:

1. that the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of
his liberty;
2. the officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained;
3. the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and

4. a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person (Sec. 3, Rule 102,
Revised Rules of Court).

It appearing that all the above requirements have been met and finding merit in the petition, the
same is hereby GRANTED. Let a writ of habeas corpus issue immediately.

The Director, New Bilibid Prisons, is commanded to forthwith execute the writ for de
Guzman's discharge from confinement unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause,
to make due return of the writ, and to submit a complete inventory of all other prisoners therein
similarly situated within thirty days, to relieve them from further confinement. With costs de
oficio. SO ORDERED.

7. EPZA vs. Commission on Human Rights G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992
Facts:
 - EPZA purchased a land from Filoil Refinery Corporation, and before possession of the
area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products
therein without permission from EPZA. EPZA paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to
those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims.
- Ten years later, respondent Teresita, Loreto and Pedro, filed in the respondent Commission
on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint praying for "justice and other reliefs and
remedies". Alleged in their complaint was the information that EPZA bulldozed the area
with acts in violation of their human rights. CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding
EPZA to desist from committing such acts
- A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued by the court ordering the CHR to cease and
desist from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders.
- CHR asked for the immediate lifting of the restraining order contending that it’s principal
function "is not limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among others to
provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights
have been violated.

Issue:

WON CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against
supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing
the acts complained of.

Held:

- NO. “The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power
is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking.
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and
legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would
have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is
never derived by implication.

- The "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the
CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the
writ.