I.

Rules of Special Proceeding

Rule 72: Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules

Meaning and Scope of Special Proceedings

Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 12924216 January 2001

Facts:

Troadio Manalo died on February 1992 and was survived by his Pilar and his 11 children.
The Troadio left several real properties in Manila and a business in Tarlac. In November
1992, 8 of the surviving children of Troadio filed a petition with RTC for the judicial
settlement of the estate of their father and for appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as
its administrator. On the date of the hearing, the trial court issued an order declaring the
world in default, except the government and set the reception of evidence of the children. On
motion of Pilar vda. de Manalo, et al., the order of general default was set aside. However,
the trial court only admitted the opposition of Pilar, et al. only for the purpose of considering
its merits and denied most of the relief she sought.

Pilar, et al. filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, alleging that there was
absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family.
According to them, the petition is an ordinary civil action involving members of the same
family hence the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules
of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that
a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with. The CA, denied the
petition.

Issue:

Whether the case is in the nature of an ordinary civil action involving members of the same
family.

Whether Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable to special proceeding cases.

Ruling:

No, the case is in the nature of a special proceeding. It is a fundamental rule that in the
determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the
relief sought in the complaint or petition shall be controlling. The said petition contains
sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased
person such as the fact of death of Troadio, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at
the time of his said death. The facts of death of the decedent and of his residence within the
country are foundational facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest. It also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal
heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by Troadio which are sought to be settled
in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no
room for doubt as regard the intention of the children to seek judicial settlement of the estate
of their deceased father, Troadio. Although, it contains certain averments which may be
typical of an ordinary civil action, Pilar, et al. may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the
essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The rule has always
been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an
action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defences contained in
the answer.

No, Article 151 of the Family Code which provides that: "No suit shall be filed or maintained
between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed" is applicable only to ordinary
civil actions and NOT WITH SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. This is clear from the term 'suit'
that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of
justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of
an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an
action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong
Natcher v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 133000 02 October 2001

Facts:

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of
land. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, entered
into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate adjudicating and dividing among
themselves the real property where Graciano received 8/14 of the property and his children
1/14 each. In 1980, Graciano married Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold
a parcel of land covered TCT No. 107443 to his wife Natcher. In 1985, Graciano died leaving
his second wife Natcher and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs. Graciano’s
children filed a civil case against Natcher before the RTC alleging that upon Graciano's
death, Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired
TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in favor of
Natcher resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT No.
186059 in the name of Natcher. Similarly, Graciano’s children alleged in said complaint that
as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.

The RTC ruled that the deed of sale executed by Graciano in favor of Natcher was invalid as
it is prohibited by law; that it cannot constitute a valid donation but that the same may be an
extension of advance inheritance. On appeal, however, the CA ruled that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to distribute the estate of Graciano

Issue:

Whether an RTC, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance

annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the
decedent to any of the heirs.

Ruling:

No. An ordinary civil action and a special civil action may be differentiated as follows: 1. An
ordinary civil action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law, whereas a special civil action is a formal demand of
one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law; and 2. An
ordinary civil action is a method of applying legal remedies according to definite established
rules, whereas in special proceedings no formal pleadings are required unless the statute
expressly so provides - the remedy being granted generally upon an application or motion.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is an ordinary civil action,
whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement
of property made by the Graciano, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Thus, under
Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to
have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir. In the case at hand, RTC is acting
in its general jurisdiction and is devoid of authority to render adjudication and resolve the
issue of advancement of the real property in favor of Natcher. Moreover, the RTC was not
properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement
made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, Natcher.
Nature of Special Proceedings

Tabuada v. Ruiz
G.R. No. 168799 27 June 2008

Facts:

In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of Jose and Pacencia Caliman, the
trial court issued the following Order:

In view of the strong manifestation of the parties herein and their respective counsel
that they will be able to raise an amicable settlement, finally, on or before 25
December 2004, the Court will no longer be setting the pending incidents for hearing
as the parties and their counsel have assured this Court that they are going to submit
a “Motion for Judgment Based on an Amicable Settlement” on or before 25
December 2004.

The RTC, invoking Section 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court, terminated the proceedings on
account of the parties’ failure to submit the amicable settlement and to comply with its Order.

Issue: Whether the termination of the case premature.

Ruling:

Yes, the termination of the case was premature. While a compromise agreement or an
amicable settlement is very strongly encouraged, the failure to consummate one does not
warrant any procedural sanction, much less provide an authority for the court to jettison the
case. The case should not have been terminated or dismissed by the trial court on account of
the mere failure of the parties to submit the promised amicable settlement and/or the Motion
for Judgment Based on an Amicable Settlement. Given the non-contentious nature of special
proceedings, which do not depend on the will of an actor, but on a state or condition of things
or persons not entirely within the control of the parties interested, its dismissal should be
ordered only in extreme cases where the termination of the proceeding is the sole remedy
consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the parties therein.

The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes the motu propio dismissal of a case
if the plaintiff fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court, cannot even be used to
justify the convenient, though erroneous, termination of the proceedings herein. The RTC, in
its Order, neither required the submission of the amicable settlement or the aforesaid Motion
for Judgment, nor warned the parties that should they fail to submit the compromise within
the given period, their case would be dismissed. Hence, it cannot be categorized as an order
requiring compliance to the extent that its defiance becomes an affront to the court and the
rules. Even if it were worded in coercive language, the parties cannot be forced to comply,
for, as aforesaid, they are only strongly encouraged, but are not obligated, to consummate a
compromise. An order requiring submission of an amicable settlement does not find support
in our jurisprudence and is premised on an erroneous interpretation and application of the law
and rules.
Applicability of Rules of Civil Action

Hilado v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 164108 08 May 2009

Facts:

Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration for the
Intestate Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto before the RTC. The case was raffled to Judge Amor
Reyes, in whose court such a petition was approved. Alfred Hilado, et al. on the other hand,
filed a civil case against the estate of Roberto. Hilado, et al. then filed with the RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all
processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. The RTC denied the
manifestation/motion, on the ground that Hilado, et al. are not interested parties within the
contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. Hilado, et al.
then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that the
RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.

Issue:

Whether Hilado, et al. have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the deceased
Benedicto.

Ruling:

No, Hilado, et al. does not have a right to intervene. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor “has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court…” While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude Hilado, et al.
from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal
interest required of an intervenor “must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not
simply contingent and expectant.”

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil
Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates
of deceased persons falls within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court, not
the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that “in the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable to special proceedings.” It can readily be concluded that notwithstanding Section 2
of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent
whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of “intervention” under Rule 19
simply does not accommodate contingent claims.
 II. Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons

Rule 73: Venue and Process

Venue and Meaning of Residence

Eusebio vs. Eusebio

December 28, 1956

FACTS: Andres Eusebio, the decedent, resided in San Fernando, Pampanga for 70 years. In
1952, he bought a house in Quezon City where his belongings were transferred, while he is
supposed to be treated for a heart ailment. Soon thereafter, the decedent suffered a stroke and
was brought to the UST Hospital. He died later.

His son, Eugenio, filed with the CFI of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator
of the estate of his father. According to his petition, Andres died on November 28, 1952,
residing in the City of Quezon.

Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said
petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying therefore, that the case be dismissed for
improper venue.

LAW
Rule 75, Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.- ...in the CFI in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death...

ISSUE
Where is the residence of Andres?

HELD
Andres was residing in San Fernando, Pampanga, hence the venue was improperly laid.

The domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando, where he resided for over 70 years.
The presumption is that he retained such domicile, and hence, residence, in the absence of
satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that “a domicile once acquired is
retained until a new domicile is gained”.

If Andres established another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the
following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2)
physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently. There is
no direct evidence of Andres’s intention to stay, neither does he appear to have manifested
his wish to indefinitely in QC. Besides, it is well settled that “domicile is not commonly
changed by presence in a place merely for one’s own health, even if coupled with knowledge
that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home.
Garcia vs. Fule
November 29, 1976

FACTS
Virginia Fule, filed with the CFI of Laguna at Calamba, a petition for letters of
administration, alleging, inter alia, that Amado (the decedent) is a property owner of
Calamba, Laguna, and that Amado was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First
District of Laguna and that his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna. This was
opposed by Preciosa Garcia, the spouse of the decedent, questioning, among others authority
of CFI Calamba. Preciosa alleges that Amado was residing at Quezon City at the time he
died, hence the venue was improperly laid.

LAW
Section 1, Rule 73...in the CFI in the province in which he resides at the time of his death...

ISSUE
Where is the proper venue of the petition?

HELD
The proper venue is in Quezon City.

The term “resides” in Section 1, Rule 73, refers to actual residence as distinguished from
legal residence or domicile. “Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person.

Cuenco vs. CA
October 26, 1973

FACTS
The decedent is Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco. He was survived by his widow and their two
minor children, residing in Quezon City, and his children by the first marriage including
Lourdes Cuenco, residing in Cebu.

Lourdes filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the CFI of Cebu, alleging, inter
alia, that the Senator died intestate and that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
His widow (petitioner) also filed a Petition with the CFI of Rizal (Quezon City) for the
probate of the deceased’s last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary
in her favor.

Having learned of the intestate proceeding in Cebu, Lourdes filed an Opposition thereto. The
Cebu Court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution until after the CFI of QC shall
have acted on the petition for probate.

ISSUE
Which court has jurisdiction?

HELD
Either court has jurisdiction since the decedent manifested in his will that he has two
residences. But since the QC court was already given deference and consent of the Cebu
court, then the QC court should assume jurisdiction.
The residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter but merely of venue.

The court with whom the petition is first filed, may upon learning that a petition for probate
of the decedent’s last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously
had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and
that the allegation of the intestate petition may actually be false, may decline to take
cognizance of the petition and hold the petition in abeyance, and instead defer to the second
court.

San Luis vs. San Luis

February 6, 2007

FACTS
The decedent is Felicisimo San Luis. He was a governor of the Province of Laguna. He was
survived by his third wife (Felicidad), a son in his second marriage, and six children by his
first marriage. His wife filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC of Makati
City. She alleges, among others, that Felicisimo was residing at Alabang, Metro Manila. One
of the children of Felicisimo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue,
among others. He claims that Laguna was his father’s place of residence prior to death.

ISSUE
Where is the proper venue?

HELD
RTC Makati is the proper venue.

There is a distinction between “residence” for purposes of election laws and “residence” for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, residence and domicile are treated
as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has
intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue, the residence of person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. Hence it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and
domicile in another.
Limited Jurisdiction of Probate Court
GR 144915 (February 23, 2004)
Camaya v Patulandon

FACTS: Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein she devised, among
others, a lot to her grandson Mangulabnan. During her lifetime, she filed a petition for the
probate of her will which was admitted to probate. Later on, the she executed a codicil
modifying the part pertaining to the subject lot by giving said lot to her 4 children and to
Mangulabnan (1/5 each). Mangulabnan sought the delivery of the lot but Patulandong (the
executor) refused on account of the codicil.

Mangulabnan thus filed an "action for partition" against Patulandong (partition case). The
court ordered partition without prejudice to the probate of the codicil. On the other hand,
Patulandong filed a petition for the probate of the codicil. Mangulabnan later on sold the
subject lot to the herein petitioners Camayas.

The probate court ordered the cancellation of the TCT in the name of Mangulabnan and the
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Camayas. The court also ordered the Register of Deeds
to issue TCTs to the 4 children and to Mangulabnan.

ISSUE: W/N the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null and void and
ordered the cancellation of the TCTs of petitioners and the deed of sale

HELD: YES, probate court exceeded its jurisdiction.

It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute,
well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title
because the probate court cannot do so.

In this case, having been apprised of the fact that the lot in question was in the possession of
third parties and more important, covered by a TCT issued in the name of such third parties,
the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no
authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. The
probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared the deed of sale and the titles
of petitioners null and void, it having had the effect of depriving them possession and
ownership of the property.

Moreover, Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree provides:

SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law,

GR 127920 (August 9, 2005)

Pacioles v Chuatoco-Ching

FACTS: Both Pacioles (husband) and Emmanuel Ching (brother, nominated by the mother-
respondent Ching) were appointed as joint regular administrator of the estate. Pacioles filed
with the intestate court an omnibus motion praying, among others, that an Order be issued
directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the
declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees. Ching opposed Pacioles’ motion on the
ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is "premature and precipitate,"
considering that there is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the
inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture." Ching claimed that she
owns the bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an "heir and co-owner." The intestate court allowed the
payment of the estate taxes and attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and
distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." Pacioles filed a petition for
certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the probate court in exercising its
prerogative to schedule a hearing to inquire into the propriety of Ching’s claim, is being
extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is not tainted with
of grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: W/N a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of
ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate

HELD: GR: NO, the probate court has no jurisdiction.

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate
court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will
of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises
special and limited jurisdiction. A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that
an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its
purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such
situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional.

The CA relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate
court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said
principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing
and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property
should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose
of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory
and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered to be
hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to
the low valuation placed on the real estate properties.

And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the settlement

of Miguelita’s estate, did not submit his own inventory. He could have
submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those properties which
respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit
one shows that he acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory.

Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of
what properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted something
else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership
over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate. Clearly, the RTC, acting as an
intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that when
a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased
person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such
question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The
intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.
Respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction.

GR 167405 (February 16, 2006)

Reyes v Sotero

FACTS: Chichioco, claiming to be the niece and heir of the deceased, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising.
According to her, the deceased left real properties and assorted pieces of jewelry and money
which were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes (petitioner), a
grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco prayed that she be appointed administrator of the
estate. Reyes filed an Opposition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the
latter’s husband. She asserted that the petition should be dismissed and that the appointment
of an administrator was unnecessary, since she was the only heir of Lising. She submitted a
certification from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree was registered
therein and also a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a certification issued by the clerk of
court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City. Chichioco
filed a criminal complaint against Reyes for falsification of the adoption decree which was
ultimately dismissed by the DOJ.

The RTC appointed its branch clerk of court as the special administrator and enjoined Reyes
from conducting business activity in any of the properties left by the decedent. In a special
civil action for certiorari, the CA reversed the appointment of the special administrator but
held that it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed
adopted by the Delos Santos spouses since, according to the appellate court, "imputations of
irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt."

ISSUE: W/N the validity of an adoption decree can be assailed in a proceeding for the
settlement of estate

HELD: NO, it cannot be assailed in a proceeding for the settlement of estate.

The certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of
petitioner’s adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are
prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the
fact of petitioner’s adoption until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere
"imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since
the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.

In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in a
separate action brought principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. The
latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate,
as categorically held in Santos v. Aranzanso. Accordingly, respondents cannot assail in these
proceedings the validity of the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner’s claim that she is
the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical pronouncement in an appropriate
proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the certifications regarding the matter, as well
as the facts stated therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioner’s status
as an adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted and no serious challenge has been
brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for as long as petitioner’s adoption is
considered valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedent’s estate.

Exceptions to Limited Jurisdiction

GR L-27082 (January 31, 1978)

Coca v Borromeo

FACTS: A special proceeding was instituted for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouses. There are 3 sets of heirs: Heirs or Francisco, Prima and Concepcion. The
administrator (Coca) presented a project of partition for with a combined area of 22 hectares
(Atty-3, Francisco-5.3, Prima-6.3, Concepcion-7.3). The Heirs of Francisco opposed the
project partition claiming 12.6 ha, that Prima shall be excluded because she sold her share to
Francisco and Concepcion shall have 6.3 ha. The lower court, after noting that no separate
action had been filed to determine the ownership of the twelve hectares, issued an order
approving the project of partition but excluding the twelve hectares claimed by the heirs of
Francisco Pangilinan. After excluding the twelve hectares, the lower court did not bother to
decide how the remainder should be partitioned and whether Prima Pangilinan had a share in
that remainder.
ISSUE: W/N the ownership of a parcel of land, whether belonging to the deceased spouses or
to their heirs, should be decided in the intestate proceeding
HELD: YES, it shall be decided in the intestate proceeding.
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in
reality not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode
of practice "which may be waived".
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of 'third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare
portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from title inventory. The only
interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding. As pointed
out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be forced to
incur additional expenses (such as filing fees) by bringing a separate action to determine the
ownership of the twelve-hectare portion.

PORTUGAL vs. PORTUGAL-BELTRAN

Facts:

Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo. Subsequently Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta
and she gave birth to Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her co-petitioner. Meanwhile, Lazo gave
birth to respondent Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal.Portugal and his 4 siblings executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the estate of their father, Mariano
Portugal, who died intestate. In the deed, Portugal‘s siblings waived their rights, interests, and
participation over a parcel of land in his favor. Lazo died.

Portugal also died intestate. Portugal-Beltran executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole

Heir of Estate of Deceased Person” adjudicating to herself the parcel of land. The Registry of
Deeds then issued the title in her name. Puerta and Portugal Jr. filed before the (RTC) of
Caloocan City a complaint against Portugal-Beltran for annulment of the Affidavit of
Adjudication alleging that she is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not
entitled to inherit the parcel of land. But such was dismissed by the RTC for lack of cause of
action on the ground that Puerta and Portugal Jr.‘s status amd right as putative heirs had not
been established before a probate court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case.
Puerta and Portugal Jr. thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC‘s
dismissal of the case.

Issue: Whether or not Puerta and Portugal Jr. have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of Portugal-
Beltran‘s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the title issued in her name
Held: The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are
putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement
is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but
there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of,
among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a
special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
Puerta and Portugal Jr. as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the
costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact
that the parties to the civil case-subject of the present case, could and had already in fact
presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject Portugal‘s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of Puerta and
Portugal Jr.‘s status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by Puerta and Portugal
Jr., the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the
trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

BERNARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Eusebio Capili died in 1958, testate in which he disposed his properties in favor of his wife,
cousins all surnamed Capili and Arturo, Deogracias (petitioner) and Eduardo, all surnamed
Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes (wife) died the following year. Upon petition of Deogracias
Bernardo, executor of the estate of Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and
intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and
Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro. The executor filed a project of
partition in the estate proceedings in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the
estate of Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Reyes, whose share was
allotted to her collateral relatives.
These relatives filed an opposition to the executor’s project of partition and submitted a
counter-projection of their own claiming ½ of the properties mentioned in the will of the
deceased Capili on the theory that they belong not to the latter alone but to the conjugal
partnership of the spouses. The probate court issued an order declaring the donation void for
the reason that it falls under Article133 of the Civil Code which prohibits donation between
spouses during the marriage. In the same order, the court disapproved both project
of partitions and directed the executor to file another, dividing the property mentioned in the
last will and testament of Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation,
between the instituted heirs of Capili and Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were
conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.
Issue:
 Whether or not a probate court in a special proceeding had jurisdiction to determine
the validity of the deed of donation in question and pass upon the question of title or
ownership of the properties mentioned in the will.

Held:
Yes. The Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property
cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings, except where one of the parties
prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case
the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action. However, the court has also held that when the parties
interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a
question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass
judgment thereon (and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under
judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate
proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced. The Court held that
the determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
The probate court has the jurisdiction since there is a necessity to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among
heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including the widow, now represented because
of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and
who appeared voluntarily. The petitioners, by presenting their project of partition including
therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband)
put in question the issue of ownership of the properties is within the competence of the
probate court.

Claims for or Against Conjugal Partnership

Calma vs. Tanedo

Facts:
Spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit own a conjugal property. They were
also indebted to Esperanza Tanedo which debt was chargeable to the conjugal property.
Fausta died leaving a will wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria Calma as administratrix
of her properties. While the probate proceedings of Fausta were
pending, Tanedo filed a complaint against Eulalio for the recovery of the sums of money, and
the CFI rendered judgment for the payment of the debt. In the execution of the judgment,
despite the third party claim filed by Fausta, the property was sold by the sheriff.

Issue:

Whether Esperanza Tanedo can charge the debt against Eulalio?

Ruling:

No.The amendment introduced by Act No. 3176 consists in authorizing the institution of
testate or intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased spouse or of an
ordinary action for the liquidation and partition of the property of a conjugal partnership.
It should be understood that these remedies are alternative, and not cumulative, in the sense
that they cannot be availed of at
thesame time. Consequently, the testamentary proceedings of Fausta having beeninstituted,
the liquidation and partition of the conjugal property by reason of her marriage to Eulalio
should be made in these proceedings, to the exclusion of any other proceeding for the
same purpose. The SC also decided in another case that when the marriage is dissolved
by death of the wife, the legal power of management of the husband ceases, passing to
theadministrator appointed by the court in the testate or intestate proceedingsinstituted to that
end if there be any debts to be paid. From the foregoing, it follows that when Esperanza
Tanedo brought suit against Eulalio for the payment of the debt, which were debts chargeable
against the conjugal property, the power of Eulalio as legal administrator of the conjugal
property while Fausta was living, had ceased and passed tot eh administratrix Maria. Hence,
this being indebtedness chargeable against conjugal property, no complaint for its payment
can be brought against Eulalio, who had already ceased as administrator of the conjugal
property. The claim for this amount had to be filed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta.

Ocampo vs. Potenciano

Facts:

Edilberto Ocampo, married to Paz Yatco, executed a deed to his relative, Conrado
Potenciano and his wife Rufina Reyes, by way of sale with pacto de retro, a town lot with a
house. On the same day Ocampo signed another document, making it to appear that the
vendees were leasing to him the house and lot for the duration of the redemption period.
Though registered in the name of Ocampo alone, it in reality belonged to him and his wife as
conjugal property. Several extensions were given for repurchase but no repurchase was made.
Potenciano filed with the Register of Deeds of Laguna an affidavit for the consolidation of
title, and the RD issued a TCT in the name of Potenciano and his wife. Subsequently, with
Edilberto Ocampo and Rufina Reyes already dead, Potenciano gave Paz Yatco an option to
repurchase the property. Paz sought to exercise the option but Potenciano rejected it so Paz
tendered the payment to the court. Intervening in the case, Potenciano’s children, Victor and
Lourdes, filed a cross-complaint, alleging that the option to purchase granted by their father
to plaintiff was null and void as to the share of Rufina, which share passed to them by right
of inheritance, and that as to their father’s share in the property they were exercising the right
of redemption accorded by law to co-owners of property held in common, for which purpose
they had already tendered him the sum of P1250.

Issue: Whether Potenciano had the authority to enter into the agreement for the repurchase
of the conjugal property after the death of his wife?

Ruling:

The CA erred in supposing that the surviving spouse had such authority as de facto
administrator of the conjugal estate. The decisions relied on by the CA in support of its view
are now obsolete in view of the enactment of Act No. 3176,which provides that when the
marriage is dissolved by the death of either
husbandor wife, the partnership affairs must be liquidated in the testate or intestateproceeding
s of the deceased spouse. Furthermore, there is ground to believe that the option agreement in
question was nothing more than a mere extension of time for the payment of the mortgage
debt, since in the mind of the parties the real transaction between them was that of loan with
security, or equitable mortgage. It follows that at the time Paz Yatco made the tender of
payment and consigned the necessary amount in court, the said
contractof loan with security was still in effect, and as the tender was made in legal currency,
the tender and consignation must be held to produce their legal effect,which is that of
relieving the debtor from liability. Under this view of the case, it is not necessary to consider
the claim of Victor and Lourdes and that the CA erred in not declaring them owners of the
property in question, they having inherited ½ of it from their mother and acquired the other
half from their father in the exercise of their right of legal redemption as co-owners. As
ownership in the property never passed to their parents, they acquired nothing.

Rule 74: Summary Settlement of Estates

Extrajudicial Settlement by Agreement and Two-Year Lien

MALAHACAN vs. IGNACIO, et al.

G.R. No. L-6207, August 4, 1911
Facts:

Malahacan, as administrator of the estate of the late Guillerma Martinez (Guillerma), sued the
Ignacios (Defendants) to recover possession of the real estate owned by Guillerma. The
defendants are the only heirs of Guillerma. It is not alleged in the complaint nor does it
appear from the record or the evidence in this case that there were debts outstanding against
Guillerma Martinez at the time of her death.

Issue:

May an administrator demand the possession of a deceased’s real estate from the legal heirs if
there are no claims against the estate?

Ruling:

No. Under the provisions of the Civil Code the ownership of real estate passes to the heirs of
the owner instantly in his death. Guillerma, having seized of the lands involved in this suit
after her death, leaving the defendants as her only heirs at law, it follows that said heirs
instantly became the owners and were entitled to the immediate possession thereof. The only
ground upon which an administrator can demand the possession of the real estate from the
heirs at law is that such land will be required to be sold to pay the debts of the deceased. The
Supreme Court, in citing the case of Calzado vs. Alaras Frondoza, stated that when there are
no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an
administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are
all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened
with the costs and expenses of an administrator.

ARCILLAS vs. MONTEJO,

G.R. No. L-21725, November 29, 1968
Facts:

Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased Eustaquio Arcillas, sought the
cancellation of the TCT of Lot No. 276 and prayed for the issuance of a new certificate of
title in the names of the heirs in the enumerated proportions alleged in the petition. But before
any other material pleading could be filed with respect to this petition, five (5) other children
of the deceased filed a petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 632, praying for the
issuance of letters of administration in favor of Aurelio Arcillas preparatory to the final
settlement of the deceased's estate.

In his answer, Geronimo Arcillas opposed the issuance of letters of administration to herein
petitioner, arguing that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was the only property left by the deceased
and the deceased left no debts, the petition for administration was improper. However,
Aurelio Arcillas, in his reply, insisted that there were still other properties of the estate of the
deceased besides Lot No. 276, that there was no unanimity among the heirs for extrajudicial
partition, and that some of the heirs had been unduly deprived of their participation in the
estate.

In the trial court’s ruling, Respondent Judge Montejo denied the later petition and gave due
course to Geronimo’s petition "... to obviate the necessity of spending uselessly which would
only deplete the funds of the estate; to avoid unnecessary delay in the partition of the property
involved herein, and following the doctrines established by the Honorable Supreme Court in
several cases of the same nature, which is in consonance with the provisions of Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court…”

Issue:

Did the respondent Judge act properly in dismissing the administration proceedings under the
authority of section 1, rule 74 of the New Rules of Court upon averments that the estate left
no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in its distribution are all of age?

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court, citing Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, et al., 92 Phil. 273, ruled that section
I does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate
has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary
action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as
they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do
so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not
mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If
the intention were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the word shall as
was done in other provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the word may its used
not only once but in the whole section which indicates an intention to leave the matter
entirely to the discretion of the heirs.

Having decided to institute administration proceedings instead of resorting to the less

expensive modes of settlement of the estate, i.e. extrajudicial settlement or ordinary action for
partition, the heirs may not then be rebuffed in the exercise of their discretion granted under
section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court merely on the ground that the expenses usually
common in administration proceedings may deplete the funds of the estate. The resultant
delay and necessary expenses incurred thereafter are consequences which must be deemed to
have been voluntarily assumed by the heirs themselves so that they may not in the future be
heard to complain of these matters. Besides, the truth or veracity of petitioner's claim as to
the alleged existence of other properties of the deceased aside from the lot in question can be
more adequately ascertained in administration proceedings rather than in any other action.

PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. L-81147, June 20, 1989
Facts:

Rita Pereira Nagac (Rita), sister of the deceased Andres Pereira, instituted an action for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased.
Petitioner Victoria Pereira, spouse of the deceased, for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased.

Both the trial court and the CA ruled in favour of Rita and appointed her as the administratrix
of the intestate estate of Andres Pereira.

Issue:

Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without
leaving any debts?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the court before which the administration proceedings are
pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason for
burdening the estate of the deceased Andres Pereira with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. The parties in this case admit that there are no debts of the
deceased to be paid. The only conceivable reason why Rita seeks appointment as
administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her
own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of Victoria who supposedly
disposed of them fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason
which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the
estate of Andres Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only real
property left has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful
purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In
most instances of a similar nature, the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the
deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors,
should there be any, are protected in any event.

PADA-KILARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 134329, January 19, 2000
Facts:

During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission
from him to build a house on the northern portion of a lot owned by Jacinto. When Feliciano
died, his children continued living in the house. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario (Verona), one
of Pastor's children, has been living in that house since 1960.

Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of
his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document which they, however, never
registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds. At the execution of the extra-judicial
partition, Ananias, one of Jacinto’s six (6) children, was himself present while his other
brothers were represented by their children.

After some of the heirs of Jacinto have sold their respective co-ownership right in the lot,
Silverio Pada, one of the grandchildren of Jacinto, demanded that Verona and her husband
vacate the northern portion of the lot and filed a complaint for ejectment against them on June
26, 1995.

On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, another son of Jacinto, executed a Deed of
Donation transferring to petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as co-owners
of the subject lot. On February 12, 1996, Verona and her husband filed their Answer to the
ejectment complaint averring that the northern portion of the subject lot had already been
donated to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They contended that the extra-judicial partition
of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no special
power of attorney was executed by the children of Jacinto in favor of their respective children
who represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was effectuated only
through a private document that was never registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds
of Leyte.

The MTC ruled in favor of Verona. However, the RTC reversed the MTC’s ruling and the
CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

Issue: Is the extrajudicial partition in 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto valid?

Ruling:
Yes. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs
made in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires
partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. The requirement
in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document
and registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against
tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows
then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not
undermined when no creditors are involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is
competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which, in the first
place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to
be valid. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as
to be effective as regards the heirs that participated therein. The requirement of Article 1358
of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification
or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public
instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the validity
or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves. And neither does the Statute
of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is
not legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer
of property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of
property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the
inheritance.

The belated act of the heirs of Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners
after forty four (44) years of never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial
partition that allocated the subject property to other heirs, produced no legal effect. In the said
partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject property which was a
parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of a parcel of
coconut land in the interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel
of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of
the subject property, thus, is void for they were not the owners thereof. At any rate it is too
late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951
extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set in.
Remedies against Extrajudicial Settlement
(Contribution from Distribution, Execution against Bond or Sale of Realty of Decedent)

G.R. No. L-6871, January 15, 1912

JOSE McMICKING (McMicking), administrator of the estate of Margarita Jose

(Margarita) vs. BENITO SY CONBIENG (Conbieng), administrator of the estate of Pio
de la Gurdia Barretto Sy Pioco (Barretto)

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca (Palanca) was the administrator of the estate of Margarita and took
possession of all her properties. Mariano Ocampo was Palanca’s surety. However, Ocampo
died.

Ocampo’s appointed administrator was Doreteo Velasco, while Pio Barretto (Baretto)
became a surety of said Doroteo.

Doroteo, as the administrator filed a complete report and inventory of the property, together
with an agreement of partition. CFI approved the agreement. Thus, Doroteo delivered all the
properties to the devisees and legatees of the said Ocampo, leaving no property or thing of
value whatever belonging to said estate.

Meanwhile, Palanca was removed as administrator due to his refusal to render an account and
failure to return the properties. McMicking was appointed in his stead and filed a claim
against Palanca.

However due to Palanca’s default, McMicking filed a claim against to the estate of
Barretto, as the surety of Doroteo. Doroteo as the administrator of the estate of
Ocampo, who in turn, is the surety of said Palanca.

CFI: ruled in favor of Barretto, through Conbieng

ISSUE: WON McMicking may claim against the Barretto as the surety of Doroteo Velasco.

HELD: NO, Barretto is not liable.

The Court based their decision upon the ground that Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased
Barretto was surety, would not have been liable himself had this action been commenced
against him. If the principal is not liable upon the obligation, the surety cannot be.

A partition of the property of a deceased person may be made, notwithstanding that an

administrator with the will annexed has been appointed and the administration of the estate
under said appointment is in progress. Such provisions are applicable no matter what stage
the administration has reached
SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without legal proceedings, in certain cases. — Whatever all the heirs of a
deceased person are of lawful age and legal capacity, and their are no debts due from the intestate estate, or all the
debts have been paid by the heirs, the heirs may, by a family council as shown under Spanish law, or by agreement
 between themselves, duly executed in writing, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see
fit, without proceedings in court.

SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts. — But if it shall appear, at any time within two years after
such settlement and distribution of the estate, that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not
been paid, any creditor may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided,
unless his debt shall be paid, with interest; and the administrator appointed by the court may recover the assets of
the estate from those who have received them, for the purpose of paying the debts; and the real estate belonging to
the deceased shall remain charged with the liability to creditors for the full period of two years after such
distribution, notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may have been made.

These sections provide for the voluntary division of the whole property of the decedent
without proceedings in court. These provisions should, therefore, be given the most liberal
construction so that the intent of the framers may be fully carried out.

In the case at bar, under the broad and liberal policy which the court adopted, the division of
the property of Mariano Ocampo, deceased falls within the provisions of said sections and
may be termed, a partition of the property of a decedent without legal proceedings within the
meaning of those sections. The fact of the prior appointment of an administrator and the filing
of an inventory before such partition is of no consequence so far as the right of the owners to
partition is concerned. The only requisite for such petition prescribed by the law is that "there
are no debts or all the debts have been paid by the heirs." When this condition is fulfilled the
partition can take place, no matter what stage the administration may have reached.

The basis of the liability of a surety on an administrator's bond is the fault or failure of the
principal. The liability of the principal precedes that of the surety. Thus, If Velasco incurred
no liability, and then his surety incurred none.

Reopening by Intervention within Reglementary Period

G.R. No. 47475. May 6, 1942.

DONATO LAJOM (Lajom) vs. JOSE P. VIOLA, RAFAEL VIOLA, and SILVIO
VIOLA (Violas)

FACTS: Lajom filed a complaint in CFI Nueva Ecija, praying, that he be declared a natural
child of the late Dr. Maximo Viola and therefore a co-heir of the Violas, legitimate children.
A demurrer was also filed by Violas on the ground that the will was already probated.

CFI of Nueva Ecija ruled in favor to the Violas and dismissed the case

ISSUE: WON the aggrieved co-heir, Lojam, may bring an action for reivindication within the
prescriptive period

HELD: YES, Lojam may bring an action. In any event this matter of prescription of the
action has not been set up as a defense.

Under the law the aggrieved coheir may bring an action for reivindication within the
prescriptive period, properly applied section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding
acquisitive prescription after ten years of adverse possession by "occupancy, grant, descent or
otherwise." In order words, that even after a decree of distribution, an action for recovery
may be brought by the excluded heir within ten years.

Also, Sec. 196 of the Code of Civil Procedure safeguard the protection of property rights. The
lawmaker must have contemplated, would seem to reveal the wisdom of allowing a coheir the
benefits of the law of prescription even after a partition, judicial or extrajudicial, has been
had. Since, frequently the heirs are living in different provinces, far from one another and far
from the residence of the decedent.

Section 196. Paramount rights and amicable partition not affected. — Nothing herein contained shall
be construed so as to injure, prejudice, defeat, or destroy the estate, right or title of any person
claiming a tract of land, or any part thereof, by title under any other person, or by title paramount to
the title of the joint tenants, tenants in common, or co-parceners by whom partition may have been
made.

In the case at bar, Lojam has a paramount title to his share in the estate. Applying the law,
Lojam as the aggrieved coheir may bring an action within ten years even after a decree of
distribution of the estate of Dr. Maximo.

G.R. No. L-26876, December 27, 1969

LUCRECIA JEREZ (Lucrecia) vs. HON. EMIGDIO v. NIETES (Judge Nietes)

FACTS: Nicolas Jalandoni died. A special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was
filed before the sala of Judge Nietes, where Lucrecia, his widow, was appointed as
administratrix. A project of partition and final accounting was submitted. Judge Nietes gave
an order approving the partition. Lucilo Jalandoni alleged that he is an acknowledged natural
child of the late Nicolas, and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta, alleging that he is an
illegitimate son, sought to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were preterited in
the project of partition.

Judge Nietes allowed the intervention and reopened the proceedings to permit Lucilo, to
present whatever evidence they may have to show their right to participate in the estate of the
deceased.

CA: Affirmed the order of Judge Nietes

ISSUE: WON the decision of Judge of Nietes was proper.

HELD: No, Lucilo must present evidence to justify their right to intervene in special
proceeding.

The Court held that as a rule preterited heirs must file an intervention with proper motion
within the reglementary period to secure relief by reopening the proceedings. The only
exception for a probate proceeding that has a final liquidation be set aside is when he is left
out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence.
In the case at bar, Judge Nietes acted too soon, that the motion of Lucilo did not suffice to
call for an intervention. There must be proof beyond allegations in such motion to show the
interest of the private movants. In the absence thereof, the action taken by respondent Judge
could be considered premature. Thus, the court required Lucilo to file a proper motion to
justify its intervention.

New Action to Annul Settlement within the Reglementary Period

G.R. No. L-19060. May 20, 1964

IGNACIO GERONA (Gerona) vs. CARMEN DE GUZMAN (de Guzman)

FACTS: Placida was the legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife,
Teodora.

After the death of his first wife, Marcelo married Camila, who begot him several children, all
surnamed De Guzman; Placida has 3 children, all surnamed Gerona.

Marcelo died and subsequently the De Guzman fraudulently executed a deed of extra-judicial
settlement of the estate, with the misrepresentation that they were the only surviving heirs of
the deceased, despite of the knowledge of the Gerona, as Mareclo’s forced heirs.

De Guzman thereby secured new TCTs in their own name; such fraud was discovered by the
Gerona only the year before the institution of the case.

Gerona demanded share in said properties; but the De Guzman refused to heed said demand,
contending that Gerona’s Mother, Placida, was a spurious child and their action is barred by
statute of limitations. Thus, Gerona filed a complaint for reconveyance.

RTC: ruled in favor with the De Guzman, that the action has already been prescribed

ISSUE: WON the action for partition has been prescribed

HELD: Yes, Gerona’s action is barred by statute of Frauds.

It is already settled that an action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive
or implied trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations. Although,
as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as
long as the De Guzman do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The
statute of limitations operates as in other cases; from the moment such adverse title is
asserted by the possessor of the property.

Hence, the action for reconveyance should have been filed within four (4) years from the
discovery of fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, in 1948,
when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were
issued in the name of De Guzman exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-
judicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world.
GR 118680, March 5, 2001
Pedrosa v CA

Facts: Maria Elena Rodriquez-Pedrosa (herein petitioner) was legally adopted by spouses
Miguel and Rosalina Rodriguez in 1946. In April 1972, Miguel died intestate. Pedrosa and
Rosalina thereafter entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel’s estate, adjudicating
the estate equally between themselves.

In November 1972, Miguel’s brothers and sisters (Rodriguezes and herein private
respondents) filed an action to annul the adoption of Pedrosa. On March 11, 1983, while said
action is pending, Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement with the Rodriguezes for
the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar, who died after Miguel.
Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel.

In June 1986, the Rodriguezes filed a joint motion to dismiss the action to annul the adoption
of Pedrosa. This, the court granted. Therefter, Pedrosa sent her daughter to claim their share
of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused.

On January 28, 1987, Pedrosa filed a complaint to annul the 1983 extrajudicial settlement and
partition. Both RTC and CA dismissed the complaint, holding that the complaint was filed
beyond the two-year prescriptive period as provided in Section 4 of Rule 74.

Issue: Whether or not the right of action to annul the deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition has already prescribed

Held: No. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two-year prescriptive period (1) to persons who
have participated or had notice of the extrajudicial partition and in addition (2) when the
provision of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all persons or
heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians. Pedrosa, as records confirm, did not participate in the
partition. Hence, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in this case.

The applicable period is four years when the action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement
is on the ground of fraud. It may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud.
Since it was filed on January 28, 1987 or three years and ten months after the March 1983
partition was executed, the action has not yet prescribed.

Note that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who
had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. It is also not correct
to say that Rosalina represented Pedrosa in the partition, since Pedrosa at that time was no
longer a minor. Note also that as adopted child, Pedrosa excludes the collateral relatives of
his father. The Rodriguezes, therefore, had no interest in the estate of Miguel.

Summary Settlement of Estates of Small Value

GR L-5033, June 28, 1954
Estate of Franscisco v Carreon

Facts: Rosa Francisco, wife of deceased Jose Francisco petitioned the court for summary
settlement of the estate of her husband. After the requisite publication and there being no
creditors, the court issued an order adjudicating one-half undivided share to the widow Rosa,
and the other half in equal parts to their three children.

Thereafter, Rosa mortgaged her share of the real property to the Carreon sisters. Later, she
conveyed by absolute deed of sale her interest in the land to the Carreons.

Tiburcia Francisco, mother of deceased Jose, filed a motion in representation of a certain Jose
Palumpon, a recognized natural son of the deceased, who was not able to participate in the
settlement of the estate of Jose. She further alleged that the property in question was private
property of Jose, of which the wife could not have been awarded a portion. Because Rosa’s
interest in the property conflicted with that of her own children, Tiburcia sought to represent
the three legitimate children as well.

Subsequently, the demand for recognition of Jose Palumpon was withdrawn. However, the
court decided to proceed in taking up the matter concerning the adjudication of one-half of
the estate to Rosa. It eventually found that the land was indeed private property of Jose
Francisco, acquired four years before marriage. As such, the whole estate passed to the
ownership of the three legitimate children. The court, therefore, annulled the mortgage and
sale of the land in favor of the Carreons, to which the latter appealed.

Issue: Can the probate court validly take cognizance of the annulment of the mortgage and
sale?

Held: Yes. If during the summary proceeding, some of the heirs claim, by title adverse to
that of the decedent, some parcels of land, the probate court has no jurisdiction to pass upon
the issue which must be decided in a separate suit. But in this case, there is no question that
the realty belonged to the decedent and a separate suit was unnecessary, especially
considering the nature of summary settlements.

Furthermore, Section 4, Rule 74 expressly authorizes the court to give every heir his lawful
participation in the real estate “notwithstanding any transfers of such real estate” and to
“issue execution” thereon. All this implies that when within the amendatory period, the
realty was alienated, the court, in re-dividing it among the heirs, has authority to direct
cancellation of such alienation in the same estate proceedings, whenever it becomes
necessary to do so. To require the institution of a separate action for such annulment would
run counter to the letter and spirit of summary settlements.

GR L-10474, February 28, 1958

Sampilo v CA

Facts: Teodoro Tolete died intestate, leaving as heirs his widow Leoncia and several nephews
and nieces, children of deceased brothers and sisters. On July 25, 1946, Leoncia executed an
affidavit stating that her husband left no heir other than his legitimate wife to inherit his
properties consisting of four parcels of land. She registered said affidavit in the Register of
Deeds. On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the land in favor of Sampilo for
the sum of P10,000. Sampilo later sold the realty to Salacup.
In March 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate of
Tolete. She alleged that the widow had no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication, there
being other heirs. As such, Sampilo and Salacup acquired no rights to the land sold to them.

The CFI declared the affidavit and the deeds of sale all null and void. CA modified the
judgment, declaring that the deeds of sale are void only insofar as the properties thereby
conveyed exceed the portion that corresponds to Leoncia.

Issue: Whether Sinopera and her co-heirs’ right of action to recover the lands had already
prescribed, not having been filed within two years

Held: No. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement or by

affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such
settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the
death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention
of such effect is made, either directly or by implication.

Hence, the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to
an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is
applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have
been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part
in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.

Neither is Section 4, Rule 74 a statute of limitations or a bar of actions against third persons.
It is only a bar against the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings, but not
against third persons not parties thereto. But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of
limitations, it is
still unavailing to Sampilo. The action of Sinopera is one based on fraud, as the widow of the
deceased owner of the lands had declared in her affidavit of partition that the deceased left no
nephews or nieces, nor other heirs except herself. Plaintiff's right of action, which is based
on fraud and which has a period of four years, does not appear to have lapsed when the action
was instituted.

(Guys, walang mention ng summary settlement sa case.)

Rule 75: Production of Will, Allowance of Will Necessary

Probate Mandatory

GR 12184, Sept. 27, 1917

US v Chiu Guimco

Facts: Joaquin Cruz died in China during one of his visits there, leaving an estate worth
P40,000-P50,000. He also left a wife (Uy Cuan) and a child in China, and another wife
(Maria Villafranca) in the Philippines.
Before his departure to China, he was able to execute a will before a notary public, in which
he named his brother Chiu Guimco and a certain Co-Iden as executors. Co-Iden eventually
died with nothing done to institute probate of the will. Meanwhile, Chiu Guimco managed
Joaquin’s business and properties.

In exchange for certain properties, Maria agreed to relinquish any interest in the estate of
Joaquin. Later, however, Uy Cuan arrived in the Philippines to effect the settlement of her
husband’s estate. Through a friend (Ramon Contreras) who inquired about the affairs of the
estate, Uy Cuan sent Chiu Guimco a letter urging him to produce the will of the decedent for
the institution of lawful proceedings in accord therewith. He replied through a letter denying
having seen or taken possession of the will.

A complaint was filed in court charging Chiu Guimco, under Section 628 of the Code of
Civil Procedure with failure to produce the will within the time required by law. The CFI
found him guilty. Because he failed to produce the will even after the court’s order, he was
fined and committed to prison until he produces the will.

Issue: Whether it was right to commit Chiu to jail until he produces the will

Held: No. Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that if a person having
custody of a will after the death of the testator neglects without reasonable cause to deliver
the same to the court having jurisdiction, after notice by the court so to do, he may be
committed to the prison of the province by a warrant issued by the court and there kept in
close confinement until he delivers the will. This provision can only be applied when a court
is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased
persons; and where administration proceedings are not already pending, the court, before
taking action under this section, should require that there be before it some petition,
information, or affidavit of such character as to make action by the court under this section
appropriate.

Further, Section 628 is an ordinary criminal prosecution. To enforce the production of the
will by the accused, as provided in Section 629, would virtually compel him to convict
himself, since the mere production of the will by him would be conclusive that he had
possession of it as charged in the criminal complaint; and it seems probable that this would
constitute an infringement of that provision of law which says that in a criminal action the
defendant shall be exempt from testifying against himself.