RULE 86 CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE

Period to file claims

Intestate Estate of ARSENIO R. AFAN, MARIAN AFAN, petitioner-appellee vs. APOLINARIO S. DE GUZMAN

FACTS: De Guzman filed, in this special proceeding for the settlement of intestate estate of Arsenio R. Afan, a claim
for P1,000, allegedly due from Afan, with interest thereon, within 30 days from August 16, 1949, as set forth in a
promissory note then issued by Afan. On July 22, 1957, the administratrix of his estate objected to the consideration of
the claim upon the ground that it had been filed long after the expiration of the period for the presentation of claims
against said estate.
Lower court refused to entertain the claim. Hence, this appeal. De Guzman invokes section 2, rule 87 of the Rules of
Court which provides the time within which claims shall be filed. The second sentence thereof clothes the court with
authority to permit the filing of a claim after the lapse of the period stated in the first sentence, but prior to and
distribution, subject to the following conditions, namely: (1) there must be tin application therefor; (2) a cause must be
shown why the permission should be granted; and (3) the extension of time granted for the filing of the claim shall not
exceed one (1) month.
De Guzman has not sought permission to file the claim. Moreover, the same does not allege any reason why he should
be excused for his failure to file the claim in this proceeding within the period stated in the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reasons given are sufficient for De Guzman to be excused for his failure to file the claim
within the period stated in the Rules of Court.
HELD: No. In fact, no reasons were set forth in De Guzman’s claim. The issue in this proceeding rests upon the
discretion of the court and the record presented before the Court, which does not show that the lower court has abused
its discretion in acting as it did in the present case.
It is only on appeal that De Guzman alleged a cause, that is, he had no actual knowledge of the fact of the estate. He
offered no reason as to why he refrained from making such averment in his claim. The only reason that the court sees
is that he actually had knowledge of the fact of the estate of the deceased. In fact, he instituted a claim against the
deceased during the latter’s lifetime.
As shown by the records in Special Proceedings No. 26858, entitled 'Instance estate of Arsenio R. Afan' before the
Court of First Instance of Manila," with the prayer that said "heirs be substituted as party defendants" in Case No.
1148, "in place of the deceased Arsenio R. Afan." Yet, De Guzman choose not to file his claim in such proceeding
until July 27, 1957, one year and a half after the filing of his aforementioned "compliance."
Instead of furnishing a "cause" for the extension of the reglementary period for the filing of his claim, this omission on
the part of De Guzman fully justifies the denial of such extension and the order appealed from.
The Court have already held that failure to file a claim within the time provided therefor upon the sole ground that the
claimant was negotiating with one of the heirs for payment, is not sufficient to justify and that, where a claimant knew
of the death of the decedent and for four (4) or five (5) months thereafter he did nothing to present his claim, this can
hardly be considered as a good excuse for such neglect.
HEIRS OF RAMON PIZARRO, SR., vs.
 HON. FRANCISCO Z. CONSOLACION, CFI of Davao and LUIS TAN

FACTS:Heirs are the oppositors in Special Proceeding No. 2116 in the then (CFI) of Davao City Branch II, for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Dominga Garcia, filed by Luis Tan.
On August 12,1977, Luis Tan filed a verified petition with the CFI of Davao for the issuance of letters of
administration in favor of a certain Alfonso Atilano. The petition alleged, among others that Luis Tan is the only
surviving son of the deceased Dominga Garcia who died intestate sometime in 1930 in Canton, China; that the
deceased left a parcel of land 1 located at C.M. Recto Avenue, Davao City; and that the said lot is in the possession of
the heirs of Ramon Pizarro.
On October 4, 1977, Heirs filed an opposition to the said petition claiming that they are the heirs of Ramon Pizarro
who died intestate on June 16, 1974; and that the deceased was the vendee of one-half (1/2) of the lot by virtue of an
extrajudicial settlement of estate and deed of absolute sale executed by Vicente Tan in Hongkong on May 27, 1966.
Heirs prayed that letters of administration of Dominga Garcia's estate be issued in favor of anyone of them.
The parties entered into a compromise where they agreed to withdraw their opposition against Luis Tan’s
recommendee Alfonso Atilano and for the intestate proceedings to proceed in due course. This agreement was
approved by the CFI.
CFI issued an order requiring the filing of creditors’ claim against the estate of Dominga Garcia within the period of 6
months from the date of publication.
ISSUE:Whether or not the 6-month period provided by CFI for the filing of claims against the estate of late Dominga
Garcia is proper.
HELD: No. The range of the period specified in the rule is intended to give the probate court the discretion to fix the
period for the filing of claims. The probate court is permitted by the rule to set the period provided it is not less than
six (6) months nor more than twelve (12) months from the date of the first publication of the notice thereof. Such
period once fixed by the court is mandatory.
The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against an estate must be presented, is to insure a
speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased person and the early delivery of the property to the person entitled to
the same.
In Sikat vs. Vda. Mafincode Villanueva, 13 this Court ruled that the speedy settlement of the estate of deceased
persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and
expenses of administration have been paid is the ruling spirit of our probate law.
However, in this case the trial court set the period for the filing of the claims within six (6) months from the date of the
first publication of the notice. It was obviously short of the minimum limit of six (6) months provided for by the law.
Petitioner correctly observed that the trial court thereby shortened the period set by the law.
Since the notice issued and the period set by the trial court was not in accordance with the requirements of Section 2,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, what should then apply is the period as provided for by the rules which is not less than
six months nor more than twelve (12) months from the date of first publication of notice. The first publication of the
notice in the Mindanao Times was on March 30, 1978. Thus the two claims of petitioners against the estate which
were filed on March 5, 1979 and March 29, 1979 respectively were filed on time.
Nature of claim

RICARDO M. GUTIERREZ vs.
 LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, Executrix of the Testate Estate of the
deceased MARIA GERARDO VDA. DE BARRETTO

FACTS: In 1940, Maria Gerardo Vda. de Barretto, owner of hectares of fishpond lands in Pampanga, leased the same
to appellant Gutierrez for a term to expire on May 1, 1947. On November 1, 1941, pursuant to a decision of
Department of Public Works rendered after due investigation the dikes of the fishponds were opened at several points,
resulting in their destruction and in the loss great quantities of fish inside, to the damage and prejudice of the lessee.
In 1956, the deceased (lessor) having died in 1948 and the corresponding testate proceeding to settle her estate having
been opened, Gutierrez filed a claim for two items: first, for the sum of P32, 000.00 representing advance rentals he
had to the decedent (the possession of the leased property is alleged, having been returned to her after the open of the
dikes ordered by the government); and second, the sum of P60, 000.00 as damages in the concept of earned profits,
that is, profits which the claimant failed to realize because of the breach of the lease contract allegedly committed by
the lessor.
Gutierrez commenced an instant civil action against Lucia Milagros for the recovery of the same 60K referred to in the
administration proceeding, charging the decedent of violating the warranty in the lease contract. Gutierrez amended
his claim, withdrawing the 60K, leaving only the refund for advance rentals (32K).
ISSUE: Won Gutierrez’ claim for damages based on unrealized profits is a money claim against the estate of the
deceased Maria Gerardo Vda. de Barretto within the purview of Rule 87, Section 5.
HELD: No. The word "claims" as used in statutes requiring the presentation of claims against a decedent's estate is
generally construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the
deceased in his lifetime and could have been reduced to simple money judgments; and among these are those founded
upon contract. The claim in this case is based on contract — specifically, on a breach thereof. It falls squarely under
section 5 of Rule 87 "Upon all contracts by the decedent broken during his lifetime, even though they were personal to
the decedent in liability, the personal representative is answerable for the breach out of the assets." A claim for breach
of a covenant in a deed of the decedent must be presented under a statute requiring such presentment of all claims
grounded on contract.
The only actions that may be instituted against the executor or administrator are those to recover real or personal
property from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal. Rule 88, section 1. The instant suit is not one of them.
The denial of the claim was affirmed by this Court on the grounds that it was not a money claim and that it arose after
the decedent's demise, placing it outside the scope of Rule 87, Section 5.
MARIA G. AGUAS, FELIX GUARDINO and FRANCISCO SALINAS vs. LLEMOS

FACTS: On 14 March 1960, Francisco Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas jointly filed an action
in the CFI of Catbalogan, Samar (Civil Case No. 4824), to recover damages from Hermogenes Llemos, averring that
the latter had served them by registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with notice that the
same would be submitted to the said court of Samar on February 23, 1960 at 8: 00 a.m.; that in view of the copy and
notice served, Salinas and Spouses Guardino and Aguas proceeded to the court from their residence in Manila
accompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no such petition had been filed; and that defendant Llemos
maliciously failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs' expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing them
mental anguish and undue embarrassment.
Before he could answer the complaint, the defendant died. Upon leave of court, Salinas and Spouses Guardino and
Aguas amended their complaint to include the heirs of the deceased. On 21 July 1960, the heirs filed a motion to
dismiss, and by order of 12 August 1960, the court below dismissed it, on the ground that the legal representative, and
not the heirs, should have been made the party defendant; and that anyway the action being for recovery of money,
testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated and the claim filed therein.
Motion for reconsideration having been denied, the case was appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not a suit for damages caused by tortious conduct of a defendant survives the death of the latter.
HELD: Yes. Under Rule 87, section 5, the actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses and
those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money against the
decedent, arising from contract express or implied". None of these includes that of the plaintiffs- appellants; for it is
not enough that the claim against the deceased party be for money, but it must arise from "contract express or
implied", and these words were construed in Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil., 182, 189-194 to include all purely
personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Upon the other hand, Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or
administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a
lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. The present suit is one for
damages under the last class, it having been held that "injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific property,
but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished. To maliciously cause a party to incur
unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly injurious to that party's property.
Be that as it may, it now appears from a communication from the Court of First Instance of Samar that the parties have
arrived at an amicable settlement of their differences, and that they have agreed to dismiss this appeal. The settlement
has been approved and embodied in an order of the Court of First Instance.
The case having thus become moot, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the questions raised therein.
BPI VS. CONCEPCION AND HIJOS

FACTS: Defendants Concepcions executed a PN in favor of BPI. As a collateral, the Concepcions deposited 700
shares of PNB and mortgage a portion of their land to BPI. The Concepcions defaulted in the payment of the PN thus
BPI instituted a foreclosure proceedings.
Afterwards, Elser entered into negotiations with the Concepcions to take over the mortgaged property and assume the
mortgage debt of the Concepcions to the BPI. Elser wrote several letters to BPI regarding its conformity with the said
assumption of obligations, however, BPI did not act on the said letters. (BPI, through verbal meetings with Elser,
somehow conditionally accepted Elser’s subrogation agreement with the Concepcions)
BPI proceeded with the foreclosure proceedings against the Concepcions and Elser despite inaction to Elser’s offer to
assume the mortgage debts and his subrogation agreement with the Concepcions.
Elser died. BPI suggested the death of Elser, and asked that the administrator of the estate, C. W. Rosenstock, be
substituted in his place as defendant, and that the action be continued against Rosenstock in that capacity, on the
ground that this action is for the foreclosure of a mortgage.
The attorneys of record for Elser filed an opposition to the application to have the action continued against
Rosenstock, in substitution of Elser, on the ground that, as to Elser, this is not a foreclosure action, and hence this
action, as to him, abated by reason of his death, and any claim of the plaintiff against him should be presented to the
committee on claims and appraisals of his estate.
ISSUES: WoN the opposition is correct.
HELD: Yes.As far as Elser is concerned, BPI’s alleged cause of action rests exclusively on the deed of contract.
The well-known general rule is that a contract affects only the parties and privies thereto. But there are exceptions to
this rule and BPI contends that though it is neither a party nor a privy to the contract here in question, the subrogation
of Elser to the obligations of the Concepcions in favor of the plaintiff, as provided for in the contract, is a stipulation
pour autrui upon which the plaintiff may maintain its action.
However, applying the test of a valid stipulation pour autrui, it seems clear that neither the deed of contract nor any
other agreement between the Concepcions and Elser contained any stipulation pour autrui in favor of the BPI.
The stipulation here in question is not merely for the assumption of the mortgage debt by Elser, but is a provision for
the subrogation of Elser to the Concepcions' obligation to the BPI which if duly accepted by the BPI, works a novation
of the original agreement and releases the original debtor from further liability. However, in the present case, there
was no showing that the Conceptions or Elser were able to obtain the written consent of the BPI to the stipulation.
The ordinary rules of offer and acceptance are applicable here, and it is a cardinal rule of the law of contracts that in
order to create a binding agreement, the acceptance must be absolute, unconditional, and identical with the terms of
the offer; otherwise there is no meeting of the minds or an expression of one and the same common intention, one of
the essential elements of a valid contract.
From what we have said it follows that BPI can have no cause of action against Elser, or rather against his estate.
IMPERIAL INS., VS. DAVID
FACTS: Reyes and his wife David executed three (3) indemnity agreements in favor of Imperial Insurance jointly and
severally to assure indemnification of the latter for whatever liability it may incur in connection with its posting the
security bonds to lift the attachments in Civil Case No. Q-5213 and in Civil Case No. Q-5214, for the benefit of
Reyes, and under a homestead bond it had executed in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines. On the same
date, Reyes and his wife paid to Imperial Insurance the sum of P153.33 covering the premium and other expenses.
Reyes died and a Special Proceedings was commenced. His wife was appointed as the administratix of said intestate
estate of Reyes.
Meanwhile, judgment was rendered in the aforesaid two cases (Civil Cases Nos. Q-5213 and Q-5214) against the
spouses Reyes and David which has become final and executory. Writs of execution of the decision on the said cases
were returned unsatisfied. As a consequence, judgment was rendered against the surety bonds. Imperial Insurance
made demands on David to pay the amounts under the surety bonds and arrears in premiums thereon. When David
failed to make payments, Imperial Insurance filed Civil Case in the then CFI Manila for collection of sums of money
under three (3) different causes of action.
CFI Manila ruled in favor of Imperial Insurance.
ISSUE: WoN the lower court has jurisdiction over Imperial Insurance’ causes of action.
(David contends that Imperial Insurance’ claim should have been presented according to Rule 86 of the Revised Rules
of Court and its failure to do so operates to bar its claim forever.)
HELD: Yes.When the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring his action in toto against any of the debtors
obligated in solidum. Thus, if husband and wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in case of his death her
liability is independent of and separate from her husband’s; she may be sued for the whole debt and it would be error
to hold that the claim against her as well as the claim against her husband should be made in the decedent’s estate.
In the case at bar, David signed a joint and several obligation with her husband in favor of herein Imperial Insurance;
as a consequence, the latter may demand from either of them the whole obligation.
The Rules of Court provide the procedure should the creditor desire to go against the deceased debtor, but there is
nothing in the said provision making compliance with such procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary action
against the surviving solidary debtors, should the creditor choose to demand payment from the latter, could be
entertained to the extent that failure to observe the same would deprive the court jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
action against the surviving debtors. Upon the other hand, the Civil Code expressly allows the creditor to proceed
against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. Hence, there is nothing improper in the
creditor’s filing of an action against the surviving solidary debtors alone, instead of instituting a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor wherein his claim could be filed.
STRONGHOLD VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS: Republic Asahi Glass (RAG) contracts with JDS Construction for the construction of roadways and drainage
systems in RAG's compound. JDS Construction does so and files the required compliance bond with Stronghold
Insurance acting as surety. The contract is 5.3M the bond is 795k. JDS Construction falls woefully behind schedule,
prompting RAG to rescind the contract and demand the compliance bond. The sole owner of JDS Construction, Jose
Santos, died and JDS Construction ceased to exist. Stronghold Insurance refuses to pay the bond claiming that the
death of Jose Santos, the owner of JDS Construction extinguishes the obligation.
ISSUE: WoN Stronghold Insurance’ liability under the performance bond was automatically extinguished by the death
of Santos, the principal.
HELD: No.
As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation. Obligations are
transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the
nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are
extinguished by death. Furthermore, the liability of Stronghold Insurance is contractual in nature, because it executed
a performance bond, as a surety, Stronghold Insurance is solidarily liable with Santos in accordance with the Civil
Code.
Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a contract
against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished. What is extinguished is
only the obligee’s action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a probate court.
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with RAG were not
intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death did not result in the
extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense that he
or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, Stronghold Insurance
as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond.
METROBANK (MBTC) VS. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORP

FACTS: Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc. (SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of money against Absolute
Management Corporation (AMC). SHCI alleged in its complaint that it made advance payments to AMC for the
purchase of pieces of plywood and plyboards covered by Metrobank Check Nos. 1407668502, 140768507,
140768530, 140768531, 140768532, 140768533 and 140768534. These checks were all crossed, and were all made
payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC’s General Manager.
Chua died, and a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was commenced. This proceeding was pending at
the time AMC filed its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint. SHCI made demands on AMC, after
Chua’s death, for allegedly undelivered items. According to AMC, these transactions could not be found in its records.
Upon investigation, AMC discovered that in 1998, Chua received from SHCI 18 Metrobank checks. These were all
payable to AMC and were crossed or for payee’s account only.
ISSUE: WoN MBTC’s fourth-party complaint against Chua’s estate should be allowed in order to enforce its right to
be reimbursed by Chua’s estate in case MBTC is held liable to AMC thus, applying Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court.
HELD: Yes. MBTC’s fourth-party complaint, as a contingent claim, falls within the claims that should be filed under
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
A distinctive character of MBTC’s fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature—the claim depends on the
possibility that MBTC would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not happen. This
characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in the claims falling under
the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court
Also, the specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the general provisions of
Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the
deceased should be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for
ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely apply suppletorily.
Procedure
SANTOS VS. MANARANG
FACTS: Don Lucas de Ocampo died with certain real and personal property which, by his last will and testament, he
left to his three children, and his wife was named as Executor. Among the debts mentioned in the will, are two in favor
of Santos.
The will was duly probated and a committee was regularly appointed to hear and determine such claims against the
estate as might be presented. This committee submitted its report to the court.
Santos, presented a petition to the court asking that the committee be required to reconvene and pass upon his claims
against the estate which were recognized in the will of the testator. Santos argued that his failure to present the said
claims to the committee was due to his belief that it was unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the testator, in
his will, expressly recognized them and directed that they should be paid. The inference is that had Santos’ claims not
been mentioned in the will he would have presented them to the committee as a matter of course; that Santos was led
to believe by this express mention of his claims in the will that it would be unnecessary to present them to the
committee; and that he did not become aware of the necessity of presenting them to the committee until after the
committee had made its final report.
This petition was denied by the court, and the Santos instituted the present proceedings against the administratrix of
the estate to recover the sums mentioned in the will as due him. Relief was denied in the court below, and he now
appeals to this court.
ISSUE (1): Did the court err in refusing to reconvene the committee for the purpose of considering plaintiff's claims?
HELD (1): first step – determine whether the claims were such as a committee appointed to hear claims against an
estate is, by law, authorized to pass upon.
(The claims are described in the will as debts. There is nothing in the will to indicate that any or all of them are
contingent claims, claims for the possession of or title to real property, damages for injury to person or property, real
or personal, or for the possession of specified articles of personal property. Nor is it asserted by the Santos that they
do. The conclusion is that they were claims proper to be considered by the committee.)
Second step – when and under what circumstances may the committee be recalled to consider belated claims? Section
689 provides that "The court shall allow such time as the circumstances of the case require for the creditors to present
their claims to the committee for examination and allowance; but not, in the first instance, more than twelve months,
or less than six months; and the time allowed shall be stated in the commission. The court may extend the time as
circumstances require, but not so that the whole time shall exceed eighteen months."
(This section supersedes the ordinary limitation of actions provided for in chapter 3 of the Code. It is strictly confined,
in its application, to claims against the estates of deceased persons. It is commonly termed the statute of nonclaims,
and its purpose is to settle the affairs of the estate with dispatch, so that the residue may be delivered to the persons
entitled thereto without their being afterwards called upon to respond in actions for claims, which, under the ordinary
statute of limitations, have not yet prescribed.)
"On application of a creditor who has failed to present his claim, if made within six months after the time previously
limited, or, if a committee fails to give the notice required by this chapter, and such application is made before the
final settlement of the estate, the court may, for cause shown, and on such terms as are equitable, renew the
commission and allow further time, not exceeding one month, for the committee to examine such claim, in which case
it shall personally notify the parties of the time and place of hearing, and as soon as may be make the return of their
doings to the court." If the committee fails to give the notice required, that is a sufficient cause for reconvening it for
further consideration of claims which may not have been presented before its final report was submitted to the court.
But, as stated above, this is not the case made by Santos, as the committee did give the notice required by law. Where
the proper notice has been given the right to have the committee recalled for the consideration of a belated claim
appears to rest first upon the condition that it is presented within six months after the time previously limited for the
presentation of claims. In the present case the time previously limited was six months from July 23, 1907. This
allowed Santos until January 23, 1908, to present his claims to the committee. An extension of this time under section
690 rested in the discretion of the court.
In other words, the court could extend this time and recall the committee for a consideration of Santos’ claims against
the estate if justice required it, at any time within the six months after January 23, 1908, or until July 23, 1908, Santos’
petition was not presented until July 14, 1909.
The bar of the statute of nonclaims is as conclusive under these circumstances as the bar of the ordinary statute of
limitations would be. It is generally held that claims are not barred as to property not included in the inventory. Also,
fraud would undoubtedly have the same effect. These exceptions to the operation of the statute are, of course, founded
upon the highest principles of equity.
But what is the plea of Santos in this case? Simply this: That he was laboring under a mistake of law—a mistake
which could easily have been corrected had he sought to inform himself; a lack of information as to the law governing
the allowance of claims against estates of deceased persons which, by proper diligence, could have been remedied in
ample time to present the claims to the committee. Santos finally discovered his mistake and now seeks to assert his
rights when they have been lost through his own negligence, Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. We conclude that the
trial court made no error in refusing to reconvene the committee for the purpose of considering Santos’ claims against
the estate.
ISSUE (2): WoN the court erred in dismissing his petition against the executor/administrator wherein he asks that the
administratrix be compelled to pay over to him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him.
HELD (2): The sum of money prayed for in the complaint due to the Santos is a debt. If it is a debt, the action was
erroneously instituted against the administratrix.
There is no indication that he desired to leave anything by way of legacy to any other person. These considerations
clearly refute the suggestion that the testator intended to leave Santos anything by way of a legacy. His claim against
the estate having been a simple debt, the present action was improperly instituted against the administratrix.
But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered as partaking of the nature of a legacy and disposed of
accordingly. If this be correct then the plaintiff would receive nothing until after all the debts had been paid and the
heirs by force of law had received their shares. From any point of view the inevitable result is that there must be a
hearing sometime before some tribunal to determine the correctness of the debts recognized in the wills of deceased
persons. This hearing, in the first instance, cannot be had before the court because the law does not authorize it. Such
debtors must present their claims to the committee, otherwise their claims will be forever barred.
ESTATE OF OLAVE VS. REYES

FACTS: The estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, represented by Jose S. Matute, consist of several parcels of land.
Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO) filed a civil case in CFI Davao against Carlos and Matias
Matute, co-administrators of the estate of Amadeo, for collection of alleged indebtedness.
CFI Manila, where the special proceeding of the estate of Amadeo was lodged, issued an order directing the
administrators to secure the probate court’s approval before entering into any transaction involving the seventeen (17)
titles of the estate including the property in Davao.
Carlo and Matias together with SAMCO submitted to the CFI Davao an Amicable Settlement whereby the property in
Davao was conveyed and ceded to SAMCO as payment of its claim; that the said Amicable Settlement signed by
Carlo and Matias was not submitted to and approved by the CFI Manila nor notice thereof made to the beneficiaries
and heirs in said special proceedings; that CFI Davao, despite the opposition of the other parties who sought to
intervene in ordinary case of collection of indebtedness, and despite the utter lack of approval of the probate court in
Manila, approved the said Amicable Settlement and gave the same the enforceability of a court decision which, in
effect, ceded the property in Davao to SAMCO in payment of its claim.
SAMCO and the judge of CFI Davao contend that the Amicable Settlement need not be approved by the probate
court, “the same having been entered into in another independent action and in another court of co-equal rank. Article
2032 of the Civil Code applies only to extrajudicial compromise entered into by the administrators of the estate. And
as an the alternative, lack of approval of the probate court of the Amicable Settlement does not render it null and void,
but at most voidable, which must be the subject matter of a direct proceeding in the proper CFI.”
ISSUE: WoN the CFI Davao erred in its order approving the Amicable Settlement without the requisite approval of
the probate court of Manila.
HELD: Yes.
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that “no action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or
interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; The claim of SAMCO being one arising
from a contract may be pursued only by filing the same in the administration proceedings in the CFI Manila for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Amadeo Matute Olave; and the claim must be filed within the period
prescribed, otherwise, the same shall be deemed “barred forever.” (Section 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court).
The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of
deceased persons. That way, the executor or administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether
it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to
apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely arrangement
may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of the administration, inasmuch as upon
the death of a person, his entire estate is burdened with the payment of all of his debts and no creditor shall enjoy any
preference or priority; all of them shall share pro-rata in the liquidation of the estate of the deceased.
It is clear that the main purpose of SAMCO in filing its claim in the CFI Davao was to secure a money judgment
against the estate which eventually ended in the conveyance to SAMCO of more than twenty-nine (29) hectares of
land belonging to the estate of the deceased Amadeo Matute Olave in payment of its claim, without prior authority of
the probate court of Manila which has the exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave. It was a
mistake on the part of CFI Davao to have given due course to collection case, much less issue the questioned Order
approving the Amicable Settlement.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that “the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.” The law is clear that where the
estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter
into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court.
Attorney’s Fee
SALONGA-HERNANDEZ (the Partnership) VS. PASCUAL
FACTS: Doña Adela died, leaving behind a last will and testament, designating Pascual as the executrix, as well as the
principal beneficiary of her estate. Pascual then engaged the services of the Partnership in connection with the
settlement of the estate of Doña Adela. Their agreement as to the professional fees due to the Partnership “shall be 3%
of the total gross estate as well as the fruits thereof based on the court approved inventory of the estate. Fruits shall be
reckoned from the time of Pascual’s appointment as executrix of the estate. The 3% final fee shall be payable upon
approval by the court of the agreement for the distribution of the properties to the court designated heirs of the estate.”
The Partnership filed a Notice of Attorney’s Lien equivalent to three percent (3%) of the total gross estate of the late
Doña Adela S. Pascual as well as the fruits thereof based on the court approved inventory of the estate, pursuant to the
retainer agreement signed by and between the Partnership and Pascual. The court approved the lien.
The Partnership filed a Motion for Writ of Execution for the partial execution of its attorney’s lien.
Pascual, through Atty. Antonio Ravelo, filed her comment and/or opposition to the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution on attorney’s fees. She argued that a lawyer of an administrator or executor should charge the individual
client, not the estate, for professional fees.
ISSUE: WoN a lawyer, who renders legal services to the executor or administrator of an estate, can claim attorney’s
fees against the estate instead of the executor or administrator.
HELD: As a general rule, it is the executor or administrator who is primarily liable for attorney’s fees due to the
lawyer who rendered legal services for the executor or administrator in relation to the settlement of the estate. The
executor or administrator may seek reimbursement from the estate for the sums paid in attorney’s fees if it can be
shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to the benefit of the estate. However, if the executor or administrator
refuses to pay the attorney’s fees, the lawyer has two modes of recourse. First, the lawyer may file an action against
the executor or administrator, but in his/her personal capacity and not as administrator or executor. Second, the lawyer
may file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings, asking the court to direct the payment of attorney’s fees as an
expense of administration. If the second mode is resorted to, it is essential that notice to all the heirs and interested
parties be made so as to enable these persons to inquire into the value of the services of the lawyer and on the
necessity of his employment.
[Administration expenses include attorney’s fees incurred in connection with the administration of the estate.It is an
expense attending the accomplishment of the purpose of administration growing out of the contract or obligation
entered into by the personal representative of the estate, and thus the claim for reimbursement must be superior to the
rights of the beneficiaries.36 Notwithstanding, there may be instances wherein the estate should not be charged with
attorney’s fees. If the costs of counsel’s fees arise out of litigation among the beneficiaries thereof themselves or in the
protection of the interests of particular persons, the estate generally cannot be held liable for such costs, although
when the administrator employs competent counsel on questions which affect his/her duties as the administrator and
on which he/she is in reasonable doubt, reasonable expenses for such services may be charged against the estate
subject to the approval of the court. It has also been held that an administrator who brings on litigation for the
deliberate purpose of defrauding the legitimate heirs and for his own benefit is not entitled to reimbursement for
counsel’s fees incurred in such litigation.]
The Partnership, in filing its Notice of Attorney’s Lien, initially intended to hold Pascual, and not Doña Adela’s estate,
liable for the attorney’s fees. It did identify itself as the lawyer of Pascual, and the Probate Court did note that the lien
be satisfied chargeable to the share of the executor. Yet it must also be noted that such lien, as it is, is only contingent
on the final settlement of the estate of Doña Adela, at such time, since the Retainer Agreement on which the lien is
hinged provides that the final fee “be payable upon approval by the court of the agreement for the distribution of the
properties to the court designated heirs of the estate.” This is also made clear by the order noting the lien, which
qualified that said lien was chargeable only to the share of Pascual, hence implying that at the very least, it may be
claimed only after her share to Doña Adela’s estate is already determinate.
RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
Recovery of Estate Property
HEIRS OF GREGOIRE VS. BAKER
FACTS: J. H. Ankrom died, and thereafter, A. L. Baker, qualified as his administrator.
The heirs of Rafael Gregoire filed a claim against the estate of Ankrom for sum of money based upon a judgment
rendered in the Supreme Court of the Republic of Panama. As the affairs of the estate stood upon the original
inventory, there appeared to be sufficient assets to pay all claimants; but while these intestate proceedings were being
conducted, Baker discovered that a year and a half before his death, Ankrom had executed a mortgage on the property
here in question in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Two days after this mortgage had been executed, Ankrom
appears to have made an assignment of all his interest in the mortgaged property to one J. G. Jung, of Cincinnati,
Ohio, for a purported consideration of the sum of P1 and other good and valuable considerations. In view of these
conveyances by his intestate, Baker presented an amended inventory, omitting therefrom the tract of 930 hectares with
its improvements thereon. The court made an order approving of the omission by the administrator of said property
from the inventory
ISSUE: What is the remedy of the creditors when there is deficiency of assets and the testator during his lifetime,
fraudulently conveyed some of his property?
HELD: When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or administrator to pay debts and expenses,
and when the deceased person made in his life-time such fraudulent conveyance of such real or personal estate or of a
right or interest therein, as is stated in the preceding section, any creditor of the estate may, by license of the court, if
the executor or administrator has not commenced such action, commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name
of the executor or administrator, an action for the recovery of the same and may recover for the benefit of the
creditors, such real or personal estate, or interest therein so conveyed. But such action shall not be commenced until
the creditor files in court a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge, conditioned to indemnify the
executor or administrator against the costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon the judgment by him so
recovered for the costs incurred and such other expenses as the court deems equitable.
The remedy of the heirs of Gregoire is, therefore, to indemnify the administrator against costs and, by leave of court,
to institute an action in the name of the administrator to set aside the assignment or other conveyance believed to have
been made in fraud of creditors.
SINFOROSO PASCUAL VS. PONCIANO PASCUAL
FACTS: The Sinforoso and Ponciano are legitimate children of the testratix, Eduarda de los Santos.
In 1940, while the proceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased Eduarda were pending in CFI-Rizal,
Sinforoso instituted in the CFI-Pampanga against Ponciano and others, an action for the annulment of a contract of
sale of a fishpond situated in Pampanga, supposedly executed without consideration by said deceased in her lifetime in
favor of Ponciano. Ponciano filed a motion to dismiss, alleging want of cause of action, limitation of action, wrong
venue and pendency of another action. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that the action should have
been brought by the executor or administrator of the estate left by the deceased, and directed the plaintiff to amend his
complaint.
ISSUE: WoN the action should have been filed by the executor and not by Sinforoso as heir?
HELD: No. Under Rule 86, section 1, of the new Rules of Court, actions for the recovery or protection of the property
or rights of the deceased for causes which survive may be prosecuted or defended by his executor or administrator.
Upon the commencement of the testate or intestate proceedings the heirs have no standing in court in actions of the
above character, except when the executor or administrator is unwilling or fails or refuses to act, in which event to
heirs may act in his place. Here, the fictitious sale is alleged to have been made to Ponciano et al, one of them, Miguel
S. Pascual, being the executor appointed by the probate court. Such executor naturally would not bring an action
against himself for recovery of the fishpond. His refusal to act may, therefore, be implied. And this brings the case
under the exception. It should be noted that in the complaint the prayer is that the fishpond be delivered not to
Sinforoso but to the executor, thus indicating that the action is brought in behalf of the estate of the deceased.
VELASQUEZ ET AL VS. GEORGE ET AL
FACTS: Velasquez et al are the widow and legitimate children of the late Benjamin B. George whose estate is under
intestate proceedings.
Velasquez et al alleged that the George et al are officers of the Island Associates Inc. (IAI).
Andres Muñoz, aside from being the treasurer-director of said corporation, was also appointed and qualified as
administrator of the estate of Benjamin George in the above special proceedings.
Without the proper approval from the probate court and without notice to the heirs and their counsel, George et al
executed a Deed of First Real Estate Mortgage in favor of mortgagee Villanueva, covering three parcels of land owned
by IAI. In said Deed, George et al also expressly waived their right to redeem the said parcels. Subsequently, a power
of attorney was executed by the George et al in favor of Villanueva whereby the latter was given the full power and
authority to cede, transfer, and convey the parcels of land within the reglementary period provided by law for
redemption.
Velasquez et al, therefore, filed the complaint for the annulment of several deeds and certificates.
A motion to dismiss was filed by George et al, and administrator Andres Muñoz on the ground that the trial court had
no jurisdiction over the case. The movants contended that the subject matter of the complaint referred to the corporate
acts of the Board of Directors of Island Associates, and, therefore, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC.
The Velasquez et al contend that the resolution of the validity of a mortgage contract is within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts, and certainly not within the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission
Villanueva further contends that Velasquez et al have no capacity to file the complaint because the general rule laid
down in Rule 87, Section 3 of the Rules of Court states that only the administrator or executor of the estate may bring
actions of such nature as the one in the case at bar. The only exception is when the executor or administrator is
unwilling or fails or refuses to act, which exception according to the Valenzuela does not apply in the present case.
ISSUE (1): WoN the SEC has jurisdiction over the present case.
HELD (1): What the complaint sought to annul were documents of title which vested ownership over the three parcels
of land in question to mortgagee Villanueva, who is neither an officer, a stockholder nor a director of the corporation,
but a third party. Clearly, the lower court had jurisdiction over the controversy.
The fact that the Velasquez et al subsequently questioned the legality of the constitution of the board of directors of
the corporation did not divest the court of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. What determines jurisdiction
of the court are the allegations in the complaint.
Whether or not the mortgage contract, with an unusual provision whereby the mortgagors waived their right to redeem
the mortgaged property, could be executed without proper approval of the probate court and without notice to the
widow and legitimate children of the deceased is a matter clearly within the authority of a trial court to decide. If in
the course of trial, the court believes that the validity of the composition of the board of directors is absolutely
necessary for resolution of the issues before it, the remedy is, at most, to require that one issue to be threshed out
before the Securities and Exchange Commission and to hold in abeyance, the trial on the merits of the principal issues
in the meantime. Certainly, the solution is not for the lower court to surrender its judicial questions to an
administrative agency for resolution.
ISSUE (2): WoN Velasquez et al is not the proper party to file the complaint affecting the estate of deceased.
HELD (2): The administrator, Andres Muñoz, is the same person charged by Velasquez et al to have voted in the
board of directors without securing the proper authority from the probate court to which he is accountable as
administrator.
Inevitably, this case should fall under the exception, rather than the general rule.
RIOFERIO ET AL VS CA
FACTS: Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties. He also left a widow, Esperanza
et al, and seven children.The deceased also left a paramour and their children, Riofero et al.
Rioferio et al executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the
properties of the estate of the decedent in favor of them, and were able to obtain a loan from the Rural Bank of
Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the same properties subject of the extrajudicial settlement.
Esperanza et al filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Angeles City, praying that letters of
administration encompassing the estate of Orfinada, Jr. be issued to them.
Esperanza et al filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased
Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles and Other Related
Documents with Damages against Rioferio et al, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of
Dagupan City before the RTC of Dagupan City.
Petitioners raised the affirmative defense that Esperanza et al are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of
Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.
ISSUE: WoN the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an administrator.
HELD: Yes.
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf
of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code “that (t)he rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.”
The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value
of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator
has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on
party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 and Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz. (1) if the executor or
administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit;30 and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in
the act complained of31 and he is made a party defendant.32 Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial
relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where
there is an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of the estate during
the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when there is no appointed
administrator such as in this case.
Provisional Authority of Probate Court
MODESTO VS. MODESTO
FACTS: Bruno Modesto died leaving several heirs, among them, Cerilio Modesto and Jesus Modesto. In the course of
the intestate proceeding, Jesus, acting as administrator of the estate of Bruno, filed in the CFI of Tacloban, Leyte,
motion to cite and examine under oath several persons, especially Cerilio regarding the properties concealed,
embezzled or fraudulently conveyed which was granted by the lower court.
Jesus filed a motion in court to require Cerilio to turn over to him the personal properties belonging to the intestate
supposed to be in Cerilio’s possession. Thereafter, writ of execution was issued. By virtue of it, the provincial sheriff
issued notice of attachment against the real property of Cerilio.
Cerilio filed an urgent motion to set aside the writ of execution and for writ of preliminary injunction which was
opposed by Jesus. The public auction was set and Jesus named as the highest and only bidder. Then, Certificate of
final sale in favor of Jesus was issued by the Provincial Sheriff. Cerilio filed motion for reconsideration, however, it
was denied by the CFI. In pursuance to the writ of possession filed by Jesus, the Provincial Sheriff issued a
notification to Cerilio placing Jesus in possession of the real property sold to him. Cerilio filed petition for certiorari to
annul the proceedings had before the CFI of Leyte.
ISSUE: Whether the CFI had the authority to decide whether the properties, real or personal, belong to the estate or to
the persons examined.
HELD: No. If an executor or administrator or any interested individuals in the estate of the deceased, complains to the
court having jurisdiction of the estate that a person/s are suspected of having possessed or having knowledge of the
properties left by a deceased person, or of having concealed, embezzled or conveyed any of the said properties of the
deceased, the court may cite such person/s to appear before it and may examine him or them on oath on the matter of
such complaint. In such proceedings the trial court has no authority to decide whether or not said properties, real or
personal, belong to the estate or to the persons examined. If, after such examination there is good reason to believe
that said person or persons examined are keeping properties belonging to the estate, then the next step to be taken
should be for the administrator to file an ordinary action in court to recover the same.
VALERA VS. INSERTO
FACTS: In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent spouses, Rafael Valera and
Consolacion Sarrosa — in which Eumelia Cabado and Pompiro Valera had been appointed administrators — the
heirs of a deceased daughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a motion asking that the Administratrix, Cabado, be
declared in contempt for her failure to render an accounting of her administration.
Cabado replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose Garin, Teresa's husband and the movant heirs'
father, delivered to the administrator an 18-hectare fishpond belonging to the estate and she in turn moved for the
return thereof to the estate, so that it might be partitioned among the decedents' heirs.
Jose Garin opposed the plea for the fishpond's return to the estate, asserting that the property was owned by his
children and this was why it had never been included in any inventory of the estate. The Court viewed the Garin Heir's
motion for contempt, as well as Carbado's prayer for the fishpond's return within the purview of Section 6, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court. The incident was set for hearing and thereafter, the court issued an order commanding the heir of
Teresa Garin to reconvey immediately the fishpond to the estate of the spouses.
ISSUE: Whether the probate court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the issue of title covering a
fishpond being claimed by an heir adversely to the decedent spouses
HELD: RTC, acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of
and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant
and all the Other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the
question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason
for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g., probate, land registration, etc., is
in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived.
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. As already earlier
stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the
question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and permanently, and
writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to
determine whether it should or should not be included in the inventory. This function of resolving whether or not
property should be included in the estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence,
although the Court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision
in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.
The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, expressly invoked by
the Probate Court in justification of its holding a hearing on the issue arising from the parties' conflicting claims over
the fishpond. The examination provided in the cited section is intended merely to elicit evidence relevant to property
of the decedent from persons suspected of having possession or knowledge thereof, or of having concealed,
embezzled, or conveyed away the same. Of course, if the latter lays no claim to the property and manifests willingness
to tum it over to the estate, no difficulty arises; the Probate Court simply issues the appropriate direction for the
delivery of the property to the estate. On the other hand, if the third person asserts a right to the property contrary to
the decedent's, the Probate Court would have no authority to resolve the issue; a separate action must be instituted by
the administrator to recover the property.
Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was merely provisional, not
binding on the property with any character of authority, definiteness or permanence, having been made only for
purposes of inclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced at the hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not
be subject of execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in himself (or in another) adversely to the
decedent, and whose right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These
considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedents' names
but in others.
In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the
presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling
evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be consider as the owner of the property in controversy until his
title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the
property itself is in the persons named in the title.
Damages Arising From Crime
ABS-CBN VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
FACTS: ABS-CBN executed separate complaint-affidavits charging Exequiel B. Garcia, Miguel V. Gonzales, And
Salvador Tan (Garcia et al) of several violation of penal laws when they went to the premises of ABS CBN and
informed the employees thereof regarding the forced closure of the premises of the station and stoppage of its
operation due to the LOI No. 1 issued by then Pres. Marcos during Martial Law. Benedicto, PH ambassador to Japan
and the principal stockholder of RPN 9, the only station allowed to broadcast during martial law, rented the studios
owned by ABSCBN and occupied the same during negotiation about the monthly rentals. Due to failure to reach the
desired monthly rental rate, the counsel for ABS-CBN demanded RPN 9 to vacate the studios and pay rentals but
respondents refused to do so. At the end of Marcos’ regime, ABS CBN was returned to the Lopez’ and allowed
operation. Unfortunately, the complaints previously filed were dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of probable
cause. Hence, the present petition. Noteworthy is the fact that Benedicto died during the pendency of the case and was
dropped as party herein.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil liability of Benedicto subsists even after his death, which extinguished his criminal
liability.
HELD: No. The rules on whether the civil liability of an accused, upon death, is extinguished together with his
criminal liability, has long been clarified and settled in the case of People v. Bayotas:
1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon.
As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability
ex delicto in sensostrictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as
a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) x xx e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended.
The separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible deprivation of right by prescription.
Applying the foregoing rules, ABS-CBN's insistence that the case at bench survives because the civil liability
of the respondents subsists is stripped of merit.
RULE 88: PAYMENT OF THE DEBTS OF THE ESTATE
ALDAMIZ VS. JUDGE OF CFI-MINDORO
FACTS: Aldamiz is the administrator of the testate estate of the deceased Santiago.
After ten years from the date of his appointment, Aldamiz, as administrator, through his attorney Juan L. Luna,
submitted his accounts for the years 1944, 1945 and 1946 and also a project of partition with a view to closing the
proceedings. On said date, the court approved the accounts but refused to approve the project of partition unless all
debts including attorney's fees be first paid. In the project of partition, it was expressly stated that attorney's fees, debts
and incidental expenses would be proportionately paid by the beneficiaries after the closure of the testate proceedings,
but the court refused to sanction this clause of the project. It is for this reason that right then and there, Atty. Luna, to
comply with the wishes of the court, without previously preparing and filing a written petition to have his professional
fees fixed, and without previous notice to all the interested parties, submitted evidence of his services and professional
standing so that the court might fix the amount of his compensation and the administrator may make payment thereof.
This failure to file a written claim and to notify the interested parties thereof was not due to bad faith or fraudulent
purpose but to an honest belief on the part of the respondent attorney that such requirements were not necessary under
the circumstance.
ISSUE: WoN the Court a quo erred in its order fixing the amount of attorney’s fees and issuing a writ of execution to
satisfy the same.
HELD: Yes.
We believe and so hold that the order of the respondent court fixing the amount of attorney's fees is null and void. The
correct procedure for the collection of attorney's fees, is for the counsel to request the administrator to make payment
and file an action against him in his personal capacity and not as an administrator should he fail to pay. If judgment is
rendered against the administrator and he pays, he may include the fees so paid in his account to the court.
The attorney also may, instead of bringing such an action, file a petition in the testate or intestate proceeding "asking
that the court, after notice to all persons interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator to pay it as an expense
of administration."
We also hold that the order of execution is null and void, not only because it was intended to implement the order
fixing the amount of attorney's fees, which in itself was null and void, but because a writ of execution is not the proper
procedure allowed by the Rules of Court for the payment of debts and expenses of administration. The proper
procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate or the sale or mortgage of real property of the deceased
and all debts or expenses of administration should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale or mortgage. The order for
the sale or mortgage should be issued upon motion of the administrator and with the written notice to all the heirs,
legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines, according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90, section 2. And when
sale or mortgage of real estate is to be made, the regulations contained in Rule 90, section 7, should be complied with.
Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs have entered into possession of their respective
portions in the estate prior to settlement and payment of the debts and expenses of administration and it is later
ascertained that there are such debts and expenses to be paid, in which case "the court having jurisdiction of the estate
may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in
what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue execution if circumstances require" (Rule 89, section 6; see
also Rule 74, section 4)
BUAN VS. LAYA
FACTS: A contingent claim for P50,000 was filed by Sylvia Laya against the intestate estate of the deceased Florenica
and Rizalina Buan.
The contingent claim was based on the fact that a Philippine Rabbit Bus, owned and operated by the spouses Buan,
collided with a private car resulting to the death of Juan Laya, the father of Sylvia Laya. The driver of the bus was
charged with homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and was sentenced therefor. The
heirs of Juan Laya had reserved the right to file a separate civil action, and they did so.
Administrators of the estate opposed the contingent claim, arguing that the same could not be allowed because it has
not been filed before the death of the spouses. The CFI of Tarlac admitted the claim, but denied that a portion of the
estate be set aside to answer for the claim. Counsel for administrator then moved to set aside the order, but before they
could do so, the civil action instituted in Manila was declared premature because the criminal conviction is not yet
final, and ordered plaintiffs therein to file an amended complaint, which they did so. The CFI of Tarlac then dismissed
the contingent claim on the ground that the reason for the same had ceased to exist. Assuming that an amended
complaint had been filed, still, the same had not yet been acted upon.
ISSUE: WoN the contingent claim may be admitted.
HELD: Yes.
A contingent claim is one that, by its nature, is dependent upon the happening of an uncertain event. It may or may not
develop into a valid claim, depending upon that uncertain event.
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased, Juan C. Laya, would succeed in the action brought in Manila against the
administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, is the uncertain event or
contingency upon which the validity of the claim presented in the administration proceedings depends. While the
contingent event had not yet happened, Sylvia has no claim upon the intestate estate, for such claim would only arise
after the event happened. As such, the contingent claim may not be dismissed.
Contingent claims follow the result of the action, and as such, the fact that the case is temporarily dismissed may not
terminate the claim, as only the final results of the action could do that. The rules provide that a contingent claim is to
be presented in the administration proceedings in the same manner as any ordinary claim, and that when the
contingency arises which converts the contingent claim into a valid claim, the court should then be informed that the
claim had already matured.
DINGLASA VS. ANG CHIA
FACTS: Ang Chia et al (administratix of the estate of Lee Liong) seeks the reversal of an order of the CFI Capiz,
issued in the intestate estate proceedings of the deceased Lee Liong, holding in abeyance the approval of their petition
for an extrajudicial partition and the closing of said proceedings until after the final termination of Civil Case No. V-
331 of the same court, entitled Rafael Dinglasan, et al., vs. Ang Chia et al, in her personal capacity and as
administratrix of the estate of Lee Liong.
The civil case concerns the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land.
ISSUE: WoN the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending the
termination of the separate civil action filed by the Dinglasan, et al.
HELD: No.
Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "actions to recover real or personal property from
the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator". What practical value would this provision have if
the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close the
intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the
ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by
another person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction. (Guzman vs. Anog and Anog, supra). These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold
that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs.
Another rule of court provides that "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order,
upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a
period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said
time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased
within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
interest of the deceased." (Section 17, Rule 3.) This rule also implies that a probate case may be held in abeyance
pending determination of an ordinary case wherein an administrator is made a party. To hold otherwise would be also
to render said rule nugatory.
RULE 89 SALES, MORTGAGES, AND OTHERENCUMBRANCES OF PROPERTY OF DECEDENT
Authority to sell/mortgage Estate Property
GODOY VS. ORELLANO
FACTS: In consideration of P1,000 received by Pañgilinan, a document was executed by her giving Godoy, an option
to buy a dredge for the sum of P10,000. It appears from that document that the dredge is the common property of the
vendor and of the brothers Orellano; that the condition was that Godoy was to pay the whole price of the dredge
within twenty days; and that said option was granted in accordance with the power of attorney executed by her co-
owners who reserved the right to ratify whatever sale might be made, or option granted by Pañgilinan, their attorney-
in-fact. The latter's co-owners did not ratify the option contract. Before the expiration of twenty days, Godoy was
ready to make complete payment of the price, but Pañgilinan failed to deliver the dredge. Then Godoy brought suit in
the CFI against Pañgilinan and the Orellanos praying that they be ordered to deliver the dredge, upon payment by him
of the sum of P9,000. The Orellanos set up in their answer a special defense alleging that the dredge in question was
the property of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, pending in the CFI, and under the administration of Pangilinan;
that Godoy perfectly knows that said dredge is under judicial control and could not be disposed of without judicial
authority, and that the court has never authorized the sale mentioned in the complaint filed herein.
Pañgilinan filed a separate answer, and alleged that Godoy, as well as the Orellanos, and the notary who prepared the
aforesaid option sale, were all aware of these facts, and they led her to believe that she had the authority to dispose of
the dredge in her name and by themselves; that believing herself to be under obligation to comply with the aforesaid
option deed, she applied to the court of probate for permission to sell the dredge in the sum of P10,000; that on the day
of the hearing of the motion, her co-defendants who had themselves authorized her by means of a power of attorney
on the ground that there were higher bidders and the best thing to do was to sell it at public auction; that in view of this
opposition, Pañgilinan asked the court that it be sold at public auction, and the court authorized said defendant to sell
it at public auction; that Pañgilinan did not at any time refuse to make delivery of the dredge to the Godoy, but that it
was the court that would not give her the authority to do so; and that she is all times ready to return the P1,000
received from the plaintiff and that she has tendered it several times, but that Godoy refused to accept it.
The judge a quo rendered judgment, ordering Pañgilinan to pay Godoy the sum of P2,000 with legal interest.
ISSUE: WoN the option contract between Pañgilinan and Godoy is void because of absence of authority of the court.
HELD: Yes.
Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of properties like the one under consideration
and the power of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of Pañgilinan, without authority of court, has no
legal effect, and this is the more so, since two of the said heirs are under age, and the others did not ratify the option
contract, as provided in the aforesaid power of attorney.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the Pañgilinan was not, in her capacity as judicial
administratrix of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, legally authorized to sell, or contract to sell, any property
belonging to said estate without the authority of the court, and the contract entered into by her with the Godoy,
without this authority, is null and void.
CFI OF RIZAL VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Elena Ong Escutin, executrix of testate estate of late Ponciano Ong Lacson, asked for authority from probate
court to sell a real property to pay taxes and claims against the estate. It was granted and thus was sold to Gan Heng
for P400K. The sale was perfected and taxes were paid for the estate. Felix Ong filed an opposition on the approval by
the court of such sale and offered P450K for such real property and prayed for the acceptance of such offer. Probate
court dismissed Felix Ong’s petition, and so did the CA. However upon MR of Felix Ong, the CA found that the
probate court committed grave abuse of discretion as such offer by Felix Ong was at a higher price and thus more
beneficial for the estate.
ISSUE: WoN the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the probate court’s approval of the sale to Gan
Heng.
HELD: Yes.
The sale to be annulled was a private sale and not thru public auction. Felix Ong had no legal personality to impugn
such sale of real property to Gan Heng. Felix was neither a creditor nor an heir to the estate. Also, he did not comply
with the bond requirement of Rule 89, sec 3 of the Rules. Persons interested on such property of the estate may be
prevented by posting a bond which is fixed by the court.
Furthermore, the subsequent motion filed by the executrix to withdraw the sale as the property in question is now
worth P1M is denied. Gan Heng was a purchaser in good faith and the estate had already benefitted from the payment
made by Gan Heng.
JARODA VS. CUSI
FACTS: The Special Proceeding was commenced by Antonio Tan (Tan) alleging that Carlos Villa Abrille died
intestate and that his heirs are his surviving spouse, 9 children (among them is petitioner Natividad Jaroda) and 4
grandsons, among them respondent Tan.
Tan was appointed special administrator.
Tan filed a petition for the withdrawal of sums from PNB alleging that these sums were registered in the name of the
deceased but they were actually held in trust for co-owners of Juna Subdivision. CFI granted this motion.
CFI issued to Tan letters of administration. Tan filed a petition alleging that the deceased was a manager and co-owner
of Juna Subdivision and praying for approval by the court of the power of attorney executed by him, on behalf of the
intestate estate, appointing himself to sell share of the estate in the subdivision lots. CFI granted the petition.
Jaroda moved to nullify the 2 CFI orders. CFI denied the motion for lack of merit. Jaroda elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE (1) WoN the CFI Order allowing the withdrawal of bank deposits was in abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction?
HELD (1): Yes.
Said withdrawal is foreign to the powers and duties of a special administrator. (Rule 80.2)
The CFI order was issued without notice to, and hearing of, the heirs of the deceased. The withdrawal of the bank
deposits may be viewed as within the powers and duties of a special administrator; but actually, it is a waiver by the
special administrator of a prima facie exclusive right of the intestate estate to the bank deposits in favor of the co-
owners of the Juna Subdivision. The bank deposits were in the name of the deceased so they belong prima facie to his
estate after his death. And until the contrary, the special administrator is without power to make the waiver or to hand
over part of the estate to other persons on the ground that the estate is not the owner thereof.
ISSUE (2): Whether or not the CFI Order approving the power of attorney is valid.
HELD (2): No.
The CFI order is void for want of notice and for approving an improper contract or transaction.
An administrator is not permitted to deal with himself as an individual in any transaction concerning trust property.
This is in view of the fiduciary relationship that they occupy with respect to the heirs of the deceased and their
responsibilities toward the probate court. A contrary ruling would open the door to fraud and maladministration, and
once the harm is done, it might be too late to correct it.
By the CFI’s order, administrator Tan came to be the agent of two different principals: the court and the heirs of the
deceased on the one hand, and the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other, in managing and disposing of
the lots of the subdivision. This dual agency of Tan rendered him incapable of independent defense of the estate's
interests against those of the majority co-owners.
Pahamotang v. PNB
Facts: Melitona Pahamotang died and was survived by her husband Agustin Pahamotang, and their 8
children, including Josephine and Eleonor. Agustin filed with the CFI of Davao City a petition for issuance
of letters administration over the estate of his deceased wife. Agustin was also appointed Josephine and
Eleonor's judicial guardian in an earlier case, also in the same CFI of Davao City. The intestate court issued
an order granting Agustin’s petition.
The late Agustin then executed several mortgages and later, sale of the properties with the PNB and Arguna
respectively. The intestate court approved the mortgage to PNB of certain assets of the estate to secure an
obligation. Agustin signed the document in behalf of the estate of Melitona. The heirs later questioned the
validity of the transactions arguing that the mortgage contracts entered into by Agustin with PNB, as well as
his subsequent sale of estate properties to Arguna are void because they never consented thereto. They assert
that as heirs of Melitona, they are entitled to notice of Agustin's several petitions in the intestate court
seeking authority to mortgage and sell estate properties. Without such notice, the orders that allowed
Agustin to mortgage and sell estate properties are void on account of Agustin’s non-compliance with the
mandatory requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court declared the real estate mortgage and the sale void but both were valid with respect to the
other parties. The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals; to the appellate court, petitioners
committed a fatal error of mounting a collateral attack on the foregoing orders instead of initiating a direct
action to annul them.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court
Ruling: Yes. Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that when an order authorizing the sale or encumbrance of
real property was issued by the testate or intestate court without previous notice to the heirs, devisees and
legatees as required by the Rules, it is not only the contract itself which is null and void but also the order of
the court authorizing the same.
Thus, in Maneclang vs. Baun, the previous administrator of the estate filed a petition with the intestate court
seeking authority to sell portion of the estate, which the court granted despite lack of notice of hearing to the
heirs of the decedent. The new administrator of the estate filed with the Regional Trial Court an action for
the annulment of the sales made by the previous administrator. After trial, the trial court held that the order
of the intestate court granting authority to sell, as well as the deed of sale, were void. On appeal directly to
the Court, it was held that without compliance with Sections 2, 4 and 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, the
authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would be null and void ab initio.
In the present case, the appellate court erred in appreciating laches against petitioners. The element of delay
in questioning the subject orders of the intestate court is sorely lacking. Josephine and Eleonor were totally
unaware of the plan of Agustin to mortgage and sell the estate properties. There is no indication that
mortgagor PNB and vendee Arguna had notified Josephine and Eleonor of the contracts they had executed
with Agustin. Although Josephine and Eleonor finally obtained knowledge of the subject petitions filed by
their father, and eventually challenged the 18 July 1973, 19 October 1974, 25 February 1980 and 07 January
1981 orders of the intestate court, it is not clear from the challenged decision of the appellate court when
they actually learned of the existence of said orders of the intestate court. Absent any indication of the point
in time when petitioners acquired knowledge of those orders, their alleged delay in impugning the validity
thereof certainly cannot be established. And the Court of Appeals cannot simply impute laches against them.
Rule 90 Distribution and Partition of the Estate
Partial Distribution
Gatmaitan v. Medina
Facts: Felicisimo Gatmaitan and Gorgonio Medina, widower and brother of the deceased, respectively, were
appointed as joint administrators of the estate of the late Veronica Medina. Gatmaitan filed an amended
inventory of the estate of Veronica amounting P31,336.60 which was oppossed by Gorgonio and Dominica
Medina on the ground that the same did not represent the true and faithful list of the properties left by the
deceased. The hearing and consideration of the amended inventory was then postponed.
The heirs of Veronica filed a "Motion for Partial Partition and Distribution," stating that the estate had no
debts and the heirs were all of legal age; that some of them were necessitous and in need of cash; and
praying that the share corresponding to each of the heirs be ordered partially distributed among the heirs
pending the final distribution of the estate. The court heard counsel for Gatmaitan and for the heirs or
oppositors, but without receiving any evidence whatsoever, promulgated the order granting said motion.
Gatmaitan, filed a motion for reconsideration, calling attention to the fact that, contrary to what the order
states, "he has not agreed to the partial distribution of the estate in the manner contained in the order", and
urging that "the sums ordered to be partially distributed are not warranted by the circumstances obtaining" in
the case and that, moreover, "the manner of distribution will work difficulties to the estate and to the heirs
themselves". The motion was denied for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether the order granting the partial distribution of the estate pending the termination of the testate
proceeding was proper.
Ruling: No, the partial distribution was not proper. A partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the
final termination of the testate or intestate proceedings should as much as possible be discouraged by the
courts and, unless in extreme cases, such form of advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The
reason for this strict rule is obvious — courts should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the
decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be adequately protected and all the rightful heirs assured of
their shares in the inheritance.
However, the order of partial distribution appealed from is unwarranted. Firstly, because appears that at the
time the questioned order was rendered, the amended inventory and appraisal filed by the administrator-
appellant was not yet even accepted, and it was still under consideration by the court, in view of an
opposition to the admission thereof by some of the heirs. Moreover, it seems that notices for the presentation
of claims by possible creditors of the estate had not yet been published, so that the period for the
presentation of claims had not as yet elapsed. Consequently, it cannot be safely said that the court had a
sufficient basis upon which to order a partial distribution of the properties, having in mind the adverse
effects that it might have on the rights of the creditors and the heirs alike.
Secondly, because no bond was fixed by the court as a condition precedent to the partial distribution ordered
as provided in Section 1 Rule 91.
QUASHA PENA v LCN CONSTRUCTION
*Other facts already given under previous topics.*
FACTS: The CA modified the RTC Order granting the 2n d motion for payment by deleting the awards of
P450,000.00 and P150,000.00 in favor of the children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere,
respectively. The appellate court adopted the position of LCN that the claim of LCN was an obligation of
the estate which was yet unpaid and, under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court, barred the
distribution of the residue of the estate.
Petitioners, though, insist that the awards in favor of the petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond
Triviere is not a distribution of the residue of the estate, thus, rendering Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised
Rules of Court inapplicable. Moreover, the subject RTC Order is a mere interlocutory order that does not
end the estate proceedings. Only an order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to
the proper distributees brings the intestate proceedings to a close and, consequently, puts an end to the
administration and relieves the administrator of his duties.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the RTC order is a distribution of the residue
NO. A perusal of the RTC Order would immediately reveal that it was not yet distributing the residue of the
estate. The said Order grants the payment of certain amounts from the funds of the estate to the petitioner
children and widow of the late Triviere considering that they have not received their respective shares
therefrom for more than a decade. Out of the reported P4,738,558.63 value of the estate, the petitioner
children and widow were being awarded by the RTC their shares in the collective amount of P600,000.00.
Evidently, the remaining portion of the estate still needs to be settled. The intestate proceedings were not yet
concluded, and the RTC still had to hear and rule on the pending claim of LCN against the estate of the late
Triviere and only thereafter can it distribute the residue of the estate, if any, to his heirs.
In addition, the 2nd paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court allows the distribution
of the estate prior to the payment of the obligations mentioned therein, provided that the distributees, or any
of them, gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs.
2. Whether the advanced distribution to the widow and children was justified
NO. Although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance distribution of the
estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following:
[1] only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject of
advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and
[2] the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding
obligations of the estate (second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90).
There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and widow their shares in the estate
prior to the settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very least, took
the same into consideration. Its Order is completely silent on these matters. It justified its grant of the award
in a single sentence which stated that petitioner children and widow had not yet received their respective
shares from the estate after all these years. In addition, there was no determination that the estate has
sufficient assets to ensure equitable distribution of the inheritance in accordance with law and the final
judgment in the proceedings. Taking into account that the claim of LCN against the estate of the late
Triviere allegedly amounted to P6,016,570.65, already in excess of the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of
the estate, the RTC should have been more prudent in approving the advance distribution of the same.
Order of Partition/Distribution
TORRES v ENCARNACION
FACTS: The petitioners Torres (surviving children of Quintin, one of Marcelo’s children) contest the
jurisdiction of the RTC Judge to issue the order directing them to deliver to the administrator of the intestate
estate of Marcelo de Borja (Marcelo), a certain parcel of land which is in petitioners' possession and to
which they assert exclusive ownership. They contend that the administrator's remedy to recover that
property is an action at law and not by motion in the intestate proceeding.
The subject property was included in the project partition made by the commissioners as part of the estate of
Marcelo and was assigned to Miguel (one of the heirs of Marcelo). Over the objection of Torres, et al. the
proposed partition was approved in February, 1946, and the order of approval on appeal was affirmed by the
SC in 1949.
ISSUE: Whether the probate court has jurisdiction to order the delivery of the subject property under Rule
90 Section 1 (distribution of residue)
HELD: YES. The probate court, having the custody and control of the entire estate, is the most logical
authority to effectuate this provision within the same estate proceeding, said proceeding being the most
convenient one in which this power and function of the court can be exercised and performed without the
necessity if requiring the parties to undergo the inconvenience, delay and expense of having to commence
and litigate an entirely different action.
There are factors present in the case which greatly reinforce the probate court's authority to make the order
under review: The partition here had not only been approved and thus become a judgment of the court, but
distribution of the petitioners had received the property assigned to them or their father's estate. And this
was not all. As the administrator had refused, on technical grounds, to turn over to them their or their father's
share, they moved for and secured from the probate court an order for the execution of the partition. And
when the administrator elevated the case to this Court on certiorari, they as respondents in that petition
vigorously defended the probate court's action. They complained bitterly that execution of the partition was
long overdue and that the administrator was unduly delaying the closing of the estate.
Imperial vs. Munoz
FACTS: The deceased is Fermina Bello Santos. She was survived by her spouse Luis Santos (respondent)
and an adopted daughter Purificacion Imperial (petitioner).
In a special proceeding for the Intestate Estate of Fermina, respondent Luis, was appointed as regular
administrator. He submitted projects of partition which divided the estate between respondent Luis and
petitioner Purificacion in the ratio of 5:3, respectively. The CFI Judge approved all projects of partition in
orders dated June 6, 1967 and April 26, 1968.
On June 18, 1968, respondent Luis filed a Motion for Correction of the Projects of Partition. He claims that
the same were erroneous as it did not conform with the ruling in Santillon vs. Miranda which states that
“when intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse, concurring with only one legitimate child, is entitled to one-half
of the estate of the deceased spouse” such that he should get ¾ while Purificacion gets ¼ of the estate.
Petitioner Purificacion opposed the Motion, arguing that the orders of the Court approving the projects of
partition are final orders and can only be corrected by appeal within 30 days. The CFI, however, granted the
Motion for Correction, hence, this petition.
ISSUES: Whether the orders approving projects of partition are final orders, hence subject to the 30-day
period for appeal.
HELD: The orders are final in character and should have been appealed by the party adversely affected
within the 30-day reglementary period provided for appeal.
Under Rule 109, Section 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from an order of the CFI where such
order determines... the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled.
The questioned orders therefore have become final and executory because of the failure of respondent Luis
to appeal on time. The fact that such orders could be erroneous is irrelevant since an erroneous decree or
judgment without legal authority and contrary to the express provision of the statute, is not void.
Recognition of Heirship
Lopez vs. Lopez
FACTS: The deceased is Emeterio Lopez. He died intestate and left no legitimate descendants, ascendants
or widow. Concepcion Lopez (petitioner-appellee) filed a petition in the intestate proceeding of the estate of
the deceased, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased and praying that she be
declared his universal heiress. This was opposed by the nephews and nieces of the deceased (oppositor-
appellants).
The Court appointed Atty, Pena as administrator of the estate. Atty. Pena later filed a Motion for Declaration
of Heirs and prayed that oppositor-appellants be so adjudged. The Court however, after hearing, issued an
order declaring petitioner-appellee as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased, entitled to the
rights accorded to her by law. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner-appellee still needs to maintain a separate action for recognition.
HELD: No. It is a well-settled rule that a person claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of a deceased
need not maintain a separate action for recognition but may simply intervene in the intestate proceedings, by
alleging and proving therein his or her status as such, and claiming accordingly the right to share in the
inheritance.
Guy vs. CA
FACTS: The deceased is Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim). His known heirs are his surviving spouse
and their children, which includes the petitioner Michael Guy.
Private respondent minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother, filed a
petition for letters of administration before the RTC of Makati. Respondents allege that they are the duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei.
Petitioner opposed and argued that respondents do not have the legal personality to institute the petition for
letters of administration as they failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance
with Article 175 of the Family Code. The RTC did not resolve this issue.
ISSUE: Whether respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation.
HELD: The ruling on the issue would be premature.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the
child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence adduced
by respondents in proving their filiation. It would be impossible to determine the same in this case as there
has been no reception of evidence yet.
NOTE: While the original action filed by respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the trial
court is not precluded from receiving evidence on respondents’ filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate,
including the determination of the status of each heir.
Reason: In partition suits and distribution proceedings, the other persons who might take by inheritance are
before the court. The declaration of heirship is appropriate in such proceedings.
There is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been
instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks
additional relief in the character of heir.
Rule 91 Escheats
In Re Estate of Lao Sayco
FACTS: The deceased is Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco. The Court appointed Chinaman Lao Chiama as
administrator of the estate.
During the proceeding, the Municipal Council of Mambajao appeared and prayed that since Lao Sayco died
in that pueblo without leaving any known legitimate successor, the real and personal property left by said
decedent should be awarded to it. Administrator Lao Chiama opposed on the ground that the decedent left a
nephew residing in China.
The Court, however, ordered that the properties be assigned to the Municipality. Hence, this appeal by Lao
Chiama.
ISSUE: Whether the escheat was proper.
HELD: No.
Section 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure
"When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippine Islands, leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the
same, the president and municipal council of the municipality where the deceased last resided, if he was an inhabitant of these Islands, or of the
municipality in which he had estate, if he resided out of the Islands, may, on behalf of the municipality, file a petition with the Court of First Instance of
the province for an inquisition in the premises; the court shall thereupon appoint a time and place of hearing and deciding on such petition, and cause a
notice thereof to be published in some newspaper of general circulation in the province of which the deceased was last an inhabitant, if within the
Philippine Islands, and if not in some newspaper of general circulation in the province in which he had estate. The notice shall recite the substance of
the facts and request set forth in the petition, the time and place at which persons claiming the estate may appear and be heard before the court, and
shall be published at least six weeks successively, the last of which publications shall be at least six weeks before the time appointed by the court to
make inquisition."

From the record of these proceedings it does not appear that there was made, at the request of counsel for the
president and the municipal council of Mambajao, the inquisition provided by law, specified in the
preinserted section, for the record is not accompanied by any certified copy of the inventory of the real and
personal property that belonged to the said decedent, with a statement of the places where the realty is
located. Neither is it shown to have been ascertained whether the deceased Chinaman executed any will
during his lifetime, or whether he left in Mambajao or in any other place in these Islands any relative entitled
to inherit from him, information in regard to which points might be furnished by those who were his friends
or with whom he had friendly dealings during his lifetime. Moreover the notice summoning the persons who
believed they were entitled to his property should have been published for at least six consecutive weeks,
and not for three as was directed in the order.
It is indispensable that the requirements contained in the above-quoted section of the said code should have
been complied with by making the inquisition with regard to the matters specified, at the instance of the
interested municipality. Furthermore, the person who lays claim to the property left by the decedent at death,
as the latter’s successor or heir, must prove his identity and rights.
Republic vs CA & Solano (G.R. No. 143483, January 31, 2002)
FACTS: The Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins (widow and French
national) before the RTC of Pasay City. Solano, the all-around domestic helper of Hankins filed a Motion
for Intervention claiming that the 2 parcels of land included in the estate of Hankins were donated to her.
The motion was denied by the RTC for the reason that "they miserably failed to show valid claim or right to
the properties in question (the alleged Deeds of Donation were missing at that time). The RTC escheated the
estate of the decedent in favor of the petitioner Republic. TCTs were issued both in the name of Pasay City.
7 years after the finality of the RTC order, Solano allegedly discovered the Deed of Donation. Solano filed a
petition to annul the RTC decision. She invoked lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the part of
respondent RTC to entertain the escheat proceedings because the parcels of land have been earlier donated
to her in 1983 and 1984 prior to the death of Hankins.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Solano, not being an heir but an alleged done, have the personality to be a claimant within the
purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of the Revised Rules of Court
YES. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise
an interested party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat.
2. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject parcels of land included in the escheat proceeding
YES, the RTC has jurisdiction. In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent
during the time that the escheat proceedings were being conducted and the lower court was not divested of
its jurisdiction to escheat them in favor of Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been
previously donated. We recall that a motion for intervention was earlier denied by the escheat court for
failure to show "valid claim or right to the properties in question. "Where a person comes into an escheat
proceeding as a claimant, the burden is on such intervenor to establish his title to the property and his right
to intervene. A fortiori, the certificates of title covering the subject properties were in the name of the
decedent indicating that no transfer of ownership involving the disputed properties was ever made by the
deceased during her lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear and convincing proof showing that the
subject lands had been conveyed by Hankins to Solano, the same still remained, at least before the escheat,
part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court was right not to assume otherwise.
3. Whether Solano’s claim was already barred by prescription
YES. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its
sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir.
In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-
service by the first comers." Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually
does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. The
procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time
limit is imposed within which such action must be brought.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years from the
date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality
or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be
barred forever." The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant;
on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting
their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment.
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27 June 1989
but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when Solano decided to contest the
escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals.
Obviously, private Solano's belated assertion of her right over the escheated properties militates against
recovery.
RULE 109. APPEALS IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Testate of Vda. De Biascan vs Biascan (G.R. No. 138731. December 11, 2000)
FACTS: Rosalina (acknowledged natural child) was appointed as Regular Administriatrix (RA) in the
intestate estate of Florencio. Maria (legal wife) intervened, filed an opposition and a motion to set aside
Rosalina’s appointment. The RTC order declared that Maria, Rosalina and German were entitled to
participate in the settlement proceedings and the motion to set aside the order appointing Rosalina as RA
was denied on April 2, 1981 which Maria received through her counsel on April 9, 1981. On June 6, 1981,
or fifty-eight (58) days after the receipt of the April 2, 1981 Order, Maria filed her motion for
reconsideration which Rosalina opposed. The records of the settlement proceedings were among those lost
in the November 15, 1981 fire in the Manila City Hall. Thus, on January 2, 1985, private respondent filed a
Petition for Reconstitution of the said records. Due to the delay caused by the fire and the reconstitution of
the records, it was only on April 30, 1985 that the RTC issued an Order denying Maria’s June 6, 1981 MR.
Maria died and in the settlement of her estate, the law firm (Siguion Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako Law
Office) engaged by the by the interim Special Administrator was allegedly made aware of and given notice
of the April 30, 1985 Order only on August 21, 1996 when its associate visited Branch 4 of the Manila RTC
to inquire about the status of the case.
April 22, 1996- A Notice of Appeal was filed by petitioner from the Orders dated April 2, 1981 and April
30, 1985 of the trial court. The stamp of the trial court on the first page of the notice indicated that it was
received by the trial court on September 20, 1996. A Record of Appeal dated September 20, 1996 was
likewise filed.
On October 22, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the appeal on the ground that the appeal was
filed out of time.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the mode of appeal was proper
YES. The ruling of the trial court that Maria, private respondent Rosalina Biascan and German Biascan were
entitled to participate in the settlement proceedings falls squarely under paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 109
of the Rules of Court as a proper subject of appeal. By so ruling, the trial court has effectively determined
that the three persons are the lawful heirs of the deceased. As such, the same may be the proper subject of an
appeal.
Similarly, the ruling of the trial court denying Maria’s motion to set aside the order appointing private
respondent as the RA of the estate of Florencio is likewise a proper subject of an appeal. The Court have
previously held that an order of the trial court appointing a regular administrator of a deceased persons estate
is a final determination of the rights of the parties thereunder, and is thus, appealable. This is in contrast with
an order appointing a special administrator who is appointed only for a limited time and for a specific
purpose.
2. Whether the appeal was filed out of time
YES. In special proceedings, such as the instant proceeding for settlement of estate, the period of appeal
from any decision or final order rendered therein is thirty (30) days, a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal being required. The appeal period may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires without an appeal or a motion for reconsideration or new
trial being perfected, the decision or order becomes final.
With respect to the Order dated April 2, 1981 issued by the trial court, petitioner admits that Maria received
a copy of the same on April 9, 1981. Thus, Maria or her counsel had thirty (30) days or until May 9 within
which to file a notice of appeal with record on appeal. She may also file a motion for reconsideration, in
which case the appeal period is deemed interrupted. Considering that it was only June 6, 1981, or a full fifty-
eight (58) days after receipt of the order, that a motion for reconsideration was filed, it is clear that the same
was filed out of time. As such, when the said motion for reconsideration was filed, there was no more appeal
period to interrupt as the Order had already become final.
3. Whether the order dated April 2, 1981 of the trial court did not become final and executory as no
opposition on its timeliness was filed and no ruling as regards its timeliness was made (petitioner
 concludes, any procedural defect attending the MR was deemed cured when the trial court, in its
April 30, 1985 order, took cognizance of the same and rendered its ruling thereon)
YES, it became final and executory. It is well-settled that judgment or orders become final and executory by
operation of law and not by judicial declaration. Thus, finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse
of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or motion for reconsideration or new trial is
filed. The trial court need not even pronounce the finality of the order as the same becomes final by
operation of law. In fact, the trial court could not even validly entertain a motion for reconsideration filed
after the lapse of the period for taking an appeal. As such, it is of no moment that the opposing party failed
to object to the timeliness of the motion for reconsideration or that the court denied the same on grounds
other than timeliness considering that at the time the motion was filed, the Order dated April 2, 1981 had
already become final and executory. Being final and executory, the trial court can no longer alter, modify, or
reverse the questioned order. The subsequent filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the
finality of the judgment or order.
REPUBLIC v NISHINA (G.R. No. 186053, November 15, 2010)
FACTS: Nisaida Sumera Nishina represented by her mother filed a verified petition for cancellation of birth
record and change of surname in the civil registry of Malolos, Bulacan. Her mother, Zenaida, is a Filipino,
her father is a Japanese (Koichi Nishina), he died.
Mother’s 2nd husband: Kenichi Hakamada, divorced. As they could not find any record of her birth at the
Malolos civil registry, respondents mother caused the late registration of her birth under the surname of her
mother’s 2nd husband, Hakamada.
Mother’s 3rd husband: Takayuki Watanabe (he later adopted Nisaida by a decree issued by the Tokyo Family
Court of Japan, the decree was also recorded in the civil registry of Manila). Later, it surfaced that her birth
was in fact originally registered at the Malolos Civil Registry under the name Nisaida Sumera Nishina,
hence, her filing before the RTC of her petition praying that her second birth certificate bearing the surname
Hakamada, issued through late registration be cancelled; and that in light of the decree of adoption, her
surname Nishina in the original birth certificate be changed to Watanabe.
The petition was granted in an order dated October 8, 2007. A copy of the order was received on December
13, 2007 by the OSG which filed, on behalf of petitioner, a notice of appeal.
Nishina filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it
did not file a record on appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 (appeal from the RTCs)
ISSUE: Whether a record of appeal is required
HELD: NO. Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or judgments in
special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which
such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the
administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person
appealing unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration
The above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the pendency of special proceedings. A record
on appeal in addition to the notice of appeal is thus required to be filed as the original records of the case
should remain with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and
distinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final.
In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other matter remained to be
heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting respondents petition for
cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry.
Rule 103 Change of Name

Valid Grounds

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. CA & MAXIMO WONG

FACTS: Maximo Wong petitioned for the change of his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. whichwas his name
prior to his adoption by Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong. It was averred that his use of the surname
Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry
when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any
implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus
hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to
his former surname.

RTC: Ruled in favor with Maximo (having complied with the necessary requisites)
OSG appealed the decision. Maximo's allegations of ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends were
unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition for change of name, rather for Maximo to cast aside the name
of his adoptive father is ingratitude to the memory of the latter.

CA: affirmed RTC’s decision

ISSUE: WON Maximo Wong may legally change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr.

HELD: YES. Maximo Wong may legally change his name.

Change of name is a privilege, given the proper or reasonable cause or compelling reason. It bears stressing
at this point that to justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:
a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
c) When the change will avoid confusion;
d) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien
parentage;
e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and
f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

Here, Maximo used a valid ground. Thus, he should be allowed to change his name as prescribed by law.
Morever, In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is
left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and
not all the best evidence available. Summarizing, in special proceedings for change of name, what is
involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the
sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results
in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the
courts.

A change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and
duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship; what is altered is
only the name.

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio v. Republic

FACTS: Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex
from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex
reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a
female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of
justice and equality.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is
no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied.

ISSUE: WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

HELD: No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right.

It may be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or
write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the
change of his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows
the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the
petition.
Republic v. Jennifer B. Cagandahan
G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC,
Laguna; such that, her name be changed to “Jeff” and her gender to “male”.

She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name “Jennifer Cagandahan”.
While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperpplasia (CAH), a condition where
the person thus afflicted possesses both male and female characteristics. She was also diagnosed to have
clitoral hypertrophy, small ovaries, no breast, and menstrual development. She alleged that for all interests
and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.

ISSUE: WON the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted.

HELD: Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex
as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Court views that where a person is
biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. The respondent here
thinks of himself as a male considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones. There is
preponderant biological support for considering him as a male.
Procedure
Republic v Aquino (1979)

Facts: John Li Kan Wan filed a petition for change of his name to John Sotto alleging (a) change of status
from Chinese to Filipino after he elected Filipino citizenship and (b) the confusion caused by his use of the
name John Sotto since childhood despite being registered as John Li Kan Wan.
Court issued order giving notice to all interested parties to appear before the court and state their objections,
and directed the publication of the order in a newspaper of general circulation in Nueva Ecija. The
Republic, through OSG, filed an opposition. Despite this, the court granted the petition.

Republic filed a petition for review citing the court’s lack of jurisdiction to hear the petition for omission in
the title of the petition of the new name asked for.

Issue: Is the Republic’s contention correct?

Held: Yes.

Under Section 2, Rule 103 of the New Rules of Court, the petition for change shall set forth inter alia, the
name asked for. The requirement is mandatory and compliance therewith is essential, for it is by such means
that the court acquires jurisdiction. Failure to include the name-sought to be adopted in the title of the
petition, and consequently in the notices published in newspapers is a substantial jurisdictional infirmity. For
publication to be effective, it must give a correct information. To inform, the publication should recite,
among others, the following facts: (a) the name or names of applicant; (b) the cause for which the change of
name is sought; and (c) the new name asked for.

Notices in the newspaper, like the one under consideration, usually appears in the back pages. The reader as
is to be expected, merely glances at the title of the petition. It is only after he has satisfied himself that the
title interests him that he proceeds to read down further. The purpose of which the publication is made, that
is, to inform, may thus be served.
Republic v Marcos (1990)

Facts: Pang Cha Quen filed a petition for the change of name of her minor daughter May Sia, alias Manman
Huang, also known as Mary Pang to Mary Pang dela Cruz. She explained that she caused her daughter to be
registered as an alien under the name of Mary Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname because the child’s
father, his previous husband, had abandoned them; that her daughter has always used the name Mary Pang;
that her daughter has grown to love his stepfather Alfredo dela Cruz, to whom Pang Cha Quen is currently
married; and that Alfredo gave his conformity to and signed the petition.

After due notice and with no opposition, the court granted the petition. Republic, through OSG, appealed to
the Supreme Court raising (i) lack of jurisdiction over the case and (2) petition’s failure to adduce proper
and reasonable cause for change of name.

Issue: Is the Republic correct?

Held: Yes, on both issues.

1. The title of the petition failed to include the name Mary Pang as one of the names that the minor has
been allegedly using. This omission is fatal to the petition even if such other aliases are mentioned in the
body of the petition. In Republic vs. Zosa, G.R. No. 48762, September 12, 1988, this Court explained
the reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted and the other names or
aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition, or in the caption of the published order. It is that the
ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the caption of the published order or the title of the petition in
a special proceeding for a change of name. Only if the caption or the title strikes him because one or all
of the names mentioned are familiar to him, does he proceed to read the contents of the order. The
probability is great that he will not notice the other names or aliases of the applicant if they are
mentioned only in the body of the order or petition.---In view of the defect, the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject of the special proceedings.

2. The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of name:
a. when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
b. when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
c. when the change will avoid confusion;
d. having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of his
alien parentage; or
e. a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
not to prejudice anybody.

The reason cited by petitioner are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule is that a change
of name should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another where
none actually exists. Our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person not
their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname of their mother’s husband, who is not their father, can
result in confusion of their paternity.

Moreover, the Rules require that the petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to
change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by some other person in his behalf. In this case,
however, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia. Only May Sia herself, alias Manman
Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall have reached the age of majority, may file the petition to change her
name. The decision to change her name, the reason for the change, and the choice of a new name and
surname shall be hers alone to make. It must be her personal decision. No one else may make it for her. The
reason is obvious. When she grows up to adulthood, she may not want to use her stepfather’s surname, nor
any of the aliases chosen for her by her mother.The State has an interest in the name borne by each
individual for purposes of identification and
the same should not be changed for trivial reasons like the instant case. A change of name is a mere
privilege and not a matter of right.
RA 9255: An act allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father

In Re: Petition of Julian Wang (2005)

Facts: Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor child born in Cebu, assisted by his mother, filed a petition for
change of name. The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time
because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in
Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a
person’s name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his
current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they
are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin
language since they do not have the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that
the name of the minor Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang, thus
dropping his middle name.

The court denied the petition for lack of valid reason for dropping the change of name. Petitioner filed a
petition for review on certiorari, asking the court to determine whether or not dropping the middle name of a
minor child is contrary to law (citing Article 174 of the Family Code).

Issue: Should the petition for change of name be granted?

Held: No. The only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience.
However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and
convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and
difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change
of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when
he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of
the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our
laws.

Notes: In addition to the five reasons for change of name cited in Republic v Marcos, a person may be
allowed to change his name when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.

Name is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method of indicating
the identity of persons. The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name,
and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth
or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies the
family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by
the parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.

A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual
from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name.
(3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause
and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and
intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.

Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish
him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the
father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father
recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given
name and his mother’s surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized
illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private
handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and his father’s
surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the middle
name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized
illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
Republic v Capote (2007)
Facts: Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovani
Nadores. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and
Diosdado Gallamaso. He was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as
such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; and
[Giovanni] has been known by that name since birth. His father never took up his responsibilities as such.
Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to
that of his mother’s surname. Further, Goivanni’s mother might eventually petition him to join her in the
US and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso may complicate his status as natural child.

Upon order of the court, publication of the petition was made. Court also directed that the local civil
registrar and the OSG be sent a copy of the petition and order. After reception of evidence, the trial court
granted the petition. OSG appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in granting the petition in a summary
proceeding.

Issue: Is the OSG’s contention correct?

Held: No. While OSG is correct in its stance that proceedings for change of name should be adversarial, it
cannot void the proceedings on account of its own failure to participate therein. The trial court complied
with publication proceedings. Despite notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition, including the
OSG.

Further, the law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a
petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural
requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence
presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil
Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has
always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized
by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join
her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.

Note: The Court cited here the case of Julian Wang. Check niyo ung Notes dun sa case digest na un, guys.
RA 9048 &10172 Clerical Error Law

BATBATAN VS. OFFICE OF LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR

FACTS: Petitioner Eligia Batbatan is the mother of two minor children, Jorge Batbatan Ang and Delia
Batbatan Luy. The surnames were taken from then name and alias of their father, Ang Kiu Chuy, alias
Sioma Luy. Petitioner and Sioma Luy were never married, and Sioma Luy is married to another woman.
Petitioner filed the petition to remove the name of the father so that the son would be Jorge Batbatan and the
daughter would be Delia Batbatan. The petition was denied by the trial court on the grounds that the records
show that it was the petitioner who supplied the information in the birth certificate of her son and daughter,
and that the entries in the records of birth are correctable only if the effect would not change status,
citizenship, or any substantial alterations. Such changes must be decided in the appropriate proceeding.

ISSUE: WoN the trial court is correct.

RULING: No.
The changes sought by petitioner would not affect the status of the children because they are illegitimate in
the first place. The law requires that illegitimate children should carry the surname of their mothers and that
is precisely what the petitioner was trying to achieve here.
A clerical error implies mistakes by the clerk in copying or writing, the making of wrong entries in the
public records contrary to existing facts. An error is not clerical if it affects substantial matters, if its
correction will bring about a substantial change.
LEE VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: The respondents are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng
(Legitimate Children).
The petitioners are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan (Illegitimate Children).
The legitimate children filed two (2) separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the
records of birth of the Illegitimate Children. Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and
erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name
of “Keh Shiok Cheng” as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name “Tiu Chuan,” who is
allegedly the petitioners’ true birth mother.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is
improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition,
which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has
already prescribed.

ISSUE #1: WoN resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is proper
HELD #1: Yes. The proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a particular fact, status and/or right. Stated
differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of
certain events which created or affected the status of persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of
rights.

The petitions filed by the Legitimate Children for the correction of entries in the Illegitimate Childrens’
records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for
Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to them as shown in their birth records. Contrary to the
Illegitimate children’s contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn
legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that they are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to
establish that the former are not the latter’s children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation
at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and the Illegitimate Children.

ISSUE #2. Whether or not the private respondent’s suits amounted to a collateral attack against petitioner’s
legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding
HELD #2: No.
In the leading case of Republic vs. Valencia, Although recognizing that the changes or corrections sought to
be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, this Court, sitting en banc, held
therein that even substantial errors in a civil register may be corrected and the true facts established provided
the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. In the said case,
we also laid down the rule that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register
under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary
proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied with. (specifically, Sections
3,4 & 5)
“If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and / or cancellation of entries in the record of
birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as “summary.” There
can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any
interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and for corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon
become adversary proceedings.”

Appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding:

“If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register] is merely to correct the clerical
errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for
the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are
substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and
wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the
allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted, x x x.”
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy
granted upon mere application or motion. But this is not always the case, as when the statute expressly
provides. Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary. One only has to take a look at the procedure
outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108
requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec. 4).
The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by
the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrar and any person in interest are also required to file
their opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting
the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting
the same (Sec. 7).

[Here, the court explained Art. 412 of the Civil Code as amended by RA 9048 and the reasons of flip-
flopping decisions of SC in previous cases]

ART. 412: does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections
or changes must be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure
contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature. Thus, it is important to note that Article
412 uses both the terms “corrected” and “changed.” In its ordinary sense, to correct means “to make or set
right”; “to remove the faults or errors from” while to change means “to replace something with something
else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.

The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on
the basis of the effect that the correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries
in the civil register may be changed or corrected under Article 412.

RA 9048: Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed
without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The obvious
effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the
civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and
corrections in entries of the civil register.

RA 9048 is Congress’ response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to what exactly is that
so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished
from that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a substantial kind. For we must
admit that though we have constantly referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to
categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary
procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot
be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective application.

ISSUE #3: WoN the action has already prescribed.

HELD #3: No.Inasmuch as no law or rule specifically prescribes a fixed time for filing the special
proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the following provision of
the New Civil Code that applies:

“Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the
time the right of action accrues.”

The right of action accrues when there exist a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements, namely:
a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and
c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff.
It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has
arisen. It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The last element of their cause of
action, that is, the act of their father in falsifying the entries in petitioners’ birth records, occurred more than
thirty (30) years ago. Strictly speaking, it was upon this occurrence that private respondents’ right of action
or right to sue accrued. However, we must take into account the fact that it was only sometime in 1989 that
private respondents discovered that they in fact had a cause of action against petitioners who continue to use
said falsified birth records.

Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents of their right to
establish the truth about a fact, in this case, petitioners’ true mother, and their real status, simply because
they had discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common father at a much later date. This
is especially true in the case of private respondents who, as their father’s legitimate children, did not have
any reason to suspect that he would commit such deception against them and deprive them of their sole right
to inherit from their mother’s (Keh Shiok Cheng’s) estate. It was only sometime in 1989 that private
respondents’ suspicions were aroused and confirmed. From that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5)
years had lapsed. Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date of the
registration of the last birth among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not from the date private
respondents had discovered the false entries in petitioners’ birth records in 1989. Petitioners base their
position on the fact that birth records are public documents, hence, the period of prescription for the right of
action available to the private respondents started to run from the time of the registration of their birth
certificates in the Civil Registry. We cannot agree with petitioners’ thinking on that point. It is true that the
books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public documents and shall be
prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. Petitioners liken their birth records to land titles, public
documents that serve as notice to the whole world. Unfortunately for the petitioners, this analogy does not
hold water. Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a person’s parentage cannot be acquired by prescription. One is
either born of a particular mother or not. It is that simple.
REPUBLIC VS. KHO

FACTS: Respondent Carlito and his siblings filed petition for correction of entries in the civil registry of
Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of
his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.
Correction sought:
1. the citizenship of his mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese,"
2. deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" because his parents, Juan
Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally married.
3. with respect to the birth certificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that the date of his and his wife’s
marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage
certificate.
4. Carlito’s second name of "John" be deleted from his record of birth
5. name and citizenship of Carlito’s father in his (Carlito’s) marriage certificate be corrected from "John
Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to "Chinese," respectively.
6. In the birth certificates of Carlito’s children, correction that the first name of their mother be rectified
from "Maribel" to "Marivel."
Carlito et al presented documentary evidence showing compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of
the petition and testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of Carlito and his mother, Epifania.

The OSG argued the ff:

1. failure of Carlito et al to implead the minors’ mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer
sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to the questioned “married” status of Carlito and
his siblings’ parents, and the latter’s citizenship.
2. the trial court erred in ordering the change of the name of “Carlito John Kho” to “Carlito Kho” despite
non-compliance with jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE #1: Whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlito’s parents rendered the trial short of the
required adversary proceeding and the trial court’s judgment void.
HELD #2: No.
The correction/changes sought by Carlito et al involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless
and innocuous nature, but rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments.
This Court in Republic v. Benemerito, observed that the obvious effect of RA 9048 is to make possible the
administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in
the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate
adversarial proceedings. When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the
appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register
is satisfied.

Also, this court held in Barco vs CA, that the publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108
cured the failure to implead an indispensable party.

The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the
petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under
Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x x x x x

Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person. The
decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for
its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the
case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
ISSUE #2: Whether the trial court erred in ordering the change of the name of “Carlito John Kho” to
“Carlito Kho” despite non-compliance with jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Rule 103
of the Rules of Court.
HELD #2: No.
With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birth certificate of his name from “Carlito John” to “Carlito,” the
same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the
cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of name falls under letter “o” of Section 2 of Rule
108. Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs petitions for change of name)
were not complied with, observance of the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought
for.
KILOSBAYAN VS. ONG
FACTS: Respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, announced an
appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the
vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.

The appointment was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by Malacañang in view of the question relating to the
citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong.

There is no indication whatever that the appointment has been cancelled by the Office of the President.
Respondent Executive Secretary stated that the appointment is "still there except that the validation of the
issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)."

Kilosbayan Foundation contend that the appointment is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Kilosbayan Foundation claim that Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that
his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. The birth certificate reveals that at the time of
respondent Ong’s birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.
Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after Ong’s birth his father was finally
granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born
Filipino citizen. Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the appointment
issued to Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.

Ong’s Comment: Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen; that when respondent Ong was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was
naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in the naturalization.
Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an
identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution,
since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.

Kilosbayan’s Reply: reiterated that Ong’s birth certificate, unless corrected by judicial order in non-
summary proceedings for the purpose, is binding on all and is prima facie evidence of what it states, namely,
that Ong is a Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he was a minor would not make
him a natural-born Filipino citizen.

ISSUE: WoN Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

HELD: No.

He is still required to submit evidentiary documents. In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar,
docketed as B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that date, Ong
alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino
citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was
naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became
a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted his birth certificate and the
naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and that
his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a
Chinese citizen. It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of
naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.
It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged
subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend
the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with
his father.

Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register
can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial
change. Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative proceeding to
correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality.
Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should,
therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The series of
events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong’s ancestors, by various
births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial
proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would
have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still
appears in the records of this Court.

Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-
line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court as
that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing
so.
Rule 108 - Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry
Republic vs. Belmonte
FACTS: Private respondent herein filed with the CFI of Baguio a petition for the change of her name from
ANITA PO to VERONICA PAO. She also sought court permission to have her birth records corrected in
that her father’s name appearing as PO YU be corrected to PAO YU and her mother’s name recorded as
PAKIAT CHAN be changed to HELEN CHAN. She alleged that the maiden name of her mother is HELEN
and that PAKIAT is actually the given name of her maternal grandmother. While her father’s name PAO
YU was erroneously written in her birth certificate as PO YU. She therefore claims that her real surname is
PAO. She assigns these alleged errors to the common misunderstanding of Chinese names.
She also averred that she had been baptized and christened as VERONICA PAO and that since her
childhood up to the present, she had always been known and referred to as VERONICA PAO and not
ANITA PO.
The OSG opposed the petition and sought its dismissal. It argues that the remedies prayed for by the
petitioner cannot be allowed by the mere submission of the said petition since a petition for change of name
and a petition for correction or cancellation of entries in the Civil Register are distinct and separate and
provide for different requirements.
ISSUE: Whether a petition for change of name and the correction of certain entries in the civil registry be
joined in the same proceeding.
HELD: The procedure in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not substitute one for the other
for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of
Court allowing the change of one’s name or correction of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious
grounds. If both reliefs are to be sought in the same proceedings all the requirements of Rule 103 and 108
must be complied with. (SO PWEDE?)
In this case however, the corrections sought by the petitioner involve the very identity of her parents.
The propriety of such corrections should first be determined in a different proceeding more adversary in
character than the summary case at bar. The summary procedure for correction of the civil register under
Rule 108 is confined to innocuous or clerical errors and not to a material change in the spelling of a surname
as prayed for by petitioner. A clerical error must be apparent on the face of the record and should be capable
of being corrected by reference to the record alone. The petitioner seeks more than just the correction of a
clerical error.
Moreover, under Sec. 3 of Rule 108, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby should be made parties to the proceeding. In this case, the civil registrar
was not made a party. Said civil registrar being an indispensable party, a final determination of the case
cannot be made.
Co vs. Civil Register of Manila
FACTS: Petitioners Hubert Tan Co and Arlene Tan Co filed a petition for correction of entries in the Civil
Register. They allege that they are born in the Philippines and the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng. At
the time of their birth, their father was still a Chinese citizen. Thereafter, their father applied for
naturalization under LOI No. 270 and was conferred Philippine citizenship under P.D. No. 1055. They claim
that since they were still minors at the time their father was naturalized, then they became Filipino citizens
as well through the derivative mode of naturalization under C.A. No. 473. Petitioners now pray for the
correcting and changing of entries in their respective birth certificates as to the citizenship of their father
from CHINESE to FILIPINO.
The RTC dismissed their petition outright on the ground that the father was conferred Philippine
citizenship under P.D. No. 1055 and not C.A. No. 473, hence they cannot claim derivative naturalization.
ISSUE: Whether the petition is proper.
HELD: Yes. LOI No. 270 and C.A. No 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified aliens residing
in the Philippines, and while they provide for different procedures, both have the same purpose and
objective. They are statutes in pari materia, hence they should be construed together. C.A. No. 473 which
grants derivative naturalization to minor children should be similarly applied to the minor children of those
naturalized under LOI No. 270. The petitioners’ recourse to Rule 108, therefore, is appropriate.
The proceedings in Rule 108 are summary if the entries in the civil register sought to be corrected are
clerical or innocuous in nature. However, where such entries sought to be corrected or changed are
substantial, i.e., the status and nationality of the petitioners or the citizenship of their parents, the
proceedings are adversarial in nature. Sec. 4 regarding notice and publication will now apply in this case.
Braza v. Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental
Facts: Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died in a vehicular accident.
During the wake, Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and introduced themselves as
the wife and son, respectively, of Pablo. Cristina made inquiries in the course of which she obtained
Patrick’s birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which stated that: (1) Pablo is
the father of Patrick having acknowledged by the father on January 13, 1997; and, (2) Patrick was
legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name was changed to Patrick
Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille
were married in 1998.
Cristina and legitimate children with Pablo filed before the RTC of Negros a petition to correct the entries in
the birth certificate record of Patrick in the Local Civil Registry. They contended that Patrick could not have
been legitimated by the supposed subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is
bigamous on account of a valid and subsisting marriage between she and Pablo. Cristina and her children
also prayed for the court to direct to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit
Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation
The trial court dismissed the petition holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court,
which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA
test, and that the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
Issue: Whether the court may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an action to
correct entries in the civil registrar
Ruling: No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on
legitimacy and filiations.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an
entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally
be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A
clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or
a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is
clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations
may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due
process is properly observed.
Cristina’s cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being
bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on 15 March 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively;
hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to
emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition
filed before the court a quo.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas
Facts: Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 2000. On 18 January 2005, he married a Filipina named Daisylyn Sto. Tomas.
Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after their wedding. He
returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise her wife but was shocked to discover that
Daisylyn was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert went back to Canada and
filed a petition for divorce which was granted.
Two years later, Gerbert fell in love with another Filipina. In his desire to marry his new Filipina fiancée,
Gerbert went to Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on their
marriage certificate. Despite its registration, an NSO official informed Gerbert that their marriage still exists
under Philippine Law; and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must be judicially recognized by a
Philippine court.
Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved, with the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition and requested for the same prayer.
RTC denied Gerbert’s petition contending that Art. 26 (2) applies only to Filipinos and not to aliens.
Issue: Whether the registration of the foreign divorce decree was properly made.
Ruling: No, the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is
not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil
registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without
judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be
complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil
registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been
met in the present case, the petition filed by Gerbert with the RTC cannot be considered as one filed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
This ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign
divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108
of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Rule 102 Habeas Corpus

Nature, Scope and Function

Gonzales vs. Viola
FACTS: Appellant Gonzales was placed under arrest by order of the appellees and detained in the municipal
jail of San Miguel, Bulacan. A few hours later, a criminal complaint was filed against him and on the same
day, he was released on bail.
When the hearing on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was had in the CFI, the appellant was already
out on bail. Said court denied the petition, hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether appellant is entitled to the grant of the writ of habeas corpus.
HELD: No. The restraint of liberty which would justify the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus must be
more than a mere moral restraint; it must be actual or physical.
It is settled that a person out on bail is not so restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus.
NOTE: In passing upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus a court or judge must first inquire whether the
petitioner is restrained of his liberty. Only where such restraint obtains is the court required to inquire into
the cause of the detention, and if the alleged cause is found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted
and the petitioner discharged.
In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo De Villa
FACTS: By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, petitioner Reynaldo De Villa was found guilty of rape
of his niece by affinity. He is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison.
He now files a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of purportedly exculpatory
evidence, gathered after performing DNA test on samples collected from the petitioner and the child born to
the victim.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for the writ of habeas of corpus is proper.
HELD: No. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ is that the individual seeking such relief be
illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an
individual’s liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ is unavailing.
Concomitant to this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to directly assail a judgment
rendered by a competent court or tribunal. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus has very limited availability as a
post-conviction remedy.
Review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
only in very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such
excess. In this case, petitioner did not allege any of such grounds.
Jurisdiction
Angeles vs. Director of New Bilibid Prison
FACTS: Petitioner Rolando Angeles was convicted for the offense of selling methamphetamine
hydrochloride sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment as provided in the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425).
He now files this petition for writ of habeas corpus invoking R.A. No. 7659 which has reduced the penalties
under the provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act and the ruling in People vs. Sunga which has confirmed
the retroactive application of the amendatory law.
The newly prescribed penalty for his offense would now be prision coreccional. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the range of indeterminate penalty on petitioner should thereby be from 6 months of arresto
mayor as minimum to 6 years of prision correccional as maximum.
ISSUE: Whether the petition can be granted.
HELD: No, the petition is premature because it appears that petitioner has only served the minimum of his
sentence. (He may however be entitled for parole.)
Nonetheless, aware of the need to have the matter attended to with great dispatch as to the prisoners who
may be due for release, the Court sees it fit to take the opportunity, by way of extraordinary measures, to
pronounce thusly:
All courts of competent jurisdiction may entertain petitions for habeas corpus to consider the release of
prisoners convicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act who have served the maximum of the
applicable penalties newly prescribed by R.A. No. 7659. In this regard, the formalities required for petitions
for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally, and such petitions, although deficient in form (e.g. in letter-
petition forms), may be entertained so long as they are sufficient in substance. The courts to which the
petitions are filed may refer the matter to CHR or to the PAO for possible assistance to the prisoners
concerned.
When Proper
Tijing vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioners are husband and wife. They had a baby named Edgardo Tijing Jr. Petitioner wife
Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita. Bienvenida usually allows Angelita
to take care of the baby while she does the laundry. One day, Bienvenida had an urgent laundry job and
asked for Angelita to wait until she returned. Upon return Angelita and the baby were gone. Bienvenida later
learned that Angelita has already changed residence. The spouses looked for Angelita and their son to no
avail, until four years later, they read in a tabloid the death of the common-law husband of Angelita in
Hagonoy, Bulacan.
They found a child who is claimed by Angelita as his son, named as John Thomas Lopez. The spouses now
files for a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The RTC granted the petition but the CA reversed the same
for the reason that Bienvenida failed to establish that she was the mother of the minor.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for habeas corpus is proper.
HELD: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto. Thus, it is a proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child
even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. In these cases, the question of
illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a
remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. Hence, the
question of identity is relevant and material.
Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is
the person upon whom they have rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the minor, petitioners
cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody.
In this case, the evidence is sufficient to establish that John Thomas is Edgardo Jr.:
- Angelita could no longer bear children as she had ligation
- Angelita’s common-law husband is sterile
- The same husband admitted to his brother that John Thomas is adopted
- The midwife who allegedly delivered the child of Angelita was not presented in court
- The birth certificate of John Thomas was filed by the common-law husband and not by the midwife,
and only after four months from the alleged birth
- The child and Bienvenida had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Therefore, John Thomas is indeed the son of petitioners and the writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain the
custody of said child.
In re Ashraf Kunting
FACTS: Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the
Malaysian Police turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest
issued by the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan. Kunting was charged with 4 counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and
Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC of Isabela City.
Kunting was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp Crame for booking and
custodial investigation. Kunting was detained at Camp Crame due to the high security risks. Kunting filed an Urgent
Motion for Reinvestigation with the RTC of Basilan. The PNP even requested the DOJ Prosecutor to transfer of the
venue of the trial from Isabela City to Pasig City. The RTC denied Kunting’s Motion and directed the PNP to turn
over Kunting to Basilan. On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 and that he was never
informed of the charges filed against him.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for habeas corpus will prosper
HELD: NO.

The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and if found illegal,
the court orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus
proceedings terminate. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason
of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment.

In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by
virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by the RTC Judge of Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-
IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court.
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention. In
accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged
since he has been charged with a criminal offense.
Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Order dated February 11, 2005 reiterated its Order dated September
15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
to turn over Kunting to the court. TThe trial court has been waiting for two years for the PNP-IG to turn over the
person of Kunting for the trial of his case. The PNP-IG has delayed the turn over because it is waiting for the DOJ to
request for the transfer of venue of the trial of the case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. In its Comment, the
OSG stated that the PNP-IG is presently awaiting the resolution of the Motion for Transfer of Venue it requested from
the DOJ. In this regard, t the Police Chief Superintendent is, therefore,directed to take positive steps towards action on
said motion.
When Improper
VELASCO v CA

FACTS:A warrant of arrest was issued against accused Lawrence Larkins in Criminal Cases for violations of B.P. Blg.
22. On 20 November 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before NBI a complaint-affidavit accusing
Larkins of the crime of rape. Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, Larkins was arrested in his office in
Makati and was then as then detained at the NBI. Larkins posted bail in his BP. 22 case and the Judge issued an order
recalling and setting aside the warrant of arrest and directing the Jail Warden of the NBI to release Larkins from
confinement "unless otherwise detained for some other cause. The NBI Special Investigators refused to release
Larkins because he was still detained for another cause, specifically for the crime of rape for which he would be held
for inquest.
A complaint against Larkins was executed by Alinea. Larkins filed an Urgent Motion for Bail and thereafter, through
a new counsel filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release,
principally based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. The RTC the Court found no legal or valid grounds
to dismiss the complaint or release the accused, or to grant him bail.
Unable to accept the ruling, Larkins' common-law wife, Felicitas, filed before the CA a petition for habeas corpus
with certiorari. The CA ordered the release of Larkins on account of the fact that Larkins was detained without a
warrant of arrest for rape
ISSUE:
1. Whether the common-law wife has legal standing to file the petition for Habeas Corpus
YES. She falls within the purview of the term "some person" under Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, which
means any person who has a legally justified interest in the freedom of the person whose liberty is restrained or who
shows some authorization to make the application. However, she is NOT the real party in interest in the certiorari
aspect of the petition. Only Larkins could institute a petition for certiorari to set aside the order denying his motions
for bail and for the dismissal of the complaint against him.
Note: It does not, follow that if certiorari is available to Larkins, an application for a writ of habeas corpus will
absolutely be barred. While ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when there is an adequate remedy
by writ of error or appeal or by writ of certiorari, it may, nevertheless, be available in exceptional cases, for the writ
should not be considered subservient to procedural limitations which glorify form over substance. It must be kept in
mind that although the question most often considered in both habeas corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an
inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, the former involves a collateral attack on the judgment and "reaches the
body but not the record," while the latter assails directly the judgment and "reaches the record but not the body."
2. Whether the petition for writ of Habeas Corpus will prosper
NO. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What
is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of
habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such
as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.
Among such supervening events is the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person.
Another is the filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the accused is detained, as in the instant
case. By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of
habeas corpus is no longer available. Section 4 of Rule 102 reads in part as follows: "Nor shall anything in this rule be
held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with . . . an offense in the Philippines."
The trial court order denying the motion to bail qualifies as a process within the meaning of Section 4 of Rule 102. A
judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also, the
means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses and orders of courts
of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a writ, summons or order issued in a judicial proceeding to
acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment, or a writ, warrant,
mandate or other process issuing from a court of justice.
Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will not prosper
because his detention has become legal by virtue of the filing before the trial court of the complaint against him and by
the issuance of the order denying the motion for bail.
CABALLES v CA

FACTS: Caballes was charged with rape of a minor. Because the petitioner was charged with a non-bailable offense,
he was detained. He filed a petition for bail which was denied. He filed MR but without waiting for the resolution, he
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his right to speedy trial had been violated on account of various
postponements and on the failure of the prosecution to promptly serve the subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to
its witness (the medico-legal). The RTC MR as having been abandoned upon the filing of his motion to dismiss the
case without waiting for the resolution of the MR on the petition for bail. Judge Laurea also inhibited from the case.
Caballes then filed with CA a "Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition." As required by the CA,
Caballes filed a manifestation that he had chosen his petition to be treated as a petition for habeas corpus without
prejudice "to the concomitant application of certiorari if the court considered the same necessary or appropriate to give
effect to the writ of habeas corpus." He averred that (a) he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case; (b) Judge Laurea erred in inhibiting himself from the case; (c)
the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion in denying his petition for bail. The CA denied the petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether a petition for certiorari from the decision of the CA dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
is proper
NO. The period for appeal from the judgment of any court in habeas corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48) hours from
notice of the judgment appealed from. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
Following the rule, the petitioner should have appealed to this Court from the CA decision denying his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, as well as the denial of his motion for reconsideration thereof; instead, the petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The well-settled rule is that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved party’s
remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist
with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to
the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive. An appeal in this
case would still have been a speedy and adequate remedy. Consequently, when the petitioner filed his petition in this
Court, the decision of the CA was already final and executory.
A decision in a habeas corpus action stands in no different position than with any other proceeding and if the appealed
decision is to be reviewed by an appellate court, the remedy is by writ of error because the error committed by the
court is an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction.
2. Whether a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to assail the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s
motion to dismiss the case, the denial of the petition for bail, as well as the voluntary inhibition of Judge
Laurea.
NO. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of
liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s function.28 It cannot
take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of
error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is
addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ
is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of
trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances
are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of
reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the
trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not
destroyed.It has also been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not
render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not
illegal.
3. Whether a petition for habeas corpus can be joined with a petition for certiorari
NO. The two remedies are governed by a different set of rules. Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court mandates
that the joinder of causes of action shall not include special actions or actions governed by special rules, thus
proscribing the joinder of a special proceeding with a special civil action. The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral
attack on the processes, orders, or judgment of the trial court, while certiorari is a direct attack of said processes,
orders, or judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches only jurisdictional errors. It has no other use, except to bring before the court
a record material to be considered in exercising jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches the record. On the other hand,
a writ of habeas corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also reaches jurisdictional matters but does not reach the
record.
4. Whether Caballes is entitled to the writ
NO. The records show that the Caballes was charged with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua and was detained
based on the said charge; hence, if the evidence of his guilt is strong, he shall not be admitted to bail regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution. The trial court had jurisdiction over the offense charged and over the person of the
petitioner. The jail warden has the authority and, in fact, is mandated to detain the petitioner until granted bail by the
court, or the case against him dismissed, or until he is acquitted after trial. The petitioner failed to establish that his
incarceration pendente lite was illegal, and likewise failed to establish exceptional circumstances warranting the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the CA.

5. Whether a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be filed if one is deprived of his right to a
speedy disposition of the case
IT DEPENDS. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be filed if one is deprived of his right to a
speedy disposition of the case under Article IV, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution and of his right to due process.
However, the petitioner never invoked in the trial court his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case
against him. What he invoked was his right to a speedy trial under Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
He invoked his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case against him, for the first time, only in the Court
of Appeals when he filed his petition for habeas corpus.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy
trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of
his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
In this case Caballes’ own counsel contributed to the delay. Moreover, he failed to establish any serious prejudice by
the delay of the trial, and that the State deliberately delayed the trial to prejudice him.
Note: Proper remedies:

a. Denial of petition for bail: petition for certiorari in the CA (, his petition would have been granted because as gleaned from the assailed
order of the trial court, it failed to summarize the testimonies of the private complainant and that of her mother)
b. Voluntary inhibition of the judge: petition for certiorari and/or prohibition in the CA
c. Violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial: Section 8, Rule 119 ROC; petition for certiorari and/or a petition for mandamus
to compel the trial court to comply with the timeline provided for by the said Rule for trial and termination of the case
Ilusorio v Bildner

FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, lawyer, is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of
pesos. Erlinda and Potenciano were married for 30 years, have 6 children and in 1972, they separated from bed and
board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse,
Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. In 1997, upon
Potenciano’s arrival from the US, he stayed with Erlinda for about 5 months in Antipolo. 2 of their children alleged
that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant
drug prescribed by his doctor in NY, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated.
In February 1998, Erlinda filed with the Antipolo City RTC a petition for guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano due to his advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium, Makati.
Erlinda filed a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano and enforce consortium as the wife. She
alleged that respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo City. On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano is to annul that portion of the decision of the CA giving
Erlinda visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the CA from enforcing the visitation rights.
ISSUE: Whether the petition of writ of habeas corpus will prosper?
HELD: NO. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation
of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potencianos’ liberty that
would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano is about 86 years of age, or under medication
does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical
condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
The CA observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of
the court. Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial
choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to
some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the
CA that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true
restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. With his full mental
capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental
constitutional right.
Note: The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda
never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject’s sanity. When the court
ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in
case of violation or refusal to comply. The CA missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit
a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons,
he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. No court is empowered as a
judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of
habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is
best left to the man and womans free choice.
Feria vs CA
Facts: Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention by reason of his conviction of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide. petitioner sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau
of Corrections in Muntinlupa City but the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the
requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information.3 It was then
discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were missing. Petitioner
prayed for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid
judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.The RTC dismissed the case on the
ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor
authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of
the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.Petitioner argues that his detention
is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court, and that the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas
corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment.OSG maintains that public respondents
have more than sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioner’s continued
incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court,
the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized.
Issue: Whether the detetion of petitioner is proper after the destruction or loss of his criminal records.
Ruling: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. It secures
to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and
to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may
also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.
Petitioner’s claim is anchored on ground that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a
copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due process. Based on the
records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the
fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention. In Criminal Case No. 60677
(Robbery with Homicide) the accused admitted in open Court that a decision was read to him in open Court
by a personnel of the respondent Court (RTC Branch II) sentencing him to Life Imprisonment. The records
also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 198519 of then Judge Rosalio A. De
Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on January
11, 1985.
There is also no showing that petitioner duly appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, hence for all intents and purposes, such judgment has already become final and executory. When
a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or
decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. Put another way, in order that a judgment may be
subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be void for lack of jurisdiction.
WRIT OF AMPARO
Nature and Scope
Sec. of Defense vs. Manalo
Facts: Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU
on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and
torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007. Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for
Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from
depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalo’s subsequently filed a manifestation and
omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition. On December 26, 2007, the Court of
Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and
the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalo’s and the court with all official and unofficial
investigation reports as to the Manalo’s custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two
military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under
military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC
seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.
Issue: Whether the issuance of writ of amparo is proper.
Ruling: Yes. The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity
in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal
of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the
Manalo’s right to security. The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities. Understandably, since their
escape, the Manalo’s have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat
to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape
reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured,
and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a
petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained
Standing -Sec. 2
CANLAS vs NAPICO HOMEOWNERSGR
Facts: Petitioners, Armando Q. Canlas, Miguel D. Capistrano, Marrieta Pia are settlers in a certain parcel of
land situated in the Brgy. Manggahan, PasigCity. Their dwellings have either been demolished as of the time
of filing of the petition or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. Petitioners claim that
respondents Napico hold fraudulent and spurious titles. Thus, they filed a petition for writ of amparo to
summon some unprincipled Land Officials as they allege to answer their participation in the issuance of
fraudulent titles to NAPICO. The rule on writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings or
disappearances.
Issue: Whether the writ of amparo is a correct remedy for the petitioners.
Ruling: No. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.

The writ of amparo does not cover the cause of the petitioners. The threatened demolition of a
dwelling by a virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included among the enumeration of rights
covered by the writ. Also, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land in question is not
alleged at all in the petition.
Salcedo vs. Judge Bollozos

Facts: Complainant Ruben Salcedo was supervising a construction over a property, when Jose Tanmalack
and heavily armed men arrived and forces themselves inside the property. The complainant averred that
Tanmalack and his companions harassed and threated to kill and harm him and his workers. This prompted
complainant to go to police station to report the matter. The arrested Tanmalack and brought him for
questioning. Tanmalack represented by his sister filed a handwritten petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus
and the Writ of Amparo. Respondent Judge Gil Bollozos issued the Writ of Amparo which cause the
released of Tanmalack.
Issue: Whether the issuance of Wit of Amparo is proper.
Ruling: No. The respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo in Tanmalack’s favor. Had he read
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more closely, the respondent judge would have realized that the
writ, in its present form, only applies to "extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof."3 The present case involves concerns that are purely property and commercial in nature – concerns
that we have previously ruled are not covered by the Writ of Amparo.

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations
of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond
those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a
writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands – requires that
every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit: xxx

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with
the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses
of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;

The Writ of Amparo ought not to have been issued by the respondent judge since Tanmalack’s
petition is fatally defective in substance and content, as it does not allege that he is a victim of "extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or the threats thereof." The petition merely states that he is "under
threat of deprivation of liberty with the police stating that he is not arrested but merely ‘in custody.’"
Also, nowhere in the records of the instant complaint that the issuance of the writ of amparo was
attended by irregularities. The detainee’s sister who filed the petition is allowed under Section 2(b) of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo (SC A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC).
Reliefs – Secs. 4, 10, 12, 14-16, 20
Razon, et al. vs. Tagitis, et al., G.R. No. 182498
Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration of the SC’s Dec. 23, 2009 Decision, which found that “the
government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these
organizations, together with Col. Kasim, were fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of Engineer
Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis).” The Decision was based on the finding that Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col.
Kasim) informed the respondent Mary Jean Tagitis (respondent) that her husband, Tagitis, “had been under
surveillance since January 2007 because an informant notified the authorities, through a letter, that Tagitis
was a liaison for the Jema’ah Islamiah (JI); that he was "in good hands" and under custodial investigation for
complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, a
"Balik Islam" charged with terrorism (Kasim evidence).”
Prior to the issuance of the Decision, Col. Kasim was killed in an encounter with the Abu Sayaff group. The
petitioners then moved for the reconsideration of the above Decision on the ground that Col. Kasim's death
renders impossible compliance with the Court's directive that Col. Kasim be impleaded in the present case
and held accountable with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his "assets" on the
enforced disappearance of Tagitis. Additionally, the petitioners point out that the intelligence "assets" who
supplied the information that Tagitis was under custodial investigation were personal to Col. Kasim; hence,
the movants can no longer comply with the Court's order to disclose any information known to Col. Kasim
and his "assets."

Issue: Should the motion for reconsideration be granted?

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that although its directive to implead Col. Kasim as a party to the present
case has been rendered moot and academic by his death, the petitioners' motion for reconsideration should
still be denied for lack of merit.
“The extinction of Col. Kasim's personal accountability and obligation to disclose material information,
known to him and his assets, does not also erase the burden of disclosure and investigation that rests with the
PNP and the CIDG. Lest this Court be misunderstood, we reiterate that our holding in our December 3, 2009
Decision that the PNP -- through the incumbent PNP Chief; and the PNP-CIDG, through its incumbent
Chief -- are directly responsible for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their
offices regarding the disappearance of Tagitis; and that the conduct of proper investigation using
extraordinary diligence still subsists. These are continuing obligations that will not truly be terminated until
the enforced disappearance of the victim, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis, is fully addressed by
the responsible or accountable parties.”
Burden of Proof – Sec. 17
Yano, et al., vs. Sanchez, et al.,

Facts: Cleofas Sanchez and Marciana Medina (respondents) alleged that on September 17, 2006 at around
8:00 p.m., their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their
home in Sitio Dalin, Barangay Bueno, Capas, Tarlac; that at around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, September 18,
2006, Nicolas' "wives" Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at home, heard gunshots and saw
armed men in soldiers' uniforms passing by; that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day, Lourdez and Rosalie
went out to check on Nicolas and Heherson but only saw their caps, slippers, pana and airgun for catching
frogs, as well as bloodstains; and that they immediately reported the matter to the authorities. The
respondents alleged that Josephine Galang Victoria, also known as Antonina Galang (Josephine), niece of a
neighbor, later informed them that she had seen two men inside Camp Servillano Aquino of the Northern
Luzon Command (Nolcom) in San Miguel, Tarlac City on September 21, 2006 and in Camp of the Bravo
Company of the Army's 71st Infantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita on September 4, 2006. Contending
that the victims' life, liberty and security had been and continued to be violated on account of their forced
disappearance, respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of Amparo, the production of the victims'
bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the inspection of certain military camps, the issuance of temporary
and permanent protection orders, and the rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo.
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals stated that there is no link between respondents individual military
officers to the disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson. According to the CA, the evidence adduced in the
present case failed to measure up to that standard- substantial evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. However, the CA granted the petitioners some reliefs in the
interest of human rights and justice – inspections of the military camps.
Issues: 1. Does the failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the
performance of duty result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ?
2. Is the CA correct in granting a relief to the respondents despite finding that petitioners are not
accountable for the disappearance of the victims?

Ruling:
1. No. The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the
performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does
not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or
inaction on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move
and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs.

2. No. The provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious
determination of the amparo petition. For the appellate court to, in the present case, still order the
inspection of the military camps and order the army units to conduct an investigation into the
disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson after it absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs
granted by the appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a finding that petitioners could not
be held accountable for the disappearance of the victims.
Burgos vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.,

Facts: Jonas Joseph T. Burgos ' a farmer advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan (a
chapter of the militant peasant organization Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas) ' was forcibly taken and
abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant,
located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. The security guard
noted the plate number and reported the incident to his superiors as well as to the police on duty in the said
mall.

The plate number was discovered to be registered to a vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. It was
later confirmed that the vehicle was previously seized by Cpl. Castro Bugalan and Pfc. Jose Villeña of the
56th Infantry Battalion (IB) of the Philippine Army for transporting timber without permit was impounded
in the 56th IB headquarters whose commanding officer at that time was Lt. Col. Noel Clement.

In its Decision, the CA found that the evidence the petitioner (Jonas’ mother) presented failed to establish
her claimed direct connection between the abductors of Jonas and the military. The CA also held that “since
the petitioner has established that the vehicle used in the abduction was linked to a vehicle (with license
plate number TAB 194) impounded at the headquarters of the 56th IB, it became the burden of the AFP to
exercise extraordinary diligence to determine the why and the wherefore of the loss of the license plate in
their custody and its appearance in a vehicle (a maroon Toyota Revo) used in Jonas' abduction. The CA also
ruled that the AFP has the burden of "connect[ing] certain loose ends".

Issue: Was the investigation conducted by the PNP and AFP sufficient for the requirements of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo?

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there are very significant lapses in the handling of the
investigation. The PNP-CIDG failed to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female)
of the five abductors of Jonas based on their interview of eyewitnesses to the abduction. No search and
certification were ever made on whether these persons were AFP personnel or in other branches of the
service, such as the Philippine Air Force. Based on these, the Supreme Court concluded that further
investigation and monitoring should be undertaken. The SC then resolved to refer the present case to the
CHR as the Court's directly commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the investigation of the
Burgos abduction and the gathering of evidence, with the obligation to report its factual findings and
recommendations to the Court.
Boac, et al. vs. Cadapan

Facts: Armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeno (Karen) and Manuel Merino
(Merino) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and
Concepcion Empeño filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court, impleading then Generals Romeo
Tolentino and Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez and
Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. This petition for habeas corpus was later on
consolidated with the subsequent Petiiton for Writ of Amparo.
In ruling the case against the petitioners, the Court of Appeals relied on the testimony of Raymond Manalo,
who the three with his very own eyes as they were detained and tortured together. His narration and those of
the earlier witnesses, taken together, constitute more than substantial evidence warranting an order that the
three be released from detention if they are not being held for a lawful cause.
Issues:
a) whether the testimony of Raymond Manalo is credible;
b) whether the chief of the AFP, the commanding general of the Philippine Army, as well as the heads of the
concerned units had command responsibility over the abduction and detention of Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino; and
c) whether there is a need to file a motion for execution to cause the release of the aggrieved parties.

Ruling:
a. Yes. Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo
Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the
pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, also corroborate
respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention.
b. Yes. However, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify
those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes
an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal
responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the
rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may
well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further
investigation by the appropriate government agency.
c. No, there is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. The
Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen,
rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory
motions in view of the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice
it to state that a motion for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy
being offered by an amparo proceeding.
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
Nature and Scope
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ (Tapuz) vs. Hon. Judge Elmo Del Rosario. SPOUSES SANSON &
MA. LOURDES T. SANSON (Sps. Sanson)
FACTS: Sps. Sanson filed with MCTC (Aklan) a complaint for forcible entry and damages with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against Tapuz. He alleged that they are the
registered owners and possessors of the disputed land, until Tapuz armed with bolos and carrying firemarms,
entered the disputed land by force and intimidation. Tapuz, in his answer denied all the allegations and
claimed that they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; on the contrary, the Sps. Sanson
are the intruders; and their certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious.
MCTC: ruled in favor of Sps. Sanson
RTC: granted Sps. Sanson’s motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and motion
for demolition.

The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen
(15) days after the Sheriff’s written notice to Tapuz to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the Sps.
Sanson to effectively take actual possession of the land.
Tapuz thereafter filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of
Demolition in CA.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition. Hence, the present petition
for certiorari with writs of amparo and habeas data.
ISSUE: W/N petition for certiorari with writ of habeas data is proper
HELD: NO. issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in form.
The writ of habeas data is intended to address the unjustified/ unlawful violation of the right to privacy
related to life, liberty and security, which was not concretely alleged in this case to merit an issuance of writ.
Allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the
petition fatally deficient. Here, no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to
privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less
demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already
set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the
insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for
the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the “fishing expedition” that the Court—in the
course of drafting the Rule on habeas data—had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas
data is not. Thus, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in
order
P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO (Felxberto) vs. DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ,
and FERDINAND T. CRUZ (Sps. Cruz)
Facts: Spouses Cruz leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to
vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which
intended to utilize it for local projects. The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the
Spouses Cruz.
MTC: rendered judgment against Spouses Cruz and issued an alias Writ of Demolition in favor of the
Province. Spouses Cruz filed a motion for TRO in the RTC, which was granted. However, the demolition
was already implemented before the TRO issuance.
Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a
memorandum issued by Governor instructing him to “protect, secure and maintain the possession of the
property,” entered the property.
Sps. Cruz refused to turn over the property. Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined
the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their
indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats.
Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data. Respondents averred that despite the
Permanent Injunction, Felixberto et al. unlawfully entered the property with the use of heavy equipment,
tore down the barbed wire fences and tents, and arrested them when they resisted petitioners’ entry.
Issues:
1. WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights; and,
2. WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case already filed.

Held:
1. Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the writs is
limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not only actual but
also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Section 1. Habeas Data.—The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.”
Tapuz v. Del Rosario also teaches: “What it is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.”
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, Spouses Cruz must meet the threshold requirement that
their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently,
the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents.
Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life,
liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property.
It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat
to their life, liberty and security.
2. Petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as
tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute.
Sps Cruz’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal
proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto. Validity of the arrest
or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not
before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be
made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.
MELISSA C. ROXAS vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
Facts: Roxas is an American Citizen of Filipino descent. While in the USA, Roxas enrolled in an exposure
program to the Philippines with a group called BAYAN-USA. She then joined a group called BAYAN-
TARLAC in a health survey in La Paz, Tarlac. While in the course of her immersion and while doing her
work, 15 heavily armed men tied her up, blindfolded, and detained her for being a member of Communist
Party of the Philippines-New People s Army (CCP-NPA). She was subjected to 5 days straight of
interrogation and torture to convince her to abandon her communist beliefs and return to the fold.
On. May 25, 2009 Petitioner was finally released and warned that she must not report what she went through
to a group called Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family. Even after her release,
she continued to receive calls from RC via the cellphone given to her. For fear for her and her family’s
safety, she filed with the SC a Petition for the Writs of Amapro and Habeas Data against her interrogators
and also impleading public officials, police officers, and military men of the highest rank (check out the list
of respondents) because she believed that it was the government that was responsible for her abduction.
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or even
approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention
areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to
produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to,
intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and
subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the
respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name
which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital
camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch,
sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her P15,000.00 cash.
SC in its resolution, issued the desired writs and referred the case to CA for hearing, reception of evidence
and appropriate action.
CA’S DECISION: granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to
refrain from distributing to the public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioners alleged ties with
the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture. The proliferation of the photograph and
video, as well as any form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only
constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on her already
volatile security.
ISSUE: Whether CA correctly granted the privilege of habeas data to the petitioner? (This issue was not
actually raised on appeal, yet SC is constrained to pass upon and review such)
HELD:No. CA's ruling on the granting of privilege of habeas data hinges on the problem that there is
actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the
right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that
would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations
and other reports about the petitioners ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately proven considering that
the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate
court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press
conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video
or photograph.
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most
especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the victim.This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA vs.
ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM
Facts: A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in Bulacan denouncing Lim, an administrative
clerk. She was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns over her safety. She complained under
the premise that the transfer was a denial of her due process. She wrote a letter stating that:
“It appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just
mere jokes if they existed at all.” She added, “instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me,
the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.” She asked for deferment thereafter.
Since the company didn’t respond, she filed for a writ of habeas data in the Bulacan RTC due to meralco’s
omission of provding her with details about the report of the letter. To her, this constituted a violation of her
liberty and security. She asked for disclosure of the data and measures for keeping the confidentiality of the
data.
Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the petition wasn’t in order.
RTC: ruled in favor of Lim.
In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data applies to entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home
Issue: Whether or not Habeas Data is the right remedy for Lim?
Held: No, petition dismissed
“Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”
It’s a forum for enforcing one’s right to the truth. Like amparo, habeas data was a response to killings and
enforced disappearances.
Castillo v Cruz- and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor
when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment is a property right in the due process clause. Lim was concerned with her employment, one that
can be solved in the NLRC.
There was no violation of respondent’s right to privacy. To argue that the employer’s refusal to disclose the
contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to the employee’s safety amounts to a violation of her
right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent even said that the letters were mere jokes and even
conceded the fact that the issue was labor related due to references to “real intent of management”.