~~ ASSIGNMENT NO 1 Name: Asad hayat Subject: Pakistan studies Title: Pak — china relationship Submitted to: Mr. Dr. Usman shaukat Submitted by: Asad hayat Program: Bba Department: Management sciences Universit®y: Uol Date: 25-12-2019PAK- K-CHINA RELATIONSHIP IN HISTORICAL pe; SPECTIVE the pact i converted int as UPPOKt to deny Inc fee han protecting herself Fequired China's military equipment, technology, and political y ratewic Link. P region. This converged with China's a twalry with India Even earlier Pakistan: gee manee OF the relations with the Western military powers, continued to assure thee ines esc aee ba enmity against the Communist regime. At the moment China also realised thas Pabst Wie had no towards India and would naturally ike to come closer to China “Sistan nounshed enmity Relations improved during 1961-62 when US-USS ion sul Soviet schism took formal shape Further the Sino-Indian war of October i902 and ten of sto Kennedy towards India paved the way for cordial relations. in the war Pakistan sided foelf with Chang and branded India as the aggressor. This showed Pakistan’s expression of her anti-Indian policy and was a move to placate the Chinese. China, understanding Pakistan's attitude, concluded a number of economic and cultural agreements with it, signed a border agreement and supported the latter on the issue of Kashmir by declaring that the fate of Kashmir should be decided by the people of Kashmir themselves ‘Thus, a convenient environment was provided to them in the early 1960s. If recalled the whole set of relations was based on statement made in 1959 by the then Chinese ambassador to the Indian Foreign Secretary face-to-face, ‘China dislikes to be concemed about the USA and China coming together’. He added: ‘It seems to us that you too cannot afford two fronts.’ It was a rather broad hint that India could face dangers if China were to build Pakistan up militarily. Since then, China's military assistance to Pakistan has become a reality. ‘Then 1960s made China’s relations with Pakistan solid from the viewpoints of mutual interest, regional strategy and the international milieu. China’s links with Pakistan were directed against India and obliquely, against the USA and the USSR. The association with Islamabad became very active and close after India’s defeat in the 1962 War. As a result, Sino-Indian relations deteriorated and China went a step further by offering military protection to Pakistan in the event of an Indian attack. It became clearer when in July 1963, Z.A. Bhutto declared: “An attack by India on Pakistan would also involve the territorial integrity and security of the largest State in Asia" 2ist February 1964, Premier Chou visited Pakistan and declared China’s open support for Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute. When President Ayub Khan visited China in March 1965, he is sard to have been given the biggest ever public welcome in China to any foreign visitor. Soon thereafter, Pakistan-China relations reached their peak when China extended full support to Pakistan in 1965 India- Pakistan War andeven threatened to attack India. Later in 1971, Pakistan played a Key role in the rapprochement between USA and China, But the setback suffered by Pakistan in the 1971 We aso affected the upward trend in its relations with China, Moreover, China's raptd economie EA Soa beginning around 1980s, resulted in adoption of a pragmatic foreign policy. Ever since, C panes to improve its relations with India and with other countries. It has adopted a neutral ea erate and wants India and Pakistan to resolve Kashmir and other problems through bilateral ee a aver not meant any downgrading of its strategic ties with Pakistan and it stands solidly ee most issues. It supported Pakistan during the Afghan Jihad in 1980s against Soviet mihtary It values Pakistan’s role in the fight against.four Chashma nuclear power reactors to Pakistan, to make the Khunjerab Pays, located at the agreement was si for both parties. tn & “Karakoram’ jet trainer! I In 1987, Pakistan and China signed an agreement to establish a joint venture for the purposes of formation of a factory producing televisions. In October 1988, an agreement was signed by both neighbouring countries under which China had to aid in the exploration of the Saindak mining project m district Chaghai, Balochistan, On the 12th of February, 1989, Pakistan and China inked the significant Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) to promote, safeguard and secure investments from both sides of the border. In April 1989, Pakistan and China became parties to an agreement, for collaborated efforts to explore and develop mineral and water resources in Khyber Pakthunkhwa (former NWFP) and Balochistan areas. On the 14th of November, 1989, four agreements were signed between Pakistan and China: the prevention of double tax, a road producing equipment for utilization in Balochistan, a $13.5 million Interest-free loan to be used for several schemes, humanitarian support of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, aimongst others. In December 1989, an MOU was signed between the two neighbouring countries for collaboration in research and development of technological dynamics in the areas of science, defence and industry In 1990, Pakistan and China signed an agreement under which China had to supply 325 MWe Chashma 1 nuclear power reactor in Punjab. In January 1990, Pakistan and China reached an agreement to collaborate in developing, designing and manufacturing the MBT 2000 Al-Khalid tank. Subsequently, by November 2000, Pakistan was able to manufacture the tank independently at Heavy Industries, Taxila. In June 1999, an agreement was signed between Pakistan and China to jointly develop and manufacture the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) JF-17 Thunder [or CAC (Chengdu Aircraft Corporation of China) FC-1 Xialong Multirole Combat Aircrafi] to replace the Pakistan Air Force's existing aircrafts, Dassault Mirage IIV/S, Nanchang AS bombers and Chengdu F7 interceptors. In the year 2000, Pakistan and China signed an agreement under which China had to assist Pakistan in the construction of the 330 MWe Chashma 2 nuclear power reactor. On the 12th of May, 2001, Pakistan and China signed an MOU through Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd. and ZTE (Chinese company) respectively, and six other agreements which included, amongst others things, cooperation on tourism, technical and economic collaborations, Saindak cooper-gold mining project lease, supply of passenger coaches and locomotives for Pakistan Railways and an an oil pipeline. In 2001, China exhibited willingness to financially assist Pakistan in constructing a deep-sea port at Gwadar which itself was purchased by Pakistan from Oman in 1958 for PKR 5.5 Billion. This port is located just 180 nautical miles from the strategic Strait of Hormuz which connects the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Furthermore, Gwadar is located at strategic proximity to the three significant parts of the world: South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Subsequently, on the 22nd of March, 2002, Pakistan and China signed an agreement to build the deep-sea port at Gwadar with financialcontribution from the Chinese of approximately $198 mill port was officially inaugurated by Pakistan on the 21st of Decay neared 19 P Decemembared to Pakistan's $50 mition The On the Sth of June, 2003, Pakistan and China si Boundary Management System between Gilgit-Bal pert, satelite connectivity and MOUS on cooperation in serine ans Manan system af border economie corridor, and collaboration on marine science and technologs be Moc en vet Tone term China signed the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) and the Joint Declarstiy Dine stan and Cooperation, In November 2003, Pakistan and China signed the extradition agreement ach eer on the 12th of December, 2007. In December 2004, Pakistan and China signed seven arene nee ‘on further promotion of bilateral trade, establishment of combined agricultural industries nad aa ene for the formation of Pakistan-China Joint Investment Company and Joint Infrastructure Develomment Fund. Pakistan also declared Free Market Economy status for China. ae On the Sth of April, 2005, Pakistan and China signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-neighbourly Relations, which came into effect on the 4th of January, 2006. Its essence was to restrain both the countries from “joining any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other side”. Additionally, an important notion for strategic relations was the “clear and unambiguous, categorical assurance by China to defend Pakistan’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity” Furthermore, 22 other agreements were signed between the two nations, including, amongst others: special tariff arrangements for 767 items under the ‘Early Harvest Programme’, mutual investments in the respective private sectors, joint anti-terrorism efforts, customs cooperation, agricultural collaborations, deepening of the Gwadar port, “combating terrorism, separatism and extremism”, cooperation in field of education, framework for supply of naval F22P Frigates, export of livestock, information technology collaborations, technical and economic cooperation, negotiations on free trade, “development of Duddar, ead zinc deposits in Balochistan”, Pakistan-China Friendship Centre project, and the export of fruit. In October 2005, Pakistan and China materialised the framework agreement by signing a pact through the Ministry of Defence Production and China Shipbuilding and Trading Company, respectively, for the supply of four F22P frigates (warships) and six Z-9c helicopters with Transfer of Technology (TOT) for use by Pakistan Navy. The first warship, the PNS Zulfiqar-class frigate became part of naval fleet on 30th of July, 2009, which was manufactured at Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard, Shanghai. Subsequently, as per the agreement, the fourth ship had to be manufactured at Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW). On the 20th of February, 2006, Pakistan and China signed a framework agreement to collaborate on energy projects, which also included a proposal by Pakistan for the 3300 km long Karakoram oil pipeline stretching from Gwadar to Khunjerab. In November 2006, Pakistan and China concluded an agreement to initiate free trade between the two countries. Subsequently, in July 2007, the Free Trade Agreement, a milestone achievement with regards to bilateral trade between the two countries became effective. In 2007, Pakistan and China signed one MOU and thirteen agreements, focusing on cooperation in various areas, including, amongst others: economy and trade, transportation, health population, energy, agriculture, meteorology, seismology, and a framework on the establishment of “trade and energy corridor” between the two nations On the 17th of April, 2007, Pakistan and China signed 27 agreements and MOUs, including, amongst others: prevention of double taxation, collaborations in the space technology sector, further collaboration amongst the private sectors of both countries, building of a cable network across borders toenhance communication, collaboration in the banking sector, systems, power generation and dams, technical and economic co. Assistanee in Criminal Matters, MOUs for collaboration between Shy Exchanges, collaboration on PAKSAT-1R, formation of Pakistan Stuy Cornyn, Karachi Stock cooperation between Pakistan Space and Upper Atmos; Sludy Centre at Beijing Us Iniversity, and phere Research Commission (SUPARCO) China Great Wall Industry. arch Commission (SUPARCO) and development projects including transit operation the Treaty on Mutual Judicial In June 2007, Pakistan and China signed an agreement under which China h *t which China had to supply two Type 054A Jiangkai U-class guided missile frigates (warships) to Pakistan, On the 19th of Dee ae December, 2007 Pakistan and China signed an agreement for the construction of Neclam-Shelum Hydrovleore Procck located near Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Jammu and Kashmir " In 2008, Pakistan Air Force signed an agreement with China Electronics Technology Group Corporation for the joint manufacturing of four ZDK-03 Airborne Early Warming and Control System (AEW&C) Karakoram Eagle aircrafts. On the 2st of February, 2009, Pakistan and China signed the ‘Agreement on Trade in Service of the China-Pakistan FTA, which came into effect on the 10th of October, 2009. On the Sth of February, 2010, Pakistan and China signed an agreement to “encourage, protect and create favourable conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party”. On the 17th of December, 2010, Pakistan and China signed four MOUs and nine agreements which included, amongst others: the development of 36 flood affected areas, and cooperation in trade, economy, transportation and energy sectors. In 2010, Pakistan and China signed an agreement, under which China had to supply four Azmat-class Fast Attack Carriers (missile) to Pakistan. On the 23rd of December, 2011, Pakistan and China signed a currency swap agreement to enhance bilateral economic and trade relations. In October 2012, Pakistan and China signed a fresh agreement to further develop the Saindak mining project for the exploration of gold, copper and silver natural reserves located in District Chagai, Balochistan. On the 18th of February, 2013, an MOU was signed between Pakistan and China to transfer the control and operations of Gwadar Port from the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA International) to China Overseas Ports Holding Company Limited. In March 2013, Pakistan and China signed an agreement under which China had to export two ACP1000 1100 MWe nuclear power reactors, KANUPP 2 and KANUPP 3, for the Karachi Coastal Power Project. In May 2013, Pakistan and China discussed the official proposal of the $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Subsequently, in April 2015, Pakistan and China signed 51 MOUs and agreements, the most significant of them being the CPEC which is also a flagship programme of China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) and the 21st century Silk Road initiative, stretching ftom China across South and Central Asia. Upon the completion of CPEC, China would be able to approach the African, West Asian and Middle Eastern markets conveniently and also be able to exert military presence in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, CPEC would provide the shortest route to China for access to the warm waters, linking Kashgar in landlocked Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, to the Gwadar port in Arabian Sea. Pakistan would also gain from the $46 billion investment by China for development in energy projects and infrastructure works and the investment would also be helpful in addressing the deprivations and grievances of the people of Balochistan through the creation of extensive opportunities and prospects. Additionally, CPEC would also prove to be advantageous to Pakistan for the promotion of tourism and the projected increase in foreign direct investment (FDI). ; The other agreements which were signed on the same occasion, included, amongst others: establishment of an ‘all-weather strategic cooperative partnership’, details of the 4th of Joint Cooperationexchanged for the supply of anti equipment, notes exchanged for ees changed fox ibihty study. MOU on the allocation of loan from China to upgrade KKH g the allocation of loan from China for the Karachi-Lahore mage net OM Havetian to iwadar Hospital's feasi Thakot, MOU on. allocation of loan from China for the Gwadar port East Bay Express mitt © Sukkut), MOU on the of loan from China for Gwadar International Airport, Protocol on Harkoge oct MOU 0m the allocation king Servi in Services, MOU for the supply of material to tackle elimate change hineragene on Trade ramework agreement for collaboration on major communication infrastructure project, MOU en ean National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, China) and. the Numen Peet the Development and Reform (Pakistan), MOU for pro-bono projects in the Gwadar Portreson MOU on the formation of China-Pakistan Joint Cotton Bio-Tech Laboratory, framework agreement for upgradation and renovation of the Karachito-Peshawar Main-Line | (ML1) railway wack and the formation of Pakistan Railway's Havelian Dry port, a protocol on the formation of Chine Pekvag Joint Marine Research Centre, MOU on collaboration between the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Films and Television of China and the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting. and National Heritage of Pakistan, Agreement for rebroadcast in Pakistan of CCTV-News Documentary, protocol on declaration of Chengdu (China) and Lahore (Pakistan) as sister cities, protocol on declaration of Zhuhai (China)and Gwadar (Pakistan) as sister cities, protocol on declaration of Karamay (China) and Gwadar (Pakistan) as sister cities, framework agreement on Gwadar-Nawabshah LNG Terminal and Pipeline Project, commercial contract on Orange Line Metro Train for Lahore On the Sth of July, 2013, Pakistan and China signed 8 MOUs and agreements focusing on, 200 km tunnels, technical and economic cooperation, supply of instruments for polio eradication, training courses for flood relief and disaster management, collaboration between the Institute of Strategic Studies (Pakistan) and China Institute of Contemporary Study (China) On the 8th of November 2014, Pakistan and China signed 19 agreements and MOUs, which included, amongst others: Sino Hydro Resource Project of 1320 MW, two coal fired projects of 1,320 MW each in Sahiwal, two Engro Thar coal fire projects of 330 MW each, Muzaffargarh coal power of 1320 MW, Rahimyar Khan project, SSRL Thar coal projects and Thar Mine Mouth Oracle projects, SSRL Thar Coal Block6 of 1000 MW, Gaddani Power Park Project of 2,640 MW, Gwadar Coal of 300 MW, Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park of 100 MW, Dawood Wind Farm of 50 MW, UEP Wind Farm of 100 MW, Sachal Wind Farm of 50 MW, Sunnec Wind Farm of 50 MW, Suki Kinari Hydropower Station of 870 MW, and Karot Hydropower Station of 720 MW. Additionally, agreements were also signed for the construction of KKH II 440km Raikot- Islamabad section, Havelian Dry Port, Karachi-Lahore Motorway, distribution of optical fibre cable across the border, Sino Hydro Resource Limited, and Hari-Ruba Economic Zone In March 2015, Pakistan and China signed an agreement under which China had to manufacture and export eight Chinese “modified Type 41 Yuan-class diesel-electric attack submarines” to the former, four of which were to be built at Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works. On the 10th of June, 2015, Pakistan and China signed an agreement under which China had to supply six marine patrol vessels with Transfer of Technology (TOT), to be used by the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency for coastal law- enforcement operations. On the 26th of July, 2016, Pakistan and China signed 17 MOUs and 7 agreements, focusing on: the establishment of industrial estates, textile industries, providing training to trainers of various fields, promotion of trade exhibitions, cooperation in energy, and infrastructure projects including water treatment plants,On the 1th of May, 201, Pakistan anil China signed framework of the 21x Century Martine Silk Road initiate ang gets: Me con techavwcal ant economic collaboration for Gwadar Aicpon may pit Road Bee agreement 10 implement the renovation and enhancement vr Havelian Dry Port On the 20th of July 2017, Pakistan a exploration of uranium, taking another step towards closer the 2 wember, 2017, Pakistan and China inked the tong Tay conomie Comudor (CPEC), where it was agreed 10 cooperate: wr uneae tourism, finance arnt connectivity, amongst others Additionally. Chine deasen ade: Aeteultre Renminbi (or Yuan) for bilateral trade instead of the US dollar (0 use thet currency Niding. amomyst others a omemmic Melt, an Bast Bay Expre pean failway link MI On the 20h of January, 2018, Pakistan and China signed 6 agreements fo Qweder port and also witnessed the inauguration of the first phase of Gwader Pros tone a eased Fetwuary 2018, Pakistan and China signed the Executive Programme of Cultural Agreement for tendo consolidating cultural relations and promoting people-to-people contact between the two states Onthe ra of Rune, 2018, Pakistan and China signed an agreement to acquire two more naval Type 054A Juangsas lt class guided missile frigates (warships) from China Geo-economics Traditionally, geo-economics has been studied as a sub-set of geo-politics, where geo- ‘economic instruments were analysed along with the traditional strategic means of exercising power ‘Samuel Huntington boldly expanded the argument and observed, “Economic activity 1s a source of power, as well as well-being. It is, indeed, probably the most important source of power and im a world in which military conflict between major states is unlikely economic power will be increasingly important in determining the primacy or subordination of states. Huntington's argument that future conflicts and structure of the world order will be determined by economic power was essentially, a call for a strategy of ‘economic power maximisation’ by major powers Geo- economics, thus, focuses on pursuing the geo-strategic interests even in the absence of a mutually advantageous trade relationship. In essence, it is the geo-strategic exercise of economic instruments and resources States often combine the elements of geo-strategy and geoeconomics to project power The geo-strategic display of power is overt, conducted through military and diplomatic means. The geo-economic power projection, however, is covert, exercised through the economic instruments for ‘accommodation or even patronage of the other actor. The geo-economic means involve the incentives such as more investments, low cost loans, lesser tariffs on goods, etc, which are operationalised gradually. In this way, geo-economics is essentially about employing the economic instruments to advance national interests for producing favourable geostrategic outcomes and impacting other nation’s economic and trade policies over their geo-strategic obyectives. Traditionally, geo-economics has been studied as a sub-set of geo- Politics, where geo-economic instruments were analysed along with the traditional strategic means of exercising power Pak-China Economic and Security Relationship The Pak-China relations are based on a com tnd resist: colcutun, prehensive geo-strategic ist It 1s a multidimensional relationship and mandates that the top leadership, from both sides, continuously guide it. For Pakistan, the strategic partnership with China is a strong pillar of its foreign policy. For China, relationship with Pakistan is a crucial component of its South Asia policyhave always extended roth countries an all-out Gradually, the closer political and military relat "PPO to lati Ach oth for regional cooperation and connectivity. The cree. has been expander, tiring creat mes, weather’ strategic engagement between the two neighbor, forms the bedro oe econome sphere Aside from a host of bilateral cooperation, it was an sq 28 itn genus Me futute “al- international forums that strengthened the bilateral yeigct, ‘iPlomati.suypene Pakistan’s position on Kashmir and lobbied agains nae etO™hip. CI '0 each other at the ‘hina, for decs otherwise, would have undermined Pakistan’s interests ovals at the United fas mas o-economic character After dismemberment of East Pakistan in 1971,Ching yy UN. Beijing only recognised the government in Dhaka ‘afer Iie’, Hansladeth'senty into the relations with it Similarly, during Pakistan's often-tense relations sr men had established diplomatic supported Pakistan, For instance, after the US operation in ‘A ‘ith Washing Laden, the Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, publicly supported por reciprocated the friendly gestures by steadfastly supporting One-China cl Pe government in Taiwan. Pakistan also supports the Chinese position ee ot recognising the bridge between China and the US, which led to th ‘bet. Pakistan has been a wo © establishment of relations between the two Meanwhile, Islamabad refrained from taking a public stance on : the Uighur issue in Chi ensured that itis also not taken up by the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) "Being acknowledged Pakistan’s due role in this regard. Pak-China Strategic Partnership: Interplay of Geo-economics In April 2015, on the eve of President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan, both govemments announced an economic and a trade corridor. The CPEC was announced at a time when a rising China was beginning to take greater interest in the regional and global politics. Instead of relying on traditional defence cooperation and arms sales, Beijing has been adding an active economic component to its foreign policy. Military cooperation and strategic engagement in itself has their limitations in inter-state relations. Relations between nations are not only defined by cooperation in military affairs instead, military and security cooperation is but one aspect of the broader bilateral relationships. For nearly five decades’ close defence and technical collaboration, including sensitive fields, defined China-Pakistan relationship. Military cooperation did deepen the bilateral relationship while expanding Beijing’s influence within Pakistan’s policy-making elite. It worked smoothly till the time Beijing was not pro-active in the broader Asian affairs. Extensive defence collaboration and technical assistance from Beijing enabled Islamabad to balance its arch-rival, India. Defence cooperation and sharing of military technology also has an un- intended potential of escalating the regional tensions, a prospect Beijing has counselled against. China supported Pakistan’s position on Kashmir during 1970s and 1980s. In 1990s, however, the Chinese stance began to shift. In December 1996, in an address to Pakistan's Senate, the then Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, suggested that the unresolved disputes should be set aside, temporarily, for longer-term stability in the region. Even during the Kargil conflict, China reiterated the call for resolving the disputes through negotiations, while emphasising need of ‘defusing tensions. Similarly, 15-years later, President Xi Jinping, emphasised the need for stability and security as a pre-requisite of development. In this sense, introducing @ framework of economic cooperationdevelopment inhibits the conflictual tendencies yegion, With the CPEC, transformation in the bitauen! 1% expands fg investments by China’s State-Owned Enterprises (gop. ‘lationship 4g" 28'S footprint in the implies that Beijing will prioritise the trajectory gf OL) 1” intatocy Large-scale Capitalising on existing, strategic partnership, China jnenat™® "lationship ane. Proecs billion economy. The magnitude of the CPEC inguart’® ' connect wag "eet th nations interconnected north-south routes, it is intended to uperve KES it clear eq sktstan’s USS300 production and industrial capacity of Pakistan transport infrastructure tee.” three * ener, The CPEC will be connecting the populous Punjab prov Karachi (Sindh) and the city of Kashgar (Xinjiang) whije m0 ‘© Gwadar port (Cali Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). In a way, security relationship aan through Gilgit Balu access to Pakistan, particularly, the Gwadar port and the Arabian grt *®Y fF China's longterm presents an opportunity to redirect its economy towards growth and fi For Pakistan, the CPEC decade, following construction of the Gwadar port, Beijing and (slamapar sation: After nearly a economic development initiative. The initial announcements included the ee undertaking an nearly USSI [billion in infrastructure and US$33billion in energy production nee Peewee *© invest 15 years.The volume of the Chinese investments under the CPEC ion projects over the next fi makes it of foreign capital in Pakistan, since its independence in 1947 Sit the single largest influx The magnitude of the CPEC investments is twice the combined Islamabad received from Weshington, since 2001, as a frontline state in. cee eee - years, Pakistani economy has grown at an average rate of 4 percent. It is expected that the CPEC will boost the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate by another 2 per cent while allowing Pakistan to achieve much-needed political and economic stability and regional integration. Yet for Beijing, the CPEC is one of the six trade corridors under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Other five corridors require multilateral cooperation and, thus, are in varying stages of implementation. The CPEC, however, is a bilateral initiative. Successful undertaking of the CPEC is crucial for smooth implementation of the BRI. Beijing needs to demonstrate that its model of economic development produces the desired results and is equally beneficial for other countries participating in the BRI. It requires improvement in internal security of Pakistan and regional stability. Pakistan has committed itself to ensure security in those regions which are part of the CPEC routes. This again is manifestation of China attempting to achieve geo-strategic objectives through economic means. Meanwhile, the traditional avenues of cooperation i.e., defence and foreign policy support between Islamabad and Beijing are also deepening. An assertive China is gradually showing the willingness to take on the responsibilities of international leadership. Pakistan, on its part, has global influence. Given Pakistan’s all-out support to the BRI, Beijing, in tum, has also extended all- ‘out-support to Islamabad’s foreign policy goals. Since onset of the CPEC, China has endorsed Pakistan’s application for entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)and held up the Indian backed proposal to put Masood Azhar on the UN-designated terrorists list. Beijing has supported Islamabad on these issues despite concerns raised by New Delhi. By disregarding the Indian reservations, China has taken public positions on these two issues, thus, also raising the commitment cost for itself In the realm of Seen Ci in tandem with the CPEC, both countries ann: 55 billion deal for the sale of eight Chinese > ced billion submarines to Pakistan pee UsPak-Chit i ‘a ina Geo-economic Cooperation and Regional Security Order Evolvi Bier ae ie CPEC han hitch gms in the Pak-China relationship, particularly, the decades, Indin factor guided the Pak-China relations, wine porn et ean ode. Fr hedge against. New Delhi a Terrorism and conflict in Af here both viewed each other as strat ec New pattems began to emerge, however, during the last decade ighanistan and Pakistan complicated China's regional calculus Analytically, thus, regional security, here, comprises two sub-sets: 1 China-India and India-Pakistan rivalries, essentially, the South Asian security framework. 2. Conflict in Afghanistan and instability in Pakistan's border regions Regional Security in South Asia The South Asian security order is largely being dominated by ‘the protracted conflict between India and Pakistan. The unresolved dispute of Kashmir and the military tensions continued to overshadow the prospects of meaningful engagement between the two contending states. Pakistan also contests the Indian attempts to be ahegemon in South Asia, At the same time, China and India also have an unresolved border dispute. Military tensions often spike between New Delhi and Beijing. However, over last two decades, their focus shifted towards managing the border dispute and expanding the bilateral economic Telationship. Yet, China remains a crucial factor in India Pakistan rivalry, because of its strategic partnership with Islamabad. Expanding geo-economic relationship with Islamabad implies that Pakistan would count on Beijing’s active support, more than before, in its rivalry with India. China, also, would increasingly have greater interest in India Pakistan relationship, but from a different perspective. For China, economic corridors under the BRI have two goals: strategic and economic. Premier Li Keqiang, during his May 2013 visit to Islamabad, said that Beijing “hope(s) to create a giant economic corridor that would not only enhance China’s strategic significance but would also help in restoring peace and stability in Asia” His emphasis on restoring “peace and stability” was a clear indication of the Chinese policy of pursuing stability in the regional politics. Beijing, thus, has a vital stake in maintaining peace and stability in the region, particularly, between India and Pakistan. In September 2016, as Pakistan-India tensions heightened over Kashmir, Beijing counselled both sides to ‘exercise restraint,” ‘avoid escalation’ and defuse tensions through “dialogue.” It was a departure from China’s existing policy of non-interference in the affairs of other nations. However, given the growing Chinese stake in Pakistan's economic development, owing to the CPEC, Beijing now has an interest in a stable relationship between. Islamabad and New Delhi. India has also been made a part of the BRI through Bangladesh- China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor. New Delhi, however, has not been receptive to the Chinese connectivity and regional integration initiatives due to its “core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.” India has expressed reservations on the route of theparticularly in Afghanistan, and stability of Pakistan to In terms of separatism and tern Inerable region of Xinjiang, which nomic Stabilising Afghanistan advance its own security and economic interees Ton China has a vul it aims to development and counter-terrorism efforts ia Islamabad initiated a large-scale mil Operation, Zarb-e-Azb, against Tehrik-iTaliban Pakistan (TTP) and foreign fighters in Noh Waziristan in June, 2014. During past three years Pakistan army has cleared North Waziristan of foreign and local militants. Beijing has appreciated Pakistan's military action against the ‘terrorism and militancy. M ilitaney and terrorism in Afghanistan and its Surrounding region can only be addressed through political resolution of the war in Afghanistan. The conflict, however, is quite complex in Afghanistan with the mvolvement of various stakeholders including the warring Afghan factions, the Afghan government, the regional and extra-regional powers, including the US. For decades, China stayed away from @ proactive engagement in Afghanistan, in recent years, however, it has developed economic and security interests in Afghanistan. Beijing is investing in copper mines and thus, seeks stability, which would also weaken the matrix of Islamist militancy in the region. Pakistan remains central to any peace talks in Afghanistan. For Beijing, geo- economic partnership with Pakistan is also one of the means to pursue a settlement of the Afghan conflict. From late 2014, China has made consistent calls for peace talks in Afghanistan. In October 2014, Beijing proposed setting up a ‘peace and reconciliation’ forum, with participation from the Afghan government, China, Pakistan and the Taliban. It was indication of China’s willingness to playa greater role in brokering peace in Afghanistan. Few months later, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, offered facilitation’ in ‘realising reconciliation’ between Afghan goverment and “political factions.’ He also noted that Pakistan was willing to play a ‘constructive’ role in peace process. This was a signal expressing readiness and seriousness from Beijing for a constructive peace process, with an active participation from Pakistan In early 2016, China and Pakistan joined a four-nation process for commencing peace talks between Afghan government and the Taliban. The Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG), comprising Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the US, was an effort by the regional powers to commence a peace dialogue between the Afghan goverment and Taliban. It was a major initiative in the sense that China andthe US as G-2 were directly participating in the dialogue process It reflected Beijing’s willingness to go an extra mile in ensuring constructive and fruitful negotiations for settlement of Afghan conflict. Earlier Beijing had hosted representatives of Taliban and Afghan government for back-channel talks, but the QCG was a front-channel initiative with the direct Chinese participation, a deviation from its past practice. 1