1.
2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
A.C. No. 10132, March 24, 2015
HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO REPRESENTED BY DAVID ALILANO, Complainants, v. ATTY.
ROBERTO E. EXAMEN, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) by the heirs of Pedro Alilano against Atty. Roberto E. Examen for
misconduct and malpractice for falsifying documents and presenting these as evidence
in court thus violating the Lawyer’s Oath,2 Canons 1,3 104 and 19,5 and Rules
1.01,6 1.02,7 10.01,8 and 19.019 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Pedro Alilano and his wife, Florentina, were the holders of Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-23261 covering a 98,460 sq. m. parcel of land identified as Lot No. 1085 Pls-
544-D located in Paitan, Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat. Pedro and Florentina died on March
6, 1985 and October 11, 1989, respectively.
It appears that on March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of
Sale10 were executed by the Spouses Alilano in favor of Ramon Examen and his wife,
Edna. Both documents were notarized by respondent Atty. Roberto Examen, brother of
the vendee. Sometime in September 1984, Spouses Examen obtained possession of the
property.
On January 12, 2002, the heirs of Alilano filed a suit for recovery of possession before
the Regional Trial Court of Sultan Kudarat against Edna Examen and Atty. Roberto
Examen.11 It was during this proceeding that Atty. Examen introduced into evidence the
March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of Sale.
On November 15, 2003,12 the heirs of Alilano filed this complaint alleging that Atty.
Examen, based on Barretto v. Cabreza,13 violated the notarial law when he notarized the
absolute deeds of sale since a notary public is prohibited from notarizing a document
when one of the parties is a relative by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree or
affinity within the second civil degree. It is also alleged that Atty. Examen notarized the
documents knowing that the cedula or residence certificate number used by Ramon
Examen was not actually his but the residence certificate number of Florentina. Atty.
Examen also falsely acknowledged that the two witnesses personally appeared before
him when they did not. Lastly, it is alleged that despite knowing the infirmities of these
documents, Atty. Examen introduced these documents into evidence violating his oath
as a lawyer and the CPR.
In his defense, Atty. Examen pointed out that there was no longer any prohibition under
the Revised Administrative Code for a notary public to notarize a document where one
of the parties is related to him by consanguinity and affinity. 14 With regard to the use of
Florentina’s residence certificate as Ramon’s, Atty. Examen said that he was in good
faith and that it was office practice that the secretary type details without him
personally examining the output.15 In any event, he reasoned that the use of another’s
residence certificate is not a ground for disbarment and is barred by prescription based
on IBP Resolution No. XVI-2004-13 dated January 26, 2004 where it was proposed that
the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Section 1, Rule VIII, be revised to include a prescription period for
professional misconduct: within two years from the date of the act.16cralawred
In its Report and Recommendation,17 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found
Atty. Examen liable for breach of the Notarial Law and introducing false Absolute Deeds
of Sale before court proceedings. It stated that there was ample evidence to support
the complainants’ contention that the Spouses Alilano did not voluntarily and knowingly
convey their property, i.e. denials under oath by attesting witnesses and NBI Report by
Handwriting Expert Jennifer Dominguez stating that Pedro Alilano’s signature in the
September 1984 Absolute Deed of Sale was significantly different from the specimen
signatures. It also noted that Ramon Examen’s residence certificate number, date and
place of issue were also falsified since the residence certificate actually belonged to
Florentina Pueblo. It thus recommended that the penalty of disbarment be imposed.
The IBP Board of Governors (BOG) in its June 26, 2007 Resolution 18 adopted the IBP
CBD’s report but modified the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a
period of two years and a suspension of Atty. Examen’s Notarial Commission for a
period of two years.
Atty. Examen moved for reconsideration. In its Notice of Resolution, the IBP BOG
denied the motion for reconsideration. It also modified the penalty imposed to
suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year and disqualification from
re-appointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. 19cralawred
We agree with the IBP that Atty. Examen is administratively liable and hereby impose a
modified penalty.
In disbarment cases the only issue that is to be decided by the Court is whether the
member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not.20 It is not therefore
the proper venue for the determination of whether there had been a proper
conveyance of real property nor is it the proper proceeding to take up whether
witnesses’ signatures were in fact forged.
NO PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS FOR
ACTS OF ERRING MEMBERS OF THE BAR
In Frias v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,21 the Court En Banc opined that there can be no
prescription in bar discipline cases. It pointed out this has been the policy since 1967
with the Court’s ruling in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo22 and reiterated in Heck v. Santos23 where
we had the chance to state:
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the
very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private
complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely
exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the
duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the
administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the
commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint,
erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the
Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench
and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath. x x x
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to
the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer…. (Italics supplied)24
We therefore ruled in Frias, that Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP
CBD was void and had no legal effect for being ultra vires and thus null and
void.25cralawred
This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Bengco v. Bernardo,26 where the
Court stated that putting a prescriptive period on administrative cases involving
members of the bar would only serve to embolden them to disregard the very oath they
took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from
whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.
Atty. Examen’s defense of prescription therefore is of no moment and deserves scant
consideration.
THE SPANISH NOTARIAL LAW OF
1889 WAS REPEALED BY THE REVISED
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917
Prior to 1917, governing law for notaries public in the Philippines was the Spanish
Notarial Law of 1889. However, the law governing Notarial Practice is changed with the
passage of the January 3, 1916 Revised Administrative Code, which took effect in
1917. In 2004, the Revised Rules on Notarial Practice27 was passed by the Supreme
Court.
In Kapunan, et al. v. Casilan and Court of Appeals,28 the Court had the opportunity to
state that enactment of the Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial
Law of 1889. Thus:
It is petitioners’ contention that Notary Public Mateo Canonoy, who was related to the
parties in the donation within the fourth civil degree of affinity, was, under Articles 22
and 28 of the Spanish Notarial Law, incompetent and disqualified to authenticate the
deed of donation executed by the Kapunan spouses in favor of their daughter
Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo. Said deed of donation, according to petitioners, became
a mere private instrument under Article 1223 of the old Civil Code, so that under the
ruling laid down in the case of Barretto vs. Cabreza (33 Phil., 413), the donation was
inefficacious. The appellate court, however, in the decision complained of held that the
Spanish Notarial Law has been repealed with the enactment of Act No. 496. We find
this ruling to be correct. In the case of Philippine Sugar Estate vs. Poizart (48 Phil., 536),
cited in Vda. de Estuart vs. Garcia (Adm. Case No. 212, prom. February 15, 1957), this
Court held that “The old Spanish notarial law and system of conveyance was repealed
in the Philippines and another and different notarial law and system became the law
of the land with the enactment of Act No. 496.”29 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the heirs of Alilano stated that Atty. Examen was prohibited to notarize the
absolute deeds of sale since he was related by consanguinity within the fourth civil
degree with the vendee, Ramon. The prohibition might have still applied had the
applicable rule been the Spanish Notarial Law. However, following the Court’s ruling
in Kapunan, the law in force at the time of signing was the Revised Administrative Code,
thus, the prohibition was removed. Atty. Examen was not incompetent to notarize the
document even if one of the parties to the deed was a relative, his brother. As correctly
observed by the IBP CBD:
At the time of notarization, the prevailing law governing notarization was Sections 231-
259, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code and there was no prohibition on a
notary public from notarizing a document when one of the interested parties is related
to the notary public within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or second degree of
affinity.30
Note must be taken that under 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Section 3(c), a
notary public is disqualified among others to perform the notarial act if he is related by
affinity or consanguinity to a principal within the fourth civil degree, to wit:
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act
if he:
xxxx
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree.
That Atty. Examen was not incompetent to act as a notary public in the present case
does not mean that he can evade administrative liability under the CPR in conjunction
with the provisions of the Notarial Law.
NOTARIES PUBLIC MUST PERFORM
THEIR DUTIES DILIGENTLY AND
WITH UTMOST CARE
In Nunga v. Atty. Viray,31 this Court stated:
…[N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may
act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not
qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the
courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that the
notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document
making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity
thereof. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For
this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties.32 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Thus under the prevailing law at the time of notarization it was the duty of the notary
public to comply with the requirements of the Notarial Law. This includes the duty
under Chapter 11, Section 251 of the Revised Administrative Code:
SEC. 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of cedula [residence] tax. – Every
contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall have
certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper cedula
[residence] certificates or are exempt from the cedula [residence] tax, and there shall be
entered by the notary public as a part of such certification the number, place of issue,
and date of each cedula [residence] certificate as aforesaid.
Under Chapter 11, Section 249 of the Revised Administrative Code provided a list of the
grounds for disqualification:
SEC. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission. – The following derelictions of duty on
the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be
sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula
certificates.chanrobleslaw
xxxx
In Soriano v. Atty. Basco,33 the Court stated that notaries public are required to follow
formalities as these are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected. Thus, the Notarial
Law requires them to certify that a party to the instrument acknowledged before him
has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence
certificate) and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of the certification.
Failure to perform his duties results in the revocation of a notary’s commission. The
Court said:
As a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge
with fidelity the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by
public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost
respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment are sacrosanct. He
cannot simply disregard the requirements and solemnities of the Notarial
Law.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, based on the submission of the complainants, it is clear that the residence
certificate number used by Ramon Examen and as notarized by Atty. Examen in both
Absolute Deeds of Sale was not in fact the residence certificate of Ramon but
Florentina’s residence certificate number.35 Atty. Examen interposes that he was in
good faith in that it was office practice to have his secretary type up the details of the
documents and requirements without him checking the correctness of same.
A notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public
interest, with accuracy and fidelity.36 Good faith cannot be a mitigating circumstance in
situations since the duty to function as a notary public is personal. We note that the
error could have been prevented had Atty. Examen diligently performed his functions:
personally checked the correctness of the documents. To say that it was his secretary’s
fault reflects disregard and unfitness to discharge the functions of a notary public for it
is he who personally acknowledges the document. He was behooved under Section
251, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code to check if the proper cedulas were
presented and inspect if the documents to be acknowledged by him reflected the
correct details. This Court cannot stress enough that notarization is not a routinary
act. It is imbued with substantive public interest owing to the public character of his
duties37.
Atty. Examen posits that the failure of a notary to make the proper notation
of cedulas can only be a ground for disqualification and not the proper subject for a
disbarment proceeding. We disagree.
In violating the provisions of the Notarial Law, Atty. Examen also transgressed the his
oath as a lawyer, provisions of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, appended to respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral Philippines, the Department of Justice and all courts in the country for their information
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission and guidance.
to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority SO ORDERED.
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

By his negligent act of not checking the work of his secretary and merely perfunctorily
notarizing documents, it cannot be said that he upheld legal processes thus violating
Canon 1 of the CPR. Neither can it be said that he promoted confidence in the legal
system. If anything, his acts serve to undermine the functions of a diligent lawyer. He
thus ran afoul Rule 1.02 of the CPR. We cannot stress enough that as a lawyer,
respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession. 38 A lawyer’s
mandate includes thoroughly going over documents presented to them typed or
transcribed by their secretaries.39cralawred

The Court notes that the case between the parties is not the first that reached this
Court. In Edna Examen and Roberto Examen v. Heirs of Pedro Alilano and Florentina
Pueblo,40 Atty. Examen and his sister-in-law questioned via a petition for certiorari41 the
propriety of three Court of Appeals’ Resolutions relating to a case involving Lot No. 1085
Pls-544-D this time with respect to its fruits. There the Court of Appeals (CA) after giving
Atty. Examen 90 days to file his appellant’s brief, denied a second motion for extension
of time merely on the basis of a flimsy reason that he had misplaced some of the
transcript of the witnesses’ testimonies. The CA did not find the reason of misplaced
transcript as good and sufficient cause to grant the extension pursuant to Section
12,42 Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court. It stated that it was a “flimsy and lame
excuse to unnecessarily delay the proceedings.”43 The CA was of the opinion that
defendant-appellant’s, herein respondent, motion was “a mockery of the procedural
rules.”44 This Court denied the petition for various procedural defects.45cralawred

With respect to the penalty imposed, given that Atty. Examen not only failed to uphold
his duty as a notary public but also failed to uphold his lawyer’s oath and ran afoul the
provisions of the CPR, the Court deems it proper to suspend Atty. Examen from the
practice of law for a period of two years following this Court’s decision in Caalim-
Verzonilla v. Pascua.46cralawred

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto E. Examen is hereby SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS. In addition, his present notarial commission, if any,
is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for
a period of two (2) years from finality of this Decision. He is further WARNED that any
similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
2. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
G.R. No. 193156, January 18, 2017
IVQ LANDHOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, v. REUBEN BARBOSA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
IVQ Landholdings, Inc. (IVQ) assails the Decision2 dated December 9, 2009 and the
Resolution3 dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90609. The
decision of the appellate court affirmed the Decision4 dated June 15, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 222 in Civil Case No. Q04-52842, which
adjudicated in favor of herein respondent Reuben Barbosa (Barbosa) the ownership of
the property subject of this case and ordered the cancellation of IVQ's certificate of title
thereto. The resolution of the appellate court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration5 and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration6 filed by IVQ
regarding the Court of Appeals' decision.
The Facts
On June 10, 2004, Barbosa filed a Petition for Cancellation and Quieting of
Titles7 against Jorge Vargas III, Benito Montinola, IVQ, and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, which case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q04-52842 in the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 222.
Barbosa averred that on October 4, 1978, he bought from Therese Vargas a parcel of
land identified as Lot 644-C-5 located on Visayas Avenue, Culiat, Quezon City (subject
property). Thereafter, Therese Vargas surrendered to Barbosa the owner's duplicate
copy of her title, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 159487. In the Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Barbosa and in the copy of Therese Vargas's TCT No. 159487, the subject
property was described as:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A parcel of land (Lot 644-C-5 of the subdivision plan, LRC, Psd-14038, being a portion of
Lot 644-C, Fls-2544-D, LRC, Record No. 5975); situated in the District of Culiat, Quezon
City, Island of Luzon. x x x containing an area of THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY-TWO (3,452) square meters, more or less.8
Barbosa said that he took possession of the subject property and paid real estate taxes
thereon in the name of Therese Vargas. Sometime in 2003, Barbosa learned that
Therese Vargas's name was cancelled and replaced with that of IVQ in the tax
declaration of the subject property.
Upon investigation, Barbosa found out that the subject property was previously
registered in the name of Kawilihan Corporation under TCT No. 71507. Therese Vargas
acquired the subject property from Kawilihan Corporation and the date of entry of her
TCT No. 159487 was November 6, 1970. On the other hand, IVQ supposedly bought the
subject property from Jorge Vargas III who, in turn, acquired it also from Kawilihan
Corporation. The date of entry of Jose Vargas III's TCT No. 223019 was October 14, 1976.
This title was later reconstituted and re-numbered as TCT No. RT-76391. The title of IVQ,
TCT No. 253434, was issued on August 6, 2003.
Barbosa argued that even without considering the authenticity of Jorge Vargas III's title,
Therese Vargas's title bore an earlier date. Barbosa, thus, prayed for the trial court to
issue an order directing the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
Jorge Vargas III's TCT No. 223019 and IVQ's TCT No. 253434 and adjudicating ownership
of the subject property to him.9
In their Answer10 to the above petition, Jose Vargas III, Benito Montinola, and IVQ
(respondents in the court a quo) countered that the alleged title from where Barbosa's
title was allegedly derived from was the one that was fraudulently acquired and that
Barbosa was allegedly part of a syndicate that falsified titles for purposes of "land
grabbing." They argued that it was questionable that an alleged lot owner would wait
for 30 years before filing an action to quiet title. They prayed for the dismissal of the
petition and, by way of counterclaim, sought the award of moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City neither filed an answer to Barbosa's petition nor
participated in the trial of the case.
During trial, Barbosa testified, inter alia, that he is the owner of the subject property
that he bought from Therese Vargas. The property was at that time registered in her
name under TCT No. 159487. Barbosa took possession of the subject property seven
days after he bought the same and he employed a caretaker to live therein. Before
Therese Vargas, the owner of the property was Kawilihan Corporation, which company
was owned by Jorge Vargas.11 Barbosa stated that the subject property remained
registered in the name of Therese Vargas as he entrusted her title to another person for
custody but the said person went to Canada. Barbosa paid real estate taxes on the
subject property in the name of Kawilihan Corporation from 1978 until 2002. From 2003
to 2006, he paid real estate taxes thereon in the name of Therese Vargas.12
Barbosa added that in the year 2000, Santiago Sio Soy Une, allegedly the president of
Lisan Realty and Development Corporation (Lisan Realty), presented to Barbosa's
caretaker a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage,13 which was allegedly executed
by Jorge Vargas III and Lisan Realty involving the subject property. Barbosa then went on
to compile documents on the transactions relating to the subject property.
Barbosa testified that in the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage of Jorge Vargas
III and Santiago Sio Soy Une, the Friar Land Survey (FLS) number was denominated as
FLS-2554-D, while in the title of Therese Vargas it was FLS-2544-D. Barbosa obtained a
certification from the Lands Management Bureau that FLS-2554-D was not listed in their
electronic data processing (EDP) listing, as well as a certification from the DENR that FLS-
2554-D had no records in the Land Survey Records Section of said office. On the other
hand, he obtained a certification from the Lands Management Bureau that Lot 644
subdivided under FLS-2544-D was listed in their records.14 Barbosa also learned that IVQ
was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission only on June 5, 1998.
Moreover, on January 7, 2004, IVQ filed Civil Case No. Q-17499(04), which is a petition
for the cancellation of an adverse claim filed by Santiago Sio Soy Une (Exhibit "RR"). In a
portion of the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) in said case, it was stated that IVQ
bought the property from Therese Vargas, not from Jorge Vargas III.15
Barbosa furthermore secured a certification from the EDP Division of the Office of the
City Assessor in Quezon City that there were no records of real property assessments in
the name of Jorge Vargas III as of August 15, 2006. Moreover, Barbosa stated that Atty.
Jesus C. Apelado, Jr., the person who notarized the March 3, 1986 Deed of Absolute Sale
between Jorge Vargas III and IVQ, was not authorized to do so as Atty. Apelado was only
admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in 1987. Also, the notarial register
entries, i.e., the document number, page number, book number and series number, of
the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of IVQ were exactly the same as those in the special
power of attorney (SPA) executed by Jorge Vargas III in favor of Benito Montinola, who
signed the Deed of Absolute Sale on behalf of Jorge Vargas III. The Deed of Absolute Sale
and the SPA were notarized by different lawyers but on the same date. 16
On the part of the respondents in the court a quo, they presented a lone witness, Atty.
Erlinda B. Espejo. Her testimony was offered to prove that she was the legal consultant
of IVQ; that IVQ's TCT No. 253434 was acquired from Jorge Vargas III through TCT No.
RT-76391; that Jorge Vargas III's title was mortgaged at Philippine National Bank (PNB),
Bacolod; that Benito Montinola, the attorney-in-fact of Jorge Vargas III, sold the subject
property to Lisan Realty who in turn assigned its rights to IVQ and; that IVQ redeemed
the property from PNB. Barbosa's counsel offered to stipulate on the offer so that the
witness' testimony could already be dispensed with.17
As to the supposed sale to Lisan Realty and Lisan Realty's assignment of rights to IVQ,
the counsel for Barbosa agreed to stipulate on the same if the transactions were
annotated in Jorge Vargas III's title. The counsel for IVQ said that they were so
annotated. Upon inquiry of the trial court judge, the counsel for IVQ clarified that the
transfers or assignment of rights were done at the time that the subject property was
mortgaged with PNB. The property was then redeemed by IVQ on behalf of Jorge Vargas
III.18
The Decision of the RTC
On June 15, 2007, the RTC granted Barbosa's petition and ordered the cancellation of
IVQ's TCT No. 253434.19 The trial court noted that while the original copy of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Barbosa was not presented during trial, Barbosa presented
secondary evidence by submitting to the court a photocopy of said deed and the deed
of sale in favor of his predecessor-in-interest Therese Vargas, as well as his testimony.
The RTC ruled that Barbosa was able to establish the existence and due execution of the
deeds of sale in his favor and that of Therese Vargas.
The Certification20 dated February 12, 2004 from the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-
Officio Sheriff of the RTC, Manila stated that the page on which the Deed of Sale dated
October 4, 1978 in favor of Barbosa might have been probably entered was torn. This,
however, did not discount the possibility that said deed was actually notarized and
recorded in the missing notarial records page. Moreover, the RTC found that Barbosa
adduced evidence that proved the payment21 of Therese Vargas to Jorge Vargas, as well
as the payment of Barbosa to Therese Vargas.
The RTC further observed that Therese Vargas's TCT No. 159487 and Jorge Vargas III's
TCT No. 223019 bear more or less identical technical descriptions of Lot 644-C-5, except
for their friar survey plan numbers. However, the Lands Management Bureau and Land
Survey Records Section of the DENR, NCR issued certifications attesting that their
respective offices had no record of FLS-2554-D, the land survey number in the
certificates of title held by Jorge Vargas III and IVQ. On the other hand, Barbosa
presented a certified true copy of the subdivision survey plan FLS-2544-D from the
Lands Management Bureau, thereby bolstering his claim that the title of Therese Vargas
was an authentic transfer of the title of Kawilihan Corporation.
Therese Vargas's TCT No. 159487 was also issued earlier in time than Jorge Vargas III's
TCT No. 223019. Not only was the original of Therese Vargas's TCT No. 159487
presented in court, but the same was also proven to have existed according to the
Certification from the LRA dated October 6, 2003 that Judicial Form No. 109-D with
Serial No. 1793128 - pertaining to TCT No. 159487 - was issued by an authorized officer
of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
In contrast, the RTC noted that IVQ was not able to prove its claim of ownership over
the subject property. The deed of sale in favor of IVQ, which was supposedly executed
in 1986, was inscribed only in 2003 on Jorge Vargas III's TCT No. RT-76391 that was
reconstituted back in 1993. Instead of substantiating their allegations, respondents in
the court a quo opted to offer stipulations, such as on the matter of Lisan Realty's
assignment of its rights of ownership over the subject property in favor of IVQ.
However, the said assignment was not reflected in the title of Jorge Vargas III. The RTC
likewise found it perplexing that when IVQ filed a petition for cancellation of
encumbrance in Jorge Vargas III's title, docketed as LRC No. Q-17499 (04), it alleged
therein that it acquired the subject property from Therese Vargas, not Jorge Vargas III.
The trial court added that while there is no record of tax declarations and payment of
real estate taxes in the name of Jorge Vargas III, Therese Vargas declared the subject
property for taxation purposes in her name and, thereafter, Barbosa paid real estate
taxes thereon in her name. On the other hand, the only tax declaration that IVQ
presented was for the year 2006. The RTC also opined that while Barbosa was not able
to sufficiently establish his possession of the subject property as he failed to put on the
witness stand the caretaker he had authorized to occupy the property, IVQ also did not
gain control and possession of the subject property because the same continued to be
in the possession of squatters.
To impugn the above decision of the trial court, IVQ, alone, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration/New Trial/Reopening of Trial22 under the representation of a new
counsel.23 In its Motion for Reconsideration, IVQ argued that the RTC erred in
concluding that Barbosa's title is superior to its title.24 IVQ alleged that Barbosa
submitted forged and spurious evidence before the trial court. On the other hand, in its
Motion for New Trial, IVQ alleged that it was defrauded by its former counsel, Atty.
Leovigildo Mijares, which fraud prevented it from fully presenting its case in court. IVQ
also averred that it found newly-discovered evidence, which it could not have
discovered and produced during trial.
In an Order25 dated November 28, 2007, the trial court denied IVQ's Motion for
Reconsideration/New Trial/Reopening of Trial for lack of merit.
IVQ's Appeal in the Court of Appeals
IVQ interposed an appeal26 to the Court of Appeals. In its Appellant's Brief, IVQ first laid
down its version of the facts, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On 12 March 1976, Kawilihan Corporation, represented by its President and Chairman of
the Board Jorge B. Vargas, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale x x x, whereby he sold the
subject property to appellant Vargas, III.
On 14 October 1976, TCT No. 71507 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 223019 x
x x was issued in the name of appellant Vargas, III who on 23 December 1976 executed a
Special Power of Attorney x x x in favor of appellant Benito C. Montinola, Jr. with power
among other things to mortgage the subject property for and in behalf of appellant
Vargas, III.
On 25 December 1976, appellant Vargas, III mortgaged the subject property to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), Victorias Branch, Negros Occidental as security for a
loan in the principal amount of P506,000.00.
On 04 October 1978, Therese Vargas executed a Deed of Absolute Sale x x x wherein she
sold the subject property to appellee Barbosa who however did not register the said
sale with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. It appears that Therese Vargas was able
to secure TCT No. 159487 x x x in her name on 06 November 1970 covering the subject
property.
Meanwhile, appellant Vargas, III executed another Special Power of Attorney x x x in
favor of appellant Montinola, Jr. with power among other things to sell the subject
property for and in behalf of appellant Vargas, III. Thus, on 03 March 1986, during the
effectivity of the mortgage contract with PNB, appellant Montinola sold the subject
property to appellant IVQ for and in consideration of the amount of P450,000.00.27
After the alleged sale of the subject property to IVQ, the following incidents
transpired:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
When appellant Vargas, III failed to pay his loan, PNB foreclosed the mortgage and in
the public auction that followed, the subject property was sold to PNB.
A Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB but the latter did not cause the
registration of the certificate of sale right away.
Sometime in 1991, appellant Montinola, Jr. caused the filing of a Petition for
Reconstitution of TCT No. 223019 which was granted in 1993. Consequently, TCT No. RT-
76391 was issued, in the name of appellant Vargas, III, in lieu ofTCT No. 223019. On 13
July 1993, the Certificate of Sale in favor of PNB was inscribed on appellant Vargas, III's
new title.
On 17 February 1994, appellant Vargas, III executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage x x x wherein he sold to Lisan Realty and Development Corporation (Lisan
Realty) the subject property with the latter assuming the loan balance with PNB.
On 23 June 1994, appellant IVQ, for and in behalf of defendant Vargas, III, redeemed the
subject property from PNB and on 24 June 1994, the Certificate of Redemption was
annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. RT-76390.
On 21 August 2000, Lisan Realty caused the annotation of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim
x x x on TCT No. RT-76390.
Thereafter, appellant IVQ filed a Petition for Cancellation of Encumbrance x x x with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, docketed as LRC Case No. Q-17499 (04).
On 06 August 2003, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City cancelled TCT No. RT-76390
and in lieu thereof TCT No. 253434 was issued in the name of appellant IVQ.
On 11 February 2004, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220 rendered a
Decision x x x granting appellant IVQ's Petition for Cancellation of Encumbrance and
ordering the cancellation of the annotation of the adverse claim on TCT No. 253434.
In August 2004, appellant IVQ instituted [a] Complaint x x x for unlawful detainer with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 38 against several persons who
were occupying the subject property without any right whatsoever. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 38-33264.
On 26 October 2004, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 38 rendered a
Decision x x x in favor of appellant IVQ ordering the defendants therein to vacate the
subject property.28
The Court of Appeals, however, paid no heed to IVQ's appeal as it affirmed the ruling of
the RTC. The appellate court held that Barbosa was able to prove his ownership over the
subject property, while IVQ presented a rather flimsy account on the transfer of the
subject property to its name.
IVQ filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
on the above judgment, but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its assailed
Resolution dated July 30, 2010.
IVQ's Petition for Review on Certiorari
IVQ instituted before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari on August
20, 2010, which prayed for the reversal of the above rulings of the Court of Appeals. In
a Resolution29dated September 29, 2010, the Court initially denied IVQ's petition for its
failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its assailed
rulings.
30
IVQ filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the denial of its petition. To prove that its
title to the subject property is genuine, IVQ averred that the Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of Jorge Vargas III was notarized by Atty. Jejomar C. Binay, then a notary public for
Mandaluyong. IVQ attached to its motion for reconsideration, among others, a
photocopy of a Certification31 dated October 8, 2010 from the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the RTC of Pasig City that "ATTY. JEJOMAR C. BINAY was appointed Notary
Public for and in the Province of Rizal for the year 1976" and that he "submitted his
notarial reports for the period January, 1976 up to December, 1976." IVQ also attached
a photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Jorge Vargas III obtained from the
records of the National Archives on October 14, 2010.32
To prove that Barbosa's claim of ownership is spurious, IVQ attached to its motion for
reconsideration the following documents:
(1) a photocopy of a Certification dated October 27, 2010 from the Office of the Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court that Espiridion J. Dela Cruz, the notary public who
supposedly notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Therese Vargas, is not a
member of the Philippine Bar;33
(2) a photocopy of the Certification dated October 19, 2010 from the National Archives
of the Philippines that a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Therese Vargas is
not extant in the files of said office;34
(3) a Certification dated October 12, 2010 from the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-
Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Manila, stating that the notarial entries of Atty. Santiago R.
Reyes in the Deed of Absolute Sale between Therese Vargas and Barbosa Doc. No. 1947,
Page 92, Book No. XIV, Series of 1978 - actually pertained to a different deed of sale;35
(4) photocopies of pages 90, 91 and 92, Book XIV, Series of 1978 of Atty. Santiago R.
Reyes's notarial records, which were reproduced from the National Archives on October
14, 2010, showing that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Therese Vargas and Barbosa
was not found therein;36
(5) a photocopy of a Certification dated October 14, 2010 of the City Treasurer's Office
of the City of Manila, stating that Residence Certificate No. A-423263 - the residence
certificate number of Therese Vargas in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Barbosa -
was not among those allotted to the City of Manila;37 and
(6) a letter dated October 20, 2010 from Director Porfirio R. Encisa, Jr. of the LRA
Department on Registration, explaining that the land survey number of FLS-2554-D in
IVQ's TCT No. 253434 was a mere typographical error and it should have been FLS-2544-
D.38
In a Resolution39 dated December 15, 2010, the Court denied IVQ's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Undaunted, IVQ filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration, 40 arguing that it was able to
submit new pieces of documentary evidence that surfaced for the first time when its
Motion for Reconsideration was submitted by its new counsel. IVQ entreated the Court
to consider the same in the higher interest of justice.
Barbosa opposed41 the above motion, countering that the same is a prohibited pleading.
Barbosa maintained that it was impossible for IVQ to acquire ownership over the subject
property as the latter was only incorporated on June 5, 1998. Thus, IVQ could not have
bought the property from Jorge Vargas III on March 3, 1986 or subsequently redeemed
the property in 1994.
In a Resolution42 dated June 6, 2011, the Court reinstated IVQ's petition and required
Barbosa to comment thereon.
Barbosa moved for a reconsideration43 of the said resolution, citing IVQ's lack of legal
personality when it supposedly purchased the subject property and IVQ's inconsistent
statements as to how it acquired the same. The Court treated the above motion of
Barbosa as his comment to IVQ's petition and required IVQ to file a reply thereto. 44
In its Reply,45 IVQ primarily argued that Barbosa did not bother to refute the allegations
and the evidence on the spuriousness of his title and instead sought to divert the issue
by attacking IVQ's corporate existence.
The Court, thereafter, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.46
In its memorandum,47 IVQ avers that while the evidence supporting its case surfaced for
the first time after its petition was filed with this Court, peculiar circumstances involving
the actuations of IVQ's former counsel and Barbosa's introduction of spurious
documents warrant the suspension of procedural rules in the interest of justice. IVQ
insists that Barbosa was not able to prove his claim by preponderance of evidence.
Upon the other hand, Barbosa contends that IVQ could not legally claim ownership of
the subject property as this claim is anchored on a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Jorge Vargas III on March 3, 1986 while IVQ was incorporated only on June 5, 1998.
Barbosa also points out that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of IVQ was signed only
by Jorge Vargas III's representative, Benito Montinola. There is no corresponding
signature on the part of the vendee. Barbosa adopts entirely the findings of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals that the sale in favor of Therese Vargas is the one to be legally
sustained.
The Ruling of the Court
Without ruling on the merits of this case, the Court finds that there is a need to reassess
the evidence adduced by the parties to this case and thereafter reevaluate the findings
of the lower courts.
To recall, Barbosa initiated this case before the trial court via a petition for cancellation
and quieting of titles. As held in Secuya v. De Selma,48
In an action to quiet title, the plaintiffs or complainants must demonstrate a legal or
an equitable title to, or an interest in, the subject real property. Likewise, they must
show that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that purportedly casts a cloud
on their title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy. This point is clear from Article 476 of the Civil Code, which
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet title."
"An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein." (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
The Court also stressed in Santiago v. Villamor49 that in civil cases, the plaintiff must
establish his cause of action by preponderance of evidence; otherwise, his suit will not
prosper.
In the instant case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals adjudicated the subject
property in favor of Barbosa and directed the cancellation of IVQ's certificate of title.
The trial court found that Barbosa was able to substantiate the transfer of ownership of
the subject property from Kawilihan Corporation to Therese Vargas and then to
Barbosa. Specifically, Barbosa established the existence and execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated September 11, 1970 between Kawilihan Corporation and Therese
Vargas, as well as the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 4, 1978 between Therese
Vargas and Barbosa. In like manner, the trial court ruled that Barbosa adduced evidence
that purportedly proved the payment of Therese Vargas to Kawilihan Corporation, and
the payment of Barbosa to Therese Vargas. Also, the trial court found that Barbosa was
able to prove the validity of Therese Vargas's TCT No. 159487. Moreover, the friar land
survey number in Therese Vargas's TCT No. 159487- FLS-2544-D - was the one found to
be extant in the records of Lands Management Bureau, not FLS-2554-D, the survey
number in the certificates of title of Jorge Vargas III and IVQ.
On the other hand, the trial court found that IVQ failed to establish its claim of
ownership over the subject property, given the inconsistent statements on how the
property was transferred from Kawilihan Corporation to Jorge Vargas III and eventually
to IVQ.
Before this Court, however, IVQ adduced new pieces of documentary evidence that
tended to cast doubt on the veracity of Barbosa's claim of ownership.
To impugn the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Kawilihan Corporation and
Therese Vargas, IVQ submitted a copy of the Certification from the Office of the Bar
Confidant that Espiridion J. Dela Cruz, the notary public who supposedly notarized the
said deed, is not a member of the Philippine Bar. IVQ also submitted a copy of the
Certification from the National Archives, stating that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of Therese Vargas was not found in their records.
Anent the Deed of Absolute Sale between Therese Vargas and Barbosa, IVQ presented a
Certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of
Manila, stating that the notarial entries of Atty. Santiago R. Reyes in said deed, i.e., Doc.
No. 1947, Page 92, Book No. XIV, Series of 1978, pertained to a deed of sale between
other individuals. Also, the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Barbosa was not found in
the photocopies of pages 90, 91, and 92 of the aforesaid notarial records of Atty.
Santiago R. Reyes, which pages were reproduced from the National Archives. IVQ also
submitted a Certification from the City Treasurer's Office of the City of Manila, stating
that Therese Vargas's Residence Certificate No. A-423263 in the Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of Barbosa was not among those allotted to the City of Manila.
Furthermore, IVQ submitted a letter from Director Porfirio R. Encisa, Jr. of the LRA
Department of Registration, stating that the survey number FLS-2554-D in IVQ's TCT No.
253434 was a typographical error and the same should have been FLS-2544-D.
On the other hand, to bolster its claim of ownership over the subject property, IVQ
presented a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale50 dated March 12, 1976 between
Kawilihan Corporation and Jorge Vargas III that was obtained from the records of the
National Archives. IVQ also submitted a copy of the Certification from the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City that Atty. Jejomar C. Binay, the officer who
notarized the said deed, was indeed appointed as a notary public for the province of
Rizal for the year 1976 and the latter submitted his notarial reports for the said year.
Interestingly, despite the claim of both parties that their respective titles could be
traced to TCT No. 71507 in the name of Kawilihan Corporation, neither of them thought
to submit a certified true copy of the cancelled TCT No. 71507, which would have
indicated to whom the subject property had in fact been transferred.
The parties likewise admit in their pleadings that there is an on-going investigation being
conducted by the LRA on the authenticity and genuineness of the certificates of title
involved in the present case and to date, the LRA has not issued any official report
pertaining to said investigation.
After reviewing the factual and procedural antecedents of this case, the Court deems it
appropriate that further proceedings be undertaken in order to verify the authenticity
and veracity of the parties' certificates of title and other documentary evidence.
For sure, the Court is aware that the aforesaid evidence belatedly introduced by IVQ are
not technically newly-discovered evidence, given that the same could have been
discovered and produced at the trial of the case had IVQ exercised reasonable diligence
in obtaining them.51 Nonetheless, we find that the above evidence cannot simply be
brushed aside on this ground alone. The same are too material to ignore and are
relevant in ultimately resolving the question of ownership of the subject property.
In Mangahas v. Court of Appeals,52 we recognized the long line of jurisprudence
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[I]t is always in the power of this Court to suspend its own rules, or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it. This
Court is mindful of the policy of affording litigants the amplest opportunity for the
determination of their cases on the merits and of dispensing with technicalities
whenever compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it.
(Citations omitted.)
Indeed, the alleged defects in the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
September 11, 1970 between Kawilihan Corporation and Therese Vargas and the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated October 4, 1978 between Therese Vargas and Barbosa are by no
means trivial.
53
As the Court stressed in Vda. De Rosales v. Ramos :ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making
that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
xxxx
The notary public is further enjoined to record in his notarial registry the necessary
information regarding the document or instrument notarized and retain a copy of the
document presented to him for acknowledgment and certification especially when it is a
contract. The notarial registry is a record of the notary public's official acts.
Acknowledged documents and instruments recorded in it are considered public
document. If the document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and
there is no copy of it therein, doubt is engendered that the document or instrument was
not really notarized, so that it is not a public document and cannot bolster any claim
made based on this document. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
Furthermore, in Bitte v. Jonas,54 the Court had occasion to discuss the consequence of
an improperly notarized deed of absolute sale. Thus -
Article 1358 of the New Civil Code requires that the form of a contract transmitting or
extinguishing real rights over immovable property should be in a public document. x x x.
xxxx
Not having been properly and validly notarized, the deed of sale cannot be considered
a public document. It is an accepted rule, however, that the failure to observe the
proper form does not render the transaction invalid. It has been settled that a sale of
real property, though not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing is,
nevertheless, valid and binding among the parties, for the time-honored rule is that
even a verbal contract of sale or real estate produces legal effects between the parties.
Not being considered a public document, the deed is subject to the requirement of
proof under Section 20, Rule 132, which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Accordingly, the party invoking the validity of the deed of absolute sale had the
burden of proving its authenticity and due execution. x x x. (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted.)
In the instant case, should the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Therese Vargas and
Barbosa, respectively, be found to be indeed improperly notarized, the trial court would
have erred in admitting the same in evidence without proof of their authenticity and in
relying on the presumption regarding the regularity of their execution. Barbosa would
then have the additional burden of proving the authenticity and due execution of both
deeds before he can invoke their validity in establishing his claim of ownership.
Therefore, IVQ should be allowed to formally offer in evidence the documents it
belatedly submitted to this Court and that Barbosa should equally be given all the
opportunity to refute the same or to submit controverting evidence.
Given that the Court is not a trier of facts and there still are factual matters that need to
be evaluated, the proper recourse is to remand the case to the Court of Appeals for the
conduct of further proceedings.
In Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque,55 the Court explained the propriety of
resorting to the above procedure in this wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient evidence for copy of TCT No. 71507 that is registered in the name of Kawilihan Corporation, if
us to warrant the annulment of the Manotok title. All that the record indicates thus far possible. As previously discussed, neither of the parties submitted the same before the
is evidence not yet refuted by clear and convincing proof that the Manotok's claim to trial court and no explanation was likewise offered for this omission. As TCT No. 71507 is
title is flawed. To arrive at an ultimate determination, the formal reception of ultimately the title from which the certificates of title of Therese Vargas and Jorge
evidence is in order. This Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise structurally Vargas III supposedly emanated, the same may indicate which of the two subsequent
capacitated to receive and evaluate evidence de novo. However, the Court of Appeals titles cancelled it.
is sufficiently able to undertake such function.
It would likewise be expedient for the parties to submit evidence as to the character of
The remand of cases pending with this Court to the Court of Appeals for reception of their possession of the subject property, given that the trial court ruled that neither of
further evidence is not a novel idea. It has been undertaken before - in Republic v. Court them were able to prove their possession thereof.
of Appeals and more recently in our 2007 Resolution in Manotok v. Court of Appeals.
Our following explanation in Manotok equally applies to this The Court further reiterates its directive to the parties to submit information as to the
case:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary results of the investigation of the Task Force Titulong Malinis of the LRA regarding the
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari, the Court authenticity ofTCT No. 159487 registered in the name of Therese Vargas and TCT No.
may, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the 223019 registered in the name of Jorge Vargas III.
evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an appropriate court, agency or
office. The delegate need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision. After the conclusion of its proceedings, the Court of Appeals is directed to submit to this
Court a detailed Report on its findings and conclusions within three months from notice
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings of fact. Its of this Resolution. Said report, along with all the additional evidence that will be offered
conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It by the parties, shall be thoroughly considered in order to determine with finality the
is a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating issue of ownership of the subject property.
factual matters, including documentary evidence.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for the purpose of hearing
In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before it to and receiving evidence, including but not limited to, those specifically required by the
the Court of Appeals. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court commissioned the Court in this Resolution. The Court of Appeals is directed to conclude the proceedings
former Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the and submit to this Court a Report on its findings and recommended conclusions within
controversy, x x x. The Court of Appeals therein received the evidence of the parties and three (3) months from notice of this Resolution. The Court of Appeals is further directed
rendered a "Commissioner's Report" shortly thereafter. Thus, resort to the Court of to raffle this case immediately upon receipt of this Resolution.
Appeals is not a deviant procedure.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of authority
to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 SO ORDERED.
of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner
when a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or
otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. The
order of reference can be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and
the commissioner may likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The
commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in writing to the court upon the
matters submitted to him by the order of reference. In Republic, the commissioner's
report formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court on the matter. The same
result can obtain herein. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
Aside from receiving and evaluating evidence relating to the pieces of documentary
evidence submitted by IVQ to this Court, the Court of Appeals may likewise receive any
other additional evidence that the parties herein may submit on their behalf.

The Court, in particular, deems it necessary for the parties to submit a certified true
 [G.R. NO. 156310 : July 31, 2008]
XERXES A. ABADIANO, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JESUS and LOLITA MARTIR, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March
14, 2002 and its Resolution2 dated November 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 51679. The CA
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental3 declaring respondents as the owners of the property in question.
Subsequently, on February 21, 1962, Leopoldo Bañares filed before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental an ex-parte petition praying for: first, the
confirmation of the Agreement of Partition, the Conformity executed by David
Abadiano, and the Deed of Sale between him and his father; and second, the
cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and, in lieu thereof, the issuance of a new
certificate of title over the property. In an Order dated February 22, 1962, the court
ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the names of Dr. Leopoldo Bañares, Amando Bañares, and Ramon
and David Abadiano. Pursuant thereto, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31862
was issued by the Register of Deeds for Negros Occidental.9
Petitioner insists that this is still the valid and subsisting title over Lot No. 1318 and that
no sale of the portion pertaining to Ramon and David Abadiano ever took place. 10

On the other hand, respondent spouses alleged that, prior to the issuance of TCT No. T-
The case stemmed from an action for quieting of title and/or recovery of possession 4 of
31862, Ramon Abadiano, for himself and on behalf of David Abadiano, had already sold
a parcel of land filed by herein respondents against Roberto Abadiano, Faustino
their rights and interests over Lot No. 1318-C11 to Victor Garde. The sale was allegedly
Montaño, and Quirico Mandaguit. Petitioner Xerxes A. Abadiano intervened in that
evidenced by a document of sale (Compra Y Venta) dated June 3, 1922 and
case.
acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Peralta and bearing notarial inscription "Doc.
No. 64, Pag. No. 60, Book No. III, series of 1922." The sale was allegedly affirmed by
Lot No. 1318 of the Kabankalan Cadastre consists of 34,281 square meters covered by
David Abadiano in a document dated September 30, 1939. 12
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20461 issued on November 19, 1923 in the name
of the spouses Inocentes Bañares and Feliciana Villanueva. Before the issuance of OCT
They further alleged that from the time of the sale, Victor Garde and his heirs were in
No. 20461, however, Inocentes and the heirs of Feliciana Villanueva (who had
continuous, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession and occupation in the
predeceased her husband) executed an Agreement of Partition dated June 1, 1922 over
concept of an owner of Lot No. 1318-C.13 On December 29, 1961, the heirs of Victor
Lot No. 1318. The lot was partitioned and distributed as follows: (1) 14,976 sq m
Garde sold their rights and interests over Lot No. 1318-C14 to Jose Garde, who
denominated as Lot No. 1318-A, in favor of Demetrio Bañares; (2) 10,125 sq m
immediately took possession thereof. Jose Garde continuously planted sugarcane on the
denominated as Lot No. 1318-B, in favor of Ramon and David Abadiano (grandchildren
land until he sold the property to Lolita Martir in 1979.15
of Inocentes and Feliciana); and (3) 10,180 sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-C, in
favor of Amando Bañares. The partition is embodied in a Deed of Partition executed on
June 1, 1922 and notarized the following day by Notary Public Jose Peralta with notarial After acquiring the property, respondent spouses continued to plant sugarcane on the
inscriptions "Reg. No. 64, Pag. 69, Libro III."5 land. Sometime in March 1982, after respondent Jesus Martir harvested the sugarcane
he had planted on Lot No. 1318-C, defendant below Roberto Abadiano (son of Ramon)
allegedly entered the property and cultivated the remaining stalks of sugarcane and
On September 30, 1939, David Abadiano, who was absent during the execution of the
refused to vacate despite demands to do so. The following year, defendants Roberto
Agreement of Partition, executed a Deed of Confirmation acknowledging and ratifying
Abadiano, Faustino Montaño, and Quirico Mandaguit again harvested the sugarcane on
the document of partition.6
Lot No. 1318-C.16 Further, the defendants also entered the property and harvested the
sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-B,17 which by then had been acquired by Lolita B. Martir
OCT No. 20461 was administratively reconstituted on February 15, 1962 and in lieu
from her adoptive father, Amando Bañares.18
thereof OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) was issued over Lot No. 1318, still in the name of
Inocentes Bañares and Felicidad Villanueva. Annotated at the back of the reconstituted
Thus, in April 1982, herein respondent-spouses filed the Action to Quiet Title and/or
title were the Agreement of Partition and the Deed of Confirmation. 7
Recovery of Possession with Damages before the then CFI of Negros Occidental.
On June 14, 1957 Demetrio Bañares sold his share of the lot to his son, Leopoldo. The
In their Answer with Counterclaim,19 defendants denied that the subject property was
same was annotated at the back of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461).8
ever sold by Ramon and David Abadiano, and that, consequently, defendant Roberto
Abadiano had inherited the same from Ramon. They also alleged, by way of Special and
Affirmative Defenses, that the subject land still belonged to the estate of Ramon and
David Abadiano and was never alienated. They alleged further that the act of spouses
Martir in planting sugarcane on the land was without Roberto's consent; that Roberto
had demanded that the spouses Martir pay him reasonable rental for the land but that
they had persistently refused to do so; and that sometime in March 1981, Roberto and
the spouses Martir came to an agreement whereby the defendant continued to
cultivate the remaining stalks of sugarcane left by plaintiffs and that until the harvest of
said sugarcane, plaintiffs never posed any objection thereto.
Xerxes Abadiano intervened in the proceedings before the trial court alleging likewise
that his predecessor Ramon Abadiano never sold their share of the property to Victor
Garde.20
After trial, the court issued a Decision21 dated June 23, 1995, ruling in favor of the
spouses Martir, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants declaring plaintiffs spouses Jesus and Lolita Martir as the true and legitimate
owners of portions of Lot No. 1318 Kabankalan Cadastre denominated as Lots 1318-B
and 1318-C and ordering:
(1) That the defendants Roberto Abadiano and the intervenor Xerxes Abadiano shall
surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862 to the Registrar of Deeds of Negros
Occidental who is directed to partially cancel said title and issue new Certificate of Title
corresponding to Lots 1318-B and 1318-C in the names of the spouses Jesus and Lolita
Martir;
(2) That the defendants shall jointly and severally pay to the plaintiffs the amount of
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos representing the value of the sugarcanes of
plaintiffs which defendants harvested and milled with SONEDCO and;
(3) To pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.22
The trial court rejected therein defendants' contention that the Compra Y Venta was
null and void because the co-owner, David Abadiano, did not sign the same. It held that
the Supreme Court has ruled to the effect that the sale by a co-owner of the entire
property without the consent of the other co-owners was not null and void but that only
the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, making the buyer a co-owner. The trial
court also held that although the Compra Y Venta was not annotated either on the OCT
or on the reconstituted OCT, the validity of the sale was not vitiated. The registration or
annotation is required only to make the sale valid as to third persons. Thus, the trial
court concluded that the Compra Y Venta was valid between the parties, Ramon
Abadiano and Victor Garde.
The trial court also brushed aside the defendants' contention that the Compra Y Venta
contained the same notarial inscription as the Deed of Partition. It said that assuming
this to be true, this may be considered an error which did not nullify the Compra Y
Venta; at most, the document would be non-registrable but still valid.
On the contention that the alleged confirmation executed by David Abadiano was for
the Deed of Partition and not for the Compra Y Venta, the trial court agreed. It,
however, interpreted the same to mean that David Abadiano must not have authorized
his brother to sell his share in Lot No. 1318-C. The effect was that David Abadiano
continued to be one of the registered owners of the property and his heirs stepped into
his shoes upon his death.
However, the trial court found that the plaintiffs' (respondents') claim that they and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property for more than
sixty (60) years was duly established. In contrast, the court found that defendants and
intervenor, and their deceased parents, had not been in possession of their share in the
property. It held that the defendants and intervenor were guilty of laches for failing to
avail of the many opportunities for them to bring an action to establish their right over
Lot No. 1318-C.
Defendants appealed to the CA. However, the same was summarily dismissed in a
Resolution dated February 11, 1997 due to defendants' failure to pay the required
docket fee within the period set. Nonetheless, the records were retained for the appeal
of Xerxes Abadiano, intervenor in the trial court.
On March 14, 2002, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the Decision of the RTC in
toto.23
Xerxes Abadiano now comes before this Court raising the following arguments:
A
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, BASED ON ITS MISAPPREHENSION
AND/OR OMISSION OF THE FACTS, IN DISREGARDING THE PRIMORDIAL ISSUE OF
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF SALE ("COMPRA Y VENTA") IS A SPURIOUS DOCUMENT
B
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF LACHES
OVER REGISTERED LAND24
The Petition is impressed with merit. We believe the trial court and the CA erred in
ruling for the respondents. Accordingly, we reverse the assailed Decision and
Resolution.
It is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by
the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed
on appeal. Such findings are binding and conclusive on the Court. Further, it is not the
Court's function under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure to review,
examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented. The
jurisdiction of the Court in a Petition for Review under Rule 45 is limited to reviewing
only errors of law. Unless the case falls under the recognized exceptions, the rule shall
not be disturbed.25
anyone and that consequently, defendant Roberto Abadiano had inherited the same
from the former; x x x.29 (emphasis supplied).
Likewise, petitioner specifically denied the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Complaint.
He alleged that the lot "had never been sold or alienated and the same still remains
intact as the property of the Intervenor and his co-owners by operation of law."30
This was testified to by Roberto Abadiano during the trial, thus:

However, this Court has consistently recognized the following exceptions: (1) when the Q: During the lifetime of your father, do you know if your father has ever sold to any
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the party his share on Lot No. 1318?cralawred
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
A: He has not sold his share.31
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
These statements were enough to impugn the due execution of the document. While it
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
is true that this Court had previously ruled that mere denials would not have sufficed to
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
impeach the document, in this case, there was an effective specific denial as
are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main
contemplated by law in accordance with our ruling that -
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.26 defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is
otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect
that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its
In the present case, we find that the trial court based its judgment on a
genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the
misapprehension of facts, as well as on the supposed absence of evidence which is
genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a
contradicted by the records.
ground not affecting either.32
In appreciating the alleged Compra Y Venta presented by respondents, the trial court
It was error then for the RTC to have brushed aside this issue and then make so
concluded that "[t]he parties have no quarrel on the existence of a Deed of Sale of a
sweeping a conclusion in the face of such opposition. In light of this challenge to the
portion of Lot No. 1318 executed by Ramon Abadiano for himself and as representative
very existence of the Compra Y Venta, the trial court should have first resolved the issue
of David Abadiano, dated June 3, [1922] in favor of Victor Garde." 27
of the document's authenticity and due execution before deciding on its validity.
Unfortunately, the CA did not even discuss this issue.
The trial court erred in its conclusion.
We are cognizant, however, that it is now too late in the day to remand the case to the
Borne very clearly by the records is the defendants' repudiation of the existence of the
trial court for the determination of the purported Compra Y Venta's authenticity and
sale in their Answer with Counterclaim. They stated:
due execution. Thus, we will resolve this very issue here and now in order to put an end
to this protracted litigation.
2. That defendants admit plaintiffs' allegation in paragraph 4 that there has been no
particular designation of lot number (sic) for each of the co-owner (sic) of Lot No. 1318
There is no denying that TCT No. 31862 is still the subsisting title over the parcel of land
but specifically deny under oath the other allegations thereof the truth being that the
in dispute. It is also a fact that the purported Compra Y Venta was not annotated on TCT
property referred to here as Lot No. 1318 remains undivided to this day that the owners
No. 31862 until April 1982, shortly before the complaint was commenced, even though
thereof as shown by the TCT No. 31862 co-own the same pro-indiviso;
the deed was allegedly executed in 1922.

3. That defendants have no knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
Considering that the action is one for quieting of title and respondents anchored their
allegations in paragraph 528 and therefore specifically deny the same under oath the
claim to the property on the disputed Compra Y Venta, we find it necessary to repeat
truth being that Ramon Abadiano and David Abadiano had not sold the land at bar to
that it was incumbent upon the trial court to have resolved first the issue of the
document's due execution and authenticity, before determining its validity.
Rule 130, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole;
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office.
Respondents attached only a photocopy of the Compra Y Venta to their complaint.
According to respondent Lolita Martir, the original of said document was in the office of
the Register of Deeds. They allegedly tried to obtain a copy from that office but their
request was refused. No other evidence but these bare assertions, however, was
presented to prove that the original is indeed in the custody of the Register of Deeds or
that respondents' due and diligent search for the same was unsuccessful.
The Rule states that when the original document is unavailable, has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.33
In the case at bar, respondents failed to establish that the offer in evidence of the
document was made in accordance with any of the exceptions allowed under the
abovequoted rule, and yet, the trial court accepted the document as genuine and
proceeded to determine its validity based on such assumption.
The trial court likewise brushed aside the apparent defect that the document presented
contained the same notarial inscription as the Agreement on Partition. Indeed, the Deed
of Partition and the Compra Y Venta, though executed on different days, were notarized
on the same day, and both documents contained the signatures of the same witnesses
and the same notarial inscription.
This notwithstanding, the court concluded, "Assuming this to be true, same could be
considered an error which did not nullify, (sic) the Deed of Sale or Compra Y Venta. At
most, the document would be a non-registrable, but valid document."34
We stress that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal
manner therein expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity. 35
In this case, while it is true that the error in the notarial inscription would not have
invalidated the sale - if indeed it took place - the same error would have meant that the
document cannot be treated as a notarial document and thus, not entitled to the
presumption of regularity. The document would be taken out of the realm of public
documents whose genuineness and due execution need not be proved. 36
Accordingly, respondents not having proven the due execution and genuineness of the
purported Compra Y Venta, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of petitioner.
Next, we determine if petitioner is guilty of laches. On this issue, we rule in the negative.
Under the Property Registration Decree,37 no title to registered land in derogation of the
title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.38 Indefeasibility and imprescriptibility are the cornerstones of land
registration proceedings. Barring any mistake or use of fraud in the procurement of the
title, owners may rest secure on their ownership and possession once their title is
registered under the protective mantle of the Torrens system.39
Nonetheless, even if a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, 40 the registered
landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by
reason of laches.41
Laches has been defined as neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction
with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will
operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the assertion of a right which works
disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on some change in the
condition or relations of the property or parties. It is based on public policy which, for
the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which
otherwise could be a valid claim.42
The four basic elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of
one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and
for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights,
the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having
been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the
part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his
suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant or the suit is not held to be barred.43
The reason for the rule is not simply the lapse of time during which the neglect to
enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition which may have arisen
during the period in which there has been neglect. In other words, where a court finds
that the position of the parties will change, that equitable relief cannot be afforded
without doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed
or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the
consequences of his own neglect.44
Though laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved
positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations
in the pleadings.45
Based on the foregoing, we hold that petitioner is not guilty of laches. The evidence on
record does not support such finding.
Petitioner had reasonable ground to believe that the property, being still in the name of
his predecessor in interest, continued to be theirs, especially considering that the
annotation of the purported sale was done only in 1982. According to petitioner, his
father had told him that his (the father's) inheritance was in the possession of their
uncle, Amando Bañares who knew likewise that the property was theirs.
Thus, Roberto Abadiano testified:
Q: Before Amando Bañares died, did you know that your father is a part owner of Lot
No. 1318?cralawred
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And did you not complain to Amando Bañares that your father is a pert owner of that
lot?cralawred
A: No, Sir. We did not complain because he was our grandfather and when he dies, the
property will go back to us.46
And herein petitioner testified:
Atty. Garaygay'
Q: Before the war who was occupying this lot which you claimed belonging (sic) to your
father?cralawred
A: The uncle of my father, Amando Bañares, Sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, before and after the war and during the lifetime of Amando
Bañares, he was the one in possession of Lot No. 1318?cralawred
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was the condition of the lot under the possession of the lot under the
possession of Amando Bañares - was it under lease?cralawred
A: As far as I can remember, my father told me that his inheritance was with Amando
Bañares, his uncle.47
From the testimonies of petitioner and the defendants during trial, it would appear that
they were unaware of any of respondents' actions in relation to the property until the
death of their grandfather, Amando Bañares. When they did find out that respondents
were occupying the land, they immediately took action to occupy what they believed
was still rightfully theirs.
On this point, petitioner testified, thus:
Q: When did you initiate the move to claim Lot No. 1318-B as your inheritance from
your late father?cralawred
A: It was shortly after the death of Amando Bañares.
Q: Who were these, who initiated the move to claim Lot No. 1318-B?cralawred
A: I advised my brothers here in Kabankalan to take action to possess the land which
was then occupied before by our (sic) great uncle, Amando Bañares.
Q: When was that, in what year, because we do not know when did your uncle (sic)
die?cralawred
A: It was after the death of Amando Bañares sometime in 1973 or 1974.
Q: Why did it take you that long before you initiated the move to claim the
inheritance?cralawred
A: Considering that relatives were involved and the fact we understand that our late
parents revered our uncle so, we cautiously tried to take action shortly after his death,
so as not to antagonize our relatives.
Q: What did you do in order to claim your inheritance?cralawred
A: Now, after learning that it was being farmed by Lolita Martir, I advised my brothers
here in Kabankalan to go to Bacolod City to seek the intercession of the Philippine
Constabulary Commander in order to thresh out the matter in a way that there will be
no hostility or adverse reaction.
Q: What other reactions did you take, if any?cralawred
A: Well, I told my brother that they have a confrontation in the Office of the PACLAP
known as the Presidential Action Commission on Land Problems.
Q: Besides that confrontation at the PACLAP, what other action did you personally take
as an heir of Lot No. 1318-B?cralawred
A: After that confrontation, I advised my brothers to occupy the land in question to farm
it because it belongs to us.
Q: With respect to the Transfer Certificate of Title, what action, if any, did you
undertake?cralawred
A: Well, we drew out a Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication and after it was
approved by the Court, it was annotated at the back of the Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-31862 and we were given a co-owner's copy of the said title by the Register of
Deeds.
xxx
Q: Mr. Witness, when did you and your co-owners executed (sic) this Declaration of
Heirship and Adjudication over Lot 1318-B?cralawred
A: That was on July 17, 1976.
Q: Was that before or after the plaintiffs have filed this present case?cralawred
A: That was almost 6 or 7 years before this present case was filed. 48
On the other hand, Roberto Abadiano testified:
Atty. Garaygay'
Q: Now, according to you, your father is the co-owner of Lot No. 1318. Prior to the
death of your father, who was in possession of Lot No. 1318?cralawred
Witness'
A: What I know is it was Amando Bañares.
Q: You mean to say that when your father was still alive, it was Amando Bañares who
was in possession of Lot No. 1318?cralawred
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And until when did you know that Amando Bañares has been in possession of Lot No.
1318?cralawred
A: Up to 1976 when he died.
Q: After his death in 1976, who was in possession of the said lot?cralawred
A: I made a verification in the Office of the Register of Deeds, and when I went to the
said lot, it was vacant.
Q: When was that?cralawred
A: In 1976-1977, and I have it planted in 1978.49
That petitioner and his co-heirs waited until the death of Amando Bañares to try and
occupy the land is understandable. They had to be careful about the actions they took,
lest they sow dissent within the family. Furthermore, they knew that their parents
revered Amando.50
The Court has recognized that this reaction cannot be characterized as such delay as
would amount to laches, thus:
in determining whether a delay in seeking to enforce a right constitutes laches, the
existence of a confidential relationship between the parties is an important
circumstance for consideration, a delay under such circumstances not being so strictly
regarded as where the parties are strangers to each other. The doctrine of laches is not
strictly applied between near relatives, and the fact that parties are connected by ties of
blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwise unreasonable delay. 51
In addition, several other factors militate against the finding of laches on the part of the
petitioner.
When the Original Certificate of Title was reconstituted on February 15, 1962, no
annotation therein was made of the Compra Y Venta or of the Deed of Sale between
Ramon Abadiano and Victor Garde. Only the Agreement of Partition, the Confirmation
by David Abadiano, and the sale from Demetrio to Leopoldo Bañares were annotated
therein.52 Neither does the Deed of Sale of Demetrio's share in favor of Leopoldo,
executed in 1957, mention that the property belonged to anyone other than the parties
to the Deed of Partition.53
Likewise, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862, which was issued in 1962 pursuant to
an Order of the Kabankalan CFI, was issued in the names of Leopoldo Bañares, Amando
Bañares, and Ramon and David Abadiano. Even at the time of the issuance of said TCT,
there was no annotation of the alleged sale to Victor Garde, which according to
respondents took place in 1922.
If respondents' contention were true, the TCT should not have been issued in April 1962
in the name of Ramon and David Abadiano, but in the name of Victor Garde or Jose
Garde - who by then had supposedly acquired the property by virtue of the Declaration
of Heirship and Deed of Sale executed on December 29, 1961.54 As it is, neither
respondents nor any of their predecessors in interest participated in any of the
proceedings for the issuance of the OCT, the reconstituted OCT, or the TCT. The
petitioner's testimony on the matter is revealing:
Q: Based on your investigation, did you find records of the proceedings of the
reconstitution of title of Lot 1318 or any evidence as to the participation of the plaintiffs
in this Reconstitution Petition?cralawred
A: Based on the existing records, they did not participate.
Q: How about in the Reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. (sic) did the
plaintiffs participate therein?cralawred
A: They did not also.
Q: How about in the issuance of the new Transfer Certificate of Title, did the plaintiffs
participate therein?cralawred
A: No, sir.55
Again, the TCT bears out the fact that the purported Compra Y Venta to Victor Garde
was annotated thereon only on April 23, 1982. On the other hand, several entries made
in 1981 evince that petitioner and his co-heirs took steps after Amando's death to assert
their rights over the property.56
In 1976, the heirs of David Abadiano executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of
Roberto Abadiano giving the latter authority to act, sue, and/or represent them in any
suit or action for recovery of possession or of whatever kind or nature. 57 For their part,
the heirs of Ramon Abadiano executed a Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication over
the part of Lot No. 1318 pertaining to their predecessor. 58
Ranged against these positive steps, respondents only have their bare assertions to
support their claim that they indeed had possession of the land through their
predecessors in interest, which are insufficient to overcome the testimony that it was
Amando Bañares - and not Victor Garde - who had possession of the property during the
former's lifetime, or that after Amando's death, the lot remained unoccupied.
In sum, we find that petitioner is not guilty of such neglect or inaction as would bar his
claim to the property in question. In contrast, it is most telling that respondents, who
are claiming to have been in possession of the property by virtue of an alleged duly
constituted sale for almost 60 years, have themselves failed within that long period to
have the same property transferred in their name or even only to have the sale
annotated on the title of the property.
Finally, we come to the issue of damages. Petitioner prays that respondents be made to
pay actual damages of not less that P30,000.00 plus rentals on the property from the
time of the latter's occupation, moral damages amounting to P100,000.00, and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
The record shows that petitioner testified on the prevailing rate of rentals on the
subject property from the time of Amando Bañares' death in 1976 until the time of the
trial. According to petitioner, the rental rate from 1976 until 1985 was P3,000.00 per
hectare, while from 1985 until the time of his testimony in 1994, the rental rate
was P5,000.00 per hectare. We thus rule that the actual damages that may be awarded
shall be based only on these rates.59
Considering, however, that petitioner's co-heirs (defendants Roberto Abandiano, et al.)
were able to enter the property and harvest the sugarcane therein in 1981 and,
thereafter, the land remained unoccupied, the rent must be reckoned only from the
time respondents actually occupied the land until March 1981.chanrobles virtual law
library
The claims for moral damages must be anchored on a definite showing that the claiming
party actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings. 60 In this case, we find that
petitioner's testimony that he suffered from sleepless nights from worrying about this
case and considering the great distance he had to travel from his home in Tacloban to
see the case through are enough bases to award him moral damages. With the award of
moral damages, exemplary damages are likewise in order. 61
Attorney's fees are recoverable when exemplary damages are awarded, or when the
court deems it just and equitable. The grant of attorney's fees depends on the
circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion of the court.62 Given the
circumstances of this case, we grant the prayer for attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51679 are reversed and set
aside. A new one is entered:
(1) reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental
in Civil Case No. 1331;
(2) declaring the heirs of Ramon and David Abadiano as the lawful owners of Lot No.
1318-B, a portion of Lot No. 1318 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862,
Kabankalan Cadastre, Negros Occidental; andcralawlibrary

(3) ordering respondents to pay petitioner and his co-heirs rentals at the rate
of P3,000.00 per hectare per year, from the time of actual occupation of the land in
1976 until March 1981, moral damages in the amount of P100,00.00, exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 142977 : September 30, 2008]
LEONOR CAMCAM, JOSE, FORTUNATO, VIRGINIA, GLORIA, FLORENDO, DELFIN,
RODRIGO, LEUTERIO, NARCISO, ONOFRE, ZENAIDA, AURELIA, TEOFILA, FELICIDAD,
MERCEDES, LYDIA, ALFREDO, BIENVENIDO, EFREN, LILIA, ERLINDA, MELINDA,
MARYLOU, MERIAM, all surnamed SALVADOR, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS AND ARCADIO FRIAS, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Leonor Camcam (Leonor) and her husband Laureano Salvador (Laureano)
were the registered owners of two parcels of land, Lot Nos. 19554 and 18738 of the
Cadastral Survey of San Carlos, Pangasinan, located in the Barrio of Basista, San Carlos,
Pangasinan.
Laureano died intestate on December 9, 1941. He was survived by his wife-petitioner
Leonor; his brothers Agapito and petitioners Jose and Fortunato, all surnamed Salvador;
and the heirs of his deceased brother Luis Salvador (Luis), namely, petitioners Virginia,
Gloria, Florendo, Delfin, Rodrigo, Eleuterio, Narciso, Onofre, Zenaida, and Aurelia, all
surnamed Salvador.
On February 9, 1983, Leonor, together with her brothers-in-law Agapito, Jose,
Fortunato, and Luis' heirs, filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan a Complaint,1 docketed as Civil Case No. SCC-833, against respondent
Arcadio Frias (Frias), for annulment of the following documents executed by Leonor in
Frias' favor covering Lot Nos. 19554 and 18738:
1. November 4, 1982 Deed of Adjudication with Sale of the entire Lot No. 19554 and - of
Lot No. 18738, for a P11,000 consideration signed by Leonor (Exhibit "B"/"1");2
2. November 4, 1982 Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Sale of "ONE-HALF (' ) portion
EACH [of the two lots] together with [Leonor's] conjugal share of ONE-HALF (' ) EACH of
the [two lots] with all the improvements thereon" for a P45,000
consideration, signed by Leonor (Exhibit "A"/"3");3 and
3. November 23, 1982 Deed of Absolute Sale of the other half of Lot No. 18738, for a
consideration of P3,000, signed by Leonor (Exhibit "C"/"2").4
Before the trial court, petitioners advanced the following version of the case:
In November 1982, Frias offered to purchase the two lots from Leonor. Leonor,
however, was only willing to enter into a sale with right of repurchase within five years.
Frias agreed to Leonor's condition but he deceived her into signing the Deed of
Adjudication-Exhibit "B"/"1," after which he paid her P9,000 out of the P11,000
consideration, he promising that he would settle the balance of P2,000 before the end
of the month.
In the latter part of November 1982, Frias, instead of delivering the balance of P2,000,
again deceived Leonor into signing another document, the Deed of Absolute Sale-Exhibit
"C"/"2," he telling her that since two lots were involved, she had to sign another
instrument pertaining to the other lot.
Upon verification with Rodolfo Acosta (Acosta), the notary public who notarized Exhibits
"B"/"1" and "C"/"2," petitioners discovered that the deeds Leonor signed transferred
ownership of the entire area covering the two lots. They also, upon inquiry with the
Register of Deeds at Lingayen, discovered that Original Certificate of Title Nos.
116345 and 120276 in the name of Leonor and her husband covering the two lots were
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 1437527 and 1437538 were in their stead
issued in Frias' name. Further, they discovered that Frias registered the document-
Exhibit "A"/"3," which had the same date and notarial details as those of Exhibit "B"/"1."
Petitioners alleged that assuming that the documents are valid, it is void with respect to
the shares of Leonor's co-heirs-co-petitioners as they were conveyed without their
knowledge and participation.
They thus prayed for judgment
(1) Declaring null and void, the Deed of Adjudication with Sale dated November 4, 1982
[Exhibit "B"/"1"], and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 23, 1982 [Exhibit
"C"/"2"] on the ground that the said documents did not reflect the true intention of the
parties x x x, moreover, the shares of the plaintiffs, other than plaintiff Camcam,
were included without their knowledge, participation and consent x x x;
(2) Declaring null and void, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale dated November
4, 1982 [Exhibit "A"/"3"] based on the fact that it is absolutely fictitious and simulated x
x x;
(3) That as a consequence of the nullity of [Exhibit "A"/"3"], TCT Nos. 143752 and
143753 be declared null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Lingayen,
Pangasinan to cancel said transfer certificates of titles issued in the name of defendant
Frias and the annotations on OCT Nos. 11634 and 12027 relative to the cancellation be
cancelled; or, in the alternative, the defendant Frias xxx be ordered to execute a deed of
reconveyance over the parcels subject of this suit in favor of the plaintiffs, in the
following proportion, to wit: one half (1/2) to plaintiff Camcam, and the other half shall
pertain to the other plaintiffs, namely, Agapito, Jose, Fortunato and the heirs of the late
Luis, all surnamed Salvador, in equal proportion;
(4) Declaring plaintiffs Agapito, Jose, Fortunato, and the late Luis, all surnamed Salvador,
the latter being represented in this suit by his heirs, as the only legitimate heirs to
inherit the estate of their deceased brother, Laureano Salvador who died on December
9, 1941, thereby excluding the widow from participating xxx;
(5) Declaring the defendant liable for actual, compensatory and moral damages to
plaintiffs and litigation expenses, assessable in terms of money in such amount as will be
proved in court, and to pay exemplary damages as may be assessed by the court;
(6) Declaring the defendant liable for the attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00
and to pay the costs.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
They likewise prayed for other just and equitable reliefs.10
Upon the other hand, Frias advanced the following version:
Leonor inherited the two lots, to the exclusion of her co-petitioners, under the old Civil
Code11 and it was she who convinced him to buy them.
Leonor later changed her mind and was willing to sell only the whole of the residential
land, Lot No. 19554, and - of the mango and coconut land, Lot No. 18739,12 as she was
giving her brothers-in-law two weeks to buy the - remaining portion thereof,13 hence, he
and Leonor forged Exhibit "B"/"1." Leonor later informed him that her brothers-in-law
could not buy the remaining - portion of Lot No. 18739, hence, he and Leonor forged
Exhibit "C"/"2."14
After the execution of the two documents dated November 4, 1982, Frias brought them
to the Municipal Building to pay taxes. When asked by an employee of the then-Ministry
of Agrarian Reform how much he paid for the lots, Frias confessed to not having
indicated the correct consideration on the documents because he wanted to "escape"
paying taxes such as capital gains taxes. On being informed of the consequences of not
reflecting the true consideration of the two lots in the documents, he had the third
document, Exhibit "A"/"3," prepared which, after explaining to Leonor the reason
beyond the necessity therefor, she signed in notary public Acosta's office. 15
During the pendency of the proceedings before the trial court, Leonor's brother-in-law
Agapito died and was substituted by his heirs, namely petitioners Teofila, Felicidad,
Mercedes, Lydia, Alfredo, Bienvenido, Efren, Lilia, Erlinda, Melinda, Marylou, and
Meriam, all surnamed Salvador.16
By Decision17 of December 12, 1990, Branch 57 of the Pangasinan RTC, holding that:
x x x
We cannot agree that Leonor Camcam signed [these] document[s] without reading
them. She signed [them] and read [them] because she was one who had enough
learning. x x x Besides that, Evangeline Pira, and Gertrudes Calpo signed it themselves as
[witnesses according to] the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo Acosta.
x x x
But this is true only with regards to - of the properties as [they are] conjugal in nature.
As regards x x x the other half of the property the rights of inheritance by x x x brothers
and sisters under the old law is provided thus:
Article 948. If there are brothers and sisters and nephews, who are children of brothers
and sisters of the whole blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per
stirpes.
Article 953. In case there are brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters, the
widow or widower shall have a right to receive, in concurrence with the former, the
portion of the inheritance in usufruct granted him or her in Article 837.
Article 837. When the testator leaves no legitimate descendants or ascendants, the
surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance also in usufruct 18 (The
old civil code) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE the other half [of the two lots] should be divided among the brothers and
sisters and nephews and nieces by the right of intestate succession; to brothers and
sisters, per capita; and the nephews and nieces per stirpes; of one-half of the
property. The remaining one-half belong[s] to defendant [herein-respondent Frias].
Ordering the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan to cancel TCT No. 143752 and
143753 and instead issue another title, one half of the property to the brothers and
sisters, per capita; and to the nieces and nephews per stirpes; the other half to the
defendants.19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
On appeal,20 the Court of Appeals, by Decision21 of April 30, 1992, affirmed with
modification the trial court's decision. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the lower court dated December
12, 1990 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. One-half of the properties in
question belong to defendant-appellee Arcadio Frias, by virtue of the valid sale by
Leonor Camcam. The other half should be divided among the brothers, nephews and
nieces of the late Laureano Salvador by right of intestate succession: to brothers per
capita and to the nephews and nieces per stirpes.
THE Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan is directed to cancel TCT Nos. 143752
and 143753 and issue the corresponding titles in accordance with the above
pronouncement. The expenses of the survey should be borne equally by plaintiffs-
appellants and defendant-appellee. Costs against plaintiffs-appellants.22 (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
Their Motion for Reconsideration23 having been denied,24 petitioners filed the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari,25 faulting the appellate court
1. . . . IN NOT DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE THREE (3) DEEDS X X X CONSIDERING
THEIR PHYSICAL APPEARANCE AND CONDITIONS INDICATING STRONGLY THE
IRREGULARITIES OF THEIR EXECUTION.
2. [IN NOT DECLARING THAT] THE SALES WERE ILLEGAL, CONSIDERING THE OTHER
PETITIONERS [,] BEING OWNERS OF THE OTHER HALF, HAVE THE PREFERENTIAL RIGHT
TO PURCHASE THAT HALF PORTION INSTEAD OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.26
Petitioners contend as follows:
x x x
From the appearance of these documents, particularly the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition and Sale (Annex "A" or Exh. "A"/"3") and the Deed of Adjudication with
Sale (Annex "B" or Exh. "B"/"1"), while both were notarized by the same notary public,
yet they have identical notarial documentary identification, i.e., the same documentary
number to be 464, same page number 44, the same book number X and the same series
of 1982, and appeared to have been "sworn" before the notary public on the same date
- November 4, 1982.
x x x
Aside from the anomalous situation created by the irregularly executed deeds and
advantageously employed by the private respondent, in order to conceal the apparent
irregularities, the private respondent claimed that the Deed of Partition and Sale (Annex
"A" or Exh "A"/"3") dated November 4, 1982, was a consolidation deed of the Deed of
Adjudication with Sale dated November 4, 1982 (Annex "B" or Exh. "B"/"1") and the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 23, 1982 (Annex "C" or Exh "C"/"2").
However, summing up the consideration stated in Annex "B" of P11,000.00 and the
consideration stated in Annex "C" of P3,000.00, the total will naturally be P14,000.00,
but the alleged [consolidation] deed (Annex "A" or Exh "A"/"3") shows the consideration
is not P14,000.00 but P45,000.00.27
x x x
Assuming, without admitting, that petitioner Leonor Camcam regularly sold her one-half
portion in the two parcels of land in favor of private respondent Arcadio Frias, however,
considering the preferential right of the other petitioners, who are admittedly the
owners of the other half portion in said parcels of land, and considering further the
attendant circumstances of this case, as discussed above, the petitioners, with the
exception of petitioner Leonor Camcam, should be allowed to jointly exercise their right
of redemption, the consideration of which shall proportionately be based on that Deed
(Annex "B" or Exh. "B"/"1") which was published in the newspaper.28 (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
The petition is bereft of merit.
Without passing on the merits of Frias' claim that Leonor originally sold to him - of Lot
No. 18739 as reflected in the first November 4, 1982 document but later conveyed the
remaining - thereof, hence, the execution of the second document bearing the same
date, an irregular notarization merely reduces the evidentiary value of a document to
that of a private document, which requires proof of its due execution and authenticity
to be admissible as evidence.29 The irregular notarization - or, for that matter, the lack
of notarization - does not thus necessarily affect the validity of the contract reflected in
the document. Tigno v. Aquino30 enlightens:
x x x [F]rom a civil law perspective, the absence of notarization of the Deed of
Sale would not necessarily invalidate the transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358 of
the Civil Code requires that the form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes real
rights over immovable property should be in a public document, yet it is also an
accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper form does not render the
transaction invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly held that the form required in Article
1358 is not essential to the validity or enforceability of the transaction, but required
merely for convenience. We have even affirmed that a sale of real property though not
consigned in a public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding
among the parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or
real estate produces effects between the parties.31 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Petitioners alleged fraud on Frias' part, hence, they had the burden of establishing the
same by clear and convincing evidence.32 This they failed to discharge.
By Leonor's account, she signed the three documents relying on Frias' word that they
were deeds of "mortgage," and she did not read them because she "[did] not know how
to read,"33 When asked, however, on cross-examination about her educational
attainment, Leonor answered that she finished the third year of a nursing course at San
Juan de Dios Hospital.34
Clarifying her statement that she did not know how to read, Leonor explained that she
knew how to read but her eyesight was blurred.35 Leonor's granddaughter-witness
Gertrudes Calpo (Gertrudes) who signed as witness in Exhibit "B"/"1" declared,
however, that she read the contents of Exhibit "B"/"1" to Leonor,36 thus belying
petitioners' claim that Leonor signed the same without knowing its true contents.
As for Exhibit "A"/"3" which petitioners maintain is spurious, Leonor's signature therein
being allegedly forged,37 Leonor herself admitted having signed the same, 38 and this was
corroborated by Gertrudes.39

As for Leonor's co-petitioners' invocation of their right of redemption of the share of

Leonor in the lots sold to Frias, points of law, theories, issues of fact, and arguments not
brought to the attention of the trial court ordinarily are not considered by a reviewing
court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.40 Besides, given that
petitioners already knew of the sale as early as 1983, they are guilty of laches, having
raised their right of redemption for the first time in 2000 when they filed the present
petition.41

At all events, even assuming that the invocation by Leonor's co-petitioners of their right
of redemption was timely made, it cannot be considered a valid exercise thereof as it
was not accompanied by a reasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price. 42

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. NO. 174240 : March 20, 2013
SPOUSES LEHNER and LUDY MARTIRES, Petitioners, v. MENELIA CHUA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Amended Decision,1 as well as the Resolutions2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 30, 2005, July 5, 2006 and August 28, 2006,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 76388. The assailed Decision of the CA reversed and set
aside its earlier Decision, dated April 30, 2004, in favor of petitioners. The July 5, 2006
Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, while the August 28, 2006
Resolution denied petitioners' Second Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Subject of the instant controversy are twenty-four memorial lots located at the Holy
Cross Memorial Park in Barangay Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City. The property, more
particularly described as "Lot: 24 lots, Block 213, Section: Plaza of Heritage-Reg.," is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 342914. Respondent, together with her
mother, Florencia R. Calagos, own the disputed property. Their co-ownership is
evidenced by a Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care, denominated as Contract
No. 31760, which was executed on June 4, 1992.3chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On December 18, 1995, respondent borrowed from petitioner spouses the amount
of P150,000.00. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over the
abovementioned property. Respondent committed to pay a monthly interest of 8% and
an additional 10% monthly interest in case of default.4chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent failed to fully settle her obligation.
Subsequently, without foreclosure of the mortgage, ownership of the subject lots were
transferred in the name of petitioners via a Deed of
Transfer.5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On June 23, 1997, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a
Complaint against petitioners, Manila Memorial Park Inc., the company which owns the
Holy Cross Memorial Park, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, praying for the
annulment of the contract of mortgage between her and petitioners on the ground that
the interest rates imposed are unjust and exorbitant. Respondent also sought
accounting to determine her liability under the law. She likewise prayed that the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Manila Memorial Park, Inc. be directed to
reconvey the disputed property to her.6chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On November 20, 1998, respondent moved for the amendment of her complaint to
include the allegation that she later discovered that ownership of the subject lots was
transferred in the name of petitioners by virtue of a forged Deed of Transfer and
Affidavit of Warranty. Respondent prayed that the Deed of Transfer and Affidavit of
Warranty be annulled.7 In their Manifestation dated January 25, 1999, petitioners did
not oppose respondent's motion.8 Trial ensued.
After trial, the RTC of Quezon City rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners, the
dispositive portion of which reads, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered against Menelia R. Chua
and in favor of the Sps. Lehner Martires and Ludy Martires; and Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc. as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. The Complaint is denied and dismissed for lack of merit;cralawlibrary
2. The counterclaims are granted as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
a. Menelia R. Chua is ordered to pay the Sps. Martires the amount of P100,000.00 as
moral damages; the amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the amount
of P30,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees plus costs of suit.
b. Menelia R. Chua is ordered to pay Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. the amount
of P30,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On appeal, the CA affirmed, with modification, the judgment of the RTC, disposing as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, and the decision of the trial court dated 03 August 2002 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as to the amount of moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Plaintiff-appellant Menelia R. Chua is hereby ordered to pay the defendant-appellees
Spouses Martires the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages; P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and attorney's fees of P10,000.00 plus costs of suit.
Insofar as defendant-appellee Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. is concerned, the
attorney's fees awarded is reduced to P10,000.00 plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The CA ruled that respondent voluntarily entered into a contract of loan and that the
execution of the Deed of Transfer is sufficient evidence of petitioners' acquisition of
ownership of the subject property.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.11 Petitioners opposed
it.12chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On September 30, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed Amended Decision with the
following dispositive portion:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the movant's Motion for Reconsideration.
Accordingly, the decision of this Court dated April 30, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 76388,
which had affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
221, in Civil Case No. Q-97-31408, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and it is hereby declared
that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(1) The assailed decision dated August 3, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
Branch 221 in Civil Case No. Q-97-31408 is hereby Reversed with the following
MODIFICATIONS, to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(1) The Deed of Transfer dated July 3, 1996, as well as the Affidavit of Warranty, are
hereby declared void ab initio;cralawlibrary
(2) The loan of P150,000.00 is hereby subject to an interest of 12% per annum.
(3) The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
[are] hereby directed to cancel the registration or annotation of ownership of the
spouses Martires on Lot: 24 lots, Block 213, Section: Plaza Heritage Regular, Holy Cross
Memorial Park, being a portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 342914 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, and revert registration of ownership over the same in
the name of appellant Menelia R. Chua, and Florencia R. Calagos.
(4) The movant, Menelia R. Chua, is hereby ordered to pay the spouses Martires the
amount of P150,000.00 plus interest of 12% per annum computed from December 18,
1995 up to the time of full payment thereof and, after deducting payments made in the
total amount of P80,000.00, the same shall be paid within ninety (90) days from the
finality of this decision. In case of failure to pay the aforesaid amount and the accrued
interests from the period hereinstated, the property shall be sold at public auction to
satisfy the mortgage debt and costs, and if there is an excess, the same is to be given to
the owner.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.13chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The CA reconsidered its findings and concluded that the Deed of Transfer which, on its
face, transfers ownership of the subject property to petitioners, is, in fact, an equitable
mortgage. The CA held that the true intention of respondent was merely to provide
security for her loan and not to transfer ownership of the property to petitioners. The
CA so ruled on the basis of its findings that: (1) the consideration, amounting
to P150,000.00, for the alleged Deed of Transfer is unusually inadequate, considering
that the subject property consists of 24 memorial lots; (2) the Deed of Transfer was
executed by reason of the same loan extended by petitioners to respondent; (3) the
Deed of Transfer is incomplete and defective; and (4) the lots subject of the Deed of
Transfer are one and the same property used to secure respondent's P150,000.00 loan
from petitioners.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,14 but the CA denied it in its Resolution
dated July 5, 2006.
On July 26, 2006, petitioners filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration, 15 but again, the
CA denied it via its Resolution dated August 28, 2006.
Hence, the present petition based on the following grounds:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DEED OF
TRANSFER EXECUTED BY THE RESPONDENT IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS BY RULING
THAT:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. The Deed of Transfer executed by respondent in favor of petitioners over the subject
property was not entered in the Notarial Book of Atty. Francisco Talampas and reported
in the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
2. The Deed of Transfer was not duly notarized by Atty. Francisco Talampas inasmuch as
there was no convincing proof that respondent appeared before Notary Public Atty.
Talampas.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEED OF TRANSFER
EXECUTED BETWEEN THE RESPONDENT AND THE PETITIONERS CONSTITUTED AN
EQUITABLE MORTGAGE CONSIDERING THAT:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. Said issue was not raised in any pleading in the appellate and trial courts.
2. Respondent herself admitted that a separate mortgage was executed to secure the
loan.16chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The petition lacks merit.
At the outset, the instant petition should be denied for being filed out of time.
Petitioners admit in the instant petition that: (1) on July 18, 2006, they received a copy
of the July 5, 2006 Resolution of the CA which denied their Motion for Reconsideration
of the assailed Amended Decision; (2) on July 26, 2006, they filed a Motion to Admit
Second Motion for Reconsideration attaching thereto the said Second Motion for
Reconsideration; (3) on September 5, 2006, they received a copy of the August 28, 2006
Resolution of the CA which denied their Motion to Admit as well as their Second Motion
for Reconsideration; and (4) they filed the instant petition on October 20, 2006.
Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for review
on certiorari under the said Rule "shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from or of the denial of the
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the
judgment." Relative thereto, Section 2, Rule 52 of the same Rules provides that "no
second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party
shall be entertained." Based on the abovementioned dates, the start f the 15-day period
for the filing of this petition should have been reckoned from July 18, 2006, the time of
petitioners' receipt of the CA Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration, and
not on September 5, 2006, the date when they received the CA Resolution denying their
Second Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, petitioners should have filed the instant
petition not later than August 2, 2006. It is wrong for petitioners to reckon the 15-day
period for the filing of the instant petition from the date when they received the copy of
the CA Resolution denying their Second Motion for Reconsideration. Since a second
motion for reconsideration is not allowed, then unavoidably, its filing did not toll the
running of the period to file an appeal by certiorari.17 Petitioners made a critical mistake
in waiting for the CA to resolve their second motion for reconsideration before pursuing
an appeal.
Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional.18 For this reason, petitioners' failure to file this petition within the 15-day
period rendered the assailed Amended CA Decision and Resolutions final and executory,
thus, depriving this Court of jurisdiction to entertain an appeal therefrom. 19On this
ground alone, the instant petition should be dismissed.
In any case, even granting, arguendo, that the present petition is timely filed, the Court
finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and conclusions of the CA in its
disputed Amended Decision.
Anent the first assigned error, petitioners are correct in pointing out that notarized
documents carry evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their due
execution and enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by
evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to
falsity.20 However, the presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be
affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. 21 A
defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a
private instrument.22 Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a
document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-
notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such
document is preponderance of evidence. 23chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the present case, the CA has clearly pointed out the dubious circumstances and
irregularities attendant in the alleged notarization of the subject Deed of Transfer, to
wit: (1) the Certification24 issued by the Clerk of Court of the Notarial Section of the RTC
of Makati City which supposedly attested that a copy of the subject Deed of Transfer is
on file with the said court, was contradicted by the Certification25 issued by the
Administrative Officer of the Notarial Section of the same office as well as by the
testimony of the court employee who prepared the Certification issued by the Clerk of
Court, to the effect that the subject Deed of Transfer cannot, in fact, be found in their
files; (2) respondent's categorical denial that she executed the subject Deed of Transfer;
and (3) the subject document did not state the date of execution and lacks the marital
consent of respondent's husband.
Indeed, petitioners' heavy reliance on the Certification issued by the notary public who
supposedly notarized the said deed, as well as the Certification issued by the Clerk of
Court of the Notarial Section of the RTC of Makati City, is misplaced for the following
reasons: first, the persons who issued these Certifications were not presented as
witnesses and, as such, they could not be cross-examined with respect to the
truthfulness of the contents of their Certifications; second, as mentioned above, these
Certifications were contradicted by the Certification issued by the Administrative Officer
of the Notarial Section of the RTC of Makati City as well as by the admission, on cross-
examination, of the clerk who prepared the Certification of the Clerk of Court, that their
office cannot, in fact, find a copy of the subject Deed of Transfer in their files; 26 and
third, the further admission of the said clerk that the Certification, which was issued by
the clerk of court and relied upon by petitioners, was not based on documents existing
in their files, but was simply based on the Certification issued by the notary public who
allegedly notarized the said Deed of Transfer.27chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Assuming further that the notarization of the disputed Deed of Transfer was regular, the
Court, nonetheless, is not persuaded by petitioners' argument that such Deed is a
sufficient evidence of the validity of the agreement between petitioners and
respondent.
While indeed a notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity, the fact that a
deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents.28 The presumption is
not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.29 In
the present case, the presumption cannot be made to apply, because aside from the
regularity of its notarization, the validity of the contents and execution of the subject
Deed of Transfer was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima facie validity
was subsequently overthrown by the questionable circumstances attendant in its
supposed execution. These circumstances include: (1) the alleged agreement between
the parties that the ownership of the subject property be simply assigned to petitioners
instead of foreclosure of the contract of mortgage which was earlier entered into by
them; (2) the Deed of Transfer was executed by reason of the loan extended by
petitioners to respondent, the amount of the latter's outstanding obligation being the
same as the amount of the consideration for the assignment of ownership over the
subject property; (3) the inadequacy of the consideration; and (4) the claim of
respondent that she had no intention of transferring ownership of the subject property
to petitioners.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of
the CA that the agreement between petitioners and respondent is, in fact, an equitable
mortgage.
An equitable mortgage has been defined as one which, although lacking in some
formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless
reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, there
being no impossibility nor anything contrary to law in this
intent.30chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
One of the circumstances provided for under Article 1602 of the Civil Code, where a
contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, is "where it may be fairly
inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the
payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation." In the instant case, it
has been established that the intent of both petitioners and respondent is that the
subject property shall serve as security for the latter's obligation to the former. As
correctly pointed out by the CA, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
disputed Deed of Transfer would show that the said document was executed to
circumvent the terms of the original agreement and deprive respondent of her
mortgaged property without the requisite foreclosure.
With respect to the foregoing discussions, it bears to point out that in Misena v.
Rongavilla,31 a case which involves a factual background similar to the present case, this
Court arrived at the same ruling. In the said case, the respondent mortgaged a parcel of
land to the petitioner as security for the loan which the former obtained from the latter.
Subsequently, ownership of the property was conveyed to the petitioner via a Deed of
Absolute Sale. Applying Article 1602 of the Civil Code, this Court ruled in favor of the
respondent holding that the supposed sale of the property was, in fact, an equitable
mortgage as the real intention of the respondent was to provide security for the loan
and not to transfer ownership over the property.
Since the original transaction between the parties was a mortgage, the subsequent
assignment of ownership of the subject lots to petitioners without the benefit of
foreclosure proceedings, partakes of the nature of a pactum commissorium, as provided
for under Article 2088 of the Civil Code.
Pactum commissorium is a stipulation empowering the creditor to appropriate the thing
given as guaranty for the fulfillment of the obligation in the event the obligor fails to live
up to his undertakings, without further formality, such as foreclosure proceedings, and a
public sale.32chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the instant case, evidence points to the fact that the sale of the subject property, as
proven by the disputed Deed of Transfer, was simulated to cover up the automatic
transfer of ownership in petitioners' favor. While there was no stipulation in the
mortgage contract which provides for petitioners' automatic appropriation of the
subject mortgaged property in the event that respondent fails to pay her obligation, the
subsequent acts of the parties and the circumstances surrounding such acts point to no
other conclusion than that petitioners were empowered to acquire ownership of the
disputed property without need of any foreclosure.
Indeed, the Court agrees with the CA in not giving credence to petitioners' contention in
their Answer filed with the RTC that respondent offered to transfer ownership of the
subject property in their name as payment for her outstanding obligation. As this Court
has held, all persons in need of money are liable to enter into contractual relationships
whatever the condition if only to alleviate their financial burden albeit
temporarily.33chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Hence, courts are duty-bound to exercise caution in the interpretation and resolution of
contracts lest the lenders devour the borrowers like vultures do with their prey. 34 Aside
from this aforementioned reason, the Court cannot fathom why respondent would
agree to transfer ownership of the subject property, whose value is much higher than
her outstanding obligation to petitioners. Considering that the disputed property was
mortgaged to secure the payment of her obligation, the most logical and practical thing
that she could have done, if she is unable to pay her debt, is to wait for it to be
foreclosed. She stands to lose less of the value of the subject property if the same is
foreclosed, rather than if the title thereto is directly transferred to petitioners. This is so
because in foreclosure, unlike in the present case where ownership of the property was
assigned to petitioners, respondent can still claim the balance from the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale, if there be any. In such a case, she could still recover a portion of the
value of the subject property rather than losing it completely by assigning its ownership
to petitioners.
As to the second assigned error, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners' contention
that the issue of whether or not the subject Deed of Transfer is, in fact, an equitable
mortgage was not raised by the latter either in the RTC or the CA.
It is true that, as a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought
before the lower tribunal for its consideration.35 Higher courts are precluded from
entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings
below, but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on
appeal.36 However, as with most procedural rules, this maxim is subject to
exceptions.37 In this regard, the Court's ruling in Mendoza v. Bautista 38 is instructive, to
wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x Indeed, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to
waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned.
Section 8 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court provides:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SEC. 8 Questions that may be decided. - No error which does not affect the jurisdiction
over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the
proceedings therein will be considered, unless stated in the assignment of errors, or
closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief,
save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.

Thus, an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they
are not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as
errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as
errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law;
(c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in
arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of
justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as
errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some
bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court
ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error
assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the
determination of a question properly assigned, is
dependent.39chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In the present case, petitioners must be reminded that one of the main issues raised by
respondent in her appeal with the CA is the validity and due execution of the Deed of
Transfer which she supposedly executed in petitioners' favor. The Court agrees with
respondent that, under the factual circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the
determination of the validity of the subject Deed of Transfer would necessarily entail or
involve an examination of the true nature of the said agreement. In other words, the
matter of validity of the disputed Deed of Transfer and the question of whether the
agreement evidenced by such Deed was, in fact, an equitable mortgage are issues which
are closely related, which can, thus, be resolved jointly by the CA.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Amended Decision and
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated September 30, 2005, July 5, 2006 and August
28, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 76388, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,
CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON,
AND FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for
purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested
parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement,
or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of
the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
Antecedents
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his
second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V.
Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and
Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely:
respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate
shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation
Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate
stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for
the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate (Special
Proceedings No. 3094–CEB).1 The RTC granted the petition considering that there was
no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita were issued on
September 7, 1992.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on
December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the
inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no real properties but only
personal properties” worth P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20;
furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806
shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth P22,708.25.2
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the
inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be
examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s motion through the order of January
8, 1993.
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8,
1993,3 supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the
44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock;4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on
January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in
exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of
P4,440,700.00;5 and the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of
stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.6
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under
oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a
formal opposition to or comment on the inventory and the supporting documents
Teresita had submitted.
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to
present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the
motion for approval of the inventory.7cralawred
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of
court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the
issue of what properties should be included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC
set dates for the hearing on that issue.8
Ruling of the RTC
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March 14,
2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had
excluded properties that should be included, and accordingly ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court hereby
denies the administratrix’s motion for approval of inventory. The Court hereby orders
the said administratrix to re–do the inventory of properties which are supposed to
constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado by including therein the
properties mentioned in the last five immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and
then submit the revised inventory within sixty (60) days from notice of this order.
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her administration
of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession. She
must render such accounting within sixty (60) days from notice hereof.

SO ORDERED.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the
reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real
properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to
Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had
already come into the possession of and registered in the name of Mervir
Realty.10 Thelma opposed the motion.
On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration,11 stating that there
was no cogent reason for the reconsideration, and that the movants’ agreement as heirs
to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties should be included or excluded from
the inventory already estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the
issue.
Decision of the CA
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
approve the inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to include real properties
that had been transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her four children and her
stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14,
2001 and May 18, 2001 by petition for certiorari, stating:
I
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD BY THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO
DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE
INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
II
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY REGISTERED
IN THE NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE
INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
III
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE
NOW ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE
OF WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE
LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO.12
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, disposing as follows:13
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is GRANTED partially.
The assailed Orders dated March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed and
set aside insofar as the inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at
Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject matter of
the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised
inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is concerned and affirmed in all other
respects.
SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for certiorari because
the order of the RTC directing a new inventory of properties was interlocutory; that
pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the ownership of the thing
sold “shall be transferred to the vendee” upon its “actual and constructive delivery,”
and to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale made through a public
instrument was equivalent to the delivery of the object of the sale, the sale by Emigdio
and Teresita had transferred the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir Realty because
the deed of absolute sale executed on November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that
Emigdio had thereby ceased to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had
assigned the parcels of land to Mervir Realty as early as February 17, 1989 “for the
purpose of saving, as in avoiding taxes with the difference that in the Deed of
Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional seven (7) parcels of land were included”;
that as to the January 10, 1991 deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had been “even at the
losing end considering that such parcels of land, subject matter(s) of the Deed of
Assignment dated February 12, 1989, were again given monetary consideration through
shares of stock”; that even if the assignment had been based on the deed of assignment
dated January 10, 1991, the parcels of land could not be included in the inventory
“considering that there is nothing wrong or objectionable about the estate planning
scheme”; that the RTC, as an intestate court, also had no power to take cognizance of
and determine the issue of title to property registered in the name of third persons or
corporation; that a property covered by the Torrens system should be afforded the
presumptive conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by disregarding the presumption, had
transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on the
matter; and that the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et
al. were estopped from questioning its jurisdiction because of their agreement to
submit to the RTC the issue of which properties should be included in the inventory.
The CA further opined as follows:
In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that petitioners are
estopped from questioning its jurisdiction considering that they have already agreed to
submit themselves to its jurisdiction of determining what properties are to be included
in or excluded from the inventory to be submitted by the administratrix, because
actually, a reading of petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001
filed before public respondent court clearly shows that petitioners are not questioning
its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for which they are not
estopped, since that is their right, considering that there is grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order
dated March 14, 2001 denying the administratrix’s motion for approval of the inventory
of properties which were already titled and in possession of a third person that is,
Mervir Realty Corporation, a private corporation, which under the law possessed a
personality distinct and separate from its stockholders, and in the absence of any
cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said
titles in favor of Mervir Realty Corporation should stand undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no authority to
determine the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and
even if public respondent court was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate
court, private respondent nonetheless failed to adjudge competent evidence that would
have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction because to disregard the
separate jurisdictional personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and
convincingly established since it cannot be presumed.14
On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Teresita, et
al.15
Issue
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties
in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by
sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his
lifetime?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
I inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration
Was certiorari the proper recourse
to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the resort to the
special civil action for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC by Teresita and her co–
respondents was not proper.
Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained.
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether
the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. In Pahila–Garrido v.
Tortogo,16 the Court distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court
has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves
something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary
matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The
test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does
the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is
final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of
preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the
subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is
to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing
and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting
multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a
considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary
expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental
questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the
lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a
judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in
the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then
is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the
were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was
not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory
and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion
from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the
course of the administration proceedings.

In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court, in affirming the decision of
the CA to the effect that the order of the intestate court excluding certain real
properties from the inventory was interlocutory and could be changed or modified at
anytime during the course of the administration proceedings, held that the order of
exclusion was not a final but an interlocutory order “in the sense that it did not settle
once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots.” The Court observed there that:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the
title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the
parties (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448–9 and
473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L–42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).18 (Bold emphasis
supplied)
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where the Court declared that a
“probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon
questions of title provisionally,” and reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, that
the “patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that
questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory
of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.” Indeed, in the cited case
of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the
opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do
so. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to
take against the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph
of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court,21 which also governs appeals in special
proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court
of law “that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable” may be the subject of an appeal in due
course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution (interlocutory
because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be held
and the judgment rendered) is expressly made non–appealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the
possibility that material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special
proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances
in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. – An interested
person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a
Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or
judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share
of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower
court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from
the appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights
of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new
trial or for reconsideration.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any of
the instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.
II
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion for including properties in the inventory notwithstanding their having been
transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime, and for disregarding the
registration of the properties in the name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its
conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of
the RTC.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be
granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and
willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of
administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty–bound to direct the
preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the
surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the
inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant
to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within three (3)
months after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court
a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate,
the court may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their
assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and
personal properties of the decedent in the inventory.22 However, the word all is
qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies
that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or
are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the
phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent
can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of
another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate
of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the
liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable
distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the
estate.”23 Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested
with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the
inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the CA cannot impose its judgment in order
to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or
excluded from the inventory in the absence of “positive abuse of discretion,” for in the
administration of the estates of deceased persons, “the judges enjoy ample
discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to
replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive
abuse of discretion.”25 As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of
discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial
duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special
and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of
the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the
decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All
that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they
should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the Court
said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:26
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination
of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for
this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in
several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate
or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of
the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right
of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if
there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to
an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination
of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a separate
action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one
of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by
the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate
court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as
the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory
is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold
emphasis supplied)
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for
the inclusion of the properties in question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz:
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio Mercado was
one of the heirs of Severina Mercado who, upon her death, left several properties as
listed in the inventory of properties submitted in Court in Special Proceedings No. 306–R
which are supposed to be divided among her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while
being examined in Court by the counsel for the petitioner, that she did not include in the
inventory submitted by her in this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the said estate
of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties constituting Emigdio Mercado’s share in
the estate of Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory of properties
required to be submitted to the Court in this particular case.
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado also admitted
in Court that she did not include in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty
Corporation which are in her name and which were paid by her from money derived
from the taxicab business which she and her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal
undertaking. As these shares of stock partake of being conjugal in character, one–half
thereof or of the value thereof should be included in the inventory of the estate of her
husband.
In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado admitted, too, in
Court that she had a bank account in her name at Union Bank which she opened when
her husband was still alive. Again, the money in said bank account partakes of being
conjugal in character, and so, one–half thereof should be included in the inventory of
the properties constituting as estate of her husband.
In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case that Lot No.
3353 of Pls–657–D located in Badian, Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square meters
as described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Cebu is still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado
until now. When it was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB–12690 which was decided on
October 19, 1995, it was the estate of the late Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be
the owner thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened in the said case in order
to be the owner thereof. This fact was admitted by Richard Mercado himself when he
testified in Court. x x x So the said property located in Badian, Cebu should be included
in the inventory in this case.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by the late
Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue of the
Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said day (Exhibit N for the petitioner and
Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was a transfer in contemplation of death. It was made
two days before he died on January 12, 1991. A transfer made in contemplation of
death is one prompted by the thought that the transferor has not long to live and made
in place of a testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). Section 78 of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that the gross estate of the decedent
shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property to the
extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer in
contemplation of death. So, the inventory to be approved in this case should still include
the said properties of Emigdio Mercado which were transferred by him in
contemplation of death. Besides, the said properties actually appeared to be still
registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten (10) months after his death,
as shown by the certification issued by the Cebu City Assessor’s Office on October 31,
1991 (Exhibit O).28
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the
jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory by the
administrator. The aforequoted explanations indicated that the directive to include the
properties in question in the inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and thus was
far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado should
be included in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the
shares being inherited by Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime was the conjugal partnership
of gains.29 For purposes of the settlement of Emigdio’s estate, it was unavoidable for
Teresita to include his shares in the conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting
that specific property acquired during that property regime did not pertain to the
conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and that party must prove the
exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and convincing evidence. 30 In
the absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the conjugal partnership of
Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners
of the affected properties were,31 and which of the properties should form part of the
estate of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be
included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of Mervir
Realty, the RTC made findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB–12692, a
dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate
of Emigdio, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in
Emigdio’s name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of March 14, 2001, or ten years
after his death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the name of Emigdio.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB–12692. Such
lack of interest in Civil Case No. CEB–12692 was susceptible of various interpretations,
including one to the effect that the heirs of Emigdio could have already threshed out
their differences with the assistance of the trial court. This interpretation was probable
considering that Mervir Realty, whose business was managed by respondent Richard,
was headed by Teresita herself as its President. In other words, Mervir Realty appeared
to be a family corporation.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir
Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the
inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per
se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the contents
purported to be. The presumption of regularity could be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.32 As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of
Appeals:33
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the
presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public to
validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any
binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still and
always is the primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract. (Bold
emphasis supplied)
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of Mervir Realty
with the real properties owned by Emigdio would still have to be inquired into. That
Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two days prior to his death was a
circumstance that should put any interested party on his guard regarding the exchange,
considering that there was a finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer of the
pancreas at the time.34 In this regard, whether the CA correctly characterized the
exchange as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be validated by the facts
to be established in court.
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of
Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately excluding them from the
inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of the
deed of assignment. This is because:
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of
registration of titles to lands. However, justice and equity demand that the titleholder
should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the
State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage
to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put
a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were
noted in the certificate at the time of registration or that may arise subsequent thereto.
Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude
and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have
regularly performed their duties.35
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of assignment of
January 10, 1991, such lots should still be included in the inventory to enable the
parties, by themselves, and with the assistance of the RTC itself, to test and resolve the
issue on the validity of the assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate
court might have constricted the determination of the rights to the properties arising
from that deed,36 but it does not prevent the RTC as intestate court from ordering the
inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of that deed. This is because the RTC
as intestate court, albeit vested only with special and limited jurisdiction, was still
“deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it
effective.”37
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the
important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the
heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving
spouse, herein Teresita herself, to “bring into the mass of the estate any property or
right which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.” Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement
by the decedent on the legitime of an heir “may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon
shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.” Rule 90 thereby
expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the
matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct
the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory
heir by the decedent.38
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the
inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as
an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and
proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the
possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to
Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually
part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its
orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave
abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi–judicial power was exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge,
tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi–judicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 39
In light of the foregoing, the CA’s conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC was unwarranted and erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15,
2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with
dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094–CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late
Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the
respondents to pay the costs of suit.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208450
SPS. ROBERTO ABOITIZ AND MARIA CRISTINA CABARRUS, Petitioners
vs.
SPS. PETER L. PO AND VICTORIA L. PO, Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208497
SPS. PETER L. PO AND VICTORIA L. PO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. ROBERTO ABOITIZ AND MARIA CRISTINA CABARRUS, JOSE MARIA MORAZA, AND
ERNESTO ABOITIZ AND ISABEL ABOITIZ, Respondents
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves two (2) Petitions for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Court of Appeals'
October 31, 2012 Decision2 and its June 17, 2013 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 03803.
The assailed decision affirmed the Regional Trial Court's Decision,4 which declared the
spouses Peter Po and Victoria Po (Spouses Po) as the rightful owners of the parcel of
land. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that respondents Jose Maria Moraza (Jose),
spouses Ernesto Aboitiz (Ernesto), and Isabel Aboitiz (Isabel) were innocent buyers in
good faith whose titles were entitled to protection. 5 The assailed resolution denied the
Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the spouses Roberto Aboitiz and Maria Cristina
Cabarrus (Spouses Aboitiz).6
The Spouses Aboitiz filed the Petition7 docketed as G.R. No. 208450. The Spouses Po
filed the Petition8 docketed as G.R. No. 208497. These cases are consolidated in the case
at bar.
This case involves a parcel of land located in Cabancalan, Mandaue City, 9 initially
registered as Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887, and titled under the name of
Roberto Aboitiz (Roberto). 10 The land is referred to as Lot No. 2835. 11
This parcel of land originally belonged to the late Mariano Seno (Mariano). 12
On July 31, 1973, Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco
Seno (Ciriaco), over a 1.0120-hectare land in Cebu covered by Tax Declaration No.
43358. 13 This property included two (2)
lots: Lot No. 2807 and the land subject of this case, Lot No. 2835. 14
On May 5, 1978, Ciriaco sold the two (2) lots to Victoria Po (Victoria).15 The parties
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. 16
On July 15, 1982, Mariano died and was survived by his five (5) children (Mariano Heirs):
Esperanza Seno V da. De Kuizon, Ramon Seno, 17 Benita Seno Vda. De Lim, Simeon
Seno,18 and Ciriaco.19
In 1990, Peter Po (Peter) discovered that Ciriaco "had executed a [q]uitclaim dated
August 7, 1989 renouncing [his] interest over Lot [No.] 2807 in favor of [petitioner]
Roberto."20 In the quitclaim, Ciriaco stated that he was "the declared owner of Lot [Nos.]
2835 and 2807."21
The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco.22 By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the Spouses Po
executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 28, 1990 in which Ciriaco agreed to
pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses Po as consideration
for the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses Po were left with after the
quitclaim. 23
However, also in 1990, Lot No. 2835 was also sold to Roberto.24 The Mariano Heirs,
including Ciriaco, executed separate deeds of absolute sale in favor of
Roberto.25 Thereafter, Roberto immediately developed the lot as part of a subdivision
called North Town Homes.26
In 1991, the Spouses Po declared Lot No. 2835 for taxation purposes and was issued Tax
Declaration No. 0634-A.27
In 1992, Roberto also declared Lot No. 2835 for taxation purposes and was issued Tax
Declaration No. 1100, annotated with: "This tax declaration is also declared in the name
of Mrs. VICTORIA LEE PO married to PETER PO under [T]ax [Declaration] [N]o. 0634-A so
that one may be considered a duplicate to the other. "28
On April 19, 1993, Roberto filed an application for original registration of Lot No. 2835
with the Mandaue City Regional Trial Court, acting as land registration court. 29 The case
was raffled to Branch 28 and docketed as LRC Case No. N-208.30
In its Decision dated October 28, 1993, the trial court granted the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-887 in the name of Roberto.31 The lot was immediately
subdivided with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose.32
On November 19, 1996, the Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to
declare nullity of title with damages.33
The complaint was docketed in Branch 55, Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. 34
The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses Po in its Decision dated November 23, 2009:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs, and
against defendants, declaring the plaintiffs as owner of subject land and ordering the
defendants reconvey and/or return to plaintiffs Lot No. 2835; declaring as absolute
nullity all the documents of sale involving Lot 283 5 executed by the Heirs of Mariano
Seno in favor of defendant Roberto Aboitiz and such other documents used in the
improvident issuance of titles in the name of defendants, and to cancel the said titles. 35
The Spouses Aboitiz appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its
Decision dated October 31, 2012, partially affirmed the trial court decision, declaring the
Spouses Po as the rightful owner of the land. However, it ruled that the titles issued to
respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel should be respected. 36
The Court of Appeals discussed the inapplicability of the rules on double sale and the
doctrine of buyer in good faith since the land was not yet registered when it was sold to
the Spouses Po.37 However, it ruled in favor of the Spouses Po on the premise that
registered property may be reconveyed to the "rightful or legal owner or to the one
with a better right if the title [was] wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person's name."38 The Court of Appeals held that the Mariano Heirs were no longer the
owners of the lot at the time they sold it to Roberto in 1990 because Mariano, during his
lifetime, already sold this to Ciriaco in 1973. 39
It found that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po was duly
notarized and was thus presumed regular on its face. 40 Their Memorandum of
Agreement did not cancel or rescind the Deed of Absolute Sale but rather strengthened
their claim that they "entered into a contract of [s]ale. "41
It likewise ruled that, contrary to the assertion of the Spouses Aboitiz, there was no
showing that Ciriaco merely held the property in trust for the Mariano Heirs. 42
It held that the action of the Spouses Po had not yet prescribed because their complaint
in 1996 was within the 10-year prescriptive period as the title in favor of the Spouses
Aboitiz was issued in 1994.43
However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the certificates of title of Jose, Ernesto, and
Isabel were valid as they were innocent buyers in good faith.44
The Spouses Aboitiz thus filed their Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No.
208450.1âwphi1
45
They argue that the Decision of Branch 55, Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City
granting the complaint of the Spouses Po is void for lack of jurisdiction over the
matter.46 They claim that a branch of the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to
nullify a final and executory decision of a co-equal branch;47 it is the Court of Appeals
that has this jurisdiction. 48
They likewise assert that the Spouses Po's cause of action has prescribed 49 and allegedly
accrued when the Deed of Absolute Sale between the Spouses Po and Ciriaco was
executed on May 5, 1978.50 They maintain that more than 10 years had elapsed when
the complaint was filed on November 12, 1996, thus barring the action through
prescription.51
The Spouses Aboitiz further insist that "estoppel and laches have already set in." 52 They
claim that they have been "in open, public, continuous, uninterrupted, peaceful[,] and
adverse possession" in the concept of owners over the property for "46 years as of
1993," without the Spouses Po acting on the Deed of Absolute Sale. 53 They attest that
the development of North Town Homes Subdivision "was covered by utmost publicity,"
but the Spouses Po did not immediately question the development or interpose any
objection during the registration proceedings. 54
They posit that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po is "clearly
fake and fraudulent" 55 as evidenced by certifications of its non-existence in the notarial
books and the Spouses Po's failure to enforce their rights over the property until 18
years later. 56 They also affirm that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the
Spouses Po is inadmissible as no documentary stamp was paid and affixed. 57
Lastly, they contend that the Mariano Heirs should have been impleaded in the action as
they are indispensable parties. 58
The Spouses Po filed a Comment59 where they argued that the Regional Trial Court had
jurisdiction when it granted their complaint because the case filed by the Spouses
Aboitiz was for the registration of the land, while the case they filed was for
reconveyance.60 They insisted that their action had not prescribed because an action for
reconveyance prescribes in 10 years from the "date of issuance of the certificate of title
over the property."61 They argued that "laches ha[d] not set in."62 They claimed that the
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale between them and Ciriaco was not fake or fraudulent
and was admissible in evidence63 whereas the Spouses Aboitiz failed "to overcome [its]
presumption of regularity and due execution."64 They asserted that "the documentary
stamps tax ha[d] been paid"65 and that the Mariano Heirs were not indispensable
parties.66
Spouses Aboitiz filed a Reply67 reiterating their arguments in the Petition.
The Spouses Po also filed a Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 208497.
They claim that respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel are not "innocent purchasers for
value."68 They allegedly knew of the defective title of Roberto because his tax
declaration had the following annotation: "This tax declaration is also declared in the
name of Mrs. VICTORIA LEE PO, married to PETER PO under tax dec. No. 0634-A so that
one may be considered a duplicate to the other. (Section 89 Paragraph H PD 464)." 69
Spouses Aboitiz filed a Comment.70 Aside from reiterating their assertions in their
Petition for Review in G.R No. 208450, they argued that there was no evidence that they
acted in bad faith as "subdivision lot buyers [were] not obliged to go beyond the An action for annulment of title questions the validity of the title because of lack of due
[T]orrens title."71 process of law. There is an allegation of nullity in the procedure and thus the invalidity
of the title that is issued.
Spouses Po filed a Reply. 72
The complaint of the Spouses Po asserted that they were the true owners of the parcel
For resolution are the following issues: of land which was registered in the name of the

First, whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the Spouses Peter and Spouses Aboitiz.78 They alleged that they acquired the property from Ciriaco, who
Victoria Po's complaint; acquired it from Mariano. 79 They claimed that the Spouses Aboitiz had the property
registered without their knowledge and through fraud. 80 Thus, they sought to recover
Second, whether the action is barred by prescription, the property and to cancel the title of the Spouses Aboitiz. 81 Thus the prayer in their
Complaint stated:
Third, whether the doctrines of estoppel and laches apply;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Honorable Court is respectfully prayed to render
judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants, ordering the latter as follows:
Fourth, whether the land registration court's finding that Ciriaco Seno only held the
property in trust for the Mariano Heirs is binding as res judicata in this case;
1. To reconvey and/or return to plaintiffs Lot No. 2835 which is the
subject matter of this complaint;
Fifth, whether the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco Seno and the Spouses Peter
and Victoria Po should be considered as evidence of their entitlement to the property;
2. To declare as absolute nullity all the documents of sale involving Lot
2835 in favor of defendants and such other documents used in the
Sixth, whether the Mariano Heirs, as sellers in a deed of conveyance of realty, are
improvident issuance of the Title in the name of defendants, and to
indispensable parties; and
cancel said Title;
Finally, whether the respondents Jose Maria Moraza, Ernesto Aboitiz, and Isabel Aboitiz
3. To pay jointly and severally the amount of ₱ 1,000,000.00 as moral
are innocent purchasers in good faith.
damages; ₱500,000.00 as actual damages; ₱ 100,000.00 as attorneys
fees and ₱ 20,000.00 as litigation expenses.
I
Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the
The Spouses Aboitiz argue that Branch 55, Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction
premises. 82
to nullify the final and executory Decision of Branch 28, Regional Trial Court in LRC Case
No. N-208.73 They claim that that it is the Court of Appeals that has jurisdiction to annul
Except for actions falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, the
judgments of the Regional Trial Court.74
Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving "title to,
or possession of, real property."83 Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides:
However, the instant action is not for the annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial
Court. It is a complaint for reconveyance, cancellation of title, and damages. 75
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
A complaint for reconveyance is an action which admits the registration of title of
another party but claims that such registration was erroneous or wrongful. 76 It seeks
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
the transfer of the title to the rightful and legal owner, or to the party who has a
interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
superior right over it, without prejudice to innocent purchasers in good faith. 77 It seeks
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts,
the transfer of a title issued in a valid proceeding. The relief prayed for may be granted
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts[.]
on the basis of intrinsic fraud-fraud committed on the true owner instead of fraud
committed on the procedure amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title is an action involving the title to real
property. 84
The complaint of the Spouses Po is clearly an action for reconveyance and annulment of
title. Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear the case.
The Spouses Aboitiz claim that it is the Court of Appeals that has jurisdiction over the
annulment of Regional Trial Court judgments. 85
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is provided in Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129:
Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional
Trial Courts[.]
While the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to annul judgments of the Regional Trial
Courts, the case at bar is not for the annulment of a judgment of a Regional Trial Court.
It is for reconveyance and the annulment of title.
The difference between these two (2) actions was discussed in Toledo l 86 v. Court of
Appeals:
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that
it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment,
final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking
jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. An action for reconveyance, on the other hand, is
a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of
compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him. The Court of Appeals has
exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial
Courts whereas actions for reconveyance of real property may be filed before the
Regional Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts, depending on the assessed value of
the property involved.
Petitioners allege that: first, they are the owners of the land by virtue of a sale between
their and respondents' predecessors-in-interest; and second, that respondents Ramoses
and ARC Marketing illegally dispossessed them by having the same property registered
in respondents' names. Thus, far from establishing a case for annulment of judgment,
the foregoing allegations clearly show a case for reconveyance. 87 (Citations omitted)
As stated, a complaint for reconveyance is a remedy where the plaintiff argues for an
order for the defendant to transfer its title issued in a proceeding not otherwise invalid.
The relief prayed for may be granted on the basis of intrinsic rather than extrinsic fraud;
that is, fraud committed on the real owner rather than fraud committed on the
procedure amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
An action for annulment of title, on the other hand, questions the validity of the grant of
title on grounds which amount to lack of due process of law. The remedy is premised in
the nullity of the procedure and thus the invalidity of the title that is issued. Title that is
invalidated as a result of a successful action for annulment against the decision of a
Regional Trial Court acting as a land registration court may still however be granted on
the merits in another proceeding not infected by lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud if
its legal basis on the merits is properly alleged and proven.
Considering the Spouses Aboitiz's fraudulent registration without the Spouses Po's
knowledge and the latter's assertion of their ownership of the land, their right to
recover the property and to cancel the Spouses Aboitiz' s88 title, the action is for
reconveyance and annulment of title and not for annulment of judgment.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear this case.
II
The Spouses Aboitiz argue that the Spouses Po's cause of action has prescribed. 89 They
claim that prescription has set in because the original complaint was filed only on
November 12, 1996, after more than 10 years after the Deed of Absolute Sale between
Ciriaco and Spouses Po was executed on May 5, 1978. 90
The Spouses Po's action has not prescribed.
"[A]n action for reconveyance ... prescribes in [10] years from the issuance of the
Torrens title over the property."91 The basis for this is Section 53, Paragraph 392 of
Presidential Decree No. 152993 in relation to Articles 145694 and 1144(2)95 of the Civil
Code.96
Under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), the owner of a
property may avail of legal remedies against a registration procured by fraud:
SECTION 53. Presentation of Owner's Duplicate Upon Entry of New Certificate. - ...
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and
equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the
rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title ...
Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring a property through fraud
becomes an implied trustee of the property's true and lawful owner.97
An implied trust is based on equity and is either (i) a constructive trust, or (ii) a resulting
trust.98 A resulting trust is created by implication of law and is presumed as intended by
the parties.99 A constructive trust is created by force of law 100 such as when a title is
registered in favor of a person other than the true owner. 101
The implied trustee only acquires the right "to the beneficial enjoyment of [the]
property." 102 The legal title remains with the true owner. 103 In Crisostomo v. Garcia,
J,r., .: 104
Art. 1456 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes.
Thus, it was held that when a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of
title of property, a constructive trust is created in favor of the defrauded party.
Constructive trusts are "created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the
demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention
against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal
right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold."
When property is registered in another's name, an implied or constructive trust is
created by law in favor of the true owner. The action for reconveyance of the title to the
rightful owner prescribes in 10 years from the issuance of the title. 105 (Citations
omitted)
Thus, the law creates a trust in favor of the property's true owner.
The prescriptive period to enforce this trust is 10 years from the time the right of action
accrues. Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
In an action for reconveyance, the right of action accrues from the time the property is
registered . 106
In Crisostomo, 107 the petitioners were able to transfer the property under their names
without knowledge of the respondent. 108 The respondent filed an action for
reconveyance. 109 In arguing that the action for reconveyance had prescribed, the
petitioners claimed that the cause of action of the respondent should be based on the
latter's Deed of Sale and thus the respondent's right of action should have accrued from
its execution.110 This Court, however, ruled that the right of action accrued from the
time the property was registered because registration is the act that signifies that the
adverse party repudiates the implied trust:
In the case at bar, respondent's action which is for Reconveyance and Cancellation of
Title is based on an implied trust under Art. 1456 of the Civil Code since he averred in his
complaint that through fraud petitioners were able to obtain a Certificate of Title over
the property. He does not seek the annulment of a voidable contract whereby Articles
1390 and 1391 of the Civil Code would find application such that the cause of action
would prescribe in four years.
An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of
title over the property.
It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud
or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Art. 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years
pursuant to Art. 1144. This tenyear prescriptive period begins to run from the date the
adverse party repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes place when the
adverse party registers the land. 111 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
Likewise, in Duque v. Domingo: 112
The registration of an instrument in the Office of the Register of Deeds constitutes
constructive notice to the whole world, and, therefore, discovery of the fraud is deemed
to have taken place at the time of registration. Such registration is deemed to be a
constructive notice that the alleged fiduciary or trust relationship has been repudiated.
It is now settled that an action on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10)
years from the date the right of action accrued. The issuance of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 7501 in 1931 to Mariano Duque commenced the effective assertion of adverse
title for the purpose of the statute of limitations. 113 (Citations omitted)
Registration of the property is a "constructive notice to the whole world."114 Thus, in
registering the property, the adverse party repudiates the implied trust. 115 Necessarily,
the cause of action accrues upon registration. 116
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title does not seek to question the
contract which allowed the adverse party to obtain the title to the property. 117 What is
put on issue in an action for reconveyance an d cancellation of title is the ownership of
the property and its registration. 118 It does not question any fraudulent contract. 119
Should that be the case, the applicable provisions are Articles 1390120 and 1391 121 of
the Civil Code. 122
Thus, an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title prescribes in 10 years from
the time of the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. 123
Considering that the Spouses Po's complaint was filed on November 19, 1996, less than
three (3) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property on April 6, 1994,
it is well within the 10-year prescriptive period imposed on an action for reconveyance.
III
The Spouses Aboitiz insist that estoppel and laches have already set in. 124 They claim
that they have been in "open, continuous, public, peaceful, [and] adverse" possession in
the concept of owners over the property for "46 years as of 1993," without the Spouses
Po acting on their Deed of Absolute Sale. 125 Moreover, the development of North Town
Homes Subdivision "was covered by utmost publicity" but the Spouses Po did not
promptly question the development. 126 In fact, they did not interpose any objection
during the registration proceedings. 127
There is laches when a party was negligent or has failed "to assert a right within a
reasonable time," thus giving rise to the presumption that he or she has abandoned
it. 128 Laches has set in when it is already inequitable or unfair to allow the party to
assert the right. 129 The elements of laches were enumerated in Ignacio v. Basilio:
There is laches when: (1) the conduct of the defendant or one under whom he claims,
gave rise to the situation complained of; (2) there was delay in asserting a right after
knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after an opportunity to sue; (3) defendant
had no knowledge or notice that the complainant would assert his right; (4) there is
injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant. 130 (Citation omitted)
"Laches is different from prescription."131 Prescription deals with delay itself and thus is
an issue of how much time has passed. 132 The time period when prescription is deemed
to have set in is fixed by law. 133 Laches, on the other hand, concerns itself with the
effect of delay and not the period of time that has lapsed. 134 It asks the question
whether the delay has changed "the condition of the property or the relation of the
parties" such that it is no longer equitable to insist on the original right. 135 In Nielson &
Co., Inc. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.: 136
Appellee is correct in its contention that the defense of laches applies independently of
prescription. Laches is different from the statute of limitations. Prescription is
concerned with the fact of delay. Whereas laches is concerned with the effect of delay.
Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting
a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of
the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches
applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed
time, Laches is not. 137
The defense of laches is based on equity. 138 It is not based on the title of the party
invoking it, but on the right holder's "long inaction or inexcusable neglect" to assert his
claim. 139
This Court rules that the Spouses Po is not barred by laches. There is no showing that
they abandoned their right to the property. The factual findings reveal that the Spouses
Po had their rights over the property registered in the assessor's office. 140 They testified
that they introduced improvements by cultivating fruit trees after they purchased the
lots.141 When the Spouses Po discovered that Ciriaco executed a quitclaim renouncing
his interest over Lot No. 2807 in favor of Roberto, the Spouses Po executed a
Memorandum of Agreement with Ciriaco to protect their interest in Lot No. 2835. 142
The Spouses Po also had the property declared for taxation purposes in their names and
Tax Declaration No. 0634-A was issued. 143 Thus, when the Spouses Aboitiz also had the
property declared for taxation purposes, it had the annotation: "This tax declaration is
also declared in the name of Mrs. Victoria Lee Po, married to Peter Po under tax dee.
no. 0634-A so that one may be considered a duplicate to the other." 144
The Spouses Aboitiz only acquired their alleged rights over the property in 1990, when
the Mariano Heirs executed the Deeds of Sale in their favor. 145 Assuming the Spouses
Aboitiz immediately took possession and began construction in 1990, it cannot be said
that the Spouses Po were in delay in asserting their right. In the Spouses Po's complaint,
they asserted that they made demands upon the Spouses Aboitiz to reconvey to them
the property. 146 They also referred the matter to the barangay for conciliation:
11) That demands were made upon the defendants to reconvey to plaintiffs Lot 2835
unlawfully and feloniously acquired by defendants, but to no avail, thereby compelling
the plaintiffs to elevate the matter for barangay conciliation, and for failure of the
parties to effect a settlement, the proper Certification to file action was then issued, a
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "L." 147
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the Spouses Aboitiz did not deny that demands were
made upon them and that the matter was elevated for barangay conciliation:
8. Par. 11 is denied as regards the all[e]gation that Lot 2835 was feloniously and
un[l]awfully acquired by defendants, for being false. The truth is that defendants were
in good faith in acquiring same property. Defendants refused to meet the demands of
settlement by plaintiffs because they are strangers to the property in question. 148
When they discovered that the property was registered in the name of the Spouses
Aboitiz in 1993, the Spouses Po then filed the instant complaint to recover the property
sold to them by Ciriaco, alleging that it was done without their knowledge, through
evident bad faith and fraud. 149 The Spouses Po filed this case in less than three (3) years
from the time of registration.
Based on these circumstances, the elements of laches are clearly lacking in this case.
There was no delay in asserting their right over the property, and the Spouses Aboitiz
had knowledge that the Spouses Po would assert their right.
Thus, it cannot be said that they are barred by laches.
 IV
The Spouses Aboitiz insist that there is already a finding by the Regional Trial Court in
LRC Case No. N-208 that Ciriaco merely held the property "in trust for the [Mariano
Heirs]." 150 Thus, Ciriaco could not have validly sold the property to the Spouses
Po. 151 They claim that these findings are binding on the whole world because land
registration proceedings are actions in rem. 152
In the Decision in LRC Case No. N-208, no one opposed the application for
registration.153 Moreover, the Spouses Aboitiz presented only one (I) witness, Gregorio
Espina (Espina), an employee of Roberto, 154 whotestified:
That this parcel of land is covered by tax declarations, to wit: 1) Tax Dec. No. 43174 in
the name of Ciriaco Seno for the year 1953 (Exh. "T");
11) Tax Dec. No. 2835 in the name of applicant, Roberto Aboitiz for the year 1991 (Exh.
"DD").
That the tax declarations covering Lot No. 2835 are in the name of Ciriaco Seno because
the heirs of Mariano Seno have agreed that Lot No. 2835 be held in trust by Ciriaco Seno
in favor of the heirs. 155
This Court rules that this cannot be binding in this action for reconveyance.
Res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: (i) bar by prior judgment and (ii) conclusiveness
of judgment, respectively covered under Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court,
paragraphs (b) and (c): 156
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
Res judicata in the concept of bar by prior judgment proscribes the filing of another
action based on "the same claim, demand, or cause of action."157 It applies when the
following are present: (a) there is a final judgment or order; (b) it is a judgment or order
on the merits; (c) it was "rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and parties"; and (d) there is "identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action" between the first and second actions. 158
Res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment applies when there is an
identity of issues in two (2) cases between the same parties involving different causes of
action.159 Its effect is to bar "the relitigation of particular facts or issues" which have
already been adjudicated in the other case. 160 In Calalang v. Register of Deeds of
Quezon City:161
The second concept - conclusiveness of judgment - states that a fact or question which
was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as
the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be
again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same
court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause
of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held
that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue[s]
be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive
in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first
suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not
required but merely identity of issues. 162
However, in Racoma v. Fortich, 163 this Court held that res judicata could not be a
defense in an action for reconveyance based on fraud where the complainant had no
knowledge of the application for registration:
The other ground upon which the lower court dismissed the complaint is res judicata. It
is stated in the order of dismissal that the plaintiff had admitted that the property in
controversy was applied for by defendant Maximina Fortich in a cadastral proceeding
and under Act 496; that the proceedings were in rem and, therefore, the whole world,
including the plaintiff, were parties thereto and bound by the judgment thereon ... [I]t is
obvious that the lower court was referring to the legal effect of the conclusiveness
against all persons of the in rem decision in the cadastral case rather than the actual fact
that the plaintiff was a claimant who appeared in the said case, for he alleged in his
complaint that he "has no knowledge whatsoever of the application for registration filed
by defendant Maximina Fortich and the order of decree of registration issued in favor of
the defendant Maximina Fortich by this Honorable Court until on February 25, 1967 ... "
(Record on Appeal, page 30). Such being the case, then an action for reconveyance is
available to the plaintiff, the decree of registration notwithstanding, for ...
" ... , it is now a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that the existence of a decree of
registration in favor of one party is no bar to an action to compel reconveyance of the
property to the true owner, which is an action in personam, even if such action be
instituted after the year fixed by Section 38 of the Land Registration Act as a limit to the
review of the registration decree, provided it is shown that the registration is wrongful
and the property sought to be reconveyed has not passed to an innocent third party
holder for value.["] 164 (Emphasis supplied)
The reason for this rule is to prevent the unjust deprivation of rights over real property.
As discussed in People v. Cainglet: 165
It is fundamental and well-settled that a final judgment in a cadastral proceeding - a
proceeding in rem - is binding and conclusive upon the whole world.1âwphi1 Reason is
that public policy and public order demand not only that litigations must terminate at
some definite point but also that titles over lands under the Torrens system should be
given stability for on it greatly depends the stability of the country's economy. Interest
republicae ut sit finis litium. However, this conclusiveness of judgment in the registration
of lands is not absolute. It admits of exception. Public policy also dictates that those
unjustly deprived of their rights over real property by reason of the operation of our
registration laws be afforded remedies. Thus, the aggrieved party may file a suit for
reconveyance of property or a personal action for recovery of damages against the party
who registered his property through fraud, or in case of insolvency of the party who
procured the registration through fraud, an action against the Treasurer of the
Philippines for recovery of damages from the Assurance Fund. Through these remedial
proceedings, the law, while holding registered titles indefeasible, allows redress
calculated to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of other. Necessarily,
without setting aside the decree of title, the issues raised in the previous registration
case are relit1ated, for purposes of reconveyance of said title or recovery of
damages. 166 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
In this case, the Spouses Po allege that the registration was done through fraud. They
contend that they were unaware and were thus unable to contest the registration and
prove their claim over the property. Aside from several tax receipts, the Spouses Po
formally offered as evidence, among others, the Deed of Sale executed by Mariano in
Ciriaco's favor, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Ciriaco in their favor, and the Tax
Declaration under Victoria's name. Additionally, they also submitted their Memorandum
of Agreement with Ciriaco and the Quitclaim executed by Ciriaco in favor of the Spouses
Aboitiz.167 These documents were not considered by the land registration court when it
issued the title in favor of the Spouses Aboitiz. The Spouses Po also offered the
Application of Original Registration of Title of the Spouses Aboitiz to prove that the
Spouses Aboitiz only submitted to the land registration court the cancelled tax
declarations of Ciriaco, instead of the tax declaration of the Spouses Po. 168
Thus, the ruling of the land registration court cannot be so conclusive as to deny the
Spouses Po the remedy afforded to them by law. The action for reconveyance allows
them to prove their ownership over the property. Hence, they are not precluded from
presenting evidence that is contrary to the findings in the land registration case.
The factual findings of the land registration court are not being questioned. An action
for reconveyance based on an implied trust seeks to compel the registered owner to
transfer the property to its true owner. 169 In Hortizuela v. Tagufa: 170
[A]n action for reconveyance is a recognized remedy, an action in personam, available to
a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in
another's name. In an action for reconveyance, the decree is not sought to be set
aside. It does not seek to set aside the decree but, respecting it as incontrovertible and
no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered
owner to the rightful owner. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property
has not passed to an innocent third person for value.
There is no quibble that a certificate of title, like in the case at bench, can only be
questioned through a direct proceeding. The MCTC and the CA, however, failed to take
into account that in a complaint for reconveyance, the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible and is not being questioned. What is being sought is the
transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name to its
rightful owner or to the one with a better right. If the registration of the land is
fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee,
and the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the
property. 171 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
Likewise in Naval v. Court of Appeals:172
Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The fact that petitioner was able to
secure a title in her name did not operate to vest ownership upon her of the subject
land. Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest
title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. It cannot
be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of
others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that
the real property may be coowned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it
may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.
As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the
Torrens title, the registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the registered
property to its true owners. The rationale for the rule is that reconveyance does not set
aside or re-subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought
instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to the
one with a better right. 173 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
The rationale for allowing reconveyance despite the finality of the registration is that
the issuance of a certificate of title does not create or vest ownership to a person over
the property. 174 Registration under the Torrens system "is not a mode of acquiring
ownership."175 A certificate is only a proof of ownership. 176 Thus, its issuance does not
foreclose the possibility of having a different owner, and it cannot be used against the
true owner as a shield for fraud. 177
In an action for reconveyance, the parties are obliged to prove their ownership over the
property. Necessarily, the parties may present evidence to support their claims. The
court must weigh these pieces of evidence and decide who between the parties the true
owner is. Therefore, it cannot be bound simply by the factual findings of the land
registration court alone.
An exception to this rule is if the party claiming ownership has already had the
opportunity to prove his or her claim in the land registration case. 178 In such a case, res
judicata will then apply. 179 When an issue of ownership has been raised in the land
registration proceedings where the adverse party was given full opportunity to present
his or her claim, the findings in the land registration case will constitute a bar from any
other claim of the adverse party on the property. 180
However, this is not the circumstance in the case at bar. The Spouses Po were not able
to prove their claim in the registration proceedings. Thus, res judicata cannot apply to
their action for reconveyance.
V
The Spouses Aboitiz posit that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the
Spouses Po is fake and fraudulent. 181 They argue that this is evidenced by certifications
of the document's non-existence in the notarial books and the Spouses Po's failure to
enforce their rights over the property until 18 years later. 182 They also claim that the
Deed of Absolute Sale is inadmissible as no documentary stamp was paid and affixed. 183
This Court notes that the Spouses Aboitiz are raising questions of fact which are not
within the scope of a review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 184 An
appeal under Rule 45 must raise only questions of law, unless the factual findings are
not supported by evidence or the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts. 185 Absent these exceptions, the factual findings of the lower courts are accorded
respect and are beyond the review of this Court.186
The Spouses Aboitiz failed to prove that these exceptions exist in the case at bar. The
Regional Trial Court lent credence to documents presented by the Spouses Po, Peter's
testimony about Mariano's sale of the property to Ciriaco, 187 Ciriaco's sale of the
property to the Spouses Po, and the issuance of a Tax Declaration in the name of
Victoria. 188
During trial, Peter also testified that after they bought the land, they had a caretaker
who cultivated the property by planting fruit trees. 189 He claimed that when they
subsequently discovered the quitclaim executed by Ciriaco in favor of the Spouses
Aboitiz, they executed a Memorandum of Agreement to protect their interests in the
property. 190 He stated that they filed a complaint in the barangay when the Spouses
Aboitiz started cutting down their improvements and that they subsequently discovered
that Ciriaco was forced by the Mariano Heirs to sell the property to the Spouses
Aboitiz. 191
The Spouses Aboitiz presented as their first witness Armando Avenido, who testified
according to the records only. 192 He claimed that he was familiar with the land which
was being developed by Aboitiz Land. He testified that Roberto acquired the land
through separate Deeds of Sale from the Mariano Heirs, had the tax declaration
transferred in his name, paid the taxes on the property, applied for the property's
registration, and developed the property into a subdivision.193 During cross-examination
it was revealed that the tax declaration of the Spouses Po was issued before the tax
declaration of the Spouses Aboitiz and that the Spouses Po acquired from Ciriaco the
entire land, while the Spouses Aboitiz purchased only one-fifth (1/5) of the property. 194
The Spouses Aboitiz's second witness, Bienvenido Escoton, testified that he was a
mason working in the subdivision on the road lot and that he knew no person claiming
ownership of the land since 1989. 195
The Regional Trial Court thus held:
Analyzing the adduced and admitted evidence of both parties, Art. 1544 of the Civil
Code cannot be aptly applied in the case at bar, for reason that only the sale of Ciriaco
Seno (Exh. "A" Exh. All" Exh. 2"/ A, A-1 and A-2) has the validating elements of sale,
whereas the rest of the Deeds of Sale (Exhs 1 to 5) executed by the Heirs of Mariano
Seno in favor of the Defendants are void, for containing untruthful statements as
pleaded and proven. They are no longer the owners of the subject property when they
executed the several Deeds of Conveyance to defendant Roberto Aboitiz.
On the first issue on the identity and location of the land, the sale of Ciriaco Seno to
Plaintiffs (Exh. "A") reflected in the Tax Declarations that the Defendants used in their
titling proceeding is the very same lot as certified by the Barangay Captain dated July 28,
1999 under Plaintiff's Request for Admission. Concerning the second formulated issue,
only the Deed of Sale executed by Ciriaco Seno was valid with all the attending
requisites of sale. It was sold by the legitimate owner of the land, Ciriaco Seno to the
Plaintiffs. The sale (Exh. A, Exhibit "X") enjoyed preferential date of execution, being
dated or executed in 1978 by the lawful owner Ciriaco Seno who was first to register the
sale in the Registry of Property office, and due to such registration, the Tax Declaration
of Ciriaco Seno, was cancelled and a new Tax Declaration was issued in the name of
Victoria Po for as shown in Exh. E the said tax declaration succeeded in canceling the Tax
Declaration of Mariano Seno (Exh. C) and was issued thereafter a Tax Declaration in the
name of C[i]riaco Seno (Exh. D). So, when the latter sold the subject land to plaintiffs in
1978, the same was already owned by C[i]riaco Seno.
When Mariano Seno died in 1982, the subject land owned by C[i]riaco Seno, naturally, is
not part of the estate of Mariano Seno, for at that point in time, the subject land is now
owned by plaintiffs Sps. Po, and the same was declared in their names (Exh. "D" "E" &
"E-1 ").
As to the issue whether defendant Roberto Aboitiz was a purchaser in good faith and for
value, the Court holds that defendant Roberto Aboitiz was not a purchaser in good faith
and for value for he was already informed of the ownership of plaintiffs over the subject
land during the conciliation proceedings before the barangay official when plaintiffs
filed a barangay case against him.
In this case, the Court believes that defendant Roberto Aboitiz is aware of the
proprietary rights of the plaintiffs considering the land was already declared for taxation
purposes in plaintiffs' names after the tax declaration of said land, first in the name of
Mariano Seno was cancelled and another one issued in the name of C[i]riaco Seno when
the latter bought the said land from his father Mariano Seno, and after the said tax
declaration in the name of C[i]riaco Seno was cancelled and another one issued in the
name of plaintiffs herein.
So, defendant Roberto Aboitiz purchased the subject land from the Heirs of Mariano
Seno who are no longer the owners thereof and the tax declaration of subject land was
no longer in the name of Mariano Seno nor in the name of Heirs of Mariano Seno.
The City Assessor of Mandaue City even issued a Certification (Exh. X) to the effect that
Tax Declaration No. 0634-A in the name of Mrs. Victoria Lee Po married to Peter Po was
issued prior to the issuance of T.D. No. 1100 in the name of Roberto Aboitiz married to
Maria Cristina Cabarruz.
Buyers of any untitled parcel of land for that matter, to protect their interest, will first
verify from the Assessor's Office that status of said land whether it has clean title or
not. 196
With the exception of its ruling regarding respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel being
purchasers in good faith, these factual findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Thus, there is no showing that the factual findings are not supported by evidence or that
the judgment seems to be based on a misapprehension of facts. Therefore, the factual
findings of the lower courts are binding.
Furthermore, this Court finds that the Spouses Aboitiz failed to prove their claim of
fraud. The Spouses Aboitiz attempted to prove that the Deed of Absolute Sale between
Ciriaco and the Spouses Po was fake and fraudulent by presenting certifications of its
non-existence in the notarial books of the notary public who notarized the document. 197
However, a review of the certifications does not even state that the document does not
exist in the notarial books.
The Certification dated April 1, 1997 of the Records Management and Archives Office of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports states:
This is to certify that per records of this Office, Deed of Sale executed by and between
Ciriaco Seno and Victoria Lee known as Doc. No. 66; Page No. 14; Book No. I; Series of
1978 entered in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Jesus Pono is not among the
documents transferred by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for safekeeping. 198
Likewise, the Certification dated April 4, 1997 of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, 7th Judicial Region, Cebu City provides:
This is to certify that as per notarial records on file with this office, available and found
as of this date, Atty. Jesus M. Pono had been issued a Notarial Commission for the term
1978-1979.
It is further certifie[d] that said Notary Public has not submitted his notarial reports for
the year 1978-1979 in this office wherein the Deed of Sale as stated on the letter dated
March 31, 1997 designated as Doc. no. 66; Page no. 14; Book no. I and Series of 1978 is
allegedly included. 199 (Emphasis supplied)
These Certifications do not declare that the Deed of Absolute Sale does not exist. They
only state that at the time of their issuance, the Notary Public had not submitted his
notarial reports or that the document had not been transferred to the archives for
safekeeping. It cannot logically be concluded from these certifications that the
document is inexistent, false, or fraudulent. In any case, the Notary Public's failure to
submit his or her notarial report does not affect the act of notarization. 200
Rule 132, Section 30 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 30. Proof of notarial documents. - Every instrument duly acknowledged or
proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further
proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of
the instrument or document involved.
When a private document is notarized, the document is converted to a public document
which is presumed regular, admissible in evidence without need for proof of its
authenticity and due execution, and entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. 201
To overturn the presumption in favor of a notarized document, the party questioning it
must present "clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant evidence."202
Thus, parties who appear before a Notary Public should not be prejudiced by the failure
of the Notary Public to follow rules imposed by the Notarial Law.203 They are not obliged
to ensure that the Notary Public submits his or her notarial reports. 204
The Spouses Aboitiz failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the
presumption. The notarized Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po
is, thus, presumed regular and authentic.
Consequently, this Court can affirm the finding that the property was sold to Ciriaco in
1973, and that Ciriaco, as the owner of the property, had the right to sell it to the
Spouses Po. Hence, the lot did not form part of the estate of Mariano, and the Mariano
Heirs did not have the capacity to sell the property to the Spouses Aboitiz later on.
VI
The Spouses Aboitiz argue that the Mariano Heirs are indispensable parties who should
have been impleaded in this case.205
The Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties.
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 7. Compulsory Joinder of Indispensable Parties. - Parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs
or defendants.
An indispensable party is the party whose legal presence in the proceeding is so
necessary that "the action cannot be finally determined" without him or her because his
or her interests in the matter and in the relief "are so bound up with that of the other
parties."206
The property owners against whom the action for reconveyance is filed are
indispensable parties.207 No relief can be had, and the court cannot render a valid
judgment, without them. 208 The property has been sold to respondents Jose, Ernesto,
and Isabel.209 Thus, they are indispensable parties.
However, the seller of the property is not an indispensable party. 210 In Spring Homes
Subdivision Co., Inc. v. Spouses Tablada, Jr.: 211
Similarly, by virtue of the second Deed of Absolute Sale between Spring Homes and the
Spouses Lumbres, the Spouses Lumbres became the absolute and registered owner of
the subject property herein. As such, they possess that certain interest in the property
without which, the courts cannot proceed for settled is the doctrine that registered
owners of parcels of land whose title is sought to be nullified should be impleaded as an
indispensable party. Spring Homes, however, which has already sold its interests in the
subject land, is no longer regarded as an indispensableparty, but is, at best, considered
to be a necessary party whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole
controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in
its absence without affecting it. This is because when Spring Homes sold the property in
question to the Spouses Lumbres, it practically transferred all its interests therein to the
said Spouses. In fact, a new title was already issued in the names of the Spouses
Lumbres. As such, Spring Homes no longer stands to be directly benefited or injured by
the judgment in the instant suit regardless of whether the new title registered in the
names of the Spouses Lumbres is cancelled in favor of the Spouses Tablada or not. Thus,
contrary to the ruling of the RTC, the failure to summon Spring Homes does not deprive it
of jurisdiction over the instant case for Spring Homes is not an indispensable
party. 212 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied).
The Mariano Heirs, as the alleged sellers of the property, are not indispensable parties.
They are at best necessary parties, which are covered by Rule 3, Section 8 of the Rules
of Court:
Section 8. Necessary Party. - A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who
ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already
parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
action.
Necessary parties may be joined in the case "to adjudicate the whole controversy," but
the case may go on without them because a judgment may be rendered without any
effect on their rights and interests. 213
The Mariano Heirs may likewise be considered material witnesses to the action. A
material matter to which a witness can testify on can be a "main fact which was the
subject of the inquiry" or any circumstance or fact "which tends to prove" the fact
subject of the inquiry, "which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative
to such inquiry," and "which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who
testifies."214
The validity of the Deeds of Sale allegedly executed by the parties in this case is a
material matter in determining who the true owner of the property is. Thus, the
Mariano Heirs, including Ciriaco, may testify as to the Deeds of Sale they executed to
prove which sale is the valid one.
However, it is clear that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. They have
already sold all their interests in the property to the Spouses Aboitiz. They will no longer
be affected, benefited, or injured byany ruling of this Court on the matter, whether it
grants or denies the complaint for reconveyance. The ruling of this Court as to whether
the Spouses Po are entitled to reconveyance will not affect their rights. Their interest
has, thus, become separable from that of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel.
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable
parties.
VII
Despite these findings, the Spouses Po cannot recover the property. Respondents Jose,
Ernesto, and Isabel are innocent purchasers for value.
An innocent purchaser for value refers to the buyer of the property who pays for its full
and fair price without or before notice of another person's right or interest in it. 215 He or
she buys the property believing that "the [seller] [i]s the owner and could [transfer] the
title to the property."216
The Spouses Po argue that respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel are not innocent
purchasers for value because the tax declaration over the property has the following
annotation:
This tax declaration is also declared in the name of Mrs. Victoria Lee Po, married to
Peter Po under tax dee. no. 0634-A so that one may be considered a duplicate to the
other.
However, if a property is registered, the buyer of a parcel of land is not obliged to look
beyond the transfer certificate of title to be considered a purchaser in good faith for
value.217
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1529218 states:
Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. - Every registered owner receiving a certificate
of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the
same free from all encumbrances except those noted in said certificate and any of the
following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the
Philippines which are not by law required to appear ofrecord in the Registry of Deeds in
order to be valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of record.
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately
preceding the acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser for value,
without prejudice to the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that
period from the delinquent taxpayer alone.
Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any
government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, if the certificate of title does not state
that the boundaries of such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been
determined.
Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or
pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law or regulations on agrarian
reform. (Emphasis supplied)
In Cruz v. Court of Appeals:219
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land and to put
a stop to any question of legality of the title except claims which have been recorded in
the certificate of title at the time of registration or which may arise subsequent thereto.
Every registered owner and every subsequent purchaser for value in good faith holds
the title to the property free from all encumbrances except those noted in the
certificate. Hence, a purchaser is not required to explore further what the Torrens title
on its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto.
Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus
issued, acquire rights over the property the court cannot disregard such rights and order
the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would
be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with
property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance
whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued. This is contrary to the evident
purpose of the law. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige
him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. Even if a
decree in a registration proceeding is infected with nullity, still an innocent purchaser
for value relying on a Torrens title issued in pursuance thereof is protected. 220
The rationale for this rule is the public's interest in sustaining "the indefeasibility of a
certificate of title, as evidence of the lawful ownership of the land or of any
encumbrance" on it.221 In Leong v. See:222
One need not inquire beyond the four comers of the certificate of title when dealing
with registered property ...
The protection of innocent purchasers in good faith for value grounds on the social
interest embedded in the legal concept granting indefeasibility of
titles.1âwphi1 Between the third party and the owner, the latter would be more familiar
with the history and status of the titled property. Consequently, an owner would incur
less costs to discover alleged invalidities relating to the property compared to a third
party. Such costs are, thus, better borne by the owner to mitigate costs for the
economy, lessen delays in transactions, and achieve a less optimal welfare level for the
entire society.223 (Citations omitted)

Thus, respondents were not obliged to look beyond the title before they purchased the
property. They may rely solely on the face of the title.

The only exception to the rule is when the purchaser has actual knowledge of any defect
or other circumstance that would cause "a reasonably cautious man" to inquire into the
title of the seller.224 If there is anything which arouses suspicion, the vendee is obliged
to investigate beyond the face of the title. 225 Otherwise, the vendee cannot be deemed
a purchaser in good faith entitled to protection under the law. 226

In this case, there is no showing that respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel had any
knowledge of the defect in the title. Considering that the annotation that the Spouses
Po are invoking is found in the tax declaration and not in the title of the property,
respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel cannot be deemed purchasers in bad faith.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' October 31, 2012 Decision227 and its June 17, 2013
Resolution228 in CA-G.R. CV No. 03803 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015 this document, his notarial stamp and falsified signature were superimposed over the
typewritten name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this
JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, v. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent. document.13 Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear
that he notarized it before his admission to the Bar.
DECISION
On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he needed
to simultaneously use several notarial registers in his separate satellite offices in order
BRION, J.:
to better cater to the needs of his clients and accommodate their growing
number.14 This explains the irregular and non-sequential entries in his notarial registers.
We review Resolution No. XX-2011-2641 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-2069, which imposed on Atty. Paul Centillas
Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not personally
Zaide (Atty. Zaide) the penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law,
hire him as her counsel. Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he previously
revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being
worked as an associate. The real counsel of Gimeno and her relatives in their annulment
commissioned as a notary public, for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
of title case was Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's partners. 15 On this basis,
(Notarial Practice Rules).2
the respondent should not be held liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.
The Case
Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in his
pleadings.16
On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Gimeno) filed a complaint3 with the
IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary
The IBP Proceedings
public's office; (2) falsification; (3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language;
and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust.
On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for mandatory
conference.17 After this, both parties were required to submit their position papers.
In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission 4 to the Bar
and receipt5 of his notarial commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition
In his report and recommendation18 dated May 18, 2010, Commissioner Pedro A.
with deed of absolute sale on March 29, 2002.6 She also accused Atty. Zaide of making
Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for
false and irregular entries in his notarial registers.7
violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests, and using
abusive and insulting language in his pleadings.
Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She engaged the
services of his law firm Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices (ZMZ) in an annulment
He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1 (a) and 1 (b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice
of title case that involved her husband and her parents-in-law.
Rules when he maintained several active notarial registers in different offices. These
provisions respectively require a notary public to "keep, maintain, protect and provide
Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared against her in for lawful inspection, a chronological official register of notarial acts consisting of a
the complaint for estafa and violation of RA 30198 that one Priscilla Somontan
permanently bound book with numbered papers" and to "keep only one active notarial
(Somontan) filed against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno posited that by appearing
register at any given time."19
against a former client, Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against the representation of
conflicting clients' interests.9
However, Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty. Zaide should not be held
administratively liable for usurping a notary public's office. The investigating
Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist" in the
commissioner noted that the evidence presented on this issue is not enough to prove
same administrative complaint that Somontan filed against her.10 In another civil case
that Atty. Zaide signed and notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition
where she was not a party, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide referred to his opposing
even after his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission. 20
counsel as someone suffering from "serious mental incompetence" in one of his
pleadings.11 According to Gimeno, these statements constitute intemperate, offensive
Commissioner Magpayo also found that the evidence presented proved that Gimeno
and abusive language, which a lawyer is proscribed from using in his dealings. was indeed Atty. Zaide's former client. He disagreed with Atty. Zaide's defense that
Gimeno only hired ZMZ but did not personally hire him to defend them in their
In his answer12 dated September 13, 2007, Atty. Zaide argued that he did not notarize
annulment of title case. The retainer of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of all its
the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition. As it appeared on the notarial page of
lawyers.21 But despite this previous attorney-client relationship, the investigating
commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for representing
conflicting interests since the annulment of title case is totally unrelated to the
Ombudsman complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno through Atty. Zaide.
Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used intemperate,
offensive, and abusive language when he called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist" in
one of his pleadings.22
For violating the Notarial Practice Rules, Commissioner Magpayo recommended that
Atty. Zaide be suspended for three months, and for another six months for employing
abusive and insulting language.23
document. In fact, this document never appeared in his notarial register and was
never included in his notarial report for the year 2002. He contended that Gimeno
falsified his signature and used his notarial stamp to make it appear that he was the one
who notarized it.
This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's
details as a lawyer and as a notary public had not yet existed. He was admitted to the
Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have obtained and used the exact figures
pertaining to his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the expiration date of his
notarial commission, prior to this date, particularly on March 29, 2002.

The IBP Board of Governors' Findings
In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) opined that the
evidence on record fully supports the findings of the investigating commissioner.
However, the Board modified the recommended penalty and imposed instead the
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial
commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a notary
public.24
This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Gimeno's claim
such as a witness to the alleged fictitious notarization, leads us to the conclusion
that Atty. Zaide could not have notarized the document before his Bar admission and
receipt of his notarial commission.
We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only generated after his
Bar admission, were stamped on the March 29, 2002 document. How this happened is
not clear from the evidence before us.

Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration25 of the Board's November 19, 2011 b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices
resolution but this was also denied in its subsequent June 21, 2013 resolution.26
We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different
The Court's Ruling notarial registers in several offices. Because of this practice, the following notarized
documents had been irregularly numbered and entered:
The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended penalty, Document27 Date Doc. No. Page Book Year
and accordingly confirms them. Special Power of
6/20/05 273 55 18 2005
Attorney
For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall discuss each of the main issues that the Secretary's Certificate 10/28/05 226 46 18 2005
parties identified. Affidavit of Quitclaim 10/31/05 272 55 18 2005
Affidavit of Loss 4/17/06 54 11 25 2006
Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules Affidavit of Two
4/17/06 310 61 25 2006
Disinterested Persons
a. Usurpation of a notarial office Petition for Issuance of
4/17/06 72 15 25 2006
Owner's Duplicate copy
As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any concrete Affidavit of Parental
4/19/06 461 93 23 2006
evidence to show that Atty. Zaide notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial Consent
partition prior to his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission. Confirmation of Sale 4/21/06 283 56 25 2006
Deed of Absolute Sale 4/27/06 304 60 25 2006
It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, Section l(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall
as notary public. Atty. Zaide's signature and notarial stamp that bears his name, roll keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these
number,, PTR number, IBP number, and the expiration date of his notarial commission, Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a
were merely superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's typewritten name. permanently bound book with numbered pages." The same section further provides
that "a notary public shall keep only one active notarial register at any given
Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document are his true time."28 On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping several active notarial
information. However, he denied that he personally stamped and signed the registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI.
The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one active
notarial register and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically arranged. The "one
active notarial register" rule is in place to deter a notary public from assigning several
notarial registers to different offices manned by assistants who perform notarial
services on his behalf.
Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also
personally administer the notarial acts29 that the law authorizes him to execute. This
important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other person, other than the
notary public, should perform it.
On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological sequence in
order to address and prevent the rampant practice of leaving blank spaces in the
notarial register to allow the antedating of notarizations.
In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he needed to maintain
several active notarial registers in separate offices so he could accommodate the
increasing number of his clients requiring his notarial services.
This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his powers
and duties are impressed with public interest.30 A notary public's office is not merely an
income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer who has been privileged
to receive a notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform.
Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial
commission. His flagrant violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules is
not merely a simple and excusable negligence. It amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer [should]
uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes."
Representing conflicting interests
The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable
for representing conflicting clients' interests.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
In Aninon v. Sabitsana,31 the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer is guilty
of representing conflicting interests between and among his clients.
One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.32
Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use
against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection
or previous employment.33
Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared against
Gimeno, his former law firm's client.
The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when Atty. Zaide
left ZMZ. Moreover, the case where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an entirely
different subject matter and is not in any way connected to the complaint that
Somontan filed against Gimeno with the Ombudsman.
The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her family
pertained to the annulment of a land title. Somontan was never a party to this case
since this only involved Gimeno's relatives. On the other hand, the case where Atty.
Zaide appeared against Gimeno involved Somontan's Ombudsman complaint against
Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of the funds that Somontan entrusted to her, and
for Gimeno's alleged corruption as an examiner in the Register of Deeds of Iligan
City. Clearly, the annulment of title case and the Ombudsman case are totally
unrelated.
There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at the time
Somontan engaged his services, he had already left ZMZ. More importantly, nothing in
the record shows that Atty. Zaide used against Gimeno any confidential information
which he acquired while he was still their counsel in the annulment of title case.
Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for violating the
prohibition against the representation of conflicting interests.
Use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in professional dealings
The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a lawyer's
professional dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or any other person, is based
on the following canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts. (emphasis supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case,
called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist."34 And in another case, Gimeno observed that
Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and immoderate language in presenting his
comment against his opposing counsel:
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in the
whole Justice System, and the Department of Justice in particular, where the taxpayers
paid for her salary over her incompetence and poor performance as a
prosecutor... This is a clear manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious
mental incompetence as regard her mandate as an Assistant City
Prosecutor.35 (emphasis supplied)
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words — a
conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court.

While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.36

On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain from
any offensive personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyer's language even in his pleadings, must be dignified.37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommended

penalty of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Paul
Centillas Zaide is found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and for
using intemperate, offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8
and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His notarial
commission, if existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is declared DISQUALIFIED from
being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is
also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.
3. DISQUALIFICATIONS
Adm. Case No. 6475 January 30, 2013
FE A. YLAYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
For the Court's consideration is the disbarment complaint 1 tiled by Fe A. Ylaya
(complainant) against Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott (respondent) who allegedly deceived
the complainant and her late husband, Laurentino L. Ylaya, into signing a "preparatory"
Deed of Sale that the respondent converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his
relatives.
After the submission of the respondent's comment to the complaint, the Court referred
the complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline ofthe Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, evaluation and recommendation.
The complainant alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners of two
(2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title ( TCT) Nos. 162632 and 162633
located at Barangay Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa City. Prior to the acquisition of these
properties, TCT No. 162632 (property) was already the subject of expropriation
proceedings filed by the City Government of Puerto Princesa (City Government) on May
23, 1996 against its former registered owner, Cirilo Arellano. The expropriation case was
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan and Puerto Princesa, Branch 95, and
was docketed as Civil Case No. 2902. The RTC already fixed the price and issued an order
for the City Government to deposit ₱6,000,000.00 as just compensation for the
property.2
The respondent briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the
expropriation case as intervenors for being the new registered owners of the property.
The complainant alleged that the respondent convinced them to sign a "preparatory
deed of sale" for the sale of the property, but he left blank the space for the name of
the buyer and for the amount of consideration. The respondent further alleged that the
deed would be used in the sale to the City Government when the RTC issues the order
to transfer the titles.3 The respondent then fraudulently – without their knowledge and
consent, and contrary to their understanding – converted the "preparatory deed of sale"
into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001,4 selling the subject property to Reynold
So and Sylvia Carlos So for ₱200,000.00.5
The complainant denied that she and Laurentino were paid the ₱200,000.00 purchase
price or that they would sell the property "for such a measly sum" when they stood to
get at least ₱6,000,000.00 as just compensation.6
The complainant also claimed that the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 4, 2001 even though Reynold and Sylvia (his mother’s sister) are his uncle
and his aunt, respectively.7
The respondent denied all the allegations in the complaint.8
The respondent argued that the complainant’s greed to get the just
Compensation9 caused her to file this "baseless, unfounded and malicious" disbarment
case.10 He claimed that the sale was their voluntary transaction and that he "simply
ratified the document."11 He also claimed that Reynold and Laurentino had originally
jointly purchased the properties from Cirilo Arellano on July 10, 2000; that they were co-
owners for some time; and that Laurentino subsequently sold his share to Reynold
under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001.12
The respondent specifically denied asking the complainant and her late husband to
execute any "preparatory deed of sale" in favor of the City Government. 13 He also
denied that the Deed of Absolute Sale contained blanks when they signed it. 14 That he
filed for the spouses Ylaya and Reynold an opposition to the just compensation the RTC
fixed proved that there was no agreement to use the document for the expropriation
case.15 He also argued that it was clear from the document that the intended buyer was
a natural person, not a juridical person, because there were spaces for the buyer’s legal
age, marital status, and citizenship,16 and he was even constrained to file a subsequent
Motion to Intervene on behalf of Reynold because the complainant "maliciously
retained" the TCTs to the subject properties after borrowing them from his
office.17 Lastly, he denied violating the Rules on Notarial Practice.18
On September 4, 2006, the respondent filed a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case
dated August 24, 2006 praying for the early resolution of the complaint. 19
On December 5, 2006, the complainant filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the
Verified Complaint and To Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006.20
On February 28, 2008, the complainant executed an Affidavit21 affirming and confirming
the existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on
March 6, 2000;22 the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated April 19, 2000; 23 and the
Deed of Absolute Sale notarized in 2001.24 The respondent submitted this Affidavit to
the IBP as an attachment to his Motion for Reconsideration of April 21, 2008. 25
The IBP’s Findings
In her Report and Recommendation dated November 19, 2007, IBP Commissioner Anna
Caridad Sazon-Dupaya found the respondent administratively liable for violating Canon
1, Rule 1.01 (A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct) and Canon 16 ("A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).26 She
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. 27
In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-30228 dated December 14, 2007, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the IBP Commissioner’s finding, but increased the penalty imposed
to two (2) years suspension and a warning:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner [in] the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s violations of Canon 1, [Rule]
1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule IV, Sec. 39(c) of
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice), Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott is
hereby SUSPENDED from practice of law for two (2) years with a Warning that
commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. [emphases supplied]
On May 8, 2008, the respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 21,
2008, attaching, among others, a copy of the complainant’s Affidavit dated February 27,
2008, admitting the existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale between Cirilo and Laurentino; the MOA between Laurentino and Reynold; the
Deed of Absolute Sale between Laurentino and Reynold; and the Compromise
Agreement between Reynold and the complainant dated November 14, 2006 for the
expropriation case.29
On September 4, 2008, the respondent filed a Manifestation with the Supreme Court,
requesting that the IBP be directed to resolve his Motion for Reconsideration.30
31
By Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors
denied the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration for failing to raise any new
substantial matter or any cogent reason to warrant a reversal or even a modification of
its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-302.32
On March 14, 2012, the respondent filed a Petition for Review (on appeal) assailing the
IBP’s findings, as follows:33
a) In conveniently concluding that the Deed of Absolute Sale was pre-signed
and fraudulently notarized without requiring Fe Ylaya to adduce evidence in a
formal hearing thus, violated the respondent’s right to due process as he was
not able to cross-examine her. This is not to mention that the complainant
failed to offer corroborative proof to prove her bare allegations;
b) In sweepingly and arbitrarily disregarded/skirted (sic) the public documents
(MOA and 2 other DOAS) duly executed by the parties therein and notarized by
the respondent;
c) In totally ignoring the complainant’s Affidavit admitting the genuineness and
due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in issue;
d) In arbitrarily concluding the absence of co-ownership by Reynold So and Fe
Ylaya of the subject lots despite the existence of a notarized MOA clearly
showing the co-ownership of Ylaya and So; and
e) In finding the respondent/appellant’s act of notarizing the DOAS as contrary
to the notarial rules.
The Issues
From the assigned errors, the complainant poses the following issues:
(1) whether the IBP violated the respondent’s right to due process; and
(2) whether the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is
administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-
13-SC.
The Court’s Ruling
We set aside the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and those of
the IBP Board of Governors finding the respondent liable for violating Canon 1, Rules
1.01 and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.34
We however hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his client’s
properties. We likewise find him liable for violation of (1) Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for
representing conflicting interests without the written consent of the represented
parties, thus, violating the rule on conflict of interests; and (2) Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for
neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.
a. Due process violation
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. Denial of due process
means the total lack of opportunity to be heard or to have one’s day in court. As a rule,
no denial of due process takes place where a party has been given an opportunity to be
heard and to present his case;35 what is prohibited is the absolute lack of opportunity to
be heard.
The respondent claims that the IBP violated his right to due process because he was not
given the "amplest opportunity to defend himself, to cross examine the witness
complainant, to object to the admissibility of documents or present controverting
evidence"36 when the IBP rendered its conclusion without requiring the complainant to
adduce evidence in a formal hearing and despite the absence of corroborative proof. He
insists that these defects rendered the complainant’s allegations as hearsay, and the
IBP’s report, recommendation or resolution null and void.
Although the respondent failed to have a face-to-face confrontation with the
complainant when she failed to appear at the required mandatory conference on
October 6, 2005,37 the records reveal that the respondent fully participated during the
entire proceedings and submitted numerous pleadings, including evidence, before the
IBP. He was even allowed to file a motion for reconsideration supported by his
submitted evidence, which motion the IBP considered and ruled upon in its Resolution
No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010.38
In Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization v. Laguesma, 39 we held that due
process, as applied to administrative proceedings, is the opportunity to explain one’s
side. In Samalio v. Court of Appeals,40 due process in an administrative context does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where the
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or through pleadings, is
accorded, no denial of procedural due process takes place. The requirements of due
process are satisfied where the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand.
Similarly, in A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. v. Office of the President, 41 we held that "due
process, as a constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a
trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations,
position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of due process that must
be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude[, provided that]
fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for being violative of
due process, for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position
papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties."42
In this case, the respondent’s failure to cross-examine the complainant is not a sufficient
ground to support the claim that he had not been afforded due process. The respondent
was heard through his pleadings, his submission of alleged controverting evidence, and
his oral testimony during the October 6, 2005 mandatory conference. These pleadings,
evidence and testimony were received and considered by the IBP Commissioner when
she arrived at her findings and recommendation, and were the bases for the IBP Board’s
Resolution.
Moreover, "any seeming defect in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of
a motion for reconsideration. A denia of due process cannot be successfully invoked by
a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
Undoubtedly in this case, the requirement of the law was afforded to the respondent." 43
We also note that the respondent, on a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case dated
August 24, 2006, submitted his case to the IBP for its resolution without any further
hearings. The motion, filed almost one year after the mandatory conference on October
6, 2005, significantly did not contain any statement regarding a denial of due process. In
effect, the respondent himself waived his cross-examination of the complainant when
he asked the IBP Board of Governors to resolve the case based on the pleadings and the
evidence on record. To quote his own submission:
1. On June 30, 2004, a complaint was filed in this case;
2. On October 19, 2004, the respondent filed his comment with all its
attachments denying all the allegations in the complaint;
3. On June 23, 2005, the respondent filed his position paper. On April 28, 2006,
the respondent also filed his supplemental position paper. By contrast, up to
this date, the complainant/petitioner has not filed her verified position paper
thus, waived her right to file the same;
4. There being no other genuine issues to be heard in this case as all the
defenses and counter-arguments are supported by documentary evidence, it is
most respectfully prayed that the instant case be resolved on its merits or be
ordered dismissed for lack of merit without further hearing;
5. Further, considering that there is an on-going case in Branch 52 of the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan in Civil Case No. 2902 for Expropriation
involving the same property, and such fact was deliberately omitted by the
complainant in her Verified Complaint as shown in the certification of non-
forum shopping, the outright dismissal of this case is warranted, hence, this
motion; and
6. This is meant to expedite the termination of this case.44 (underscore ours;
italics supplied)
Finally, we note Section 11, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that:
No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigator’s
Report shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon
considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a
miscarriage of justice, in which event the
Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including
invalidation of the entire proceedings.
In this case, the IBP Commissioner’s findings were twice reviewed by the IBP Board of
Governors – the first review resulted in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-30245 dated
December 14, 2007, affirming the IBP Commissioner’s findings, but modifying the
penalty; the second review resulted in Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8,
2010,46 denying the respondent’s motion for reconsideration. In both instances, the IBP
Board of Governors found no defect or miscarriage of justice warranting a remedial
action or the invalidation of the proceedings.
We emphasize that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in that they
are neither purely civil nor purely criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers,47 not the trial of an action or a suit.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation
by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor. [emphases deleted]
The complainant in disbarment cases is not a direct party to the case but a witness who
brought the matter to the attention of the Court.48 Flowing from its sui generis
character, it is not mandatory to have a formal hearing in which the complainant must
adduce evidence.
From all these, we find it clear that the complainant is not indispensable to the
disciplinary proceedings and her failure to appear for cross-examination or to provide
corroborative evidence of her allegations is of no merit. What is important is whether,
upon due investigation, the IBP
Board of Governors finds sufficient evidence of the respondent’s misconduct to warrant
the exercise of its disciplinary powers.
b. Merits of the Complaint
"In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is
preponderance of evidence which the complainant has the burden to
discharge."49 Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side
is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight than that of the other. It means
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief compared to the
presented contrary evidence.
Under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, in determining whether preponderance
of evidence exists, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence,
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, and the probability or improbability of their
testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater
number.50 By law, a lawyer enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges against him until the contrary is proven, and that as an officer of the court, he is
presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. 51
The IBP Commissioner set out her findings as follows:
The undersigned, after a careful evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties,
finds that the charges of the complainant against the respondent are worthy of belief
based on the following:
First, the allegation of the respondent that Reynold So was actually co-owner of spouses
Ylanas (sic) in the properties subject of the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano and
Spouses Ylanas (sic) is hard to believe despite the presentation of the Memorandum of
Agreement.
It is elementary in Rules of Evidence that when the contents of a written document are
put in issue, the best evidence would be the document itself. In the Deed of Sale
between Felix Arellano and Spouses Ylanas (sic), the buyer of the subject properties is
only Laurentino L. Ylaya married to Fe A. Ylaya. The document does not state that
Reynold So was likewise a buyer together with Laurentino Ylaya, or that the former paid
half of the purchase price.
Also, it is hard for this Commission to believe that Reynold So, assisted by a lawyer at
that and who allegedly paid half of the purchase price, would not insist for the inclusion
of his name in the Deed of Sale as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title subsequently
issued.
The Memorandum of Agreement between the spouses Ylaya and Reynold So produced
by the respondent cannot overturn the belief of this Commission considering that the
Memorandum of Agreement was executed more than a month AFTER the Deed of Sale
between Felix Arellano and the Ylayas was notarized. This is not to mention the fact that
the complainant denied ever having executed the Memorandum of Agreement. A close
examination of the signatories in the said Memorandum of Agreement would reveal
that indeed, the alleged signatures of the complainant and her husband are not the
same with their signatures in other documents.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Memorandum of Agreement is valid,
thereby making Laurentino Ylaya and co-owner Reynold So co-owners of the subject
properties (Please see Annex "B" of respondent’s Comment), this Commission finds it
hard to believe Laurentino Ylaya would sell it to Reynold So for ₱200,000 x x x when his
minimum expenses for the purchase thereof is already ₱225,000.00 and he was
expecting to receive ₱7,000,000.00, more or less. That would mean that if Reynold So
and the complainant were co-owners, the ₱7,000,000.00 would then be equally divided
among them at ₱3,500,000.00 each, far above the ₱200,000.00 selling price reflected in
the pre-signed Deed of Sale.
As to the second issue, this Commission believes that the respondent committed serious
error in notarizing the Deed of Sale and the Memorandum of Agreement between his
uncle Reynold So and Laurentino Ylaya based on Rule IV, Section 3 (c) of A.M. No. 02-8-
13-SC which provides as follows:
"Sec. 3. Disqualifications – a notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act
if he:
(a) x x x.
(b) x x x.
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by
affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree."
The defense therefore of the respondent that he did not violate the aforementioned
Rule becausehis uncle Reynold So, the buyer is not the principal in the Subject Deed of
Sale but the seller Laurentino Ylaya (please see page 3 of the respondent’s
Supplemental Position Paper) is misplaced. Clearly, both the buyer and the seller in the
instant case are considered principals in the contract entered into.
Furthermore, if we are to consider the argument of the respondent that his uncle was
not a principal so as to apply the afore-quoted provision of the Rules, the respondent
still violated the Rules when he notarized the subject Memorandum of Agreement
between Laurentino Ylaya and his uncle Reynold So. Clearly, both complainant and
Reynold So were principal parties in the said Memorandum of Agreement. 52
The respondent argues that the IBP Commissioner’s findings are contrary to the
presented evidence, specifically to the MOA executed by Laurentino and Reynold
acknowledging the existence of a co-ownership;53 to the complainant’s Ex Parte Motion
to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006
where she stated that the parties have entered into a compromise agreement in Civil
Case No. 2902, and that the disbarment complaint arose from a misunderstanding,
miscommunication and improper appreciation of facts;54 to her Affidavit dated February
27, 200855 affirming and confirming the existence, genuineness and due execution of
the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6, 2000;56 and to the Deed of Absolute
Sale notarized in 2001.57
In all, the respondent claims that these cited pieces of evidence prove that this
administrative complaint against him is fabricated, false and untrue. He also points to
Atty. Robert Peneyra, the complainant’s counsel in this administrative case, as the hand
behind the complaint.58 According to the respondent, Atty. Peneyra harbors ill-will
against him and his family after his father filed several administrative cases against Atty.
Peneyra, one of which resulted in the imposition of a warning and a reprimand on Atty.
Peneyra.59
Reynold, in his Affidavit dated October 11, 2004, confirms that there was a co-
ownership between him and Laurentino; that Laurentino decided to sell his half of the
property to Reynold because he (Laurentino) had been sickly and in dire need of money
to pay for his medical bills; that Laurentino agreed to the price of ₱200,000.00 as this
was almost the same value of his investment when he and Reynold jointly acquired the
property; and that the sale to Reynold was with the agreement and consent of the
complainant who voluntarily signed the Deed of Sale. 60
After examining the whole record of the case, we agree with the respondent and find
the evidence insufficient to prove the charge that he violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
Specifically, (1) the evidence against the respondent fails to show the alleged fraudulent
and deceitful acts he has taken to mislead the complainant and her husband into signing
a "preparatory deed of sale" and the conversion into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June
4, 2001 in favor of Reynold; and (2) no prohibition exists against the notarization of a
document in which any of the parties interested is the notary’s relative within the 4th
civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity, at that time the respondent notarized the
documents.
In her Report and Recommendation,61 the IBP Commissioner concluded that the
respondent is liable for deceit and fraud because he failed to prove the existence of a
co-ownership between Laurentino and Reynold; in her opinion, the signatures of the
complainant and of her husband on the MOA "are not the same with their signatures in
other documents."62
We do not agree with this finding. While the facts of this case may raise some questions
regarding the respondent’s legal practice, we nevertheless found nothing constituting
clear evidence of the respondent’s specific acts of fraud and deceit. His failure to prove
the existence of a co-ownership does not lead us to the conclusion that the MOA and
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 are spurious and that the respondent was
responsible for creating these spurious documents. We are further persuaded, after
noting that in disregarding the MOA, the IBP Commissioner failed to specify what
differences she observed in the spouses Ylaya’s signatures in the MOA and what
documents were used in comparison.
Apart from her allegations, the complainant’s pieces of evidence consist of TCT Nos.
162632 and 162633;63 her Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. 2902 dated
May 17, 2000;64 the RTC order in Civil Case No. 2902 dated November 6, 2000 fixing the
price of just compensation;65 the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001;66 the
spouses Ylaya’s Verified Manifestation dated September 2, 2002, filed with the RTC in
Civil Case No. 2902, assailing the Motion to Deposit Just Compensation filed by the
respondent on behalf of Reynold and manifesting the sale between Laurentino and
Reynold;67 the Provincial Prosecutor’s Subpoena to the complainant in connection with
the respondent’s complaint for libel;68 the respondent’s complaint for libel against the
complainant dated August 27, 2003;69 the complainant’s Counter Affidavit dated March
26, 2004 against the charge of libel;70 and the respondent’s letter to the Provincial
Attorney of Palawan dated April 5, 2004, requesting for "official information regarding
the actual attendance of Atty. ROBERT Y. PENEYRA" at an MCLE seminar.71
We do not see these documentary pieces of evidence as proof of specific acts
constituting deceit or fraud on the respondent’s part. The documents by themselves are
neutral and, at the most, show the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship
between the respondent and the complainant. It is one thing to allege deceit and
misconduct, and it is another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting
these allegations.72
We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is on the complainant;
the Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes her case by
clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence.73 Preponderance of evidence means that
the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight
than that of the other party. When the pieces of evidence of the parties are evenly
balanced or when doubt exists on the preponderance of evidence, the equipoise rule
dictates that the decision be against the party carrying the burden of proof.74
In this case, we find that the complainant’s evidence and the records of the case do not
show the respondent’s deliberate fraudulent and deceitful acts. In the absence of such
proof, the complaint for fraud and deceit under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility must perforce be dismissed.
We note that the respondent has not squarely addressed the issue of his relationship
with Reynold, whom the complainant alleges to be the respondent’s uncle because
Reynold is married to the respondent’s maternal aunt.75 However, this is of no moment
as the respondent cannot be held liable for violating Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-
8-13-SC because the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 200176 and the MOA dated
April 19, 200077 were notarized by the respondent prior to the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-
8-13-SC on July 6, 2004. The notarial law in force in the years 2000 - 2001 was Chapter
11 of Act No. 2711 (the Revised Administrative Code of 1917) which did not contain the
present prohibition against notarizing documents where the parties are related to the
notary public within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity. Thus, we must
likewise dismiss the charge for violation of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
c. Liability under Canons 15, 16 and 18 We find the respondent liable under Canon 15,
Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting interests without the written consent of all
concerned, particularly the complainant; under Canon 16 for being remiss in his
obligation to hold in trust his client’s properties; and under Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for
neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 states:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. [emphasis ours]
The relationship between a lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued with the
highest level of trust and confidence. Necessity and public interest require that this be
so. Part of the lawyer’s duty to his client is to avoid representing conflicting interests. He
is duty bound to decline professional employment, no matter how attractive the fee
offered may be, if its acceptance involves a violation of the proscription against conflict
of interest, or any of the rules of professional conduct. Thus, a lawyer may not accept a
retainer from a defendant after he has given professional advice to the plaintiff
concerning his claim; nor can he accept employment from another in a matter adversely
affecting any interest of his former client. It is his duty to decline employment in any of
these and similar circumstances in view of the rule prohibiting representation of
conflicting interests.78
The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies "even if the lawyer
would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose
for the other, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information
acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated."79 The sole exception is provided in Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility – if there is a written consent from all the parties after full
disclosure.
Based on the records, we find substantial evidence to hold the respondent liable for
violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The facts of
this case show that the respondent retained clients who had close dealings with each
other. The respondent admits to acting as legal counsel for Cirilo Arellano, the spouses
Ylaya and Reynold at one point during the proceedings in Civil Case No.
2902.80 Subsequently, he represented only Reynold in the same proceedings, 81 asserting
Reynold’s ownership over the property against all other claims, including that of the
spouses Ylaya.82
We find no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved and we
cannot give the respondent the benefit of the doubt in this regard. We find it clear from
the facts of this case that the respondent retained Reynold as his client and actively
opposed the interests of his former client, the complainant. He thus violated Canon 15,
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We affirm the IBP Commissioner’s finding that the respondent violated Canon 16. The
respondent admits to losing certificates of land titles that were entrusted to his care by
Reynold.83 According to the respondent, the complainant "maliciously retained" the
TCTs over the properties sold by Laurentino to Reynold after she borrowed them from
his office.84 Reynold confirms that the TCTs were taken by the complainant from the
respondent’s law office.85
The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to "hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Allowing a party to take
the original TCTs of properties owned by another – an act that could result in damage –
should merit a finding of legal malpractice. While we note that it was his legal staff who
allowed the complainant to borrow the TCTs and it does not appear that the respondent
was aware or present when the complainant borrowed the TCTs, 86 we nevertheless hold
the respondent liable, as the TCTs were entrusted to his care and custody; he failed to
exercise due diligence in caring for his client’s properties that were in his custody.
We likewise find the respondent liable for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting
a legal matter entrusted to him. Despite the respondent’s admission that he
represented the complainant and her late husband in Civil Case No. 2902 and that he
purportedly filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in their behalf, the records show that
he never filed such a motion for the spouses Ylaya. The complainant herself states that
she and her late husband were forced to file the Motion for Leave to Intervene on their
own behalf. The records of the case, which include the Motion for Leave to Intervene
filed by the spouses Ylaya, support this conclusion.87
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer "shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him, and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable." What
amounts to carelessness or negligence in a lawyer’s discharge of his duty to his client is
incapable of an exact formulation, but the Court has consistently held that the mere
failure of a lawyer to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation. 88
In Canoy v. Ortiz,89 we held that a lawyer’s failure to file a position paper was per se a
violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar to Canoy, the
respondent clearly failed in this case in his duty to his client when, without any
explanation, he failed to file the Motion for Leave to Intervene on behalf of the spouses
Ylaya. Under the circumstances, we find that there was want of diligence; without
sufficient justification, this is sufficient to hold the respondent liable for violating Canon
18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
d. The Complainant’s Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to
Dismiss the Case and her Affidavit
We are aware of the complainant’s Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint
and To Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 200690 and her Affidavit91 affirming and
confirming the existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale
notarized on March 6, 2000.92 The complainant explains that the parties have entered
into a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 2902, and that this disbarment complaint
was filed because of a "misunderstanding, miscommunication and improper
appreciation of facts";93 she erroneously accused the respondent of ill motives and bad
intentions, but after being enlightened, she is convinced that he has no personal or
pecuniary interests over the properties in Civil Case No. 2902; that such
misunderstanding was due to her unfamiliarity with the transactions of her late husband
during his lifetime.94 The complainant now pleads for the respondent’s forgiveness,
stating that he has been her and her late husband’s lawyer for over a decade and
affirms her trust and confidence in him.95 We take note that under their Compromise
Agreement dated November 14, 2006 for the expropriation case,96 the complainant and
Reynold equally share the just compensation, which have since increased to
₱10,000,000.00.
While the submitted Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to
Dismiss the Case and the Affidavit appear to exonerate the respondent, complete
exoneration is not the necessary legal effect as the submitted motion and affidavit are
immaterial for purposes of the present proceedings. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court states that, "No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of
the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of
the complainant to prosecute the same."
In Angalan v. Delante,97 despite the Affidavit of Desistance, we disbarred the respondent
therein for taking advantage of his clients and for transferring the title of their property
to his name. In Bautista v. Bernabe,98 we revoked the lawyer’s notarial commission,
disqualified him from reappointment as a notary public for two years, and suspended
him from the practice of law for one year for notarizing a document without requiring
the affiant to personally appear before him. In this cited case, we said:
Complainant’s desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate
respondent or put an end to the administrative proceedings. A case of suspension or
disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant.
What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a
civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.
They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the
court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have
in the proper administration of justice.99
In sum, in administrative proceedings against lawyers, the complainant’s desistance or
withdrawal does not terminate the proceedings. This is particularly true in the present
case where pecuniary consideration has been given to the complainant as a
consideration for her desistance. We note in this regard that she would receive
₱5,000,000.00, or half of the just compensation under the Compromise
Agreement,100 and thus agreed to withdraw all charges against the respondent. 101 From one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt
this perspective, we consider the complainant’s desistance to be suspect; it is not with more severely.
grounded on the fact that the respondent did not commit any actual misconduct;
rather, because of the consideration, the complainant is now amenable to the position SO ORDERED.
of the respondent and/or Reynold.

e. Procedural aspect

We remind all parties that resolutions from the IBP Board of Governors are merely
recommendatory and do not attain finality without a final action from this Court.
Section 12, Rule 139-B is clear on this point that:

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. –

xxxx

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the
whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action.1âwphi1

The Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.102 It
exercises such disciplinary functions through the IBP, but it does not relinquish its duty
to form its own judgment. Disbarment proceedings are exercised under the sole
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the IBP’s recommendations imposing the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law or disbarment are always subject to this Court’s
review and approval.

The Penalty

In Solidon v. Macalalad,103 we imposed the penalty of suspension of six ( 6) months from

the practice of law on the respondent therein for his violation of Canon 18, Rule 18.03
and Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In Josefina M.
Aniñon v. Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr.,104 we suspended the respondent therein from
the practice of law for one (1) year, for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Under the circumstances, we find a one (1) year suspension
to be a sufficient and appropriate sanction against the respondent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we set aside Resolution No. XVIII-.2007-302 dated

December 14, 2007 and Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010 of the IBP
Board of Governors, and find respondent Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott GUILTY of violating
Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As a penalty, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
A.C. No. 9514 April 10, 2013
BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. QUIRINO P. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Bernard N. Jandoquile
against respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr.
The Facts of the case are not disputed.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit2 signed by Heneraline L. Brosas,
Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa and Elmer L. Alvarado. Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Heizel
Wynda Brosas Revilla, Atty. Revilla, Jr.'s wife. Jandoquile complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr.
is disqualified to perform the notarial act3 per Section 3( c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice which reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act
if he:
xxxx
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal4 within the fourth civil degree.
Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the three affiants in the
complaint-affidavit to show their valid identification cards.
In his comment5 to the disbarment complaint, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not deny but
admitted Jandoquile’s material allegations. The issue, according to Atty. Revilla, Jr., is
whether the single act of notarizing the complaint-affidavit of relatives within the fourth
civil degree of affinity and, at the same time, not requiring them to present valid
identification cards is a ground for disbarment. Atty. Revilla, Jr. submits that his act is
not a ground for disbarment. He also says that he acts as counsel of the three affiants;
thus, he should be considered more as counsel than as a notary public when he
notarized their complaint-affidavit. He did not require the affiants to present valid
identification cards since he knows them personally. Heneraline Brosas and Herizalyn
Brosas Pedrosa are sisters-in-law while Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the
Brosas family.
Since the facts are not contested, the Court deems it more prudent to resolve the case
instead of referring it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.
Indeed, Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. We agree with him, however, that his violation is
not a sufficient ground for disbarment.
Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s violation of the aforesaid disqualification rule is beyond dispute. Atty.
Revilla, Jr. readily admitted that he notarized the complaint-affidavit signed by his
relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice clearly disqualifies him from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from
performing the notarial act, since two of the affiants or principals are his relatives within
the fourth civil degree of affinity. Given the clear provision of the disqualification rule, it
behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with prudence and refuse notarizing the
document. We cannot agree with his proposition that we consider him to have acted
more as counsel of the affiants, not as notary public, when he notarized the complaint-
affidavit. The notarial certificate6 at the bottom of the complaint-affidavit shows his
signature as a notary public, with a notarial commission valid until December 31, 2012.
He cannot therefore claim that he signed it as counsel of the three affiants.
On the second charge, we agree with Atty. Revilla, Jr. that he cannot be held liable. If
the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show their
valid identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a "jurat" under
Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in
which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public
and presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the
instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or
affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document. In this case,
Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s wife; Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa is his
wife’s sister-in-law; and Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. knows the three affiants personally. Thus, he was justified in no longer
requiring them to show valid identification cards. But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is not without
fault for failing to indicate such fact in the "jurat" of the complaint-affidavit. No
statement was included therein that he knows the three affiants personally.7 Let it be
impressed that Atty. Revilla, Jr. was clearly disqualified to notarize the complaint-
affidavit of his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. While he has a valid
defense as to the second charge, it does not exempt him from liability for violating the
disqualification rule.
As we said, Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s violation of the disqualification rule under Section 3(c),
Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is not a sufficient ground to disbar him. To
our mind, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not commit any deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or
gross immoral conduct, or any other serious ground for disbarment under Section
27,8 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. We recall the case of Maria v. Cortez 9 where we
reprimanded Cortez and disqualified him from being commissioned as notary public for
six months. We were convinced that said punishment, which is less severe than
disbarment, would already suffice as sanction for Cortez’s violation. In Cortez, we noted
the prohibition in Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice that a
person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document (1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the
notarization and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified
by the notary public through a competent evidence of identity. Cortez had notarized a
special power of attorney without having the alleged signatories appear before him. In
imposing the less severe punishment, we were mindful that removal from the Bar
should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe such as reprimand,
temporary suspension or fine would accomplish the end desired.1âwphi1

Considering the attendant circumstances and the single violation committed by Atty.
Revilla, Jr., we are in agreement that a punishment less severe than disbarment would
suffice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr., is REPRIMANDED and

DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public, or from performing any
notarial act if he is presently commissioned as a notary public, for a period of three (3)
months. Atty. Revilla, Jr. is further DIRECTED to INFORM the Court, through an affidavit,
once the period of his disqualification has lapsed.

SO ORDERED.
4. REFUSAL TO NOTARIZE AND FALSE OR INCOMPLETE CERTIFICATES
A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014
MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus)
against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following
grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness to become an
officer of the Court.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
In the Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar Confidant
on 23 June 2004, she alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and
notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the former
as its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for
perjury and for collection of sum of money. She claimed that respondent was a
consultant of the local government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore
aware that the market stall was government-owned.
Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant
legal and financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by
respondent sometime in September 1999 without the signature of the lessees.
However, complainant only found out that the agreement had not been signed by the
lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for another copy from respondent. The
other contract was a sale agreement over a property covered by a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes
Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but
did not advise complainant that the property was still covered by the period within
which it could not be alienated.
In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently
submitted three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an
Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs
were not signed by the principals named therein and bore only the signature of the
named attorney-in-fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit
corroborated complainant’s allegations against respondent. 2
On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution
requiring respondent to submit her comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days
from receipt of notice.3
In her Comment,4 respondent explained that the mortgage contract was prepared in the
presence of complainant and that the latter had read it before affixing her signature.
However, complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so the contract was hastily
done. It was only copied from a similar file in respondent’s computer, and the phrase
“absolute and registered owner” was inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a
cause for disciplinary action, because complainant constructed the subject public
market stall under a “Build Operate and Transfer” contract with the local government
unit and, technically, she could be considered its owner. Besides, there had been a prior
mortgage contract over the same property in which complainant was represented as the
property’s absolute owner, but she did not complain. Moreover, the cause of the
perjury charge against complainant was not the representation of herself as owner of
the mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from all liens and
encumbrances. The perjury charge was even dismissed, because the prosecutor found
that complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the previous
mortgage contract over the same market stall.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document
attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was actually new. She gave the court’s copy of the
agreement to complainant to accommodate the latter’s request for an extra copy. Thus,
respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on complainant’s assurance that
the lessees would sign it and that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the
court. Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.
As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent
claimed that complainant was an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no
advice on the repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the purchase agreement
was notarized, complainant did not present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned
nothing about it. Rather, the agreement expressly stated that the property was the
subject of a case pending before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB); complainant was thus notified of the status of the subject property. Finally,
respondent maintained that the SPAs submitted by complainant as additional evidence
were properly notarized. It can be easily gleaned from the documents that the attorney-
in-fact personally appeared before respondent; hence, the notarization was limited to
the former’s participation in the execution of the document. Moreover, the
acknowledgment clearly stated that the document must be notarized in the principal’s
place of residence.
An exchange of pleadings ensued after respondent submitted her Comment. After her
rejoinder, complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Submission of Additional
Evidence.5 Attached thereto were copies of documents notarized by respondent,
including the following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs
naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either
the principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with incomplete signatures of
the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a lease contract that lacked
the signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim
form (Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter to a potential
investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10) an unsigned Consent to
Adoption.
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective
Position Papers.6 Notably, respondent’s Position Paper did not tackle the additional
documents attached to complainant’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion.
THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP
In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
recommended the immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission of respondent and
her disqualification as notary public for two years for her violation of her oath as such by
notarizing documents without the signatures of the parties who had purportedly
appeared before her. He accepted respondent’s explanations with respect to the lease
agreement, sale contract, and the three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso. However, he found
that the inaccurate crafting of the real estate mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to
hold respondent liable for violation of Canon 187 and Rule 18.038 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also recommended that she be suspended from
the practice of law for six months.9
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008,
unanimously adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one year.10
Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration11 and Second Motion for
Reconsideration.12 She maintained that the additional documents submitted by
complainant were inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing the
procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice).13 Moreover, the Urgent Ex Parte Motion of complainant was actually
a supplemental pleading, which was prohibited under the rules of procedure of the
Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was not the proper party to question those
documents. Hence, the investigating commissioner should have expunged the
documents from the records, instead of giving them due course. Respondent also
prayed that mitigating circumstances be considered, specifically the following: absence
of prior disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or selfish motive; personal and
emotional problems; timely good-faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of her misconduct; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or
cooperative attitude toward the proceedings; character or reputation; remorse; and
remoteness of prior offenses.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March 2012,
denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to justify
a reversal of the IBP’s findings.14
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y.
Santiago – through a letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio –
transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against
respondent.15
THE COURT’S RULING
After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the
parties’ submissions in this case, the Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.
Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court shall first
dispose of some procedural matters raised by respondent.
Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by
complainant are inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable argument was raised in Tolentino
v. Mendoza,16 in which the respondent therein opposed the admission of the birth
certificates of his illegitimate children as evidence of his grossly immoral conduct,
because those documents were obtained in violation Rule 24, Administrative Order No.
1, Series of 1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as follows:
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that “evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.”
There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue.
The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the
inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of
Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions
against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does
it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render said
records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only
provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and
seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable
searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the
government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself
with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only
tempers governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression and
unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.
Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case. The alleged
"warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurer's
office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted
searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the
subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on
Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in
question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly taken
into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent. 18
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the
inadmissibility of documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly
considered in evidence the other notarized documents submitted by complainant as
additional evidence.
Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by
complainant sometime in September 199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of
the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures, she could have given complainant a
certified photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is not a rarity in
respondent’s practice as a notary public. Records show that on various occasions from
2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that were either unsigned or
lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each document maybe a ground for
disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer to demand that a document be
signed in his or her presence.26

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the
Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion of complainant constitutes a
very same ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the said notary
supplemental pleading must fail as well. As its very name denotes, a supplemental
pleading only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary pleading. Its usual public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. 27 Thus, in
acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared before her, respondent
office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with
also violated Rule 10.0128 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her oath as a
respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original
lawyer that she shall do no falsehood.29
complaint.19 Accordingly, it cannot be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by
complainant was a supplemental pleading. One of her charges against respondent is
Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary public.
that the latter notarized incomplete documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease
In several instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to be
agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally barred from
submitting additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her complaint. utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their oath as notaries public. 30 Even so, the rule is
that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and the Court will not
disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. 31 The
Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds that
she committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary public. blatant disregard by respondent of her basic duties as a notary public warrants the less
severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law and perpetual disqualification
to be commissioned as a notary public.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but
one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating
Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as
into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
well as her oath as notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing,
is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being
requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's
commissioned as a notary public.
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined. 20

Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a
member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the
Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for
notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly
their information and guidance.
as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of
the notarization process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial
No costs.
documents diminished. 21 In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not
the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the
provisions of the real estate mortgage contract does not make respondent any less SO ORDERED.
guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly,
respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 122 and Rules 1.0123 and 1.0224 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 A.C. No. 6677, June 10, 2014
EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN MARQUIZO, ROSEMARIE
BALATUCAN, MILDRED BATANG, MARILEN MINERALES, AND MELINDA D. SIOTING,
COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. PHILIP Z. A. NAZARENO, Respondent.
DECISION
complaint16 against Sps. Sioting before the HLURB for the rescission of their contract to
sell and the latter’s ejectment, similar to its pending September 9, 2002 ejectment
complaint. Yet, in the certification against forum shopping attached thereto executed by
the Head of its Credit and Collection department, Norilyn D. Unisan, 17 Rudex declared
that it has not commenced or is not aware of any action or proceeding involving the
same issues pending before any court, tribunal or agency.18 The said certification was
notarized by Atty. Nazareno himself.19

On April 1, 2004, six (6) similar complaints20 for rescission of contracts to sell and
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
ejectment, plus damages for non-payment of amortizations due, were filed by Atty.
Nazareno, on behalf of Rudex, against the other complainants before the HLURB. The
For the Court’s resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by complainants
certifications against forum shopping attached thereto likewise stated that Rudex has
Euprocina I. Crisostomo (Crisostomo), Marilyn L. Solis (Solis), Evelyn Marquizo
not commenced or has any knowledge of any similar pending action before any court,
(Marquizo), Rosemarie Balatucan (Balatucan), Mildred Batang (Batang), Marilen
tribunal or agency.21
Minerales (Minerales), and Melinda D. Sioting (Sioting) against respondent Atty. Philip Z.
A. Nazareno (Atty. Nazareno), charging him with making false declarations in the
On February 21, 2005, complainants jointly filed the present administrative complaint
certifications against forum shopping subject of this case in disregard of Section 5, Rule
for disbarment against Atty. Nazareno, claiming that in the certifications against forum
7 of the Rules of Court, and malpractice as a notary public in violation of the Code of
shopping attached to the complaints for rescission and ejectment of Rudex filed while
Professional Responsibility.cra1awredjgc
Atty. Nazareno was its counsel, the latter made false declarations therein that no similar
actions or proceedings have been commenced by Rudex or remained pending before
The Facts
any other court, tribunal or agency when, in fact, similar actions or proceedings for
rescission had been filed by herein complainants before the HLURB against Rudex and
Sometime in 2001, complainants individually purchased housing units (subject
Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment complaint was filed by Rudex, represented by Atty.
properties) in Patricia South Villa Subdivision, Anabu-II, Imus, Cavite, from Rudex
Nazareno, against Sps. Sioting. In addition, complainants asserted that Atty. Nazareno
International Development Corp. (Rudex).2 In view of several inadequacies and
committed malpractice as a notary public since he only assigned one (1) document
construction defects3 in the housing units and the subdivision itself, complainants
number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) in all the certifications against forum shopping that were
sought the rescission of their respective contracts to sell before the Housing and Land
separately attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission and
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking the refund of the monthly amortizations they
ejectment.22
had paid.4 The first batch of rescission cases was filed by herein complainants
Sioting5 on May 24, 2002, and Crisostomo6 and Marquizo7 on June 10, 2002, while the
Despite notice, Atty. Nazareno failed to file his comment and refute the administrative
second batch of rescission cases was filed by complainants Balatucan 8 on March 3,
charges against him.23
2003, Solis9 and Ederlinda M. Villanueva10 (represented by Minerales) on May 12, 2003,
and Batang11 on July 29, 2003. In all the foregoing rescission cases, Rudex was
In the interim, the HLURB, in the Resolutions dated April 14, 200524 and May 12,
represented by herein respondent Atty. Nazareno.
2005,25 dismissed Rudex’s complaints for rescission and ejectment26 on the ground that
its statements in the certifications against forum shopping attached thereto were false
Judgments of default were eventually rendered against Rudex in the first batch of
due to the existence of similar pending cases in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the
rescission cases.12 Sometime in August 2003, Rudex filed three (3) petitions for
Rules of Court.cra1awredjgc
review13 before the HLURB assailing the same. In the certifications against forum
shopping attached to the said petitions, Rudex, through its President Ruben P. Baes, and
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
legal counsel Atty. Nazareno, stated that it has not commenced or has knowledge of any
similar action or proceeding involving the same issues pending before any court,
In a Report and Recommendation27 dated March 8, 2012, Integrated Bar of the
tribunal or agency14 – this, notwithstanding the fact that Rudex, under the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero recommended the
representation of Atty. Nazareno, previously filed an ejectment case on September 9,
suspension of Atty. Nazareno for a period of six (6) months for his administrative
2002 against Sioting and her husband, Rodrigo Sioting (Sps. Sioting), before the violations.
Municipal Trial Court of Imus, Cavite (MTC).15
The Investigating Commissioner found, among others, that there were unassailable
On January 29, 2004, Rudex, again represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed another
proofs that the certification against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s ejectment
complaint against Sps. Sioting had been erroneously declared, considering that at the
time Rudex filed the said complaint in September 2002, Sps. Sioting’s rescission
complaint against Rudex, filed on May 24, 2002, was already pending. Hence, it was
incumbent upon Rudex to have declared its existence, more so, since both
complaints involve the same transaction and essential facts, and a decision on the
rescission complaint would amount to res judicata on the ejectment complaint.28 In this
relation, the Investigating Commissioner observed that Atty. Nazareno cannot claim
innocence of his omission since he was not only Rudex’s counsel but the notarizing
officer as well. Having knowingly made false entries in the subject certifications against
forum shopping, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Nazareno be
held administratively liable and thereby penalized with six (6) months suspension. 29
In a Resolution30 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, but modified
the recommended penalty from a suspension of six (6) months to only one (1) month.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Atty. Nazareno should be held
administratively liable and accordingly suspended for a period of one (1)
month.cra1awredjgc
The Court’s Ruling
The Court affirms the IBP’s findings with modification as to the penalty imposed.
Separate from the proscription against forum shopping31 is the violation of the
certification requirement against forum shopping, which was distinguished in the case
of Sps. Ong v. CA32 as follows:
The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the certification
requirement should by now be too elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate,
compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from and
independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference
in the treatment between failure to comply with the certification requirement and
violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable
sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes sufficient
cause for the dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or initiatory
pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary
dismissal thereof and for direct contempt. x x x.33
Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a
certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court,
and subjects the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions, viz.:
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a)
that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he
shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to
the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his
counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (Emphases
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code)
which read as follows:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
xxxx
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the
certifications against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s pleadings, for which he should
be held administratively liable.
Records show that Atty. Nazareno, acting as Rudex’s counsel, filed, in August 2003,
petitions for review assailing the judgments of default rendered in the first batch of
rescission cases without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the
existence of the ejectment case it filed against Sps. Sioting which involves an issue
related to the complainants’ rescission cases. Further, on January 29, 2004, Rudex,
represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed a complaint for rescission and ejectment against
Sps. Sioting without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence
of Sioting’s May 24, 2002 rescission complaint against Rudex as well as Rudex’s own
September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint also against Sps. Sioting. Finally, on April 1,
2004, Atty. Nazareno, once more filed rescission and ejectment complaints against the
other complainants in this case without disclosing in the certifications against forum
shopping the existence of complainants’ own complaints for rescission.
Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of cases, Atty.
Nazareno – as mandated by the Rules of Court and more pertinently, the canons of the
Code – should have truthfully declared the existence of the pending related cases in the
certifications against forum shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings. Considering
that Atty. Nazareno did not even bother to refute the charges against him despite due
notice, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the IBP’s resolution on his
administrative liability. However, as for the penalty to be imposed, the Court deems it
proper to modify the IBP’s finding on this score.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,34 a penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of
law was imposed against the lawyer therein who was shown to have deliberately made
false and untruthful statements in one of his pleadings. Given that Atty. Nazareno’s
infractions are of a similar nature, but recognizing further that he, as may be gleaned
from the foregoing discussion, had repetitively committed the same, the Court hereby
suspends him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary
public, considering that he assigned only one document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to
the certifications against forum shopping attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints
for rescission and ejectment despite the fact that each of them should have been
treated as a separate notarial act. It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the
notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of the notarization, among others,
the entry and page number of the document notarized, and that he shall give to each
instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register. 35 Evidently, Atty. Nazareno did not comply with
the foregoing rule.
Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached to
all the aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a material
falsehood, i.e., that Rudex had not commenced any actions or proceedings or was not
aware of any pending actions or proceedings involving the same issues in any other
forum. The administrative liability of an erring notary public in this respect was clearly
delineated as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code in the case of Heirs of the
Late Spouses Villanueva v. Atty. Beradio, 36 to wit:
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her
notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly
as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of
the notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on notarial
documents diminished. In this case, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent
also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.37 (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In said case, the lawyer who knowingly notarized a document containing false
statements had his notarial commission revoked and was disqualified from being
commissioned as such for a period of one (1) year. Thus, for his malpractice as a notary
public, the Court is wont to additionally impose the same penalties of such nature
against him. However, due to the multiplicity of his infractions on this front, coupled
with his willful malfeasance in discharging the office, the Court deems it proper to
revoke his existing commission and permanently disqualify him from being
commissioned as a notary public. Indeed, respondent ought to be reminded that: 38
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making
that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
xxxx
When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of the document under
his hand and seal he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the
purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition
to the solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to
authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and
delivery. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon him
by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the
doing of any. Failing in this, he must accept the consequences of his unwarranted
actions.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno is found GUILTY of making false
declarations in the certifications against forum shopping subject of this case, as well as
malpractice as a notary public. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Further, he is PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary
public and, his notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby REVOKED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended
to respondent’s personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 11668, July 17, 2017
JOY T. SAMONTE, Complainant, v. ATTY. VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 dated March 15, 2013, filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), by complainant Joy T. Samonte (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil (respondent), praying that the latter be
disbarred for acts unbecoming of a lawyer and betrayal of trust.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that sometime in October 2012, she received summons from the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch XI, Davao City,
relative to an illegal dismissal case, i.e., NLRC Case RAB-XI-10-00586-12, filed by four (4)
persons claiming to be workers in her small banana plantation. 2 Consequently,
complainant engaged the services of respondent to prepare her position paper, and
paid him the amount of P8,000.003 as attorney's fees.4 Despite constantly reminding
respondent of the deadline for the submission of her position paper, complainant
discovered that he still failed to file the same. 5 As such, on January 25, 2013, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a Decision6 based on the evidence on record, whereby complainant
was held liable to the workers in the total amount of P633,143.68. 7 When complainant
confronted respondent about the said ruling, the latter casually told her to just sell her
farm to pay the farm workers.8 Because of respondent's neglect, complainant claimed
that she was left defenseless and without any remedy to protect her interests against
the execution of the foregoing judgment;9 hence, she filed the instant complaint.
In an Order10 dated March 26, 2013, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
directed respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint.
In his Answer11 dated April 19, 2013, respondent admitted that he indeed failed to file a
position paper on behalf of complainant. However, he maintained that said omission
was due to complainant's failure to adduce credible witnesses to testify in her favor. In
this relation, respondent averred that complainant instructed her to prepare an
Affidavit12 for one Romeo P. Baol (Romeo), who was intended to be her witness;
nevertheless, respondent was instructed that the contents of Romeo's affidavit were
not to be interpreted in the Visayan dialect so that the latter would not know what he
would be testifying on. Respondent added that complainant's uncle, Nicasio Ticong, who
was also an intended witness, refused to execute an affidavit and testify to her lies.
Thus, it was complainant who was deceitful in her conduct and that the complaint
against him should be dismissed for lack of merit.13
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation14 dated March 14, 2014, the IBP-CBD found
respondent administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Essentially, the IBP-CBD
found respondent guilty of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10, and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.15
In a Resolution16 dated December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the aforesaid Report and Recommendation, finding the same to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP, with modification, however,
as to the penalty in order to account for his breach of the rules on notarial practice.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful
of their cause, and accordingly, exercise the required degree of diligence in handling
their affairs. Accordingly, lawyers are required to maintain, at all times, a high standard
of legal proficiency, and to devote their full attention, skill, and competence to their
cases, regardless of their importance, and whether they accept them for a fee or for
free.17 To this end, lawyers are enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain
lawful objectives.18 These principles are embodied in Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule
18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR, which respectively read as follows:
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

In this case, it is undisputed that a lawyer-client relationship was forged between
complainant and respondent when the latter agreed to file a position paper on her
behalf before the NLRC and, in connection therewith, received the amount of P8,000.00
from complainant as payment for his services. Case law instructs that a lawyer-client
relationship commences when a lawyer signifies his agreement to handle a client's case
and accepts money representing legal fees from the latter,19 as in this case. From then
on, as the CPR provides, a lawyer is duty-bound to "serve his client with competence
and diligence," and in such regard, "not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."
However, it is fairly apparent that respondent breached this duty when he admittedly
failed to file the necessary position paper before the NLRC, which had, in fact, resulted
into an adverse ruling against his client, i.e., herein complainant. To be sure, it is of no
moment that complainant purportedly failed to produce any credible witnesses in
support of her position paper; clearly, this is not a valid justification for respondent to
completely abandon his client's cause. By voluntarily taking up complainant's case,
respondent gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend the latter's
interest therein. Verily, he owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.20 In Abay v. Montesino,21 it was explained that
regardless of a lawyer's personal view, the latter must still present every remedy or
defense within the authority of the law to support his client's cause:
Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must
serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Otherwise stated, he owes entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense
that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every
such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the
client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his
duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves
the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In light of the foregoing, the Court therefore agrees with the IBP that respondent should
be held administratively liable for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
Likewise, the IBP correctly found that respondent violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
CPR. Records show that he indeed indulged in deliberate falsehood when he admittedly
prepared23 and notarized24 the affidavit of complainant's intended witness, Romeo,
despite his belief that Romeo was a perjured witness. In Spouses Umaguing v. De
Vera,25 the Court highlighted the oath undertaken by every lawyer to not only obey the
laws of the land, but also to refrain from doing any falsehood, viz.:
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to
refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of
any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a
servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an
exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore,
that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically
reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice."26 (Emphases supplied)
Notably, the notarization of a perjured affidavit also constituted a violation of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. Section 4 (a), Rule IV thereof pertinently provides:
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. – A notary public shall not perform any notarial act
described in these Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the
appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or
transaction is unlawful or immoral[.] (Emphasis supplied)
On this score, it is well to stress that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest. It must be underscored that
the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document,
making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity
thereof. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For
this reason, a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity
of this form of conveyance would be undermined."27
Having established respondent's administrative liability, the Court now determines the
proper penalty.
The appropriate penalty to be meted against an errant lawyer depends on the exercise
of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. In Del Mundo v.
Capistrano,28 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure
to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client. Similarly,
in Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr.,29 the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer for his inexcusable
negligence in failing to file the required pleading to the prejudice of his client. Hence,
consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court adopts the penalty recommended by
the IBP and accordingly suspends respondent from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year. Moreover, as in the case of Dela Cruz v. Zabala,30 where the notary public
therein notarized an irregular document, the Court hereby revokes respondent's
notarial commission and further disqualifies him from being commissioned as a notary
public for a period of two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil is found GUlLY of violating Rule

10.01, Canon 10 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his
receipt of this Resolution. Moreover, in view of his violation of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, his notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he
is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2)
years. Finally, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended
to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the
same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.