Phil. Assoc. of Service Exporters vs. Drilon rights among all men and women.

mong all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that

G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
FACTS:
The petitioner, engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,
male and female, for overseas placement, challenges the Constitutional
validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of
Labor and Employment, in the character of “GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,” in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Specifically, the measure is assailed for “discrimination against males or
females;” that it “does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills;” and that it is violative of the right to
travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power,
police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. In its
supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation “in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law.” 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence
of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter’s
non-impairment clause, in addition to the “great and irreparable injury” that
PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.
(1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions;
and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is well
aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked
by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of
maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various
forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are
compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker
of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of
exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government’s
efforts. The State through the labor Secretary Exercise the police power
which is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed
the “law of overwhelming necessity.” It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.”

ISSUE:

Whether the Department Order of the Respondent is in violation of the Equal

Protection Clause and Discriminatory against Sexes.

RULING:

No, the petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested
measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No.
1 applies only to “female contract workers,” but it does not thereby make an
undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that “equality
before the law” under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of
 LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, Discussions:
corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180,
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us
vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO,
in good faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute
City Treasurer of Manila, respondents.
must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which,
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957 being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the
medium of a treaty.
FACTS:

Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the

Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail RULING:
Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally
associations, among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause
trade; and “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only
business.
to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance,
Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that:

It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of
their liberty and property without due process of law.

The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.

The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally

accepted principles.
 WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate of the deceased important source of foreign exchange needed by our government and is thus
Antonio Jayme Ledesma, plaintiff-appellant v. J. ANTONIO ARANETA, as pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its
collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellee promotion, protection and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the
general welfare. Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the
G.R No. L-7856 December 22, 1955
general welfare demanded that the sugar industry be stabilized in turn; and
FACTS: in the wide field of its police power, the law-making body could provide that
the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components
Appellant in this case Walter Lutz in his capacity as the Judicial Administrator to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to
of the intestate of the deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover sustain.
from the Collector of the Internal Revenue the total sum of fourteen
thousand six hundred sixty six and forty cents (P 14, 666.40) paid by the The subject tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the
estate as taxes, under section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 567, also known rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other
as the Sugar Adjustment Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950. words, the act is primarily a valid exercise of police power.
Commonwealth Act. 567 Section 2 provides for an increase of the existing tax
on the manufacture of sugar on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar
manufacturer; while section 3 levies on the owners or persons in control of
the land devoted to the cultivation of sugarcane and ceded to others for
consideration, on lease or otherwise - "a tax equivalent to the difference
between the money value of the rental or consideration collected and the
amount representing 12 per centum of the assessed value of such land. It was
alleged that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and
support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a
public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action was
dismissed by the CFI thus the plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act No. 567 are
unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that the fact that sugar production is one of the
greatest industry of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its
export products; that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in the
fields and factories; that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of the
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Manila, and the HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity
as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986
FACTS:
Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short),
popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality.
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said
check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the
offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or
a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double said
amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws
and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to
cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90)
days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by
the drawee bank.
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker
or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the
bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of
mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption
of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness
of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall
not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor,
the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the
bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence,
provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored
check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or
attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute prima facie
proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to
the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written,
stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of
course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding
imprisonment for debt.
RULING:
No. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation
for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the
law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong
to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice
of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand
fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest.

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of

public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public
nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract.

RULING:

No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom

to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are
not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized
as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day
and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the
banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of
the state.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:

No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as
the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the
payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument
is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish
both the swindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude
classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under
the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary.
 Department of Education vs. San Diego
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
FACTS:
Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree
of BS Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT 3 times and
flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner
rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to
the RTC of Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights
to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the
private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16,
1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed
with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS
Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional
grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic
freedom, due process and equal protection.
RULING:
No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure
intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have
initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which
the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge
to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human
resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not
used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best
promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of
satisfaction.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality
education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is
entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent
has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to say
the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is
intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person
who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for
any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not
for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his
interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter,
he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the
appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full
harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward
what may even be a brilliant future. We cannot have a society of square pegs
in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers
who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as
merchants. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and
enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for
which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations.
Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice
Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a
nation of misfits.
 Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
FACTS:
Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No.
626-A is assailed. Said order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial
transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose) and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of
this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in
the case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these shall be given to deserving
farmers as the Director of Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit. Petitioner had
transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These
were confiscated by the police for violation of the above order.
Petitioner sued for recovery, which the RTC granted upon his filing of a
supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the merits, the lower court
sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they can no longer be
produced, directed the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on
the constitutionality of the executive order, on the grounds of want of
authority and presumed validity. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate
Court, such ruling was upheld. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from invalidity
because it is imposed without giving the owner a right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due
process clause.
RULING:
YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be
present:
(a) that the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference, and;
(b) that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose.
In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above
requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has
a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the order,
and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose
sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of
carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if female upon
issuance of a permit adequately works for the conservation of those still fit
for farm work or breeding, and prevention of their improvident depletion.
Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to observe the
second requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of the
prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is
missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of the animals can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with
no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them
in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more that moving
them to another will make it easier to kill them there. Even if assuming there
was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty is
invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to
be heard.
Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared as
forfeited for the government. Concededly, there are certain occasions when
notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with, such as summary
abatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic
materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However, these are
justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and
urgency of the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure is
present. The manner by which the disposition of the confiscated property
also presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since the
officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively)
are granted unlimited discretion. The usual standard and reasonable
guidelines that said officers must observe in making the distribution are
nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit.
Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even
corruption.

Doctrine:

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police
power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police
power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty
and property for the promotion of the general welfare. As long as the activity
or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under
the police power is not only proper but necessary. In the case at bar, E.O. 626-
A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order (E.O. 626 as cited
in Toribio case) but NOT the same lawful method. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise
of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos
is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive.
 CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. ERICTA
G.R. No. L-34915 24 Jun 1983
FACTS:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The
Establishment, Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type
Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within The Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And
Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof" provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery
shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death,
to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall
immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than
six months from the date of approval of the application.
For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced
but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City
Council passed a resolution to request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop
any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City
where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space
intended for paupers burial.
The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.
in writing that Section 9 of the ordinance would be enforced.
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory
relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to
annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question. Respondent alleged that the
same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local
Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid
exercise of police power.
RULING:
Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police
power. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City
to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and
occupation as may be established or practiced in the City.
Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution).
On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which
the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2)
eminent domain, (3) taxation.
The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep.
Act 537 that reads as follows:
“To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, …, and for the protection of property
therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as
the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this
section.”
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to
regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question
not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park
cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the
provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that
upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private
cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled’. The confiscatory clause and the
penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery.
Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'.
It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of
property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken
for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of
Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It
deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay,
even without compensation.
 ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC. OF DAR
G.R. NO. L-78742 14 JUL 1989
FACTS:
These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No.
27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A.
No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777 - The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos.
228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal
protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310 - This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc.
No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking must be simultaneous
with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with
money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the
E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744 - The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative
of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without
due process or just compensation.
G.R. No. 78742 - Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are
unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian
Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the
above-quoted decree.
ISSUE:
Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain.
RULING:
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the
same time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power
is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge
of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene
materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The
confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of
property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of
just compensation to the owner.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question
of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under
challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an
exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it
becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own
in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the
land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical
possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner
in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain.
 MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC v. SECRETARY OF DSWD
G.R. No. 175356 December 3, 2013
FACTS:
RA 7432 was passed into law (amended by RA 9257), granting senior citizens
20% discount on certain establishments.
To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance and the
DSWD issued its own Rules and Regulations. Hence, this petition.
and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic
commodities. It serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent their
lives on contributing to the development and progress of the nation.
In turn, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability
of a private establishment.
The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial
distinctions from, price control or rate of return on investment control laws
which are traditionally regarded as police power measures.

Petitioners are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens
but are only assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme
prescribed under RA 9257 and the implementing rules and regulations issued
by the DSWD and the DOF.
Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III,
Section 9 of the Constitution, which provides that: "private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation."
Respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise
of the State’s police power.
The subject regulation differs there from in that (1) the discount does not
prevent the establishments from adjusting the level of prices of their goods
and services, and (2) the discount does not apply to all customers of a given
establishment but only to the class of senior citizens. Nonetheless, to the
degree material to the resolution of this case, the 20% discount may be
properly viewed as belonging to the category of price regulatory measures
which affect the profitability of establishments subjected thereto. On its face,
therefore, the subject regulation is a police power measure.

ISSUE:

Whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of

police power or eminent domain.

RULING:

The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power.

It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged governmental

act is an exercise of police power or eminent domain. The judicious approach,
therefore, is to look at the nature and effects of the challenged governmental
act and decide on the basis thereof.

The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who,
at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses
 PASCUAL VS. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS

G.R. NO. L-10405 29 DEC 1960 In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend
upon whether the said roads were public or private property when the bill
FACTS:
was passed by congress or when it became effective. The land which was
Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for owned by Zulueta, the appropriation sought a private purpose and hence,
declaratory relief with injunction on the ground that RA 920, Act null and void. The donation did not cure the nullity of the appropriation;
appropriating funds for public works, providing P85,000 for the construction, therefore a judicial nullification of a said donation need not precede the
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road declaration of unconstitutionality of the said appropriation.
terminals, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads within
The decision appealed from is reversed.
Antonio Subdivision. Antonio Subdivision is owned by the respondent, Jose
Zulueta, a member of the Senate of the Philippines. Respondent offered to
donate the said feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig and the offer was
accepted by the council, subject to a condition that the donor would submit
plan of the roads and an agreement to change the names of two of the street.
However, the donation was not executed, which prompted Zuleta to write a
letter to the district engineer calling attention the approval of RA 920. The
district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse the letter that inasmuch
the feeder roads in question were private property at the time of passage and
approval of RA 920, the appropriation for the construction was illegal and
therefore, void ab initio. Petitioner, prayed for RA 920 be declared null and
void and the alleged deed of donation be declared unconstitutional. Lower
court dismissed the case and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds

stipulated in RA 920 are constitutional.

RULING:

The ruling case law rules that the legislature is without power to appropriate
public revenue for anything but public purpose. The taxing power must be
exercised for public purposes only and the money raised by taxation can be
expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private
individuals.
 PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA

GR NO. L-4817 26 MAY 1954

FACTS:

Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398
together with the law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila). The ordinance imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons
exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the
same. The law authorizing said ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of
the city to impose a municipal occupation tax on persons engaged in various
professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax under
section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest
as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court declared the ordinance
invalid and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class

legislation, and authorize what amounts to double taxation.

RULING:

The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed,
and in its discretion may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation,
and leave others untaxed. It is not for the courts to judge which cities or
municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes aside from
that imposed by the National Government. That matter is within the domain
of political departments. The argument against double taxation may not be
invoked if one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the
city. It is widely recognized that there is nothing inherently terrible in the
requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation by
both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower
court is reversed with regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law
authorizing it.
 REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC v. CIR and CTA
14 SCRA 20 June 16, 1965
FACTS:
In 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc. in Bacolod City donated P10,000 in case to Rev.
Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental and the
predecessor of Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic
Church. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended.
On March 1958, M.B. Estate filed a donor’s gift tax return. Subsequently, on
April 1960, the CIR issued an assessment for donee’s gift tax in the amount of
P1,370 including surcharges, interest of 1% monthly from May 1958 to June
1960 and the compromise for the late filing of the return against the Catholic
Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental of which Lladoc was a priest.
Lladoc protested and moved to reconsider but it was denied. He then
appealed to the CTA, in his petition for review, he claimed that at the time of
the donation, he was not the parish priest, thus, he is not liable. Moreover,
he asserted that the assessment of the gift tax, even against the Roman
Catholic Church, would not be valid, for such would be a clear violation of the
Constitution. The CTA ruled in favor of the CIR. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not donee’s gift tax should be paid
RULING:
Yes. Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from
taxation cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents, appurtenant
thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed
on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra distinguished
from excise taxes.
In the present case, what the Collector assessed was a donee's gift tax; the
assessment was not on the properties themselves. It did not rest upon
general ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the properties,
upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. Manifestly, gift
tax is not within the exempting provisions of the section just mentioned. A
gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of
property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used
exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the
Constitution.
As well observed by the learned respondent Court, the phrase "exempt from
taxation," as employed in the Constitution should not be interpreted to mean
exemption from all kinds of taxes. And there being no clear, positive or
express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of Lladoc, the exemption
herein must be denied.
However, the Court noted the merit of Lladoc’s claim, and held as liable the
Head of Deocese for being the real party in interest instead of Lladoc who
was held to be not personally liable; the former manifested that it was
submitting himself to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court and he
presented Lladoc’s brief, by reference, as his own and for all purposes.
 ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. represented by PEDRO V. BORGONIA ,
petitioner, vs. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Abra;
ARMIN M. CARIAGA, Provincial Treasurer, Abra; GASPAR V. BOSQUE,
Municipal Treasurer, Bangued, Abra; HEIRS CF PATERNO MILLARE,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-39086, June 15 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly
incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a
complaint to annul and declare void the “Notice of Seizure’ and the “Notice
of Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of
real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said “Notice of
Seizure” by respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer,
defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.
educational purposes. Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the
exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the
school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by
law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of the
building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of
exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned
in the Constitution.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification
that half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification
is derived from the fact that the ground floor is being used for commercial
purposes (leased) and the second floor being used as incidental to education
(residence of the director).

The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the
trial court in its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government,
holding that the second floor of the building is being used by the director for
residential purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by Northern
Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property
is not being used exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting
an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari
with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said
petition on 17 August 1974.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for
educational purposes.

RULING:

No. Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine
Constitution, expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries,
churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or
 ANTERO M. SISON, JR., vs. RUBEN B. ANCHETA, Acting Commissioner,
Bureau of Internal Revenue
FACTS:
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 135. It amended Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1977.
Petitioner as taxpayer alleged that "he would be unduly discriminated against
by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the
exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed
income or salaried individual taxpayers." He characterizes the above section
as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in
character.
is where it can be shown to amount to the confiscation of property from
abuse of power. Petitioner alleges arbitrariness but his mere allegation does
not suffice and there must be a factual foundation of such unconstitutional
taint.
On equal protection: it is suffices that the laws operate equally and uniformly
on all persons under similar circumstances, both in the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed.
On the matter that the rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable- this
requirement is met when the tax operates with the same force and effect in
every place where the subject may be found.
“Also, the rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect
equality, because this is hardly attainable.”

For petitioner, therefore, there is a transgression of both the equal protection
and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring
uniformity in taxation.
The OSG prayed for dismissal of the petition due to lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed provision violates the equal protection and due
process clause of the Constitution while also violating the rule that taxes must
be uniform and equitable.
“Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of
property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power
has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes
of taxation.”
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation. Where “the differentiation”
complained of “conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity” it “is
not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and is therefore
uniform.” There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection
for all that is required is that the tax “applies equally to all persons, firms and
corporations placed in similar situation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

RULING:

No. The petition is without merit. The SC ruled against Sison. The power to
tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure the performance
of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds. To
paraphrase a recent decision, taxes being the lifeblood of the government,
their prompt and certain availability is of the essence.

On due process: it is undoubted that it may be invoked where a taxing statute

is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious example
 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO VS. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 115455 1994 Aug 25
FACTS:
The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods
and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent
to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or
properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale
or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of
the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code.
The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) contends that
the imposition of VAT on sales and leases by virtue of contracts entered into
prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of
“non-impairment of contracts.”
maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure the
peace and good order of society. In truth, the Contract Clause has never been
thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save
only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration.
Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and the Court does not
understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is
that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general, but only
by a specific, law.
Further, the Supreme Court held the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its
formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases
before it. To sum up, the Court holds:
(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied
with by Congress in the enactment of the statute;
(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment
of statutes - beyond those prescribed by the Constitution - have been
observed is precluded by the principle of separation of powers;

(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press,
ISSUE:
nor interfere with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties
Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional on ground that it violates the the right to an education; and
contract clause under Art. III, sec 10 of the Bill of Rights.
(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that
the law is regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested
rights protected under the Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do not
RULING: justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition.
No. The Supreme Court the contention of CREBA, that the imposition of the
VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into
prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of
non-impairment of contracts, is only slightly less abstract but nonetheless
hypothetical. It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through
the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power
of the State. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal
order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the
 PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
FACTS:
1) The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO)
is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino,
Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and
members of the petitioner Union. PBMEO decided to stage a mass
demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the
alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
2) Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged
abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first
shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third
shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and
that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed
demonstration.
3) The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of
the PBMEO after learning about the planned mass demonstration. During the
meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was
stressed out by the union that the demonstration was not a strike against the
company but was in factual exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional
right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition
for redress of grievances.
4) The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would
interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of
revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the
workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.
5) A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal
that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and
regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they
would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took
place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation
of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
6) The lower court decided in favour of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith.
The PBMEO’s motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the
Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not to regard the demonstration against police officers, not
against the employer, as a violation of freedom expression in general and of
their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances.
2) Whether or not the collective bargaining agreement is an inhibition of the
rights of free expression, free assembly and petition of the employers.
RULING:
1) Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of
time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of
government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of
officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs —
political, economic or otherwise.
The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang
was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their
employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and
completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their
right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before
appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police
officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political
rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm
to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their
local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rights guaranteed in Section Three.
rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that
The Supreme Court set aside as null and void the orders of Court of Industrial
they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as
Relations. The Supreme Court also directed the re-instatement of the herein
consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its
eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation from
productivity as well as profits.
the service until re-instated, minus one day’s pay and whatever earnings they
might have realized from other sources during their separation from the
service.
2) To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal
from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is “a potent means of
inhibiting speech” and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on
the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition.

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the
employees, according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect
imposes on the workers the “duty … to observe regular working hours.” The
strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated
working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration
against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over
the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation.
Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender
ground.

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because
the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and
workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the
subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service
constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression,
freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the
respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1)
in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the
Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the
employees the right “to engage in concert activities for … mutual aid or
protection”; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
 Simon v. Commission on Human Rights
GR No. 100150 Jan 5, 1994
FACTS:
A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of
the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City
Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor,
was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and
members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said
notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of 3 days within which to
vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA to give way to the
construction of the"People's Park".
On 12 July 1990, private respondents, led by their President Roque Fermo,
filed a letter-complaint with the CHR against the petitioners, asking for a
letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. of Quezon City to stop
the demolition of the private respondents'stalls, sari-sari stores, and
carinderia along North EDSA. CHR issued a preliminary order directing the
petitioners to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA
pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.
Petitioners started the demolition despite CHR’s order to desist. Respondents
consequently asked that petitioner’s be cited in contempt.
Meanwhile, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by
respondents. They alleged that the Commission has no jurisdiction over the
complaint as it involved respondents’ privilege to engage in business, not
their civil and political rights.
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in
contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on
each of them. On 1 March 1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying
petitioners' motion to dismiss. The CHR opined that "it was not the intention
of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only
to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a
quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for
the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines"
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners Simon Jr.
et al filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin the CHR from hearing private
respondents’ complaint.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to hear the complaint and grant the
relief prayed for by respondents.
2) Whether or not the CHR can investigate the subject matter of respondents’
complaint.
RULING:
1) No. Under the constitution, the CHR has no power to adjudicate.
2) No. Complaint does not involve civil and political rights.
Art XIII, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that the CHR has the power
to investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights.
In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, the Court through Justice Andres
Narvasa observed that:
(T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental
law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered
such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have

CHR’s investigative power encompasses all forms of human rights violations

involving civil and political rights.

The term civil rights has been defined as referring to those rights that belong
to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration
of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal
protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Political rights, on the other
hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the
right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights
appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily

apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that
would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations.
Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of
rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of
tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings
and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious."

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be
demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary
shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be
developed into a "People's Park." Looking at the standards hereinabove
discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not
prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari
stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights"
intended by the Constitution.
 Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918
DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed
to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be
safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that
proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of
real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio
returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning
again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure
proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give
notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of
the summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China.
It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement.
Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the
cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was
likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the
bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the
court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a
motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the
original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside
the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings
subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default
and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process of law was observed.
RULING:
As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with
certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following
conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2)
jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or
over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant
must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be
rendered upon lawful hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity
to be heard, we observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the
proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which
appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer
this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in
addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence
is known. Though commonly called constructive, or substituted service of
process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the
owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial
proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees
fit to protect it.
It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any
absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice.
The periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands,
and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight.
Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though
much increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which
it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service.
It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the
mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice
unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the
defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that
actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to
be considered absolutely necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means
of notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this:
Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or
by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected
with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation
and sale.
 STATE PROSECUTORS V. JUDGE MURO
A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994
FACTS:
Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54,
was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno
V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules
2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda
Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the
Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely
on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the judge
believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the President of the
Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported
announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect
repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to
further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case.
The petitioners stressed that this is not just a simple case of a misapplication
or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in
altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a
motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving
the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a
written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of
elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad
faith and partiality.
Moreover, Petitioner’s alleged that the judge also exercised grave abuse of
discretion by taking judicial notice on the published statement of the
President in the newspaper (Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe)
which is a matter that has not yet been officially in force and effect of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
in taking judicial notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign
exchange restriction published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the
case.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance
of the law. It cannot comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait
for the publication of the circular no. 1353 which is the basis of the
President’s announcement in the newspaper, believing that the public
announcement is absolute and without qualification and is immediately
effective and such matter becomes a public knowledge which he can take a
judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that a
new law should be published for 15 days in a newspaper of general circulation
before its effectivity. When the President’s statement was published in the
newspaper, the respondent admitted of not having seen the official text of
CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this
matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on
the public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice
of.
For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be
presented:
(1) The matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) It must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
(3) It must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
The court ruled that the information he obtained from the newspaper is one
of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in taking cognizant of a law that was not
yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the
prosecution the right to be heard and of due process. The court ordered for
the dismissal of the judge from service for gross ignorance of the law and
grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring
in exercising his discretion to take judicial notice on matters that are hearsay
and groundless with a reminder the power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by the courts with caution at all times.