OBERGEFELL ET AL. V.
HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF sex marriage performed in another state on the ground of its same-sex
HEALTH, ET AL. 576 US (2015)
RULE: The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of
the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of
that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental
right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied to them. Baker v.
Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) must be and is overruled, and Mich. Const. art.
I, § 25, Ky. Const. § 233a, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3101.01 (2008), and Tenn.
Const. art. XI, § 18 are held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex
couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-
sex couples.
FACTS: Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a
union between one man and one woman. Fourteen same-sex couples, and
two men whose same-sex partners were deceased, filed suits in Federal
District Courts in their home States, claiming that respondent state officials
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or
to have marriages lawfully performed in another State given full recognition.
Each District Court ruled in petitioners' favor, but the Sixth Circuit
consolidated the cases and reversed.
ISSUE: Did the state officials violate the Fourteenth Amendment by
denying same-sex couples the right to marry?
CONCLUSION: YES
The Court held that under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment, same-sex couples have a fundamental right to
marry. Laws of Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee were held invalid
to the extent they excluded same-sex couples from civil marriage on the
same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples. Because same-sex
couples can exercise the fundamental right to marry in all states, it follows
that there is no lawful basis for a state to refuse to recognize a lawful same-
character. The Court reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO
FACTS: Right against cruel and unusual punishment
Accused-apellant Leo Echegaray was charged and convicted for the crime of
raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed
sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act No. 7659,
commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-
appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
In appealing the conviction, it raised the constitutionality of the Death
Penalty Law as being severe and excessive, cruel and unusual in violation of
the constitution. He invokes the ruling in Furman vs. Georgia wherein the
US Supreme Court categorically ruled that death penalty is cruel and
degrading. He also argues that death is an excessive and cruel punishment
for a crime of rape because there is no taking of life in rape. He invokes the
ruling in Coker vs. Georgia which said that while rape deserves serious
punishment, it should not involve the taking of human life. In rape, life is not
over for the victim. Death penalty should only be imposed where the crime
was murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not Death Penalty is cruel and unusual punishment.
HELD: NO. The penalty is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In the US case
of Kemmler, it was held that punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death. It implies there something inhuman, barbarous,
something more than the extinguishment of life. It is degrading if it involves
public humiliation. The severity is not sufficient, but must be
disproportionate to the crime committed. Excessiveness is measured by 1)
seriousness of the crime, 2) policy of the legislative, 3) perversity of the
accused.
The issue in Furman vs. Georgia is not so much the death penalty itself, but
the arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was
imposed by the jury. It was nullified because the discretion in which the
statute vested in trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and
without any parameters, guidelines, or standards.
With regard to the case of Coker vs. Georgia, the SC held that this case has
no bearing on Philippine experience and culture. Such a premise is in fact an
ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a
tooth for a tooth". But, the forfeiture of life simply because life was taken,
never was a defining essence of the death penalty in the context of our legal
history and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in
heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed
unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or
criminal acts with severely destructive effects, and because they have so
caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society
and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of
individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently
prevented from doing so.
RA 7659 already sufficiently defined what are heinous crimes – crimes
punished with death are those that are grievous, odious, and hateful by
reason of inherent viciousness, atrocity and perversity, those that are
repugnant and outrageous to common standards of norms and decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. They also include crimes
which are despicable because life is callously taken, or the victim is treated
as an animal or dehumanized.
ROE V. WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. CT. 705, 35 L. ED. 2D 147, 1973 U.S.
LEXIS 159 (U.S. JAN. 22, 1973)
Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion
except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes
were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent defendant
Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant
alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to
receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not
threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to
afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant
sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming
that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of
personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Issue. Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the
appellant to terminate her pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal
liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, in the
personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights
or its penumbras, or among the rights reserved to the people by the Ninth
Amendment?
Held. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the
right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively
recent vintage, deriving from statutory changes generally enacted in the
latter half of the 19th century. At common law abortion performed before
quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was not
an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly
established common law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus.
Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal
abortion laws. The first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social
concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been
taken seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is
that the abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to
protect pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques have
altered the situation, with abortions being relatively safe particularly in the
first trimester. The third reason is the State’s interest is in protecting the
prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the
pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the
abortion decision must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant
woman’s attending physician, and may not be criminalized by statute.
For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the
State may regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health
based upon the State’s interest in promoting the health of the mother.
For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even
proscribe abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the
mother’s life, based upon the State’s interest in the potential of the
potential life of the unborn child.
CRUZAN V. DIRECTOR, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
because clear and convincing evidence was not produced to show that
Cruzan herself would have chosen to refuse treatment.
Issue(s).
 Did Cruzan have a right under the United States Constitution that
would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment?
 Did Missouri’s procedural requirement for clear and convincing
evidence of an incompetent person’s desire to terminate life support
before it is terminated violate the Constitution?
Held. No and No. The Missouri Supreme Court is affirmed.
Prior decisions support the principle that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing medical treatment
under the Due Process Clause. But incompetent persons do not enjoy the
same rights, because they cannot make voluntary and informed decisions.
The right to terminate life-sustaining treatment of an incompetent, if it is to
be exercised, must be done for such incompetent by a surrogate. Missouri’s
interest in the preservation of life is unquestionably a valid State interest.
The Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as a right to refuse
life-saving treatment. Missouri may legitimately safeguard these personal
decisions by imposing heightened evidentiary requirements. Moreover,
even when available, family members will not always act in the best
interests of a patient. The State is entitled to safeguard against such abuses.

Facts. Nancy Cruzan was involved in a car accident, which left her in a
“persistent vegetative state.” In order to feed her and to facilitate her
recovery, surgeons implanted into her a gastronomy feeding and hydration
tube. After it become apparent that Cruzan had virtually no chance for
recovery, Petitioners, Cruzan’s parents, asked hospital employees to
terminate the life support procedures. The State hospital employees refused
to honor this request without court approval. After trial, on appeal, the
Missouri Supreme Court refused to order termination of the life-support,
BOLOS V. BOLOS 634 SCRA 429, October 20, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration
of nullity of her marriage to Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article
36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition
for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by respondent Danilo
and he thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the
required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the order
declaring its decision declaring the marriage null and void as final and
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition forcertiorari under
Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render
the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of
abandoning him, the family home and their children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders
of the RTC declaring the nullity of marriage as final and executory. The
appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration
as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this
case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on
February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to
petitioner, the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.” Such
that petitions filed after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by
the A.M. No. even if the marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo,
in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable
because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980,
years before its effectivity.
ISSUE: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,” is applicable to the case at bench.
HELD: No, it does not.
RATIO: The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.
Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages
under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt.
The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule
sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and
those solemnized under the Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to
subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under the Family
Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to
the word “marriages.”
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC
decision which denied due course to respondent’s appeal and denying
petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration.
AGLIPAY V. RUIZ, GR NO. L-45459, MARCH 13, 1937
Facts of the Case: The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in
Manila newspapers that he would order the issuance of postage stamps for
the commemoration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress
celebration in the City of Manila. The said event was organized by the
Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the petitioner, is the
Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, requested Vicente
Sotto who is a member of the Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the
President. The said stamps in consideration were actually issued already and
sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of
the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing
and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress
Held: No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and
selling the commemorative postage stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision
of Act No. 4052, which contemplates no religious purpose in view, giving the
Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the issuance of new
postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of course,
the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the
violation of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage
stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a particular church or
denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic Church, nor
were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The
purpose of issuing of the stamps was to actually take advantage of an
international event considered to be a great opportunity to give publicity to
the Philippines and as a result attract more tourists to the country. In
evaluating the design made for the stamp, it showed the map of the
Philippines instead of showing a Catholic chalice. The focus was on the
location of the City of Manila, and it also bore the inscription that reads
“Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” In
considering these, it is evident that there is no violation of the Constitution
therefore the act of the issuing of the stamps is constitutional.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without
pronouncement as to costs.
EDWARDS V. AGUILLARD 482 U.S. 578
Facts. The Act forbids the teaching of evolution in public schools unless
accompanied by instruction in “creation science.” No school is required to
teach evolution or creation science. If either is taught however, the other
must be taught. The Appellees, Aguillard and other parents of children
attending Louisiana public schools, Louisiana teachers, and religious leaders
(Appellees) challenged the constitutionality of the Act. The District Court
held that the Act violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution
either because it prohibited the teaching of evolution or because it required
the teaching of creation science with the purpose of advancing a particular
religious doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issue. Whether the Act violates the Establishment Clause of the
Constitution?
Held. Yes. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Lemon’s first prong
focuses on the purpose of that animated adoption of the Act. In this case,
the Appellants, Edwards and others (Appellants), have identified no clear
secular purpose for the Act. The goal of providing a more comprehensive
science curriculum is not furthered by either outlawing the teaching of
evolution or by requiring the teaching of creationism. While the Supreme
Court is normally deferential to the state’s articulation of a secular purpose,
it is required that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not without
a sham. It is clear that requiring schools to teach creation science with
evolution does not advance academic freedom. The Act does not grant
teachers the flexibility that they did not already possess to supplant the
present science curriculum with a presentation of theories besides
evolution, about the origin of life. Here, the purpose of the Act was to
restructure the science curriculum to conform with a particular religious
viewpoint. Therefore, the Act violates the Establishment Clause of the
Constitution.
BAZE V. REES APRIL 16, 2008 NO. 07-5439
FACTS OF THE CASE: Two Kentucky inmates challenged the state's four-
drug lethal injection protocol. The lethal injection method calls for the
administration of four drugs: Valium, which relaxes the convict, Sodium
Pentathol, which knocks the convict unconscious, Pavulon, which stops his
breathing, and potassium chloride, which essentially puts the convict into
cardiac arrest and ultimately causes death. The Kentucky Supreme Court
held that the death penalty system did not amount to unconstitutional cruel
and unusual punishment.
The death row inmates acknowledged that the lethal injection procedure, if
applied as intended, would result in a humane death. They nevertheless
contended that the lethal injection protocol was unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments, because of the
risk that the protocol's terms might not be properly followed, resulting in
significant pain. The Court held that the inmates had not carried their
burden of showing that the risk of pain from maladministration of the
concededly humane lethal injection protocol, and the failure to adopt
untried and untested alternatives, constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. The Court also held that if a state refused to adopt an
alternative method of execution in the face of documented advantages that
the alternative was feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly
reduced a substantial risk of severe pain, without a legitimate penological
justification for adhering to its current method of execution, then that
refusal to change would be cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.
The inmates' alternative proposal had problems of its own, and had never
been tried by a single state.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a four-drug lethal injection process to
carry out death sentences a violation of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel
and unusual punishment?
DECISION: NO
In a 7-2 decision with four concurrences and a dissent, the Court held that
Kentucky's lethal injection scheme did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
Noting that the inmates had conceded the "humane nature" of the
procedure when performed correctly, the divided Court inmates had failed
to prove that incorrect administration of the drugs would amount to cruel
and unusual punishment. However, the Court also suggested that a state
may violate the ban on cruel and unusual punishment if it continues to use a
method without sufficient justification in the face of superior alternative
procedures. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. announced the judgment and
issued an opinion joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Samuel A. Alito.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion supporting
the judgment but for the first time stated his opposition to the death
penalty. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote a
separate concurring opinion in support of the judgment. Justice Alito also
issued a separate concurring opinion. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by
Justice David Souter, dissented.
ROPER V. SIMMONS, 543 U.S. 551
Facts. Respondent Simmons conspired to burglarize and murder a person
with two friends. Only one fully participated. They entered the victim’s
home, kidnapped her, bound her with duct tape and electrical cord, and
threw her into a river. Respondent was 17 at the time. He subsequently
bragged out the killing. He was taken into custody and confessed. He was
put on trial as an adult, convicted, and sentenced to death.
Issue. “[W]hether it is permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States to execute a juvenile
offender who was older than 15 but younger than 18 when he committed a
capital crime.”
Held. No. The Supreme Court of the United States first established the
applicability of the Eight Amendment, as well a precedent of the application
of the death penalty to minors. Traditionally, minors did not face capital
punishment. It noted that a “consensus” of the country is against the
application of the death penalty to juveniles.
The Supreme Court noted the gravity of capital punishment and its
application. “Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who
commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme
culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.'” The Supreme
Court further noted that juveniles are different, in that: they lack maturity
and understanding of responsibility; are “more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure”; and
that “that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an
adult.” Having recognized the fact that a juvenile is not “the worst”
offender, “the penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them
with lesser force than to adults.”
ATKINS V. VIRGINIA 536 U.S 304 (2002)
Facts. Atkins Daryl (D) was sentenced to death for shooting a patron of an
automated teller machine and for robbery, after he was found guilty of
abduction, capital murder and armed robbery. A verdict of “mildly mentally
retarded” pertaining to the health of Atkins (D), was given by a forensic
psychologist. This verdict of the psychologist was based on the interview he
had with Atkins (D) and with others who knew him, review of school and
court records of other crimes and a standard intelligence test which showed
that Atkins (D) had a full scale IQ of 59. Atkins (D) however appealed against
the ruling of the trial court on the ground that sentencing a mentally
retarded criminal to death was a cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.
Issue. Under the Eighth Amendment, is the capital punishment of a mentally
retarded convict cruel and unusual?
Held. (Stevens, J.) Yes. Under the Eighth Amendment, the capital
punishment of a mentally retarded convict is cruel and unusual. Mentally
retarded persons should be tried and punished when they commit crimes
once they meet the law’s requirement. Mentally retarded persons do not
act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious
adult criminal conduct because of their disabilities in the areas of reasoning,
control of impulses and judgment. Hence, the enactment of the federal
government which exempts the mentally retarded from execution has
provided a strong evidence in which the society view the mentally retarded
offenders as less culpable than the average criminal. The mentally retarded
person’s disposition often portrays that they lack remorse for their crimes
and they are also poor witnesses because they are not capable of assisting
their counsel. Reversed and remanded.
FORD V. WAINWRIGHT 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
Facts. Alvin Ford (Defendant) was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. While in prison, Defendant’s behavior began to change, and he
started experiencing numerous suicidal delusions related to the Ku Klux
Klan. Defendant also believed that a large group of his friends and family
was being held hostage inside the prison. After examination, a psychiatrist
concluded that Defendant suffered from severe paranoid schizophrenia.
Shortly afterward, a second doctor met with Defendant and concluded that
Defendant did not understand why he was being executed or recognize the
relationship between his death sentence and the homicide of which he had
been convicted. Following the procedures set forth under Florida law for
determination of competency of a condemned inmate in Fla. Stat. § 922.07
(1985), the governor of Florida empanelled three psychiatrists to evaluate
whether Defendant had the mental capacity to understand the nature of
the death penalty and the reasons why it was imposed on him. After
interviewing Defendant at a single meeting, all three psychiatrists produced
different diagnoses, but all agreed that Defendant understood the nature
and effects of the death penalty. Pursuant to the statute, the governor
made the final decision, based upon the psychiatrists’ conclusions, and
signed a death warrant for Defendant’s execution. Defendant’s attorneys
subsequently brought an action in federal court seeking a writ of habeas
corpus.
Issue. Whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of an
insane prisoner.
Held. Yes. The case is remanded. The Eight Amendment prohibits the
execution of an insane person.
Discussion. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment,” which includes execution of a
prisoner who is incompetent. Whether a particular punishment comports
with the amendment is evaluated by considering both traditional and
contemporary societal values and justifications. At common law, the
practice of executing a prisoner who lost his sanity was extensively
condemned and considered cruel and inhuman. A number of potential
reasons supported this widespread condemnation of the procedure,
including that execution of an insane person is simply an affront to
humanity and that it does not provide an example to others and has
therefore no deterrence value, along with various religious explanations.
Today, many of these justifications are still compelling. The retributive
purpose of the death penalty is not served when a person does not
understand why he is being put to death, and the natural unease and
repugnance toward the practice is felt throughout the country. Because this
restriction arises from the Constitution, condemned prisoners have a right
to fair and independent fact-finding procedures to determine present
insanity. Here, the Florida procedures under § 922.07 are inadequate and
flawed, because they do not comport with due process requirements. The
procedures do not allow the prisoner to submit his own material to be
considered in the final decision and thus do not provide an opportunity to
be heard. There is also no chance to confront the state-appointed
psychiatrists’ or challenge their opinions, which is an important element of a
truth-seeking process. Lastly, the insufficiently neutral executive branch has
complete power over the ultimate decision. Though this Court will not set
forth an exhaustive list of necessary procedures, each state must develop
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon executions
of potentially mentally ill inmates.
VICTORIA SEGOVIA, ET. AL. VS THE CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION
G.R. NO. 211010, MARCH 17, 2017
FACTS: This is a petition for the issuance of Writs of Kalikasan and
continuing mandamus to compel the implementation of the following
environmental laws and executive issuances - Republic Act No. (RA) 9729
(Climate Change Act), and RA 8749 (Clean Air Act); Executive Order No. 774
(BO 774); AO 254, s. 2009 (AO 254); and Administrative Order No. 171, s.
2007 (AO 171).
In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the
foregoing laws and executive issuances resulted in the continued
degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the
petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology,14 and
may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land,
water, and air" by the government without due process of law.15
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, assert that
petitioners are not entitled to a writ of kalikasan because they failed to
show that the public respondents are guilty of an unlawful act or omission;
state the environmental law/s violated; show environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants of
two or more cities; and prove that non- implementation of Road Sharing
Principle will cause environmental damage.
ISSUES: Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus
should be issued.
RULING : NO.
For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:
1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology;
2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and
3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would
be violated. In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the
constitutional right to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology and
bare allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show
that public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that
constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful
ecology.

Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.

Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely

ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and the official can
only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. At
its core, what the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the performance
of a ministerial act, but a discretionary act - the manner of implementation
of the Road Sharing Principle. Clearly, petitioners' preferred specific course
of action (i.e. the bifurcation of roads to devote for all-weather sidewalk and
bicycling and Filipino-made transport vehicles) to implement the Road
Sharing Principle finds no textual basis in law or executive issuances for it to
be considered an act enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the necessary
conclusion that the continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not the
implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control
the exercise of discretion of the executive as to how the principle
enunciated in an executive issuance relating to the environment is best
implemented. Hence, the continuing mandamus cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.