G.R. No. 193986 January 15, 2014
On September 17, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision, 13 the dispositive portion of which provides:
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES INC., Petitioner,
vs.
BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP. and MITSUI SUM TOMO INSURANCE CO. LTD., Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
seeking the reversal of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88361, which affirmed with
modification the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), of Makati City, Branch 138 in Civil Case No. 04-1005.
The facts follow:
On August 29, 2003, Sumitomo Corporation (Sumitomo) shipped through MV Eastern Challenger V-9-S, a vessel owned by
petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (petitioner), 31 various steel sheets in coil weighing 271,828 kilograms from
Yokohama, Japan for delivery in favor of the consignee Calamba Steel Center Inc. (Calamba Steel). 4The cargo had a declared
value of US$125,417.26 and was insured against all risk by Sumitomo with respondent Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd.
(Mitsui). On or about September 6 2003, the shipment arrived at the port of Manila. Upon unloading from the vessel, nine
coils were observed to be in bad condition as evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargo No. 67327. The cargo
was then turned over to Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI) for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending Calamba Steel’s
withdrawal of the goods. When ATI delivered the cargo to Calamba Steel, the latter rejected its damaged portion, valued at
US$7,751.15, for being unfit for its intended purpose.5
Subsequently, on September 13, 2003, a second shipment of 28 steel sheets in coil, weighing 215,817 kilograms, was made
by Sumitomo through petitioner’s MV Eastern Challenger V-10-S for transport and delivery again to Calamba Steel.6 Insured
by Sumitomo against all risk with Mitsui,7 the shipment had a declared value of US$121,362.59. This second shipment arrived
at the port of Manila on or about September 23, 2003. However, upon unloading of the cargo from the said vessel, 11 coils
were found damaged as evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargo No. 67393. The possession of the said cargo
was then transferred to ATI for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending withdrawal thereof by Calamba Steel. When
ATI delivered the goods, Calamba Steel rejected the damaged portion thereof, valued at US$7,677.12, the same being unfit
for its intended purpose.8
Lastly, on September 29, 2003, Sumitomo again shipped 117 various steel sheets in coil weighing 930,718 kilograms through
petitioner’s vessel, MV Eastern Venus V-17-S, again in favor of Calamba Steel.9 This third shipment had a declared value of
US$476,416.90 and was also insured by Sumitomo with Mitsui. The same arrived at the port of Manila on or about October
11, 2003. Upon its discharge, six coils were observed to be in bad condition. Thereafter, the possession of the cargo was
turned over to ATI for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending withdrawal thereof by Calamba Steel. The damaged
portion of the goods being unfit for its intended purpose, Calamba Steel rejected the damaged portion, valued at
US$14,782.05, upon ATI’s delivery of the third shipment.10
Calamba Steel filed an insurance claim with Mitsui through the latter’s settling agent, respondent BPI/MS Insurance
Corporation (BPI/MS), and the former was paid the sums of US$7,677.12, US$14,782.05 and US$7,751.15 for the damage
suffered by all three shipments or for the total amount of US$30,210.32. Correlatively, on August 31, 2004, as insurer and
subrogee of Calamba Steel, Mitsui and BPI/MS filed a Complaint for Damages against petitioner and ATI.11
As synthesized by the RTC in its decision, during the pre-trial conference of the case, the following facts were established,
viz:
1. The fact that there were shipments made on or about August 29, 2003, September 13, 2003 and September 29,
2003 by Sumitomo to Calamba Steel through petitioner’s vessels;
2. The declared value of the said shipments and the fact that the shipments were insured by respondents;
3. The shipments arrived at the port of Manila on or about September 6, 2003, September 23, 2003 and October
11, 2003 respectively;
4. Respondents paid Calamba Steel’s total claim in the amount of US$30,210.32. 12
Trial on the merits ensued.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. and
Asian Terminals, Inc., jointly and severally, ordering the latter to pay plaintiffs the following:
1. Actual damages amounting to US$30,210.32 plus 6% legal interest thereon commencing from the filing of
this complaint, until the same is fully paid;
2. Attorney’s fees in a sum equivalent to 25% of the amount claimed;
3. Costs of suit. The defendants’ counterclaims and ATI’s crossclaim are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
Aggrieved, petitioner and ATI appealed to the CA. On July 9, 2010, the CA in its assailed Decision affirmed with modification
the RTC’s findings and ruling, holding, among others, that both petitioner and ATI were very negligent in the handling of the
subject cargoes. Pointing to the affidavit of Mario Manuel, Cargo Surveyor, the CA found that "during the unloading
operations, the steel coils were lifted from the vessel but were not carefully laid on the ground. Some were even ‘dropped’
while still several inches from the ground while other coils bumped or hit one another at the pier while being arranged by the
stevedores and forklift operators of ATI and [petitioner]." The CA added that such finding coincides with the factual findings
of the RTC that both petitioner and ATI were both negligent in handling the goods. However, for failure of the RTC to state
the justification for the award of attorney’s fees in the body of its decision, the CA accordingly deleted the same. 15 Petitioner
filed its Motion for Reconsideration16 which the CA, however, denied in its Resolution17 dated October 6, 2010.
Both petitioner and ATI filed their respective separate petitions for review on certiorari before this Court.1âwphi1 However,
ATI’s petition, docketed as G.R. No. 192905, was denied by this Court in our Resolution18 dated October 6, 2010 for failure
of ATI to show any reversible error in the assailed CA decision and for failure of ATI to submit proper verification. Said
resolution had become final and executory on March 22, 2011.19 Nevertheless, this Court in its Resolution20 dated September
3, 2012, gave due course to this petition and directed the parties to file their respective memoranda.
In its Memorandum,21 petitioner essentially avers that the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC because the survey
reports submitted by respondents themselves as their own evidence and the pieces of evidence submitted by petitioner clearly
show that the cause of the damage was the rough handling of the goods by ATI during the discharging operations. Petitioner
attests that it had no participation whatsoever in the discharging operations and that petitioner did not have a choice in
selecting the stevedore since ATI is the only arrastre operator mandated to conduct discharging operations in the South Harbor.
Thus, petitioner prays that it be absolved from any liability relative to the damage incurred by the goods.
On the other hand, respondents counter, among others, that as found by both the RTC and the CA, the goods suffered damage
while still in the possession of petitioner as evidenced by various Turn Over Surveys of Bad Order Cargoes which were
unqualifiedly executed by petitioner’s own surveyor, Rodrigo Victoria, together with the representative of ATI. Respondents
assert that petitioner would not have executed such documents if the goods, as it claims, did not suffer any damage prior to
their turn-over to ATI. Lastly, respondents aver that petitioner, being a common carrier is required by law to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods it carries. 22
Simply put, the core issue in this case is whether the CA committed any reversible error in finding that petitioner is solidarily
liable with ATI on account of the damage incurred by the goods.
The Court resolves the issue in the negative.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that factual questions may not be raised before this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari as this Court is not a trier of facts. This is clearly stated in Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, which provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order
or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth.
Thus, it is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put in issue. Questions of fact cannot
be entertained.23
1
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain
set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the
probability of the situation.24
extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession
of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the
consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.32 Owing to this high degree of diligence required of them, common
carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to have been at fault or negligent if the goods they transported deteriorated or got lost
or destroyed. That is, unless they prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods. In order to avoid
responsibility for any loss or damage, therefore, they have the burden of proving that they observed such high level of
diligence.33 In this case, petitioner failed to hurdle such burden.

In this petition, the resolution of the question as to who between petitioner and ATI should be liable for the damage to the
goods is indubitably factual, and would clearly impose upon this Court the task of reviewing, examining and evaluating or In sum, petitioner failed to show any reversible error on the part of the CA in affirming the ruling of the RTC as to warrant
weighing all over again the probative value of the evidence presented25 – something which is not, as a rule, within the the modification, much less the reversal of its assailed decision.
functions of this Court and within the office of a petition for review on certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 9, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88361
While it is true that the aforementioned rule admits of certain exceptions, 26 this Court finds that none are applicable in this is hereby AFFIRMED.
case. This Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC which were duly affirmed by the CA.
Unanimous with the CA, this Court gives credence and accords respect to the factual findings of the RTC – a special
commercial court27 which has expertise and specialized knowledge on the subject matter28 of maritime and admiralty – With costs against the petitioner.
highlighting the solidary liability of both petitioner and ATI. The RTC judiciously found:
SO ORDERED.
x x x The Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes (TOSBOC, for brevity) No. 67393 and Request for Bad Order Survey No.
57692 show that prior to the turn over of the first shipment to the custody of ATI, eleven (11) of the twenty-eight (28) coils
were already found in bad order condition. Eight (8) of the said eleven coils were already "partly dented/crumpled " and the
remaining three (3) were found "partly dented, scratches on inner hole, crumple (sic)". On the other hand, the TOSBOC No.
67457 and Request for Bad Order Survey No. 57777 also show that prior to the turn over of the second shipment to the
custody of ATI, a total of six (6) coils thereof were already "partly dented on one side, crumpled/cover detach (sic)". These
documents were issued by ATI. The said TOSBOC’s were jointly executed by ATI, vessel’s representative and surveyor
while the Requests for Bad Order Survey were jointly executed by ATI, consignee’s representative and the Shed Supervisor.
The aforementioned documents were corroborated by the Damage Report dated 23 September 2003 and Turn Over Survey
No. 15765 for the first shipment, Damage Report dated 13 October 2003 and Turn Over Survey No. 15772 for the second
shipment and, two Damage Reports dated 6 September 2003 and Turn Over Survey No. 15753 for the third shipment.

It was shown to this Court that a Request for Bad Order Survey is a document which is requested by an interested party that
incorporates therein the details of the damage, if any, suffered by a shipped commodity. Also, a TOSBOC, usually issued by
the arrastre contractor (ATI in this case), is a form of certification that states therein the bad order condition of a particular
cargo, as found prior to its turn over to the custody or possession of the said arrastre contractor.

The said Damage Reports, Turn Over Survey Reports and Requests for Bad Order Survey led the Court to conclude that
before the subject shipments were turned over to ATI, the said cargo were already in bad order condition due to damage
sustained during the sea voyage. Nevertheless, this Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that there was also negligence on
the part of the employees of ATI and [Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.] in the discharging of the cargo as observed by plaintiff’s
witness, Mario Manuel, and [Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.’s] witness, Rodrigo Victoria.

In ascertaining the cause of the damage to the subject shipments, Mario Manuel stated that the "coils were roughly handled
during their discharging from the vessel to the pier of (sic) ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. and even during the loading operations
of these coils from the pier to the trucks that will transport the coils to the consignee’s warehouse. During the aforesaid
operations, the employees and forklift operators of EASTERN SHIPPING LINES and ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. were very
negligent in the handling of the subject cargoes. Specifically, "during unloading, the steel coils were lifted from the vessel
and not carefully laid on the ground, sometimes were even ‘dropped’ while still several inches from the ground. The tine
(forklift blade) or the portion that carries the coils used for the forklift is improper because it is pointed and sharp and the
centering of the tine to the coils were negligently done such that the pointed and sharp tine touched and caused scratches,
tears and dents to the coils. Some of the coils were also dragged by the forklift instead of being carefully lifted from one place
to another. Some coils bump/hit one another at the pier while being arranged by the stevedores/forklift operators of ASIAN
TERMINALS, INC. and EASTERN SHIPPING LINES.29 (Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, it is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes while being unloaded generally remain under the custody of
the carrier.30 As hereinbefore found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA based on the evidence presented, the goods were
damaged even before they were turned over to ATI. Such damage was even compounded by the negligent acts of petitioner
and ATI which both mishandled the goods during the discharging operations. Thus, it bears stressing unto petitioner that
common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. Subject to certain exceptions enumerated under Article
173431 of the Civil Code, common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods. The

2
G.R. No. 177188 December 4, 2008
EL GRECO SHIP MANNING AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner El
Greco Ship Manning and Management Corporation (El Greco), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 of the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc dated 14 March 2007 in C.T.A. EB No. 162. In its assailed Decision, the CTA En Banc affirmed
the Decision2 dated 17 October 2005 of the CTA Second Division in CTA Case No. 6618, ordering the forfeiture of the vessel
M/V Criston, also known as M/V Neptune Breeze, for having been involved in the smuggling of 35,000 bags of imported
rice.
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:
On 23 September 2001, the vessel M/V Criston docked at the Port of Tabaco, Albay, carrying a shipment of 35,000 bags of
imported rice, consigned to Antonio Chua, Jr. (Chua) and Carlos Carillo (Carillo), payable upon its delivery to Albay. Glucer
Shipping Company, Inc. (Glucer Shipping) is the operator of M/V Criston. 3
Upon the directive of then Commissioner Titus Villanueva of the Bureau of Customs (BOC), a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention, Seizure Identification No. 06-2001, was issued by the Legaspi District Collector, on 23 September 2001 for the
35,000 bags of imported rice shipped by M/V Criston, on the ground that it left the Port of Manila without the necessary
clearance from the Philippine Coast Guard. Since the earlier Warrant covered only the cargo, but not M/V Criston which
transported it, a subsequent Warrant of Seizure and Detention, Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A, was issued on 18
October 2001 particularly for the said vessel. The BOC District Collector of the Port of Legaspi thereafter commenced
proceedings for the forfeiture of M/V Criston and its cargo under Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A and Seizure
Identification No. 06-2001, respectively.4
To protect their property rights over the cargo, consignees Chua and Carillo filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tabaco, Albay, a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) assailing the authority of the Legaspi District Collectors to issue the Warrants of Seizure and Detention and
praying for a permanent injunction against the implementation of the said Warrants. Their Petition was docketed as Civil
Case No. T-2170.5
After finding the Petition sufficient in form and substance and considering the extreme urgency of the matter involved, the
RTC issued a 72-hour TRO conditioned upon the filing by Chua and Carillo of a bond in the amount of P31,450,000.00,
representing the value of the goods. After Chua and Carillo posted the required bond, the 35,000 bags of rice were released
to them.6
The Legaspi District Collector held in abeyance the proceedings for the forfeiture of M/V Criston and its cargo under Seizure
Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A pending the resolution by the RTC of Civil Case No. T-
2170. When the RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. T-2170 filed by the BOC, the Legaspi District Collector
set the hearing of Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A. A notice of the scheduled
hearing of the aforementioned seizure cases was sent to Glucer Shipping but it failed to appear at the hearing so set. After a
second notice of hearing was ignored by Glucer Shipping, the prosecutor was allowed to present his witnesses. 7
In the meantime, while M/V Criston was berthing at the Port of Tabaco under the custody of the BOC, the Province of Albay
was hit by typhoon "Manang." In order to avert any damage which could be caused by the typhoon, the vessel was allowed
to proceed to another anchorage area to temporarily seek shelter. After typhoon "Manang" had passed through Albay province,
M/V Criston, however, failed to return to the Port of Tabaco and was nowhere to be found. 8
Alarmed, the BOC and the Philippine Coast Guard coordinated with the Philippine Air Force to find the missing vessel. On
8 November 2001, the BOC received information that M/V Criston was found in the waters of Bataan sporting the name of
M/V Neptune Breeze.9
Based on the above information and for failure of M/V Neptune Breeze to present a clearance from its last port of call, a
Warrant of Seizure and Detention under Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 was issued against the vessel by the BOC
District Collector of the Port of Manila. 10
For the same reasons, the Legaspi District Collector rendered a Decision on 27 June 2002 in Seizure Identification No. 06-
2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A ordering the forfeiture of the M/V Criston, also known as M/V Neptune
Breeze, and its cargo, for violating Section 2530 (a), (f) and (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. 11
In the meantime, El Greco, the duly authorized local agent of the registered owner of M/V Neptune Breeze, Atlantic Pacific
Corporation, Inc. (Atlantic Pacific), filed with the Manila District Collector, in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208, a Motion
for Intervention and Motion to Quash Warrant of Seizure Detention with Urgent Prayer for the Immediate Release of M/V
Neptune Breeze. El Greco claimed that M/V Neptune Breeze was a foreign registered vessel owned by Atlantic Pacific, and
different from M/V Criston which had been involved in smuggling activities in Legaspi, Albay. 12
Acting favorably on the motion of El Greco, the Manila District Collector issued an Order 13 dated 11 March 2002 quashing
the Warrant of Seizure and Detention it issued against M/V Neptune Breeze in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 for lack
of probable cause that the said vessel was the same one known as M/V Criston which fled from the jurisdiction of the BOC
Legaspi District after being seized and detained therein for allegedly engaging in smuggling activities. According to the
decretal part of the Manila District Collector’s Order:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the Warrant
of Seizure and Detention issued thereof be Quashed for want of factual or legal basis, and that the vessel "M/V
Neptune Brreze" be released to [El Greco] after clearance with the Commissioner of Customs, proper
identification and compliance with existing rules and regulations pertinent in the premises.
On automatic review by BOC Commissioner Antonio Bernardo, the Order dated 11 March 2002 of the District Collector of
the Port of Manila was reversed after finding that M/V Neptune Breeze and M/V Criston were one and the same and that the
Legaspi District Collector had already acquired prior jurisdiction over the vessel. The Decision dated 15 January 2003 of the
BOC Commissioner, contained in his 2nd Indorsement14 to the Manila District Collector, decreed:
Respectfully returned to the District Collector, POM, the within case folders in POM S. I. No. 2001-208, EL
GRECO SHIP MANNING AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Claimant/Intervenor, with the
information that the Decision of that Port in the aforesaid case is hereby REVERSED in view of the following
reasons:
1. Subject vessel MV "NEPTUNE BREEZE" and MV "CRISTON" are one and the same as shown
by the vessels documents retrieved by the elements of the Philippine Coast Guard from MV
"CRISTON" during the search conducted on board thereof when the same was apprehended in
Tabaco, Albay, indicating therein the name of the vessel MV "NEPTUNE BREEZE," the name of
the master of the vessel a certain YUSHAWU AWUDU, etc. These facts were corroborated by the
footage of ABS-CBN taken on board the vessel when the same was subjected to search.
2. Hence, prior jurisdiction over the said vessel was already acquired by the Port of Legaspi when
the said Port issued WSD S.I. No. 06-2001-A and therefore, the Decision of the latter Port forfeiting
the subject vessel supercedes the Decision of that Port ordering its release.
Seeking the reversal of the Decision dated 15 January 2003 of the BOC Commissioner, El Greco filed a Petition for Review
with the CTA which was lodged before its Second Division as CTA Case No. 6618. El Greco averred that the BOC
Commissioner committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the forfeiture of the M/V Neptune Breeze in the absence of
proof that M/V Neptune Breeze and M/V Criston were one and the same vessel. 15 According to El Greco, it was highly
improbable that M/V Criston was merely assuming the identity of M/V Neptune Breeze in order to evade liability since these
were distinct and separate vessels as evidenced by their Certificates of Registry. While M/V Neptune Breeze was registered
in St. Vincent and the Grenadines16 as shown in its Certificate of Registry No. 7298/N, M/V Criston was registered in the
3
Philippines. Additionally, El Greco argued that the Order dated 11 March 2002 of the Manila District Collector already
became final and executory for failure of the BOC Commissioner to act thereon within a period of 30 days in accordance with
Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
On 17 October 2005, the CTA Second Division rendered a Decision17 in CTA Case No. 6618 sustaining the 15 January 2003
Decision of the BOC Commissioner ordering the forfeiture of M/V Neptune Breeze. Referring to the crime laboratory report
submitted by the Philippine National Police (PNP) stating that the serial numbers of the engines and the generators of both
M/V Criston and M/V Neptune Breeze were identical, the CTA Second Division concluded that both vessels were indeed one
and the same vessel. The CTA Second Division further ruled that nothing in the provisions of Section 2313 of the Tariff and
Customs Code could buttress El Greco’s contention that the Order dated 11 March 2002 of the Manila District Collector
already became final and executory. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CTA Second Division reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for Review is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision in
the 2nd Indorsement dated January 15, 2003 of then Commissioner Bernardo is hereby AFFIRMED.18
In a Resolution19 dated 7 February 2006, the CTA Second Division denied the Motion for Reconsideration of El Greco for
failure to present issues that had not been previously threshed out in its earlier Decision.
Undaunted, El Greco elevated its case to the CTA En Banc through a Petition for Review, docketed as C.T.A. EB No. 162,
this time lamenting that it was being deprived of its property without due process of law. El Greco asserted that the CTA
Second Division violated its constitutional right to due process when it upheld the forfeiture of M/V Neptune Breeze on the
basis of the evidence presented before the Legaspi District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure
Identification No. 06-2001-A, of which El Greco was not notified and in which it was not able to participate. 20
In its Decision21 promulgated on 14 March 2007, the CTA En Banc declared that the CTA Second Division did not commit
any error in its disquisition, and dismissed the Petition of El Greco in C.T.A. EB No. 162 for lack of merit. According to the
CTA En Banc, the appreciation and calibration of evidence on appeal (from the ruling of the BOC) lies within the sound
discretion of its Division, and the latter’s findings and conclusions cannot be set aside unless it has been sufficiently shown
that they are not supported by evidence on record. The CTA En Banc thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision promulgated on
October 17, 2005 and Resolution dated February 7, 2006 of the Second Division of this Court, are hereby
AFFIRMED.22
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration with the CTA, El Greco already sought recourse before this Court via this Petition
for Review on Certiorari, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT EL GRECO WAS DENIED OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT M/V NEPTUNE BREEZE AND M/V CRISTON ARE ONE AND THE SAME VESSEL.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT M/V NEPTUNE BREEZE IS QUALIFIED TO BE THE SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE
UNDER SECTION 2531 OF THE TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE.
The primordial issue to be determined by this Court is whether M/V Neptune Breeze is one and the same as M/V Criston
which had been detained at the Port of Tabaco, Albay, for carrying smuggled imported rice and had fled the custody of the
customs authorities to evade its liabilities.
El Greco insists that M/V Neptune Breeze and M/V Criston are not the same vessel. In support of its position, El Greco again
presents the foreign registration of its vessel as opposed to the local registration of M/V Criston.
The CTA En Banc, however, affirming the findings of the CTA Second Division, as well as the Legaspi District Collector,
concluded otherwise.
We sustain the determination of the CTA En Banc on this matter.
Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of facts of the CTA are binding on this Court and can only be disturbed on appeal if
not supported by substantial evidence.23 Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 24
A review of the records of the present case unveils the overwhelming and utterly significant pieces of evidence that more than
meets the quantum of evidence necessary to establish that M/V Neptune Breeze is the very same vessel as M/V Criston, which
left the anchorage area at Legaspi, Albay, without the consent of the customs authorities therein while under detention for
smuggling 35,000 bags of imported rice.
The crime laboratory report of the PNP shows that the serial numbers of the engines and generators of the two vessels are
identical. El Greco failed to rebut this piece of evidence that decisively identified M/V Neptune Breeze as the same as M/V
Criston. We take judicial notice that along with gross tonnage, net tonnage, length and breadth of the vessel, the serial numbers
of its engine and generator are the necessary information identifying a vessel. In much the same way, the identity of a land
motor vehicle is established by its unique motor and chassis numbers. It is, thus, highly improbable that two totally different
vessels would have engines and generators bearing the very same serial numbers; and the only logical conclusion is that they
must be one and the same vessel.
Equally significant is the finding of the Legaspi District Collector that all the documents submitted by M/V Criston were
spurious, including its supposed registration in the Philippines. In a letter dated 14 March 2002, Marina Administrator Oscar
M. Sevilla attested that M/V Criston was not registered with the Marina.
Finally, Customs Guard Adolfo Capistrano testified that the features of M/V Criston and M/V Neptune Breeze were similar;
while Coast Guard Commander Cirilo Ortiz narrated that he found documents inside M/V Criston bearing the name M/V
Neptune Breeze. These testimonies further fortified the conclusion reached by the Legaspi District Collector that M/V Criston
and M/V Neptune Breeze were one and the same.
We also take note that the purported operator of M/V Criston, Glucer Shipping, was a total no-show at the hearings held in
Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A before the Legaspi District Collector. Despite
being sent several notices of hearing to its supposed address, Glucer Shipping still failed to appear in the said proceedings. It
becomes highly unfathomable for an owner to ignore proceedings for the seizure of its vessel, risking the loss of a property
of enormous value.
From the foregoing, we can only deduce that there is actually no Glucer Shipping and no M/V Criston. M/V Criston appears
to be a mere fictional identity assumed by M/V Neptune Breeze so it may conduct its smuggling activities with little risk of
being identified and held liable therefor.
We cannot give much credence to the self-serving denial by El Greco that M/V Neptune Breeze is not the same as M/V
Criston in light of the substantial evidence on record to the contrary. The foreign registration of M/V Neptune Breeze proves
only that it was registered in a foreign country; but it does not render impossible the conclusions consistently reached by the
Legaspi District Collector, the CTA Second Division and the CTA en banc, and presently by this Court, that M/V Neptune
Breeze was the very same vessel used in the conduct of smuggling activities in the name M/V Criston.
Neither can we permit El Greco to evade the forfeiture of its vessel, as a consequence of its being used in smuggling activities,
by decrying denial of due process.
In administrative proceedings, such as those before the BOC, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied
and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. 25The essence of due process
4
is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 26
Although it was not able to participate in the proceedings in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification
No. 06-2001-A before the Legaspi District Collector, it had ample opportunity to present its side of the controversy in Seizure
Identification No. 2001-208 before the Manila District Collector. To recall, full proceedings were held before the Manila
District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208. Even the evidence presented by El Greco in the latter proceedings
fails to persuade. The only vital evidence it presented before the Manila District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 2001-
208 was the foreign registration of M/V Neptune Breeze. It was still the same piece of evidence which El Greco submitted to
this Court. Even when taken into consideration and weighed against each other, the considerably sparse evidence of El Greco
in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 could not successfully refute the substantial evidence in Seizure Identification No. 06-
2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A that M/V Neptune Breeze is the same as M/V Criston.
Moreover, the claim of El Greco that it was denied due process flounders in light of its ample opportunity to rebut the findings
of the Legaspi District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and No. 06-2001-A before the CTA Second Division
in CTA Case No. 6618 and the CTA En Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 162, and now before this Court in the Petition at bar.
Unfortunately, El Greco was unable to make full use to its advantage of these repeated opportunities by offering all possible
evidence in support of its case. For example, evidence that could establish that M/V Neptune Breeze was somewhere else at
the time when M/V Criston was being held by customs authority at the Port of Legaspi, Albay, would have been helpful to
El Greco’s cause and very easy to secure, but is glaringly absent herein.
After having established that M/V Neptune Breeze is one and the same as M/V Criston, we come to another crucial issue in
the case at bar, that is, whether the order of forfeiture of the M/V Neptune Breeze is valid.
The pertinent provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code read:
SEC. 2530. Property Subject to Forfeiture Under Tariff and Customs Law. – Any vehicle, vessel or aircraft,
cargo, articles and other objects shall, under the following conditions, be subject to forfeiture:
a. Any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, including cargo, which shall be used unlawfully in the importation or
exportation of articles or in conveying and/or transporting contraband or smuggled articles in commercial
quantities into or from any Philippine port or place. The mere carrying or holding on board of contraband or
smuggled articles in commercial quantities shall subject such vessel, vehicle, aircraft or any other craft to
forfeiture; Provided, That the vessel, or aircraft or any other craft is not used as duly authorized common carrier
and as such a carrier it is not chartered or leased;
xxxx
f. Any article, the importation or exportation of which is effected or attempted contrary to law, or any article of
prohibited importation or exportation, and all other articles which, in the opinion of the Collector, have been
used, are or were intended to be used as instruments in the importation or exportation of the former;
xxxx
k. Any conveyance actually being used for the transport of articles subject to forfeiture under the tariff and
customs laws, with its equipage or trappings, and any vehicle similarly used, together with its equipage and
appurtenances including the beast, steam or other motive power drawing or propelling the same. The mere
conveyance of contraband or smuggled articles by such beast or vehicle shall be sufficient cause for the outright
seizure and confiscation of such beast or vehicle, but the forfeiture shall not be effected if it is established that
the owner of the means of conveyance used as aforesaid, is engaged as common carrier and not chartered or
leased, or his agent in charge thereof at the time has no knowledge of the unlawful act.
The penalty of forfeiture is imposed on any vessel engaged in smuggling, provided that the following conditions are present:
(1) The vessel is "used unlawfully in the importation or exportation of articles into or from" the Philippines;
(2) The articles are imported to or exported from "any Philippine port or place, except a port of entry"; or
(3) If the vessel has a capacity of less than 30 tons and is "used in the importation of articles into any Philippine port or place
other than a port of the Sulu Sea, where importation in such vessel may be authorized by the Commissioner, with the approval
of the department head."27
There is no question that M/V Neptune Breeze, then known as M/V Criston, was carrying 35,000 bags of imported rice
without the necessary papers showing that they were entered lawfully through a Philippine port after the payment of
appropriate taxes and duties thereon. This gives rise to the presumption that such importation was illegal. Consequently, the
rice subject of the importation, as well as the vessel M/V Neptune Breeze used in importation are subject to forfeiture. The
burden is on El Greco, as the owner of M/V Neptune Breeze, to show that its conveyance of the rice was actually legal.
Unfortunately, its claim that the cargo was not of foreign origin but was merely loaded at North Harbor, Manila, was belied
by the following evidence - the Incoming Journal of the Philippine Coast Guard, Certification issued by the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Port State Control Center of Manila, and the letter dated 4 October 2001 issued
by the Sub-Port of North Harbor Collector Edward de la Cuesta, confirming that there was no such loading of rice or calling
of vessel occurring at North Harbor, Manila. It is, therefore, uncontroverted that the 35,000 bags of imported rice were
smuggled into the Philippines using M/V Neptune Breeze.
We cannot give credence to the argument of El Greco that the Order dated 11 March 2002 of the Manila District Collector,
finding no probable cause that M/V Neptune Breeze is the same as M/V Criston, has already become final and executory,
thus, irreversible, pursuant to Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code. According to said provision:
SEC. 2313. Review of Commissioner. – The person aggrieved by the decision or action of the Collector in any
matter presented upon protest or by his action in any case of seizure may, within fifteen (15) days after
notification in writing by the Collector of his action or decision, file a written notice to the Collector with a copy
furnished to the Commissioner of his intention to appeal the action or decision of the Collector to the
Commissioner. Thereupon the Collector shall forthwith transmit all the records of the proceedings to the
Commissioner, who shall approve, modify or reverse the action or decision of the Collector and take such steps
and make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to his decision: Provided, That when an appeal is filed
beyond the period herein prescribed, the same shall be deemed dismissed.
If in any seizure proceedings, the Collector renders a decision adverse to the Government, such decision shall be
automatically reviewed by the Commissioner and the records of the case elevated within five (5) days from the
promulgation of the decision of the Collector. The Commissioner shall render a decision on the automatic appeal
within thirty (30) days from receipts of the records of the case. If the Collector’s decision is reversed by the
Commissioner, the decision of the Commissioner shall be final and executory. However, if the Collector’s
decision is affirmed, or if within thirty (30) days from receipt of the record of the case by the Commissioner
no decision is rendered or the decision involves imported articles whose published value is five million pesos
(P5,000,000.00) or more, such decision shall be deemed automatically appealed to the Secretary of
Finance and the records of the proceedings shall be elevated within five (5) days from the promulgation of the
decision of the Commissioner or of the Collector under appeal, as the case may be: Provided, further, That if the
decision of the Commissioner or of the Collector under appeal as the case may be, is affirmed by the Secretary
of Finance or if within thirty (30) days from receipt of the records of the proceedings by the Secretary of Finance,
no decision is rendered, the decision of the Secretary of Finance, or of the Commissioner, or of the Collector
under appeal, as the case may be, shall become final and executory.
In any seizure proceeding, the release of imported articles shall not be allowed unless and until a decision of the
Collector has been confirmed in writing by the Commissioner of Customs. (Emphasis ours.)
There is nothing in Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code to support the position of El Greco. As the CTA en
banc explained, in case the BOC Commissioner fails to decide on the automatic appeal of the Collector’s Decision within 30
days from receipt of the records thereof, the case shall again be deemed automatically appealed to the Secretary of Finance.
Also working against El Greco is the fact that jurisdiction over M/V Neptune Breeze, otherwise known as M/V Criston, was
first acquired by the Legaspi District Collector; thus, the Manila District Collector cannot validly acquire jurisdiction ove r
the same vessel. Judgment rendered without jurisdiction is null and void, and void judgment cannot be the source of any right
whatsoever.28
Finally, we strongly condemn the ploy used by M/V Neptune Breeze, assuming a different identity to smuggle goods into the
country in a brazen attempt to defraud the government and the Filipino public and deprive them of much needed monetary
5
resources. We further laud the efforts of the Commissioner of the Customs Bureau and the other executive officials in his
department to curb the proliferation of smuggling syndicates in the country which deserves no less than our full support.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 17 October 2005 and
Resolution dated 7 February 2006 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in CTA EB No. 172 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

6
 G. R. No. 153660 - June 10, 2003
PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, NESTOR ROMERO, NILO ESPINA, EDDIE LADICA, ARMAN QUELING,
ROLANDO NIETO, RICARDO BARTOLOME, ELUVER GARCIA, EDUARDO GARCIA and NELSON
MANALASTAS, Petitioners, vs.COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., Respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals1 dated 21 December 2001 which affirmed with modification the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission promulgated 30 March 2001.2
On 15 February 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and its officers, Lipercon Services,
Inc., People's Specialist Services, Inc., and Interim Services, Inc., filed a complaint against respondents for unfair labor
practice through illegal dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the perpetuation of the "Cabo System." They thus
prayed for reinstatement with full back wages, and the declaration of their regular employment status.
For failure to prosecute as they failed to either attend the scheduled mandatory conferences or submit their respective
affidavits, the claims of fifty-two (52) complainant-employees were dismissed. Thereafter, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera
conducted clarificatory hearings to elicit information from the ten (10) remaining complainants (petitioners herein) relative
to their alleged employment with respondent firm.
In substance, the complainants averred that in the performance of their duties as route helpers, bottle segregators, and others,
they were employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc. They further maintained that when respondent company replaced
them and prevented them from entering the company premises, they were deemed to have been illegally dismissed.
In lieu of a position paper, respondent company filed a motion to dismiss complaint for lack of jurisdiction and cause of
action, there being no employer-employee relationship between complainants and Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and that
respondents Lipercon Services, People's Specialist Services and Interim Services being bona fide independent contractors,
were the real employers of the complainants. 3 As regards the corporate officers, respondent insisted that they could not be
faulted and be held liable for damages as they only acted in their official capacities while performing their respective duties.
On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera rendered a decision ordering respondent company to reinstate complainants to
their former positions with all the rights, privileges and benefits due regular employees, and to pay their full back wages
which, with the exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages must be computed upon proof of his dismissal as of 31
May 1998, already amounted to an aggregate of P1,810,244.00. 4
In finding for the complainants, the Labor Arbiter ruled that in contrast with the negative declarations of respondent company's
witnesses who, as district sales supervisors of respondent company denied knowing the complainants personally, the
testimonies of the complainants were more credible as they sufficiently supplied every detail of their employment, specifically
identifying who their salesmen/drivers were, their places of assignment, aside from their dates of engagement and dismissal.
On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an employer-employee relationship
between the complainants and respondent company when it affirmed in toto the latter's decision.
In a resolution dated 17 July 2001 the NLRC subsequently denied for lack of merit respondent's motion for consideration.
Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals which, although affirming the finding of the NLRC that an
employer-employee relationship existed between the contending parties, nonetheless agreed with respondent that the
affidavits of some of the complainants, namely, Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero, Nilo Espina, Ricardo Bartolome,
Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas, should not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm
the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. As a consequence, the appellate court dismissed their complaints for
lack of sufficient evidence. In the same Decision however, complainants Eddie Ladica, Arman Queling and Rolando Nieto
were declared regular employees since they were the only ones subjected to cross-examination.5 Thus -
x x x (T)he labor arbiter conducted clarificatory hearings to ferret out the truth between the opposing claims of the parties
thereto. He did not submit the case based on position papers and their accompanying documentary evidence as a full-blown
trial was imperative to establish the parties' claims. As their allegations were poles apart, it was necessary to give them ample
opportunity to rebut each other's statements through cross-examination. In fact, private respondents Ladica, Quelling and
Nieto were subjected to rigid cross-examination by petitioner's counsel. However, the testimonies of private respondents
Romero, Espina, and Bantolino were not subjected to cross-examination, as should have been the case, and no explanation
was offered by them or by the labor arbiter as to why this was dispensed with. Since they were represented by counsel, the
latter should have taken steps so as not to squander their testimonies. But nothing was done by their counsel to that effect.6
Petitioners now pray for relief from the adverse Decision of the Court of Appeals; that, instead, the favorable judgment of the
NLRC be reinstated.
In essence, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should not have given weight to respondent's claim of failure to cross-
examine them. They insist that, unlike regular courts, labor cases are decided based merely on the parties' position papers and
affidavits in support of their allegations and subsequent pleadings that may be filed thereto. As such, according to petitioners,
the Rules of Court should not be strictly applied in this case specifically by putting them on the witness stand to be cross-
examined because the NLRC has its own rules of procedure which were applied by the Labor Arbiter in coming up with a
decision in their favor.
In its disavowal of liability, respondent commented that since the other alleged affiants were not presented in court to affirm
their statements, much less to be cross-examined, their affidavits should, as the Court of Appeals rightly held, be stricken off
the records for being self-serving, hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. With respect to Nestor Romero, respondent points
out that he should not have been impleaded in the instant petition since he already voluntarily executed a Compromise
Agreement, Waiver and Quitclaim in consideration of P450,000.00. Finally, respondent argues that the instant petition should
be dismissed in view of the failure of petitioners7 to sign the petition as well as the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, in clear violation of the principle laid down in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman.8
The crux of the controversy revolves around the propriety of giving evidentiary value to the affidavits despite the failure of
the affiants to affirm their contents and undergo the test of cross-examination.
The petition is impressed with merit. The issue confronting the Court is not without precedent in jurisprudence. The oft-cited
case of Rabago v. NLRC9 squarely grapples a similar challenge involving the propriety of the use of affidavits without the
presentation of affiants for cross-examination. In that case, we held that "the argument that the affidavit is hearsay because
the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed
in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers
only."
In Rase v. NLRC,10 this Court likewise sidelined a similar challenge when it ruled that it was not necessary for the affiants to
appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would be to negate the
rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the application
of the technical rules of evidence.
Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC11 succinctly states that under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Further, it notes that
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of due process. We find no compelling
reason to deviate therefrom.
To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules
obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent
application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. The submission by respondent, citing People v.
Sorrel,12 that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find
relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an
administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the
necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based on
verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.
7
As to whether petitioner Nestor Romero should be properly impleaded in the instant case, we only need to follow the doctrinal
guidance set by Periquet v. NLRC13 which outlines the parameters for valid compromise agreements, waivers and quitclaims
-

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents
a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is
only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement
are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the
person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the
quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.

In closely examining the subject agreements, we find that on their face the Compromise Agreement14 and Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim15 are devoid of any palpable inequity as the terms of settlement therein are fair and just. Neither can we glean
from the records any attempt by the parties to renege on their contractual agreements, or to disavow or disown their due
execution. Consequently, the same must be recognized as valid and binding transactions and, accordingly, the instant case
should be dismissed and finally terminated insofar as concerns petitioner Nestor Romero.

We cannot likewise accommodate respondent's contention that the failure of all the petitioners to sign the petition as well as
the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in contravention of Sec. 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court will cause
the dismissal of the present appeal. While the Loquias case requires the strict observance of the Rules, it however provides
an escape hatch for the transgressor to avoid the harsh consequences of non-observance. Thus -

x x x x We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance of the rules. The attestation
contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the
same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot
justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction (underscoring supplied).

In their Ex Parte Motion to Litigate as Pauper Litigants, petitioners made a request for a fifteen (15)-day extension, i.e., from
24 April 2002 to 8 May 2002, within which to file their petition for review in view of the absence of a counsel to represent
them.16 The records also reveal that it was only on 10 July 2002 that Atty. Arnold Cacho, through the UST Legal Aid Clinic,
made his formal entry of appearance as counsel for herein petitioners. Clearly, at the time the instant petition was filed on 7
May 2002 petitioners were not yet represented by counsel. Surely, petitioners who are non-lawyers could not be faulted for
the procedural lapse since they could not be expected to be conversant with the nuances of the law, much less knowledgeable
with the esoteric technicalities of procedure. For this reason alone, the procedural infirmity in the filing of the present petition
may be overlooked and should not be taken against petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
decision of the NLRC dated 30 March 2001 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 29 May 1998
ordering respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., to reinstate Prudencio Bantolino, Nilo Espina, Eddie Ladica, Arman
Queling, Rolando Nieto, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas to their former positions
as regular employees, and to pay them their full back wages, with the exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages
are yet to be computed upon proof of his dismissal, is REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that herein petition
is DENIED insofar as it concerns Nestor Romero who entered into a valid and binding Compromise Agreement and Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim with respondent company.

SO ORDERED.

8
G.R. No. 96492 November 26, 1992
ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO MANANGHAYA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUFROCINA DE LA CRUZ and VIOLETA DELOS REYES, respondents.
NOCON, J.:
Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the respondent Court's decision promulgated on
November 22, 1990, 1 which affirmed with modification the agrarian court's decision promulgated January 10, 1990,2 which
ordered them and the other defendants therein to, among others, restore possession of the disputed landholding to private
respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz. Said respondent court's decision is now final and executory as to Olympio Mendoza
and Severino Aguinaldo, the other petitioners in the respondent court, since they did not appeal the same.
Since petitioners do not dispute the findings of fact of the respondent Court, the same shall be quoted verbatim and are as
follows:
It appears from the records that Juan Mendoza, father of herein defendant Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos.
46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with an area of 23,000 square
meters and 19,000 square meters, respectively. Devoted to the production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by
Julian dela Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz. Julian died on September 25, 1979.
In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of Julian, she succeeded him as bona fidetenant of the subject lots;
that between July 7 to July 15, 1984, Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter
Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and working on the subject premises;
and that until the filing of the instant case, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy
rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction in the meantime.
Defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, duly elected and/or appointed barangay officials of Bahay Pare,
Candaba, Pampanga, denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza,
particularly in the cultivation of the latter's farm lots. Claiming that they have always exercised fairness, equity, reason and
impartiality in the discharge of their official functions, they asked for the dismissal of the case and claimed moral damages
and attorney's fees in the total amount of P165,000.00 (Answer with Counterclaim, Records, pp. 48-51).
For his part, defendant Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and
approval, and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his defenses. He also demanded
actual and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees (Answer, pp. 77-78).
During the pendency of the case in the lower court, Mendoza of the case in the lower court, Mendoza was in possession of
the subject lots and had cultivated the same. Upon motion of plaintiff, the court directed its Deputy Sheriff to supervise the
harvesting of the palay crops, to cause the threshing thereof and to deposit the net harvest (after deducting from the expenses
incurred), in a bonded warehouse of the locality subject to the disposition of the court. 3
The respondent Court rendered judgment affirming the appealed agrarian court's decision with the modification that Lot 106
is not covered by it.
The dispositive portion of the appealed decision, which was modified, states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor of plaintiff and against defendants:
On the Mandatory Injunction:
1. Ordering said defendants to restore possession of the landholding subject of the action to the plaintiff and enjoining said
defendants and any person claiming under them to desist from molesting them or interfering with the possession and
cultivation of the landholding descriptive in paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:
Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area
of 23,969 square meters, more or less, owned by a certain Juan Mendoza, and devoted principally to the production of palay,
as evidenced by a Certification from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued on July 30, 1984.
2. a) Ordering the defendants to vacate the premises of the two landholding in question and to
respect the tenancy rights of plaintiff with respect to the same;
b) Ordering defendants, jointly and severally to pay unto plaintiff 220 cavans of palay or its
equivalent in cash of P33,000.00 from the principal crop year of 1984, and every harvest time until
defendants finally vacate and surrender possession and cultivation of the landholding in question to
plaintiff.
c) the prayer for moral damages, not having been sufficiently proved, the same is denied.
d) Ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.
The awards herein provided should first be satisfied from the deposits of the harvests ordered by
the Court from which the planting and harvesting expenses have been paid to defendant Olympio
Mendoza; and if said net deposits with the Court or the warehouses as ordered by the Court are
insufficient, then the balance should be paid by defendants, jointly and severally. 4
Defendants who are the petitioners in this case, in a Petition for Review on Certiorari, present for the consideration of the
Court:
[T]he lone issue of whether or not they can be held liable, jointly and severally, with the other
defendants, for the harvests of the litigated property, Lot No. 46, or the money equivalent thereof
starting from the principal crop years of 1984 and every harvest time thereafter until the possession
and cultivation of the aforestated landholding are finally surrendered to the private respondent. 5
It is the position of petitioners that they are not liable jointly and severally with Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo
because the present petition involves Lot No. 46, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the bahay Pare Estate, bahay Pare, Candaba,
Pampanga and not Lot No. 106 of the estate, which lot was purchased by petitioner Romeo Reyes from Olympio Mendoza's
father, Juan, and which he later donated to the barangay Bahay Pare of Candaba, Pampanga, for the construction of the Bahay
Pare Barangay High School. 6 As to their supposed participation in the dispossession of private respondent from the disputed
landholding, petitioners present the September 30, 1987 Resolution of Investigating Fiscal Jesus M. Pamintuan, as approved
by Pampanga Provincial Fiscal Villamor I. Dizon, in I.S. No. 8576, 7 wherein private respondent's complaint against
petitioners and the other defendants in the agrarian court for violation of P.D. 583 8 was dismissed, to show that private
respondent's "point is already settled and considered closed." 9 lastly, petitioners claim that they were included in the present
controversy so that their political career would be destroyed. 10
Private respondents deny petitioners' allegations and contend that it was petitioners who conspired with Olympio Mendoza
and Severino Aguinaldo in ejecting them not only from Lot No. 46 but also from Lot No. 106. They maintain that it was in
Farmlot No. 46 from where they were ejected and dispossessed, so much so that even if Farmlot No. 106 was removed by the
Court of Appeals from the judgment, as Farmlot No. 46 was harvesting palay worth at least P33,000.00 per year since 1989,
private respondents, who are entitled to the possession and peaceful enjoyment of the farmlot as provided for in Section 23
of the Agrarian Reform Law, should be compensated for the lost income by the petitioners who are solidarily liable with
Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo. 11
We find for the private respondents.
It is clear that petitioners are asking Us to re-examine all the evidence already presented and evaluated by the trial court and
re-evaluated again by the respondent appellate court. Said evidence served as basis in arriving at the trial court and appellate
9
court's findings of fact. We shall not analyze such evidence all over again but instead put finis to the factual findings in this
case. Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court 12 absent the exceptions which do not obtain in the instant case. 13

We agree with the appellate court in its retiocination, which We adopt, on why it has to dismiss the appeal. Said the Court:

In her Complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that she "is the tenant of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106
Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area of
23,969 square meters, more or less . . ." (Complaint, Record, vol. 1, p.1). However, during Violeta's
testimony, she clarified that actually only Lot No. 106, which contains an area of P19,000 square
meters, is not included in this controversy (T.S.N., August 10, 1989, p. 5; May 8, 1989, p. 12). This
statement was corroborated by plaintiff's counsel, Atty. Arturo Rivera, who informed the court that
the 19,000 square meter lot is subject of a pending case before the MTC of Sta. Ana, Pampanga
(Ibid., p. 15). The inconsistency between the averment of the complaint and the testimony of the
witness should not only because there was no showing that she intended to mislead defendants and
even the trial court on the subject matter of the suit. It would in the complaint since together with
Lot 106 had been include in the complaint since together with Lot 46, it is owned by Olympio's
father.

We also concur with the trial court's finding on the participation of the other appellants in the
dispossession of appellee. They not only knew Olympio personally, some of them were even asked
by Olympio to help him cultivate the land, thus lending credence to the allegation that defendant
Olympio, together with his co-defendants, prevented plaintiff and her workers from entering the
land through "strong arm methods". (Decision of RTC, records, vol. II p. 564).

Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of
Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes "B" and "C") although the affiants were not presented and
subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the "Rules of Court shall
not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character." The same provision states that
"In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and
counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence".

Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence.
This substantial evidence rule was incorporated in section 18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on
June 17, 1976 (Castro vs. CS, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989). In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals, 141 SCRA 226, the Supreme Court defined what substantial evidence is:

Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been
defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence
is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot
substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what
evidence is entitled to belief.14

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 22, 1990 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

10
G.R. No. 154108 December 10, 2008
FIRST UNITED CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
MENANDRO G. VALDEZ and RAMON E. ADEA, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 157505 December 10, 2008
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROSE MARIE ALONZO-LEGASTO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99,
MENANDRO G. VALDEZ, and RAMON ADEA IV, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In February 1998, the National Housing Authority (NHA), petitioner in G.R. No. 157505, contracted the First United
Construction Corporation (FUCC), petitioner in G.R. No. 154105, for its Freedom Valley Resettlement Project (the Project)
in Sitio Boso-Boso, Antipolo, Rizal.
Menandro G. Valdez (Valdez) and Ramon E. Adea (Adea) who are respondents in both petitions, Principal Engineers of the
NHA, formed part of the NHA team tasked to oversee FUCC’s contract works and provide guidance for the proper
implementation of the Project.
The technical specifications of the Project called for the laying of a subbase course and base course on the roads before
pouring concrete. FUCC instead substituted concrete treated base course (CTBC) for subbase course, despite repeated written
reminders by respondents to follow the specifications of the Project. 1 And FUCC refused to have the necessary materials and
field density tests conducted before pouring concrete on portions of the roads, and even poured concrete without proper
approval, its attention having been called by respondents to its failure to comply with requirements notwithstanding. 2
On December 11, 1998, FUCC submitted its Second Progress Billing, attaching thereto the Abstract of Accomplishment 3 for
the Project from July 1, 1998 to November 30, 1998. It billed the NHA a total of P50,701,846.80 inclusive of P2,305,240
representing cost for subbase course on major roads, P129,800 representing cost for subbase course on minor roads, and an
additional P376,040 representing cost for subbase course or a total cost of P2,811,080 for subbase course.4
In the meantime, the road leading to the Project collapsed after a typhoon. The collapse of the road was the subject of three
articles by Art A. Borjal (Borjal) in The Philippine Star in which he wrote about the poor construction of the roads and the
massive wastage of government funds on the Project. 5 The first of the three articles was published on December 27, 1998.
During a NHA-Contractor’s meeting on January 12, 1999, respondent Valdez raised the non-compliance by FUCC with the
approved plans and specifications of the Project, particularly the use of CTBC instead of subbase course. Mariano Raner
(Raner), the Officer-in-Charge of the Project, explained that the technical practice is acceptable provided that the subgrade
course has a sufficient California Bearing Ratio value to support the pavement and that CTBC is most advantageous during
rainy season. It was resolved during the same meeting that before payment per road works would be considered, tests would
be first conducted to find out if the constructed roads met the acceptable standard. 6
Respondent Valdez later recommended to the Officer-in- Charge (OIC) of the Project that only P16,342,226.23 be paid to
FUCC based on the NHA’s own Abstract of Physical Accomplishment, he explaining as follows:
Last 18 February 1999, the General Manager and the Manager, SLB visited the site and conducted a meeting.
The General Manager instructed the NHA staff to process the billing of the Contractor within one week. One of
the issues resolved at that meeting was the use of Official Receipt[s] as support for payment with regards to the
furnishing of equipment and furniture, which unfortunately as of this date have not yet been submitted by the
Contractor.
Pending the result of the tests conducted by JSR Geotechnical Services on the structural layer of the roads, the
NHA engineers evaluated the request for payment, which was given to the Contractor last 24 January 1999. This
was the basis for the meeting held on 25 February 1999 between the Contractor and the NHA technical staff,
which you have presided. It was discuss[ed] then that a meeting with JSR be held since you informed us that
they have completed the report on the test conducted.
During the meeting with JSR, Contractor, and the NHA technical staff held last 02 March 1999, the result of the
tests were presented and validated our observation that the Contractor ha[s] indeed not laid sub-base coarse [sic]
materials on the roads. In addition, all of the in-placed Field Density Tests for base coarse materials laid do not
conform with the FDT as required by the approved specifications. Moreover, the thickness of some of the said
base coarse materials does not conform with the required thickness based on the approved plans of 180mm. It
was the opinion of the NHA technical staff at that time that additional tests be conducted on the roads with
respect to the laid base course materials to have a conclusive report on its acceptability and conformity with the
approved plans and specifications.
With these development[s], the NHA technical staff prepared the Abstract of Physical Accomplishment xxx from
the period 01 July 1998 to 31 December 1998 in the total amount of P16,342,226.23, incorporating among others
the agreement reached with the Contractor in the 25 February 1999 meeting, for your review and perusal. This,
however, would still need the required Official Receipt (OR) of the Contractor with regards to the equipment
and furniture.7
On March 29, 1999, FUCC, through its Executive Vice-President Ben S. Dumaliang (Dumaliang) and the Project Manager
Samuel A. Aquino (Aquino), filed an administrative complaint against respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman for
dishonesty, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
FUCC alleged that respondents tried to extort money from it but failed, hence, they refused to act with dispatch on its Second
Progress Billing and to officially document various variation orders despite instructions by their superiors. 8
FUCC further alleged that respondents consistently arrived late at the Project site, used for personal purposes the service
vehicles leased by it to NHA for the Project, and used the Project site as their private gun firing range. 9
In their Joint-Counter Affidavit,10 respondents alleged that FUCC filed the complaint to coerce them into recommending full
payment of its Second Progress Billing amounting to P50,701,846.80 and force them to assist the NHA Management and
FUCC in the cover-up on the investigations resulting from the allegations in Borjal’s newspaper articles.
Respondents further alleged that the Project OIC Raner and the NHA General Manager Angelo F. Leynes (Leynes) pressured
them to attribute the collapse of the road to natural causes and to justify payment on the works done outside of the
specifications.11
At the preliminary conference held on August 8, 1999, 12 respondents manifested that they were foregoing the conduct of a
formal hearing and were submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the available evidence on record. 13
By Order of August 30, 1999, the Ombudsman limited the issues of the case as follows:
1. Whether respondents tried to extort money from the complainant;
2. Whether respondents used for their personal use the vehicles leased to the NHA by FUCC; and
3. Whether respondents unjustly failed to act on FUCC’s requests. 14
11
And it ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda which they complied with.15
By Decision16 of January 13, 2000 bearing his January 28, 2000 approval, the Ombudsman absolved respondents of
negligence in acting on FUCC’s Second Progress Billing, 17 but found them liable for extortion and using the vehicles leased
to the NHA for personal use, and accordingly dismissed them from the service. 18
Thus, the Ombudsman decision disposed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office hereby finds the respondents guilty of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT punishable by DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE which carries the penalty of SUSPENSION FROM WORK
FOR SIX MONTHS WITHOUT PAY; the former offense carrying a heavier penalty, Respondents
MENANDRO G. VALDEZ and RAMON G. ADEA, are both hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM
SERVICE.
Further, the General Manager of the NHA is hereby ordered to implement the instant Decision in accordance
with law and advice of action taken thereof be furnished this Office within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.19 (Emphasis in the original)
Respondents thereupon wrote a letter20 to the NHA informing it that as they intended to file a Motion for Reconsideration of
the decision of the Ombudsman pending its finality, they had the right to remain in office. Respondents’ letter was served on
the NHA on February 15, 2000 at about 4:00 PM.21 The following day, respondents received a Memorandum of February 14,
2000 signed by Leynes informing them of their termination from employment, 22 drawing them to file before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a complaint23against the NHA, its General Manager Leynes, and NHA Human Resource
Department Manager Lorna M. Seraspe, for injunction with application and prayer for the issuance of preliminary prohibitory
injunction and/or a temporary restraining order. Branch 99 of the Quezon City RTC issued a temporary restraining order and
a preliminary prohibitory injunction,24 prompting the NHA to file before the Court of Appeals a petition25 against the RTC
trial judge and herein respondents for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order. The NHA petition was docketed as C.A. G.R. No. 57963.
Respondents did file a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman decision which was denied, hence, they challenged the
decision via petition before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as C.A. G.R. No. 62534.
The Court of Appeals, in C.A. G.R. No. 62534, issued a temporary restraining order26 enjoining the Ombudsman and the
NHA from implementing the Ombudsman decision of January 13, 2001.
By Decision of February 28, 2002 rendered in C.A. G.R. No. 62534, the Court of Appeals, finding FUCC’s administrative
complaint to be bereft of substantial evidence, 27 reversed the Ombudsman’s decision and accordingly dismissed the
administrative cases against respondents. Thus, it disposed:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Decision of 13
January 2000 of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as its Orders dated 18 May 2000 and 27 December 2000
are hereby SET ASIDE and declared NULL AND VOID. The administrative case against petitioners
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
FUCC’s Motion for Reconsideration29 was denied.30
In view of its decision in C.A. G.R. No. 62534, the Court of Appeals dismissed C.A. G.R. No. 57963 for having become moot
and academic.31
FUCC appealed the appellate court’s decision in C.A. G.R. No. 62534 via the first subject petition, for review, 32docketed as
G.R. No. 154108. FUCC faults the appellate court:
I
x x x IN HOLDING THAT THE OMBUDSMAN ALLEGEDLY RELIED SOLELY UPON "THE MERE
AFFIDAVITS OF FUCC’S WITNESSES" WHICH ALLEGEDLY DO "NOT FALL UNDER THE
REQUIRED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS [SIC].
II
x x x IN MISAPPRECIATING CERTAIN FACTS INDUBITABLY ESTABLISHED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO FAVOR RESPONDENTS.
III
x x x IN [TAKING] AS GOSPEL TRUTH RESPONDENTS’ PATENT, VICIOUS AND MALICIOUS
LIE THAT FUCC ALLEGEDLY FLAGRANTLY VIOLATED THE TERMS OF THE
CONTRACT.33 (Emphasis in the original)
The NHA appealed the dismissal of C.A. G.R. No. 57963 via petition for review, 34 G.R. No. 157505. NHA faults the appellate
court
1. x x x in denying due course and dismissing NHA petition for certiorari and prohibition for being moot and
academic.
2. x x x in not holding that the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint of Private
Respondents.35
By Resolution of July 16, 2003, the Court consolidated G.R. No. 157505 and G.R. No. 154108.36
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving with substantial evidence the allegations in the
complaint.37 While rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, this assurance of a
desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go as far as to justify orders without basis in evidence having rational
probative force.38
In the administrative case against respondents subject of G.R. No. 157505, the Ombudsman found them liable for extortion
based on the affidavits of FUCC’s witnesses,39 holding that "cases of extortion virtually depend on the credibility of
complainant’s testimony because of [their] intrinsic nature where only the participants can testify to [their] occurrences." 40
The records show that Valdez’ recommendation to pay the FUCC only P16,342,226.23 came about in light of his finding that
FUCC failed to lay subbase in accordance with the specifications of the Project.
FUCC itself admits not having laid subbase, even as it charged the NHA for the cost thereof despite its claim that it omitted
the subbase "to save funds".41 The FUCC claims that the NHA approved the substitution of CTBC for conventional base
course and subbase. However, FUCC showed no evidence of such approval other than its own letters to the NHA stating its
intention to use CTBC instead of the conventional base course and subbase required by the contract. 42
Respecting the charge that respondents used for personal purposes the vehicles leased by FUCC to the NHA, the same is
unsupported by substantial evidence. Valdez’s signature on the entries in the logbook reflecting the vehicles’ trips 43 does not
necessarily indicate that he and/or Adea took the trips. It could indicate that he was attesting to the authenticity of the trips.
At any rate, FUCC did not refute the claim that there were instances when other NHA personnel used the vehicles. 44
12
IN SUM, FUCC having failed to support its charges against respondents with substantial evidence, the Court of Appeals did
not err in reversing the Ombudsman decision and accordingly dismissing the administrative complaint against respondents to
thus render NHA’s petition in G.R. No. 157505 moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

13
G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl
the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.
The Indictment
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler,
Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an
information that reads:
That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent
through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his
former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it to
appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial
emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud. 1
The Facts and the Case
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan
University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004.
When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish
broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did
not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the
other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her
text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768.
Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman
with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A). 2 The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the
message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from
a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B). 3
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to
create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of the
messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt
pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish
contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to
meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he
walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony
Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish:
"Malandi ka kasi!"
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert in information technology
and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and
superimpose it on the body of another woman in another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to
make it appear that the face and the body belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the face was not proportionate to the
body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture
of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone
like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003 and their relation lasted
until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in December
2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his help in
selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents
of his pockets, and brought him to the police station.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was sending
her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims
that he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he
said, why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself
who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits
2 to 7).5
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle claims that she received
the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained them because she was jealous and angry. She did not want to
see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit
A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was the woman in those
four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed.
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The RTC
observed that she wept while recounting her experience, prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible expression
of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim during
her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of human nature and experience."6 Thus,
in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), 7 the latter rendered a decision dated January 31, 2008, 8 affirming the RTC
decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the
present for review on certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her face
pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section
5(h) of R.A. 9262.
The subordinate issues are:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262;
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case, already constitutes
a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;
14
 3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his constitutional
rights; and
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case.
The Court’s Rulings
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with
whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm
or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.
xxxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any form of
harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited
to, the following acts:
xxxx
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment
are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman;
and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had a "dating relationship" with
Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved over
time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus:
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance
or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring
supplied.)
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the offended woman have or had sexual
relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia
Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make
love to" as in "He romanced her."
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not
say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple’s
relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself
distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while
Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of
a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse
taking place between those involved.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off" variety (away-bati), their romance
cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a continuing basis." But the two of them were romantically
involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a
relationship of mutual trust and love.
An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that
the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what
"away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry at her.
That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous.10
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form of harassment. He claims
that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any
act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates
into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is
repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her getting one could not possibly
have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological distress. He claims having previously
exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not impressed with their claim that
it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since
her face did not clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her
testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the
pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time to delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the
pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There would have been
nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for several
years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not
giving credence to her testimony.1avvphi1
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged moral
sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based
on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and
face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in
15
the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying
is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her
a nightmare.

Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without any warrant, the evidence
presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either
the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need
such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone
that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.

Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s testimony that she received the obscene picture and
malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in
communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to
summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did. 12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the confiscated
cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.

Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish. 13 His defense was that he himself received those
messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone.
But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the
same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to
pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.

Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it
should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this
Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it
was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. 14

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil
actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. 15

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567
dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.

SO ORDERED.

16
G.R. No. 204894 March 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZ y FABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS y DELANTAR, and
ROGER JALANDONI y ARI, Appellants.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit (Enojas), Arnold Gomez y
Fabregas (Gomez), Fernando Santos y Delantar (Santos), and Roger Jalandoni y Ari (Jalandoni) with murder before the Las
Pifias Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case 06-0854.1
PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (P02 Gregorio) testified that at around 10:30 in the evening of August 29, 2006, he and P02
Francisco Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they spotted
a taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop near the intersection of BF Almanza and Alabang-
Zapote Roads. The officers approached the taxi and asked the driver, later identified as accused Enojas, for his documents.
The latter complied but, having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they asked him to come
with them to the police station in their mobile car for further questioning. 2
Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi behind. On reaching the 7-11 convenience store on
the Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he approached
the store’s door, however, he came upon two suspected robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect
dead and hit the other who still managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.
On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man whom he saw running towards Pilar Village. He
saw another man, who came from the Jollibbee outlet, run towards Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2
Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the men were able to take a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an
ambulance. On returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with them had fled.
P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of Investigation Division of the Las Piñas Police, testified that he and PO2 Teoson
Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito) immediately responded to PO2 Gregorio’s urgent call. Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi driver
who fled, was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas
apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its incoming messages.3
The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2 Pangilinan had killed was someone named Reynaldo Mendoza who
was armed with a .38 caliber revolver. The police found spent 9 mm and M-16 rifle shells at the crime scene. Follow-up
operations at nearby provinces resulted in finding the dead body of one of the suspects, Alex Angeles, at the Metro South
Medical Center along Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.4
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in accused Enojas’ mobile phone and, posing as
Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest
of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The
prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused.5
The victim’s father, Ricardo Pangilinan, testified that his son was at the time of his death 28 years old, unmarried, and was
receiving police pay of ₱8,000.00 to ₱10,000.00 per month. Ricardo spent ₱99,999 for burial expense, ₱16,000.00 for the
interment services, and ₱50,000.00 for purchase of the cemetery lot.6
Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or testify in the case, 7 the accused opted to instead
file a trial memorandum on March 10, 2008 for their defense. They pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since
they were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly
identified.
On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment,8 finding all the accused guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation
and use of armed men with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. It thus sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the possibility of parole and to indemnify the heirs of PO2 Pangilinan with
₱165,999.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱2,080,000.00 as
compensation for loss of earning capacity.
Upon review in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 03377, on June 14, 2012 the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed in
toto the conviction of the accused.9 The CA, however, found the absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution failed
to prove that the several accused planned the crime before committing it. The accused appealed from the CA to this Court. 10
The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or
Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead.11 This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by
circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.12
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of all
the accused. Thus:
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously parked in front of
the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers were bringing him with them to the police station because of the
questionable documents he showed upon query. Subsequent inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas’ mobile
phone that contained messages which led to the entrapment and capture of the other accused who were also
taxicab drivers.
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police station where he was about
to be taken for questioning, tending to show that he had something to hide. He certainly did not go to the police
afterwards to clear up the matter and claim his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running away from the scene of
the shooting.
4. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout; the
messages also referred to "Kua Justin" as the one who was hit in such shootout and later died in a hospital in
Bacoor, Cavite. These messages linked the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in entrapping accused Santos, Jalandoni,
Enojas, and Gomez, who were all named in the text messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made references to the
7-11 shootout and to the wounding of "Kua Justin," one of the gunmen, and his subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an organized group of taxicab drivers
engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones with call numbers that
corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas left in his
taxicab.13
The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that the aggravating circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b)
use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In "aid of armed men," the men act as
accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused,
otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a
special aggravating circumstance that is not among the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as
17
qualifying a homicide to murder.14 Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only for homicide, aggravated
by the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.

As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying
the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. 15 Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was
a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. 16 Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text
messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the
mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.

The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest.1âwphi1 But, assuming that this was so, it cannot
be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after
an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been
committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the persons they were to arrest had committed it.17 The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by
accused Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an
entrapment using this knowledge.

The award of damages by the courts below has to be modified to conform to current jurisprudence. 18

WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Court of Appeals Decision of June 14, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03377. The Court
instead FINDS accused-appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit, Arnold Gomez y Fabregas, Fernando Santos y Delantar, and Roger
Jalandoni y Ari GUILTY of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearms. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court SENTENCES each of them to 12 years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The Court also MODIFIES the award of exemplary damages by
increasing it to ₱30,000.00, with an additional ₱50,000.00 for civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

18
G.R. No. 109840 January 21, 1999 a) the amount of P42,306.00 representing
accrued or back rentals from January 1, 1987 to
December 31, 1989;
JOSE L. CHUA and CO SIO ENG, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RAMON IBARRA, respondents. b) a monthly rental of P7,320.50 for the use or
occupancy of the premises starting January 1,
1990 until July 24, 1990 and at Ten Thousand
MENDOZA, J.: (P10,000.00) Pesos from July 24, 1990 until the
defendants shall have vacated the same;
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, 1 dated October 8, 1992 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59 of Makati, Metro Manila, ordering the ejectment of petitioners from the c) the amount of P10,000.00 representing
premises owned by private respondent. reasonable attorney's fees:

Petitioners were lessees of a commercial unit at No. 3086 Redemptorist Street in Baclaran, Parañque, Metro Manila. The 3. Dismissing defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit; and
lease was for a period of five (5) years, from January 1, 1985 to December 31, 1989. The contract expressly provided for the
renewal of the lease at the option of the lessees "in accordance with the terms of agreement and conditions set by the lessor."
Prior to the expiration of the lease, the parties discussed the possibility of renewing it. They exchanged proposal and 4. With costs against the defendants.
counterproposal, but they failed to reach agreement. The dispute was referred to the barangay captain for conciliation but still
no settlement was reached by the parties.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision. In its decision, dated October 8, 1992, the Court of
Appeals ordered:
On July 24, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner's in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, which on February 4, 1992 rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:2
WHEREFORE, except for the modification that the monthly rental that petitioners should pay
private respondent from July 24, 1990 until the latter finally vacate the premises in question is
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby, rendered as follows: reduced to P7,320.00, the decision of the respondent court in this case is AFFIRMED in all other
respects, with costs against petitioners Jose L. Chua and Ko Sio Eng.

1. The defendants (herein petitioners) are hereby given a period of two (2)
years extension of occupancy of the subject premises starting the date of Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review for certiorari. Petitioners assign
the filling of the instant complaint; several errors as having been allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals.

2. The defendants are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff (herein private
respondent) the sum of P188,806.00 representing back rentals as of the
year 1991 and a monthly rental of P10,000.00 thereafter until the
expiration of the aforesaid extension of their occupancy or until the
subject premises is actually vacated.
First. Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the lower court's finding that they owe private respondent
the amount of P42,306.00 as unpaid rentals from January 1, 1987 to December 31, 1989 because neither the letter of demand
nor the complaint for unlawful detainer alleged a claim for unpaid rentals. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, however, the
issue of arrearages was raised at the pre-trial by private respondent and evidence on this question was presented without
objection from petitioners:5

3. Defendants are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of
P15,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
4. Defendants are hereby ordered to pay the cost of suit.
First of all, while it is true that there was no express demand in private respondent's complaint for
unlawful detainer against petitioners for the latters payment of rental arrearages, private respondent
in a pleading dated December 17, 1990 filed with the MTC (by way of comment to petitioners'
motion to admit amended answer) stated:

That moreover the unpaid rentals from January 1987 to December 31,
SO ORDERED. 1989 amounts to FORTY TWO THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIX
PESOS (P42,306,00), exclusive of rentals from January 1 to December
31, 1990 which would be one hundred eighty thousand pesos
On appeal by both parties, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59 of Makati ruled that the lease was for a fixed period of five
(P180,000.00) or a total of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY TWO
(5) years and that, upon its expiration on January 1, 1990, petitioners' continued stay in the premises became illegal. As
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIX PESOS (222,306,00)
provided in Art. 1687 of the Civil Code, the power of the courts to fix the period of lease is limited only to cases where the
period has not been fixed by the parties themselves. The dispositive portion of the decision 3 states:
(p. 75 Orig. Rec).
Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the appealed decision, as follows:
Then, at the pre-trial of December 17, 1990, among the issues proposed by counsel for plaintiff
(now private respondent) was whether:
1. Ordering the defendants (herein petitioners) and all persons claiming and/or acting for and in
their behalf to vacate the premises known as door No. 3086 Redemptorist, corner G.C. Cruz Streets,
Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and turn over possession thereof to the plaintiff (herein private 3. defendants are in arrears for the rentals from Dec. 31, 1987 to January
respondent); 1989, in accordance with the contract:

2. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the following:

19
 (p. 8, tsn Dec. 17, 1990:
p. 87, id.)
Counsel for defendants (herein petitioners) did not object to the statement of issues made by
plaintiffs counsel and instead simply stated as their own main issue whether plaintiff had a valid
cause of action for ejectment against them as he is not the sole owner of the leased premises, and
then averred that "based on this premise, the other issues raised by plaintiff could be dependent on
the resolution of the stated issues" (id., p. 88. Orig. Rec.). Later, at the hearing of February 12, 1990.
plaintiff Ramon Ibarra testified that although his lease contract (Exh. "A") with petitioners stipulated
an annual ten percent (10%) additional rental starting in 1986 (i.e., the monthly rental in 1986 was
P5,500, in 1987, it was P6,050; in 1988, it was P6,655.00; and in 1989, it was P7,320.50), petitioners
continued to pay only the original monthly rental of P5,000 stipulated in their contract (Exh. "A"),
so that petitioners had incurred total rental arrearages at the end of 1989 of P42,306.00 (pp. 6-8,.
tsn, op cit.: pp. 113-115. Orig. Rec.). . . .
Obviously, then, petitioners' rental arrearages from 1986 to 1989 as an issue raised at the pre-trial
and on which issue private respondent presented evidence without any objection from petitioners.
And considering that the petitioners incurred said rental arrearages because they did not pay private
respondent the automatic 10% increase in their monthly rental every year for the years 1986 to 1989
as agreed upon and stipulated in their lease contract (Exh. "A".) which contract is the law between
the parties, justice and good faith demand that petitioners should pay said rental arrearages. As
correctly ruled by the respondent court, "to absolve the defendants from paying rentals in arrears
while they continue occupying and enjoying the premises would be allowing the defendants to
enrich themselves at the expense of the plaintiff. (p, 55, Rollo).
This contention is devoid of merit. The fact that petitioners allegedly made repairs on the premises in question is not a reason
for them to retain the possession of the premises. There is no provision of law which grants the lessee a right of retention over
the leased premises on that ground. Art. 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 546, which provides for full reimbursement
of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good
faith, i.e., one who builds on a land in the belief that he is the owner thereof. In a number of cases, the Court has held that this
right does not apply to a mere lessee, like the petitioners, otherwise, it would always be in his power to "improve" his landlord
out of the latter's property.13 Art. 1678 merely grants to such a lessee making in good faith useful improvements the right to
be reimbursed one-half of the value of the improvements upon the termination of the lease, or, in the alternative, to remove
the improvements if the lessor refuses to make reimbursement.
Petitioners were thus correctly ordered to pay attorney's fees considering that private respondent had to go to court to protect
his interest.14 The award of P10,000.00 is reasonable in view of the time it has taken this rather simple case for ejectment to
be decided.
Fourth. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the denial of their counterclaim for damages for their
failure to enjoy the peaceful possession of the premises because private respondent allowed vendors to ply their trade at the
front portion of the leased premises. Petitioners claim that, as a result, they suffered business losses and moral injuries. As
both the Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court held, however, there is no evidence to support this claim. As the
Court of Appeals said, petitioners never complained before about the sidewalk vendors occupying a portion of the leased
property. It was only after negotiations for renewal of the lease had failed and private respondent had filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against them did they complain about the vendors.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 8, 1992, is AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt
Costs against petitioners.

Indeed, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter
as the objection to its admissibility becomes apparent, 6 otherwise the objection will be considered waived and such evidence SO ORDERED.
will form part of the records of the case as competent and admissible evidence. 7 Rule 10, §5 8 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
allows the amendment of the pleadings in order to make them conform to the evidence in the record.

Second. Petitioners claim that they are entitled to an estension of time to occupy the premises in question. This, too, is without
merit. After the lease terminated on January 1, 1990 and without the parties thereafter reaching any agreement for its renewal,
petitioners became deforciants subject to ejectment from the premises. 9

Neither did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that petitioners are not entitled to a reasonable extension of time to occupy the
premises on account of the fact that the lease contract between the parties has already expired. As there was no longer any
lease to speak of which could be extended, the Metropolitan Trial Court was in effect making a contract for the parties which
it obviously did not have the power to do.10 The potestative authority of the courts to fix a longer term for a lease under Art.
1687 of the Civil Code11 applies only to cases where there is no period fixed by the parties. To the contrary, in this case, the
contract of lease provided for a fixed period of five (5) years from January 1, 1985 to December 31, 1989. As the Court held
in Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Banco Nacional Filipino:12

It is not the province of the court to alter a contract by construction or to make a new contract for
the parties; its duty is confined to the interpretation of the one which they have made for themselves,
without regard to its wisdom or folly, as the court cannot supply material stipulations or read into
contract words which it does not contain.

Indeed, Art. 1675 of the Civil Code excludes cases falling under Art. 1673 (which provides among others, that the lessor may
judicially eject the lessee when the period agreed upon or that which is fixed has expired) from the cases wherein, pursuant
to Art. 1687, courts may fix a longer period of lease. For these reasons, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling
that petitioners were not entitled to an extension of the lease upon its expiration.

Third. The appellate court found petitioners guilty of bad faith in refusing to leave the premises. But petitioners contend that
they acted in good faith under the belief that they were entitled to an extension of the lease because they had made repairs
and improvements on the premises.

20
G.R. No. 164940 November 28, 2007
VARORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC., Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION)and ROLANDO M.
PEREZ, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Varorient Shipping Co., Inc. (Varorient)
seeking the reversal of the 25 May 2004 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83881 which dismissed its
petition for certiorari and injunction and the 9 August 2004 Resolution2 of the same court which denied its motion for
reconsideration.
The basic facts necessary for the resolution of the issues before this Court are not disputed. Varorient, acting in behalf of
Lagoa Shipping Corporation (Lagoa), employed private respondent Rolando Perez (Perez) as a "fitter" on board the vessel
M/V Sparrow. Perez and Varorient, the latter acting in the capacity as the local manning agent of its foreign principal, executed
a Contract of Employment dated 2 December 1998. 3
Once deployed on the M/V Sparrow, Perez started to suffer from persistent back pains. Aboard the vessel, a foreign doctor
who treated Perez issued a medical report certifying that the latter was already fit for continued employment, but
recommending nonetheless that Perez be assigned to light work only. Perez was thus repatriated to the Philippines as he could
no longer perform his duties as a fitter.4
Once back in the Philippines, Perez was diagnosed with lumbosacral instability, a condition treatable by physical therapy.
The persistent back pains were caused by an injury in the lower spine causing Perez’s lumbar curve to be abnormally
exaggerated due to his lifting and carrying of heavy objects as a fitter. 5 At the expense of Varorient, Perez was placed by
company-designated physicians under a physical therapy program consisting of 10-20 sessions. After having completed 10
sessions, Perez abruptly discontinued his medical evaluation and treatment.6Instead, on 9 September 1999, he filed a
Complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) 7 praying for disability benefits, illness allowance,
reimbursement of medical and medicine expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees. Named as respondents to the complaint were
Varorient, Margarita Colarina (Colarina), and Lagoa.
The case was assigned to Labor Arbiter Antonio Cea and the parties duly filed their position papers. Eventually, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a Decision8 dated 20 January 2003 ordering the dismissal of the case for lack of merit. Perez appealed the
decision to the NLRC which, on 30 October 2003, rendered a Decision9 vacating and setting aside the Labor Arbiter’s ruling.
The NLRC ratiocinated that Perez had already complied with the requirements to claim compensation for his injury pursuant
to the POEA Standard Employment Contract when he presented himself to the company-designated physician for medical
treatment within 120 days from the date of his repatriation, and that he was not to be blamed for the failure of Varorient to
make a disability assessment despite the fact that he had already completed 10 physical therapy sessions. 10
After its motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC, Varorient filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari and Injunction11 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
On 18 June 2004, Varorient received a copy of the first assailed Resolution dated 25 May 2004 dismissing its petition. The
Court of Appeals held:
There are three (3) petitioners in this petition for certiorari[:] Varorient Shipping Co., Inc., Margarita Colarina and Lagoa
Shipping Corporation. However, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping certification [were] signed by a
certain Ma. Luisa C. Isuga, Managing Director and Corporate Secretary of Petitioner Varorient Shipping Co., Inc., without
showing any authority to act for and in behalf of any of the petitioners. Absent such authority, the petition is fatally flawed.
ACCORDINGLY, this petition is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.12
On 4 July 2004, Varorient filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 with the Court of Appeals. Attached to the motion is the
Secretary’s Certificate14 dated 7 May 2004, evincing the authority of Ma. Luisa C. Isuga, Varorient’s managing director and
corporate secretary, to represent Varorient in the certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals, and "to sign for and in
behalf of Varorient all pertinent documents, papers, pleadings, motions, petitions, and other related incidents, in connection
with the case against it, its President, Margarita Colarina, and its foreign principal, Lagoa Shipping Corporation" filed by
Perez.15
On 24 August 2004, Varorient received a copy of the second assailed Resolution16 dated 9 August 2004, denying its motion
for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals ruled:
x x x In the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, it is insisted that Isuga, being the Managing Director and
Secretary of Varorient is duly authorized to represent and act in behalf of the corporation, its foreign principal Lagoa and
President Margarita Colarina. It is further alleged that even if there is no express authorization from Varorient and the other
petitioners, still Isuga is impliedly authorized to file the petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. The motion, nonetheless, attached a Secretary’s Certificate dated May 7, 2004 which petitioners claim to have been
inadvertently omitted in the course of filing the petition.
We cannot agree with the petitioners. Neither do [w]e find consistency in their ratiocination that even without authorization,
Isuga is authorized to act for the three (3) petitioners, and at the same time, presenting a Secretary’s Certificate on a supposed
Board of Directors’ meeting of Varorient on May 5, 2004. It would seem to [o]ur mind, that the Board Resolution and the
Secretary’s Certificate was just an afterthought. Otherwise, Ma. Luisa C. Isuga, the Corporate Secretary who was allegedly
given authority by the Board to act for and in behalf of Varorient could not have missed to append or even mention it in the
petition at bar. Moreover, the Secretary’s Certificate is issued by the Board of Directors of Varorient and not the two (2) other
petitioners, Lagoa and its President, Margarita Colarina. Apropos, the foregoing circumstances only confirm that Isuga was
not duly authorized when she signed the verification and non-forum shopping certification at the time the instant petition was
filed.
Petitioner is hereby reminded that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of
directors that exercises its corporate powers. In the absence of any authority from the board of directors, no person, not even
the officers of the corporation, can validly bind the corporation. [Premium Marble Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 264
SCRA 11 (1996); Esteban, Jr. v. Vda. de Ocampo, 360 SCRA 230 (2002); Social Security System v. Commission on Audit,
384 SCRA 548 (2002)].
xxxx
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated June 29, 2004 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.17
Hence, the present petition.
Varorient argues that there is substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46, considering the submission of the secretary’s
certificate showing the authority of Ma. Luisa C. Isuga to act for and in behalf of petitioner. Petitioner further argues that the
Court of Appeals should have upheld the primacy of substantial justice over technical rules of procedure.
There are three issues before us. The first, whether Varorient has substantially complied with the verification and certification
requirement, is ultimately less than decisive to this case. The more worthy questions for consideration pertain to the effect of
the respective failures to execute the prescribed verification and certification of Colarina, as a corporate officer solidarily
bound with Varorient in the payment of employment claims, and Lagoa, as the foreign principal of Varorient.
There is sufficient jurisprudential justification to hold that Varorient has substantially complied with the verification and
certification requirements. We have held in a catena of cases 18 with similar factual circumstance that there is substantial
compliance with the Rules of Court when there is a belated submission or filing of the secretary’s certificate through a motion
for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision dismissing the petition for certiorari.
21
The Court is not unmindful of the necessity for a certification of non-forum shopping in filing petitions for certiorari as this
is required under Section 1, Rule 65, in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. When the petitioner
is a corporation, the certification should obviously be executed by a natural person to whom the power to execute such
certification has been validly conferred by the corporate board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents.
Generally, the petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatory’s
authority.19
Still, a distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirements for certificate of non-forum shopping and
verification and substantial compliance with the requirements as provided in the Rules of Court. The Court has allowed the
belated filing of the certification on the justification that such act constitutes substantial compliance. In Roadway Express,
Inc. v. CA,20 the Court allowed the filing of the certification fourteen (14) days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v.
LandBank,21 the Court reinstated a petition on the ground of substantial compliance even though the verification and
certification were submitted only after the petition had already been originally dismissed. In Havtor Management Philippines
Inc. v. NLRC,22 we acknowledged substantial compliance when the lacking secretary’s certificate was submitted by the
petitioners as an attachment to the motion for reconsideration seeking reversal of the original decision dismissing the petition
for its earlier failure to submit such requirement.
As with Havtor, Varorient rectified its failure to submit proof of its Corporate Secretary’s authority to sign the
verification/certification on non-forum shopping on its behalf when the necessary document was attached to its motion for
reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. The admission of these documents, and consequently, the petition itself, is in
line with the cases we have cited. It must be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping
is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing
the undesirable practice of forum shopping. 23
We now turn to the more crucial and ultimately determinative issues.
The Court of Appeals, in dismissing the petition, cited the failure of Colarina, president of Varorient, to execute a separate
certification. We hold that this ground ultimately does not justify the dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers (POEA Rules) makes clear that
the corporate officers, directors and partners are required to execute a verified undertaking that they would be jointly and
severally liable with the company over claims arising from the employer-employee relationship.24 By legal mandate, the
interest of Colarina in this case, arising as it does from the employer-employee relationship, is intertwined with that of
Varorient.
We must examine the legal nature of the obligation for which Colarina is being held liable in the present case. The POEA
Rules holds her, as a corporate officer, solidarily liable with the local licensed manning agency. Her liability is inseparable
from those of Varorient and Lagoa. If anyone of them is held liable then all of them would be liable for the same obligation.
Each of the solidary debtors, insofar as the creditor/s is/are concerned, is the debtor of the entire amount; it is only with respect
to his co-debtors that he/she is liable to the extent of his/her share in the obligation. 25 Such being the case, the Civil Code
allows each solidary debtor, in actions filed by the creditor/s, to avail himself of all defenses which are derived from the
nature of the obligation and of those which are personal to him, or pertaining to his share. 26 He may also avail of those defenses
personally belonging to his co-debtors, but only to the extent of their share in the debt.27 Thus, Varorient may set up all the
defenses pertaining to Colarina and Lagoa; whereas Colarina and Lagoa are liable only to the extent to which Varorient may
be found liable by the court. The complaint against Varorient, Lagoa and Colarina is founded on a common cause of action;
hence, the defense or the appeal by anyone of these solidary debtors would redound to the benefit of the others. 28
29
De Leon v. Court of Appeals featured a husband and wife who were sued jointly for a sum of money. After the trial court
had ruled against the spouses, the husband through counsel timely filed a notice of appeal, while the wife, through another
counsel, attempted to submit a separate notice of appeal which was belatedly filed. The wife’s notice of appeal was denied
by the Court of Appeals on account of its belatedness. Commenting on these circumstances, the Court, through Justice
Quisumbing, observed:
x x x Respondent spouses having been jointly sued under a common cause of action, an appeal made by the husband inures
to the benefit of the wife. The notice of appeal filed by Estelita was a superfluity, the appeal having been perfected earlier by
her husband.30
The passage finds persuasive application to the case at bar.1awphi1 As in this case, Varorient and Colarina were jointly sued
under a common cause of action. By virtue of the requisite undertaking under the POEA Rules, Colarina is solidarily bound
to Varorient for whatever liabilities may arise in this case. In De Leon, the timely filing by the husband of the notice of appeal
was deemed to have inured to the benefit of his wife, who had filed a tardy notice of appeal of her own. Thus, in this case the
substantial compliance by Varorient should likewise redound to the benefit of the other solidary obligors, such as Colarina,
who may have been independently deficient in the execution of their own requirements.
The Court is ready to arrive at such a conclusion because it sees that Colarina’s participation in this case is ultimately
dispensable to its resolution. If Varorient were to be found liable and made to pay pursuant thereto, the entire obligation would
already be extinguished31 even if no attempt was made to enforce the judgment against Colarina. Because there existed a
common cause of action against the three solidary obligors, as the acts and omissions imputed against them are one and the
same, an ultimate finding that Varorient was not liable would, under these circumstances, logically imply a similar exoneration
from liability for Colarina and Lagoa, whether or not they interposed any defense.
The other contentious issue is whether the certificate of non-forum shopping filed by Varorient as a local manning agent is
sufficient to cover and benefit its foreign principal, Lagoa. On that score, the Court of Appeals again erred in dismissing the
petition since a very specific line of jurisprudence has emerged precisely to the effect that the foreign principal need not
execute a separate verification and certification from that of the local agent.
That issue was squarely resolved in the case of MC Engineering, Inc. v. NLRC.32 As in this case, the Court of Appeals had
dismissed a special civil action for certiorari on account of the failure of the foreign principal to execute a separate verification
and certification against forum shopping from that submitted by the local private employment agency. The holding of the
Court in MC Engineering may very well apply to this case, thus:
In the case at bar, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners before the Court of Appeals contains a certification against
forum shopping. However, the said certification was signed only by the corporate secretary of petitioner MCEI. No
representative of petitioner Hanil signed the said certification. As such, the issue to be resolved is whether or not a
certification signed by one but not all of the parties in a petition constitutes substantial compliance with the
requirements regarding the certification of non-forum shopping.
xxxx
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals should have taken into consideration the fact that petitioner Hanil is being sued by
private respondent in its capacity as the foreign principal of petitioner MCEI. It was petitioner MCEI, as the local private
employment agency, who entered into contracts with potential overseas workers on behalf of petitioner Hanil.
It must be borne in mind that local private employment agencies, before they can commence recruiting workers for
their foreign principal, must submit with the POEA a formal appointment or agency contract executed by the foreign
based employer empowering the local agent to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the principal or foreign-
based employer for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and contract of employment. Considering that
the local private employment agency may sue on behalf of its foreign principal on the basis of its contractual
undertakings submitted to the POEA, there is no reason why the said agency cannot likewise sign or execute a
certification of non-forum shopping for its own purposes and/or on behalf of its foreign principal.
It must likewise be stressed that the rationale behind the requirement that the petitioners or parties to the action themselves
must execute the certification of non-forum shopping is that the said petitioners or parties are in the best position to know of
the matters required by the Rules of Court in the said certification. Such requirement is not circumvented and is substantially
complied with when, as in this case, the local private employment agency signs the said certification alone. It is the local
private employment agency, in this case petitioner MCEI, who is in the best position to know of the matters required in a
certification of non-forum shopping.33
The conclusions reached by the Court in MC Engineering, Inc. v. NLRC34 are further supported by the relevant rules and
regulations adopted by the POEA, which establish in essence that the foreign principal does not have personality in the
Philippines unless it acts through a licensed local manning agent as its accredited principal. The POEA Rules specifically
ordains that the local manning agent is solidarily liable for every obligation that the foreign principal may incur against the
local worker:
22
Part I General Provisions

x x x Rule II Definition of Terms:

Joint and Solidary Liability – refers to the nature of liability of the principal and the manning agency, for any and all
claims arising out of the implementation of the employment contract involving Filipino seafarers. It shall likewise refer
to the nature of liability of officers, directors, partners or sole proprietors with the company over claims arising from employer-
employee relationship.

xxxx

Part II Licensing and Regulation

RULE II Issuance of License

Section 1. Requirements for Licensing.

xxxx

e. A verified undertaking stating that the applicant shall: xxx xxx xxx 8. Assume joint and solidary liability with the
employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the employment contract,
including but not limited to wages, death and disability compensation and their repatriation;

xxxx

f. In case of corporation or partnership, verified undertaking by officers, directors and partners that they will be jointly and
severally liable with the company over claims arising from employer-employee relationship.

Further perusal of the POEA Rules indicates that the relationship between the local manning agent and the foreign principal
is so intertwined. Indeed, the foreign principal does not have any capacity to act in the Philippines, unless through its
accredited local manning agent. For example, an accredited foreign principal can only engage and employ Filipino seafarers
for specific ship/s through a licensed local manning agency; and foreign principals/employers who wish to advertise job
requirements using Philippine print media, broadcast, or television may do so only through a POEA licensed local manning
agency. Moreover, only duly licensed local manning agencies may file an application for registration of principals; while
registered foreign principals are required to enroll ships through their agencies.

We thus re-stress that a foreign principal that is acting only through its local manning agent has no need to file a separate
certificate of non-forum shopping.35

Clearly then, following stare decisis and even a cursory look at the POEA rules and regulations, the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error of law when it dismissed the petition because of the failure of Colarina and Lagoa to execute the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping independently of Varorient.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 15 May 2004 and 09 August 2004
are SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.

SO ORDERED.

23
G.R. No. 137757 August 14, 2000 Q. When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was "Totong" you are referring to whom?

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, A. Rodegelio, sir.

vs.
RODEGELIO TURCO, JR., aka "TOTONG", accused-appellant.
(p. 15, id; Underscoring supplied)

DECISION
She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known him for four (4) years and appellant is her second cousin (p.
34, id). Unaware of the danger that was about to befall her, Escelea forthwith opened the door. Appellant Turco, with the use
MELO, J.: of towel, covered Escelea's face. Appellant, aside from covering the victim's mouth, even placed his right hand on the latter's
neck.

Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka "Totong") was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 2349-272,
Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of Basilan of the 9th Judicial Region, stationed in Isabela, Basilan, under the following
Information:
That on or about the 8th day of July, 1995, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Km. 6, Begang
Barangay, Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above-named accused, by the use of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab the undersigned complainant by her neck, cover
her mouth and forcibly make her lie down, after which the said accused mounted on top of her and removed her short pant
and panty. Thereafter, the said accused, by the use of force, threat and intimidation, inserted his penis into the vagina of the
undersigned complainant and finally succeeded to have carnal knowledge of her, against her will.
Appellant bid Eseelea to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which was about twelve (12) meters away
from the victim's house, appellant lost no time in laying the victim on the grass, laid on top of the victim and took off her
shortpants and panty (pp. 17-19, id). Escelea tried to resist by moving her body but to no avail. Appellant succeeded in
pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside Escelea's private part. The victim felt terrible pain (p. 20, id).
Still dissatisfied, after consummating the act, appellant kissed and held the victim's breast. Thereafter, appellant threatened
her that he will kill her if she reports the incident to anybody, thus:
"He threatened me, that if you will reveal the incident to anybody I will kill you.

(p. 21, id; Underscoring supplied)

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Finally, after having satisfied his lust, appellant hurriedly went home. Escelea, on the other hand, upon reaching home,
(p. 6, Rollo.) discovered that her shortpants and panty were filled with blood (p. 23, id). For almost ten (10) days, she just kept to herself
the harrowing experience until July 18, 1995 when she was able to muster enough courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando
Pioquinto, about the said incident. Orlando in turn informed Alejandro, the victim's father, about the rape of his daughter.
At his arraignment on November 8, 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial ensued. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked Escelea to see a doctor for medical examination (p. 27, id).

The prosecution's version of the generative facts, as gathered from the testimony of its witnesses - Alejandra Tabada, mother
of the victim; PO3 Celso Y. Tan Sanchez, the police officer who investigated the case; Orlando Pioquinto, brother-in-law of
the victim; Escelea Tabada, the 13-year-old victim; and Felicitas delos Santos Timorata, the medical record clerk who used
to be the medical officer under Dr. Rimberto Sanggalang, the physician who physically examined the victim after the incident
- is abstracted in the Appellee's Brief in this wise:
Escelea was accompanied by her sister Clairlyn Pioquinto to the Provincial Hospital. She was examined by Dr. Rimberto
Sanggalang. After the issuance of the medical certificate, they went to Isabela Municipal Station and filed Escelea's complaint
against appellant (pp. 30-33, id).
(pp. 97-100, Rollo.)

Escelea Tabada and appellant Rodegelio Turco were neighbors in lower Begang, Isabela, Basilan, their houses being only
about sixty (60) meters apart (p. 6 and p. 8, t.s.n.; August 19, 1996). Escelea was then staying with her father, Alejandro and The defense presented Leonora Cabase, neighbor of accused-appellant; her granddaughter Corazon Macapili, and accused-
her deaf grandmother, Perseveranda (p. 9, id). She was twelve (12) years and six (6) months old at the time of incident, having appellant himself. Accused-appellant denied the charge. The defense that the victim and him were sweethearts was also
been born on December 3, 1982 (p. 3, id). advanced. Leonora Cabase mentioned this in her direct testimony.

The nightmare of Escelea began in the evening of July 1995. At around seven o'clock (7:00 p.m.) in the evening, Escelea,
after (pp. 11-12, id) [sic]. She was accompanied by a certain Cory Macapili, the granddaughter of her neighbor, Leonora
Cabase (p. 13, id).
Cory left upon reaching Escelea's home. Escelea went upstairs to join her grandmother who was already sleeping in the room.
About to enter the said room, Escelea heard a call from outside. She recognized the voice and when she asked who was it, the
party introduced himself as the appellant, viz:
Q. After you heard your named was mentioned, what did you say if any?
A. I answered: "Who is that?"
In reaching a moral certainty of guilt, the trial court held:
While the accused denies the charge of rape, his witness, Mrs. Leonora Cabase was trying to project that the complainant
Escelea Tabada and the accused Rodegelio Turco, Jr. are sweethearts. In the case of People vs. Casil, 241 SCRA 285, the
Supreme Court agrees with the trial court that the "sweetheart story" was a mere concoction of appellant in order to exculpate
himself from criminal liability. The claim of voluntary love affair is an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair
needed proof. Nowhere in the record of the case that the same was substantiated, though mentioned by Mrs. Leonora Cabase.
The accused and/or his witnesses must present any token of the alleged relationship like love notes, mementos or pictures and
the like. Such bare allegation of the defense, not to mention its utter lack of proof, is incredulous. It is hard to understand how
such a relationship could exculpate a person from the rape of a terrified young child barely a little over the age of twelve (12)
years old. Indeed, a love relationship, even if true, will not necessarily rule out force (People vs. Sergio Betonio, G.R. No.
119165, September 26, 1997, Case Digests of Supreme Court Decisions, Vol. 36, No. 3, September 1-29, 1997, pp. 695-697).

There are guiding principles in rape cases as cited in People vs. Victor Abrecinoz, G.R. No. 122474, October 17, 1997, Case
Q. Did the person calling your name answer you?
Digests of Supreme Court Decisions, Vol. 37, No. 1, October 2-31, 1997, pp. 157-160, and they are: (1) an accusation for
rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove
A. I heard, sir, "me Totong". it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the

24
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Thus, the credibility of the
complainant is a paramount importance, and if her testimony proves credible, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof.
It should be noted that the complainant and the accused are second degree cousin or they are sixth civil degree relatives. The
mother of the accused is a first degree cousin of the father of the complainant. In the culture of the Filipino family on extended
family, the relationship between the complainant and the accused being only second degree cousin, it becomes the duty of an
older relative (the accused) to protect and care for a younger relative (the complainant). It is very hard to understand or
comprehend why a cousin files a case of rape against her cousin, unless it is true. There is no showing that there was
compelling motive why the case be filed against the accused, except that the rape really happened.
xxx
xxx
xxx
It is noted that there was no underlying reason why the complainant and/or her father would bring an action against the
accused, except that the accused had raped Escelea Tabada on July 8, 1995, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. If it were
not true that she was raped by the accused, why would she expose herself to an embarrassment and traumatic experience
connected with the litigation of this rape case. We are aware of the Filipino culture especially on virginity. We likened it as a
mirror, once dropped and broken, it can no longer be pieced together ... not ever. This is true among the Filipino folks that
the complainant belonged, poor and helpless and everything is entrusted to God. The complainant is a young girl, a little over
twelve (12) years old and almost illiterate, having attended school up to Grade III only. So poor that her family cannot even
buy the cheapest television set and she has to go to a house of a neighbor for the meager joy of seeing a television show ...
and expose herself to the danger of the dark night. All said, it is very difficult to be poor. Going to the court is a shout for help
... let us try to hear it.
xxx
xxx
xxx
WHEREFORE, under the above circumstances and evaluation, this court finds the accused "GUILTY" of rape and sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) for moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(pp. 33-37, Rollo.)
In accused-appellant's brief, he assigns the following alleged errors:
I
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
OF RAPE BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINANT ESCELEA TABADA AND HER
WITNESS.
II
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PROSECUTION, BASED ON THE AFFIDAVITS AND ORAL TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINANT
AND ITS WITNESSES WAS ABLE TO PROVED [sic] BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE
ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME OF RAPE AGAINST THE COMPLAINANT.
III
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED TO
SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO INDEMNIFY THE COMPLAINANT THE
AMOUNT OF P50,000.00 REPRESENTING MORAL DAMAGES BASED ON THE EVIDENCES
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
(p. 101, Rollo.)
He particularly argues that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt considering that other than the
written statement of the complainant before the Police Station of Isabela and before the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial
Court, and her testimony during direct examination, no other evidence was presented to conclusively prove that there was
ever rape at all; that she only presumed that it was accused-appellant who attacked her since she admitted that immediately
upon opening the door, the perpetrator hastily covered her face with a towel; that nothing in her testimony clearly and
convincingly shows that she was able to identify accused-appellant as the perpetrator; that complainant implicated accused-
appellant only because her father forced her to do so; and lastly, that no actual proof was presented that the rape of the
complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who
prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.
We agree with the trial court.
As aptly recalled by the trial court, there are three guiding principles in the review of rape cases, to wit: (1) an accusation of
rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove;
(2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense (People vs. Gallo, 284 SCRA 590 [1998]; People vs.
Balmoria, 287 SCRA 687 [1998]; People vs. Auxtero, 289 SCRA 75 [1998]; People vs. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 [1998]).
Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a determination concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of complainant's
testimony.
The trial court described complainant as "a young girl, a little over twelve (12) years old and almost illiterate, having attended
school up to Grade III only. So poor that her family cannot even buy the cheapest television set and she has to go to a house
of a neighbor for the meager joy of seeing a television show ... and exposes herself to the danger of the dark night." But verily,
age, youth, and poverty are not guarantees of credibility. Hence, thorough scrutiny must be made by the Court.
Complainant narrated the incident in this wise:
Q While you went upstairs and about to enter the room of your grandmother, did you hear anything?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A I heard a call, sir.
Q How was the call made?
25
A It is just by saying: "Lea". A Yes, sir.
Q After you heard your name was mentioned, what did you say if any? Q After removing your shortpants and panty, what else did the accused do?
A I answered: "Who is that?" A He abused me, sir.
Q Did the person calling your name answer you? Q You said that he abused you, how did he abuse your?
A I heard, sir, "me Totong". A He put his private part inside my private part, sir.
Q When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was "Totong", you are referring to whom? Q When the accused was on top of you and he forcibly abused you, what did you do?
A Rodegelio, sir. A I tried to move my body, sir.
Q When you say "Rodegelio", you are referring to Rodegelio Turco, Jr., the accused in this case? Q While you were trying to move your body and while the accused was on top of you, what did the accused do?
A Yes, sir. A He tried to insert his private part to my private part, sir.
Q After the person calling your name "Lea" identified himself as "Totong", what did you do? Q And was he able to insert his private part?
A I opened the door, sir. A Yes, sir.
Q And when you opened the door, what happened next? Q What did you feel when his private part was already inside your private part?
A Totong with the use of towel covered my face, sir. A I felt pain, sir.
Q Aside from covering your face with a towel, what else did he do? Q Will you please explain why you felt when the private part of the accused was already inside your private part?
A He covered my mouth, sir. A I felt pain when he already finished, sir.
Q Aside from covering your mouth, what else did he do? Q By the way, before July 8, 1995, were you had been raped? Will you please tell us whether you have already experienced
A He placed his right hand on my neck, sir. or you have already your menstruation at that time?
Q Aside from placing his right hand ... when he placed his right hand on your neck, where was he? Was he infront or behind? A No, sir.
A He was at my back, sir. Q Now you stated to the Honorable Court ... after the accused had sexually abused you and you said you felt pains after he
Q After placing his right hand on your neck behind you, what did "Totong" do next with that position? consumated the sexual act, after that what did he do next after consumating the act?
A He covered my mouth, sir. A After consumating his desire, he raised my panty and shortpants then he kissed me and hold my nipple, sir.
Q After covering your mouth and face, what did he do next? Q After the accused had raised your shortpants and panty, embraced you, kissed you and hold your breast, did he tell you
A He told me to walk, sir. anything?
Q Where did he bring you? A He threatened me, "that if you will reveal the incident to anybody I will kill you."
A I don't know exactly where he brought me, sir. Q In what dialect? In Chavacano, sir.
Q But you know very well that he brought you to a certain place? A After the accused embraced you, kissed you and hold your nipple and threatened you in Chavacano dialect, what happened
A I don't know exactly the place where he brought me, sir. next after that?
Q Is it far from your house where you were forcibly taken? No more, sir.
A Yes, sir. (tsn, Aug. 19, 1996, pp. 14-22.)
Q Do you have a copra kiln?
ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III:
The witness already answered that she does not know where she was brought, leading, Your Honor. On cross-examination, the victim did display some apparent confusion when the defense counsel asked her about the events
COURT: (Questioning the witness) that transpired before the ill-fated July 8, 1995. The query prompted her to narrate the incident prior to said date when she
Q According to you, from your house you were brought by the accused to a place which you do not know? also watched television at the home of Leonora Cabase, and that when she arrived home, accused-appellant came and called
A Yes, Your Honor. her "Lea" and when she asked who was it, he answered "so Totong". When she asked what he wanted, he said he wanted to
Q What place? borrow a guitar. She said that she could not lend him the guitar since her father was not yet around. He insisted but to no
A Pig pen, Your Honor. avail, and hence he just went home. She went to sleep afterwards. On re-direct examination, she clarified that when accused-
Q Do you know the owner, of that pig pen? appellant came to borrow the guitar on July 8, 1995, it was about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Lastly, she said that the
A Our pig pen, Your Honor. incident of the borrowing of the guitar and the incident that transpired at 7 o'clock in the evening on July 8, 1995 were separate
Q Who owned that pig pen? incidents.
A My father, Your Honor.
Q How far is that pig pen to your house?
Significantly, three things could be perceived: complainant's youth, her apparent confusion concerning the events that
A (From this witness stand to that road outside of this building).
transpired, and her fear of both accused-appellant and her father.
COURT:
It is about 12 meters. Alright, continue.
PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO: (Continuing) At the outset, it should be remembered that the declarations on the witness stand of rape victims who are young and immature
Q You stated in answer to the question of the Honorable Court that you were brought to the pig pen or the place where you deserve full credence (People vs. Bernaldez, 294 SCRA 317 [1998]). Succinctly, when the offended parties are young and
were sexually abused, were you place inside or outside? immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired,
ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III: considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed by
Leading, Your Honor. court trial if the matter about which they testified were not true (People vs. Clopino, 290 SCRA 432 [1998]). In addition, we
PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO: take cognizance of the trial court's observation on the segment of the Filipino society to which the victim belongs - almost
I will withdraw. illiterate, having attended school up to the third grade only, and so poor that she had to go to a neighbor's house to watch
Q Will you please explain to the Court what particular place of the pig pen that you were brought by the accused? television, yet one who values her virginity which like a "mirror, once dropped and broken ... can no longer be pieced together
A Inside the grasses, sir. ... not ever," this being "true among the Filipino folks [to which] complainant belonged, poor and helpless everything is
Q When you were already inside the grasses near this pig pen, what did the accused do to you? entrusted to God" (p. 35, Rollo).
A He put me down, sir.
Q When you were already down on the ground, what did the accused do next?
A He mounted on me, sir. The victim's relatively low level of intelligence explains the lapses in her testimony, having intermingled two incidents.
Q And when the accused was already on top of you, what did he do next? Nonetheless, it can easily be gathered from the record that the defense counsel may have contributed to this confusion when
A He molested me, sir. he asked the victim what transpired "before" the incident (tsn, August 19, 1996, p. 37). Minor lapses in a witness' testimony
Q Before he molested you, did he remove anything from your body? should be expected when a person recounts details of an experience so humiliating and so painful to recall as rape (People vs.
A Yes, sir. Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478 [1998]).Rape, as a harrowing experience, is usually not remembered in detail. For, such an offense
Q What? is not something which enhances one's life experience as to be worth recalling or reliving but, rather, something which causes
A My shortpants and panty, sir. deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim for the rest of her life, which her conscious or subconscious
Q You stated that the accused while on top of you removed your pants and panty, did he totally remove it from your body? mind would prefer to forget (People vs. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 [1997]). These lapses do not detract from the overwhelming

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testimony of a prosecution witness positively identifying the malefactor (People vs. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Further,
the testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated
passages therein (People vs. Natan, 193 SCRA 355 [1991]).
The Court finds that the victim had no motive to falsely testify against accused-appellant. Her testimony deserves the credence
accorded thereto by the trial court (People vs. Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487 [1998]). Pertinently, no woman, especially one of
tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by
being subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished (People vs. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251 [1998]).
Another point to consider is the blood relationship between accused-appellant and the victim. At this juncture, we reiterate
the trial court's observation thereon - the mother of accused-appellant being a first degree cousin of the victim's father, that
makes the victim and accused-appellant second degree cousins or sixth civil degree relatives. Filipino culture, particularly in
the provinces, looks at the extended family as closely-knit and recognizes the obligation of an older relative to protect and
take care of a younger one. On the contrary, in the instant case, the victim initiated the prosecution of her cousin. If the charge
were not true, it is indeed difficult to understand why the victim would charge her own cousin as the malefactor. Too, she
having no compelling motive to file said case against accused-appellant, the conclusion that the rape really happened is
logically reinforced.
As regards the initial delay of the victim in reporting the rape incident, suffice it to state that the delay and initial reluctance
of a rape victim to make public the assault on her virtue is not uncommon (People vs. Gallo, supra). In the case at bar, the
victim's fear of her father who had moral ascendancy over her, was explicit. She testified that she did not disclose the incident
to her father because of fear both of her father as well as of accused-appellant (tsn, August 19, 1996, pp. 23-24). Such reaction
is typical of a twelve-year-old girl and only strengthens her credibility.
The issue of credibility of the victim having been settled, there are a few points presented by the defense that must be passed
upon:
1. Other than their blood relationship, was there an intimate relationship between accused-appellant and the victim? The
theory initially advanced by the defense in the proceedings before the court a quo is the "sweetheart theory". In this regard,
.we agree with the trial court that the "sweetheart story" was a mere concoction of accused-appellant in order to exculpate
himself from criminal liability. In People vs. Venerable (290 SCRA 15 [1998]), we held that the sweetheart theory of the
accused was unavailing and self-serving where he failed to introduce love letters, gifts, and the like to attest to his alleged
amorous affair with the victim. Hence, the defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory that he
and the victim were sweethearts. Independent proof is necessary, such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. It is likewise
remarkable, a confession possibly of the bankruptcy of this theory that accused-appellant has not insisted on this defense in
his brief, seemingly abandoning this line.
We, therefore, conclude that whatever familiarity and supposed closeness there was between accused-appellant and the victim,
is explained not by an intimate relationship but by their blood relationship. Hence, it is noticeable that on the day of the
incident, when accused-appellant called upon the victim and the latter asked who he was, the victim knew right away that her
caller was accused-appellant when the latter replied "Si Totong".
Accused-appellant, in his direct testimony, tried to deny any blood relation with the victim Escelea Tabada and touched on
the apparent friendship between them, as follows:
Q You mentioned earlier that you know the complainant, why do you know the complainant Escelea Tabada?
A I only know her when I was already in jail, sir.
Q You mean to say that you never knew the complainant before you were arrested?
A I do not know her, sir.
COURT: (Questioning the witness)
Q Why, are you not related to the Tabadas?
A No, Your Honor.
ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III: (Continuing)
Q Have you ever seen the complainant in Begang?
A The complainant is at Begang, sir.
Q And you mentioned that you were not related with the complainant, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir, we are only close.
Q So, in other words, Mr. Witness, you and the complainant Escelea Tabada were already friends?
A Yes, sir.
(tsn, June 16, 1998, pp. 42-43.)
However, on cross-examination, he notably crumbled:
Q Now, you stated in your direct examination that you are not related to the Tabadas in San Antonio Begang, Isabela, Basilan,
is that right?
A Yes, sir, we are only close.
Q Is it not a fact Mr. Witness that your mother is the first cousin of the father of Escelea Tabada?
A They are cousins, sir.
Q So, indeed you are related to the Tabadas?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, when you said that you are not related to the Tabadas, you were not telling the truth?
A Yes, sir.
(ibid, p. 51.)
2. Accused-appellant argues that no actual proof was presented that the rape actually happened since the medico-legal officer
who prepared the medical certificate was not presented in court to explain the same.
In People vs. Bernaldez (supra), the court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical certificate issued by the examining
physician despite the failure of the latter to testify. While the certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule
since entries in official records (under Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court) constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence
rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or
credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. We place emphasis on the distinction
between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and
is not excluded by the law or the rules (Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court) or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence
is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the
weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule
133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no
weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids
its reception (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1998 ed., p. 550).
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little
probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied
solely on the medical certificate (stating that there was "[h]ymen rupture, secondary to penile insertion" as well as "foul-
smelling discharges." The diagnosis was "[r]uptured hymen secondary to rape" [p. 68, Record]). In fact, reliance was made
on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to convict (People
vs. Topaguen, 369 SCRA 601 [1997]). It is well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of
rape (People vs. Lacaba, G.R. No. 130591, November 17, 1999; People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55 [1996]; People vs.
Venerable, supra). The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of
rape (People vs. Taneo, supra). It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper (People
vs. Auxtero, supra). In the instant case, the victim's testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict.
As a final observation, it must be said that the amount awarded by the trial court in favor of Escelea Tabada as indemnification
(P50,000.00 for moral damages) for the rape is incomplete based on established jurisprudence and must be modified.
In People vs. Betonio (279 SCRA 532 [1977]), we held that the award of P50,000.00 to the victim as indemnity for rape not
committed or qualified by any of the circumstances under the Death Penalty Law, needs no proof other than the conviction
of the accused for the raped proved. This is different from the P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages which also needs no
pleading or proof as basis thereof (People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 [1998]).
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Rodegelio
Turco, Jr. aka "Totong" is ordered to indemnify the offended party, Escelea Tabada, in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos in addition to the sum of P50,000.00 already awarded by the trial court as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
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