HELD/RATIO:
16. Lameyra v. Pangilinan ● Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 12 Series of 1994 provides as follows:
G.R. No. 131675
DATE: MAR. 2, 2001
By: EAY3
Topic: ABANDONMENT
Petitioners: LAMEYRA
Respondents: PANGILINAN
Ponente: GONZAGA-REYES, J.
FACTS:
● Pedro C. Lameyra was a janitor/messenger in the Municipal Hall of Famy, Laguna. He
was appointed as such on February 2, 1988 under temporary status and was given a
permanent appointment on January 1, 1989 to the same position by then Municipal
Mayor Melquiadez Acomular.
● Mayor Acomular was defeated in the last election for the mayoralty post by
respondent Mayor George S. Pangilinan.
● On August 21, 1995, petitioner Lameyra received a letter from respondent Mayor
Pangilinan informing him that he is dropped from the roll of employees of the local
government unit of Famy, Laguna pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series
of 1994 of the Civil Service Commission due to the following reasons: 1.
Insubordination; 2. AWOL.
● Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Civil Service Commission alleging that he
was a permanent employee and that he was terminated without prior written notice
of the charges and without investigation and hearing, in violation of his security of
tenure and due process. He alleged that the act of Mayor Pangilinan was an act of
political vengeance as he was publicly known to have voted for his political rival.
● Mayor Pangilinan contends that
o That the dropping of appellant from the payroll was pursuant to
Memorandum Circular No. 12, series of 1994, dated March 10, 1994, of
this Honorable Commission due to insubordination and for being absent
without o􏰀cial leave, and was resorted to when appellant failed to justify
his continued leave of absence without official leave
o failure to comply with the May 31, 1995 memorandum constitute
insubordination and his continued absence without official leave was
deemed and considered as abandonment of employment.
● The Civil Service Commission in Resolution No. 96-0828 dated February 6, 1996
dismissed the appeal and a􏰀rmed the action of the Municipal Mayor in dropping him
from the roll of employees for absence without leave
● Lameyra 􏰀led a motion for reconsideration alleging that he had not earlier been
furnished copy of Mayor Pangilinan’s comment and disputing the version of Mayor
Pangilinan that he refused to report for work. He claimed that upon advice of the
Civil Service Commission in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, he reported for work at the office of
the Vice Mayor Constancio Fernandez, as he was not allowed by the Personnel
Officer to sign his name in the log book.
ISSUE: The petitioner abandoned his employment? - NO
"2.1 Absence without approved leave
An officer or employee who is continuously absent without approved leave
(AWOL) for at least thirty (30) calendar days shall be separated from the service or
dropped from the rolls without prior notice. He shall, however, be informed of his
separation from the service not later than 􏰀5 days from its effectivity which shall be
sent to the address appearing in his 201 files.
● It is clear from a reading of the above provision that the no prior notice is required
to drop from the rolls an employee who has been continuously absent without
approved leave (AWOL) for at least thirty (30) calendar days. It appears that solely
on the basis of the certi􏰀cation of the Personnel O􏰀cer/Human Resources
Management Assistant Benito Vicencio to the effect that petitioner did not report
for work for the period from July 6, 1995 to August 6, 1995, and the undisputed fact
that he has not submitted any proof that he actually 􏰀led an application for leave
nor presented any approved leave application for the said period, petitioner’s
termination from the service was upheld by the Civil Service Commission and the
Court of Appeals.
● However, petitioner contests the 􏰀nding that he was absent at all. He claims that he
reported for work but was prevented from signing the log book by the very o􏰀cer,
Benito Vicencio, who certi􏰀ed that he did not report for work on the dates in
question. He alleges in his petition and insists in his reply, that he was not furnished
a copy of Mayor Pangilinan’s comment, and was able to secure a copy only after
receiving a copy of the Resolution of the Civil Service Commission upholding the
termination of his service. This allegation of petitioner, which was raised even in the
Court of Appeals was not disputed by respondent Pangilinan in his Comment to the
Petition nor in his Comment to the Petition filed in the Court of Appeals. Accordingly,
the first opportunity that petitioner had to contest the su􏰀ciency of the evidence to
support his dismissal was when he 􏰀led his motion for reconsideration from the
Resolution of the Civil Service Commission dated February 6, 1996. The three sworn
statements which were annexes to said motion directly controverted Vicencio's
certi􏰀cation that he was absent without leave, cannot be considered new evidence
belatedly submitted as there was no notice and hearing when he was dropped from
the rolls. Considering that one of the a􏰀ants is Vice-Mayor Fernandez, whose acts as
a public o􏰀cial are also entitled to a presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty, it would be in compliance with the requirements of due process to have given
said sworn statement due consideration in view of the circumstances prevailing in
this case. This is in consonance with the respondent’s own theory that petitioner was
afforded his right to be heard when he 􏰀led his motion for reconsideration in the
Civil Service Commission.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded
to the Civil Service Commission for further proceedings in accordance with the tenor of this
decision. cda
SO ORDERED.
 17. Zandueta v. de la Costa ○ Hence, there is incompatibility between the 2 appointments and,
G.R. No. L-46267 consequently, in the discharge of the office conferred by each of them,
November 28, 1938 resulting in the absorption of the former by the latter.
By: Sarah Zurita ● In accepting this appointment and qualifying for the exercise of the functions of the
Topic: ACCEPTANCE OF INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE office conferred by it, by taking the necessary oath, and in discharging the same,
Petitioners: FRANCISCO ZANDUETA disposing of both judicial and administrative cases corresponding to the CFIs of
Respondents: SIXTO DE LA COSTA Manila & Palawan, Zandueta abandoned his first appointment and ceased in the
Ponente: Villa-real exercise of the functions of the office occupied by him by virtue thereof.
● GR: when a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly
FACTS:
created or reorganized by law, — which new office is incompatible with the one
● Quo warranto instituted by Hon. Zandueta against Hon. de la Costa
formerly occupied by him — , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by
○ Zandueta is alleging that de la Costa has been illegally occupying the office
taking the necessary oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by executing
of Judge CFI MANILA
acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the
● 1st appointment: Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance of CFI
corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was
MANILA, by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President in his favor,
occupying by virtue of his former appointment and he can not question the
and confirmed by the Com. on Appointments of the National Assembly.
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed
● CA 145 (Judicial Reorganization Law) was enacted
○ He is excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new
○ Zandueta received from the President a new ad interim appointment as
appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept
judge of first instance of both CFI MANILA & CFI PALAWAN in accordance
it by reason of legal exigencies
with said Act.
● If the petitioner believed, as he now seems to believe, that Commonwealth Act No.
● National Assembly adjourned with the Com. on Appointments NOT acting on the
145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment offered
new ad interim appointment of Zandueta
him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that
● 2nd appointment: Another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued for
his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to
Zandueta -- he took oath
the power entrusted with the final determination of the question whether a law is
● Zandueta, acting as executive judge, performed several executive acts:
unconstitutional or not.
○ Designation of assistant clerk as admin. Officer; Appointment of a lawyer
○ If he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would
as notary public; Authorized justice of the peace Iñigo R. Peña to defend a
later be estopped from questioning the validity of said appointment by
criminal case the hearing of which had begun during the past sessions in
alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued, is
Coron; Granted a leave of absence of 10 days to justice of the peace
unconstitutional.
Abordo; Granted a leave of absence of 13 days to another justice of the
○ He likewise knew, or at least he should know, that his ad interim
peace
appointment was subject to the approval of the Commission on
● May 1938: Com. on Appointments disapproved the ad interim appointment of
Appointments of the National Assembly and that if said commission were
Zandueta, who was advised by the Secretary of Justice
to disapprove the same, it would become ineffective and he would cease
● August 1938: President appointed de la Costa as judge to preside over CFI MANILA
discharging the office.
& CFI PALAWAN, and his appointment was approved by the Com. on Appointments
● when a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of
● De la Costa took the necessary oath and assumed office.
a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another
○ President issued the corresponding final appointment in favor of de la
appointment to preside over the same branch of the same Court of First Instance, in
Costa
addition to another court of the same category, both of which belong to a new
judicial district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to the old
ISSUE: W/N Zandueta may proceed to question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of
one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the
which the new ad interim appointment of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial
corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to be to repossess
District, to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his
it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new appointment
favor.
has been issued
○ said new appointment having been disapproved by the Commission on
RULING: NO -- HE IS ESTOPPED.
Appointments of the National Assembly, neither can he claim to continue
● It should be noted that the territory over which Zandueta could exercise and did
occupying the office conferred upon him by said new appointment, having
exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his last appointment is wider than that over which
ipso jure ceased in the discharge of the functions thereof.
he could exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of the former.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Wherefore, the petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the
same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner. So ordered.
18. Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres v CA
GR 118883
January 16,1998
By: MJB
Topic: Termination of Official Relations – Acceptance of Incompatible Office
Petitioners: SB of San Andres Catanduanes – V.Mayor Nenito Aquino and Mayor Lydia Romano
Respondents: CA and Augusto Antonio
Ponente: Carpio Morales
NOTE: Mahaba lang pagkakagawa ko dahil sa Doctrine pero madali lang siya.
DOCTRINE:
Resignation – Defined in Ortiz v Comelec act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he
declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. It is an expression of the incumbent
in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the
office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority."
● To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must
be:
o (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term;
o (b) an act of relinquishment;
o (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.
Abandonment of Office - voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the
intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. Indeed, abandonment of office is
a species of resignation; while resignation in general is a formal relinquishment, abandonment
is a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser. Nonuser refers to a neglect to use a privilege
or a right (Cylopedic Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.) or to exercise an easement or an office (Black's
Law Dictionary, 6th ed.). Abandonment springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and
freedom of choice. Its concomitant effect is that the former holder of an office can no longer
legally repossess it even by forcible reoccupancy.
● There are 2 essential elements of abandonment
o (1) an intention to abandon and
o (2) an overt act by which intention is carried on.
FACTS:
● Antonio, private respondent, was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay Catanduanes
on March 1989.
● He was later elected president of the Association of Barangay Council(ABC) for the
Municiplity of San Andres Catanduanes.
● Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1983, he was appointed by the President as
Member of the Sanguniang Bayan of the said municipality.
● Meanwhile, DILG Sec. declared the election for the president of the Federation of the
Association of Barangay Council(FABC) void for lack of quorum.
● As a result, the provincial council was reorganized.
● DILG Sec then designated private respondent as a temporary member of the Sanguniang
Panlalawigan of Catanduanes effective on 15 June 1990. Because of his designation,
private respondent tendered his resignation as a member of the Sanguniang
Bayan dated 14 June 1990 to the Mayor of San Andres Catanduanes. Copies of his
letters were also forwarded to the provincial governor, DILG and the municipal
treasurer
● Subsequently, Aquino then the Vice President of ABC was appointed by the provincial
governor as member of the Sanguniang Bayan in place of private respondent.
● Aquino assumed office on 18 July 1980 after taking his oath.
● Subsequently, the ruling of the DILG annulling the election of the FABC president was
reversed by the Supreme Court and declared the appointment of private respondent
void for lacking the essential qualification of being the president of FABC.
● On 31 March 1992, private respondent wrote to the Sanguniang Bayan(SB) of San Andres
regarding his re-assumption of his original position. SB refused.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent's resignation as ex-officio member of Petitioner Sangguniang
Bayan ng San Andres, Catanduanes is deemed complete so as to terminate his official
relation thereto; - NOPE!
2. Whether or not respondent had totally abandoned his ex-officio membership in
Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan
3. Whether or not respondent is entitled to collect salaries - NO SIR!
HELD/RATIO:
First Issue: RESIGNATION
● The resignation was not complete for lack of acceptance thereof of the proper authority
however, an office may still be deemed relinquished through
voluntary abandonment which needs no acceptance.
● In Ortiz vs Comelec, resignation is defined as the “act of giving up of an ifficer by which
he declines his office andrenounces the further right to use it”. It can be express or
implied.
● To constitute a complete and operative resignation the following must be present.
o (1) an intention to relinquish a part of the term;
o (b) an act of relinquishment;
o (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. In the case at bar, there was no
evidence that the private respondent’s resignation was accepted by the
proper authority.
● Although the Local Government Code of 1983 was silent as to who specifically should
accept the resignation it provides that the position shall be deemed vacated only upon
acceptance of resignation and should be acted upon by the Sangunian concerned.
● The resignation letter was tendered to the mayor and copies were sent to the governor,
DILG and the municipal treasurer but none of them expressly acted on it.
● Furthermore, under established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence of statutory
provisions as to whom it should be submitted, should be submitted to the appointing
power.
● Therefore, the resignation should have been submitted to the president or to the DILG as
the president’s alter ego.
Second Issue: ABANDONMENT
● Abandonment has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the
holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof.
● Resignation is the formal relinquishment, abandonment is the voluntary
relinquishment by non-user.
● There are 2 essential elements of abandonment
o (1) an intention to abandon and
o (2) an overt act by which intention is carried on.
● In the case at bar the first element was manifested on the following instances:
o (1) private respondent’s failure to perform his function as SB;
o (2) his failure to collect the corresponding renumeration for the position,
o (3)his failure to object to the appointment of Aquino as his replacement to SB
and
o (4) his prolonged failure to initiate any act to reassume his post in the SB after
SC had nullified his designation as member of Sanguniang Panlalawigan.
● The second element was demonstrated by the following:
o (1) his letter of resignation,
o (2) his assumption of office as member of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan,
o (3) his faithful discharge of his duties and functions of SP and
o (4) his recept of renumeration for such post.
Third Issue: SALARY
● Having ruled that private respondent had voluntarily abandoned his post at
theSangguniang Bayan, he cannot be entitled to any back salaries.
● Basic is the "no work, no pay" rule.
● A public officer is entitled to receive compensation for services actually rendered for as
long as he has the right to the office being claimed.
● When the act or conduct of a public servant constitutes a relinquishment of his office, he
has no right to receive any salary incident to the office he had abandoned.
● Petition Granted and Assailed Decision is Reversed and Set Aside. No Cost
20.) DARIO vs. MISON
G.R. NO. 81954
08 AUG 1989
TOPIC: Termination of official relations; Removal
PETITIONER: Cesar Dario
RESPONDENTS: HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME and HON. CATALINO
MACARAIG, JR., in their respective capacities as Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of
Finance, and Executive Secretary
PONENTE: Sarmiento
FACTS:
● On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3,
"DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE
PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND
PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW
CONSTITUTION."
● Among other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
○ The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:
○ (a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive structures,
and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime;
● Pursuant thereto, it was also provided:
○ SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is
made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
 ○ SECTION 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of the
organization effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws then in
force, receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder.
● The reorganization process actually started as early as February 25, 1986, when the
President called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignations
beginning with the members of the Supreme Court."
● Later on, she abolished the Batasang Pambansa and the positions of Prime Minister and
Cabinet under the 1973 Constitution. Since then, the President has issued a number of
executive orders and directives reorganizing various other government offices.
● On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated E.O. 127, "REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY
OF FINANCE." Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the reorganization
of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
● Three days later, on February 2, 1987, the Filipino people adopted the new Constitution.
● Incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in the nature
of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," prescribing the
procedure in personnel placement.
● On January 26, 1988, Commissioner Mison addressed several notices to various Customs
officials, in the tenor as follows:
○ Please be informed that the Bureau is now in the process of implementing the
Reorganization Program under Executive Order No. 127.
○ Pursuant to Section 59 of the same Executive Order, all officers and employees of the
Department of Finance, or the Bureau of Customs in particular, shall continue to perform
their respective duties and responsibilities in a hold-over capacity, and that those
incumbents whose positions are not carried in the new reorganization pattern, or who
are not re- appointed, shall be deemed separated from the service.
○ In this connection, we regret to inform you that your services are hereby terminated as
of February 28, 1988. Subject to the normal clearances, you may receive the retirement
benefits to which you may be entitled under existing laws, rules and regulations.
○ In the meantime, your name will be included in the consolidated list compiled by the Civil
Service Commission so that you may be given priority for future employment with the
Government as the need arises.
● As far as the records will likewise reveal, a total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau
of Customs were given individual notices of separation.
ISSUE: Whether Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a license upon
the Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done under an
"automatic" vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason. NO.
RULING:
● The core provision of law involved is Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution.
○ Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a
result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and
the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under
the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at
the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the Government
or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career
officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, had been accepted.
● The Court considers the above provision critical for two reasons:
○ (1) It is the only provision — in so far as it mentions removals not for cause — that would
arguably support the challenged dismissals by mere notice, and
○ (2) It is the single existing law on reorganization after the ratification of the 1987 Charter,
except Republic Act No. 6656, which came much later.
● It is also to be observed that unlike the grants of power to effect reorganizations under the
past Constitutions, the above provision comes as a mere recognition of the right of the
Government to reorganize its offices, bureaus, and instrumentalities.
● Other than references to "reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution,"
there is no provision for "automatic" vacancies under the 1987 Constitution.
● Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies.
They are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the new Constitution
free from the "fetters" of due process and security of tenure.
● At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of
office (not by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by reason
of economy or to remove redundancy of functions.
● In the latter case, the Government is obliged to prove good faith. In case of removals
undertaken to comply with clear and explicit constitutional mandates, the Government is
not hard put to prove anything, plainly and simply because the Constitution allows it.
● Evidently, the question is whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
is a grant of a license upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have
validly done under an "automatic" vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme
or reason.
● As we have seen, since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions for
"automatic" vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a
restraint upon the Government to dismiss public servants at a moment's notice.
● What is, indeed, apparent is the fact that if the present Charter envisioned an "automatic"
vacancy, it should have said so in clearer terms, as its 1935, 1973, and 1986 counterparts
had so stated.
● Whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter, and
necessarily, upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it can not be
legitimately stated that we are merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of
the Revolutionary Government had started.
● Reorganization under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution is not as stern as reorganization
under the prior Charter. Whereas the latter, sans the President's subsequently imposed
constraints, envisioned a purgation, the same cannot be said of the reorganization
inferred under the new Constitution because, precisely, the new Constitution seeks to
usher in a democratic regime.
○ But even if we concede ex gratia argumenti that Section 16 is an exception to due process
and no-removal-"except for cause provided by law" principles enshrined in the very same
1987 Constitution, which may possibly justify removals "not for cause," there is no
contradiction in terms here because, while the former Constitution left the axe to fall
where it might, the present organic act requires that removals "not for cause" must be as
a result of reorganization. As we observed, the Constitution does not provide for
"automatic" vacancies.
○ It must also pass the test of good faith — a test not obviously required under the
revolutionary government formerly prevailing, but a test well-established in democratic
societies and in this government under a democratic Charter.
● Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued
in good faith.
● As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a
dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in
that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall.
● Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is
done for political reasons or purposely to defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good
faith, no valid "abolition' takes place and whatever "abolition' is done, is void ab initio.
● There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of
positions, 82 or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
● The Court finds that after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs
hierarchy — except for the change of personnel — has occurred, which would have justified
the contested dismissals.
● There is no showing that legitimate structural changes have been made — or a
reorganization actually undertaken, for that matter — at the Bureau since Commissioner
Mison assumed office, which would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees.
● There can therefore be no actual reorganization to speak of, in the sense, say, of reduction
of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions, but a revamp of personnel pure and simple.
● The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel
but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988. 86 This betrays a clear intent to "pack"
the Bureau of Customs. He did so, furthermore, in defiance of the President's directive to
halt further layoffs as a consequence of reorganization.
● Finally, he was aware that layoffs should observe the procedure laid down by Executive
Order No. 17.
● We are not, of course, striking down Executive Order No. 127 for repugnancy to the
Constitution. While the act is valid, still and all, the means with which it was implemented is
not.
● In conclusion, we restate as follows:
● 1. The President could have validly removed government employees, elected or appointed,
without cause but only before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987
(De Leon v. Esguerra, supra; Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, supra); in this connection,
Section 59 (on non-reappointment of incumbents) of Executive Order No. 127 cannot be a
basis for termination;
● 2. In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid separation and retirement benefits or
upon their option be given reemployment opportunities (CONST. [1987], art. XVIII, sec. 16;
Rep. Act No. 6656, sec. 9);
● 3. From February 2, 1987, the State does not lose the right to reorganize the Government
resulting in the separation of career civil service employees [CONST. (1987), supra] provided,
that such a reorganization is made in good faith. (Rep. Act No. 6656, supra.)
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DATED JUNE 30, 1988,
SEPTEMBER 20, 1988, NOVEMBER 16, 1988, INVOLVED IN G.R. NOS. 85310, 85335, AND 86241,
AND MAY 8, 1989, INVOLVED IN G.R. NO. 85310, ARE AFFIRMED.
THE PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 81954, 81967, 82023, AND 85335 ARE GRANTED. THE PETITIONS
IN G.R. NOS. 83737, 85310 AND 86241 ARE DISMISSED.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS IS ORDERED TO REINSTATE THE EMPLOYEES SEPARATED
AS A RESULT OF HIS NOTICES DATED JANUARY 26, 1988.
THE EMPLOYEES WHOM COMMISSIONER MISON MAY HAVE APPOINTED AS REPLACEMENTS
ARE ORDERED TO VACATE THEIR POSTS SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF WHATEVER BENEFITS
THAT MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.
21. PEREZ V. PROVINCIAL BOARD
GR NO. L-35474
MARCH 29, 1982
By: CLAIRE
Topic: FORFEITURE
Petitioners: HONORATO C. PEREZ
Respondents: PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA, HON. EDUARDO L. JOSON, in his capacity
as Governor of Nueva Ecija, and VALENTIN C. ESCUADRO, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer
of Nueva Ecija
Ponente: ESCOLIN
FACTS:
· An action was filed for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul Resolution
No. 228 of the respondent Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija; to enjoin respondents from
enforcing and implementing said Resolution; and to compel respondents to recognize
petitioner Honorato Perez as acting provincial fiscal
· When former fiscal Celestino Juan was appointed judge of the CFI of Quezon, Sec of
Justice, in AO 388, designated first assistant fiscal Emilio Cecilio of Nueva Ecija as acting
provincial fiscal
· Then Pres. Marcos nominated Honorato for appointment to the position of provincial
fiscal of Nueva Ecija. It appears, however, that the nomination was submitted to the
Commission on Appointments (COA) for confirmation was by-passed upon adjournment
sine die of Congress. The ff day, Marcos designated petitioner as acting provincial fiscal.
· Reacting to the said designation, Provincial Board enacted Resolution No. 146 address
to the COA, manifesting its opposition to the confirmation of Honorato’s appointment.
Gov. Joson also filed a formal protest w/ the Committee on Justice of the COA, making
known his strong & emphatic opposition to the confirmation. After submission of
evidence, the said Committee resolved not to recommend the confirmation of Honorato’s
appointment.
· During the 6th special session of Congress, Honorato was nominated anew for
appointment to the office in question, but the same was likewise by-passed upon
adjournment of the Congress.
· Aug 11, 1972, Honorato took his oath of office as acting provincial fiscal pursuant to
the designation extended by Marcos; and on Aug 14, 1972 he formally assumed office
· Aug 21, 1972, Provincial Board passed Resolution No 288, ordering Provincial
Treasurer to stop payment of Honorato’s salaries as acting provincial fiscal. The dispute
came when the Provincial Treasurer disapproved Honorato’s requisition for various office
supplies. His salary vouchers were likewise disapproved by the Governor.
ISSUE: WON Provincial Board has the power to pass & enact a resolution not recognizing
Honorato as acting provincial fiscal despite the fact that Honorato assumed office pursuant to
the designation of the president // WON Provincial Board has the power to defy and/or pass
judgment on the validity of the said designation and assumption

RULING:
1. We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the issues raised, this petition having become
moot and academic.
2. We take cognizance of the fact that petitioner Perez filed his certificate of candidacy
for the office of mayor of Cabanatuan City in the local elections of January 30, 1980.
3. The mere filing of a certificate of candidacy constitutes forfeiture of his right to the
controverted office under Section 29 of the Election Code of 1978 which provides:
"SEC. 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position. — Every person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall
ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy.
Members of the Cabinet shall continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the
filing of certificate of candidacy, subject to the pleasure of the President of the Philippines."
4. A petition instituted to establish petitioner's right to an appointive office is rendered
moot and academic where his right to said office has been forfeited by his filing of a
certificate of candidacy to an elective office.
ACCORDINGLY, this petition is hereby dismissed, No costs. SO ORDERED.
22. DE LLANA v. ALBA
G.R. NO. 57883
March 12, 1982
KCTR
Topic: TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS; ABOLITION OF OFFICE
Petitioners: GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of
Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C.
ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON
AGUILA
Respondents: MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUITCO, Chairman,
Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice
Ponente: FERNANDO, C. J.
DOCTRINE: The abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in
good faith suffers from no infirmity.
FACTS:
● Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes,” was passed. It provides that:
o Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to
municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and
the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary.
● De llana, Presiding Judge of City Court of Olongapo, filed for Declaratory Relief
and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin Minister of the Budget, Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and Minister of Justice from implementing Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.
o alleged that the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been
ignored and disregarded
o imputed lack of good faith in its enactment
● Solicitor General Mendoza filed an Answer.
o pointed out that there is no valid justification for the attack on the
constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power
vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary
o claimed that allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on
the independence of the judiciary are unwarranted and devoid of any
support in law
ISSUE:
W/N Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is unconstitutional – NO.
RULING:
1. The Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts
and in the process, to abolish existing ones.
● Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power
to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to
certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court.
2. The Batasang Pambansa did not act arbitrarily in enacting the assailed law, but rather, in
good faith.
● A Report was submitted by Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization.
o It is imperative that there be a greater efficiency in the disposition of cases
and that litigants, especially those of modest means — much more so, the
poorest and the humblest — can vindicate their rights in an expeditious
and inexpensive manner.
o There is need for a major reform in the judicial system.
o This process of modernization and change compels the government to
extend its field of activity and its scope of operations.
o equally of vital concern is the problem of clogged dockets
● Cabinet Bill #42 was the basis for BP 129.
o The Bill alleged that its enactment would result in, 1.) more efficiency in
the disposal of cases; 2.) improvement in the quality of justice; and 3.) the
reform would fit the court system to the exigencies of present and future
Philippine society.
● The deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa amounted to 590 pages.
o much discussion and research went into this law
3. Abolition of the existing inferior courts does not collide with the security of tenure enjoyed
by incumbent Justices and judges Under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution.
● It is admitted that Section 9 of the same Article of the Constitution provides for the
security of tenure of all the judges.
● Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition
of the office.
o There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there
is in law no occupant.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications . . . If
petition is dismissed. No costs. innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as
he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he
25. Loyao v Caube deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable
A.M. No. P-02-1599. under the situation.
April 30, 2003. ● Considering the gravity of his offense, we find the recommendation of Judge
By: RRV ● Loyao that respondent be dismissed from the service to be well-taken. Clearly, he
Topic: Death was guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Petitioners: EXECUTIVE JUDGE LEANDRO T. LOYAO, JR ● To be sure, respondent Caube's death has permanently foreclosed the prosecution
Respondents: MAMERTO J. CAUBE, Clerk of Court II and RICARDO B. QUISADIO, of any other actions, be it criminal or civil, against him for his malfeasance in office.
Court Interpreter II, Branch 1, MTC, Maasin, Southern Leyte We are, however, not precluded from imposing the appropriate administrative
Ponente: Per Curiam sanctions against him. Respondent's misconduct is so grave as to merit his dismissal
from the service, were it not for his untimely demise during the pendency of these
Doctrine: The death or retirement of any judicial officer from the service does not preclude proceedings. However, since the penalty can no longer be carried out, this case is
the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. now declared closed and terminated
FACTS:
● A group of teachers filed a complaint against Mamerto Caube Ricardo Quisadio for ACCORDINGLY, based on all the foregoing, this administrative matter is CLOSED AND
Grave Misconduct in Office and Usurpation of Judicial Functions TERMINATED in view of the death of respondent Clerk of Court Mamerto J. Caube.
○ Caube was Clerk of Court II SO ORDERED
○ Quisadio was Court Interpreter
● They alleged that respondent Caube issued subpoenas directing them to appear
before his office for a conference to settle their financial obligations to Ester
Servacio, owner of the Maasin Traders Lending Corporation. Respondent Caube
signed the subpoenas purportedly on authority of Presiding Judge Cunanan.
● Despite the fact that they were not parties to any civil or criminal cases,
complainants appeared before respondent Caube's office, where they met with
Servacio and eventually reached a settlement of the latter's claims. Respondent
Caube drew the necessary compromise agreement, wherein the complainants
agreed to pay the amount of P12,000.00 each to Servacio on or before 30 April 1998,
otherwise, formal complaints may be instituted against them.
○ (In short, the Clerk of Court presided over settlement whereby the
teachers paid their debts to Servacio. As if this Clerk was a judge.)
● The complainants argued that the respondent Caube had no authority to issue court
processes against them since they were not involved in any lawsuit. Moreover, the
fact of being subpoenaed and required to appear before the court was traumatic to
them. They also alleged that respondent Caube collected from them the amount of
P500.00 as attorney's fees for his services in preparing the amicable settlement
● Judge Loyao recommended to the OCA Caube be dismissed, and Quisadio be
suspended.
● While the proceedings were ongoing, Caube died in Cebu.
● The case against Quisadio was dismissed
ISSUE: W/N the administrative liability of a public officer is extinguished due to his death -
NO
RULING:
● The death or retirement of any judicial officer from the service does not preclude
the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable.
● The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official
innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be