9

CHAPTER – I

INTRODUCTION
 10

INTRODUCTION
The text books on modern Indian history ascribe the origin of 1857 Uprising to the unrest of the
native sepoys in Bengal and Meerut in May of that year. The geographical extent of the mutiny
as it turned into a revolt was confined, according to these texts, to Bengal and further west to
Awadh, Delhi and some parts of central India. The impression that the history students are given
of the uprising is that many parts of the subcontinent, including the North East, were unaffected
by this historic event. Leading historians of North East India have done some studies on the area
and have made it known that this region was no less turbulent during this mutiny turned revolt.
On Assam many good works have been done on this area of study by different scholars. But, so
far, no scholar has done any good work on the response of the people of Jaintia, Cachar and the
independent kingdom of Manipur to this great uprising. Materials, mainly archival, on the real
nature and character of the events of 1857 in North East India still await scholars who intend to
work on this area. Therefore, this work is a sincere attempt to study the stated undiscovered area
of the nature and character of the events of 1857 in this region.

1.1 Currents of 1857 Revolt in North East India

As in the case of North India, it was also those discontented erstwhile aristocracy and nobility
who had played a great role in these events in North East India. One different nature in this
region was that of the absence of any mutiny of sepoys stationed in this region. It was the main
reason why there was less number of European casualties in 1857. Even if there was no mutiny
forerunning the events, the region experienced some currents which had resulted in the
conspiracies, plots and revolts. Those main currents which had made deep imprints in this region
in 1857 were four in number. First, Maniram Dewan (an erstwhile noble of Assam) who was in
Calcutta then imported the wave of 1857 Revolt into Assam; secondly, incriminating letters,
mendicants and agents from North India infected the idea of 1857 Revolt to the sepoys of
Assam; thirdly, the mutiny of the three Companies of 34th Native Infantry Regiment, Chittagong,
and that of the 73rd Native Infantry Regiment stationed at Dacca and their march towards North
 11

East India and fourthly, spreading of the news of the fall of British rule in India with the
completion of the latter‟s a hundred years rule (i.e., 100 years after the Battle of Plassey, 23 June
1757). Indeed, after the rebels‟ occupation of Delhi and Lucknow they decided to incite the
troops and people of Bengal for a united cause. By this time, most of the north eastern states of
India were under the Government of Bengal. Here, it was expressed:
“A proclamation should be issued both to the troops and people of Bengal if possible, or
if otherwise, as far as possible at present, to the effect that the people of every city,
whether Hindus or Muslims, should be unanimous in attacking simultaneously this
accursed nation (by the appointment of a leader in each city).”1
Consequently, the plots and conspiracies made in Assam in 1857 were directly connected with
Delhi as a report also expressed:
“Many of the men of the first Assam Light Infantry are from the Arrah District, and
closely related to the mutineers of the 40th N.I. Some of them are from the estates of Koar
Singh and an uneasy spirit has lately been perceived to prevail among them. From
information collected from independent quarters, the men of the regiment above
mentioned appear to have been in communication with the Jorehat Rajah, Sarang
Kunderpesswar Singh, and to have offered to retake the province and hold it for him,
pending the receipt of final instruction, it is believed from Delhi.”2
Indeed, Maniram Dewan who made plots in 1857 in Assam was really influenced by Istahars
(notifications) of Mughal Emperor as one of them read as follows:
“Hook or by crook, the Feringis must be driven out from Hindusthan. Must they be
cleared out, even, at the cost of your life. All Hindusthan, must regain independence. But
we must have the leader who shall be honest, sincere and have the command over the
disintegrated people. He shall have to be courageous too.”3
As the revolt needed a united power of the Indians to fight against the British, its leaders made
appeals for unity and integration of all Hindus and Muslims. Here, Iqbal Husain writes, “Appeal
to unity and protection of deen aur dharam is made in almost all the Proclamations issued by
Nana Sahib, Brijis Qadr, Khan Bahadur Khan, Rani Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi, Prince Feroze Shah
and Bahadur Shaha Zafar.”4 In fact, agents from North India entered Assam to arouse the sepoys
of Assam to rise under the leadership of Saring Raja Kanderpeswar Singha. Hannay, the
Commandant of the First Assam Light Infantry, told Mr. Carter on 17th August that agents from
 12

Northern India were in Gauhati and “trying to arrange a rising amongst our sepoys in connection
with the Assam Raja.”5 Under the third Category, places like Tripura, Cachar, Manipur and
lower Assam witnessed events of 1857. For Tripura, the Raja did not have any commendable
engagement against the mutineers. Really, the then Lieutenant Governor, F.J. Halliday wrote
that “the conduct of the Tippera Raja seemed open to some question, as he had done little
towards checking the progress of the mutinous detachment; but the power of this chief is merely
nominal, and I trust that his apparent backwardness will prove to have been the result, not of
disloyalty, but of disability to afford Government any substantial assistance.”6 Therefore, Tripura
is not studied in a separate chapter. When the Chittagong mutineers arrived at the border of
Cachar and Manipur, they were defeated time and again and many of them were captured by
Kuki scouts who were engaged by the British Authorities of Cachar. Here Buckland writes:
“They were completely disorganized and dispirited; numbers had been killed by Kuki
scouts who had been offered a reward for every sepoy killed by them. One petty chief,
named Manjihow, had accounted for not less than 12 of them. Some men were found
dead in the jungle from actual starvation, and, to be brief, of the 3 companies which left
Chittagong not more than 3 or 4 men are believed to have escaped death or capture.”7
The mutineers of the 73rd Native Infantry marched towards North East and entered Goalpara
District of Assam and plundered Bugwah. Here, the Special Narrative of the Government of
Bengal, expressed, “The party of armed sepoys who had appeared at Karaibari from the direction
of Mymensing…were reported to have gone off in the direction of Cooch Behar or Bootan, after
having killed a Burkundaz of the Gowalparrah police and plundered Bugwah and another
neighboring village.”8 Had the 73rd N.I taken their way towards east and successfully joined the
34th N.I, it would have been very difficult for the Sylhet Light Infantry to control the unrest in
the Eastern Frontier. By the fourth current, places like Khashi and Jaintia Hills were aroused as a
statement was made „that “exaggerated rumors” of the fall of the British power had caused some
excitement among the Khasi chiefs. Mention is specially made of the former Jaintia raja,
Rajendra Singh and his intrigues with the Cherra Syiem to recover his lost possession.‟9 The
Cherra Raja had already expressed his loyal disposition to the British Government. Therefore,
the intrigues of Raja Rajendra Singh with Cherra Raja failed. On the Khashis, Mr. Allen
(deputed at Cherrapunji) reported that:
 13

“A Khasia of the name of Surka, a chief adviser of the Cherra raja, who was at that time
confined in the jail for some offence, had been found attempting to tamper with a sepoy
of the jail guard. His term of imprisonment was nearly out, but he was in consequence of
this detained; as soon as the disturbance in the plains ceased, he was released on
security.”10
Therefore, Surka‟s attempt for a revolt in the Khashi territory was a failure.
Since the Raja of Cherrapunji had shown his allegiance to the British Government, only
one Chapter, concerning Raja Rajendra of Jaintia who had also made conspiracies with his hill
Doolois, is dealt with in this thesis regarding the state of Meghalaya. In this way, only those
events having serious concerns like that of Assam, Jaintia, Cachar and Manipur are studied in
separate chapters. One chapter concerning Chittagong mutineers and the Battle of Latoo is
included, as its character though a mutiny, is somewhat different from other events which had
occurred in North India.
As the revolt was suppressed in North India with a heavy hand, the plots, conspiracies
and the revolt of the people of North East India were also controlled by tact and superior
technology of the British. On the failure of the great revolt, William Dalrymple writes on
Bahadur Shaha Zafar, “He was physically infirm, partially senile and had no money to pay the
troops who flocked to his standard. Octogenarians can hardly lead a cavalry charge.”11 On this
very failure, Suvobrata Sarkar also expresses on the role of electric telegraph, “The telegraph
played a crucial role when a large-scale revolt broke out in 1857. This was perhaps the first
„telegraph war‟.”12
1.2 Historical background, literature study and objective
1.2.1 Assam and the Revolt of 1857
Assam was not conquered by the British, but was fraudulently acquired. It suffered annexation
even though its rulers had not gone to war against the British. The Ahom state ceased to exist
after the Treaty of Yandaboo, 1826. Of the two Ahom princes who had taken refuse under the
British, Chandra Kanta was pensioned and removed to Kaliabor. Purandar Singha was not
provided with any pension as it was believed that he had considerable wealth. Later, Upper
Assam was returned to Purandar Singha for five years (1833-1838), after which the Company
resumed its administration there. A glaring cause of the plots and conspiracies in Assam, in
 14

1857, was that of the destitute condition of those erstwhile nobilities after the British occupation
of Assam. On the occupation of Assam, David Syiemlieh writes:
“It fell heavily on a class of people long accustomed to a life of ease to change their
habits so abruptly and to take up other vocations particularly demanding physical labour.
They possessed neither land nor much of movable property: the state provided hitherto all
their requirements through the service of the pykes while their comforts and dignities
were maintained by the slaves who could be procured in those days in abundance. The
socio-economic changes in the wake of British occupation naturally brought irritation and
sufferings in every home that had depended on the services of others.”13
The case of the princes and the nobles was taken up by Maniram Dewan and moved it up to the
level of Lt. Governor of Bengal. When the case was rejected, Maniram Dewan joined the 1857
Revolt by making plots to rise against the British.
Many historians have given their views on the volcanic nature of 1857 in Assam. K.N.
Dutt, in his Landmarks of the Freedom Struggle in Assam, writes that, “Three companies of
European seamen with 100 men each were sent to Assam one after the other.”14 S.K. Chaube, in
his “1857 in India and her Northeast”, expresses on Maniram Dewan that, “He was dangerous to
the colonial masters. He had to be eliminated, especially because the British officers suspected
widespread disaffection among the native soldiers of the First Assam Light Infantry and the
Local Artillery Corps at Dibrugarh and Golaghat in Upper Assam, the erstwhile dominion of the
Ahom Government.”15 Once again, Benudhar Sharma, in his The Rebellion of 1857 vis-à-vis
Assam, states that, “Amid the two hundred thousand Indian Martyrs who laid down their lives at
the altar of the country‟s freedom in 1857, Maniram Dewan and Piyali Barau must be counted as
two of the brightest luminaries whose names posterity must remember with reverent care.”16
Indeed, Maniram Dewan was a great statesman, economist and a philosopher martyr of
Assam in the early second half of the nineteenth century A.D. After his visits to Calcutta and
exposing himself into the socio-economic and political developments in Bengal during the first
half of the nineteenth century, a lot of changes had taken place in his previous social and political
dispositions. He, remaining in deep thoughts in his lonely room on the Chitpur Road, Calcutta,
seems to have had many dreams of Assam. In 1857, the Dewan joined the revolt by making
conspiracies, and consequently, was arrested and hanged to dead on 26th February, 1858. On the
scaffold, the leader‟s last comment to the people of Assam was, “O my countrymen! You had to
 15

suffer and grieve a lot from me during my tenure of office. It behoves of you, now, to forgive me
at this juncture, for all those omissions and commissions on my part.”17 Here, what was really
expected from the mouth of the leader was- Long Live Ahom Monarchy. But the martyr did not
express it. It seems that there was a preconceived dream (highly philosophical) in the mind of
Maniram Dewan when he expressed his last words. One more aspect in the study of Maniram
Dewan can be his objectives (dreams) when Madhu Mallick was made his associate some
months before the 1857 Revolt. On these areas, so far, no scholar has taken pains to highlight the
possible dreams of the leader. Therefore, in one chapter of this thesis a sincere attempt is made to
discover Maniram Dewan‟s underlying philosophy on the above stated areas of study.

1.2.2 1857 in Jaintia Hills

The plain areas of Jaintia were annexed to the territory of the Company on 15th March, 1835, on
the question of human sacrifice. Raja Rajendra Singh was not satisfied with the treatment meted
out to him by the British Government. When the ex-Raja heard about the fall of the British
Empire in 1857, he started making plots with the Cherra Raja as well as his Dolois. The
Government‟s first reaction to this report was that Rajendra Singh should be seized if possible
and sent to Calcutta. Allen cautioned that this would be making the raja and the whole
proceedings of more importance than it deserved.18 At that juncture, owing to the failure of his
plots, the former Raja, in turn, wrote a letter to the Government offering his willingness to fight
with the British against the mutineers.
On Jaintia in 1857, Sir Edward Gait, in his A History of Assam, writes, “Exaggerated
stories of the fall of the British power caused some excitement amongst the Khasi Chiefs, and the
ex-Raja of Jaintia began to intrigue with some of them with a view to the recovery of his lost
possessions.”19 Once again, David R. Syiemlieh, in his “Historiography of Literature and sources
on the Uprising of 1857 in North East India,” expresses, “Mention is specifically made of the
former Jaintia raja, Rajendra Singh and his intrigues with the Cherra Syiem to recover his lost
possessions.”20 But, Dr. Shobhan N. Lamare, in his Resistance Movements in North-East India,
writes, “On September 15, 1857, the ex-Jaintia Raja, Rajendra Sing offered to assist the
Company to subdue the Sepoys in revolt.”21 It was also stated that the ex-Raja was ready to
proceed to Hindustan with his troops comprising “2500 (Cookees, Khasis and Moneepuris) to
 16

fight against the enemy of the British Government.”22 Therefore, contrasting statements were
made on the Raja needing serious study to analyze the circumstances which had led him to
change his mind from being an arch enemy of the British then to a supporter of the British
Government. So far, no scholar has done any study on this area. Therefore, in a chapter of this
thesis, an attempt is made to study critically the circumstances which had rendered Raja
Rajendra Singh to change his mind so soon from being an anti-British conspirator to a person
who had decided to support the British in 1857 Revolt.

1.2.3 Chittagong Mutineers and the Battle of Latoo

At Chittagong, three companies of the 34th Native Infantry Regiment were stationed. In the
beginning of the great revolt the sepoys of these three companies remained loyal to the British.
With the spread of the Revolt of 1857 towards eastern India reaching Jagadishpur, the sepoys of
Chittagong became restless and, all of a sudden, mutinied on 18th November, 1857. They
marched towards North East and entered Cachar where they were completely defeated.
On the mutiny of the 34th N.I. Chittagong, J.B. Bhattacharjee, in his Cachar under British
Rule in North East India, writes that “three companies of the 34th Native Infantry, which had
mutinied at Chittagong, entered Cachar with the intention to push on into Manipur. They were
encountered by the British troops at several places. At Latu the mutineers succeeded in killing
Major Byng of the Sylhet Light Infantry.”23 On this area of study, Sir Edward Gait, in his A
History of Assam, expresses that:
“the three companies of the 34th Native Infantry stationed at Chittagong mutinied and
after burning their lines, breaking open the jail and plundering the treasury, marched in
the district of Comilla; they then turned off into the jungle of Hill Tippera, whence they
subsequently emerged in the south-east of the Sylhet district.”24
Here, these scholars have not taken much pain on the study of the real nature and character of
these mutineers when they fought the Battle of Latoo. This thesis makes a sincere attempt, in one
chapter, to deal with the real nature of these mutineers at the Battle of Latoo (Malegarh Hills,
Karimganj District, Assam).

1.2.4 Cachar and the Revolt of 1857

Cachar was under Kachari rulers when it started its diplomatic as well as commercial relations
with the Company. When it was under Govindchandra (1813-30), it became very weak. At this
 17

time, Manipuri princes who took shelter in Cachar expelled Govindchandra to Sylhet and ruled
over South Cachar for six years (1818-1823). Many Manipuris, in that process, became
permanent settlers of Cachar. When Cachar was annexed by the British in 1832, colonial
economy was introduced. By that time, those gallant Manipuris living in Cachar no longer liked
to be under the British. Taking the advantage of 1857 Revolt, Manipuris under the leadership of
Prince Narendrajit Singh revolted against the British and fought the Battle of Binnacandy on 12 th
January, 1858.
On the role played by prince Narendrajit Singh in Cachar with the mutineers of the 34th
Native Infantry Regiment, Chittagong, Sir Edward Gait, in his A History of Assam writes, “They
still headed for Manipur, and were joined by some Manipuri princes, pretenders to the raj, with a
few followers.”25 Here, the author failed to analyze critically with facts to support his statement.
This topic was also studied by H.K. Barpujari in his Assam in the Days of the Company, and
expressed about the mutineers of Chittagong, “After marching through the Jungles of Hill
Tipperah they entered into south-east corner of the district of Sylhet with the object of joining in
Cachar Narendrajit, the pretender to the Manipur Raj, and his followers.”26 Again, J.B.
Bhattacharjee in his Cachar under British Rule in North East India stated, “The Manipuri
princes, then detained in Cachar and having designs on the throne of Manipur, endeavored to
befriend the mutineers, but failed to organize and thereby exposed themselves to British
wrath.”27 The same area was again studied by David R. Syiemlieh, in his article, “Historiography
of Literature and Sources on The Uprising of 1857 in North East India,” in Rethinking 1857, and
expressed:
“The former rulers of the district, which was annexed in 1832, made no attempt to join
and support the sepoys once they entered the district. Manipuri princes, on the other
hand, wanted to take advantage of the mutiny in Cachar. There does not appear to have
been much popular support.”28
These statements are more or less the repetition of Gait‟s view on Narendrajit Singh and they all
require sufficient facts and records to support their views. In this thesis, a sincere attempt is made
depending more on archival source materials with conclusion that Narendrajit Singh‟s uprising in
1857 had the support of the people of Cachar, and also, it could not be for the throne of Manipur.
Therefore, it is an effort to cast fresh light on those areas which remained untouched by previous
scholars.
 18

1.2.5 Manipur in 1857

Manipur regained her independence after the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826). Gambhir
Singh became the Raja of this restored kingdom. Later, Manipuris came to know that their
human resources had been exploited by the British not only in Manipur but also in Cachar.
Indeed, the British policy on Manipur was to make it a watch-dog of the Company against
Burma. In Cachar too, Manipuris were engaged in protecting Kuki raids under the Company‟s
policy of giving Tuccavi (Loan). In 1834, the British Government, in a measure to appease the
Burmese who were preparing to invade the British territory, ceded the Kabaw Valley of Manipur
to Burma. Besides, the interference of the Company in the internal affairs of Manipur made
Manipuris more and more anti-British. That was why Manipuris, except a few under Raja
Chandrakirti Singh, did not support the British in 1857.
On this event, Cheitharol Kumbaba (the chronicle of Manipur) mentions that hearing the
war of Hindus against the British and their march towards Manipur there were five gun shots and
600 sepoys under Nameirakpa Major went and reached Jiri.29 The same area was studied by
Alexander Mackenzie in his The North-East Frontier of India and expressed, “The conduct of
the Rajah during the mutiny was reported to have been praiseworthy, and the satisfaction of the
Government was accordingly expressed on the subject.”30 Once again, Robert Brown in his
Statistical Account of Manipur stated, “The conduct and feelings of the raja and the majority of
the officials and inhabitants were at that time good, and the raja‟s offers of assistance to the
British Government in case of need sincere.”31 However, this statement of good nature of the
inhabitants of Manipur is quite contrary to the statement of McCulloch (Political Agent at
Manipur) that, “Throughout these proceedings the conduct of the Rajah has been most
praiseworthy. He and one or two of his officers were the only men in the country who seemed to
have interest in what they were doing.”32 Therefore, a critical study of the response of the Raja
and the masses of Manipur to 1857 would be of high value for the history of India in general and
North East India in particular. This thesis also deals seriously with this new area of study in the
history of North East India.
1.3 British preparations to face 1857 in North East India
 19

As the Revolt of 1857 was spreading more and more at different regions of the subcontinent,
there was a high possibility of spreading it in North East India also. Therefore, the Government
took up the following steps to face the possible revolt in the region.
1.3.1 Deputation of Mr. Allen in North East India
Mr. W.J. Allen, Officiating Member of the Board of Revenue, was deputed at Cherrapunji to
take up possible steps in this region to face any untoward incident related to 1857. Here, C E
Buckland writes, “Mr. Allen, of the Sadar Board of Revenue, had been deputed to Cherrapunji
some months before the commencement of any disturbances, and I found it advisable to place the
Eastern frontier temporarily under his control, a measure which has been very successful.”33
Indeed, it was at the later end of August 1857 that the districts of Sylhet and Cachar were placed
under Mr. Allen, and later, the Chittagong mutineers and their revolt with the people of Cachar
was suppressed. On the role of Allen, it was recorded, “At Sylhet Mr. Allen had taken every
precaution for the protection of the district. He had also written to Capt. McCulloch at Munipoor
to warn the Munipoor Government to be prepared to attack the fugitives should they found their
way into the territory.”34 Had not the Sylhet Light Infantry taken prompt actions under the
directives of Mr. Allen, the Eastern frontiers of British India would have been under a serious
political deadlock. C E Buckland again writes:
“Had not the Sylhet Light Infantry displayed an almost unhoped-for loyalty, and,
moreover, a very distinguished gallantry, the eastern districts would have been utterly
disorganized for an indefinite time, and, even supposing troops to be available, there
would have been most serious difficulty in restoring matters to their original state of
tranquility.”35
1.3.2 Formation of the Manipur Regiment
During the 1857 Revolt, as most of the British Army was engaged in the North India, there were
very few of them in the Eastern frontier. Therefore, the Government decided to establish a
Manipur Regiment to assist the Government at this precarious hour. Accordingly, it was
reported, “Orders were issued to the Pol. Agent at Muneepore and the officer commanding the
S.L.I. (Sylhet Light Infantry) to raise a corps each of 1500 Munipooreans to be drilled at
Cherrapoonji.”36 The Government also arranged the accommodation for the recruited Manipuris
at Cherrapunji. Here it was expressed, “The repair of the old jail was sanctioned for their
accommodation and arrangements were made to procure a sufficient supply of grain for their
 20

maintenance. Natives of Muneepore were recommended for enlistment in preference to the

Cacharees, the former being more active and warlike.”37 Regarding the pay of the sepoys of
Manipur Regiment, the Government of Bengal expressed, “It was suggested that they should
receive the same pay as the Sylhet Light Infantry while under training and that their pay should
be increased when they became general service corps.”38 After some time, when the Manipuris in
Cachar revolted against the Government, the headquarters of the said regiment was shifted to
Jamalpur (Bengal) to avoid any kind of support to those rebels. C E Buckland also writes, “The
Manipur Levy, which was raised at Cherrapunji, has been moved to Jamalpur, and all seems to
promise a continuance of tranquility.”39
1.3.3 British diplomacy and the Raja of Manipur
In the early fifties of the nineteenth century, Raja Chandrakirti Singh of Manipur did not have a
cordial relationship with the British Government. To improve his image, the Raja, therefore,
wanted to give some assistance to the Government when the revolt started. At this juncture,
Robert Stewart, Officiating Superintendent of Cachar, was in great need of more army for the
safeguard of his district. His request to the authorities in Calcutta to send more British Army
failed. When the Chittagong mutineers entered Cachar the Superintendent tactfully wrote a letter
to McCulloch, Agent at Manipur, stating that the “Munniporees who might guide them to this
country were with the Mutineers.”40 On hearing it, the Raja, being enraged and also to fulfill his
wish sent 400 sepoys on the Cachar border to assist Robert Stewart. Hence, the Government
tactfully influenced the Raja of Manipur to get his fullest support to the British Government.

1.4 Research Methodology

While working on this thesis, source materials like archival, military field reports, chronicles,
gazetteers, oral sources, folk songs, diaries, news papers and journals are consulted. Some of the
archival sources which are collected from the National Archives of India (New Delhi), the West
Bengal State Archives and the Manipur State Archives are Abstract Proceedings of Bengal
Mutiny, Judicial General Letters to C (Court) of Directors, Judicial Abstract Proceedings,
Special Narrative of the Mutiny (Govt. of Bengal), Foreign Secret Consultations, Judicial
Department Proceedings, Home Public Proceedings, Foreign Political Consultations, Foreign
Department proceedings, Judicial Index, Foreign Political Letters to Court of Directors and
Political Letters from Secy. of State etc. Besides, many secondary source materials which are
 21

preserved primarily in the National Library, Calcutta; the ICHR Library, New Delhi; Libraries of
the Imphal College, the Manipur University, the Assam University and the Manipur State
Archives are also a good source of this thesis.
.

REFERENCES
1. Iqbal Hussain (ed.), Proclamations of the Rebels of 1857, (Draft, ICHR, New Deihi),
Document No. 18, Bismillah-hir-Rahmanir Rahim-Pamphlet Fath Islam.
2. Judicial letters to C (Court) of Directors, Special Narrative, 30th August - 5th September 1857,
dt., 12th September 1857, No. 24, para 113, Govt. of Bengal, West Bengal State Archives
(Hereafter, WBSA).
3. Benudhar Sharma, Rebellion of 1857 vis-à-vis Assam, (Chenikuthi, Gauhati, 1858), p. 30.
4. Iqbal Husain, “Remembering 1857,” in S.N. Raza Rizvi, S.Z.H. Jafri (eds.), The Great
Uprising of 1857, (Anamika Publishers & Distributers (P) LTD., New Delhi, 2009), p. 26.
5. David R. Syiemlieh, “Historiography of Literature and Source on the Uprising of 1857 in
North East India,” in Sabyasachi Bhattacharya (ed.), Rethinking 1857, (Orient Blackswan
Private Limited, New Delhi, 2009), p. 214.
6. C E Buckland, Bengal under the Lieutenant Governors, Vol. I., (Deep Publications, New
Delhi, 1976), pp. 151-52.
7. Ibid., p. 150.
8. Judicial Department, dt. 2nd January 1858, Special Narrative, No. 1, para 42, Govt. of Bengal,
WBSA.
 22

9. David R. Syiemlieh, op. cit., p. 216.

10. C E Buckland, op. cit., pp. 150-51.
11. William Dalrymple, The Last Mughal: The Fall of a Dynasty, Delhi 1857, (Penguin Books
India Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 2007), p. 483.
12. Suvobrata Sarkar, “Technological Momentum: Bengal in the Nineteenth Century,” in Indian
Historical Review, Vol. 37, Number 1, (SAGE Publications, New Delhi, June 2010), p. 97.
13. David R. Syiemlieh, op. cit., p. 212.

14. K.N. Dutt, Landmarks of the Freedom Struggle in Assam, (Guwahati: Lawyer‟s Book Stall,
1958), p. 26.

15. S.K. Chaube, “1857 in India and her Northeast”, in B. Datta Ray, Bimal I. Deb and
Siddeshwar Sarma (eds.), Freedom Struggle in North East India, (Omsons Publications, New
Delhi, 2011), p. 8.

16. Benudhar Sharma, op. cit., p. 15.

17. Ibid. p. 72.

18. David R. Syiemlieh, op. cit., p. 216.

19. Sir Edward Gait, A History of Assam, (Lawyer‟s Book Stall, Gauhati, 1997), p. 309.
20. David R. Syiemlieh, op. cit., p. 216.
21. Dr. Shobhan N. Lamare, Resistance Movements in North-East India: The Jaintias of
Meghalaya, (Regency Publication, Delhi, 2001), p. 44.
22. Dr. Hamlet Bareh, The History and Culture of the Khasi People, (Spectrum Publications,
Gauhati), p. 160; also see Dr. Shobhan N. Lamare, op. cit., pp. 44-45.
23. J.B. Bhattacharjee, Cachar under British Rule in North East India, (Radiant Publishers, New
Delhi, 1977), pp. 247-48.
24. Sir Edward Gait, op. cit., p. 309.
25. Ibid., p. 310.
26. H.K. Barpujari, Assam in the Days of the Company (1826-1858), (Spectrum Publications,
Gauhati, 1980), p. 193.
27. J.B. Bhattacharjee, op. cit., p. 248.
 23

28. David R. Syiemlieh, op. cit., p. 217.

29. L. Ibungohal and N. Khelchandra (eds.), Cheitharol Kumbaba, (Imphal, 1989), p. 335.
30. Alexander Mackenzei, The North- East Frontier of India, (A Mittal Publication, Delhi,
2005), p. 155.
31. R. Brown, Statistical Account of Manipur, (A Mittle Publication, Delhi, 2001), p. 69.
32. Foreign Political Consultations, 28 May 1858, No. 139, McCulloch to Secy. Govt. of India,
Foreign Dept., Fort William, Munnipore, 12 Feb. 1858, MSA.
33. C E Buckland, op. cit., p. 142.
34. Judicial Department, dt., 2nd January 1858, Special Narrative, No. 1, para 24, Govt. of
Bengal, WBSA.
35. C E Buckland, op. cit., p. 142.
36. Judicial letters to C of Directors, Special Narrative, 30 Aug.-5th Sep. 1857, dt., 12th
September 1857, No. 24, para 109, Govt. of Bengal, WBSA.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., para 111.
39. C E Buckland, op. cit., p. 152.
40. Foreign Political Consultations, 28 May 1858, No.139, McCulloch, Political Agent at
Munnipore to Secretary, Government of India, Foreign Department, Fort William, No. 13, 12
February, 1858, Para 7, NAI.